Oxford Brookes University
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Place making Under Occupation: Impacts of Segregation on Buildings Rhetoric. West Bank case studies.

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Abstract

The main aim of this research is to investigate the segregation mechanism in the West Bank and its impact on the Palestinian place making practices and to understand if some could be considered as possible expressions of resilience.

The research question to be answered to was: “What are the effects of the occupation on the perception of space and place rhetoric by the Palestinians as well as on the way in which they shape their own space?”

First, this study inscribes the complex set of structures and processes that have produced today’s reality in the West Bank in the frame of settler colonial tools of domination and control. Second, it focuses on place related theories in order to understand the social implications of Israeli territorial practices of segregation on Palestinian environments. Third, it uses the resilience lens to analyse the place making tools used to adapt to and transform that reality in three case studies.

This research contributes to reducing the gap in knowledge about the role of heritage awareness and place making in resilient behaviours under colonization. Moreover, it also combines the subjects of settler colonization, place attachment and resilience, and brings another point of view to these topics, which attract scholars from various disciplines. By framing its findings within the existing literature and by pointing at some new developments based on these, this study opens the way to further research on the role of heritage, place making and resilience under occupation.

For Andrea and Nora

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ARIJ: Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (www.arij.org)
B'TSELEM: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (www.btselem.org)
DAAR: Decolonizing Architecture and Art Residency (www.decolonizing.ps)
EAPPI: Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (eappi.org)
HRC: Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (www.hebronhrc.ps)
ICOMOS: International Council on Monuments and Sites (www.icomos.org)
ISM: International Solidarity Movement (palsolidarity.org)
OCHA OPT: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs – Occupied Palestinian Territories (www.ochaopt.org)
PLO: Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
PA: Palestinian Authority
PASSIA: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (www.passia.org)
PCBS: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (www.pcbs.gov.ps)
TIPH: Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UN: United Nations (www.un.org)
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (en.unesco.org)
UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (www.unrwa.org)
UNSCOP: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
YAS: Youth Against Settlements

Glossary of Arabic and Hebrew terms

‘ayn	village spring
Al-Khalil	‘the friend’, Arabic name of Hebron town
Aliyah	Jewish immigration to the Holy Land
Dar	house and/or family residing in it
Dunam (or dunum)	unit for measuring land of Ottoman origin, 1 dunam = 1000 square meters (0.10 ha)
Fellaheen	Arabic farmers
Gurfa	room
Haganah	‘defence’, military wing of Jewish leadership in Mandate Palestine, created in 1920
Haram-al-Sharif	the Noble Sanctuary home of the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem
Homa umigdal	‘wall and tower’ fortified Jewish settlement
Hosh	quarter of extended family
Hurmah	holy or wife
Iman	religious leader
Intifada	‘shaking off’, Palestinian uprising
Irgun	nationalist extremist Jewish movement detached from Haganah in 1931
Khawabi	mud containers
Kibbutz	collective agricultural Jewish settlement
Mastabeh	living room in traditional Palestinian houses
Matruk land	land left for general public use
Mawat land	dead or undeveloped land
Miri land	state land
Moshavot	Jewish settlement in which private and cooperative property coexists
Mulk land	private land
Palmach brigades	‘shock brigades’, elite fighting force of the Haganah, Jewish underground army in Mandate Palestine
Pogrom	collective massacre of ethnic or religious group, particularly one aimed at Jews
Sahah	main square
Shabab	young men
Sheik	village/town leader
Sumud	resilience, steadfastness
Tabun	bread oven
Tanzimat	Ottoman economic, administrative, juridical, military and political reforms
Wadi	valley
Waqf land	land owned by religious foundations or used for cultural activities, protected under Islamic rule
Yeshiva	Jewish school dedicated to the study of traditional religious texts

List of interviewees

(Please note: names have been withheld to preserve anonymity)

1. Wadi Rahhal Village

Code name	Gender	Age	Date of interview
WR01	F	35	2 Feb 2015
WR02	F	37	2 Feb 2015
WR03	F	98	2 Feb 2015
WR04	M	25	5 Feb 2015
WR05	F	23	8 Feb 2015
WR06	F	41	9 Feb 2015
WR07	F	35	9 Feb 2015
WR08	F	29	9 Feb 2015
WR09	F	50	10 Feb 2015
WR10	M	23	10 Feb 2015
WR11	M	53	10 Feb 2015
WR12	F	80	10 Feb 2015
WR13	M	60	15 Feb 2015
WR14	M	25	16 Feb 2015
WR15	M	18	16 Feb 2015
WR16	M	46	16 Feb 2015
WR17	M	41	16 Feb 2015
WR18	M	51	17 Feb 2015
WR19	M	55	17 Feb 2015
WR20	F	45	19 Mar 2015

2. Battir Village

Code name	Gender	Age	Date of interview
B01	F	22	3 Apr 2016
B02	M	49	3 Apr 2016
B03	M	42	3 Apr 2016
B04	F	48	3 Apr 2016
B05	F	24	4 Apr 2016
B06	F	50	4 Apr 2016
B07	F	50	4 Apr 2016

B08	F	65	4 Apr 2016
B09	M	36	4 Apr 2016
B10	M	40	8 Apr 2016
B11	M	22	8 Apr 2016
B12	M	24	8 Apr 2016
B13	M	36	8 Apr 2016
B14	M	51	9 Apr 2016
B15	F	26	9 Apr 2016
B16	M	56	15 Apr 2016
B17	M	67	15 Apr 2016
B18	M	26	15 Apr 2016
B19	F	52	28 Apr 2016

3. Tel Rumeida Neighbourhood

Code name	Gender	Age	Date of interview
TR01	M	42	25 Feb 2015
TR02	F	69	28 Feb 2015
TR03	F	40	28 Feb 2015
TR04	M	53	28 Feb 2015
TR05	F	69	28 Feb 2015
TR06	F	26	2 Mar 2015
TR07	F	41	2 Mar 2015
TR08	M	45	2 Mar 2015
TR09	F	47	3 Mar 2015
TR10	F	32	3 Mar 2015
TR11	M	18	3 Mar 2015
TR12	M	61	4 Mar 2015
TR13	F	42	7 Mar 2015
TR14	F	42	13 Mar 2015
TR15	M	23	13 Mar 2015
TR16	M	31	13 Mar 2015
TR17	M	65	14 Mar 2015
TR18	M	43	14 Mar 2015
TR19	F	38	16 Mar 2015

Chapter 1.

Introduction

Research Background

After the Second World War, as processes of decolonisation emerged throughout the world, the creation of Israel figured as a stark counterexample (Veracini, 2018). The goal of the Zionist project was a state where all the Jews of the world could find their home: "A land without a people for a people without a land." In fact, this founding slogan of Zionism is analogous to North American, Australian, and even South African colonial stories. In this study, the Israeli experience will be analysed as a settler colonial one, therefore, as quite different from the colonialism of European expansionism in the nineteenth century.

It might be said that Israel recalls the Algerian-French experience, the main difference being that Zionists did not have a 'main' land on which they could depend or to which they could return (Pappe, 2008). Moreover, Zionists had a different attitude towards the local population. Indeed, others already inhabited the "land without a people" – namely, the Palestinians – and this became the basis for an endemic, existential conflict that lasted for approximately two decades.

After Israeli's military victory in the Six Days War of 1967, this conflict took the form of an occupation, in which the possession of material elements (such as land, borders, and resources) was its final objective. In 1967, Israel adopted a permanent 'state of emergency' in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, indefinitely suspending the law without abrogating it (Agamben, 1995). A selective system of permits, visas, and security checks, controls and limits the movement of the Palestinians and represents a shift of borders between today's Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In the West Bank, urban and territorial planning constitutes the main instrument of a complex mechanism of control (Segal and Weizman, 2003; Petti, 2007; Halper, 2009), referred to as the Architecture of Occupation (Weizman, 2007). This intricate system of different mechanisms and elements, such as checkpoints, walls, roadblocks and settlements (Weizman, 2007; Braverman, 2009), produces territorial and social fragmentation.

The 1993 Oslo Agreement further divided the territory into three different geopolitical zones (A, B and C), placing them under increasing levels of Israeli military control. Since then, the West Bank has seen a multiplication of borders and a fragmentation of the land caused by the expansion of settlement enclaves. The concepts

of ‘state of exception’ and of ‘the camp’ (Agamben, 2005) provides some interpretive clues to understanding the implications of occupation, and there are parallels to be drawn with the Bantustans of South African Apartheid system (Human Science Research Council, 2009). Similarly, ethnographers of imprisonment systems have defined these mechanisms of spatial control as constitutive of a “carceral” society (Bornstein, 2008), found also in countries like Iraq, Morocco, Spain, Cyprus and Tibet (Gold, 2000; Ewing, 2002; Bowden, 2007; Farah, 2008; Alpar Atun and Doratli, 2009). In the West Bank, these mechanisms become a system that provides and defines the means of a continuous military occupation.

The panopticon is the cornerstone of Israeli military and civilian presence throughout the West Bank (Foucault, 1977; Hannah, 1997). Settlements planning and placement, guard towers, military flying checkpoints along roads, cameras within towns, all these mechanisms transform the life of Palestinians into a continuous surveillance experience (Smith, 2011). More recently, since 2000, the Separation Barrier has been built along the West Bank with the single goal of limiting access to Israel for Palestinians. This barrier acts as a fluid border, not only a physical barrier, but also as a container of political and social rules as well as behaviours. Cutting deep into the Palestinian side of the Green Line, the Separation Barrier acts as a tool for territorial appropriation and as a solid object that dismantles landscapes and communities.

Gaps of Knowledge

Israel’s mechanisms and system of occupation in the West Bank have been extensively studied, but the Palestinian place making outside Jerusalem is still, to my knowledge, an under-explored subject. Scholarship on settler colonialism shows that the Zionist project was based on territorial issues of land appropriation, and that the key instruments of Israeli appropriation of the West Bank have always been planning and architecture. Emphasis on the Palestinian experience demonstrates that this military occupation, whereby a sense of security, of social well-being and of identity (especially linked to a place) are eroded, threatens in turn a sense of home as a safe space. Walls, fences, gates, security cameras are displayed everywhere by the Israeli occupier. They prompt the question: to what extent do these mechanisms influence the Palestinian architectural and spatial imaginary, and thereby impact on their attachment to a place and its collective memories?

Take for instance, the houses in Tel Rumeida (Hebron) that are secured from the

attacks of the ultra-orthodox Jewish settlers by iron fences and walls. Is this the result of on-going process of "colonization of the mind" (Dascal, 2009), resulting in the adoption of the coloniser's habits or, conversely, their rejection and resistance? Or, even a balance of the two positions? An analysis of Palestinian place making in different phases, since the beginning of the occupation, would explore the significance of the segregation policies for the local building traditions and perceptions. It would see if these policies have resulted in the adaptation and modification of the Palestinian sense of (architectural) culture and belonging (Memmi, 1967). To this end, this study seeks to explain the Palestinian approach to place making taking into consideration vernacular buildings and construction techniques. In the initial years after the advent of the military occupation, a construction fever spread through the West Bank and the vernacular architecture was gradually replaced by one perceived as more modern. The Palestinian labour work in Israel has been discussed for its economical and political implications (Tamari, 1981; Farsakh, 2002, 2005), but not, I contend, from the architectural perspective of the effects it has had on the "traditions" of local building.

In more recent years, since Eyal Weizman coined the term "Architecture of Occupation" (2007), scholars have started to describe the elements of this system of territorial appropriation and control and their effects on the Palestinian population and landscape (Rotbard, 2003; Bornstein, 2008; Alatout, 2009; Fields, 2010; Harker, 2010). By building on these analyses, this study seeks to elaborate on the notion and activities of resilience, in particular, its perception, impact and value as a means to interpret the choices of place making by Palestinians despite the occupation.

Exploring the Context

Placing Israeli Occupation in the Settler Colonial Framework

Historically, Zionism has been interpreted by way of its national agendas as they have been impacted by the conflict. For Israeli historians, Zionism was a nationalistic movement with a socialist twist and some liberal tendencies, which ultimately aimed to return the Jewish population to its ancient homeland. According to the Palestinian explanation, however, Zionism was a colonialist movement that assaulted the Palestinian homeland with great force, posing a threat to the whole Arab world. These histories served political narratives without providing any scholarly references (Pappe, 2008).

In the 1980s, however, a new critical Israeli historiography has challenged both these narratives. Baruch Kimmerling (1983) and Gershon Shafir (1987) shifted thinking towards a new direction, interpreting Zionism as territorial nationalism and

colonialism. Since then, several studies have been written considering settler colonialism the central paradigm from which to understand the relationship between Zionism and Palestine. Some of the current scholarship, for example the books of Lorenzo Veracini (2006), Nur Masalha (1992), Steven Salaita (2006), continue to explore the on-going occupation of the West Bank as the last surviving example of classic settler colonialism in the world. Zionism was a colonial project for it occupied a land in order to fulfil its vision of return to an ancient homeland and, in doing so, it dispossessed other people – the natives.

Segregation and Territorial Control

Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal were among the first scholars to deconstruct the relationship between politics, occupation and architecture, in their book, A Civilian Occupation (Segal and Weizman, 2003). As the title indicates, the main idea of this book is that Israeli occupation works on two sides: the civilians collaborate together with the military in order to colonise the West Bank geography (Jabareen, 2006). The book contains a number of essays covering the Israeli architectural history and spatial planning, from the Zionist immigration in the Mandate period to the early national building, up until the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967. This publication demonstrates how Zionism seized the landscape with a system of domination and control, designed by planning professionals and operated to a large degree by the Jewish civilian population.

This system has been defined by Weizman as the "Architecture of Occupation" later on in another publication (2007), which could be considered the major book filling the gap about the history of Israeli spatial occupation of Palestine. Alternatively, Yiftachel defined it as colonial "fracturing" and "entrapment" of indigenous groups; the on-going militarization and fragmentation of the territory (Yiftachel, 2006b). Hanafi called it "spacio-cide", depicting the thorough destruction of space (Hanafi, 2006). Weizman, in turn, unpacks the making of the Israeli segregation of the Palestinian population and the resultant spacio-cide of the previously Arab space. He argues that the land is made 'hollow' by militarized planning through which legalised spatial relations of control constantly attempt to facilitate Jewish colonisation, while at the same time separating the locals from the settlers. The Architecture of Occupation is equivalent to the sum of the tools designed by Israeli architects, geographers and planners. The settlements are spread on the ground as military strongpoints of settler colonisation. The Separation Barrier becomes an elastic social construct that changes trajectory according to colonial political objectives; the road infrastructure carves into

the land and enforces the separation between two populations.

Following Weizman's publication, more studies have been done on the spatial system of the Israeli occupation, describing the matrix of elements on the ground that allows Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories and, at the same time, to expand its control over the territory. Specifically, it consists of three interlocking systems: (1) military overview of air, land and border controls; (2) a physical architectural network of settlements, checkpoints, roadblocks, by-pass roads and the Separation Barrier; and (3) behind-the-scenes administrative measures of housing demolitions and land confiscations (Halper, 2000). Geographers, too, have devoted scholarly work to the topic of spatial control and segregation in the case of the West Bank and the Israeli colonisation (Newman, 2002; Gregory, 2004; Falah, 2005; Yiftachel, 2006a).

Place making and Resilience

The Israeli occupation focuses on the landscape by appropriating and colonising the territory through architectural elements. The relation of the Palestinian population to that landscape is inevitably influenced by the presence of these elements and by their function of segregation and control.

In order to understand the effects of this environment of occupation on Palestinians, the first element to be studied is their perception of it. According to theory, the perception of a place can affect the bond between this place and its inhabitants (Rollero and De Piccoli, 2010). This bond might have the characteristics of place identity, implying that the physical environment has become part of the residents' (as an individual or a community) process of self-identification. Or, this bond could be intended as place attachment in that an affective relation exists between a place and its inhabitants. The built environment, which is the source and object of place attachment, gives roots to the shared memories of a community and thereby is the product of place making.

In this study, the action of place making by the occupied Palestinians is read through the lens of resilience. Resilience is fundamentally a way of looking at things – an attitude towards life that under critical conditions may require absorption of or adaptation to the situation. Place making is the process through which a community builds and nurtures the relation between people and the environment. As such, place making is seen not only as grassroots initiative, but also as an operation of creation of a place that contains all the characteristics of a social group and of the context in which it is inserted. The feeling of attachment that residents have for their environment is

fundamental in fostering the will to produce place making activities. A strong sense of place derives from a sense of ownership, from actively participating in its production, and from the perception of its meaning and use.
In this study then, place making under occupation will be based on shared values, community memories, and a capacity for resilience.

Resilience is approached here as a lens: a way of seeing, analysing and understanding place making in the West Bank area. I suggest that applying 'resilience' as a lens in reading place making under occupation may help to design encouraging initiatives, projects, and policies for the future. Any occupied population, such as the Palestinians in the West Bank, could adopt place making policies in order to generate resilience, as a resilient attitude is necessary to decide to invest in place making under the duress provoked by military occupation and colonisation.

Main concepts applied

The paradigm of settler colonialism is the basis from which this research interprets the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The study then focuses on the concept of segregation as an accessory of settler colonialism, as a tool to isolate, control and finally deprive the indigenous of their sovereignty over the land. In the case of West Bank, a forced spatial separation of the two population groups sharing the territory, Israeli settlers and Palestinian residents, aims at limiting the interaction between the groups and at restricting the freedom of movement of the less powerful group.

Segregation and territorial control are exercised by Israel through a system of mechanisms of control that draw this research near to the framework of studies about carceral societies, another key concept utilised by this work. The West Bank inhabitants experience a graduated incarceration, carried on by a foucauldian system of apparatuses that restrict their freedom, such as guarded towers, fences, checkpoints, CCTV cameras, walled borders.

This research uses the concept of perception to describe how all these physical elements of the Architecture of Occupation affect the way in which Palestinians perceive their own landscape. The perception of a place is influenced by different cultural factors and personal experiences, and as such it can affect the bond between individuals and places. Two main concepts associated to the relationship between people and places are place identity and place attachment. Place identity is here intended as the definition of personal identity in relation to the physical environment (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983). Place attachment is the affection that people develop for an environment that inspires feelings of comfort, safety and familiarity

(Hidalgo and Hernandez, 2001).

The concept of place making, considered here as the social process made of place construction and place formation (Harvey, 1996), explains the way in which societies produce places, thus expressing their identity and character through architectural built forms.

This research goes further, however, by integrating the concept of place making with that of resilience, as a useful tool to frame the attitude of populations under prolonged occupation and segregation towards their own built environment.

Aims and Objectives

This study develops following its initial research question: what are the effects of the occupation on the perception of space and place by the Palestinians as well as on the way they shape their own space? The research question guides the subsequent definition of the research aims and objectives, which outline more into details the interest of this study, its methodology, and the different stages of enquiry and analysis. The research question bases the study in a situation of occupation and clearly locates its main interest in the built environment and the place making of the occupied population, the Palestinians in particular. In order to answer to the research question, the history of the occupation needs to be narrated with particular attention paid to the process of land acquisition and to the effects on the occupied population, until the final analysis of the Palestinians place making activities.

Aims

The main aim of this research is to investigate the mechanisms of segregation imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank, and its impact on Palestinian place making practices as possible expressions of resilience. To this end, the following seeks to analyse the perception of ‘place’ by certain Palestinians given more than fifty years of increasing presence of architecture of occupation elements. ‘Space’, which relates to the objective world perceived by way of its physical characteristics, becomes ‘place’ when enriched by the meaning and values assigned to it by human experience and histories (Tuan, 1974). Taking the architecture of occupation as its background, this research focuses on its influence on the meaning and value Palestinians’ assign to their environment.

Moreover, it explains the significance of place-identity as a concept to the occupied population under the presence of on-going settler colonization. Thereby, the following explores the effects that all the elements which constitute the occupation syntax (e.g. settlements, check points, roadblocks, fences, gates, walls, etc.) have on the

occupied population sense of place attachment.

Subsequently, this research will expand its focus by analysing the ways in which Palestinians are provoked and forced to adapt when shaping their own spaces. The place making choices of Palestinians will be analysed by way of case studies and are looked at through the lens of resilience. This way the following seeks to highlight the characteristics of absorption, adaptation or transformation of the Palestinians' creation of places.

Objectives

The study has four ultimate objectives. The first objective is to delineate the identification of the Zionist movement as a case of settler colonialism. The second is to complement this with a description of the forms and practices of segregation in the context of West Bank. The third objective concerns an in-depth study of the influence of these occupation practices on Palestinian ones in relation to the formation of place identity and place attachment. Finally, the fourth objective seeks to analyse Palestinian place making as a possible act of resilience.

Methodology

The choice to employ case studies in this research allows for preservation of the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events, especially given that this research focuses mainly on 'how' and 'why' questions (Yin, 2003). In this instance, a multiple-case design was selected since 'the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust' (Herriot and Firestone, 1983, cited in Yin, 2003, p.46).

Three localities were selected as case studies after a rigorous process of data analysis and an exploratory fieldwork in the West Bank. The first case study is the village of Wadi Rahhal in the Bethlehem Governorate, characterised by its vicinity to the Separation Barrier and the Jewish-only settlement of Efrat that erases the village's direct connection with Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Wadi Rahhal's economy used to be based on agriculture, but today most of its green land has been seized by Israel together with the water sources. After the Oslo Accords of 1992, the village land was declared area B (around 40%) and C (around 60%), which makes it complicated for the villagers to expand their built area.

The second case study selected for this research is the village of Battir, situated in the Makrour Valley, near Bethlehem. Battir is traditionally an agricultural village, strongly connected to its land and its traditions. History holds an important role in

shaping the character of the village population, as in the past there were significant occasions of direct confrontation with the Israeli occupier, when the village strategically kept its possession of the land. The village's land has been declared a 'cultural landscape' and in 2014 Unesco inscribed it on the World Heritage List. Today, this land is threatened by the construction of the Separation Barrier and of Israeli settlements.

The third case study is the urban neighbourhood of Tel Rumeida, in the city of Hebron. This case is quite specific, as here, since 1984, Israeli settlers live among Palestinian residents, with the protection of the Israeli army. This case study differs from the other two, as the Israeli settlements are built in-between the Palestinian houses and a complicated closures system controls the access and movement of Palestinians, in order to maintain a separation between the two communities. Heavily affected by segregation policies and settlers' violence, the Palestinian residents apply place making strategies as ways to protect themselves and their neighbourhood.

During the main fieldwork, that took place between 20014 and 2016, qualitative data was collected from the three chosen localities through open-ended and semi-structured interviews, group discussions, focus groups, mental maps production, observation, as well as field notes. Visual data were further collected in the form of photographs, which were taken in order to identify the studied context.

Three monographic chapters will thereby contain an analysis of this data obtained (cf. Chapters 8, 8, and 10). The subsequent analysis will not seek to compare the data collected in the three case studies (indeed, this will be much more implicit). Rather, so as to grant each case study its own integrity, they will be presented on their own terms allowing for thorough descriptions of their respective situations in the West Bank. A more detailed discussion on the research methodology can be found in Chapter 7.

Time period researched

The research relates the historical background of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank from its very beginning (the first Jewish immigration at the end of the Nineteenth century) to the recent years after the construction of the Separation Barrier (2010s).

The time period that was researched during the fieldwork data collection covers the decades after the beginning of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (1967). Depending on the participants' age, the interviews and the focus groups discussions report experiences of the 1980s (the beginning stages of the occupation), the 1990s and the effects of the Oslo Accords, the 2000s and the increasing of the

segregation system.

Significance of the Research

In a broad context, this research contributes to the literature and studies on settler colonization, segregation and place attachment. In providing information on historical and contemporary characteristics that constitute the Zionist movement as a settler colonial enterprise, it seeks to explain the ways in which Zionists have planned since the initial settlements a total occupation of land and so, how they merged (seemingly mundane) strategies of architectural and urban planning with explicit military ones. The research goes further, however, by describing the elements of the Architecture of Occupation as tools of segregation and control of the Palestinian population inside the West Bank and how they affect the physical landscape, the place making and the people (as individuals and communities), threatening their place identity and place attachment. In light of these concepts, it is important to consider which place making practises are direct consequences of the occupant behaviour and system, and which are a conscious reaction to it.

In the case of the latter, looking at these practises as a means of resilience could help frame the attitude of Palestinians towards their own built environment. This research thereby integrates the concept of place making with that of resilience in the case of protracted military occupation and colonial segregation. The historical significance of this research lies in its approach to the contemporary history of Israeli occupation in the West Bank by way of an architectural lens. The evolving architectural reality of Palestinian place making is rarely investigated and, when it is, it is done so often in connection to the demolition and destruction of landscapes and buildings by the Israeli military.

Moreover, the following research looks at the place making practises of Palestinians as expressions of resilience and resistance to the daily practices of the colonizer. In this regard, it provides an overview of the development of certain strategies that seek to increase awareness of Palestinian heritage and the need for its conservation. Vernacular architecture in Palestine, for instance, is endangered by the occupation and receives little attention due to the lack of awareness as well as of funds. The analysis provided by this study could thereby help in preventing its abandonment (both physical and epistemological) and ideally inspire further research on the topic.

Limitations of the Research

This study presents itself with many possible limitations, of which most are related to

the fact that it was conducted in an occupied territory. This required on general a high level of flexibility in the fieldwork phase so as to adapt to the uncertainty and impromptu obstacles of life in the West Bank. In fact, during the fieldwork, travel could be restricted, thereby affecting or me or the participants: scheduled interviews were often postponed or even cancelled definitively and the organization of group meetings became at times very difficult. Nonetheless, established flexibility in the collection of data in the design phase of the fieldwork helped to find new options for carrying the data collection to completion.

Another significant limitation was the fact that being in an occupied territory limits access to people, organizations, data and documents. In fact, data and statistics were scarce or, as will be better explained in Chapter Seven, sometimes it was necessary to use some data sources likely to be imprecise. However, this fact didn't limit the quality of the study as the source of data was chosen in preference over a non-controversial one.

Another possible source of limitation, especially in regards to ethics, was my role as a researcher and my relationship with the community being studied. I am a foreigner who does not speak the local language well, endeavoured to win the research participants trust and thereby challenge suspicions that my identity (as a Westerner) may always come first in my perception and research. This limitation was overcome by the fact that I had a deep personal knowledge of the territory under study and that my supervisors had years of experience in conducting research in the same or similar fields.

In addition, I undertook a phase of analysis of available methodological literature concerning the position of research (and the researcher) in conflict areas; this concerns the making of value and normative judgements. This phase was conducted in order to submit a form for ethical approval. I was thereby well-aware of the implications of doing research in a contested land and of the difficulty of conducting rigorous research in an occupied territory.

In fact, I did consider various ethical issues that concern doing fieldwork in a conflict area: such as, being foreign to both the geographical area and the society on which the research focuses; securing the privacy of the participants due to the state of military occupation of the region (therefore, the participants' names are never mentioned, even in my field notes, and they will be identified herein only by numbers); the difficulty to help the participants to avoid taking political sides or upholding a precise agenda in their answers (it is here that I will have to display the ability to perceive the complete picture and drive the interview to a more neutral zone); and, last

but not least, maintaining impartiality in order to follow a rigorous methodology during the whole process.

Structure of the Thesis

The thesis is developed by way of eleven chapters that are divided as follows:

Chapter Two introduces the first of two theoretical chapters by framing the research in the study of settler colonialism. It will, therefore, start with an overview of the theoretical framework of the concept of "colonisation". First, it explains settler colonialism as distinct from extractive colonialism and imperialism. Second, it links settler colonialism to the concept of segregation of a population and of land, using the South Africa's Apartheid as an example of a settler colony ruled by separation of the population on racial lines, which added to the dispossession of the natives and to their displacement. Third, it introduces Giorgio Agamben's theory of the state of exception (1995), as applied to the native population that is deprived of its sovereignty on the land and so starts to exist outside the system regulated by laws. The chapter, then, explores the concept of occupation, which in the case of settler colonization is exerted by a mix of military control and civilian presence. Finally, it explains what Avram Bornstein (Bornstein, 2008) means by "carceral society": the resulting collaboration of physical containments (e.g. prisons, checkpoint, walls) and social practices of control that are the basis of contemporary settler colonies.

Chapter Three continues the overview of the theories on which the theoretical framework of this study is based by introducing the concept of place and its socio-spatial implications. This chapter introduces the concept of place perception, intended as the psychological dimension of experiencing places together with the concepts of a 'sense of place' and of 'place identity'. The chapter continues with the theory of place attachment, described at first merely as possessiveness and control of the territory (Altman, 1975; Brower, 1980), then with a clearer focus on the affective aspects of territoriality (Brown, 1987). The chapter ends with the definition of the concept of resilience and its importance in recovering from traumatic experiences related also to the environment.

Chapter Four introduces the characteristics of the physical space of historic Palestine prior to 1948 as a natural and built landscape in order to contextualize the research. The chapter hence presents the ancient history of the region, with specific emphasis on the natural landscape as the context in which traditional Palestinian architecture has been inserted. More specifically, the focus of this research is the West Bank landscape. This chapter aims at illustrating the traditional architecture of the West

Bank, including then the traditional use of space. In doing so, it will describe the peasant village and the townhouse as well as their spatial and architectural characteristics, together with the social norms of traditional Palestinian society.

Chapter Five will provide a historical background to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prior to 1948, read through the lenses of territorial appropriation. This chapter explains why the possession of the land occupies such an important place in the shaping of the borders of and within Palestine. Starting from the end of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, it will describe how Palestinian society evolved in the course of the 20th century. In the period between the two World Wars, Palestine became the space of activity of the Zionist movement, whose interest lay in the creation of Eretz Israel, the Jewish state. The possession of territory, therefore, became the ultimate goal and thereby the cause for conflict between Jews and Arabs. This chapter will thus explain the reasons behind this conflict and the geographical patterns of Zionist immigration in order to show how it has influenced the Palestinian society.

Chapter Six continues the story of the territorial appropriation by Israel, focusing on the a number of key events, including: the objective of nation building after 1948; the plans for settlements after 1967; the territorial segregation after Oslo in 1992' and the introduction of the Architecture of Occupation after 2000. The settlements, integrated with the territorial planning of the occupied lands, is herein described as a method that intends to transform the landscape itself into a tool of total domination and control. The system of military mechanisms such as checkpoints, watchtowers, gates, fences, barbed wire that has been deployed over a period of decades has today become characteristic of the West Bank landscape. Moreover, this chapter explains how the concrete-built Separation Barrier embodies a reality that contains as many architectural elements as it does political ones.

Chapter Seven explains the methodology applied within this study. Starting with a section on the process of the literature review, it moves on to a detailed description of the explorative fieldwork and the selection of case studies for the main field work. It then describes the choice of methods to be utilized during the main field work, such as observation, open ended interviews, group discussions, and mental maps production, in order to collect qualitative data. The difficulties of the fieldwork are described towards the last part of the chapter, which will end with an explanation of the data analysis methods.

Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten focus on the analysis and findings related to the three selected case studies, respectively: Wadi Rahhal, Battir, and Tel Rumeida. Each chapter relates to the data collected in one case study only and is intended as a

monographic study of the situation in that locality.

Chapter Eleven, in turn, discusses the research findings by comparing the results of the analysis from the individual case study chapters in relation to the identified literature. This chapter will start with evidence of the settler colonial process as identified in the three case studies. Then, it will describe the segregation and architecture of occupation apparatuses that can also be found in the localities under study in terms of spatial segregation, restriction of movement, and permit system, and how they affect the Palestinian population. The chapter then will reconnect with the second part of the theoretical framework and introduces the importance of collective memory and place attachment in the case studies. The chapter ends with the description of place making activities by the occupied population through the lens of resilience.

Chapter Twelve, conclusively, will summarise the findings of this research and will explain them in relation to the contribution to knowledge on the subject of Palestinian life under occupation and, more in general, of place making as expression of resilience in the case of long-term military occupation and colonial segregation. While drawing attention again to some of the limitations of this research, this chapter will ultimately propose certain recommendations for further development about the role of heritage awareness and place making in resilient behaviours under colonisation.

Chapter 2.

Theoretical Framework: Settler Colonialism, Segregation and Carceral Societies

Introduction

This chapter consists of an overview of the concepts that constitute the basis of the theoretical framework of this research. The first concept explained here is the one of settler colonialism as distinct from extractive colonialism and imperialism. Settler colonialism is a form of colonialism whereby the colonisers are not simply migrating from their existing homeland to a new territory for the purposes of economic extraction and exploitation; their purpose instead is to create a new country, a new homeland, in another's place. Indeed, their primary interest is not the exploitation of raw materials and human resources of another land, but the territory itself. Upon this logic, the native population – who are rarely mentioned in the narratives of settler colonialists – are obliged to disappear through various mechanisms.

An example of a settler colony and its mechanisms is apartheid South Africa, which was ruled by the separation of the population on racial *segregation*. This had the effect of dispossessing the native population of land and economic resources, promulgating their displacement within the territory and beyond. What this chapter seeks to highlight are the ways that the settler society refuses to recognise the claims of native populations to the land such that in inevitable confrontation with them, the latter's existence is viewed as a threat to the settler society – a threat which must be dealt with through the legal and physical securitisation of the land itself.

This chapter will thereby introduce the notion of segregation that, in the case of settler colonialism, is deployed by way of military control as well as civilian presence. The set of legal and military rules established to create the physical and the immaterial boundaries that lock the native population outside and within specific areas contribute to the system of colonisation. Avram Bornstein refers to this process as the creation of a "*carceral society*", which results from the collaborative work of physical forms of containment (i.e. prisons, checkpoint, walls) and social practices of control, erecting in turn the bases of the contemporary settler colony (2008).

Settler Colonialism: A Definition

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford English Dictionary 1989), the

word “colony” comes from the Latin term, “*colonia*” (“farm” or “settlement”), in reference to the Romans who settled in other lands while maintaining their citizenship as a Roman within the Roman Empire. After defeating Cartago (146 B.C.), the Romans began to colonise North Africa which soon saw a substantial increase of southern European settlers, attracted by its fertile lands (Bentivogli, 2002). The local populations were subjected to a process of Romanisation and, in the case of colonies established along the seacoast, to the attribution of Roman citizenship. Larger colonies in the internal areas, populated by Roman settlers (“*coloni*” or farmers), retained their status as Latin colonies and therefore their partial administrative autonomy. In this respect, the colony is “a settlement in a new country” that retains its social, economic and political connections to the original State.

Ania Loomba (1998) highlights how this definition does not suggest or refer to the existence of a native population, who might have already been living in the “new country” where the colonies were to be established. Therefore, she expands the definition by describing colonialism as “the process of conquest and control of other people’s land and goods” (Loomba, 1998, p.2). Edward Said also offers a useful distinction between the categories of “imperialism”, intended as the domination of a region by a distant metropolitan centre, and “colonialism” which refers to the action of creating settlements in a far-off territory (Said, 1994). Colonialism, upon this distinction, can be viewed as a constant feature of human history: in the 2nd Century A.D., the Roman Empire expanded from Armenia to the Atlantic; similarly, Genghis Khan and the Mongols accumulated territory throughout the Middle East and China; the Ottoman Empire covered the Balkans and Asia Minor, and so on.

What makes colonialism *imperialism*, however? For Marxist scholars, the birth of imperialism is connected to the development of capitalism in Europe (Bottomore, 1983). European colonial powers, in particular, sought to extract human and natural resources from the territories that they had conquered, thereby recreating their systems of economy in new lands so as to expand and profit from new markets. Thus European colonialism endeavours to produce an economic imbalance in order to render industrial growth. The colonised territory was typically controlled by the imperial power, using bureaucratic administrators and soldiers, who were deployed in a transitory manner and replaced at the end of their contracts. Travel to colonies was often considered too dangerous for women, therefore the European colonial population consisted mostly of men (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

The colonial powers operated in different ways in order to avoid any kind of rebellion among the colonised population: some encouraged intermarriage (Portugal),

others supported the birth of an educated local elite (France), while others still preferred to rule through local traditional institutions (Britain). This extractive form of colonialism, whereby a minority of newcomers rules over a majority of natives, is well described by A.G. Hopkins in his histories of British imperialism (Hopkins, 1999). Similarly, George Balandier uses the concept of "colonial situation" to explain the domination imposed by a foreign minority on an indigenous population. He maintains that, in all colonial territories, "the subjected people, spread out in Asia, Africa and Oceania, are all of cultures called *backward*, or pre-machine" (Balandier and Cunneen, 1952, p. 1). Jürgen Osterhammel further asserts the definition of colonialism as "a relationship of domination between an indigenous majority and a minority of foreign invaders" (Osterhammel, 2005, p. 16).

The focus of this research is not this, more common, understanding of extractive colonialism, rather, I will focus on settler colonialism: including, how it consists of land appropriation, the elimination of native populations and land-property expansion by an external group. While settler colonialism begins with migration (akin to imperialist colonialism), the colonialists or 'migrants' intend to stay in the newfound territory beyond the acquisition of economic opportunities: they are, in other words, 'conquerors' enforcing a political order of their own making. As James Belich (Belich, 2009) points out in his study of New Zealand, settlers *remake* their own society by applying their own sense of sovereignty to and over the new land. In this regard, settler colonies attract a much larger population of men and women who leave their country of origin in order to settle *permanently* elsewhere. Algeria, for example, was the destination of hundreds of thousands of French families (over one million Pieds-Noir were evacuated to France at Algerian independence); Angola was also 'made' and remade under the control of thousands of Portuguese people (Adam and Moodley, 1993).

The settler colonisation process consists of two elements: territoriality and control over the land and over the people within a certain territory. Territoriality, as defined by Sack (1986), has to be intended: a territorial expression of power, related to how a group of people assert their influence or control over a geographical area. Although colonial historiographies have typically made a distinction between colonies of settlement and colonies of exploitation, the settler colonial phenomena has been placed within the same analytical frame for a long time. Patrick Wolfe's "*Settler colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology*" (Wolfe, 1992) finally divided colonial and settler colonial formations from a structural point of view. Wolfe argues that the primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself. Lorenzo Veracini (2010) goes further in explaining that land acquisition becomes the principal factor that

motivates settlement. Upon this logic, the attitude towards native populations first manifests as a potential (enslaved) labour force, as can be seen in the cases of Latin America, Algeria and South Africa, and secondly as a group to be isolated or even eliminated, as in the cases of Australia, North America and the Caribbean (Wolfe, 2011).

In fact, settlers of settler colonialism are not transitory migrants: they come to stay and, in this endeavour to hold onto the land, indigenous populations are obliged to relinquish their claim to it, if not simply vanish. Wolfe, when describing British colonisation of North America, defines the process as "logic of elimination". The settlement process thereby takes a number of steps: firstly, land appropriation through indigenous dispossession and elimination; and, secondly, the attempt to legitimate settler sovereignty over the land. The land itself remains always central to the settler society. Hence, one of the instruments that settlers use to legitimise their claim and sovereignty is the creation of myths that depict the land as *terra nullius* (i.e. barren lands), that is, a wilderness that they are destined to bring to life and productivity. The colonised are in turn conceived as something akin to phantoms that haunt the empty and vast newly discovered nature (Mbembe, 2003). They are described by the settler narratives as natural beings conducting a 'bare life', something not really human. Any crimes committed against the native population are thereby not subject to legal prosecution. In short, the indigenes are vanishing creatures, described as somehow unaware of the territory they live on; indifferent to its destiny or even ungrateful for its riches that only the settler can recognise (Veracini, 2010).

Settler colonialism initially legitimates its course of actions by attributing to itself the image of 'the civiliser' who comes to develop and improve the life of the colonised (Memmi, 1967). This kind of narrative is common in all the different types of colonisation, as Edward Said argues in his famous work *Orientalism* (1978), concerning the representation of non-Western cultures by Western imperialist states (see also Loomba, 1998). For Said, orientalism is an epistemological instrument of the colonial power who deploys the knowledge produced of orientalists for political ends. The European colonial powers base their representation of non-Europeans on the notion of "otherness", a kind of difference counterposed to the representations of "familiarity" applied to themselves (Said, 1978). In settler colonialism, the narrative may include the element of predestination that provides the settlers a written destiny of colonisation decided by some superior entity. This is starkly evident in the Zionist claim to Palestine: the land is portrayed as an ancestral homeland to which they have an inalienable right to return (Adam, 2003; Fields, 2010).

Palestine: The Settler Colonial Paradigm Applied

Among Palestinian historians (Hilal, 1976; Said, 1979; Sayegh, 2012), settler colonialism stands as an interpretive paradigm for the Zionist invasion even prior to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. These works have highlighted Zionism's colonial goal to expel Palestinians from the land in order to inhabit it instead with Jewish settlers. After the 1967 war, when Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, settler colonialism gained momentum and its political ideology became increasingly focussed, both for the settlers and, in turn, as a focus of resistance for the Palestinian national movement and the intellectual work of many scholars committed to the Palestinian cause (Salamanca et al., 2012).

In 1973, the famous text by Maxine Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial-Settler State?*, promulgated an understanding of the settler colonial perspective in western radical circles, much in line with the work of revisionist historians who contributed to establishing an awareness and understanding of the paradigm even further. The works by these so-called 'new historians' highlight Israel's pursuit of land expropriation and ethnic cleansing (Morris, 1988; Pappe, 1992), expansionism and land acquisition patterns (Kimmerling, 1983; Ram, 1993) as well as land and labour exploitation (Shafir, 1987). Following the publication of Patrick Wolfe's seminal work, *Settler Colonialism* (1999), the settler colonial paradigm gained prominence in critical and revisionist studies about Palestine (Busbridge, 2018). An increasing number of scholars (e.g. Piterberg, 2008; Shafir, 1996; Veracini, 2010, 2013, 2015; Wolfe, 1999, 2006; Falah, 2005; Yiftachel, 2006a, 2008; Nasasra et al., 2014) have countered the liberal peace paradigm, which was embodied in the 1993 Oslo two-state solution framework, by providing detailed analysis of the Zionist project as one of a settler coloniser. Scholars have focused mainly on the Palestinian context in Israel, studying the 'geopolitics of enclavisation' (Falah, 2005), the 'internal colonialism' (Zureik, 1979), and the ethnocratic policy of the Israeli state (Yiftachel, 2006a, 2008).

More recently, scholars have employed the settler colonial paradigm to discuss different aspects of the conflict: from the support given to Israel by international settler colonial entities like the United States (Chomsky and Pappe, 2015) to contradictions within Zionist discourse (Lloyd, 2012). The most recent line of scholarship applies comparative analyses to deconstruct the discourse of exceptionality that so often surrounds the conflict (Lloyd, 2012; Piterberg, 2013).

The latest developments of settler colonial studies have seen an expansion in geographical reach, as scholars begin to perceive and evaluate the coexistence of

‘settler colonies’ and ‘exploitation colonies’. Penny Edwards’ (2003) analysis of British Burma and French Cambodia, for instance, demonstrates that gendered constructions of domesticity in these colonies can be linked to settler colonial practices despite their traditional association with British and French imperialist colonialism. Alternatively, Mamdani (2009; 2012) and Gott (2007) demonstrate how settler colonialism has shaped Africa and South America, including the whole process of post-colonialism insofar as it uptakes the ‘settler’ *versus* ‘native’ binary and paradigm.

When talking about a ‘settler colonial present’, Veracini (2015) expands the boundaries of the discourse even more, rendering it a contemporary universal issue by arguing that the settler colonialism paradigm is a global mode of domination. Indeed, Scott Morgensen observes that the settler colonial phenomena is globally constitutive of liberal modernity and of the current practices of international governance (Morgensen, 2011), for example, continuing ‘land grabs’ by foreign (both Western and East Asian) governments and corporations in the developing areas of the world. The rhetoric of *terra nullius* (i.e. a land without people) prevails, and the assumption of semi-sovereign rights over vast areas land can still be identified as settler colonialism (Veracini, 2015).

In the last thirty years, conservationists have placed financial and cultural value on maintaining undeveloped (free of human intervention) ecologically-rich land (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). In underdeveloped and developing countries, the ‘experience’ of this is much the same as colonialism in that the local population is deprived by wealthy and powerful foreign entities of the benefits of their own land. For example, in 1990s Chile, acres of Patagonian rainforest were bought by an American ecologist and turned over to the Chilean state for perpetual ecological protection. Likewise, the green areas of Area C in the West Bank, declared by Israel as untouchable by the Palestinian people for ecological conservation reasons, are a further example of “green settler colonialism” (Hendlin, 2014).

Zionism: A Settler Colonial Movement

The following utilises the settler colonial model in order to explain the logic and method behind Israeli Occupation in the West Bank. The primary goal of the Zionist movement is the permanent appropriation of land and, as such, *not* the economic exploitation of its resources and its existing population. Indeed, ‘empty land’ is the founding myth of early Zionism (Stein, 2002). But, where precisely this land would be located was not considered important; Herzl himself in fact first intended to create a Jewish state in Argentina. When the opportunity arose in Palestine, however, Herzl embraced the colonial narrative and described the newborn Tel Aviv as “an outpost of

civilization against barbarism" (Herzl, 1988).

Saree Makdisi (2008) depicts the Zionist settlement in the territory of Israel as a typical case of settler colonialism. Indeed, the colonialist narratives which are central to the legitimisation and execution of Zionist programs play on the idea of a redeeming Western civilization that has located an empty territory *in need of their care*. The natives, whose existence is not deemed of any particular consequence to the outside world, become immediately 'the savage other' counterposed to the civilising settler. Zionism, Goldberg writes, contains in itself the modernising imperative according to which the land of Palestine is still in a pre-modern state and thereby in need of the Zionist's civilising effect (Goldberg, 2009). In a similar manner, when describing the context of colonialism in Algeria, Fanon (2004) points out that the very identity of the colonised is forged by the narrative of the coloniser; the coloniser in turn sees himself as giving birth or life to that territory. The Zionist picture, typified by the quote "*a land without a people for a people without a land*"[1], further confirms the need for the functional absence of a native population in the promised land (Said, 1978).

Israel, in line with the methods of settler colonisation (Lloyd, 2012), encouraged at first the creation of a dependant and subordinate Palestinian workforce (as has occurred in much of Latin America, Algeria and South Africa). It successively moved towards the total exclusion and displacement of Palestinian workers, whose labour was easily replaced by that of new immigrant workers (Rozenholc, 2010). As Wolfe (1992) notes, colonial settlers seek to systematically segregate indigenous groups from social and economic life, not unlike what once took place in Australia, North America and New Zealand. Israel expresses its settler colonial attitude in its pursuit of a permanent appropriation of the land through military and legal ways. The founder of Zionism, Theodore Herzl, was highly aware of the impact that the local population could have on the realisation of the Zionist project. Without sovereign rights, he explained, Jewish immigration would have stopped when the native population felt threatened by it (Herzl, 1988). In fact, as I will explain below, Israeli rule over Palestinian land has shifted since the 1967 occupation to an occupation model of sovereign power that intends to enclose and eventually displace the Palestinian population (Gordon, 2008).

The Settler Colonial Paradigm: A Critique

While the interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the oppression of the Palestinian people provided by the settler colonial paradigm is of great benefit to this research, there is a valid criticism. The frames of this paradigm have been developed by and large with regard to white Anglo-Saxon settler colonies (e.g. Australia, Canada,

Aotearoa/New Zealand, etc.), therefore, its application to the context of the Jewish state of Israel should be better interrogated. However, I suggest that better interrogation serves, in fact, to reveal how the paradigm still applies.

One argument, in this regard, concerns the exceptional historical status of Israel and of the Jewish national movement, a limited understanding of which is achieved if only seen through the impact that the creation of the State has had on the Palestinian population. Israel, however, was founded on and continues to rely on the settler colonial logic of conquest through which methods of displacement, dispossession and elimination of the local indigenous population (here: native Palestinians) prevails (Degani, 2016). Indeed, in the scope of settler colonial studies, the project of Zionism is not treated as a mere imitation of previous other settler colonialisms but as a raw, unrefined version with one people replacing another on the land, by means of violent acts of conquest and dispossession. The focus of these studies has primarily been Zionism's relationship with the indigenous people and how this relationship replicates the relationships characteristic of other settler-colonial projects. The research of Gordon and Ram (2016) draws a comparison of the landscapes created by the elimination of indigenous populations throughout the more accepted histories of settler colonialism (e.g. North America, Australia) with the West Bank. By comparison, the West Bank represents an 'intermediate' form of settler colonialism more similar to the colonial regimes of (then) Rhodesia and South Africa. However, the West Bank is characterised by significant contradictions, as unobstructed access to the territory itself – that is, the primary objective of settler colonialism – is never complete so long as the indigenous population remains.

Leading on from this counter-argument of exceptionalism is another which claims that colonialism is deployed for the benefit of a colonial centre, for instance, the *British* or *French* Empire who extract resources to respectively benefit the British and French State. The project of Zionism *lacks* this centre (i.e. there is not State to whom Israel itself is legally subject), *ergo* it is not colonialism. As I have already shown, however, settler colonialism is distinct from other forms of colonialism on the basis that its mode (or modes) of domination is contingent on the settlers' ability to subtract themselves from the supervisory control of a distant central authority. They perceive themselves as neither the foreign bureaucrat nor the foreign soldier; they intend to stay in the new land, presumably destined for them.

Another critique approaches the matter from quite a different angle, however. Wolfe's description of settler colonial strategies has very recently been critiqued for *essentialising* the polarity between 'the settler' and 'the native' (Svirsky and Ben Arie,

2019). Wolfe thereby seems to remove any possibility for *indigenous* agency, resistance and politics (see also Busbridge, 2018; Svirsky, 2014). According to these critics, if settler colonialism is an on-going structure aimed at the elimination of the native, then it leaves no space for strategies of decolonisation. In effect, in seeking to erase Palestinians indigenous to the land, Zionist settler colonialism has better defined them as a Palestinian people and nation, thereby giving rise to a perpetual inability to the Zionist settler colonial project. Indeed, Fanon notes that it is "the settler that brings the Native into existence" as 'the native' (1967, p. 36).

The presence (or absence) of the "indigenous other" (Veracini, 2008) creates different social, spatial and legal interactions between members of the population within the territory (Gordon and Ram, 2016). Therefore, a settler-colonial studies paradigm strictly frustrates Zionist claims of indigeneity. Zionists are not indigenous to the land: they assert a historical, that is, non-ontological relationship to it. Whereas, Palestinians identify as an indigenous peoples because they understand themselves as originating from the country; because they entertain an ontological relationship with it; and, because they are subjected to the domination of a socio-political collective which claims, on the contrary, to have a historical relationship to it (Veracini, 2018).

Decolonisation: Liberation Opportunities through the Settler-Colonial Lens

Taking into account these critiques, the question that I particularly seek to answer is the following: how can settler-colonial studies provide and facilitate a compelling interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The new wave of settler colonial scholarship has used comparative analyses to dismantle the traditional definition of the conflict in Palestine as an exceptional case, as seen especially in relation to the local context of the West Bank (Salamanca et al., 2012). Belich has described the 19th Century, as the age of the global settler revolution (2009), but the history of Zionism demonstrates that the settler revolution has lasted much longer than generally assumed. Therefore, although, as an interpretive paradigm, the settler-colonialism framework helps us to understand the Israel-Palestine conflict, I would argue that it begs a heightened focus on what *really* matters in such contexts of oppression, indeed, how to define and embrace decolonial praxis and liberation from the occupation.

Recent studies on settler colonialism bring the Israel-Palestine relationship into direct comparison with those in South Africa (Ram, 1993), Rhodesia and French-Algeria (Lloyd, 2012), as well as earlier settler colonial enterprises in North America or Australia - all places in which indigenous peoples have been violently dispossessed and forced to socio-economically, legally and politically assimilate into settler states

(Busbridge, 2018). Such comparative analyses reiterate the fact that Palestinians *are* an indigenous people and that scholarship on Palestine can thereby be aligned with indigenous studies in general. Wolfe's failure to consider Palestinians as an indigenous people and therefore the Palestinian movement as an indigenous struggle renders settler colonialism a 'zero-sum' game, leaving little to no room in turn for social and political transformation beyond mere opposition to systematic elimination. In his binary vision of the relationship between settlers and natives, Wolfe defines the *logic of elimination* as the struggle between the former (who wants to obtain the land by eliminating the native) and the latter, who can only fight back to survive (Wolfe, 2013; Busbridge, 2018). It is pertinent that, to recognise Palestinians as indigenous would connect their political claims to an international arena of movements, such as the Arab struggle for self-determination and the struggles of indigenous peoples in North America, Latin America, Oceania, and elsewhere (Hilal, 2015; Salamanca et al., 2012). Such an alignment would noticeably expand the tools of decolonisation available to Palestinians, connecting them with international informal and formal associations, social media and cross-border collaborative efforts.

For one, a settler-colonial perspective arguably strips bare the Oslo Accord's liberal approach to peace and its two-state solution as *false* promises of liberation, as it fails to acknowledge and address the root causes of Israeli settler colonisation in Palestine. A settler-colonial perspective is required instead to rethink modes and models of liberation and to identify and perhaps even to foster strategies of decolonisation (Salamanca et al., 2012). In this regard, it is important to incorporate concepts of liberation and decolonisation at the start of *any* analysis which seeks to understand local modes of indigenous decolonial struggles (Pappe, 2018). The purpose as such, here, is to offer examples or sources of inspiration for new and alternative indigenous ways of decolonising Palestine.

The Concept of Segregation

The concept of segregation is historically an accessory of colonialism in all its forms. The scientific community of the 19th Century believed in the superiority of the Caucasoid race as hierarchally distinct from the inferiority of Mongoloids and Negroids (Njoh, 2008). Therefore, racial discrimination became a direct expression of imperialist colonial policy: the civilisation of the coloniser was in some ways deemed (inevitably) superior to the 'barbarism' of colonised. This attitude materialised in the colonies through the planning and organisation of colonial space which sought principally to separate racialised groups of people. The British colonial city in the tropics, for

instance, was characterised by separate quarters for indigenous populations. Such racial segregation was developed even more systematically in apartheid South Africa, though it was present in most of the colonial world: from the colonisation of Ireland by the British to imperial India and French North Africa (Christopher, 1983). Racial spatial segregation was applied in concomitance with restrictions on the movement of indigenous populations as a mean of social control and economic subjugation of 'the native' (Njoh, 2008).

Segregation is hence one of the basic tools of settler colonial projects. Because settler colonialism is not only defined by territoriality (and extraction-based expansion), however, and demands a specific physical and spiritual relation be established by the colonists claim to the land, segregation is arguably exacerbated to the point of elimination. According to Wolfe, the settlers' claim to a particular land can only be accomplished through the elimination of the existing native population. Therefore, it is not territoriality alone, but a particular relation to the land that explains the logic of settler societies: including, their principles of organisation, the practices of everyday life and even common sense (Rifkin, 2013). Segregation is thus not merely a means to exploit an underclass of racialised people, but it is also a means to (ultimately) eliminate them (Svirsky, 2016).

Under settler colonialism, segregation becomes a tool to isolate and control an indigenous people as well as deprive them of their claim to sovereignty over the particular territory. Through this lens, Native Americans and Australian Aborigines are viewed as unwanted intruders on a desired territory; as such, they are to be displaced in isolated enclaves and kept under control. Nowadays, segregation has evolved into various forms of social and spatial isolation, of which gated communities and ghettoisation are but two examples. Various outcomes notwithstanding, at its core segregation is the forced or coerced spatial separation of differing groups within a population; a separation which seeks to limit the interactions between these groups and thereby restrict the freedom of movement of any group deemed inferior or out of place.

In Palestine, the project of Zionism seeks to prevent the development of a Jewish-Palestinian shared life in parallel with Palestinian existence within Israel's state. As such, the double elimination of shared life and indigenous life characterises this manifestation of settler colonialism. This logic and attitude is not implicit, but highly active in the Zionist makings of legal and physical architectures that constitute legitimate life (Svirsky, 2016).

What is in a Word like "Apartheid"

Referring to the Palestinian situation as one of *apartheid* is considered rather controversial in mainstream circles. And yet, as I will explain, it is precisely the term that best explains the system of rule by which the State of Israel defines and controls the Palestinian population residing in the Occupied West Bank. In settler colonialism, the expropriation of indigenous land demands one of two possible situations for the indigenous population: their exploitation as a subordinate labour force (as seen in Latin America, Algeria and South Africa) or their elimination (as seen in Australia, North America and the Caribbean) (Lloyd, 2012). Under Israeli occupation, the Palestinian population has been subject to both management and gradual elimination. Both modes of subordinating the indigenous population require the assumption of a racial hierarchy; both the prestige and the legitimacy of the settlers depend on the conviction of their superiority over the indigenous population, whether this is attributed in terms of the higher cultural or moral development or in terms of material civilisation (Memmi, 1967).

In the 19th Century, the colonial world was dominated by the British Empire which brought about a colonial attitude, later defined in Rudyard Kipling's famous poem, "The White Man's Burden" (1899). The author celebrates British colonialism as a mission of civilisation that would not exploit, but in fact *benefit* the racialised natives. Because the indigenous populations are described as inherently inferior due to their race and 'barbaric' culture, it is the coloniser's natural duty is to civilise them through a process of subjugation – a process which is read by the colonials as redemptive. Therefore, in settler colonies, the ideology of race is a crucial part of the construction of an unequal system of domination. As Wolfe explains, the colonisers feel threatened when the colonised need to share the same social space; their response is to reproduce relationships of inequality and hierarchy (Wolfe, 2016).

Such policies of racial discrimination and segregation arguably find their culmination in the system of apartheid in South Africa. The word 'apartheid' itself stems from the Afrikaner language to mean 'separation'. The most harrowing character of apartheid in South Africa was its legal institutionalisation. Based on a complex set of laws, the white minority were entitled to maintain a socially, economically and political privileged status in South Africa's society. The whole system was based on three central "pillars". First, the Population Registration Act (1950) divided the population into distinct racial groups; the racial identities of citizens could be identified by their Identity Cards, which divided them according to the groups of white, coloured, Indian and black. Second, the Group Areas Act (1950) segregated these groups into different

geographical areas, while the Bantu Homeland Citizenship Act (1970) deprived those seen to originate from black African tribes of South African citizenship (Tutu and Urbina, 2002; Hilal, 2003; Hasan, 2008). Third, the system of security laws that different groups were subjected to (Human Sciences Research Council, 2009).

Responding to the grave situation in South Africa, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (henceforth: Apartheid Convention), signed by the UN in 1973, defined the system as a crime which takes place when a specific ethnic group creates conditions that allow it to dominate on another ethnic group or to systematically oppress it. The conditions for such a system involve the negation of basic human rights, physical or psychological violence as well as inhumane or demeaning treatment (United Nations, 1973). This general definition of apartheid has been later specified in the Rome Statute (i.e. 'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court', 1998), and the crime of apartheid has been added to the list of crimes against humanity.

The three central pillars of apartheid in South Africa are evident in Israel's practices and attitudes towards the Palestinian population of the West Bank. Let's first consider the main characteristic of apartheid: the total separation of ethnic and racial groups within a population. For many scholars, the Israeli apartheid system was born in 1948 (e.g. Bishara, 2001; Pappe, 2002; Hasan, 2008) given that the refugees who fled their villages at the time were later prevented by the Absentee Property Law (1950) to return home, therefore, keeping them away from the new Jewish population (Marshall, 1995). Another act of Israeli apartheid can be seen in the unilateral separation of one group of the population from the other by the establishing of Jewish and non-Jewish identities within Israeli territory (Yiftachel, 2001, 2009; Hilal, 2003). Attributed to these identities is a dual legal system which assigns the Palestinian population to the military courts and the Israeli settlers to the civil justice, despite living in the same territory. Thus the first pillar of apartheid appears to be in consolidated through double legal standards.

The second pillar of apartheid is reflected in the fragmentation of the West Bank territory, as shown on the maps of the Oslo Agreements. Palestinian enclaves exist like islands in a sea of Israeli military controlled lands – the intention being segregation and domination. A similar goal was pursued by white South Africans with the creation of independent states for members of the non-white population, called Bantustans; these were enclaves within the territory of South Africa and were deemed totally independent of the Afrikaner nation. Thus the whites (20 per cent of the population) were able to seize 80 per cent of the land, while alleviating any legal responsibility towards members

of the black population. The form of self-government that the Oslo Accords granted the West Bank, perceived by the Palestinian political class as a step towards achieving the goal of an independent state, has in reality legally institutionalised the military system of permits, checkpoints and barriers. The second pillar of apartheid is thus entwined with the third. As segregation is rendered ever more legal ('Americans for Middle East Understanding', 2007), and more comparable to the life of Black South Africans under the Pass Laws (Carter, 2006), the more visible the separation of people is made on the ground. The Oslo Accords allowed Israel to distinguish between Palestinian and Jewish citizens of the Occupied Territories. Not only did this alleviate any legal responsibility of Israel towards Palestinians (Zreik, 2004), but it affirmed Israel as a Jewish State by keeping the majority of Israel's population Jewish (Bishara, 2001).

What is significant to the system of apartheid is that a rule of segregation is imposed by one powerful group (which is not necessarily a majority or minority of the population) over a less powerful one (Hilal, 2003). Israel has assigned to its citizens and to the occupied population a *group identity* that determines where a person can reside, to which set of legal and military rules they will be subjected as well as the policy that will be applied to them. It is thus not out of the question to view Israel's relationship to the Palestinian population of the West Bank as one of *apartheid*, a point I will further pursue by highlighting the carceral nature of Israel's practices within the territory.

Surveillance and Carceral Societies

Following 1967, the modality of the occupation in the West Bank changed from a biopolitical model, which incorporated and managed a subordinated and labouring indigenous population, to a model of sovereign power that segregates, disciplines, and eventually displaces the Palestinian people living there (Gordon, 2008).

In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) famously argues that modern society is a disciplinary one, whereby power is exercised through the management of individuals and groups via a number of public institutions (e.g. schools, prisons, etc.). As such, Foucault broadly defines modern life as characterised by surveillance, examination, and incarceration, all part and parcel of the exercise of discipline over individuals within a particular society. He provides two examples as to how discipline functions. The first concerns the management of a plague in a town which involves enclosing members of said town within guarded walls and the set-up of rudimentary systems of surveillance, identification and, in relation to the plague afflicted, isolation. The enclosed space, which facilitates surveillance and close examination of the town members who are constantly checked and categorised, constitutes a model of

disciplinary mechanism. The second example concerns the treatment of lepers, which already anticipates a division of people into categories of sickly or not, who are systematically excluded from society through deportation.

The function of discipline is to provide and affirm a particular image of normalisation. In carceral systems, individuals are driven to adhere to an image of what is normal as per the decision of a sovereign power. While normalisation usually connotes assimilation, in a colonial context it encompasses whatever is required to render life 'normal' for the colonisers. Administrative, indefinite incarceration is one such technique that has been utilised regularly by neo-colonialist powers, like the United States, as well as in other colonial contexts (Saito, 2018) such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The process of "normalisation" (which, for Foucault, corresponds to maximum productivity) progresses through spatial restrictions, time regulation, social confinement in hierarchies, and continuous public judgement. Any attempt to escape from normalisation results in a form of punishment. In settler colonial cases, indefinite detention is utilised by the settler class as part of its perceived prerogative to appropriate indigenous lands and resources, render those lands profitable, control who may or may not enter or remain within the borders of 'their' state.

The use of indefinite detention is one of the many tools of control adopted by Israel in the West Bank, and it is similar to the one used by the US for national security reasons in Guantanamo Bay as well as for the internment of Japanese American citizens during WWII. Indefinite detention is often described—and contested—as a form of exclusion from society, whereby detainees are denied the protection of penal legislation and rendered socially invisible through forced confinement. Generally characterised as "exceptional" measures necessary to protect the public from imminent threats to the national security (Van Bergen and Valentine, 2006), they constitute a condition of colonialism. As Penny Pether observes (2012), indefinite detention is regularly and effectively used to facilitate settler appropriation of land and natural resources, to ensure a readily available and easily disposable labour force and to exercise a claimed sovereign prerogative to maintain social order.

In the colonial society, the perfect mechanism of social control functions like Jeremy Bentham's panopticon, designed in the 18th Century for optimal and efficient prison surveillance. The panopticon prison is designed as an annular ring of back-lit cells surrounding a central tower, from which the actions of all prisoners are visible to a few unseen watch-guards. Moreover, inmates are highly aware that their activities are being watched, but they are unaware whether they are being watched at any one particular moment; thus they tend to regulate their own behaviour to avoid

repercussion. Discipline as such is not only enforced, but *internalised*. The "architectural apparatus" acts in this way as a machine that sustains power relations independent of people.

The settler state, founded on colonialism, requires multiple strategies of containment and surveillance in order to maintain its power. Panopticism was in fact a colonial tool, propagated by the British in colonial India (Mitchell, 1988). From there, it was transferred to Palestine, together with other material surveillance mechanisms such as identity cards, map-making and census categorisations in order to quell Arab opposition to colonial rule (Zureik, 2016). Panopticism has proven to be an effective system of population control; prison is no longer a judicial sanction but rather a form of collective social control to which everyone is subjected as a preventive measure. Yet to be developed in Bentham's time, the prison panopticon manifests in 20th Century systems of security such as the CCTV camera. The use of panopticism becomes evident in the case of occupied territory, in which the occupier needs to watch and control the actions of an occupied population (Hannah, 1997).

The prison analogy recurs often in Palestinian experiences of living in the West Bank. Many describe the Israeli policies and means of control applied in the occupied territory in carceral terms, drawn from the reality of imprisonment that many Palestinians (especially, men) have experienced at least once in their life. The system of graduated incarceration (Smith, 2011) that pervades the West Bank is made of a series of apparatus that restrict and complicate the life of local Palestinians. This prison analogy is further realised by architectural elements that affect the landscape and the built environment: indeed, this regime of confinement, as described by Avram Bornstein (2008), has grown since 1967 and today is comprised of checkpoints, fences and walls that encircle entire towns and villages, creating a diffused geography of *enclavisation*, similar to Bowman's "encystations" (2007). The Palestinians who live in the West Bank therefore perceive their land as a prison, in which they are walled and caged.

Additionally, as seen in the Foucauldian analysis, the prison analogy and its reliance on the metaphor of walled borders (which are so often invoked in contemporary politics) do not operate only through such physical exclusion. Constituted by a complex system of guarded towers, fences, checkpoints and CCTV cameras, the West Bank as a prison operates through hierarchical systems of surveillance and strict observation. In the case of the Western Sahara wall, built by Morocco, the walled border is the limit between the land of order and the space of suspended sovereignty, that is, the state of exception. The Saharawi confined in refugee camps outside the

border zone are excluded from the right to their disputed land. Similarly, in occupied Baghdad, the US Army has built walls to keep the Sunni neighbourhoods (like Adhamiya and Azamya) isolated from the sectarian violence that reigns in the urban space, thereby selecting the population and creating religion-based gated communities. The “barrier” as opposed to the “border”, as argued by Weizman (2007), contains in itself a double semiotics for it functions as a military technology and as the sum of social and political practices, which control and discipline groups and individuals. As Foucault argues, “architecture is not simply an element in space, but a plunge into a field of social relations in which it brings about some specific effects” (1984, p. 252). Thus Ozguc (2010) points out that the panopticon should be looked at as something more than an architecture tool of confinement, but as a co-presence of different modalities of power.

Walls as part of the security system of a sovereign society function as *spatialising agents*: that is to say, they contain social and political values that are simultaneously space-forming and space-contingent (Ozguc, 2010). In this way, the space resulting from the existence of walls is a social, political and ideological construct, typical of that society (Soja, 1980; Lefebvre, 1991). Walls, in the context of the carceral society, can be read as panoptic tools which endeavour to erase certainties. Uncertainty and unpredictability as guiding principles of borders that can be closed at any time without notice, or trespassing could be refused on changing motivations. As Yehouda Shenhav and Yael Berda (2009) note, the effectiveness of such apparatus is based not on rationalised rules of conduct, but on its unpredictable and uncertain usage.
In the frame of settler colonialism, walled barriers act simultaneously as instruments of separation, occupation and of territorial expansion (Brown, 2010). The walls around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, for instance, impede African immigration into Europe; the fence that cuts into the Western Sahara region secures disputed land onto the Moroccan side, leaving the Saharawi displaced population in temporary camps on the other side; the U.S. barrier in the Nevada desert is designed to stop illegal migration and smuggling of drugs, but at the same time it creates a barrier between richer and poorer areas of the world. While it maintains its own unique characteristics, this research considers the Israeli Separation Barrier as similar to all these cases. At times, it circles Israeli settlements for security reasons, not unlike the gated communities of the United States, though these lands are enclaves on a foreign territory more alike Ceuta and Melilla in the Moroccan desert. Additionally, it segregates Palestinian communities from each other and from their own lands in a similar manner to the case of occupied Kashmir wherein India has put in place barbed wire and minefields. None of these walls

have the pretence of permanence; they are built as temporary defences in a state of emergency engendered by what the population in power perceive as a break in the normal order of things (Agamben, 2005). Due to their existence as "*suspended political solution*" (Azoulay and Ophir, 2005, p. 22), they tend to fuel a diffused sense of violence and a continuous state of exception.

In conclusion, carceral societies and carceral studies could be applied effectively to studies of settler colonialism. Firstly, the settler colonial built environment successfully recalls carceral environments. Wolfe describes indigenous bodies being incarcerated in the settlers' strive to eliminate the indigenous people. As such, all colonial buildings made of interlocking spaces could be considered as part and parcel of such a system: prisons, reserves, residential schools in Canada, sanatoriums for TB patients, canneries for indigenous workers, and other spaces alike are all constructed for the same purpose, namely, to restrict the indigenous freedom of access to the land and to maintain relationships with other indigenous nations. Incarceration in this context can also be considered a design intended to separate indigenous peoples from the settler society, and from each other as well. Secondly, the more immaterial instruments used to control a population in the carceral society - CCTV cameras, border controls, administrative incarcerations and walled borders - have the same effect of control and segregation of the subjected population typical of settler colonisation. The West Bank is a laboratory where the instruments of carcerality and settler colonialism together contribute to the Israeli goal of weakening and eliminating the native Palestinian community.

Notes

[1] While in his seminal book "The Question of Palestine" (1980) Edward Said erroneously attributes this slogan to the British writer Israel Zangwill, it was actually coined in 1843 by a Christian Evangelical clergyman (Muir, 2008).

Chapter 3.

Theoretical framework: Place Attachment and Resilience

Introduction

In what follows, I will introduce the broader socio-spatial implications of place in order to understand the significance of built places in relation to Palestinian life under occupation. My analysis will begin with the seemingly basic concept of perception and, specifically, what it means to perceive a place. Perception is a process influenced a number of cultural factors, including personal experience and development as well as imagination and memory (Lowenthal, 1961). The perception of a place affects the bonds established between an individual and that place (Brown, Perkins and Brown, 2003; Rollero and De Piccoli, 2010). The two bonds that will be investigated here are place identity (Proshansky, 1978; Lalli, 1992; Oktay, 2002; Soltani, Zangiabadi and Nastaran, 2013) and place attachment (Altman and Low, 1992; Hummon, 1992; Giuliani, 2003; Lewicka, 2005; Zenker and Rütter, 2014).

Place identity, a term I take from the research of Proshansky, concerns the relationship between architecture, the environment, the landscape and identification (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983). For instance, built artefacts which are physically and historically rooted to a specific place provide human memories with a defined location. In so doing, they can generate a 'collective memory' of place whereby the history of a social group, consisting of customs and significant events, are linked to particular built environments (Rossi, 1966). Place attachment concerns a certain affection that people develop in relation to the environment insofar as it inspires feelings of comfort, safety and familiarity (Hidalgo and Hernández, 2001). Connected to these concepts, and key to my study, is the concept and activity of place making, which will be reflected upon here as the social process made of place construction and place formation (Harvey, 1996).

Last but not least, I will introduce the notion of resilience in relation to Palestinian place making activities, with its characteristics of absorption, adaptation to and transformation of a critical environment. The notion of resilience in this research and the cases it will discuss concerns more than 'coping to survive' as Palestinians confront structures of occupation. What I will draw out is how the Palestinian understanding of steadfastness (sumud) is orientated around not only enduring the difficult reality, but also moving forward towards a possible liberated future.

The Perception of Space and the Environment

Rationalism asserts that reason and mental perception, rather than physical senses and experience, are the basis of knowledge and self. Empiricism, alternatively, contends that sense-based experience is our primary source of knowledge. Disagreeing with both dominant schools of thought, Merleau-Ponty is a proponent for phenomenology as the study of experience and what is essential to experience of the world in which we live; integral to his study is the structure of perception and consciousness (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Building on the work of Edmund Husserl, considered in many ways the father of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty notes how experience and perception can only be understood when grounded in concrete experience. Indeed, fundamental to phenomenology is the notion of lived experience, indeed, the rather intuitive idea that we, as conscious beings, incorporate and transform experienced phenomena (e.g. events, objects, emotions) into meaning which inevitably informs our thinking, language and activities that occur in everyday life, engendering a 'lifeworld.'

Phenomenology endeavours to explain the structures of individual perception. In relation to place, it must take into consideration the sensory qualities of light, sound, texture, colour and perspective (Perez de Vega, 2010). But, this begs the question of the extent to which one can remove himself from lived experience in order to understand what underpins it. It was Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), seeking to go beyond Husserl's original focus on perception, who thereby proclaimed a need to focus on the question of being. For Heidegger, human beings are inseparable from the world in which they live and exist, therefore, experience is always already situated in a world and in ways of being in that world (Heidegger, 1962). Thus, describing experience and thereby perception properly entails understanding the being for whom such a description matters: a being-there (Dasein).

On this basis, two levels of experience can be identified: sensation and perception. In his classic book, The Primary World of Senses, Erwin Straus establishes the fundamental distinction between the two: sensation relates to the physical experience of the senses whereas perception relates to mental experiences (Straus, 1963). While sensation concerns corporeality, being based on the use of senses to implicitly record reality, perception concerns the mental grasp of that reality in both rational and personal terms. Perception is a process strongly influenced by cultural factors, such as personal experience, learning processes, imagination, and memory, all of which shape one's or a group's lifeworld (Lowenthal, 1961). Humans do not merely observe, but perceive their environment, organising what they observe into coherent

patterns, thereby aligning images, expectations and meanings as they relate back to the environment (O'Riordan, 1976).

Phenomenology has been taken up in relation to the field of architecture most prominently by theorists such as Christian Norberg-Schulz and Alberto Perez-Gomez (see: Norberg-Schulz, 1980; Pérez-Gómez, 1998). The former, in his text Genius Loci, defines perception as a function of the built form that promotes an experience that is not only physical, but also immaterial through observation (Norberg-Schulz, 1980). Perception could then help to understand the meaning of a built environment for its inhabitants, both as individual perception and as common shared cultural meanings (Auret, 2018). Perez-Gomez, who belongs to a second generation of architectural theorists born after WWII, describes architecture not only as an aesthetic project, but also as speaking to people through perception, connecting to human consciousness and thereby orienting the lives of the inhabitants (Pérez-Gómez, 2015). Not unlike these two thinkers, I intend to understand the identification of place as fundamental to the human lifeworld and to our perceptions of architecture. From a phenomenological perspective then, place is defined as "any environmental locus that draws human experiences, actions, and meanings together spatially and temporally" (Seamon, 2013), such as a room or a neighborhood, a town, city, or a geographical region.

Theories of Place

Martin Heidegger was highly influential on the work and writings of humanistic geographers who developed the notion of place in the 1970s. In his treatise Building, Dwelling, Thinking (1971), Heidegger explores the relation between architecture, environment, landscape and identification with place. According to his study of the etymology of the German words buan (meaning both building and dwelling at the same time) and its close association to bin (to be), building and dwelling can be identified with being. Identity is therefore related to space, and dwelling is the way in which people exist on the planet, as man is insofar as he dwells (Heidegger, 1977). As such, Heidegger endeavours to make a distinction between the rather abstract continuous space of 'the landscape' from the bounded space in which people actually live. By way of dwelling, people can identify and create their existential space inside and despite the generic context around them. In this way, place encourages such mental activity as imagination, memory, emotions and associations (Sharr, 2007).

In a similar vein, but reflecting instead on urban landscapes, Aldo Rossi (1966) explains the importance of collective memory in defining significant urban artefacts: for instance, the Empire State building in New York or the Eiffel Tower in Paris. Because

such built artefacts are physical and historically rooted to a specific place, they are set as important backdrops to our memories. Global cities aside, the power of vernacular architecture in evoking a particular way of life also provides an emblematic example of this condition. Collective memory is enabled as the result of a social group's history, consisting of customs and significant historical events (Halbwachs, 1950). Palestinians are, therefore, very often able to recall the common act of building new houses, which involves the whole community and requires shared knowledge for its success. In what follows, I will provide a more detailed explanation of various theoretical perspectives on place, including that of critical humanistic geography from which I will draw on the concepts of place attachment and place identity.

Distinguishing between Space and Place: Critical Humanistic Geography

During the 1970s, building upon and shifting away from phenomenological discourse, human geography began to distinguish between the notion of place and space. Space, a central concept to geography, was deemed a distinct and imminent entity that surrounds individuals and groups. When space is endowed with human meaning, however, it becomes place. Space can be organised into places, thereby defined by some as "territories of meaning" (Holt-Jensen, 1999, p. 224); that is, as spaces endorsed with specific meaning (Relph, 1976; Tuan, 1977; Altman and Low, 1992). For this reason, place became core to the study of human geography, as it focuses on the ways in which the natural environment and the built environment shape the individual through the filter of experience and perception. Human experience is inevitably defined by place and human activity can in turn shape a place according to emotions, ideas, memories, values and preferences. A specific place identity thereby emerges through this process of affectivity and affect (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983).

The notion of genius loci (i.e. the spirit of the place), as proposed by Norberg-Schulz, refers to what is locally specific: the sum of all the physical and symbolic values in a particular environment, which ultimately correspond to the sense people have and attribute to a specific place (Jiven and Larkham, 2003). The role of the built environment in the creation of a sense of place is described in various theories of place with emphasis on its role at a local level (see: Jacobs, 1961; Lynch, 1962, 1970; Alexander, Ishikawa and Silverstein, 1968; Knox, 2011). Place is conceptualised as a particular location that has acquired a set of meanings (Cresswell, 2009). Place identity is thereby linked to the cultural practices of communities that produce the built world in which they live and to place making as the experiences made manifest in producing place (Jiven and Larkham, 2003).

Yi-Fu Tuan (1980) and Edward Relph (1976) define place identity in the frame of humanistic geography by characterising it with five central functions: recognition, meaning, expressive-requirement, mediating change, and anxiety and defence function. Relph (1974), in particular, identifies two opposite lived relationships with place: "insideness" and "outsideness". Insideness refers to feelings of security and comfort, to being at ease in a particular place whereas outsideness refers to a sense of separation and discomfort in relation to as well as alienation from a place. These are not mutually distinct experiences, as Relph believes, in an outsideness-insideness continuum whereby several modes of place experience can take place at once or in relation to different variables of that place.

Place identity as such concerns the meaning and significance that places have for inhabitants and users, described as the sum of memories, interpretations, ideas, and related feelings about the specific setting or different types of settings (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983). The environmental past of a person is made of elements of all the places that they have inhabited, and then can be used to approach other settings. Place identity is not distinct from but incorporated into self-identity (Hauge, 2007). The individual perception of artefacts is nonetheless significantly affected by contemporary global cultures and preferences (Rossi, 1966).

Post-modernism and Place

Most human geographers would agree that, in our globalised world, the relation between the place or places in which we live, our cultural activities, experiences and identities have been transformed. Globalisation, including the mass flux of people, goods and ideas that circulate nearly everywhere, change our relationship to place and other within that place. Due to this, a more critical approach to the distinction between space and place emerged in the 1980s by human geographers inspired by both the belief system of humanism and by contemporary interpretations of Marxism, feminism, and post-structuralism. Many began to argue that being a product of social processes, the notion of place cannot be construed as either natural or authentic. Our place attachments are in fact constituted through certain social conditions, influenced heavily by the dictate of certain power structures.

Most prominently, David Harvey affirms that place (not unlike time) is a social construct (Harvey, 1993) and thereby focuses on the social and political processes that construct it. Upon his critical view, place is today used in a rather regressive and reactionary way; this can be shown by the rise of gated communities everywhere, which justify their means of exclusion on the basis of place-based definitions of community

(as today is visible in the nationalist turn of many European countries). Alternatively, the anthropologist Marc Augé takes a slightly different angle in his careful observations of the relation between people and place. Augé analyses how certain spatial transformations shape new dynamics between local and global dimensions as well as between places and individuals. Of particular interest here is his theory of "non-places" (Augé, 1995).

Augé argues that a sense of place, which is produced through the interaction of a society and an intact soil, is receding in importance and is being replaced by 'non-places', such as, motorways, airports, shopping centres, and industrial parks. These built environments do not have any specific identity or even a specific relation to its surroundings; they function more or less as transit spaces for (non-specific) individuals. Within non-places, individuals are no longer defined by their identity, but in relation to the role and actions they perform there. In the non-places, the people merely interpret a role, which can be that of the consumer, of the tourist, the traveller or the spectator, based on the place or situation in which they are; but, in any of these cases, they are not asked for either their participation or particular mode of interaction. In this regard, Augé juxtaposes the non-place to the anthropologic space of traditional humanist conception, which represents the identity of those whom inhabit them, tell a common history, and support relationships according to a shared belonging. Non-places appear symptomatic of modern life.

As Augé observes, non-places are spaces in which one feels neither at home nor welcome in any way; they are above all else spaces wherein the individuality of the person and of encounters between people are imposed upon by a public rationality. Though they are spaces that in a sense belong to nobody, they are not neutral places, but expressions of a designed order, indeed, of a ratio that is promoted by certain public and powerful institutions. On this point, Augé notes how access to non-places often requires verification of personal identity even though the environment suggests anonymity (1995, p.102). Rather, it seems to be that the user of the non-place needs to prove his identity in order to prove his innocence. A non-place is interstitial, without inherent character, defined precisely by the quality that it affords to some: a smooth transition between one place and another.

The militarised spaces of the West Bank under Israeli occupation can be interpreted as non-places: indeed, many of them are checkpoints, border areas, controlled gates, military areas; all are quintessential to the make-up of the Palestinian experience of the region and occupation. Checkpoints, borders, gates are non-places that continually reinforce the transience of the Palestinian experience as well as its

individual and collective vulnerability. Checkpoints are not officially established Palestinian spaces, since they are controlled by the Israeli Army, but Israel neither acknowledge legal responsibility for these checkpoints nor do they recognize them as 'sovereign' spaces (Tawil-Souri, 2010). As such, they function as both non-places and as mechanisms of control (Weizman, 2007).

On top of this, it is important to remember that non-places are characterised by lack of attachment, constant circulation, communication and consumption; they act against developing direct relationships and bonds between people and the world. Without the ability to establish relationships and bonds in relation to a place and with others in that place, the transmission and development of a community's collective memory between generations – which is fundamental to the identity of an individual and group – is suspended. This research considers that people's lives develop in environments composed of buildings and structures that represent the collective identity, memory and culture (Zaprianov, 2012), real world locations expressing a various array of characteristics belonging to non-place and places.

A Global Sense of Place

The criticism of place as too fixed and bounded of a concept, rooted in some nostalgia of a distant past, arises from human geographers as well. Among them, Doreen Massey argues that these fixed places became the locus of exclusionary practices. She describes place as actively constituted by mobility, and especially, of particular interest for this research, movement of people and ideas. According to Massey, place is neither bound or rooted to a single location, nor is it connected to a homogeneous sense of identity, rather, place is the production of interrelations, embedded in practices of material engagement (Massey, 2005).

Without rejecting classical approaches to place, such as that of Tuan (1977), Massey explicitly analyses space and place as social and material constructs. They are first and foremost the products of spatialised relations; in motion then, as we often are in this highly globalised world, "you are not just travelling, through space or across it, you are altering it a little" (Massey, 2005, p. 118). Massey's insistence on the central role of relations in the construction of place considers place as deeply interconnected, but also as different from one another and hence as unique (Castree, 2003). To this end, she proposes "a notion of place where specificity (local uniqueness, a sense of place) derives not from some mythical internal root nor from a history of relative isolation – now to be disrupted by globalization - but precisely from the absolute particularity of the mixture of influences found there" (Massey, 1999, p. 22; cited in Castree et al.,

2006, p. 310). Different terms define her conception of place, including, global, progressive or extrovert. Each proffers a sense of place in which the connections between a particular locality and the wider world are central, thereby erasing the pre-existing categories of inside and outside; the uniqueness of a place is thus defined by the nature of its interactions to other places.

More importantly, Massey notes how place can become a source of conflict; this is because the existence of place always already involves us, whether we like it or not, in the life of the others (Massey, 2005). Conflict thereby arises as a result of differences, fraught encounters over place making practices and imaginations of a place – both require constant negotiation. It is this negotiation that lies at the heart of the material and social production of place and can result from alterations in the individuals or groups who inhabit various places. Along this line of thought, it is clear to see that in Occupied Palestine Israeli settlers and Palestinian inhabitants have different expectations and aspirations in regards to place production. The process of negotiation in this context, however, has yet to officially start; the case in fact represents how negotiation can be undermined when a more powerful side decides to impose change over and in spite of others who inhabit the same locale.

Place Attachment

The identity of a place is linked to individual cognition, which depends on the characteristics of the physical environment as well as on the social features associated to it and on the individual's capacity to adapt to it (Giuliani, 2003). Therefore, our built environment is shaped by us and shapes us in turn. We attach meanings to it (via perception) and in return it guides our lives (Nivala, 1996). In fact, the built environment in which we live is an integral part of our existence. This point, that the built environment is not only scenery, but has historic, cultural or social meaning, can be explained by associating it to the broader concept of place. The lived experience of space is elaborated through our personal experience, and it evolves with our ageing and maturing (Lowenthal, 1961).

A 'sense of place' refers to the more nebulous meanings associated with place: indeed, the feelings and emotions a place evokes. These meanings can be individual and based on personal biography or they can be shared. A collective sense of place is based on mediation and representation upon the encounter of materiality, meaning, and practice. To understand the implications of 'a sense of place,' a useful prompt is Spinoza's notion of affect. As he explains, affects connote the unity of perception and sensation; in a nutshell, affects are states of mind and body which are related to feelings

and emotions (Spinoza, 1994). The affective bonds that people develop in relation to place are in part to do with the capacity for a place to permit control and provide opportunities for privacy, security and serenity (Altman and Low, 1992). In conditions like the one of occupied West Bank, these bonds are threatened due to the Israeli occupation and the way it regulates and limits the use of the territory by the occupied population.

The concept of an affective bond with place furthermore concerns the notion of place identity given that self-identity is defined by the cognition of the physical world in which one lives (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983). In that case, the surroundings become part of the extended-self of the individual, not only by satisfying objective needs, but by triggering positive emotions (Belk, 1992). Throughout life, people create memories within a place and build attachment to it. Through one's personal connection to a place, they gain a sense of belonging and purpose, which then provides significance and meaning to life (Altman and Low, 1992). Fried's study (1963) on the psychological effects of forced dislocation, during programmes of urban renovation in the West End of Boston, is particularly salient. Fried affirms that people's spatial identity and group identity incurred damage as a result, for familiar structures and social settings were lost, thereby severing their affective bonds (Giuliani, 2003). Fried notes how grief, typically attributed to the death of a loved one, can also emerge upon the loss of an important place.

The notion of place attachment further emerges in relation to what Tuan calls topophilia (1974) which endeavours to detail the affective aspects of the human relationship with geographic space. The concept of topophilia helps to define exactly what place is: geographic spaces charged with emotional significance by human experience. Tuan argues that this bond with a specific place varies from individual to individual and that it is related to culture and aesthetic attitudes. In fact, place attachment is a complex phenomenon that incorporates the many aspects of the people-place relationship. Memories, feelings of ownership, pride of creation, are all relations that could trigger attachment to a place. Nominally, it consists of a bonding that involves affect and emotions, knowledge and beliefs, and behaviours and actions in reference to a place (Altman and Low, 1992; Chow and Healey, 2008). Place attachment has been defined as the affective link between people and a specific environment, involving feelings of comfort, safety, and home (Hidalgo and Hernández, 2001). Therefore, attachment to place is considered a fundamental need (Relph, 1976), and as such it is part of human territoriality, defined as the relationship between humans and a particular physical setting (Brower, 1980).

Control over territory, in particular, is an important aspect of place attachment – not only to this research – but because it can be viewed as a purpose-oriented behaviour typical of settler societies and military occupation. This control is expressed in occupied lands by attempts to control the appearance of the place, thereby exercising what has been defined as an "appropriation of space" (Brower, 1980). The Zionist movement in Palestine, as has been shown, expresses a strong feeling of possessiveness towards the land for it associates it to a particular self-image and collective narrative. Indeed, while place attachment arises out of an actual experience of that place (Brown, 1987), it can also be triggered by symbolic associations (Low, 1992), for instance, as between the Zionist people and the 'promised' land. Such symbolic bonds established between a people and a particular territory can be intensified by the personalisation of the territory.

Place attachment has its opposite, what Tuan calls, topophobia: the repulsion for a place (1980). These can be places that are perceived as dangerous or threatening, but also those places that are deemed uncomfortable or different from what one finds familiar. Places of conflict or of imprisonment, saturated with feelings of despair and danger, are prime examples. Even the domestic space, usually idealised as a place of privacy, security and serenity (Giuliani, 2003), could provide a good example depending on who one asks. Feminists have argued, for instance, that the domestic space can be an oppressive, confining and even terrifying place for many people, especially for those who suffer domestic abuse (Rose, 1993; Marlin and Mohanty, 1986). Therefore, Tuan's view of home as a place were we feel safe when the outside world is insecure and we can be ourselves and comfortable, as in the definition of "being completely at home" (Tuan, 1980) is questionable.

Place Making: The Production of Place

The meaning of place is closely tied to the production of place; how might we define this production, however? Aldo Rossi (1966) defines locus as the singular yet universal relation that exists between a specific local situation and the buildings present. In 1975, George Andrews used the term "place making" to describe the founding of settlements by the ancient Maya (Andrews, 1975). In the following year, Edward Relph used the term "unselfconscious place-making" to describe the vernacular practices of making a place by adapting it to a particular site specific social, physical, aesthetic and spiritual needs of a group of people (Relph, 1976). The creation of a vernacular architecture and society participation in this creation (Alexander, 1979) is often perceived as fundamental to place making.

Vernacular architecture can refer to, on the one hand, historically-situated

traditional designs within a particular region (Rapoport, 1969, 2006; Quiney, 1990). On the other hand, ‘vernacular’ could refer to who is doing the building and within this, it must be considered whether vernacular can be applied to both present and future inhabitants (Oliver, 1997; Vellinga, 2011). It is my contention that vernacular architecture is something of a mix of all the above: it is the product of a people whose culture or historical traditions influence the built environment; it is fundamentally linked to the social, economic and environmental context of a past and existing community. Following this definition, place making can be considered the union of the context and the built form produced by it (Stea and Turan, 1993). In line with this, place making can be described as a self-conscious act, performed through thoughtful design (Relph, 1976). To belong and to feel attached is a physical experience that largely depends on proximity, size and aesthetics (Al-Sabouni, 2017). A caring built environment is capable of acting like a ‘womb’ for its inhabitants; an environment that can remind them of what matters to them, and embrace their shared living. Place making activities can therefore strengthen this experience if they are shared within the community.

Since the 1990s, architects, planners and politicians alike have considered the practice of place making in reference to a community-based approach to planning and urban design. Take for instance, Lynda Schneekloth and Robert Shible definition of place making as “the way all of us as human beings transform the places in which we find ourselves into places in which we live” (1995, p. 1). As such, place making involves the modification or the destruction of a place, through numerous and various actions, including, construction and deconstruction as well as the cultivation of land, which involves the cutting of trees, the planting of gardens, and the opening of new roads. There is no doubt that today the term ‘place making’ is used in various contexts as a means to signal ‘authenticity’ and ‘quality’ in building projects. But, making a place is not the same as constructing a building. Place making is more about the shared process and the production of a place that serves people as a vital community resource. Place making would thereby entail a sense of belonging, attachment and of responsibility for a place insofar as the place plays a key role in identity creation and maintenance. As Norberg-Schulz declares, “architecture and man-made landscape are not superfluous, for human life requires a system of places that have structure and form and meaning” (Norberg-Schulz, 1969, p. 226).

As societies grow and change, places are received, made and re-made (Harvey, 1996). Although Harvey does not use the term place making, he calls “place production” the social process of place construction and place formation. By way of

place production, a society expresses its sense of permanence, which is limited nonetheless insofar as it is subject to mutation, extinction and replacement. Permanence begets a sense of belonging. As such, this idea of 'place making' contains both the Lefebvrian definition of space as socially produced, and the characteristic of 'making' and potential transformation (Svašek and Komarova, 2018). In this way, place can be used as an "interpretative frame through which people measure their lives, evaluate others, take political positions, and just make sense" (Gieryn, 2000, p. 467).

Although place making refers now mostly to community-based design of small urban spaces (Relph, 2016), I propose to build upon a more intimate sense of place, after Relph, which renders place making a question of "how distinctive places are made" (Relph, 1976, pp. 67–78), and upon a more community-based sense of making (or production), after Harvey (1996), whereby making is an expression of a society and its sense of belonging. Thus I will apply this notion of place making to those actions undertaken by Palestinians to preserve and maintain a Palestinian identity in my three case studies. In these case studies, it will be shown how place making itself can be symbolic to a community for its ability to strengthen self-esteem under duress or occupation. As in the case of Palestine, place making expresses collective accomplishments in the form of historical buildings, attractive cities, historic sites, all of which have survived a history of occupation. A certain pride is taken in these environments and so, the Palestinian residents strive to maintain the aesthetics and place-bound symbols of a region (Al-Sabouni, 2016); this process of preservation is particularly salient, I would add, in conflict or crisis situations.

Defining Resilience

Place making in the context of occupied Palestinian is inevitably accompanied by resilience; in fact, I would argue that place making constitutes an act of resilience. Of Latin origin, the verb resilire (formed by the prefix re- and the verb salire) means to bounce back as well as to contract, to shrink (Glare, 1980); in a figurative sense, it means not to be touched by something negative. Scientifically-speaking, the term 'resilience' has a long history of multiple, interconnected meanings in ecology, psychology, anthropology, art, literature, law, science and engineering (Alexander, 2013). Moreover, in the fields of development and humanitarianism, it serves as a measurement of the well-being and livelihoods of communities and societies in contexts of crises, such as natural disasters, climate change, or armed conflicts (Interpeace, 2016). More specifically, following the guidance of Framework for Assessing Resilience programme developed by the United Nations, I will employ the definition of

resilience in relation to the diverse responses that enable individuals, communities, institutions, and societies to deal peacefully with the impact of crisis, conflict and violence (Interpeace, 2016).

More often than not, resilience is used in a context of physics to denote the characteristics of a material to resist stress, solicitations or crashes and to subsequently return to its original shape or position. In the human and social sciences, the concept of resilience has a more recent history, however. In 1973, Holling brought to prominence the notion of resilience in relation to systems theory and ecology, providing the basis for its use in the social sciences (Holling, 1973; Adger, 2000). Resilience was then gradually used to analyse interactions between humans and the environment (Janssen et al., 2006). The Resilience Alliance was formed in 1999 so as to develop an interdisciplinary approach to resilience in the humanitarian sector defining some core concepts (Janssen et al., 2006). Today, definitions of resilience might indicate the process, as the evolution and the interaction of different levels of risk and protection, or the outcome as the physic and psychic condition untouched by difficulties (Kaplan, 1999).

Resilience, both as an outcome and as a process, presupposes two elements: the risk factors and adaptation (Malaguti, 2005). The former refers to the variables present at each systemic level (i.e. person, family, community, society) able to predict subsequent problems. The latter is a little more complex, however. Indeed, Fergus and Zimmerman (2005) argue that adaptation and resilience have two different meanings. To explain the adaptation, recourse is made to the protection factors present at each systemic level (i.e. person, family, community, society), which are able to offset the effect of risk factors. In all cases, resilience is a dynamic element, subject to change in the circumstances in which the person plays an active role (Rutter, 1985, 1987). Adopting the systemic perspective, people, families and communities are constantly changing systems and, therefore, a return to a previous state in the strict sense would be impossible.

Community Resilience

The extension of the concept of resilience to an ecological sense of the term shifts the analysis from one of individual resilience to that of the community sphere. In the context of crisis situations, the impact on the community appears more often than not exclusively disastrous, prompting the prevalent assumption that communities are just unable to recover by themselves, that is, without external aid or influence (Sonn and Fisher, 1998; Van den Eynde and Veno, 1999). Tobim and Whiteford, on the contrary,

report that sociological research emphasises the therapeutic role of the crisis at the community level as a catalyst for solidarity among residents. However, recent studies have criticised this perspective, pointing out that the cooperative attitude of the community would be short-lived (Tobim and Whiteford, 2002).

The concept of community resilience can shed light on some of the possible positive reactions of the community to critical events. One definition of community resilience is that of Dawes, Cresswell and Cahan (2004), who understand it as the capacity of a community to resist critical events that challenge its physical environment and social fabric.

According to Kimhi and Shamai (2004), the definitions of resilient communities take three main directions: 1) 'adaptive resilience' which refers to a given community's capacity to absorb the impact of a crisis; 2) 'absorptive resilience' which refers to the speed and ability to recover from resulting stress; and 3) 'transformative resilience' which refers to the creative potential of social systems to improve their psychological functioning as a result of adversity. In 2012, the Institute of Development Studies included these three main categories of resilience in what the authors refer to as the 3D Resilience Framework (Béné et al., 2012; McCandless and Simpson, 2015). Absorptive resilience conveys attempts to minimise or to buffer the exposure to – and consequence of – shocks and stresses ex ante where possible, and to recover quickly when exposed ex post. Adaptive resilience involves making choices and taking actions to mitigate the effects of conflict and violence as well as coping with the consequences. In order to do so, it includes moderating potential destruction and identifying opportunities to do things differently as well as evolving livelihood strategies based on the changed conditions. Last but not least, transformative resilience manipulates conflict drivers and structures, trying to create a new or changed system that more readily addresses the initial causes of conflict (USAID, 2013). Absorptive and adaptive resilience express the defensive self-reliance of a community insofar as they display strategies that enable survival despite shock and stressors, without directly addressing the causes of conflict or violence and without removing the threat (Interpeace, 2016). Transformative resilience reacts instead to long-term, non-linear stress conditions with pro-change processes, such as protests against corruption, community-based initiatives, varying degrees of demonstrations of resistance (Wise et al., 2014).

Hernandez (2002) talks about collective resilience to indicate those coping processes that occur within a social context affected by a traumatic event and that are aimed at supporting and rebuilding social bonds and a sense of belonging. Sonn and Fisher (1998) indicate that the extension of the concept of resilience from the individual

to the community is represented by the idea of competent communities. However, resilience and competence are two different concepts, even if partially overlapping: the first refers to the adaptation process following a disturbing event, while the second focuses more on coping skills and on community resources to deal effectively with adversity. Put differently: while community resilience denotes a process of adaptation in an ecological perspective, which takes into account, not only internal factors within the community, but also those external to the community itself, such as, international aid or relations with neighbouring social and political entities (see Chapter 10, for an example), the concept of competent community focuses on the particular characteristics of a community that allow them to adapt, absorb or transform.

Moreover, empowerment and community resilience, unlike competence, can have areas of overlap. According to Zimmerman (2013), resilience and empowerment share the emphasis on factors such as the participation, locus of control, involvement (see, for an example, Chapter 9). Community-level risk factors act in the same way as risk factors at the individual level, with the only difference that they affect a community as a whole rather than a single people. In turn, problems that affect a community cannot be solved by an individual, but requires shared vision and collective action. Risk factors may vary in severity from negative economic and socio-political trends or issues, such as oppression by dominant groups (Sonn and Fisher, 1998), to natural disasters that upset the community, like a flood (Bravo et al., 1990). Furthermore, the severity of the risk factor (for example a military confrontation) and its duration are important elements to take into consideration as they can undermine the resilience of communities, as shown by a study on the inhabitants on the border between Israel and Lebanon (Kimhi and Shamai, 2004).

Resilience Factors

There are a number of studies that consider the elements which make up community resilience. One of the first models of resilience towards a community hazard (for example, the storage of toxic waste) is that of Bachrach and Zautra (1985). This model insists upon three variables of community resilience: 1) self-efficacy; 2) problem-oriented coping; and 3) a sense of community, which predicates greater or lesser community involvement in solving a problem. More so, a sense of community is particularly important because it can give meaning to collective action required to overcome the problem. For this reason, Adger (2000) talks about resource dependency, that is, the quantity and quality of resources on which the community can rely. To a similar end, Breton (2001) refers to social and human capital; to the people, groups,

networks, voluntary associations and services present in a community. Somewhat conversely, Clauss-Ehlers and Lopez-Levy (2002) place emphasis on community culture, which can counter the rates of violent behaviour. Each factor – i.e. physical and social capital, culture, not to mention, systems of norms and meanings – contributes to an awareness of a crisis situation and to a common or collective understanding of how to react to it.

In a study on refugee communities in Israel, Doron (2005) notes the following factors as important to overcoming stress factors and to a thriving of the community post-crisis:

- A sense of belonging to the community;
- The locus of control;
- Transformative resilient attitude;
- Empowerment and development of community skills;
- Presence of leaders with optimistic perspective;
- A shared community vision, strengthened by religion and tradition;
- Social networks of mutual aid and solidarity organisations.

Changing the perspective, a distinction can be made between distal resilience factors, related to historical and structural elements, and proximal, related to the resources needed to deal with a specific critical event (Paton and Johnston, 2001). Distal factors can refer to comparatively small dimensions of a community, for instance, shared traditions which are very important resilience factors connected to fostering a sense of community. Proximal factors, however, such as the capacity for community-wide coping, refers to the attempts made by residents to find shared solutions to common problems as well as to the quality of relief services that available and of great importance in an emergency situation (Paton et al., 2001).

Resilience and the Environment of Communities under Stress

Resilience can be described as the nexus between social systems, natural systems and the built environment (Cutter, 2008). Resilience can be determined by the five elements of sustainable livelihood: social, economic, human, physical and natural assets (Manyena, 2006). Therefore, for Cannon (2008), strengthening the resilience of a system is about strengthening and protecting livelihoods. Focusing on providing a better future for individuals and communities means aspiring to do more than simply ‘coping’ (McEntire et al., 2002). Indeed, resilience should arguably mean more than restoration or survival, rather, it should involve aspirations for a better social, economic and political situation (Manyena, 2006).

Critics of resilience, like Manyena, note how the concept tends to focus on the

outcome and hence on the capacity for a community to 'cope', 'bounce back', 'withstand', and 'absorb negative impacts'. In this sense, resilience risks reinforcing a status quo of affairs (Twigg, 2009) despite the fact that this could mean maintaining systems of corrupt governance, flailing economic policies and restricted civil rights (Pelling, 2011). When the state of return is undesirable or unobtainable, as in the case of the old life of a Palestinian village, resilience with the goal of transformation is often envisioned as an alternative. For this reason, in defining resilience, the adaptive capacity of a community is often paired with processes of transformation: an adaptive response to unanticipated risks requires, after all, a degree of flexibility and capacity to transform (Johnson and Blackburn, 2014).

Resilience is currently used in disaster risk reduction, as "the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions" (UNISDR, 2009, p. 224). In this definition, all the various meanings of the term are recalled: 'bouncing back', adapting, overcoming and maintaining integrity (Alexander, 2013). Moreover, it is in this sense of the term that the resilient spirit emerges in Palestinian culture by way of the word Sumud, which means the ability to survive a trauma without giving up; to react with the spirit of adaptation, irony and mental flexibility. Sumud, translated as 'steadfastness', has become a sort of national Palestinian ideal that carries the meaning of determination to stay in the country and on the land in spite of the abuses committed by the military occupation.

Moreover, sumud implies, as suggested by Raja Shehadeh in his reflection on life in the West Bank, entitled The Third Way, a form of standing up to the challenges of daily life under occupation (1982). Like Shehadeh, other endeavour to apply sumud by describing with humour (or irony) the absurdities of a typical life under heavy oppression (Habibi, 1985; Amiry, 2005). Resilience is, therefore, a complete way of life, indeed, the sum of the everyday acts that prevent Israel's total subordination of the Palestinian people (Allen, 2008). If acts of resistance such as openly celebrating dignity, identity and life are ways of dealing with structures of dominance like occupation (Scott, 1985, 1990; Allen, 2008), sumud represents a form of endurance: a focus on going forward and on keeping up the hope of justice and a liberated future (Rijke and Van Teeffelen, 2014).

Conclusion

This study is based on a complex theoretical framework that has been separated into

two chapters: 1) the Israeli occupation of the West Bank as an instance of settler colonialism, and 2) the role of place making in crisis situations. In picking apart the conceptual details of these two arguments, a number of theories integral to this study have been explained. These include theories on settler colonialism and segregation as well as on carceral societies within a framework of occupation; in relation to the second argument, I have endeavoured to bring to light theories on perception and place as well as on resilience, particularly within a framework of place making. Here, I will provide a summary of the key points.

Settler Colonialism, Segregation and Carceral Societies

In the previous chapter, I introduced the concept of occupation. In the case of the West Bank, the Israeli occupation is constituted by military power and civilian settlers, and as such it can be described as a form of settler colonisation. The settler colonial paradigm has been used here to articulate what happens when one people decide to replace another on a particular land through processes of conquer and dispossession. As will be shown in the three case studies of this research, the local population suffer from increasing land dispossession and limitations of rights due to rules imposed upon them by an occupying entity. A steady erosion of the Palestinian sense of place presides in the Israeli military and settler mission. What once was an attempt to displace the demographic of a population has since become a process of systematic elimination, engendering the disappearance of native groups. The settler colonial paradigm as such challenges the positive atmosphere inspired by the Oslo peace paradigm insofar as it seeks to expound the root causes of the conflict.

Indeed, I have sought to show how segregation and the creation of a carceral society are fundamental to installing a military occupation and settler colonial reality. In the case of the West Bank, segregation is mainly territorial and seeks to limit the freedom of movement and the use of land by the less powerful group (i.e. the occupied population). The form of self-government that the West Bank obtained with the Oslo Accords, perceived by the Palestinians as a step toward independence, has in reality institutionalised the system of permits, checkpoints and barriers that make the separation more visible on the ground and make it ever more comparable to the system of apartheid once pervasive in South Africa: the goal is to separate indigenous populations from their land and from the settler society. In fact, a carceral society has emerged alongside an architecture of occupation consisting of settlements, barriers, infrastructures and military apparatuses which endeavour to gradually segregate the population and enclose some within a panoptic system. The occupiers thereby impose

on the occupied land their own sense of place, affecting a particular vision upon the landscape and upon the lives of other people residing there.

While this paints a rather wretched picture of the West Bank, all is not without hope. It is my contention that a study of local cases can provide a first step in observing and analysing more indigenous approaches to liberation and decolonisation by way of reclaiming a Palestinian sense of place within the region.

The Perception of Place

In this chapter, I have introduced the importance of perception in relation to place which is thereby mediated through different factors, such as personal experience, imagination and memory. The perception of the environment influences a person's place identity, considered as part of the self-identity in relation to the physical setting and the cognition of it. When this perception involves positive feelings such as comfort, privacy and security, then an affective bond develops between people and the environment, defined as place attachment. Understanding the significance of place identity and place attachment has involved a reflection on the concept of place as such and on various theories of place, including, phenomenology, humanistic geography (i.e. the idea that place is distinct from space), and more recent ideas which consider place in relation to a globalised and evolving world.

The aspects on which I focus concern lived and daily experiences of place that result from inhabitation, such as the feelings, ideas, memories, values and preferences generated from a specific place and its built environment. Personal experiences of place may be positive or negative, but they all contribute to the individual's place identity and sense of place attachment.

Place Making and Resilience

Expressions of perception, place identity and place attachment come together in the social process that engenders the production of place, described here as place making. Changes to the perception and to the physical reality of a territory as imposed by the occupation are reflected in the place making choices of the occupied population. Place making is here analysed as the shared process of the production of a place that serves people as a vital community resource. As such, place making fosters a community's sense of belonging and attachment to as well as sense of responsibility for a place. An occupied population feels not only the loss of place and thereby seeks to reclaim a territory's identity through recreation and maintenance.

In the case of such crisis situations, like settler colonial occupation, place

making bears with it the value of resilience: an expression of the occupied population that needs to mediate segregation and the limitations imposed on them by the carceral society. Therefore, the notion of resilience helps to reconnect the study of place making by Palestinians to their severe condition of living in an architecture of occupation. Their response to military and violent occupation may be described as defensive, survivalist and absorptive of stressors, but they may also be interpreted as creative and proactive in terms of adaptive strategies. Further still, I would argue that the Palestinian response in terms of place making can be a transformative process, a process into which I will delve deeper in the proceeding chapters.

Chapter 4.

Historic Palestine: A 'Physical Space'

Introduction

This research investigates the built environment of the West Bank, highlighting the relation between the traditional and the contemporary forms. In order to do so, it will be necessary to understand the make-up of traditional Palestinian architecture and dwellings. This chapter therefore starts by considering the natural landscape of historic Palestine and thereby better contextualise the description of its historical built environment. Palestinian traditional architecture is in many ways a Mediterranean one, and therefore common to the regions bordering the sea, as in southern Italy and Spain, the islands of Cyprus and Malta, etc. In turn, the stone buildings that line the mountainous areas of the West Bank share many of the characteristics with those built along the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea. The chapter introduces the ancient history of the region, in order to describe the context in which the vernacular architecture is rooted. Then it moves forward and describes the natural landscape in which the traditional Palestinian architecture is inserted. It does so by focusing on the West Bank landscape, as the specific subject of this research. Nevertheless, the connection between the West Bank and the Mediterranean region, as briefly described, is never ignored.

The main reason for this is the chapter's aim in setting criteria for defining the vernacular architectural of the West Bank and its use of space. In order to do so, the following seeks to choose one of the most emblematic representations of traditional settlements – the peasant village – and aims to describe its spatial and architectural characteristics. In this part of the chapter, the social norms of the traditional Palestinian society will be described. The family ties and the patriarchal structure of a conservative and closed agricultural society were mirrored in the built environment of the village and, in various ways, in the townhouse.

Historic Palestine

The toponym "Palestine" was used by the ancient Greeks to define the geographical area between the Mediterranean Sea, the Jordan River, the Dead Sea and the Red Sea. This area's natural borders are vague as it is part of the vast Siriac-Palestinian region, but also the sum of various sub-areas of distinct morphologic and climatic characteristics. It is easier to define it then as an historic-anthropic region, forged by the

alternate phases of human settlement along its deserted fringes and by complex political events (Enciclopedia Treccani, 2013).

The location of Palestine, at the centre of the routes crossing from the Fertile Crescent to the rich areas of Egypt and Anatolia, was under the influence and dictate of different religious and cultural identities. Its most ancient recorded inhabitants are the Canaanites of the third millennium B.C. (Arnaiz-Villena, 2001), but invaders came one after the other, nominally from the East (i.e. Assyrians, Persians, and Abbasids), the North (i.e. Hittites, Byzantines and Ottomans) and from the coastal region (i.e. Phoenixes and Philistines). Before unity under Roman rule, dating 67 B.C., ancient Palestine was a land inhabited by various populations: Jebusites, Philistines, Moabites, amongst others. In 637 A.D., the Caliph Omar conquered Jerusalem and ended the Byzantine nomination. Then, the crusaders conquered for a short period of time the coastal areas from Antioch to Gaza. Finally, in the XVI Century the Ottoman rule started, and lasted until the first World War (WWI). This was a time of immense political, economic and cultural turmoil, as will be explained later.

The excessive fiscal pressure, the economic stagnation, and the administrative and military malfunctions finally caused a decline of the central power that opened up a way for the exploitation of the land by European colonial powers. After WWI, what was historic Palestine became today's Lebanon, Syria, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Egypt. In what follows, I will draw particular attention to the natural and built landscapes of the West Bank.

The Landscape of Historic Palestine (Focus: the West Bank)

Historic Palestine is divided into three morphologic units: 1) the flat coastal region, 2) the mountain region, and 3) the middle pit with the Dead Sea. The West Bank region lies almost at its centre. Physically, the West Bank used to be a region of variety and diversity (Senan, 1993); flat lands alternated with low hills, often terraced, on top of which rose the villages. Dry stone walls, fallow land, residual areas of almond trees orchards, vineyards and olive trees dot the landscape of this part of Historic Palestine (Canevari and Giambruno, 2009).

The West Bank territory can ideally be divided into three longitudinal strips of land stretching from north to south (B.'Tselem, 2002), each one with different climatic characteristics that have influenced the evolution of human settlements:

- The Eastern Strip, including the Jordan Valley and the northern shores of the Dead Sea, as well as the eastern slopes of the mountain range that run along the entire West Bank from north to south.

- The Mountain Strip, the area on or adjacent to the peaks of the mountain range. This area is also known as the watershed line or the mountain-range area.

- The Western Hills Strip, including the western slopes of the mountain range.



Figure 1: Historic Palestine physical map (Source: C.S. Hammond & Co, 1959)

The Eastern Strip

Entering the West Bank from the Jordan River side, the first town encountered would be Jericho, lying in a desert interrupted by a number of green oases. Leaving Jericho towards Ramallah, the journey would turn into a climb through the perfectly bare white hills of an almost lunar landscape (Khalidi, 1995). This path borders the Jordan Valley and the northern Dead Sea coast, as well as the eastern slopes of the mountain ridge and part of the Judean Desert. This area is characterized by extreme conditions, with high temperatures, sparse precipitation (100-300 mm per annum) and, in the western part of the area, extremely steep topography (B.'Tselem, 2002).

The Mountain Strip

The mountain strip extends along the entire length of the West Bank, along the watershed line, above the four hundred meter elevation contour. This central mass of limestone mountains is the rainiest area of the West Bank, but the steep topographical profile to the east is a great obstacle to the development of agriculture. Nevertheless, all the main West Bank cities were found and funded here: Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron, along with dozens of towns and small and medium-sized villages, linked by intense commercial relations.

The Western Hills Strip

This Western Hills strip lies for ten to twenty kilometres between the western border of the Mountain Strip and the Mediterranean coastline. The slopes here descend more gently toward the sea and are the most agriculturally fertile of the West Bank. The north of the Strip hosts two cities: Tulkarem and Qalqiliya. Other medium-sized towns, amongst dozens of smaller villages, developed here a diverse agriculture (including, olive and fruit orchards, hothouses and field crops). The path along this territory borders the mountains, and goes along fields where green vegetables, yellow crops and citrus orchards grow. As it starts to climb towards the city of Nablus, the scenery changes as several villages surrounded by olive trees and other fruit trees appear (Senan, 1993).

Definition of Traditional Architecture

Having set the natural scene, this section will explore the concept of "traditional architecture" in the specific case of Historic Palestine. The traditional architecture of the Mediterranean area is strongly connected to its natural landscape and to the raw

materials that were easily found there, like stone and wood. Therefore, a similar stye of buildings developed around its shores, with various declinations in the different areas. Moreover, as time passed, each generation would add various elements to their dwellings, thereby creating a temporally-associated style.

What can, therefore, be listed as the main features of Palestinian traditional architecture? In order to understand the historical built environment of the West Bank, and to compare it with the contemporary one, it is necessary to first define its characteristics. In the literature, the essential characteristics of vernacular architecture lie in the idea of transmission, permanence, respect, inheritance and repetition from generation to generation (MEDA Euromed Héritage, 2002). Paul Oliver (1987), for instance, clearly defines 'traditional' dwellings and settlements as the built expressions of a heritage that is continuously transmitted from one generation to the next one. Two aspects of the creation of the Palestinian built environment thereby contribute to its identification as 'traditional'.

The first most significant character is the active influence of social values and models. In order to describe the traditional forms of the West Bank built environment, especially when held in comparison to the ones subsequent to the Occupation, it is necessary to include a description of the synergies that it entwines with the specific society.

Second, this research will consider as 'traditional' the buildings constructed with local materials resources; those that do not take advantage of modern transport facilities for heavy materials, of course, having existed prior to their use. The notion of 'traditional' architecture further finds definition in construction methods over the actual date of construction. Consequently, buildings complying with the rules of tradition still exist today; inhabited, used and exploited by the population (MEDA Euromed Héritage, 2002). Thus the next pages of this chapter will describe the Palestinian built environment as it has been shaped before the beginning of the XX century and the changes started by the Ottomans, and further defined by the British, which opened the society to the influences of the outside world. Even though the focus of this research is on the West Bank area, it should be acknowledged that, until the birth of the state of Israel, the buildings described in the next paragraphs were typical of the whole area of Historic Palestine.

The Ancestral Identity: The Village

Traditional architecture in Palestine is the product of the interaction between the general Mediterranean model and the specific character of the area. In particular,

Palestinian architecture has been linked to the wider tradition of Islamic eastern Mediterranean models, dating back to the Middle Ages (Fuchs, 1998). The heart of the Mediterranean society is the village, which is perceived as a clan or even a family. It is the big family, the family-clan, sometimes going beyond kinship and including servants, apprentices, and employees. The shape of the traditional house of the Mediterranean area is strongly influenced by family structure, especially, by its internal synergies and by its relation to the natural and communal outside (MEDA Euromed Héritage, 2002). In Palestine, this characteristic was further stressed by the role of the family unit inside within the particular society. The individual had less importance than the collective, and the village as a whole acted as unique extended family to the point that, up until the XX century, it was considered the unit of taxation by the State (Suad Amiry, 1987).

Generally, the village consisted of spatial clustering of communities, formed by different descents groups, who behaved according to the rules of clan ties and clan identity. Above all, the village identity dominated the various constituents of it (Suad Amiry, 1987). This feature is made especially manifest when looking at the distribution of villages and towns in XIX century West Bank. The most important towns were all located on the higher mountains along the central North-South axis road, from Jenin to Hebron, passing from Nablus, al-Bireh, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. On the contrary, the villages were located far from the roads, isolated in the countryside and surrounded by their fields. This phenomenon has been explained by Amiry (1987) as the result of two causes: the mountain villages were self-sufficient, making their living out of the products of the land and producing their crafts; furthermore, the villages were trying to protect themselves from possible menaces, which included invading armies or tax collectors from the central government. Hence, the life of the villagers took place entirely inside the village boundaries, making contact with the neighbouring villages or the bigger towns rare.

As the village inhabitants, the *fellaheen* (the farmers), represented the majority of the Palestinian population at the beginning of the XX century, it is easy to see how the society was at that time “relatively autarkic and inwardly-oriented” (Suad Amiry, 1987, p. 9). Up until the 1920s, the life of the villagers took place among the fields and the built-up areas of their village. Men and women visited the outside world only upon special occasions, mostly of a ceremonial nature such as marriage or feasts. Similarly, villages would rarely have visitors; and if so, they were mostly government officials or tax collectors. Upon those occasions, the iman and the sheik were the social and political authorities that sought to represent the spiritual and civic unity of the village.

As for the location of the villages, the topography, water supply, roads, security and the overall quality of the land was of great influence (Senan, 1993). The concentration and dispersion of villages throughout the West Bank, from the more fertile valleys around Nablus to the arid flatlands in the Hebron region, were determined by the presence and number of natural springs as well as of possible enemies in the surrounding regions. The central mountainous area of the West Bank shows the highest concentration of villages. As it descends with steep slopes towards the East, the villages were built on hilltops or on the highest peak of the slopes, in order to leave the fertile valleys and flatlands free from built areas (Amiry and Tamari, 2008). In fact, as the prosperity and survival of a village depended on the availability of cultivated land, its shape was determined by the position of its fields. The built space was typically surrounded by the agricultural land, which also divided each village from the next one. It is interesting to stress that, as in every agricultural society, the land was the most important resource and it was therefore the responsibility of the whole village to preserve it. Even if privately owned, the land could not be sold without the village's agreement (Suad Amiry, 1987).



Figure 2: historical agricultural terraces near Battir (Bethlehem area), 1892 ca. (Source Centre for Cultural Heritage Preservation Bethlehem)

Because the mountainous areas were scarce of fertile lands, the built core of the village had to consume the smallest amount of territory. The shape thereby derived from this condition is that of a compact pattern of houses, with wide empty areas differentiating one village from another. Moreover, it was forbidden to build in the fields' area, excluding that of holy shrines and field storage structures (note that this rule no longer exists, so houses spread out in areas between villages). The fields were cultivated with all the different products that the land could typically yield: olives, figs, grapes, almonds, wheat, barley, etc. The villagers could hence fulfil their needs without going out of the village's borders, enforcing in turn the unity as well as the isolation of the village. Each extended family took care of its own fields, men and women together, moving to live in the countryside during the crop season.

The village would appear from afar as a tight group of squared houses made of white limestone, immersed in the similarly stony landscape of the West Bank hills. It was usually built on the side of the hill that could be protected from the strongest winds (Shehadeh, 2008).




Figure 3: Arab village of Yalu, 1940 ca., typical houses of the peasants
(Source: Meron Benvenisti, 2000)

The spatial organisation of the built space depended on the kinship ties among the villagers. Extended families built their houses close to each other, forming a quarter inside the village (*hosh*). Therefore, kinship has been identified as the main organizing principle for the village space (S. Amiry, 1987). The need for privacy and for separation of each familiar sub-group inside the same hosh was satisfied by the presence of private or semi-private inner courtyards wherein the members of the family could live without

being in constant contact with the other relatives. The space was furthermore divided according to the gender of the inhabitants. The activities of women took place mostly in individual houses and patriarchal family courtyards, surrounded by high walls, where their privacy was granted (see Fig.4). Only the members of the restricted family had access to this area.



Figure 4: Women embroidering in the courtyard of their house, Bethlehem Mandate Period (Source: Amiry, 2008)

Visitors were usually allowed to enter the hosh to a certain extent. As the hosh was based on social homogeneity, villagers with the same social status shared the same spatial area. Therefore, the configuration of the village changed from one hosh to the other: high walls protected the privacy of the richest, while many activities took place in the streets of poorer areas. When the village was on top of a hill, the fallaheen lived on the lowest level whereas the wealthier families had the higher quarters. Thus the village was shaped by the socioeconomic identities of its inhabitants. That is to say, the built up space of the hosh represented physically the life and values of the family that inhabited it.

Each villager naturally identified with his quarter, in which his house was located and all the activities of his life took place, according to his ancestors' tradition. Traditionally the hosh bore the same name of the family that resided in it, thereby

highlighting the connection between the people and their built environment. Every kinship group could feel safe inside its quarter, physically isolated from the other of the village by walls and buildings. Within, the families could live their lives in the way their patriarchs taught them, among their own people.

The men of the village used to meet in the main plaza (*sahah*), since social rules restricted them from meeting in each other's households, wherein women would spend most of their time. When they were not working in the fields, they gathered at the guest house of the village, near the spiritual centre, the mosque. There were two spaces in particular outside of the house for women: the village spring (*'ayn*), whereby one could fetch water for the family needs or wash clothes, and the common bread oven (*tabun*) situated in the quarter (Amiry and Tamari, 2008).

The social identity of the village house

To reiterate, the house represented in Palestine the central node of all the activities of the family, not unlike the house in the Mediterranean tradition,. Thus it is possible to read into the space not only the specific architectural form, but also the social environment that shaped its inner spaces and hence the outer landscapes with which it concurs (MEDA Euromed Héritage, 2002). The house is the physical expression of those connections that tie together an extended family, connections that go back to people's ancestors who started the familial nucleus. Indeed, in Arabic, the word *dar* means both the building of the house and the family residing in it (Doumani, 1995, cited in Abdulfattah, 2007, p. 49).

The traditional village house is by far the most studied building of Palestine (Fuchs, 1998; Amiry and Tamari, 2008). It consisted of a multi-purpose, self-contained single room, where the family lived and slept with its most precious goods: the animals and the crops (see Fig. 5). The vaulted space, approximately 5 by 7 meters wide, was usually divided into three areas: the family living room (mastabeh), the food storage, and the space for animals and tools. The space was un-specialised, and only a difference in height operated a physical division between the areas (see Fig.6). This simple feature characterised the whole of Palestinian traditional architecture. An elevated platform hosted the mastabeh, so that the family area was separated from the animals and the storage. Fuchs (1998) finds the origin of the elevated platform in the diffusion of the Islamic culture into the eastern Mediterranean regions during the Abbasid period. It is, in fact, true that the concept of the multipurpose space of the single room and the element of the raised platform can be found in Turkey as well as in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and even further afield in Anatolia and Iran.




Figure 5: House in the village of 'Ebwein near Ramallah. On the left side, above, the upper level, below, the ground level. On the right side: above, section xx, below, assonometry of the living room. In the assonometry, in the middle, the mud containers for food storage used as separating wall. Behind them, the food storage area. In the bottom right, the main entrance to the house. In the center of the living room, the family area (mastabeh) and below that, the lower area for animals and agriculture tools. (Source: Amiry, 2008)

Rigid social norms defined who could have access to the mastabeh, the place where the family members also slept during the night, on mattresses laid on the carpets. The house itself had hardly any furniture, and the few things the family possessed were kept in niches or mud containers (khawabi) that the women of the family would build and decorate (see Fig.7). The main niche accommodated the mattresses for the night, usually screened by a curtain. Sometimes the only piece of furniture was a bridal chest, which a newlywed couple would use to set a boundary for their personal private space. One door led to the inside of the house, thus erecting the only access to the lower level where a small service area preceded the stable in which animals were secured for the night. A fireplace was built on the same wall as the door and all the family would gather around its warm flames during rainy winter days. The absence of windows

created a dark and fresh space during hot Palestinian summers, while in winter helped in keeping the fire warmth inside. The inner space of the house was considered the women's domain and, as such, inviolable by non-relatives, as dictated by the traditional costumes. The word hurmah means 'holy,' but it is also used to indicate a woman or a wife (Suad Amiry, 1987).




Figure 6: House near Ramallah in the British Mandate period, on the right side, the mud container for linen, on the back a tall mud container; below, the arches leading to the lower level, under the living room where the women are sitting (Source: Amiry, 2008)

Among the fellaheen, the women spent most of their day working in the semi-private front-yard of the house, in the company of their female relatives. They took care of the cleaning, the preparation of the food and some crafts activities (making clay utensils, netting baskets or embroidering traditional dresses). The level of privacy granted by this semi-private domain depended on the attitude of the family and the social status it bore. As previously noted, the rich families who ascertained greater levels of privacy could better seclude their women, while the peasants allowed them freer movement around the village quarters. Therefore, in some cases, the front yard of the house was hidden behind a high stone wall. In other cases, it was completely open to the common courtyard of the quarter.



Figure 7: View of the inside of a house, with the family sitting area, in Silwan near Jerusalem, 1886. At the center and to the left, two *khawabi*, mud containers for food conservation (Source: Amiry, 2008)

When the space inside the house became insufficient for the large family, the married son had to build his own house, usually next to his father's. With the time passing, the original house would be incorporated in a larger cluster of similar houses. Unsurprisingly, the construction of a new house was lived by the whole village as a special occasion in which everyone participated in the works without any gender exclusion. A master builder would come to the village in order to improve by way of his technical knowledge the construction of the house structure and its openings. The villagers would thereby gather the materials for the house from local resources: for instance, stones for the external walls; straw and mud for the plaster; wood for the vaulted roof structure (see Fig.8). The houses were covered with flat roofs or domes, a characteristic typical of the Palestinian region as in the other parts of the Mediterranean area. The roof is the main element that links the village house to the model of the townhouse.



Figure 8: Construction of a house in the mountain region, British Mandate period (Source: Amiry, 2008)

The urban tradition of the townhouse

The design of the village house is the most adapt translation of the social habits and traditions of the Palestinian society into a building. Therefore, the town houses (today still present in the old areas of the major cities of the West Bank like Hebron, Nablus and Bethlehem) were based on the same feature. Urban architectural features were a finer and decorated stonework, and elaborate carved decorations above doorways and cornices. These wealthier houses often had two or three storeys, according to the prestige of the family, with the master bedroom or the guest room on the top floor. In this regard, it is interesting to read what the impressions of orientalist travellers in the XIX Century:

> We were conducted into a vast open court, paved with marble, and the governor came out to meet us, and led me into the divan, or reception-hall, where a number of Moslem gentlemen were assembled. They rose from the raised

> divans, which were ranged on three sides of the room, and stood still till my brother and myself had taken the places prepared for us on the chief divan. (...) The room was very lofty. The white walls were ornamented with blue arabesque borders, painted in fresco. The arched windows and large doorway were of Saracenic form. A part of the floor was raised a few inches, to form a dais, and was spread with handsome carpets, and in the centre stood a tall brass candelabrum supporting an oil lamp. In the lower part of the room a number of servants waited. (Rogers, 1865, p. 283)

This description of a town palace appears not to differ much from the models of houses in the larger Mediterranean Islamic area: the living space was conceived as a single room with an elevated platform made for the family private life. This element links the village house to the town house in a continuous architectural tradition.

The town houses display more or less the same spatial organization as the peasant houses: nested around an enclosed courtyard, connected with the outside road through a crooked corridor, there were many single room apartments. Each unit belonged to a different 'nuclear' family (within an extended one), while in better-off courthouses the whole building belonged to a single extended family. The living quarters were situated on the first floor, accessible by way of an open stone staircase. The roof, secluded from the view of strangers by a high balustrade, was used as an upstairs. The spatial organisation of the inside of the town houses was thereby analogous to that of the villages, and the whole complex to the village court-centred cluster, showing the same vernacular origins (Fuchs, 1998).

1920, Time for changes

Around the 1920s, important mutations in the political, economic, and indeed social life of the West Bank, heavily influenced the village model. Firstly, at the end of the XIX Century, the Ottomans began a process (further defined by the British) that would lead to the dismantling of the common land system and to the increasing of private property. The rule preventing one from building any structure other than small storages or shrines in agricultural fields declined and private owners started to build their own houses outside the concentrated village centre. Thus the gap in the built fabric between the villages started to disappear in favour of dispersion.

Moreover, agriculture was soon marginalised as the system of employment as salaried labourers increased among villagers, especially starting from the years of the British Mandate. Consequently, the system of the extended family, upon which the whole West Bank society had been built from generation to generation, began to

fragment. It was the villages that were mostly affected by these social, economic and political changes given that they represented the traditional Palestinian society before all the alterations occurred. More changes were soon to come, however, with the end of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent events that led to the final partition of historic Palestine. This change would inevitably affect the landscape and the local built environment in a number of ways.



Figure 9: Courtyard of an extended family in Yatta, near Hebron
(Source: Amiry, 2008)

Chapter 5.

The History of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict

Introduction: The Boundaries

All the tales that involve historic Palestine in the XX century concern boundaries and the possession of territory. In 1915, the British promised the Arabs who fought alongside them in WWI all the Turkish land west of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus. Only one year later, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement in which Palestine was divided into different states under their control. In 1917, the Balfour declaration granted the Zionist organization British support in the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Soon after the war ended, in 1920, the newly established League of Nations gave Britain a mandate over Palestine while giving France a mandate over Syria and Lebanon. The eastern boundary of Palestine was thereby designed by the British: it ran from the shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, along the Dead Sea, the Jordan river to its confluence with the Yarmuk river, up to Syria.

The lines of the borders, once drawn by mandate, were now drawn with guns when the United Nations resolution of 1947 called for establishing two states in Palestine and war broke out. The year of 1948 ended with Israel's victory and the division of British Palestine between Israel, Jordan and Egypt. The armistice lines were marked on maps by a green pencil, hence the name "the green line" (Biger, 2008). This chapter will explain why the possession of land occupies such an important place in the shaping of Palestine's border. Starting from the end of the Ottoman Empire, it will describe how Palestinian society evolved throughout the course of XX century in response to these events. In the period between the two world wars, Palestine became a space of great activity for the Zionist movement, whose main interest was in the creation of Eretz Israel as the Jewish state. The possession of Palestine's territory thus became the ultimate goal and the cause for major successive and continuing conflict between Jews and Arabs. This chapter will explain the reasons behind this conflict and the geography as per Zionist immigration, showing its influence on Palestinian society.

Before 1948, The Ottoman Empire and Jewish Immigration

Historic Palestine under the Ottoman Empire (1517-1918)

The Ottoman Empire, who ruled Palestine for four centuries before its end in 1917,

encouraged the growth of the agricultural sector so as to increase the production of marketable goods. Starting in 1840, the Empire introduced a series of economic, administrative, juridical, military and political reforms (tanzimat) that heavily influenced the life of the Palestinian population (Morris, 1999). Mainly, these policies engendered an economic growth that introduced Palestine to the world economy. At that time, agriculture was the main livelihood in coastal, northern and central areas (see previous chapter for details). Palestine exported olive oil, cotton, soap, wheat, wool and oranges to Europe, Syria, Egypt and Asia Minor. Its manufacture industry consisted of glass, soap and leather goods. The main urban centres, such as, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth and Bethlehem, were visited by tourists and pilgrims lured by cultural, historical and religious importance (Al-Rimmawi, 2009).




Figure 10: Map of historic Palestine during the Ottoman Empire (Source: Ifpo, 2012)

The main act executed by the Ottomans was the replacement of Islamic Law of Land Ownership with Turkish Land Code. In this way, the central government strove to exert more control on the cultivators and on the revenues from the land (Shehadeh, 1982). Traditionally, there were no official documents to attest to the legal title of possession to a parcel of land; oral agreements were deemed at one point enough to establish such a title. The new law, however, classified land into six categories:

- *mulk* land; private land;
-*waqf* land; land owned by religious foundations or used for cultural activities, protected under Islamic rule;
- *matruk* land; land for general public use;
- *mawat* land; dead or undeveloped land;
- *miri* land; state land which could be leased to peasants by usufruct tenure, conditional on the constant cultivation of the land for ten years.

If the miri land was left uncultivated for more than three years, it would return to the state (i.e. makhlul land). The logic behind the miri land was to force landowners to cultivate their land, make it productive and hence taxable (B'Tselem, 2002).

In 1858, the Ottoman Empire issued the Land Registration Law, which was due to determine title to the land. In reality, however, it was a way to increase taxed properties and to identify any men subject to military conscription. The peasants were thereby required to register their land ownership, but some of them refused, fearing the high registration fees and the military conscription. Inefficiency in the registration procedures left most of the Palestinian land ownerships unregistered. In other cases, the peasants registered only a minimum quantity of their land, or they registered it in the name of deceased or members of the urban gentry, who became absentee landlords of entire villages (Halbrook, 1981). Nevertheless, many families were impoverished by the improved system of taxes collection and decided forcedly to leave their villages. Therefore, Palestine witnessed during the XIX century a process of urbanization of part of the population, attracted by better living conditions. Palestine, since 1870 part of the province of Syria, witnessed with the tanzimat the widening of the gap between the rural areas, impoverished and depopulated, and the cities, wealthier and safer.

The First Zionist Immigration (1880-1948)

In the following years, the Ottoman Empire faced the first series of Zionist immigrations to Palestine. Religious Jews had been settling in the country for centuries. They were mostly elderly pilgrims, who did not work and lived on charity. By and large, they lived in the holy cities, like Jerusalem, Hebron, Zefat and Tiberias, where they had

recreated the dilapidated and rather filthy conditions of the Jewish ghettos in Europe (Brenner, 1984). At the end of the XIX century, the ideology of Zionism spread among Jewish communities in Europe. As a result of the French revolution, ideals of freedom, justice and equality emerged, stimulating new feelings of unity and the need for egalitarianism, which grew among the secularized Jewish population. In the West (Western Europe and the US), these communities had been granted certain civil rights; but, in Eastern Europe, they were confronting by a raising hostility and institutionalized anti-Semitism (Orny and Efrat, 1973; Friedman, 1998; Safty, 2009).

The emergence of Zionism as a political force was ignited by the explosion of anti-Semitism, that found fertile soil in the nationalist ideologies typical of XIX century Europe, and then further inspired by the starting colonial attitude of European nations (Morris, 1999). Leo Pinsker, the founder of the Lovers of Zion (Hovevei Zion) movement, wrote the 1882 publication, "Auto-Emancipation: an appeal to his people by a Russian Jew." According to Pinsker, Diaspora Jews would always remain unwanted strangers in other people's countries; without their own territory, Jews would always remain without any particular essence. They had to leave Europe and move to a new land, collectively possess and thereby colonise it – a bit at a time – until finally it could be recognised as their own Jewish nation (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993; Alam, 2009; Al-Rimmawi, 2009). Therefore, Zionism intended the return to Zion as a social and political act that would have stopped the 'unnatural' condition of oppression and marginalisation in which lived the Diaspora Jews (Morris, 1999).

The First Aliyah (1882)

The first Jews who left Europe preferred to emigrate towards the United States, South America, Canada, South Africa and Australia. Palestine attracted only a small number of younger and more enterprising Jewish people (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Al-Rimmawi, 2009). The first wave of secular Eastern European Jews (mostly members of the Lovers of Zion movement) arrived in Palestine in 1882. After a perilous journey, the land they found at their arrival was not exactly a "land without a people for a people without a land[1]". Khalidi recalls the description of Palestine from Ahad Ha-Am after his visit to the country in 1891[2]. It reads:

> We abroad are used to believing that Eretz Israel is now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed, and that anyone who wishes to purchase land there may come and purchase as much as he desires. But in truth this is not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sand dunes and stony mountains are not fit to grow anything but fruit

> trees—and this only after hard labor and great expense of clearing and reclamation—only these are not cultivated (cited in Khalidi, 1997, p. 101).

The hilly central areas housed the small villages of the rural local Arab population, made up mostly of farmers. The aggressive Bedouins (and the Anopheles mosquitoes) had kept the flatlands along the Mediterranean coast and along the Jordan River almost inhabited for decades. Long-time feuds for the possession of the land and the scarce resources had divided the village clans as well as the eminent families who ruled from the cities. Because the Ottoman Empire had heavily taxed the agricultural land, the villages' clans had to sell it to the richer merchants of the cities, usually living in Beirut, Amman, Damascus or even Paris. The first Zionist immigrants were not welcomed by the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Door emanated laws to prohibit the immigration or the land acquisition by Jews; the inefficiency of the Ottoman administration and the pressure exercised by foreign superpowers made it difficult to always apply them (Morris, 1999).

Since the beginning, the land played a crucial role: the first Zionists pursued the ideal of establishing a Jewish homeland dunam by dunam, acre by acre. Jewish land acquisition focused on the Galilee, the valley and coastal regions, the southern lands, between Beersheba and Gaza. By the end of XIX century, twenty-one Jewish settlements, constituting about 4,500 inhabitants, had been established (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993). These settlements functioned as enclaves, core settlements that would later facilitate territorial expansion and enlargement (Falah, 2003). The Jews of this first aliyah were mostly town-based intellectuals who lacked any cultivation experience and familiarity with local conditions. Therefore, the settlers soon found themselves in financial distress and needed to be supported by European philanthropies as the baron Edmond de Rotschild, who recruited French colonial agronomists from North Africa with experience in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia to reshape the Zionist agriculture (Morris, 1999; Kattan, 2009).

It may seem, at first, that the Jewish settlements were of no significant impact on the Arab agriculture economy. The settlers spent most of their money on the purchase of land, which predominantly belonged to the state or to Muslim town notables and was located on the Mediterranean coastal plains and in the valleys where the peasant population was sparse. Nevertheless, their actions did affect the more local peasants and resulted in numerous land disputes.

Around the 1860s in particular, the coastal areas had been inhabited by an increasing number of Arabs, as the Bedouins' threat had become less fearful. The surrounding hilly villages, feeling safer, had started to expand their cultivated lands

along the coast, whose sandy soil was primed to grow oranges for export. The commerce increased in the years and attired many Arab workers along with many rich land buyers from the cities and members of the Zionist movement. The process leading to the establishment of a Jewish settlement caused a lot of frictions with the Arab peasants, who felt it a theft of longstanding traditional rights of tenure. They considered themselves as the true owners of the land, even if they registered it under the name of an absent landlord after the 1858 Land Law. Thus, they often realized it was not legally correct only at the moment of their eviction by the new Jewish owners.

The use of territory by the Zionist movement proved to be a spatial affair since the first series of immigration, imposing real changes on the ground. Indeed, the Palestinian landscape started to be affected by the construction of settlements, roads and farms (Al-Rimmawi, 2009). These first Jewish settlements hired the fellaheen as labourers, thus differentiating from later ones who feared the colonial parallel (Benvenisti, 1988). When they no longer needed to employ the farmers who lived on the land just purchased, they proceeded to displace them, starting a process whose social and political effects would still be realised half a century later (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993).

The Second Aliyah (1909)

The violent Russian *pogroms* (i.e. collective massacres) took place in 1881-1884 and the Dreyfus case[3] exploded in France in 1894-95, thereby constituting some sort of rupture for the European Jews (Orny and Efrat, 1973). Therefore, between the years of 1880 and 1914, Eastern European Jews massively migrated towards the West, including Western Europe and the Americas. Among those two and a half million, there was a 3 per cent who chose Palestine as their destination (Sand, 2009). The publication of Theodor Herzl's "The Jewish State" in 1896 as well as the 1897 Zionist congress at Basel reinvented Zionism as political movement (Cottrell, 2005; Alam, 2009; Kattan, 2009). Herzl[4] showed to the Jews of Europe that the gentiles would have never granted them equivalent value and respect. Herzl's Zionism hence became the dream of regaining that honour. According to him, only the return to Palestine, the Promised Land, would have allowed the birth of the "new Jew" – tough and energetic.

This image would pervade the Zionist literature of the turn of the century, influencing the attitude of the new wave of settlers that, following Herzl, flew to Palestine at the beginning of the XX century. By then, the colonisation of Palestine had gathered pace, becoming progressively institutionalised and even nationalised (Kattan, 2009). In 1901, at the fifth Zionist National Congress, the Jewish National Fund (JNF)

was established with the goal of purchasing land in Palestine to hold it in trust for the coming Jewish settlers; it was never to be sold, but only leased. Land purchased by the Fund from Palestinian Arabs and other landowners was therefore taken off the market and nationalised as collective perpetual property of the Jewish people (Kattan, 2009).

From 1908 to 1913, the Jewish National Fund used private capital to buy over 10,000 acres of farmland (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). Compared to the total area of historic Palestine, this was not a remarkable amount of land. Moreover, the Jewish settlements were still concentrated in areas away from the more populated central mountainous hills. The new city of Tel-Aviv was established in 1909, at first just a settler appendage of the Arab port of Jaffa, but soon after perceived as its economic competitor and thereby as an important step in the Zionist project of immigration, settlement and state building (Lockman, 2012).

In the first eight years of the new century the number of Jewish immigrant workers, mostly farmers, doubled to about ten thousand persons. The second aliyah (1904-1914) brought to Palestine mostly Russian Jews, some of them imbibed with socialism and labour organization theories, who soon occupied leadership positions (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003; Makdisi, 2011). These settlers focused on two ideals: the transformation of bourgeois Jews in workers-pioneers through physical labour and the creation of an exclusive class of Jewish labourers. In their view, the Jewish economy had to pursue the "conquest of labour" through exclusion of Arabs from land they farmed and from the Jewish labour market (Khalidi, 1997; Falah, 2003; Kattan, 2009; Lockman, 2012). This would provide jobs for the future immigrants and an independent economic system for the future Jewish state. This political economic strategy was a source of great resentment by the Arabs, who saw the fertile lands in the northern valleys and in the coastal plain passed to Jewish hands, giving jobs and higher wages only to the Jewish newcomers and resulting in the development of separate and distinct economies. The settlers of the second aliyah invented the model of kibbutz, a collective agricultural settlement which was economically more viable and more suitable to accommodate all the new immigrants. They created further the moshavot settlement in which private and cooperative property could coexist.

While there were only twenty-two such settlements in 1900, the growth was such that it became forty-seven in 1914 (Al-Rimmawi, 2009). Despite restrictions imposed by the Ottomans and the Arab opposition, by 1917 the JNF purchased more than 420.000 dunams, distributed mostly in the eastern parts of the Upper and the Lower Galilee as well as in the coastal plain south of Haifa, the northeast and southeast of Jaffa.



Figure 11: Map of Palestine and Jewish presence after the First and Second Aliya (Source: Passia)

The First World War (1914-1918)

On the eve of WWI, Palestine was a completely different territory than it had been in the previous century. Now, its connections with Europe were numerous: there were railroads, shipping lines and a telegraph network. Moreover, an increasing number of Europeans were living in Palestine, whether they be Jewish immigrants or business men interested in the Ottoman Empire resources. European culture was in turn spread by way of theatres and cinemas. More and more notable Arab families sent their children

to foreign board schools as a sign of socioeconomic distinction. Life in the cities of Jaffa, Haifa, and Gaza was not so different anymore from life in other Mediterranean cities — namely, Marseille, Athens, Beirut, and Alexandria.

Conversely, the towns of the Palestinian hinterland lived in a completely different manner. In the years preceding WWI, the Palestinian Arab society experienced a widening of the gap that was already beginning to separate life in the countryside from that in the towns. The fellaheen suffered the political and economic changes (starting with the Ottoman tanzimat) that had turned them into taxpayers and debtors. Often forced to migrate to urban areas in search of basic economic sustainment, they felt more and more distant from the ruling classes. Palestinian agriculture became more connected to the coast and to distant markets, placing them behind the more technologically advanced Jewish agricultural production (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). Anti-Zionist sentiment began to spread and became soon the central issue of Arab Palestinian politics. If, at first, it was an impulsive reaction to the growing impoverishment of the fellaheen, who felt threatened by the new aggressive land-buying attitude of the Jews, now the urban bourgeoisie joined in on the protests, fearing the economic competition of this new community that was creating a parallel, sealed market.

1920-1948, The British Mandate

The end of WWI saw the end of the Ottoman Empire. The region was to be shaped by the new-born League of Nations that decided to assign Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria to a Mandatory state, purportedly until they were ready to stand alone. Britain and France had nonetheless secretly signed the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1915, dividing between themselves the territory of the Middle East that was under the Ottomans, thereby breaching promises made by the Allies to the Arabs. After the war, Britain secured for itself Palestine along with Iraq. The British policy had already been explicated by the Balfour Declaration[5] with its support to the Zionist initiative (Chomsky, 1983; Sand, 2009). The objective of the Mandate in Palestine would be to foster the creation of Jewish settlements in the region and the legal immigration of Jews.

The Arabs of Palestine, that for the first time in history was to become a separate entity separated from Syria, had to be granted “civil and religious rights”, without any mention of their political rights (Codovini, 2002). The Declaration seemed to ignore the demographic situation of the time, even though Palestine was home to nearly 700.000 Arabs and 60.000 Jews. Therefore, after the Balfour Declaration and the Peace

treaty of San Remo (1920), the Palestinian Arab elite started to manifest its anti-Zionist position and the situation quickly developed into violent rebellion against the British and the Zionist presence. Meanwhile, from 1919 to 1923, a third aliyah brought to Palestine around 35,000 Eastern European Jewish youth, filled with ideals of spirit of sacrifice and collectivism from the socialist Russian revolution (Orny and Efrat, 1973). They soon created the myth of Masada[6], the Israelite city that preferred suicide to surrender to the Romans. In their vision, the Jews of Palestine were besieged and encircled, with the whole world against them, and they should fight to the bitter end for national freedom and social justice (Benvenisti, 1988).




Figure 12: Map of Palestine under the British Mandate (Source: Passia)




*Figure 1*3: Homa Umigdal settlement, 1946 (Source: Rotbard, 2003)

In these years, the plan of the Zionist movement was to create a chain of settlements across Palestine. They designed the model of fortified settlement called "Wall and Tower" or "Tower and Stockade" (Homa Umigdal in Hebrew) embodying the political dimension of "building the land of Israel" that has since become present in every act of Zionist architecture (Fig.13). The Homa Umigdal project was initiated in 1936 by the members of Kibbutz Tel Amal in order to seize control of land that had been officially purchased from the Arab landowners in Beirut, but that could not be settled because it was in use by Bedouins as pasture.




*Figure 1*4: Construction of a Homa Umigdal settlement, 1946 (Source: Rotbard, 2003)

A 35 metre by 35 metre square made of pre-fabricated wooden walls, filled with gravel and surrounded by a barbed wire fence, was rapidly built in the span of a night. Inside this enclosure were a pre-fabricated wooden tower that watched the surrounding area and four shacks to house forty pioneers. Between 1936 and 1939, some fifty-seven outposts were set up throughout the country (Fig.14). This fortified model could be considered the first example of Israeli architecture, especially as these outposts would later develop into permanent settlements of the kibbutz and moshav type (Rotbard, 2003).

One of the main issues of the Mandate period was whether or not the Jews would have unrestricted immigration and land-buying rights. For the awakening Palestinian national identity, the land issue would play an important role. It would connect the notable leaders, who were eager to acquire an official power position, to the fellaheen, who were seeing with apprehension the possibility of more and more Jewish immigrants buying land in the country.

The position of the fellaheen was heavily influenced by the difficult economic conditions in which the War had left Palestine. In the desperate effort to survive WWI, the Ottoman Empire had exploited the land of historic Palestine as a public reserve of resources. The armies crossing the land depredated the farms of their crops and animals, and sacked the mills and the granaries. The trees and the spontaneous vegetation were cut for fuel, leaving the landscape bare and scarred (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). Moreover, the war had taken away most of the men able to fight, leaving behind villages populated largely by women and elders. At the end of the war, the population was facing a deep economic crisis and the threat of starvation (Morris, 1999). Since the beginning of the Mandate, the British increased its efforts in reviving the Palestinian economy and built environment; they worked, in particular, to enhance the infrastructures by adding new airports, roads and railroads to the system. In doing so, they improved Jaffa's port services and even built a modern port at Haifa from where they could export their oil extracted in Iraq. In this way, they impressed their colonial character on the land, furthermore, by erecting government buildings and a network of dozen of forts in strategic locations (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003).

These improvements created a lively economic activity in the urban areas. Meanwhile, the active Jewish land-buying raised the prices of land, especially in the mountainous areas where unused land was rare. All this worked against the agricultural economy typical of Palestine before the Mandate. Peasants from the mountainous regions, strangled by debts or evicted from their recently sold fields, moved to the cities in search of work. The risk of the creation of a landless, underclass of Palestinian Arabs

was thereby imminent.

Violence erupted in Palestine unexpectedly in 1921 and 1929. The sudden fury of the mobs was symptomatic of the people's reaction to a semi-colonial status and the presence of aggressive newcomers. The Arab population was probably magnifying the reality, but the clash of cultures with the Russian Jewish settlers was evident. The latter's behaviour was perceived as insulting and disregarding of the former's local traditions. The feeling was that uprising was necessary to stop the British, along with the Zionists. In response, the British put a halt to Zionist immigration and formed a small unit of district officers picked from important Arab families. This move affected the peasantry as it was subjugated by the urban families. Moreover, the British tried to improve the productivity of agriculture, thus following the Ottoman behaviour. Like the Turks, they went after more tax revenues, and a better system of land registration, adopting the XIX century Ottoman legislation (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003).

In the years 1932-39, Jewish land purchase continued and under the Mandate it involved large estates whose owners lived on the other side of the border between British Palestine and French Syria-Lebanon, in Beirut or Damascus (Cohen, 2009). The number of settlements increased in the North and near the Jordan Valley, designed to create a belt connecting the ports of Haifa and Jaffa, and to include more land, especially near the borders (Al-Rimmawi, 2009). As immigration increased, the result of the policies of the German National Socialist Party, the need for land increased. JNF bought a total of 1,200,000 dunums, of which about 450,000 came from large estate foreign landowners (Cohen, 2009). Due to this, throughout the thirties, the Arab population became more and more anti-Zionist, and the Arab nationalists began to organise their political opposition.

The diffusion of political consciousness and literacy changed the source of the conflict. From the villages it moved to the urban population; and instead of the brutal violence of 1929, the 1936 revolt made use of political tools. For six months, the Arabs boycotted Zionist products and proceeded with a general strike to damage the British rulers (Khalidi, 2006). Unwittingly, this actually helped Zionist leaders prove the need for a complete economic separation between the two populations (Morris, 1999). The conflict lasted for about three years, and then the Arabs, lacking unity and organization, were defeated by the superior military force of the British and the cohesion of the Jewish fighters. The nationalists were lacking internal common goals and the support of the villagers, who could not risk impoverishing their already miserable economy.

After the strike and certain terrorist attacks, whose victims included both Arab and Jewish people, the British were provoked to review their protective policies toward

the Jewish community. Therefore, they formed the Peel Commission (1937) which proposed the solution of the partition of the land in a distribution of 20 per cent to Jewish persons and 80 per cent to Arabs; it included the annexation of Transjordan, plus a small British enclave which included Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Jaffa. The Peel proposal did not oversee any development, but would serve as base for a future arrangement. The recommendations of the Peel report were soon declared un-implementable by the Woodhead commission of 1938 that considered the partition economically unsustainable. Both the reports were refused by the Arab and the Jewish leaders.

With the Second World War (WWII) looming, the British started to fear that the Arab world might turn against them. Therefore, they annulled the idea of a Jewish state and issued the White Paper (1939) that sought to create an independent Palestine, governed by Palestinian Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers in the population. Jewish immigration was subsequently limited to 75,000 for the five-year period of 1940-1944, with a supplementary quota of 25,000 to cover refugee emergencies. After this, further immigration would depend on Arab permission (Codovini, 2002). More restrictions were also placed on Jewish land purchase. Nevertheless, the Land Transfer Regulations issued in 1940 by the Mandate government were based on the notion of partition. Accordingly, Palestine was divided into three zones (A-C), with different land transfer from Arabs to Jews regulations. In Zone A, 64 per cent of Palestine transfers were mostly prohibited; in Zone B, 31 per cent of the total area, land sales were permitted only in such cases that would bring development or mutual benefit to both Arabs and Jews; finally, in Zone C, 5 per cent of Palestine (municipal areas, the Haifa industrial zone and the maritime plain) saw no restrictions at all (Falah, 2003). Jewish immigration relied on the Zionist process of Land redemption. Without Jewish-owned land, the Zionists could not return to their land, settle somewhere or create the new Jewish society they so desired (Cohen, 2009).

The acquisition of land became more and more difficult for the JNF. Not only did the Mandate laws prohibit land sales from Arab to Jews, but the Arab nationalists became ever more violent in their opposition to Jewish immigration and settlement. Political activists and armed groups started to intimidate the potential sellers and to obstruct the eviction of tenant farmers. So even if the Arab landowners (and farmers) were willing to sell their land for economic reasons, threats from the Arab nationalists, with the support of Syrian and Lebanon, would discourage them (Codovini, 2002). Jewish land-buying continued despite these obstacles and the Arab malaise increased. In the forties, most of the small farmers had to provide some supplementary income to

survive which stemmed from non-agricultural jobs in the urban areas, especially from construction work for Jewish enterprises. When WWII erupted, imported goods became unavailable and rural communities took advantage of the situation, bettering their living standard considerably (Hurewitz, 1976).

During WWII, the Zionists had taken the side of the British, hoping in a future repudiation of the White Book and a support for the birth of a Jewish state. The Arabs were more inclined towards the Germans, predominantly for three reasons: 1) their anti-Zionism, 2) the desire to free themselves from colonial domination, and 3) their proximity to victory. Thousands of Jewish fighters enlisted in the British army, thereby gaining fighting experience. The Haganah[7] had illegally bought weapons and ammunitions. A special operation corps had been created, the Palmach[8], an assault company fully mobile on the territory. Under the British Mandate, these armies were illegal, so the combatants hid themselves in the settlements disguised as farmers. After the end of the conflict, the Haganah and the terrorist Irgun[9] revolted against colonial rule, targeting British symbols and people with explosive attacks (Khalidi, 2006). The Arabs opposed them, expressing their ideas with anti-Zionist rallies in Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in 1945.

At the time of the war, the fight for the territory of Palestine remained frozen. The stop to the land acquisition imposed by the British was working; but, the severe limitations imposed on the immigration were not. Illicit migration continued, mainly by sea. More settlements were created in central and southern Palestine, and near Lake Hula, on a bid to attain the hydro-resources. Post-war, the genocide perpetrated by Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists substantiated the necessity to provide a safe harbour for the Jews in Palestine. In principle, the Jewish survivors refused to remain in displaced person camps that recalled concentration or prison camps. And yet, Western countries refused to reintegrate them on their own territory. The Zionists were inciting the Jews from all over the world to migrate to Palestine (Morris, 1999). In order to stop the illegal immigration in the Mandate, the British adopted sometimes drastic, unpopular strategies, like reclusion of the refugees in camps, which caused them international political embarrassment. Therefore, after WWII, they no longer had the will or the resources to keep the Palestinian burden on their shoulders (Hirst, 1977).

On February 14th 1947, the British government decided to disentangle itself from the complex situation of Palestine. The problem was passed to the United Nations who, reunited in session in April-May 1947, nominated in turn a commission (UNSCOP). The members of UNSCOP stayed for five weeks in Palestine, visiting villages and settlements, speaking to functionaries and local population. They found

very welcoming Jews and diffident and impolite, if not aggressive, Arabs. The Jewish areas showed economic development in contrast to the backwardness of Arab town and villages. In fact, after the war, the new economy had broadened its boundaries and put its centres in cities like Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa. The Palestinian workers, following this tendency of individual mobility, started to become part of an impersonal urban working class. This mobility of people was increased by the displaced tenants of absentee landlords, who continued to be evicted from the purchased land often without compensation.

In the countryside, villages were left aside at the margins of the national economy (Kimmerling and Migdal, 1993). The final Zionist propaganda came from the Exodus case on July 12th 1947[10]. Unsurprisingly, the UNSCOP report asked for the end of the Mandate period and the partition of the territory into two states with international administration to be present in both Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The report recommended further for the economic union of the two states and a period of two years of British control over the immigration of 150,000 Jews into the region.

The United States and the URSS supported the partition, while the British secretly decided to evacuate Palestine in order to avoid the practical responsibility of the partition. At the moment of the vote of Resolution 181 on November 29th 1947, the Zionist and the American lobbyism worked hard and efficiently: the votes in favour amounted to 33; against, 13; abstentions, 10. The Arab delegates left the room proclaiming that the vote had no value and that any attempt at dividing the land of Palestine would end in war. They could not understand how 37 per cent of the population (around 620,000 Jews) had obtained 55 per cent of the land (14,200,000 dunums) when it has up until that point only owned 7 per cent. In fact Palestine comprised of around 26,000 squared kilometres. Of these, the Jews were allotted 14,000 squared kilometres. The Arabs, two third of the population, obtained 11,500 squared kilometres.

The maps of the partition plan render the geopolitical value of the Zionist settlements evident: the borders of the Jewish state followed the distribution of the settlements and of the pre-1948 purchased land (Falah, 2003). The Jewish state was put together by allocating all the mainly Arab-free land, where Jews had established territorial continuity. Trying to avoid the inclusion of too many Arabs inside the Jewish state, the commission plan left the isolated settlements out of Israel. The 170,000 Arab residents of Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and Safed, and the peasants of the rural sub-districts of Haifa, Tiberias, Jaffa and Ramla, would thereby remain the only Arabs inside Israel. The Negev, an area which besides Beersheba and Khalsa did not have Arab settlements,

was allotted to Israel. Moreover, most of its land already belonged to Jews. As the majority of the Arab population resided in the north-western part of the Galilee, between Jerusalem and the inland, on the coastal plain and north of the Dead Sea, these areas did not fall inside the new Jewish state (Biger, 2008).




Figure 15: Landownership in Palestine and the UN partition plan, 1947 (Source: Passia)

The Zionist leaders saw the Resolution 181 as the declaration of their statehood (Hirst, 1977). The size of the land was regarded as the minimum that they were willing to accept. It was no secret that since its first years the Zionist movement considered the future of Eretz Israel as dependent on the amount of land that Jewish people could buy and settle upon (Yosef Nachmani 1938, cited in Morris, 2008, p. 168, note 10–11).

The reaction of the British was to prepare to leave Palestine as fast as possible. At the withdrawal of the British troops on May 14th 1948, the birth of the state of Israel was proclaimed by its Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the first Arab-Israeli war subsequently exploded. Palestinian Arabs were supported by the new born Arab states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, against the Jewish army. The fight was between an army of young men (trained from WWII experience) against a disorganized and underequipped Arab army. At the end of the conflict, the UN partition plan was

pulverized and a Jewish state (Israel) was established on 78 per cent of the Mandate Palestine (including the Negev and West Jerusalem) and the remaining land of Palestine was divided between Jordan (the West Bank and East Jerusalem) and Egypt (the Gaza Strip). The conflict resulted in a lot of damage to the peasant communities of the north and of the coastal plain whereas in areas far from Jewish settlement, particularly in the central mountains, village society life remained mostly intact (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). In fact, fights and mass evictions involved the Arab population in the areas of the coastal plain, the Galilee, and the south. The eastern region with the cities of Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarem, Jenin, and the Arab part of Jerusalem, where the fighting was less violent, remained largely intact.

The flight of Palestinians from their homes had begun in the December of 1947, when the Haganah started to put in place the "Plan Dalet". This strategy was meant to clear the territory of the soon to be state of Israel of hostile forces, in anticipation of an Arab hostile reaction. Moreover, Plan Dalet outlined the scheme of a territorial continuity between the major concentrations of Jewish population that would impose the layout to the Jewish State's future borders (Morris, 2004).

The first to leave had been the wealthy merchants and notables of the cities with a dense Jewish presence, Jaffa-Tel-Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. They left for Lebanon, Egypt and Transjordan. After them, the upper and middle classes, returned to their home villages, or in all-Arab towns such as Nazareth and Nablus. Immediately after the British left, Jaffa and Haifa fell to the Jewish army and marked the end of urban and coastal Palestinian society. Terrorized by the fighting and massacres as well as by the idea of Jewish rule and revenge, many Arabs left even before the conflict could arrive at their doorsteps. When the neighbouring Arab countries entered the war to help the Palestinians, the Haganah put in place a violent mass expulsion and the decimation of the Palestinian Arab society was completed. According to many scholars (Khalidi, 1988; Masalha, 1992), the expulsion of one million Palestinians and the destruction of the built environment that characterized the now-Israeli part of historic Palestine was all premeditated. More than 400 villages were demolished and a mass of desperate refugees ended up in refugee camps in the West Bank. As a result, the outcome of the conflict is today celebrated by Israelis as their War of Independence, but it is mourned by Palestinians as the Nakba, 'Catastrophe' (Cook, 2008).

After the conflict, hundreds of thousands of refugees crowded into camps in the Gaza Strip (administered by Egypt) as well as in Syria and Lebanon. In the area that was assigned to Transjordan (later to be known as West Bank), the almost 400,000 refugees spread between refugee camps, towns and villages. With growth of this

population, resources became strained, made worse by the loss of fertile land on the western side (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003).



*Figure 1*6: Map of UNRWA Refugee Camps (red triangles), 1958
(Source: Passia)

The Palestinian society had moved from decades of agrarian development and culture to life centred around and in towns, a process which Zureik calls "depeasantification" (Zureik, 1980). After 1948, the cities on the coast and Jerusalem, around which most of the Palestinian economy was built, became inaccessible. But a massive growth of population occurred in the towns on the mountainous strip, like Nablus and Bethlehem. This encapsulated region had preserved the values of the Palestinian society afar, away from Western influence. Now, it would foster its social and cultural reconstruction. Immediately after the 1949 armistice with Egypt, Syria and Transjordan, inside Israeli borders the decision was made to ban the return of the

refugees to their homes. The main focus of Zionism had been land and security. Therefore, this decision was made to absorb abandoned properties for the Jewish people and to avoid a massive return of the Arab population. In 1949, 130 new settlements were established on the ruins of Arab villages and 700,000 new Jewish refugees from Europe and Arab countries alike took over the now abandoned houses in the cities. The biggest communities of Arab citizens remained in Haifa and Tel-Aviv (formerly, Jaffa) and spread in surviving villages (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003).

In 1950, the Israeli government made it official with the emanation of the Law of Return, granting to every Jew in the world the right to immigrate to Israel. In the following years, various laws were issued to ensure the state control of the land and to confiscate it from Palestinian private owners[11], who fell under the pressure to leave their homes (Nijim and Muammar, 1984). On the same year, Transjordan annexed the West Bank, which became the Kingdom of Jordan.



Figure 17: Map of UN partition plan, 1948 (left) and the Armistice Line of 1949 (right) (Source: Passia)

Notes

[1] This definition of Palestine was created by the Anglo-Jewish writer Israel Zangwill and immediately became the most quoted description of the land used by the Zionists leaders (Cook, 2008). It contains in its few words the Zionist mindset that ignores the Arab population and considers the territory of Palestine as the land for the future Jewish state (Said, 1979; Alam, 2009).

[2] This is the pen name of Asher Zvi Hirsch Ginsberg (18 August 1856 – 2 January 1927), a Russian Hebrew essayist. He is known as the founder of cultural Zionism. Unlike Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, Ha'am strived for "a Jewish state and not merely a state of Jews". He made his first trip to Palestine in 1891, and he described his visit in the essay "A Truth from Eretz Yisrael" about the progress of Jewish settlements, reporting on hunger, on Arab dissatisfaction and unrest, on unemployment, and on people leaving. He saw as a great error the settlers' attitude towards the Arabs, full of contempt, regarding them as savages.

[3] The Dreyfus Case exploded in France in 1894, following the presumed betrayal of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery official. Outburst of intense anti-Semitism followed his trial. His innocence was in the end proved, but it affected the perception of the French society's attitude towards the Jews. In the end, was Dreyfus a real member of the French nation or was he just a representative of an alien people who had insinuated itself inside the country? (Sand, 2009)

[4] Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) was a Hungarian Jew. As a journalist, writer and a lawyer, he covered the Dreyfus trial and explored how the anti-Semitism of this event was in fact rooted in European society in general. He thus became the founder of Politic Zionism.

[5] On November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, the British foreign secretary, sent to the office of Baron Rotschild a letter declaring the support of the Crown for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine (Chomsky, 1983; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). It read as follows: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

[6] Masada: fortress, located on a rocky peak beside the Dead Sea. In 73, after a three year siege conducted by the Romans, the Zealot population of Masada decided to commit suicide rather than surrender. According to tradition, two women and three children were left to transmit the story of this sacrifice to the Jewish community. In 1927, the poem "Masada," composed by Isaac Lamdan, became the watchword of Zionist youth (Macmillan Reference Dictionary, 2005).

[7] Haganah ("defence" in Hebrew) was the military wing of the Jewish leadership in Mandatory Palestine. Created in 1920, it served to protect Jewish colonies against the actions of Arabs against their expansion.

[8] Palmach brigades (Hebrew acronym for "shock brigades") were created in May 1941 by the Jewish Agency and Haganah.

[9] Nationalist extremist Jewish movement detached from Haganah in 1931, which used the same terrorist ways as Arab attacks.

[10] An American boat used to transport around 4,500 Holocaust survivors from France to Palestine in July 1947. The British stopped the boat just outside of port Haifa and took the passengers back to France. The journey of this Exodus finally ended in Hamburg.

[11] In 1950 the Absentee Property Law was issued, that declared anyone who was a citizen or resident of one of the Arab states or a Palestinian citizen on 29 November 1949, but who had left his or her place of residence—even as a refugee within Palestine— to be an "absentee." The Israeli "custodian of absentee property" was empowered by the Knesset to sell absentee-owned properties to the Development Authority. This legalized the possession and distribution of movable and immovable properties abandoned by the fleeing Arab population to the Jewish citizens of Israel. The custodian was thereby able to appropriate lands, households, and farms for the new wave of Jews who immigrated to Israel after

1948. As most of the owners had fled the Palestine Mandate following the outbreak of hostilities in 1948, compensation was dispensed with (Kumaraswamy, 2006).

Chapter 6.

The Territorial Planning of Occupation

Introduction

With the declaration of independence began a never-ending conflict. More Arab-Israeli wars would follow, in 1956, 1967 and 1972. Israel would win all of them, and each time the land of the Palestinians would shrink. This process of occupation can be clearly represented using the instrument of maps, a visual tool which belongs to planning, but in this context has acquired a military and political significance. Pursuing the Zionist dream of a Greater Israel (Eretz Israel), from the original settlements in the coastal plains, new plans were made to accommodate immigrants and secure the existence of the Jewish state. During the first years after the declaration of independence and the end of the 1948 war, Israel would consolidate inside the Armistice Line, demolishing Palestinian villages and creating new towns for the immigrants. While their homes were destroyed and the way back to their lands sealed, Palestinian refugees would flow in the West Bank and the surrounding Arab countries.

Palestinian society would suffer the effects of losing its main cities on the coast and the economic crisis derived from Jordanian domination would push many to emigrate further overseas. This chapter will explain how Israeli territorial planning would move in parallel with the changes in its borders during the wars against Arab countries. At first, the Sharon Plan for Israel designed the new towns of the future state. Then, after the 1967 war and the occupation of the West Bank, the Allon Plan (1967) and the Sharon Plan (1977) defined the position of civilian settlements in strategic locations to secure the new borders and the future Jewish presence on the territory. The Oslo Peace Agreements of 1992 declared the birth of a Palestinian National Authority and defined a new territorial zoning with varying levels of Israeli control.

This chapter will continue to explain how, since the birth of the state, Israel has developed a whole system of territorial control which is comprised of settlements, Jewish-only by-pass roads, checkpoints, roadblocks and barriers. This system, which has been best described as the “Architecture of Occupation” (Weizman, 2007), together with the Oslo area system, detrimentally affects the Palestinian population and landscape.

After 1948: Immediate Changes to Palestinian Society

The disappearance of the urban-middle class, the rise of emigration and the dependence on the Jordanian economy

The period of violence that culminated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was a major turning point for Palestinian society (Migdal, 1980). For almost a century, population movement from east to west and urbanisation had characterised Palestine. From the rural central hills, people were moving towards the coastal towns of Haifa and Jaffa. Before the war, more than a third of the Arab population lived in sixteen cities and towns (Benvenisti, 2000). The affluent Arab urban-middle class was an agent of modernisation, capable of revolutionising the whole Palestinian society. The elegant neighbourhoods left behind in Jaffa and Jerusalem are testimonies to its material achievements, modern lifestyle and sophistication.

With the Arab defeat in 1948, physical and geographical fragmentation occurred, resulting largely from the flight eastward of refugees and the dismantling of Arab urban institutions on the coast. The uprooting of almost 90 per cent of the urban Arab population put a halt to the process of change and modernisation (Benvenisti, 2000).

The old clan system, that had initially been weakened by the rapid processes of urbanisation and social modernisation of the latter years of the British Mandate, stood now as the last bastion of a society shaken to its foundation. Throughout the Mandate period, Palestinian society had been divided by enduring regional and local loyalties, as a strong religious attachment to Palestine among Muslim and Christians, and the "intense attachment of the urban population to their cities and towns, of the peasantry to their villages and lands, and of both to their home regions" (Khalidi, 1997). There were gaps between urban and rural populations, between the well-to-do and the poor as well as between the literate and the illiterate. However, the shared trauma of the war rendered many of these differences irrelevant, decreasing the importance of many pre-1948 conflicts, especially for those who suffered dispossession, expulsion and violent trauma (Khalidi, 1997). After the war, Palestinians found themselves again tied to external administrative boundaries: under Israeli, Jordanian and Egyptian rule; reduced to a minority population in their own land (Zureik, 1977).

Traditionally, the West Bank's trade outlets had been via the coastal cities, but after 1948 the ties to the urban infrastructure were broken. Transjordan before the war had almost no industrial base, and a very small population of mostly Bedouin tribes. After the war, the Jordanian regime capital investment policy favoured the East Bank so much so that, despite having a more literate and skilled population, the West Bank

stagnated in comparison. The Kingdom discouraged any development of a Palestinian industrial economy (Zureik, 1977), thus leaving only self-subsistence and service activities to the local population, now facing a severe economic depression.

Palestinians were left with only the option to migrate; and many did, mostly towards the East Bank, whereby they were confined to work often as low-level workers in companies with a non-Palestinian hierarchy. The more skilled and educated of the Palestinians who left first, but were soon followed by others ranked lower in the social ladder. Later, they also left towards the oils states (Kuwait) and outside the Middle East (Migdal, 1980), sending home their profits and thereby funnelling a much needed source of income that would for many years function as the basis of the Palestinian economy. Refugees suffered most due to the harsh economic conditions: employment was so scarce and they so numerous, not to mention hungry, that most were forced to work for any wage which prompted little sympathy from fellow Palestinians, who saw them mostly as a burden (Owen, 1982).

Around 720,000 Arabs fled their homes inside the Green Line area; almost 85 per cent of the Palestinian population (United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1950; Morris, 1999). After the war, refugees were mostly abandoned to refugee camps in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan; any support was dependent on UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) and other international organisations (Codovini, 2002). In these refugee camps, the difference between urban and rural, bourgeois and peasant was systematically erased by the circumstances and a new generation of Palestinians received free literacy education in UNRWA schools (Khalidi, 1997).

The reduction of Palestinian rural land

The new border that was created by 1949 Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement sought to influence heavily the lives of those who lived along it. The Demarcation Line designed in 1948 by the UN Partition Plan (designed on a map) was transformed and moved westward following Israel’s security concerns and Jordan’s acquiescence. Consequently, Israel acquired land along the border that was considered fundamental to its safety, in particular, some of the land belonging to a number of villages in the Jerusalem area came to be categorised as 'No Man's Land'. Even though such lands were not technically under Israeli control, the villagers were not permitted to cultivate them.

The results of this division on the villages were tremendous. The frontier villages were ancient settlements situated on the top of rocky hills providing natural protection for the village itself and sources of water for cultivating the land on the

plains. Once belonging to a unified territory, the West Bank villages were cut off from the vital economy of the plain area. The landholders had to give up the western, more fertile soil as it remained on the Israeli side. They were left instead with stonier, more arid lands.

Jerusalem is a good example of the transformation that took place in the areas situated along the Armistice Line. Up until 1948, the city had been an important trading centre, but the war severely impacted its commercial life. The Arab citizens that had fled the city in 1948 started to come back in 1950, but under Hashemite rule, the role of capital of the area was assigned to Amman and Jerusalem lost its economic supremacy. The new border divided it in two, and the surrounding areas were severely affected by this demarcation. The economic links with villages that had depended on the city for centuries were severed, forcing them to turn eastward to new markets for their products, wherein they encountered different and heavy competition (Owen, 1982).

The Israeli Project of Nation-Building

The destruction of Arab villages within Israel

For the government of the new-born state of Israel, the end of the war and the creation of legal borders engendered the legitimisation of the "on-going process of the fulfilment of Zionism" (Benvenisti, 2000) In order to accomplish the creation of the Jewish nation, Israel leaders had determined that the Arabs would never be allowed to return to their homes, hence that the abandoned areas were designated for the settlement of Jews or to be turned over to existing Jewish settlements. Prior to the war, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) purchased the land from its legitimate owners; now, the Israeli military expelled Arabs with the pretext of military security. But, the final objective was still to take control of the maximum amount of land and to remove as much as possible of the Arab population from it, in order to make space for the arrival of Israeli settlers.

When Palestinian communities were uprooted their physical space and landscape started to disappear. The destruction of the Palestinian landscape, both human and physical, was implemented since the earliest stages of the war. An estimation of 200 Arab villages within Israeli territory were abandoned (see Fig. 18), and from then on large geographical and demographic changes began to take place. The demolition of these villages by the army, or as a result of vandalism prompted by a sense of revenge, was the main visible sign of the destruction of the old landscape. It was accompanied by the destruction of an Arab agriculture: citrus and olive groves, orchards and terraces provided an even more significant effect for the identity of the territory. Most groves were abandoned and then uprooted to make place for housing developments for new

Jewish immigrants, who were at that point overflowing the urban areas along the coast (Benvenisti, 2000).




Figure 18: Map of Palestinian villages depopulated in 1948 and razed by Israel (Source: Passia)

In the years that followed, most of the abandoned villages remained deserted; the houses started to crumble and the orchards started to go wild. After the destruction carried out by the Israeli army, renovation work was attempted to house the Jews in the homes of Arabs who fled, but repairs turned out to be more costly than building new homes. Moreover, many Arab houses were built with the traditional technique of adobe walls, made of mud bricks and straw, making it not worth saving. The village cluster of connected houses was not well accepted by the coming European Jews, so the final

decision was usually to demolish the Arab village and build a new Israeli settlement next to it.

According to the Palestinian geographer, Ghazi Falah, who conducted a survey of the remnants of the Arab landscape inside Israel (Ghazi Falah, 1996), two-thirds of the villages disappeared completely, while others were totally demolished. Their outlines nonetheless are still identifiable thanks to prickly pear cactus hedges, stone terraces or fruit trees gone wild (Benvenisti, 2000).



Figure 19: The village of Beit Natif, depopulated in 1948, with IDF soldiers in the foreground (Source: National Photo Collection of Israel, Photography dept. Goverment Press Office)

Plan Dalet

The destruction of Palestinian villages had the political objective of preventing any sort of return of the Arabs who left in fear of war, violence and oppression. It created in turn a safe environment for the Jewish now-Israeli citizens, an environment that was already conceived of several years before the beginning of the conflict itself. Still, under the British Mandate, Zionist political and military leaders worked out the guidelines to take control of Palestine, and to protect the people and borders of the future state (Morris, 1989), as well as the Jewish population who lived in settlements outside those borders (Ghazi Falah, 1996).

The so-called Plan Dalet contained specific military orders regarding which Palestinian social centres should be targeted, occupied and eventually destroyed. It contained instructions to prevent enemy concentration and counter-attack near the

Israeli defensive line (Pappe, 2006). According to this plan, Palestinian villages that were difficult to control should be destroyed, along with those near to Jewish settlements; they were to be cleansed so as to prevent them being used as bases. In the case of resistance, all inhabitants would be expelled, forced to move outside the borders of the Israeli state. If no resistance was met, the residents were to be placed under military rule (Khalidi, 1988; Ghazi Falah, 1996; Khalidi, 2005).

Benny Morris, one of the leading so-called "new historians" of Israel, affirmed that Plan Dalet was "a strategic-ideological anchor and basis for expulsions by army commanders" (Morris, 2004). Morris writes that, in order to supervise the operations of destruction and repopulation of Palestinian areas, the new Israeli government unofficially appointed the “Transfer Committee” which was led by the President of the JNF, Yosef Weiz. The Committee agents would tour the countryside to determine which villages should be destroyed and which were to be preserved for Jewish settlement. This information was to be eventually presented to returning refugees as facts on the ground (Morris, 2004).

Absentees’ Property Law and the Law of Return (1950)

Israel’s newly formed government pursued the objective of impeding the return of Palestinian refugees, so as to create an empty land base for the further settlement of Jews, by way of two emergency laws passed in 1950. The “Law on the Acquisition of Absentees’ Property” was used to transfer to an assigned custodian all properties of the people who fled or were at the time ‘away’ from their regular place of residence determined within a specific frame of time. The custodian was then authorised to sell the property to the Development Authority, therefore, to nationalise the land. The so-called ‘absentees’ mentioned were Arabs who had left during the war, even if only for a few days, or who had already returned to the general region but had moved to a nearby safer location (Benvenisti, 2000). Nevertheless, they were legally classified as ‘absent’ during the conflict.

They, therefore, lost their land to the custodian. In the end, this operation made it possible for the government to hand over ownership of the land to new Jewish settlers, over a third of whom came to live on ‘absentee’ property by 1954 (Halbrook, 1981). At the same time that the Knesset was putting all its efforts into denying the possibility of return for the Arabs who had left, the “Law of Return” allowed Jews, wherever they might be from, to immigrate freely to Israel, acquiring automatically the right to full citizenship (Hirst, 1977).

The Sharon Plan for Israel

As said in the previous chapter, the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is tightly bound to the control of the territory. One of the first actions of the Knesset as a national government was to proceed to define its control over the territory within the Armistice Line by way of the official tools of a planning Masterplan. Therefore, only a few weeks after the declaration of independence, Arieh Sharon, a Zionist settler from the first wave and a Bauhaus architect graduate, was commissioned to establish the governmental planning department.

Sharon presented an overall masterplan for Israel, 1949–1952, known as the Sharon Plan: it consisted of a powerful tool for modelling a new landscape and thereby dictating the socio-material shape of things to come. More than a planning document, the Sharon Plan provided the government with a set of principles, which could be used as a building manual for a nationwide-project embracing dozens of new cities and towns as well as hundreds of rural settlements (see Fig.20-21). The planners were asked to provide temporary housing for the masses of new and incoming settlers, to foresee the growth of the population, and to plan for a consolidation of the Green Line, preventing further territorial concessions to the Arabs and the return of refugees.






Figure 20 (left): The Envisaged Population at the End of First Stage of Development, with small dots indicating the planned settlements (Source: Sharon, 1951)
Figure 21 (right): En Hashofet kibbutz, small agricultural unit of about 100 families, based on shared ownership of the land (Source: Sharon, 1951)

The Masterplan had to fill the periphery of the State, left vacant by hundreds of thousands of Palestinian inhabitants and the systematic destruction of their agricultural villages, which would not appear in the technical drawings. The planners, therefore, devised a network of agrarian frontier settlements, following the strategy of using civil settlements as military outposts (Segal and Weizman, 2003), as described by Ben Gurion himself in a speech from 1948:

> Only dense agricultural settlement along the borders—a chain of farmsteads in the north, on the coast, along the Jordan, and in the Negev—will act as a reliable shield for the security of the country from external attacks. Not silent stone forts, but a living, working and productive human wall—the only wall that is neither deterred nor damaged by enemy firepower—can protect the borders of our country (cited in Yiftachel, 2010).

Sharon achieved, as such, the aim of territorial security through the spatial approach of scattering the most settlements on the most space, establishing more than 400 rural Jewish settlements, giving preference to the foundation of new ones on the restoration or expansion of existing ones (Yiftachel, 2010).

The need to apply the Sharon Plan, and to contrast the concentration of the immigrants in coastal big cities, called for a top-down system of planning and construction. Subsequently, during the 1950s and 1960s, the "Israeli Project" was a state-controlled master planning project, governed by Arieh Sharon's instructions of rational distribution of population and standardised architecture (Weizman, 2007). The Sharon Plan thereby laid the historic and professional foundations for Israeli planning. The goal was to institutionalise the spatial infrastructure of the Zionist nation-building program, which would soon pass from the hands of professional architects and planner to those of politicians and army officials.

The Occupation of the West Bank (1967)

In early 1967, Israel found itself in economic difficulties and on the verge of a new conflict. A new war started from a complicated set of events that Israel perceived as threatening: first, the creation of the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (PLO); second, the first military operations of the Palestinian Al-Fatah, the support of which was sourced from the pan-arabist and socialist Baath party; third, the mutual support agreement signed by Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. Moreover, Syria and Jordan had planned the construction of a dam along the Jordan River that would have deviated the body of water's course, subtracting most of Israel's water resources, thus aggravating its economic crisis (Hirst, 1977).

The course of counter-action chosen by Moshe Dayan, Israel's Defence Minister, was preventive attack in order to avoid an Arab siege. Therefore, using fast operations to prevent Arab regrouping, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This 1967 war saw the military tactic supremacy of Israel, given that in only six days they occupied the Golan Heights of Syria, the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, and, last but not least, the West Bank of Jordan. Jerusalem was unilaterally annexed to Israel right after the ceasefire. The Arab countries refused to sign a peace agreement with Israel, but they agreed to a compromise: UN Resolution 242, subordinating peace to Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories and to the cessation of Palestinian terrorist activities. The PLO and Syria refused to agree to this recommendation that required the official recognition of sovereignty of all the Nations involved, including Israel.




Figure 22: The territorial sitation after 1967 (Source: Passia)

With the land occupied in the Six Days War, Israel was in control of a territory extending from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, on more than 100.000 square kilometres, with an Arab population that grew from 200.000 to more than a million (Codovini, 2002). The Zionist dream of Eretz Israel seemed to be finally in place, but more people were needed to ensure cultivation of the land, keeping enemies at bay (Hirst, 1977). The tools chosen to pursue these objectives were once again the ones of territorial planning.

The Evolution of Settlement Plans

After 1967, the Israeli settlements policy was moved from the hands of practitioners and technicians to those of politicians, military leaders and ideological activists, who used it as a strategic tool of control over the newly occupied territory. The Fourth Geneva Convention[1] prohibits the establishment of civilian settlements in Occupied Territories (Geneva Conventions, 2014). Nevertheless, while the Arieh Sharon plan regarded the borders of the state as fixed, post-1967 settlement enterprise considered the Occupied Territories as an indispensable opportunity (Weizman, 2007).

First steps into the West Bank: the Allon Plan (1967-77)

Before even the close of 1967, Yigal Allon − then head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlements − began to prepare a strategic plan for the establishment of settlements in certain parts of the West Bank (see map above). The main objective of the Allon Plan was to ensure state security. The establishment of a string of settlements would consolidate the Jewish presence in the borderlands, in particular, in the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert. These agricultural settlements would constitute a preliminary step towards formal annexation (Allon, 1970). They would provide maximum security and maximum territory for Israel with a minimum number of Arabs. The Allon Plan further recommended to avoid the annexation of areas densely populated by Palestinians (Benvenisti and Khayat, 1987) so as to maintain the appearance of a peaceful status quo.

The final plan (1970) proposed to annex a strip along the Jordan River with a width of approximately twenty kilometres; the areas around Greater Jerusalem; the Etzion Settlement Block southwest of this; most of the Judean Desert; and a strip of territory in the south of the Hebron mountains. All together, these areas comprise approximately 50% of the West Bank (Harris, 1980). According to the Allon Plan, the dense Palestinian communities left in two disconnected areas around Ramallah and Hebron would remain Arab (see Fig. 23).

The Allon plan was never officially adopted by the government, but it does point to the direction which the expansion of Israeli presence in the West Bank territory has taken. The first settlement in the Occupied Territories was Kfar Etzion, established in 1967 between Jerusalem and Hebron; then around thirty more settlements followed until 1977, when the Labour party in government was replaced by the Likud, who applied a more spiritual agenda to the expansion of the settlements (Benvenisti, 1988).




Figure 23: The Allon Plan (Source: Benvenisti-Khayat, 1988)

Gush Emunim and the Drobless Plan (1978)

The Likud entrusted Matitiyahu Drobless, head of the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Division, to prepare a comprehensive plan for the establishment of settlements throughout the West Bank. The Drobless Plan (1978) was completely in line with the plans of Gush Emunim, a religious organization that preached for the need to control as much land as possible, in order to realize the dream of Eretz Israel (B'Tselem, 2002).




Figure 24: The Drobless Plan (Source: Benvenisti-Khayat, 1988)

The plan was based on the assumption that the civilian presence of Jewish communities was vital to the security of the state. Therefore, to hold the areas of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) forever, a rapid settlement drive in these areas was needed. As it can be seen on the map (Fig. 24), areas around the main Palestinian towns (Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus, Qalqiliya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jericho, Hebron) would be dedicated to the construction of settlements, including land for their expansion (striped areas). The map shows how, following this plan, the Jewish presence would erode significantly the occupied territory. In fact, the cooperation with Gush Emunim led to the establishment of dozens of "community settlements", most of which were situated on the central mountain ridge close to Palestinian population centres, shifting once and for all the Israeli settlements strategy away from the recommendations of the Allon plan.

The Ariel Sharon Plan (1977-82)

During his military career, General Ariel Sharon developed a defensive strategy for the Sinai based on a series of strongpoints spread out on a series of hilltops at tactically important locations, overlooking the surrounding areas and connected by a network of fast roads. The isolated, semi-autonomous strongpoints were to be located so that each could be seen from those adjacent to it, and they could cover each other with artillery fire (Weizman, 2007).

When Ariel Sharon became Minister of Agriculture in the first Likud government (1977-1981), he applied, via a plan for the West Bank, the same strategy he used in the Sinai. Namely, he designed a map delineating vital areas for Israel's security that should subsequently be annexed. He modified and expanded the Drobless Plan and Gush Emunim, by intensifying forms of colonisation along the Green Line in order to secure the borders between the West Bank and Israel. Moreover, he concentrated on the establishment of settlements in these areas as a means of promoting annexation. On the map, it is visible how the Jewish areas are not only dotting the territory, but they become huge continuous areas. According to Sharon's map (Fig. 25), only few enclaves densely populated by Palestinians were not to come under Israeli sovereignty in the future, roughly the areas of Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron. Although the government did not officially adopt this plan, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Construction and Housing followed its recommendations and concentrated their efforts on establishing settlements on the western slopes of the central mountain ridge in the West Bank, north of Jerusalem.

These efforts reflected Sharon's belief that it was important to prevent the

contiguity of Palestinian settlements along the Green Line. It did so by disaggregating the West Bank territories west of Jenin, Nablus, and north of Ramallah, from the Palestinian communities adjacent to the Green Line within Israel. In this plan, the settlements are used as civilian strongpoints, with the aspect of residential neighbourhoods, but the purpose of securing the land. Placed on hilltops, consisting of rings of houses built following the topographic lines, they focus on control over the landscape, maximising the view for security reasons. The settlers houses would work as an inverse panopticon (Foucault, 1991), whereby the surrounding territory is potentially always under scrutiny, using the outer ring of houses as observation points. In the Ariel Sharon Plan, a network of bypass roads would then connect the Jewish settlements spread in the West Bank, from the Jordan Valley to the coastal cities, thereby separating the Palestinian communities already there even further.




Figure 25: The Sharon Plan (Source: Passia)

The Process of Land Grabs

To apply the territorial planning developed since the beginning of 1967 occupation, Israel had to take official control of hundreds of thousands of dunam (four dunam = one acre) throughout the West Bank, using a complex legal and administrative process (Fields, 2010). On the basis of the Ottoman Law of 1858, all land that was identified as mawat (for public use) or miri (for agricultural use), but was not cultivated or had been left vacant, was suddenly declared "state land" (B'Tselem, 2002). In this way, around 26 per cent of the Occupied Territories was legally registered as property of the Israeli State (Benvenisti and Khayat, 1987), which meant that Palestinians were denied use of it in any way.

This process did not take into consideration the fact that most ownership of Palestinian farm land was not (legally) documented, as the registration processes started by the British and the Jordanian could not be and had never been completed due to conflicts and occupation. Thus more land was acquired by the Israeli State by expropriation (mainly for security reasons) and on the bases of the Order Regarding Abandoned Properties. Through this system of law and regulations, around 40 per cent of the West Bank's land was officially under the control of the occupying state. This land would be subsequently included in territorial plans to establish more and more settlements, providing reserves of land for Israel's expansion (Ghazi-Walid Falah, 2003).

From 1967, the settlements built in the West Bank materialised on the ground the Sharon Plan maps. The first settlements built in the coastal plains by the Jewish immigrants in the 1930s were defensive structures (homa umigdal), consisting of a watch tower and few barracks surrounded by a security wooden wall, often built fortnight (Rotbard, 2003). The settlements established in the West Bank were of a different type: in the 1970s, there were agricultural settlements in the areas identified by the Allon plan and urban settlements closer to the Green Line. The land seizure policies just described provided the government with uncultivated lands, away from the main Israeli cities, that would call for a new type of settlement. The community settlement was the answer, open only to Jewish residents, with strict inner regulations, and heavily subsidised by the government through tax reductions and free public services. While the settlements in the central mountain ridge area were and remain populated mainly by members and supporters of Gush Emunim, the settlements north of Jerusalem are more dedicated to the general, non-ideological public, interested in improving their standard of living as they lie within a short distance from the urban centres on the coastal plain.

The Oslo Accords (1993)

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, with terrorist attacks and guerrilla activities organized by the PLO from its exile in Jordan. In those years, the Palestinian economy was overwhelmed by the Israeli one which ultimately controlled the main markets and the trading routes. The Palestinian work force was employed by Israeli agriculture, industry, building construction, and services (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2003). The closing of large tracts of land for military security zones and for the use of Israeli settlements exacerbated the situation for the Palestinian agriculture, traditionally the most important source of work. Unemployment inside the West Bank grew at high rates. Nevertheless, consumption developed in the Occupied Territories, as new income came from Israeli wages, together with new social rules and habits.

At the same time, resentment was growing among Palestinians, who saw their territory becoming just a market for Israeli goods and a reservoir of cheap labour and free land and resources for the occupier. Moreover, 100,000 settlers were then residing in the Occupied Territories, living under separate regulations from the military law the Palestinians were subjected to and lobbying internationally to request for definitive annexation. As a result of all these stimuli, a massive uprising against the occupation – the Intifada (i.e. the "shaking off") – began.

The uprising started at the end of 1987 and was finished by the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Intifada was a general protest movement that involved resistance and civil disobedience through general strikes, boycotts of Israeli Civil Administration institutions, economic boycott of Israeli goods and work, refusal to pay taxes, graffiti, barricades and guerrilla. Palestinians, after two decades of deep dependence on the Israeli market, sought to cut ties and declared their desire for independence. As a result of the international condemnation of Israel's use of massive force against Palestinian non-violent demonstrations, Israel was forced to seek an end to the violence through negotiation and dialogue with the PLO, by then internationally recognised as the representative of the Palestinian people. On its side, the PLO recognised the existence of two states with its declaration of the birth of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank.

In 1992, with the intermediation of the United States, the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, signed the Oslo Agreement, declaring on the map the reality of the territorial control in the Occupied Territories. With this agreement, the borders of 1948, which had been undone by Israel in the Six Day war of 1967, disappeared and a new system of territorial organisation was applied.




Figure 26: Map of the Oslo Agreement areas (Source: Passia)

The West Bank land was divided in three zones: A, B and C. Area A was controlled by the first ever Palestinian government: the Palestinian Authority. On the map (Fig. 26), it is made visible that A consists of the built-up areas of the main cities and towns, without consideration of possible future developments. Area B, the built-up areas of villages, was under Israeli control only for military matters and soon to be handed over to the Palestinian Authority. Area C (i.e., all the remaining areas) were categorised as space for the settlements; their foreseen expansion areas, the Green areas, the Israeli by-pass roads system, the Israeli military areas, the security buffer zone along Jordanian border, all of which are under complete Israeli control. On the

map, these areas show how the West Bank has become a sea of Israeli controlled land, in which the Palestinian state sovereignty functions as an archipelago of around 200 small isolated islands (Weizman, 2007). The emerged lands on the map, designed by Julien Bousac (Fig. 27), correspond to Areas A and B, while Area C is visualised as an ocean surrounding them. It should be noted that Area C amounts to 60 per cent of the West Bank (Bousac, 2009).



Figure 27: L'Etat-Archipel de Palestine, the Palestinian archipelago, where the green emerged lands correspond to areas A and B of the Oslo Accords (Source: Bousac, 2008)

The Architecture of Occupation

The developments of the Oslo Agreement were interrupted quite soon by missed deadlines and violence, in particular, the killing of Muslim worshippers in the Hebron Abraham mosque by settlers and the Israeli military Baruch Goldstein. This led the Palestinian Authority to withdraw from the negotiations, prompting in turn the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a Jewish fundamentalist. The Palestinian population, living under Israeli strict control, started to see violence as its only lever. The economic crisis of 1990s, due to the Gulf War and the end of the remittances from the Palestinians in Kuwait, worsened the attitude towards negotiations in general. While Oslo brought some euphoria towards possible investments in the homeland by rich Palestinians from the diaspora, the reality was quite different and international donations would be channelled through the Palestinian Authority.

All these elements together led to a second Intifada that commenced in September 2000. The provocative visit of Ariel Sharon to the haram al-sharif (i.e. the Noble Sanctuary, home of the Dome of The Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem), inflamed the Palestinian youth, who took to the streets and violently confronted the Israeli army and civilian settlers. To contrast Israeli's overwhelming military superiority, Palestinians undertook more guerrilla-like tactics of warfare, pursuing martyrdom as suicide bombers.

After five years of war, attacks, failed negotiations, the Israeli settlements withdrawal from Gaza, and the death of Yasser Arafat, the Al Aqsa Intifada ended in 2005.

Far from being just an occupying country, Israel has displayed in the West Bank all the attitudes of settler colonialism, as described in Chapter 2: pursuing a permanent appropriation of the land, firstly through military and then legally justifiable ways, and moving forward to the enclosure and eventual displacement of the Palestinian population (Gordon, 2008). Establishing civilian settlements in this way is part of a colonisation of the landscape, through which territories are brought under long-term control by dominant powers (Newman 1989; Newman 2002). With the second Intifada, the Oslo lines of partition further hardened into a mechanism of administrative control secured by strong military intervention, creating what Jeff Halper has called a "Matrix of Control" (Halper, 2000). This matrix includes of three interlocking elements: military administration of much of the West Bank and incessant army and air force intrusions elsewhere; administrative measures like housing demolitions, deportations, administrative detentions[2]; not to mention, a number of "facts on the ground" which consists of the settlements and their connecting bypass roads.

Since the Allon and Drobless plans, the system of the Israeli territorial occupation has evolved and the map representing the Occupied Territories land needed to be updated with more elements. Weizman has called it since the "Architecture of Occupation" (Weizman, 2007) to refer to a whole system of built structures that transform the landscape and become tools of domination and control.

The Separation Barrier

During the height of the second Intifada, Palestinian suicide bombers were able to reach Israel's main cities with relative ease. To prevent that, consecutive governments have been building a security barrier that extends for over seven hundred kilometres from north to south along the Green Line and inside of the West Bank (Fig. 28).




Figure 28: The Separation Barrier (thick red line) that runs into the West Bank (Source: Arij)

The Barrier is constituted by several elements of obstacles and surveillance. Along the Green Line, it consists mainly of an electronic fence, surrounded on the east side by barbed wire and a ditch, on the west side by a patrol road. Watchtowers, night vision cameras, and gates complete the structure, for a total width of approximately 50 to 100 meters (Petti, 2007). Within this area, Palestinians were evicted and anything that existed (e.g. orchards, fields or houses) were destroyed (Warschawski, 2004).

The section of the Barrier that enters urban settings becomes a proper wall made of concrete T-blocks, only few meters wide and up to 8 metres tall (Di Cintio, 2013). Only about 10 per cent of the route of the built Barrier follows the Green Line; the remaining part enters the West Bank to embrace the large settlement blocs, keeping them on the Israeli side. The route of the Wall is, according to the official version of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the decision-making result of operational and security reasons, following the topography of the land, the demography and the value of the landscape. For this reason, the Barrier is described as a temporary, security device, not a political border. But, the reality (as is shown on the map above) demonstrates that many of the deviations of the Barrier from the Green Line to include settlements and agricultural land (like in Etzion Block, Ma'ale Adumim, Ariel), intertwine security motivations with a political agenda (Brown, 2010).

Palestinian land was confiscated in order to wrap the settlements from the east, as in Ariel area, where the Barrier goes 22 kilometres deep into the West Bank, comprising almost 45 per cent of the total width of the region (Gordon, 2008). The Barrier is the most drastic change in the territorial landscape since the erection of Israeli settlements. It has worsened the fragmentation of the Occupied Territories, separating villages from their agricultural lands and the needed resources, isolating urban areas, regardless of the location of properties, workplaces and essential services. The Palestinians living in areas encircled by the Barrier, especially near Jerusalem, are subjected to a complicated series of permits through which the military regulates their residence and their movements (OCHA OPT, 2005). As it affects a multiplicity of elements (territory, demography, water, archaeology, real estate, security, identity, sovereignty), the Barrier's many twists and turns on the map can be interpreted as effects of a continuous process of negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In some cases, the route has changed or the construction has stopped after appeals to the Israeli High Court of Justice (as in the case of Battir village which will be discussed later). The consequence of this fragmentation, however, is the erosion of the notion of Palestine as a sovereign state with a continuous territory; Israeli settlements surrounded by the Barrier are transformed into islands as much as the Palestinian communities that

are separated by it. The two communities live under two different national governments and thereby under two different legal systems, and yet, on the same territory.



Figure 29: Shapes of the Separation Barrier in the West Bank (Source: Petti, 2007)

Road System, Checkpoints, Permit System

A permanent grid of by-pass roads and settlements associated with an institutionalised system of permits, checkpoints and closures, strengthens the effects of the Barrier on the Palestinians and their territory. The segregation between the Palestinians and the Israelis sharing the Occupied Territories is enforced by the road system linking the different settlements with each other and with Israel, as they are routes that cannot be used by anyone lacking a specific ethnic characterisation (Veracini, 2006).

The road system functions alongside the Barrier to pursue the goal of separation (for security reasons) between Israeli and Palestinian communities. The modern by-pass roads are exclusively for the use of Israeli settlers, physically designed to cut straight through the land in order to avoid contact with Palestinian areas. Indeed, tunnels running under Palestinian villages and towns (as in Beit Jala) or bridges over Palestinian cultivations were typically used (Weizman, 2007). The by-pass roads are under Israeli control, like Area C of the Oslo Accords, untouched by the status of the

territories they are crossing. Furthermore, the roads are used as a mechanism of acquisition of more land for the state of Israel, as they permanently use and control long stretches of land (Halper, 2000).

The Palestinians cannot use these roads and are bound to minor roads and diverted routes to avoid the Barrier and the forbidden areas. On the same territory where Palestinians need special permits and detours to move around, Israeli citizens can circulate freely. As Gregory explains, “the modern by-pass roads compress time and space for the Israeli settlers”, and the secondary roads and tracks, the roadblocks and checkpoints, “expand time and space for the Palestinians” (Gregory, 2004). Therefore, directs routes between Palestinian towns no longer exist and the trip from Bethlehem to Ramallah (once a short drive of 29 kilometres) has to follow a very long detour to avoid East Jerusalem, the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim and the Barrier surrounding them. Only cars with Israeli number plates (like taxis) and special permits can travel on more direct routes (Alison Brown, 2004). In fact, each cluster of sealed Palestinian enclaves become the terminus of an improvised network of shared taxis that travel on safe, old roads, and sometimes people have to change transport many times during the travel. A journey that would normally take 25 minutes can turn into a nightmare of two to three hours, if not more.

The permanent checkpoints (and possible flying ones) on the way create the uncertainty of the actual possibility and length of the travel. The travels from one Palestinian area to another are always subjected to Israeli decision. Checkpoints are instrumental to the permit system, ensuring Israeli control over the lives of the Palestinians. The soldiers at the check point might decide to stop you or to check every car, therefore creating long lines, or to temporarily close the road altogether, stopping all traffic.

The areas most dramatically affected are the villages and neighbourhoods near Jewish settlements, where inhabitants, deprived of their right to free movement, need Israeli permission to reach their own fields, schools or workplaces (Hass, 2002). All over the West Bank, towns and villages are subject to permanent or occasional closure as deep trenches or mounds of sand and rocks prevent any traffic in or out. Hundreds of such blockades close off the communities, sometimes reinforced by military towers or stationing. Every time Israel feels threatened by attacks to its security, it uses barricades and roadblocks to paralyze most of the Palestinians villages and towns situated in the scattered islands of Areas A and B, with devastating effects on their economy and social life.



Figure 30: By-pass Road n.60 near Beit Jala, Israelis move safely through a tunnel and a bridge that cut into the land to avoid contact with Palestinian areas (Source: Petti, 2007)



Figure 31: By-Pass Road n.60 near Beit Jala, protected by a T-block massive barrier (Source: Petti, 2007)

The discussion about Normalisation

The subject of normalisation with Israel has been a common thread in the Arab countries since 1973, when the armed conflict with Israel started to wind down. Separate attempts to normalise Arab-Israeli relations were made through the years by the Arab governments, while almost all associations of Arab intellectuals rejected any normalisation with Israel as long as the issues of territorial occupation and Palestinian right to self-determination were not addressed.

Following the Oslo Accords, a flood of funding from international donors started to change the spontaneous mass-based movements that operated at the forefront of the anti-colonial struggle into externally-driven professional non-governmental organizations. This change was influenced mainly by three factors, first the neoliberal globalization, where the civil society fills the gaps left open by the state retreat in favour of market freedom. Second, the political transformation of the anti-colonial struggle into state-building strategy under occupation. Third, a massive Western donors' intervention, forcing Palestinian organizations to withdraw from overt political activism. NGOs started to promote people-to-people exchanges, seen as fundamental components to bottom-up conflict resolution initiatives. Focused on building interpersonal understanding without addressing political issues, they created an illusion of normalcy in relationship between occupied people and their occupiers in a situation where Palestinians' rights continued to be systematically denied.

The aftereffects of the Oslo Accords proved wrong the general expectations of political change and end of the occupation. Therefore, in more recent years, Palestinian peace activists have increasingly rejected dialogue and people-to-people programs, arguing that such programs normalize ongoing injustice. The Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) issued the 'Conditions for Cooperation with Israeli Organizations' (2000), calling for both a halt to all joint programs between Palestinian and Israeli organizations and a halt to people-to-people programs. Exceptions were made considering that everyday life necessities required that Palestinians deal with the Israeli authorities, for administrative permits request or commercial activities.

The PNGO decision was a key turning point in the ongoing Palestinian push against normalisation. This document was soon followed by the BDS (Boycott Divestment and Sanction) call issued by the Palestinian Civil Society in 2005, to isolate Israel internationally and press it to comply with international law. The BDS movement aims to pressure Israel to recognize Palestinian rights to freedom, equality, and self-determination by ending the occupation started in 1967, dismantling the separation

barrier, granting full equal rights to the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel, and implementing the right of return of refugees.

In Palestine there are many definitions for normalisation, from any contact with Israelis, including joint protests against the separation barrier, to any contact with official institutions in Israel, especially in the field of academia, therefore boycotting events and activities that portray the relationship of colonial oppression, which is inherently abnormal, as if it were normal.

The role of NGOs and the position of governmental institutions, funded by international donors, have become controversial and not always perceived as positive by the Palestinian audience. Today Palestinians try to reassert their ownership of the terms of interaction. The new normalisation principles invoked by the BDS transform collaborations, moving them from coexistence-focused dialogue sessions to action-based interactions with the goal of transformation through co-resistance against injustice.

Notes

[1] The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, was adopted in August 1949 and signed by 196 states, including all UN member states, both UN observers the Holy See and the State of Palestine, as well as the Cook Islands.

[2] Administrative detention is a security measure which allows the government to arrest and hold any suspected troublemaker for up to six months without bringing any charge against him or her (Friedman 1998).

Chapter 7.

Case Studies: Selection and Methodology

Introduction

The main aim of this research is to investigate the effects of the Israeli segregation mechanisms on the way that the Palestinian population perceives and shapes its own built environment. The situation under study is particularly complex due to the existence of external and internal forces. First, the built spaces of occupation (i.e. settlements, checkpoints, barriers, etc.) have determined the characteristics of the territory beyond control of Palestinian inhabitants. These surrounding physical spaces influence the inhabitants' appropriation of the local environment and their perception of it. Secondly, as the years passed, Palestinians have also made their footprint on the territory: new houses have been constructed with impressive detachment from the past. This research follows a variety of themes, such as conflict, colonisation, architecture, place attachment and place identity, in order to understand the effects of resilience within the choices of Palestinian place making.

The approach chosen to explore these concepts is qualitative; an approach which reflects on reality as an interpretive phenomenon (Rossman and Rallis, 1998), whereby the researcher can study its meaning as it is created by the participants in their daily activities. "This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 3). Moreover, in qualitative research, social reality is considered the result of social interactions, producing meanings and contexts (Flick, von Kardorff and Steinke, 2004). The qualitative research relates these collective meanings (as shared norms and values) to individual biographies in order to describe social relationships and life circumstances. While the starting point to describe 'objective' life circumstances can be quantitative data, such as age, gender, education, profession and so on, subjective interpretation of reality is recorded through a wide use of communication. The qualitative researcher gathers multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, and documents. The skills involved in gathering qualitative data – asking questions, listening, looking, and reading – are skills used in everyday life (Rossman and Rallis, 1998).

The strategy of this investigation is to select appropriate methods to match particular research questions. This not only gives a better and more complete

understanding of the problem, but it also minimises any bias. As inquiry techniques they are differentiated by purpose and discipline. Qualitative researchers use these techniques to capture the meanings behind actions, words, and artefacts – data – so that they may scrutinise (through techniques like categorisation or quantification) these data to produce new knowledge about social phenomena. Data from the different sources are reviewed by the researcher and, finally, organized into categories or themes (Creswell, 2007).

This research aims to contribute to existing knowledge of a complex socio-political phenomenon in the difficult frame of Occupied Territories. The reality under study is multiform: rural villages, booming urban centres, informal settlements of Bedouin tribes, and so on. The approach considered the best to explore such a varied context consists of analysing cases representative of different characteristics. Therefore, this research was conducted using the multiple case studies methodology, seen as the most adapt at finding explanations to such intricate realities. The case studies methods are considered the most useful when the 'how' or 'why' questions are being posed; when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 2009). This kind of analysis is typically conducted over a period of time. In this research, three cases were selected from the explorative fieldwork: namely, Wadi Rahhal, Battir and Tel Rumeida. The main fieldwork took place in three phases, between autumn 2014 and spring 2016, thus avoiding the hot summer period and the religious celebration of Ramadan, when the society moves at a slower pace.

In order to strengthen the validity of the research, the case study inquiry relies on multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2009). A variety of techniques was used for data gathering, starting from direct observation of the events being studied and moving through interviews of the participants or artefacts collection or documents reading. This variety of sources of evidence increases the validity of the case study strategy, informed by prior development of theoretical propositions. In this research, data gathering during fieldwork was developed through three distinct phases: observation, interviews and focus groups. The results were then commented on the data analysis phase in order to produce valid conclusions.

This chapter describes and justifies the methodological approach used to collect the information before and during the fieldwork. Starting with a literature review, it moves on to the explorative fieldwork and the selection of case studies for the main fieldwork. The chapter ends with the analysis of the gathered data.

The Literature Review

Data collection for this particular research began with the development of a comprehensive literature review. The subject under study required a vast spectrum of documentation, focusing on a definition of the architecture of occupation; the past history of the conflict between Israel and Palestine; an understanding of the evolution of vernacular and traditional place making in Palestine; and, finally, the concepts of perception and of place identity, of architecture and landscape, of place attachment and resilience. Therefore, the result was a thematic literature review, organised around those main topics in two chapters, producing a solid background for the research. The literature search was based on the initial research problem formulation, but, at the same time, it was useful to refine it and to identify key concepts.

At the beginning, the subject of the research seemed overly broad and could have required a near infinite literature search. Therefore, the skill required to me at that point was to be able to refine the search to certain key concepts. This process was made possible by reading a vast amount of references in order to be able to narrow the search down to the main themes. I utilised both electronic sources (available online through the databases connected to the University library website) and physical ones found in libraries or bookshops. I deployed the search by applying a set of criteria of the inclusion of sources. The first criterion was the focus of the text on the researched subject. Reading the title of the article, then the abstract and finally the whole text made the first selection. Then, I categorised the identified sources according to the main subjects of the literature review: (1) history of the conflict; (2) settler colonialism; (3) history of Palestinian architecture; (4) the perception of places and place making; (5) architecture of occupation; and (6) the notion of resilience. A second selection criterion was the date of publication. It was important to use updated texts. At the beginning, I compiled a survey of relevant scholar articles, books and other sources like dissertations or conference proceedings. Given the link to evolving contemporary events of the subject, I decided to make use of newspaper articles and NGO reports so as to collect current data. These publications were always backed by a survey of historical literature, which can monitor how perspectives have changed throughout the years.

Given the controversial nature of the subject at hand, there was an issue regarding the critical evaluation of sources. I saw the need to define for each text:

- Provenance (i.e. what are the author's credentials? Are the arguments supported by evidence or linked to relevant texts?)
- Objectivity (i.e. is the author's perspective prejudicial?)
- Value (i.e. does the work contribute in some way to a wider understanding of

the subject?)

Once identified, publications that satisfied these criteria provided helpful bibliographies and citations in turn that widened the overall literature search. Therefore, the literature expanded and it was possible to obtain a sound knowledge of the published materials on the subject. The more I read on the subject, the more I could approach the research question in an appropriate manner and organise the references through the most relevant categories. The literature review did not end with the writing up of the related chapters of the thesis, but it was an on-going process that accompanied every step of the research. Even more, as the years passed and more texts were published, I constantly updated the reference list.

The Explorative Fieldwork

The explorative fieldwork was the result of a period of analysis of data and maps, creating a set of criteria through which to select the places to be visited. During the explorative fieldwork, I visited at least four selected places in each governorate. In the end, I selected only three of these places as case studies for the final fieldwork.

Phase 1: The Choice of Archival Records

In preparation of the explorative fieldwork, I needed demographic data about the West Bank. The governmental sources of these kinds of data could be found in the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics or the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. While the first Bureau exclusively concerns Israeli citizens living in settlements in the West Bank territory, the second Bureau rather unfortunately does not provide complete data sets on the population and the built environment, which the research needed at this stage. I was more inclined to use more detailed data collected from an unbiased source. Therefore, I decided to utilise the Applied Resource Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ) “Village Profile”, a report available online.

ARIJ is an internationally recognised institution, founded in 1990 and based in Bethlehem. As registered Palestinian NGO, ARIJ actively works on research projects in the field of sustainable development, including: management of natural resources, water management and sustainable agriculture in Palestine. The “Village Profile” is a documentation of the demographic, historical, architectural, economical characteristics of every village in Palestine, recorded with the support of the Spanish Cooperation. Even though I have some certain awareness (which was confirmed to me during a meeting with an ARIJ member) that the data collection contains probably biased information (for example, the data in most cases were collected only through village

councils), it remained a beneficial starting point, as it was the only comprehensive survey conducted by a non-controversial body.

Phase 2: The Choice of Study Areas

The West Bank is divided into nine administrative governorates: Jenin, Tulkarem, Jericho, Qalqiliya, Tubas, Nablus, Salfit, Ramallah-al Bireh, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron. I decided to exclude East Jerusalem from the study, first in order to avoid political implications, as the area had been unilaterally incorporated into the municipality of Jerusalem by Israel, politically in 1967 and physically with the construction of the Security Barrier, including several neighbouring villages. Secondly, because the localities in this area have completely different characteristics from the ones in the rest of the West Bank, so they could not be considered as representative. Moreover, in order to avoid the unpredictability of movement restrictions and unstable local situation, I decided to concentrate the exploratory fieldwork on contiguous governorates. The three most inhabited ones and the ones with a heavier presence of Occupation elements, thereby satisfying these criteria, are the Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron governorates.

Phase 3: Criteria of Selection of Cases for the Exploratory Fieldwork

Once selected the governorates in which the explorative study would take place, I began the analysis of data from ARIJ "Village Profile". I downloaded from the ARIJ website a file for each locality, containing all the data collected. In order to have a better visualisation of the information, I organised the narrative description of each locality in a categorised set of data inserted in an excel spread sheet. The columns of the chart contained the village or town name, while the rows gave information from the "Village Profile", organised into four main categories: (1) demography, (2) geography, (3) the presence of Architecture of Occupation, and (4) interaction with occupants. One chart was produced for each governorate. The products of this data categorisation were three databases containing a vast amount of information.

The research objectives focused on the influence that the occupation had on the Palestinian perception of places and place making practices. Therefore, I needed to make a selection of the data, operating with rigorous indicators in order to inform the criteria for choosing the case studies. I organised the data in the database according to two sets of indicators: objective and subjective ones. The first set would contain the size of the village, the main source of income, the age of the village, the distance from the Architecture of Occupation elements, the date of construction of the Israeli settlements

nearby, percentage of village in Area C. The second set would consist of information about the level of isolation (for example, answers to questions, like “is it easy to reach with public transportation?”), issues of violence (i.e. direct and indirect confrontation with settlers) and the various cases of occupation or land confiscation.

At this stage, the database was compared with maps of the West Bank, in order to visualise all the elements and to obtain data about the distance of each village from settlements, checkpoints, separation barrier or military bases. The map I decided to use is the one produced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territories (December, 2012). On this map I traced circles of 2.5 and 5 kilometre of radius, centred in each village or town in the studied governorates. With this method I could identify elements of the Architecture of Occupation which are very close (less then 1km), medium range (2.5 km) or far (5 km) from the Palestinian localities. Moreover, I decided to categorise the different localities according to their size, to understand what the median size was for each governorate. Therefore, I used the function of Microsoft Excel that creates dispersions charts from a set of data in order to obtain the needed information. With this chart, it was possible to identify the median size localities, the very big ones and the very small ones. Moreover it was possible to start to understand the differences between the governorates in terms of population distribution and typical type of settlement. For example, I could see that the Hebron Governorate has many very small localities, identifiable as Bedouin villages in the deserted areas of the South Hebron Hills.

At this point it was clear to me that the criteria of selection of case studies for the exploratory fieldwork would be:

1. Size (i.e. population size)
(using the data from the dispersion table, it was possible to select one very small, three median and one large settlement per each governorate);

2. Critical distance from the Architecture of Occupation
(using the data from the map, it was possible to identify some cases very close, some within medium range and some very far from the Architecture of Occupation artefacts – e.g. separation barrier, check points, settlements, etc.);


3. Date of foundation
(using the data from the ARIJ files to identify the kind of settlements – old or new settlement, with an eventual presence of vernacular architecture);

4. Main source of income

(relations with Israel and livelihoods, as depending on agricultural lands, with governmental or clerk jobs, or mainly commuters to Israel - the most interesting were the localities with an economy based on the Israeli labour market, wherein men probably went to work in the construction industry and had a constant exchange with Israelis);

5. Geopolitical Area (i.e. Area A, Area B or Area C)

I finally reasoned that the research should focus on localities placed mainly in area C, as that is the part of the West Bank under Israeli military occupation. Nevertheless, for the exploratory fieldwork I decided to keep this indicator as a variable in order to have the possibility to explore different localities.



	Ad Doha (or Al Dahwa)	Al Khader	Al Khas & An Nu'man	Al Maniya	Al Manshiya	Al 'Ubeidiya	Al Walaja	'Arab ar Rashaiyda	Ash Shawawra	Beit Fa
date of foundation	1977	1700	1900	roman era	1950	1600AD	1948	1983		1784
altitude (m above sea level)	830	839	576	760	776	532	756	512	557	929
municipality area (dunums) arij-gis 2011	1.750	8.280	1.474	8.908	558	97.232	4.328	47.841	15.297	12.12
population (census 2007 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics)	9.753	9.774	567	1.012	433	10.753	2.041	1.453	3.791	11.00
households	1849	1722	106	157	57	1703	390	224	704	1808
housing units	2220	1901	126	153	57	1865	388	291	784	2042
VILLAGE ECONOMY										
main economic activities (arij field survey 2011)	Government or private employees sector 40% trade 20%	agriculture 35% Israeli labor market 30%	israeli labor market 50% agriculture 25%	agriculture 36% services 18%	israeli labor market 40% industry 29%	Government or Other Employees Sector (26%) Agriculture Sector (19%)	israeli labor market 47% Government or private employees	Agriculture Sector (60%) Israeli Labor Market (38%)	Israeli Labor Market 65% Government or private employees	industry trade
israeli labor market	15%	30%	50%	18%	40%	38%	47%	38%	65%	
GEOPOLITICAL AREA										
% area A	n/a	9	0,5	0	0	9,1	0	5,7	52,2	0
% area B	n/a	5,5	25,6	10,1	12,5	0,4	2,6	1,1	6	85,7
% area C	n/a	85,5	73,9	89,9	87,5	82	97,4	10,2	14,6	14,3
nature reserves	n/a	0	0	0	0	8,5	0	83	27,2	0
SETTLEMENTS										
land confiscation for settlements		x				x	x	x		
settlements' name (year of foundation) population		Efrat (1979) 8200 Neve Daniyyel (1982) 1760				'Ayn Fashkhah (1969) tourist site Avenat (1983) 40	Gilo (1970) 27173 Har Gilo (1971) 462	Al A'zazima military base		
neighboring settlements			x							
neighboring settlements' name			har homa							
ARCHITECTURE OF OCCUPATION										
outposts		x								
military bases										

Figure 32: Partial example of the data collected for the selection of cases for the exploratory fieldwork (Source: author)

I utilised the data as indicators to describe the context of the hundreds of villages and towns that exist in the West Bank. My intention was to identify cases that could be generalised in the whole West Bank, so to visit very big cities as well as very small villages, localities very close and very far form the Architecture of Occupation,

agricultural areas as well as urban environments.

Finally, I organised the data in a spread sheet and visualised on a map, whereby every locality was identified for its vicinity to the Architecture of Occupation and its size. Therefore, I used these tables and maps to select a number of places that followed the criteria of selection. Through a huge work, I could size down the number of localities to 20 in total, within the governorates considered representative of the situation of the West Bank. More than five localities were still to be visited in each governorate to keep some flexibility, necessary in such an instable environment.




Figure 33: Hebron Governorate map used during the exploratory fieldwork to annotate characteristics of localities according to the criteria of selection. On the right, enlarged key indicating distance from architecture of occupation elements and population size of the Palestinian localities (Source: author)

Phase 4: Logistic organization of exploratory fieldwork

The logistical organisation of the exploratory fieldwork was made easier by my previous experience in Palestine (a few months of work prior to the beginning of the PhD). Knowledge of the place helped in figuring out what kind of issues could be faced. Moreover, the connections established in the past (and kept alive through e-mail and social networks during the past years) helped me in finding accommodation and local informants. My Director of Studies helped as well in arranging local contacts from the areas I was unfamiliar with (namely, the Hebron region). I could add to this some more contacts established after a research trip to New York, where I conducted

meetings with researchers and professors working on similar subjects. Prof. Rashid Khalidi (Columbia University), in particular, helped in contacting the University of Birzeit and the Palestine Research Institute. In this way, I could plan before my departure the accommodation for the whole period, and all the meetings with local experts or informants for the first week.

Phase 5: The Exploratory Fieldwork

The actual exploratory fieldwork took place from February 19th to March 12th, 2014. During this period I travelled through the West Bank governorates of Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah-al Bireh, visiting at least four places from the list in each of them. The choice of visited places depended from the first selection operated through a specific set of indicators prior to the departure, and the practical logistic possibilities that emerged during the work. The descriptive data was integrated with realistic evaluations in order to allow me, a foreign researcher, to conduct a rigorous study in an occupied territory. Finally, the preliminary work allowed the conduction of this exploratory mission, during which I visited 15 selected localities and a few others suggested by local practitioners.

In each of the visits, I applied a methodology for data collection that consisted of observation (with use of photographs), informal interviews with local informants and personal written field notes. As the scope of the exploratory fieldwork was to select the case studies for the final fieldwork, my main objective was to fill in the missing data from the selection criteria and to visualise the research environment. Moreover, I needed to understand how feasible the research would have been in each of the visited places, taking into consideration issues of accessibility and local participation. Thus, my collection of data started with the travel from the accommodation to the locality with public transportation. In the West Bank, public transportation consists of shared taxies that travel almost everywhere, but are subjected to the restrictions imposed by the Occupation. Therefore, I soon found out that some places were practically unreachable without a private vehicle (especially in the Hebron area). As possible changes were foreseen, I could select other places from the list and still satisfy the criteria.

Once on site, my work started with an explorative walk, during which I took photographs and written notes, recording personal impressions and the surrounding built environment. I took mostly pictures of the Palestinian environment and of the Israeli colonies or military architectures close to it. During this activity, locals, who were curious about my identity and my reason for being there, usually approached me. Women, who for social or religious reasons would tend to avoid contact with men, were

the ones to typically approach me. As such, informal interviews with local inhabitants took place, providing important information about the place's history and contemporary situation. Everyone seemed keen to talk and to give an opinion about the situation, economical or political, and to be my guide of the surroundings.

Moreover, I arranged meetings with local experts, as engineers, architects or researchers on the subject of architecture and occupation. I recorded these interviews with written notes, and then I used the collected information to select the places that needed a visit during the exploratory fieldwork. I met at least three experts in each governorate. In particular, informal interviews were conducted with engineer Hassan Muhammar, architect Alessandro Petti (DAAR - Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency), and Abdel Abu Abdo (ARIJ – Applied Research Institute Jerusalem) in the Bethlehem Governorate; Dr. Samar Nazer and Dr. Salem Thawaba (Birzeit University), Khaldun Bshara (Riwaq - Center for Architectural Conservation), and Amira Hass (Haaretz newspaper) in the Ramallah-al Bireh Governorate; architect Nuha Dandis (HRC - Hebron Rehabilitation Committee), Hamed Qawasmeh (Hebron International Resources Network), and engineer Azmi al Jabri (Municipality) in the Hebron Governorate.

As soon as the exploratory fieldwork was completed, I decided to submit a report to my supervisors. In the report, I highlighted each visited place on a map and described it through photographs. I detailed the report with notes from observations and informal interviews, containing identified issues as well. This report was used as canvas for the data analysis that followed and lead to the choice of final case studies to be used in the main field work. As the places visited during the pilot study had already been selected through a rigorous set of criteria, the data analysis followed that classification while improving it with the subjective criteria of accessibility and actual presence of the Architecture of Occupation.

At the end of the categorisation of the data, I could identify similar and different cases. At this point I needed to make a decision about the subject of my research. The study could have focussed on similar cases, displaying the same characteristics regarding population size, date of foundation, geopolitical condition and main source of income. In such a varied reality as the West Bank's one, however, the data gathered from such cases would have been only a partial representation of the whole. Therefore, I decided to select three final case studies with heterogeneous characteristics, picking cases with different characteristics according to the previously defined criteria, in order to produce a picture of the whole complex reality of the West Bank.

The first selected case study is Wadi Rahhal village (Bethlehem Governorate),

with a small population, strong dependence from the Israeli labour market, situated mostly in Area C, surrounded by settlements. The second case is the village of Battir (Bethlehem Governorate), a bigger village with a tradition of farming, situated in Area C and located on the Green Line, with a history of diplomatic confrontation with Israel and a special relation to its historical heritage. The last case study is the neighbourhood of Tel Rumeida, in the city of Hebron, an urban setting with the singularity of having Israeli settlements among the Palestinian houses and daily confrontation with the settlers and the Israeli military, with a remarkable presence of the Architecture of Occupation and systems of militarisation.

The Main Fieldwork

The main fieldwork took place in two separate phases between the months of February and March, 2014, in Wadi Rahhal and Tel Rumeida, and subsequently in the month of April, 2015, in Battir. During the suspension between these two periods of time, I was nevertheless engaged in full time professional work in the area, thus widening and deepening my knowledge and familiarity with the local environment and social habits.

Phase 1: Observation

The exploratory fieldwork provided the opportunity of a preliminary observation of the possible case studies. Impressions, made of sights, sounds and scents, were collected in pictures and notes. These acts of observation without actual participation helped me to learn as much as possible about the places as the project focus evolved. Once the main fieldwork started, I began my work with holistic observation of each case study. Observation notes and photographs I took during these observations became part of the bigger corpus of data collected.

The aim of the research at this level was to collect information about the physical space of the case studies and of the activities that take place there. In this study I adopted the direct observation technique (Patton, 1990). The written notes taken during the observation activity were integrated with photographs and sketches of salient elements that would help in the future analysis. More observation was made possible by doing guided walks with local informants, taking photographs and listening to the information provided by the guides. In Wadi Rahhal and in Battir, the guide was the local interpreter, while in Tel Rumeida, the guide was one of the participants. The guided tour was particularly useful as I was a stranger to the particular localities under study. The background information provided by the local guide helped me to correctly interpret the photographs and framing the field notes.

Phase 2: Interviews

The fieldwork data gathering proceeded with the second phase: the interviews.

My basic level of Arabic facilitated informal introductions and a gathering of more colloquial information. Additional translation was necessary, however, to approach the complex information of the research topic. Therefore, volunteer translators assisted me in every contact with participants. The translators asked interviewees questions in Arabic and then translated their answers into English. I took notes in English based upon the translation given. Translation was not necessary in few cases in which the participants were able to speak English or, as in one incredibly fortunate case, Italian, my mother tongue.

In Wadi Rahhal, the translator was the sister of a participant, who then assisted also in Battir. In Tel Rumeida, I was assisted by different volunteers, according to the availability at the moment of the interview. Translators helped in arranging the schedule and location of the interviews as well, acting as local research assistants.

I had planned to interview a selected number of twenty participants, following techniques of standardised, open-ended interviews. I considered this number of participants an approachable one for the time assigned to each case study (circa. two weeks), conducting around ten interviews per week, leaving a margin for adaptation to the participants' schedules. In the end, I conducted a total of 58 interviews: 20 in Wadi Rahhal, 19 in Battir, and 19 in Tel Rumeida. Two planned interviews had to be cancelled and could not take place, due to the restrictions of movement that participants often faced. But, I considered this as a possibility since the beginning of this fieldwork.

The people interviewed were chosen from the different households, according to the research needs, but also to the availability and willingness of participation. I did not consider a random sampling method as ideal, but I preferred voluntary participation, as more appropriate for this type of research collecting personal information about people, their past, their perceptions and their aspirations. Nonetheless, I tried to select a balanced sample of people of different ages, sexes and occupations. The presence of older participants was considered important to offer their knowledge of the environment as it was before the Occupation and the construction of Israeli settlements started. Younger participants could, on the other hand, bring a different view on the subject and contribute with their specific perception.

Among the selected participants, there were local experts who gave valuable information because of their knowledge of the subject matter. I valued interviews with local experts as additional information, however, not as specific data collection, for the

experts were not always residents of the case study localities. In Bethlehem, local architects Nada Atrash and Issam Juha (director of the Center for Cultural Heritage Preservation) and historians Dr. Khalil Shokeh and Dr. Ali Qleibo provided information about the local history, the traditional construction techniques, and the development through the years of local architectural theory. In Hebron, architect Nuha Dandis gave details about the restoration activity in the Old City and Issa Amro traced the history of Israeli occupation and Palestinian activism in Tel Rumeida.

The data collection method consisted of face-to-face semi-structured interviews, with open-ended questions, so that the issues raised by the interviewees could be followed up (International Federation of Red, Cross and Red Crescent Societies and IFRC, 2007). I prepared in advance a set of questions and I delineated an interview schedule (the questions used in the semi-structured interviews are here included in Annex A, a sample of the interview transcriptions is included in Annex B). As explained by Robson (2011) and Bryman (2008), this method allows for the order and the amount of questions to be altered according to the replies of the interviewees during the interview. Therefore, when I thought it was necessary and significant to ask further questions on the subject, I could include extra questions to follow that stream of information. I asked fixed questions to all participants in a particular order. Therefore, a certain degree of standardisation was provided in order to facilitate the subsequent analysis of data from multiple case studies.

This method of interviewing is arguably similar to that of phenomenology, as the study of participants' lived-experience and worldviews (Seidman, 1991). In order to draw out this analysis, in the interview guidelines I designed before starting the fieldwork I considered the differences between the communities involved and I modulated the activity accordingly.

In this research, the interviews are mainly used to investigate the variables of place identity, place attachment and place making. The interview schedule was composed of three main sections: personal and local history, perception of the environment, influence of the Occupation on place making. I expected the participants to answer with as much details as they wished/were able to. The questions asked started with personal life history relative to the topic, focussing on past experiences up to the present, with some interest for the knowledge of local history and a special focus on the memories of the built environment that the participants were able to share.

Questions on place attachment were asked in this phase, formulated according to the aim and objectives of this research. While other studies seek to explore the subject of home attachment or place attachment, this particular research, with its focus on the

influence of the Occupation, sought to question historical matters of place related to this subject. The narrative then shifted to the present, with a focus on specific details of participants' experiences of the topic (Rossman and Rallis, 1998). Perception of the environment and of its changes throughout the years became the focus of the interviews. Questions about the quality of the characteristics and the quality of the environment were asked, in order to understand the participants' perception. Finally the participants were asked to reflect on the significance of their personal experience, describing their favourite place in the locality and the reasons for this choice. Furthermore, in the last part of the interview, some time was dedicated to an exercise of imaginative place making wherein participants had to describe their dream house. In addition to the scheduled semi-structured interviews, informal interviews were conducted with inhabitants who approached me and started a casual conversation. These cases, as the interviews with the local experts, were excluded from the targeted 20 interviewees and have been used only as additional information.

The privacy of the participants was a very important issue due to the state of military occupation of the region. Therefore, their names were never mentioned, not even in the notes of the research, and they have since been identified using a coded system. Residents from Wadi Rahhal, for example, were coded 'WR' followed by a number (e.g. WR01, WR02, WR03) and so on. The same system has been applied to participants from Battir using 'B' as the code followed by a number (e.g. B01, B02, B03 etc.) and in Tel Rumeida the code used is 'TR' and a number (e.g. TR01, TR02, TR03 etc.). A participant information sheet explaining the research aim and containing the details of the researcher, in both English and Arabic, was provided at the moment of the interview and the participant had to sign it in order to allow for information to be gathered. The interviews were audio recorded with the permission of the interviewees.

Phase 3: Group Discussions

The data gathering continued with the focus group discussion technique. Focus group discussions are small groups of people who gather together to discuss a common theme (Creswell, 2007). Focus group discussions can be more relaxed than one-to-one interviews, and are useful for checking tentative conclusions (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). This method of interviewing assumes that an individual's attitudes and beliefs do not form in a vacuum, and that people often need to listen to others' opinions and understandings to clarify their own (Rossman and Rallis, 1998). The focus group typically helps the researcher to collect data from the participants in a more permissive environment than the interview. My role in the group discussions was that of a

moderator, not asking direct questions, but facilitating group members' interaction with each other. During the focus groups, the selected participants were made to interact with visual techniques and mental maps production.

I used focus group discussions as a way to collect more information following the first findings from the interviews, with a focus on perception, specifically, perception of the built environment. In total, twelve focus groups discussions took place, four in each case study. The focus group discussions were organised in order to have homogeneity within the group, and heterogeneity between the groups. Therefore, of the four groups in each locality, two were composed only by women and two only by men. In this way, given the local cultural habits that require the separation of unrelated women and men in social activities, each sex group could interact more freely.

The research plan was to divide the participants also in relation to their age, in order to have older participants separated from the younger ones, who might feel inhibited in expressing their opinion in the presence of their elders. This was not possible, however, as older people would not normally agree in a sufficient number to participate to a group discussion; they rarely left their house and were not interested in spending long periods of time outside. I therefore decided to use only gender as the differentiation parameter for the groups. The group discussions with women were usually held in the morning, while the children were at school and the men at work or away; the group discussions with men had to be organised in the evenings as during the day they were busy.

Group Discussions Details: Visual Research Techniques

To promote participants' talk, I applied methods deriving from visual research in one set of the focus group discussions, using the images in their scientific modality (Harper, 1988). The interviews with the help of images is a methodology developed since 1960s that encourages data gathering through the use of images. It focuses on the analysis of the modality in which people react to images and assign values and meanings (Ruby, 1995). Images are typically considered the best vectors to carry information about architecture, activities and social interactions that happen in the moment of depicting an urban environment (Bignante, 2011). The use of photographs promotes more direct involvement of the informants and stimulates the collection of qualitatively different information to that obtained in conventional interviews (Bignante, 2010). Therefore, I both collected and analysed already existing images or produced them during the research activity. Images, as such, are both objects to be collected and instruments (Pennacini, 2010). As in Harper (1988), images are used to study social transformations

in a community, by shooting pictures at different times, and also to explore the meaning that a person or a society gives to specific images. They can contribute to the exploration of how specific places work, with references to spatial practices, implicit or explicit, social relationships, power relations, etc.

Another modality of the image, as identified by Harper, is the phenomenological one. It is connected to the ability of images to evoke sensations, emotions and memories in a more intense way than what is done by a written text or by verbal questions. Roland Barthes (1981) calls this "punctum" – that is, the ability of images to create connections with the individual background of people.

The visual method applied in this research has made use of re-photography and photo stimulation. Re-photography is a method whereby two images of the same place, but in different times, are superimposed on each other. The images can be taken by the same author or they can be drawn from archives; or, one image by the author in relation to one from archives. Re-photography is used to study the changes of a place over time. The images must be taken from the same angle, thereby providing some quantitative information about the changes. Even if they are not, certain information can still be provided. The image can evoke memories, sensations and emotions in a way different from words, thereby conducting photo stimulation (Harper, 2002). John Collier used this particular technique for the first time in 1957, upon collaboration with an anthropologist (Collier, 1957). As in the research conducted on the material and symbolic nature of the landscape in boundary areas in southern Trentino (Anzoise and Malatesta, 2009), images can stimulate in the interviewed memories and reflections. What the participant finds in the photograph is not only the memory of the place, but a memory of the socio-spatial relationships that used to take place in that space.

In this study I used the re-photography as a way to show the participants at the focus group pictures of the same place (their village or neighbourhood) as it was in the past (before 1967) compared to today. The photo stimulation helped subjective opinions to emerge and promoted collective discussion. The same method was described in the case of the study of the cultural disintegration of the old people due to immigration in the city of Prato, studied by Paolo Chiozzi (1989). What participants saw in the old pictures of the town was a territory that no longer existed, and then they started to tell its story. The information became more precise and accurate, also in relation to the contemporary situation, of the subject of immigration and the meanings it had in the past and today in the changing of social habits. The relation with the environment can be present (described through the visual perception) and past (mental images).

Images are considered by Gibson (2014) the acknowledgements of a space that

ceased to exist, but stays somehow within us. In the specific case of conflict situations, the use of the image confrontation technique may help to explain how the participants are dealing with the erasure of public spaces (see, for example, Alice McIntyre's research on the Monument Road community in Belfast, 2003). Images can highlight the role played by the security dimension in defining the use of spaces, the search for comfort zones, the anger and frustration of living in a conflict geographical area as well as how boundaries and physical barriers (e.g. gates, walls, etc.) mark living spaces (McIntyre, 2003).

Three phases of photo stimulation were deployed in this study:

1. The preliminary interview, where there was no use of images, but was later used to inform the exercise of images;

2. Selection and production of images, in which images to be used were selected and the re-photography techniques applied;

3. Discussion and interpretation of images, using the social research method of the focus group discussion. The main difficulty of this phase was to find a balance between leaving to the participants the freedom to express themselves, trying to see the elements that could lead to more interesting views, and trying to rigorously follow the object of the research.







Figure 34 a-b-c: Three moments of group discussions with image stimulation in the village of Wadi Rahhal (Source: author)

In order to compare between the results of the group discussions from the three case studies, the activity was timed in relation to the photographs showed and the same amount of time was dedicated to the same thematic group of photos in each locality. The photo elicitation was divided in two phases. The first phase developed with a discussion about historic pictures of the locality, if they were available, or of a similar Palestinian village in the case of Wadi Rahhal. These photographs, collected from Internet sources, would show historic architecture and landscape since the beginning of

1900. The second phase produced a discussion about contemporary pictures of the locality, supplied by me, when possible from the same point of view of the previous ones. In doing so, these images showed the growing elements of the architecture of occupation alongside the localities under study.

All the pictures I showed were in black and white, in order not to create too much contrast between the old ones and the new ones. The time allocated for each section varied from 30 minutes to an hour, according to the intensity of the discussion (all the pictures used for the group discussions are presented in Annexes D, E, F).

Mental Maps

Urban geographers use the term "image" to mean how people represent in words and sketches the visual images of places that they have directly experienced (Tuan, 1975). The mental maps are instruments used to analyse how specific places are perceived, remembered and therefore drawn by people. They were first used in behavioural geography (Kitchin, 1994; Golledge and Stimson, 1997) that argues that humans carry mental images of their surrounding environments and that those images influence actual human behaviours (Johnston, 1997). Following this approach, new ways of studying human behaviour were developed.

One technique, in particular, used to study these personal environmental images, was the mental map. The method was outlined by Peter Gould and Thomas Saarinen since the mid 1960s in the field of behavioural geography (Saarinen, 1973; Gould and White, 1974). They defined mental maps as cartographic representations of people's evaluation of space. Under their influence, geographers started to use mental maps, primarily as cartographic representations of how people evaluate places, as well as freehand maps that people can draw to outline cities or even continents (Tuan, 1975). This technique is used to understand human behaviors based on peoples' perceptions of their spatial environment (Boschmann and Cubbon, 2014).

More recently, sketch maps have been used in participatory research to develop cartographies of group and individual spatial narratives. In participatory research, the participants are asked to draw free hand sketches of the spaces in object. Their reconstruction of spaces is usually complex and based on many elements: past memories, imaginative effort, values and emotions linked to the specific places. The subsequent analysis of the maps draws out how the places are perceived and remembered by people in a certain way, whether this be different in dimensions, shapes, distances from the one on the map. This happens because the perception of spaces depends on the knowledge of it, but also on the values applied to it (e.g. do we like the

space, are we in fact scared by it, etc.).

In Kevin Lynch's seminal study, The Image of the City (1960), urban residents were asked to draw maps of their city from memory. In this book, Lynch identifies the main elements of the mental maps: paths, landmarks (used for orientation), edges (creating barriers or links between zones), nodes (here you can enter, different from landmarks), districts (with specific rules of living). According to Lynch, our perception of places depends on the use we make of these classes of elements. In his research, when the gathered information was compiled into a collective map, it identified the elements of the built environment around which participants structured their cognitive images of the city. Memories and feelings of security play a big role, as they allow people to give meaning to their displacements through their mental perception of the places. To ask a person to draw their own mental map of a place allows us to gain information on their perceptions and values. Through a mental map we can figure out which places are more important (as they draw them in the centre even if they are not truly or bigger than the other places), how they perceive the relations between spaces (in the map they may be closer than they really are), which elements are left out and why. A mental map truly represents one's perception of a place and one's representation of reality.

Following Lynch's example, mental maps are now utilised in different fields, especially those interested in spatial cognition and environmental psychology (Young and Barrett, 2001). The early studies that followed Lynch's research launched the cognitive mapping tradition of studying the attributive value, meaning, and memory associated with places as well as the cognitive processes of spatial decision making and the behaviours of way-finding (Orleans, 1973; Gould and White, 1974). Geographic research makes a wide use of mental maps today in order to explore the individual spatial narrative (Kitchin, 1994). For example, mental maps are used to analyse individuals' residential choices, commuting routes (Kitchin, Blades and Golledge, 1997), or travel behaviours (Weston and Handy, 2004). Mental map exercises help researchers to understand the spatial orientation and way-finding skills of different humans (Downs and Stea, 1973; Rovine and Weisman, 1989), or to investigate indigenous cultures' perception, memory, and knowledge sharing of space (Feinberg et al., 2003; Roberts, 2010). Moreover, mental maps capture people's perceptions of places, based on affective images that attach feeling and meaning to places based on remembered impressions or external influences (Spencer and Dixon, 1983; Son, 2005).

The production of mental maps in this study took place during the focus group activity and involved two phases. First, I asked the participants to sketch a map of their

village, as if they had to help another find their way around for the first time, highlighting their home and the main locations of visitation. They could use colours or write some indications or names on the map, as they saw fit in order to describe their village or neighbourhood to someone who did not know it. Second, I asked the participants to show the maps they drew to the others and explain them, answering any questions or responding to comments. The discussion that followed would provide more insight and more details on the participants' choices when drawing the maps. I took notes and photographs during the activity and the final discussion was recorded.

The mental maps were coloured by way of pencils or felt-pens and expressed as free-form spatial drawings on blank paper. Without a base map for reference, these maps were obviously cartographically imprecise. Their broader purpose, however, was to grasp how the participants think spatially or behave in relation to their personal environmental perceptions of their places. As in the group discussions, women and men participated in this activity separately, allowing for more confidence and more freedom of expression deemed appropriate to the local culture. The research plan considered this as an individual activity, but it was often asked by the participants not to work alone, because drawing is not considered a common activity. Therefore, I decided to allow for groups of up to three people to draw a map together, so that participants would feel more confident in the process.




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




Figure 35 a-b-c-d-e-f-g-h: Various moments of group discussions with mental maps production in the three case studies (Source: author)

Difficulties in Conducting the Fieldwork

As a study conducted in the West Bank, this fieldwork had its own special problems. The political climate made it difficult to conduct such a research too openly and freely. Data collection in an area under occupation could be confronted with more limitations and difficulties, either from the occupying power or from the inhabitants themselves (Senan, 1993). In this research, those difficulties can be summarised in three points. First, data and statistics were scarce. As already explained, the source of data on the population that was utilised for the exploratory fieldwork was probably imprecise, because data collection can be affected by the uncertainty of the situation.

Second, during the fieldwork, travel was sometimes restricted within the West Bank as a result of blockades and military orders, which affected both me and the participants. Therefore, scheduled interviews had to be postponed or even cancelled definitely, and the organisation of group meetings became rather complicated. I personally experienced the uncertainty of Palestinian life, which consisted of the cancellation or change of plans according to sudden military dispositions. At the same time, the situation has affected people's lives so that they do not like to be out after sunset, as it is perceived unsafe, so the meetings with men were difficult to be arranged, and with women even more unless held in the morning. Moreover, limited transportation made it difficult to reach Wadi Rahhal and Battir, in particular; and everything had to be completed before the late afternoon. In Tel Rumeida, to access the area I had to cross a checkpoint and I was subject to documents checking, something that made my frequent visits to the area (in the evenings, as well) questioned by the

Israeli military. Moreover, the local interpreter that was supposed to work with me had to resign at the last moment as she was pregnant and considered the radiation from the body scanner and the location too dangerous.

Third, I had to win the participants trust and to defy the suspicions towards my identity as Westerner, which always arised at first. This was not a huge problem in the villages, for different reasons. In Wadi Rahhal a respected member of the society, the old school principal, introduced me as an academic researcher, and convinced all the villagers of the validity of this study. Battir has a familiarity with an international presence, as many came here to study the historical landscape or simply to visit it, and I had previously worked and lived in the village, therefore, I already had contacts there. In Tel Rumeida, the situation was more difficult, since the inhabitants feared the possibility that I was working for the Israeli settlers. In fact, they always refused to sign the Consent Form fearing that they could be signing away the deed to their house, hidden behind a fake Arabic translation. In fact, signature forgery or fake deeds are sometimes responsible for the acquisition of Palestinian land by Israelis in the West Bank. It was then possible to gain the trust of people in Tel Rumeida only with the help of the local activist group "Youth Against Settlement," who vouched in turn for my good intentions.

Data Analysis

Interviews and Group discussions

My work continued with the process of data analysis, that started with the transcription of the recorded interviews and focus groups discussions on separated electronic documents. I classified the photographs taken during fieldwork according to the place and subject. As this was not a participant or structured observation, the photographs were not aimed at recording participants' behaviours, but to gather information about landscape, built environment, the architecture of occupation, all in order to describe the characteristics of the localities. Then, I decided to use an analytical method to sort information into categories and codes. This qualitative content analysis of documents consisted of the identification of underlying themes in the materials being analysed (Bryman, 2008). I re-read the transcripts of interviews with research aims and objectives in mind and I kept only the parts of the text that were relevant to the research concerns. The theoretical framework influenced my choice of what to exclude from the analysis. I saved on a separate file only the selected parts and my analysis continued from this one. In case different participants often used similar phrases to express the same idea, the repetition of ideas helped me to define more complex categories using

analytical induction (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993).

Coding helped me to reduce the amount of data accumulated and to analytically categorise it (Neuman, 2000). In my study code is intended as a word symbolically assigning an essence-capturing attribute to a portion of a transcribed interview (Saldaña, 2009). After coding, I summarised my impressions in notes for research use, also known as analytic memos (Strauss, 1987). These notes became another data resource. Going back and forth between interviews' and focus groups' transcripts, and examining other data resources as reflective journal and field notes, helped me to solidify, refine or discard categories. I used quotations from the interviews to illustrate the concepts in detail. While doing this, I preserved the anonymity of the interviewees by using the system of coding established for this study.

Analysis of Mental Maps

The analytic method that I followed for the data analysis of the mental maps produced during the focus groups is well explained by Gieseking (2013) . I studied the maps following four categories, each containing a various number of analytics:

1. Mechanics of method (i.e. the map representation of reality – is it accurate?)

2. Drawing elements (i.e. how a map is drawn, how many classes defined by Lynch are present and how they are represented)

3. Narratives of place (i.e. are there cultural factors, traditions, does the construction of the maps unveil information on the way each participant perceives the landscape or the built environment?)

4. Personalization (i.e. does anything in the map reveal personal experiences or emotions? What has been the participants' attitude towards the exercise?)

Moreover, I continually questioned and critically analysed the maps, prompting some questions: for example, in what ways do they differ or are they similar? What features are common and which ones are not included, distorted or inaccurate?

I then integrated this information with the transcription of the verbal exchange that accompanied the common discussion following the map drawing exercise. I was then able to produce a table was for each map, where I collected all the data, identifying the recurring ideas from the maps and to select these ideas as in the case of the interviews' transcriptions. Finally, I arranged the text into a theoretical narrative, that narrated the participants' subjective experience organized according to the theoretical framework of the research (Silverman, 1993).

Chapter 8.

Case Study 1: Wadi Rahhal Village (Bethlehem Governorate)



Figure 36: View of Wadi Rahhal main built area (Source: Author)

Contextual background

Wadi Rahhal is a village located 5.7 km south of Bethlehem. The existence of the village dates back to 1890, and its residents tend to originate from the Al Fawaghra neighbourhood in Bethlehem. The houses belong still today to the only Muslim clan of the town, whose families originate from the same ancestor. Abdallah Ibrahim Khader bought land in Wadi Rahhal around 200 years ago and started working it with his sheep and his three sons Ali, Ahmad and Othman. After 1927 earthquake, he sold his house in Bethlehem and then settled down in Wadi Rahhal.

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the total population of Wadi Rahhal in 2007 was 1,419. There are two mixed public schools in the village, one in Wadi Rahhal itself and one in the connected area of Thabra. At that time, a privately run kindergarten had recently opened. There are no health facilities, nor ambulances serving the village area. The nearest hospitals are in Bethlehem or Beit Jala, which is about 13 km far away.




Figure 37: Wadi Rahhal aerial view, with the settlement of Efrat visible in the upper left corner (Source: Arij)

Historically, the local economy was based on agriculture. Today, however, agriculture employs just about 55 per cent of the workforce. Industry (especially stone and marble factories), alternatively, amounts to 15 per cent of local employment, trade to 13 per cent, government employment to 7 per cent, and the Israeli labour market to 7 per cent. The unemployment rate nonetheless, in Wadi Rahhal, afflicts about 30 per cent of the population (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2010). Agricultural production in Wadi Rahhal depends mostly on rainwater. As for irrigated fields, they depend on the public water network. The most common crop cultivated within the area is tomato, while the fruit tree is grape vine. The water comes from the West Bank Water Department, through the public water network established in 1985, which is controlled by the Israeli authority. When water is cut off for long periods of time in the summer, agricultural and domestic activities depend instead the tank collections of rainwater.

Following the Oslo Accords (1992), around 40 per cent of the land of Wadi Rahhal pertained to Area B and the remaining 60 per cent to Area C. Mostly agricultural or open green areas were placed under the complete control of the Israeli government. The settlement of Efrat along the northern boundary of the village, which is part of the Gush Etzion settlement block in the South Jerusalem area, has been under development since 1980. The location of this settlement de facto erases the direct road to Bethlehem, annexing most of the village's water sources and green land. The Separation Barrier runs directly on village's lands, along the new road bordering the village, ensuring that

it is kept apart from the settlement area (Fig. 38).




Figure 38: Wadi Rahhal area, with the settlement of Efrat (to the left), the separation barrier (red line), and the different shades of the Oslo zones (Source: Arij)

Since the occupation, the area of Wadi Rahhal has suffered the consequences of the Israeli plans for East Jerusalem. In 1967, to secure its domination, Israel defined a "Greater Jerusalem area," including 28 other Palestinian villages located in the West Bank and their land (Fig. 38). Those villages became the Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jerusalem, while the settlements inside Jerusalem's municipal border became Jewish neighbourhoods. This development took place on land over the official Green Line. Since then, more Israeli settlements have been built around the city, encaging in between them smaller Palestinian villages like Wadi Rahhal. As explained previously (see Chapter Six), with the Allon Plan (1977), the construction of Jewish new towns began all around the West Bank. As part of this effort, three large settlements were established to create a "protective" belt (functioning as physical, social, and symbolic buffer zones), separating Jerusalem from the Palestinian population (Chesin, Hutman and Melamed, 1999). In the east the city of Ma'ale Adumim (1975) and its surrounding settlements, in the north the town of Bet El (1977) and more significantly the town of Giv'at Ze'ev (1983), and in the south the town of Efrat (1980) and the ultra-Orthodox city of Betar Illit (1985), strengthening the Etzion Block region. Though not legally annexed, these developments, like Har Homa and Gilo in Bethlehem area, Gush Etzion, Giv'at Ze'ev, Ma'ale Adumim, and the newest battleground frontier—E1 (Shlay and Rosen, 2010), are considered as Israeli cities, part of the outer suburban ring of the Jerusalem metropolitan area.




Figure 39: Greater Jerusalem Plan map, Wadi Rahhal is located below Bethlehem, a small village opposite the big settlement of Efrat (Source: Arij)

Between 1967 and 1987, Palestinian men were employed in the fast growing construction industries building the new Jewish neighbourhoods and settlements. Therefore, East Jerusalem served as a hub for the Palestinian economy and villages which surrounded the region and began to expand in a near sprawl-like fashion as a result of an influx of large numbers of immigrants from other parts of the West Bank. Before the First Intifada, Palestinians could move inside the West Bank and inside the Green Line with few restrictions and the Second Intifada severely limited all these movements. It was the Oslo Accords which would put a final stop to them by imposing a strict permits system.

In 1995, the Israeli government adopted a master plan for a “Greater Jerusalem” encircled by an “outer ring” of jewish-only settlements: Har Adar, Givat Ze’ev, New Givon, Kiryat Sefer; Tel Zion and the settlements to the east of Ramallah, Ma’ale Adumim; Israeli buildings in Ra’s al-‘Amud, Efrat, the Etzion bloc and Beitar Illit. At the same time, the master plan added limitations to construction in Palestinian areas in Jerusalem (Halper, 2000).

The Separation Barrier built after the Second Intifada reinforced the annexation of Jewish East Jerusalem neighbourhoods, swerving into the West Bank so as to incorporate into Israel the newly-established Jewish satellite suburbs which were on or near the Green Line, while simultaneously disconnecting East Jerusalem from its Palestinian hinterland. A new Great Jerusalem Bill was proposed in July 2016,

intending to include five settlements blocks (Ma'aleh Adumim, Gush Etzion, Efrat, Beitar Illit and Givat Ze'ev) with about 150 thousand settlers under Jerusalem's municipal jurisdiction, but not officially annexed to Israel. If passed, the bill would change the demography of East Jerusalem, reducing considerably the Arab population, thereby granting a Jewish majority.

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Figure 40: Photograph of Efrat settlement, in the center, and Wadi Rahhal, to the left. In between them, the trace of the Separation Barrier (Source: Ynetnews)

Life in the Village: the Past and the Present

Wadi Rahhal is a very small village, wherein the main activity used to be agriculture. Its inhabitants used to work their fields and then turn to Bethlehem, the closest main town, in order to sell their products or buy what they needed. The different historic periods, from the British Mandate to the Jordanian kingdom to the Israeli occupation, have wrought many changes to the village. From interviews and group discussions, it became clear that all the participants divided the trajectory of their life experience between 'the past,' related to a particular moment of Israeli Occupation (according to the age of the participant, this could be either before the 1967 occupation or before the 1993 Oslo Accords, or even before the 2000 construction of the Separation Barrier) and 'the present,' as in now.

In the past, prior to the 1967 occupation, the life of the villagers was described as a simpler one, regulated by the rhythm of the fields, the crops, the orchards and the breeding of animals. In many villages in the West Bank, the people lived off the products of their own cultivations, earning little money by selling it in the nearest

market; in this case, Bethlehem. The whole family would work together in the fields: women and men, adults and children. According to those interviewed, there were the daily activities typical of the time, for instance, men predominantly worked in the fields while women saw to the needs of the household; children journeyed by foot to the school in Bethlehem. Until Israel's occupation, little villages had neither electricity nor running water; there were no telephones and few cars.

"*It was a very simple life. There were no settlements. We had sheep, cows, and land to farm. We were all farmers*" (WR03). All the hills around the village were farmed or left for the animals to pasture, as is deemed traditional in the area. This meant that the sheep could eat the grass from the common land near what would be settlements today. As the participant above notes, this would mean an economic advantage for the villagers, especially in a time when farmers could afford few expenses. The way to Bethlehem used to be short and the town could be reached upon walking straight through the fields. Those older than twenty could still remember the walk to town as part of their daily routine, whether it was to go to school or to the market. Wadi Rahhal sits ontop of a high hill, surrounded only by trees and fields, with nothing to block its view of Bethlehem and Jerusalem, which stand only a few kilometres away.



Figure 41: A view of the landscape that could recall the past of Wadi Rahhal (Source: Author)

The whole community talks of the green areas surrounding the village as well as of the sensation of freedom and community with nature. Open green areas were also available for the villagers to enjoy, therefore, many remember the traditional family picnics and barbeques that took place there: "*any of these (lost) places were wild and*

not planted, as they were empty areas, not fertile. But we could use them to build or to enjoy the space" (WR05). In these moments, the villagers would act as a conjoined family, helping and supporting each other in the case of need. The sense of community was very intense: "*in the past brothers and cousins used to live together, but no conflicts…in the past they used to take decisions together…*" (WR20).

In time of crisis, communities often idealise the past as a refuge from a disliked present (Lowenthal, 1985), though they do recognise that this past can never be returned to (Kaplan, 1987). Thus the villagers of Wadi Rahhal describe the past with a deep sense of nostalgia, talking about a quiet life, without any perceived threat of danger. Some older participants remember that "*in the past there were no fears. The people used to sleep out there, with no fear*" (WR03). The participant continues, "[in the past] *there was no fear of being refugees, of being kicked out of our land*" (WR03). After 1967, however, as people were expelled from their land upon the creation of the Green Line, a new feeling started to spread among the inhabitants.

The Oslo Accords and their Impact

The Colonisation Process via Settlements

After 1967, Israel's occupation started to develop aspects of settler colonialism made manifest in the West Bank. The settler colonisation process consists of two elements: territoriality and control (over, namely, the land and the people). In this case, a certain control over the population was exerted since the beginning of occupation by way of controlling their resources. From the 1970s onwards, right after the occupation, many modern commodities began to arrive in the village (and in other West Bank villages), unlike ever before. For some, this represented an improvement of village life. Some interviewers recall the coming of electricity and the telephone; most remembered "*when the first TV arrived in Wadi Rahhal, we watched it all together like a cinema*" (WR20). All these new services were soon to became fundamental to the local Palestinians and their way of life. The occupied population in turn were dependant on the occupying power and rendered economically inferior.

The changes that occurred in such a small village like Wadi Rahhal prompted a growing need for monetary as opposed to merely agricultural subsistence; no longer were they a self-sufficient society. All interviewees would confirm that "*the need for money increased, because in the past there was no electricity, no water, no school…but in the 1980s you had to give the children expense to go to school, you need expense to pay for electricity and so on…you need more cash*" (WR20). The situation was more or less the same in other agricultural villages of the West Bank. Therefore, most of the

men went to work in Israel or even abroad (e.g. in Jordan, Yemen or in the Gulf countries), especially for the construction industry. In the specific case of Wadi Rahhal, which is close to the Green Line and East Jersualen, most families were able to cover the raised expenses of modern living as young men could easily travel to Israel to find a job. As previously explained, Israel has followed the classic steps of settler colonialism by subordinating Palestinians to Israeli-controlled forms of labour that would later develop into systematic exclusion and displacement of Palestinian workers (Lloyd, 2012).

This process of settler colonisation continued its development after the Oslo Accords through territoriality and control over the land (Makdisi, 2008). The ever expanding possession of the land by Israel is the central node of the uneasy co-existence of Israel and Palestine. This centrality of this node manifests in and can be well-explained by looking to Wadi Rahhal, given the unstopping growth of Israeli settlements in the adjacent neighbourhoods. Take for instance, the settlement of Efrat (founded 1983), which started as only a group of caravans, but was soon to became following the Oslo Accords a town due to continuous expansion. Efrat is now home to almost nine thousand Jewish settlers (PeaceNow, 2019). Because settler colonialism consists of land appropriation (as explained in Chapter 2), elimination of the natives and of their claim to any land facilitates the expansion of an external group. In the case of Wadi Rahhal, as the years passed, more and more land which once belonged to the village as green or agricultural space would be confiscated by Israel for the growth of the settlement.

Today the settlement rises right across the road from Wadi Rahhal, opposite to the public school, on what used to be common green land.



Figure 42: Efrat under expansion in 2014, view from the village road (Source: Author)





Figure 43 a-b: Views of Efrat from the village road in 2015, with now completed housing units and new ones under construction (Source: Author)



Figure 44: Efrat settlement (center/right) and, moving to the left, the site of the Separation Barrier, the village road and the village school (small building on the left) in 2015 (Source: Author)

Territorial Expansion via Systems of Segregation and Control

In the logic of settler colonialism, segregation is a tool to isolate, control and ultimately deprive indigenous persons of their sovereignty over a particular territory. With the Oslo-designated areas, only a small part of the village (predominantly space that was already built upon) was declared under the regulations of Area B, while the remaining agricultural land was subsumed under Area C and thereby under total Israeli control. This deprived the villagers of their sovereignty over those lands for, despite having some rights of access, they remain forbidden to build anything on them that could pertain to private ownership. With such laws and regulations in place, a 'state of exception' emerges as a space is generated in which people are without rights though under the will of the law (Agamben, 2003).




Figure 45: Wadi Rahhal area on the Oslo Agreement maps (Source: B'tselem)

The physical implementation of this loss of sovereignty is made manifest in the security barrier which will protect Efrat's citizens and which is under construction between the village and the settlement on gradually expropriated by the Israeli authorities. In the frame of settler colonialism, walled barriers act simultaneously as instrument of separation, occupation and of territorial expansion (Brown, 2010). As the interviews were conducted, the security fence had not been completed and consisted instead of a metallic net on a dirt road, controlled by the settlement security guards. The spatial segregation in Wadi Rahhal is realised in concomitance with the restriction of movement of the Palestinian population. In fact, before the Second Intifada and before

the construction of the Separation Barrier, inhabitants of Wadi Rahhal could access Israel and the Jewish settlements easily, to work, to shop or simply to travel. Therefore, "*young men went to the settlements to work, while old men stayed in Wadi Rahhal and worked in the fields*" (WR20). Two other interviewees would concur: "*In the 1980s we started to work in Israel. That was the golden age. We were free to go anywhere*" (WR18 + WR19).

In the case of Wadi Rahhal, segregation took the form of the forced spatial separation of the two population groups: Palestinian villagers from Israeli settlers. The goal was to limit the interaction between groups by restricting the freedom of movement of the former. The construction of the Separation Barrier since 2000 functions as a scission point between 'the past' when the Palestinians from the West Bank were free to travel into and from Israel (and other parts of the occupied territories) and 'the present' in which movement depends on permits and is broken up by multiple borders. The purpose of the Barrier is to maintain security inside of Israel and it effectively does so by controlling the access routes. Multiple checkpoints inside the occupied territories further serve as a system of population control in what has become a carceral society.

These two tools (i.e. the Barrier and checkpoints) of segregation and control are better facilitated by the permit system that makes the freedom of movement of all Palestinians subject to Israeli decision. The permit system, created after the Second Intifada, prevented many men from Wadi Rahhal to continue their work in Israel; unemployment thereby heavily afflict the community. The system of segregation system, imposed by the Barrier, would worsen the Palestinian economic situation in general. But, in Wadi Rahhal, because a high percentage of jobs were in Israeli construction sector, the village was more greatly affected than others. Without jobs, the need for money weighed heavily on the local population, rendering many families in debt to Israeli providers of electricity and water. One interviewee notes how "*electricity is very expensive. And now we have a huge debt for that (...) with the Israelis. It is a private company. Based in Jerusalem. The company is owned by the Israelis but as the Palestinians need the electricity this company works with the PA to provide the electricity here*" (WR09).

Thus, Israel accomplished the economic and social control necessary for occupation, utilising the tactics and logics of settler colonialism. In practice, the village people saw the physical decreased of their space as their possibilities for movement were subject to ever greater limitations. This has been the result of increased security measures (especially, after the second Intifada), the expansion of the settlement of Efrat

and that of the Separation Barrier. The latter, in particular, has multiple implications for Wadi Rahhal. First, as the Barrier is built on confiscated agricultural land that belonged to the villagers, it reduces their source of income. Along with the settlement of Efrat, the Separation Barrier consumed a large portion of the village land, blocking any possible expansion of Palestinian houses. Second, the Barrier blocks the most direct road to Bethelehem, thereby cutting villagers direct route and access to their main socio-economic centre. Third, along with the Barrier, a highly-modernised security apparatus of surveillance has grown, utilising soldiers, cameras and armed settlers to explicitly and tacitly threaten the village population. The Separation Barrier changes its paths according to the need for settlement expansion, therefore, it creates a sense of uncertainty for the village's future.

As most interviewees recall, they would visit Jerusalem, and Aqqa and Jaffa by the sea, before the second Intifada. Most of them, as children, would play anywhere, especially before the construction of the settlement of Efrat. Many remember that it was possible to walk to Bethlehem on a short road, but today the physical segregation applied by Israel in relation to the occupied population makes it impossible for them to continue doing so. The old direct road to Al Khader and Bethlehem is now closed to Arabs, as it would risk cutting through the settlements. There is a new, very tortuous road that climbs up and through the hills to Wadi Rahhal, which makes a trip 20 minutes longer than normal and certainly not walkable. The public form of transportation, a shared taxi (Fig. 46), is rare and random, and it stops running after 4 pm. It is therefore quite complicated for the people of the village who do not own a private car to access the services of the town.



Figure 46: A shared taxi climbing on the road from Bethlehem to Wadi Rahhal (Source: Author)

A Carceral Society

The analogy of a prison recurs often in villagers' narratives. Indeed, many describe Israel's policies in carceral terms, mostly in connection with the way they perceive the means of control that Israel applies to the occupied territory. The system of "graduated incarceration" (Smith, 2011) that pervades the West Bank is made of apparatuses that restrict and complicate Palestinian lives.

More significantly, here, this carceral society has its architectural elements that affect the landscape and the built environment. Palestinians often perceive their land as a prison, walled and caged. The use of panopticon system becomes evident in such cases where the occupier needs to watch and control the actions of those occupied (Hannah, 1997). In fact, the Palestinian villagers cannot come close to the Security Barrier as it is patrolled by the Israeli Border Police. Once open and green, the area of and which surrounds the village is now perceived as some kind of jail, surrounded by guarded settlements, physical barriers, and controlled by hostile settlers and the border police. The feeling of imprisonment is caused in the village by the presence of settlements on every direction (Fig. 47); towards the South (Migdal'Oz), the West (Efrat and the whole Etzion Bloc), the North (with a new expansion) and the East (Taqua). The settlements are seen as ever expanding entities and perceived by the local population both as physical objects of occupation and as panoptic tools of control. Most of the interviewees expressed certain unease when describing the situation: "*you look to the side of the land where there is the settlement and it is expanding, and the land is shrinking*" (WR17).



Figure 47: The settlement of Efrat seen from the village school yard (Source: Author)

This feeling of threat and danger can be likened to what Yi-Fu Tuan calls 'topophobia', that is, the experience of a repulsion from a particular place (1980). In Wadi Rahhal, the area near the settlement is perceived not only as dangerous, but also as uncomfortable and different from what the villagers were used to. Moreover, as common green areas were seized for the creation of the Barrier, people feel that they have been deprived of the space as they cannot access the land still on their side of the Barrier: "*There was a land with a big almond tree under which we used to play. We used to go there but now it is scary because it is close to the wall*" (WR05).

During the interviews, comparisons were often made between the present and the past, whereby the latter (i.e. before the construction of the settlement) was conceived as a time with more safety and freedom. Most underline their mothers' fear for their children, comparing the life they used to have in their own childhood and the life of today's children, always perceived in danger of harassment by settlers and soldiers: "*In the past you couldn't go out at night because there were wild animals*" whereas today "*when I look at the settlement I get afraid and I hope that no settler comes here, when it is dark*" (WR12).

Place attachment: the old houses as collective memory

While living in a context of limitations with the potential for continuous confrontation with occupant entities, the villagers express feelings of attachment to places of their past; this past is often represented by buildings and structures that represent a collective identity as well as memory and culture (Zaprianov, 2012). A collective memory consists of the sum of the traces of the past that a community holds, elaborates and transmits from generation to generation, contributing to define and strengthen its own identity.

The power of vernacular architecture to evoke a disappeared way of life is an appropriate example of built testimony of the history of a social group, as in the "unselfconscious place making" described Edward Relph (1976). The pictures of old houses, showed during group discussions, evoked in most of the participants memories of the common act of building traditional houses, a process that would involve the whole community by comprising shared knowledge – shared construction was a sign of strong relationships between the villagers. Participants were able to recall aspects of the buildings themselves: how it was for everyone more climatically comfortable than the new ones; they were warm in winter and fresh in summer. The old houses represented, for everyone, the common identity of the Palestinian people as it used to be and as it should be remembered. In particular, they represented all the positive aspects of being Palestinian: sharing (as sharing the space inside the house, with one room for the whole

family, and sharing the construction); high levels of craftsmanship (with the special skills needed to work the stones); being connected with the others (by spending time together).

Childhood places seem to maintain a particular status in the affective hierarchy through all the life of individuals (Giuliani, 2003). In fact, during the interviews, when asked about their favourite places, most of the villagers chose the old family house as it holds many memories of childhood and of family life. All these memories, feelings of ownership, pride of creation, are signs of attachment to a place (Altman and Low, 1992; Chow and Healey, 2008), a bonding that in this case involves affects and emotions as well as beliefs in reference to a place. In fact, when requested to choose the residence of their dreams, the participants saw the village as the only place in which they would live. No one would consider building a house or the village as a whole anywhere else; no one seemed to consider the possibility of leaving and finding a better place to dwell. Their attachment to the village went beyond the quality of life available there. More often than not, their difficult economic situation (i.e. high rates of unemployment) restrained them from thinking of the possibilities to start a new life elsewhere.

Palestinian place making after the occupation

Adaptive Practices of Resilience

In the 1980s, Wadi Rahhal was a very small village of about fifteen stone houses: "*Each house was like a hush, a complex of rooms. Sometimes the hush had many rooms, for the father and his brothers, each house had three or four rooms*" (WR06). Then, the population of the village started to grow which required the building of new houses. As noted previously, over this period of time, the customary habits of Palestinians changed: old houses were abandoned for more modern ones, which had electricity, private bedrooms, an indoor bathroom and a kitchen, plus, water plumbing. Given the influence of new technologies and new building materials like concrete and iron, which would have been observed while working in Israel or abroad, the Palestinians of the village decided that the old houses were no longer comfortable and so, built new modern houses on the family land.

As the segregation process commenced, following the Oslo Accords, most of the village land was put in Area C; the available land in Wadi Rahhal shrank while the land available for settlements increased. In fact, in the West Bank, a double legal system assigns the Palestinian population to the military courts and the Israeli settlers, who live in the same territory, to the civil justice system, thereby enforcing an apartheid system of segregation. Because new buildings require permission from the Civil

Administration, the governing arm of Israel's military in the West Bank (who has implemented highly restrictive zoning and planning regulations), Palestinians are effectively prevented from construction (World Bank, 2008).

As already explained, the Palestinian population is characterized by sumud, translated as 'steadfastness' – a form of standing up to the challenges of daily life under occupation (Shehadeh, 1982). Sumud can be described as a way of Palestinian life under occupation, indeed, as the sum of everyday acts that prevent their total subordination to Israeli occupation (Allen, 2008).



Figure 48: Wadi Rahhal view, the houses consuming all the remaining green areas (Source: Author)

Resilience was manifest in the response of the people of Wadi Rahhal (as of most villages and towns of the West Bank) to the restrictions on buildings and construction as they started to exploit the land in Area B, wherein they could build without Israeli permission (Fig. 48). As the population increased, so did the floors of the buildings in order to accommodate new families. By doing so, the old houses and the gardens and trees among them would disappear as they demolished to make space for more buildings (Fig. 49-50-51). This process of place making describes exactly the union of the context and the architectural built form produced in it (Stea and Turan, 1993). People's happiness and wellbeing are connected to the quality of place making (Alexander, 1979), but as the effects of segregation and of land appropriation described earlier, the villagers shared now the needs of privacy, space and of an open view onto nature. One participated noted: "*I now feel that we are surrounded, in the past if you look through the window you looked to a very wild land and you felt free. Now you feel that you are surrounded, many houses are besides, next to each other, there is not more space between the houses, not like in the past*" (WR01).



Figure 49: Surviving old houses surrounded by new ones (Source: Author)



Figure 50: An old house next to a new one in the village main area (Source: Author)



Figure 51: An abandoned old house used as garbage dump (Source: Author)

Due to Israel's logic of settler colonialism, there is a steady appropriation of local natural resources. In the specific case of Wadi Rahhal, the entire water reservoir was seized within Efrat's limits. Therefore, the village receives water from an Israeli company, but only when permitted to do so. Water scarcity has become a huge issue for the village, especially during summers or moments of political crisis, the water provision is cut. In another form of resilience, the villagers have installed on their rooves, water tanks that they fill when the water runs. These black water tanks are a typical feature of Palestinian villages, who all share similar water issues. These tanks are often perceived by interviewees as a sign of lack of development or lack of freedom, often in comparison with the houses of the occupier which do not display any water tanks on the roof (Fig. 52-53).



Figure 52: Wadi Rahhal houses, on each roof a water tank (Source: Author)



Figure 53: Water tanks on the roof of village houses (Source: Author)

These examples can be defined as adaptive resilience for, by taking such actions, the villagers are trying to minimise the consequence of their occupation. The villagers can be seen to apply adaptive resilience when choosing as their favourite places, those where they can relax, free their mind and find new strength to cope with the current stresses of their situation. Most interviewees would look for natural places, where the view is still free from the presence of occupation built structures. For example, one participant describes: "*a place with a big pine tree on the other side of the village, free from the occupation, far from the settlement*" (WR05).

As a result of the place making choices that were forced on Wadi Rahhal by the occupation, the built space of the village is often perceived as inhospitable; it lacks greenery and open spaces, as it is consumed by new buildings. Within this village, there lies a distinction between the place making of a community maintaining resilience in the face of an oppressor and place making that would result from social processes of place production, through which a society acquires a sense of belonging to a place (Harvey, 1996).

The Villagers' Place making Choices

The participants appeared to share the dream of solving the issues caused by land confiscation and segregation. They tackle each issue with ideal solutions. First of all, the lack of green spaces would be approached by providing every house with a garden and "*a park, with things for kids to play and beautiful view of trees*" (WR15). Especially for women, who spend most of their time at home, a good house has a garden where "*in the summer, at sunset, you can sit and have a cup of tea, and look at the flowers and just relax*" (WR14). The need to relax is often associated with a beautiful view of nature or with sitting under a tree in a garden. Women tended to be more focused on the comparison with the neighbouring settlement, which has public parks, gardens, and "beautiful modern" houses that they can only see from afar, but are perceived as desirable homes. It is often said that the "*Israeli houses are better*" (WR11) as they use more expensive, better quality materials and waterproof red tiled rooves (*Kermit*) and central heating that prevent water infiltration and moisture.

The Israeli houses were perceived by the participants as representative of the better economic situation of the settlers. An architect was hired for the design and better quality materials were employed, with the use of more advanced technical solutions for construction. Nevertheless, these houses are stigmatised as something belonging to the occupier, therefore, not suitable for self-loving Palestinians. In juxtaposition to the

settlers' houses, the villagers describe the old Palestinian houses, that are perceived as technically superior to the actual ones, with thick stone walls and domed rooves, "*very cool in the summer time, and warm in winter*" (WR16), testimonies of a golden past before the occupation.

Another issue in the village is the lack of private space, which creates tensions between neighbours as well as relatives, who live in close proximity: "*the people live very close to each other and sometimes there are problems*" (WR02). In an attempt to escape the crowded and suffocating village, the perfect house would have be a tall building with a view of the outside, or a villa with natural sunlight entering from every side. Nevertheless, the model of the desired house is not univocal: some prefer the modern villas, while others the old houses. Modern villas are usually perceived as a sign of development, something away from the reality of the village without traces of poverty or mess, unlike the houses of the village. The villas, alternatively, resemble ideal houses for the rich as presented on TV shows or on the Internet. They have red rooves, exterior walls covered with shiny stones, running water all year round (no need for water tanks) and allow for lush gardens wherein the family can relax. A garden is something that no one in Wadi Rahhal can afford due to the lack of space and the scarcity of water, therefore, everyone dreams of having one.

The Effects of Adaptive Resilience Activities on the Built Environment

Adaptive resilience has previously been defined as the activity that involves making choices and taking actions to mitigate the effects of conflict and violence. Adaptive resilience includes identifying opportunities to do things differently, as well as evolving livelihood strategies, based on changing conditions. In Wadi Rahhal, in order to overcome the lack of free land, the solution to provide a home for everyone was found in building new houses on top of the old ones, either by destroying them or by making them disappear inside the new walls. The old houses were destroyed and the new ones were built in their place, as all the available land had been confiscated for the settlement or is under Israeli jurisdiction. Therefore, the occupation is blamed for the disappearance of the old houses; most interviewees felt that, with the old houses, the Palestinian identity was also disappearing and thereby the future of Palestinian society.

For this reason, some villagers started to believe that it would be a good idea to maintain at least one of the old houses. To this end, they followed the example of other villages that have restored the old houses, as in Battir just few kilometres away, in a final act of transformative resilience.

Chapter 9.

Case Study 2: Battir Village (Bethlehem Governorate)



Figure 54: View of Battir and its cultivated terraces (Source: Author)

Introduction and Historical Background

Battir is a relatively small Palestinian agricultural village located on the hills about 6 km north-west from the town of Bethlehem and almost 7 km south-west of Jerusalem Old City, in the Central Highlands between Nablus and Hebron. Battir's natural landscape was adapted for agricultural purposes centuries ago. The area is known for its multitude of springs around which people have settled since prehistoric times. The terraced fields date back 2,000 years and are still in use today (Emek Shaveh, 2013). They are characterised by the use of stone terraces, irrigated or dry and planted with grapevines and olive trees. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the total population of Battir in 2017 was 4,696 (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

Cultural Landscape

Battir shares many characteristics with six neighbouring localities: Husan, Nahalin,

Wadi Fukin, Al Walaja, Al Khader and Artas. This territory was traditionally connected to Jerusalem by a series of valleys and later by an Ottoman railway through which the local farmers brought their products to the bigger market. Supported by yearlong availability of spring water, cultivation of grapes, olives, plums, almonds, apricots, aubergines and various vegetables flourished, this area became significantly known as the "basket (of vegetables) of Jerusalem" (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2010).



Figure 55: Cultivated terraces (Source: Author)

The continuous dependence of the inhabitants of the area on agriculture as a major source of income has contributed to the creation of a unique cultural landscape (Fontana Antonelli, 2014). 'Cultural landscapes' are living landscapes that reflect the ways people inhabit or use a region, mirroring ways of life (Taylor and Lennon, 2011). As such, they evolve over time, influenced by the changes in human activity, reflecting the values of the society that is linked to them. The cultural landscape of Battir's agricultural gardens is composed of anthropic structures distributed along Al-Makrour valley, product of a continuous human interaction with the surrounding territory (Gola, Perugini and Harb, 2010). The local agricultural system of olive fields, vineyards and orchards is distributed along terraced fields, integrated by elements of vernacular dry-stone architecture as dry-stone retaining walls, agricultural watchtowers (manatir or qusoor), olive oil presses, ancient irrigation pools to collect the water flowing from the springs, ancient irrigation canals, and the remains of human settlements (khirab).

These objects are evidence of the presence of man in these green valleys, settled at least since the Roman Empire[1]. Moreover, as it will be explained in the next paragraphs, the cultural landscape of the agricultural terraces represents political as well as social and cultural constructs. It connects the people from the village to their past and to the achievements and values of their predecessors.




Figure 56: Battir and its cultivated terraces, abstract of sheet 16/12 Ordnance Survey, 1944 (Source: Geo See, 2019)

The Ottoman Railway and the Way to Jerusalem

This territory was part of the Jerusalem district until 1948, when the nascent state of Israel redesigned the geopolitical borders of the area. The border was drawn precisely on the site of the Ottoman railway that crosses the valley. This railway carries an interesting story worth mentioning here in order to introduce correctly the historical events that lead to a special agreement in favour of Battir's ownership of agricultural land across the border with Israel. Initially built to support religious tourism, reflecting an ancient route that ran from the coastal plains to the Judean Hills, the railway gave the village and others along the route a considerable degree of mobility (DAAR-Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency). The Ottomans with the help of local men and stonemasons from Bethlehem and Jerusalem built this railway, and the train-station opened in Battir in 1892.



Figure 57: Battir's train station and the terraces (Source: Shokeh, 2015)



*Figure 5*8: Battir's train station in 1892 (Source: Krikorian, 1892)



*Figure 5*9: 1920: Picnic at Battir's railway station with the Mushabek and Abdo families from Jerusalem (Source: This Week in Palestine)

Battir was a water-supplying stop for trains after the long journey from Jaffa, and there the women would load their baskets full of garden products to be sold in the Old City market. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate administered the railway, and trains continued stopping in Battir, contributing to the spread of the village's fame and the cultivation of its beautiful landscape.

1948 Green Line and the Special Agreement for Battir

The life of Battir's train-station would arrive to a halt with the end of the British Mandate and the birth of the State of Israel: although passenger service on the former Jaffa-Jerusalem line restarted after the 1948 war, the Battir station was closed. The armistice line between Israel and Jordan functioned as a barrier of total separation. As it roughly paralleled the foothills of the West Bank, many villages along the western slopes lost their lands in the coastal plains below. This line crossed the lands of around hundred villages and two towns, separating them from their agricultural sources of income and livelihood; Battir was among them (Brawer, 1990; Morris, 1993; Newman, 1995). In fact, the 1949 Armistice Agreement with Jordan gave Israel full control over the railway. In order then to create a wide security corridor along the railway, Israel negotiated with representatives from the village the shifting of the Green Line from the actual ceasefire line towards Battir's land.

Negotiations produced the Rhodes Agreement: a special provisional document that drew the line about 200 meters east of the railway, thus leaving 15 houses and the school of Battir on the Israeli side. But, at the same time, it allowed the inhabitants to reach their fields up to 3 km beyond the demarcation line on the Israeli side. Two gates in the barbed wire allowed people to cross and the school was reopened under Jordanian administration in 1950.



Figure 60: Battir valley and the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem railway. In red, the 1948 Armistice Line. On the right, the Boys School and the old railway station site. Beyond the red line and the railway, the fields belonging to Battir's farmers that sit on the Israeli side of the border. The Rhodes Agreement allows the Battiris to access their gardens. (Source: Daar with Amina Bech)

Hassan Mustafa: The Community Leader

There are many histories in the village that concern the negotiations which took place between village representatives and the Israeli army for the position of the border. In most, a man is considered at the centre and origin of the specific status of Battir, which allowed the village to maintain its agricultural lands beyond the Green Line. Hassan Mustafa, a prominent Battiri Palestinian nationalist, has been described as "a concerned individual, activist, writer and broadcaster" (Botmeh, 2006, p. 29). Born in Battir in 1914, the son of a tribal chief, he was highly educated having graduated from American University Cairo in 1935.

Mustafa had already been a vocal opponent of British and Zionist colonial rule and when the British Mandate ended and the conflict with Zionist forces spread, he was ready to gather weapons and fend off attacks on Battir. In the summer-fall period of 1948, when refugees from nearby villages were arriving with testimonies of massacres like the one in Deir Yassin (only 4 km away from Battir), most of the population of Battir fled, afraid of the attacks. Mustafa and few other village defenders stayed behind to prevent the village from being occupied. Battir was one of the frontier villages whose status was to be negotiated in the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire of 1949 in Rhodes. Its area was designated as No Man's Land on the Israeli armistice maps, which would have meant the erasure of the village. Mustafa, with few other men, however, convinced the Israeli Army that the houses were still inhabited by lighting candles at night and therefore kept the empty village much alive, thereby saving Battir.



Figure 61: Hassan Moustafa, on the right, in Battir in 1953 (Source: Shokeh, 2015)

Not so long after, Hassan Mustafa confronted the Israeli delegation visiting the demarcation line and he negotiated the interests of his village with the commander of the former attacks, Moshe Dayan. Hassan was able to make his voice heard. The ownership of Battir's land was reconfirmed and the farmers of Battir were allowed to cultivate their land on the Israeli side of the Green Line (Owen, 1982). The agreement further stated that the village inhabitants would protect passing trains, and so the demarcation line was moved 200 yards south of the railway as well as the borders of Battir's land were set, with the help of six villagers (Botmeh, 2006). Rules were established that villagers could use already built houses, the school and their fields inside the Israeli side of the green line as well as north of the railway. They had to underpass the railway line, however, not to walk on it (Botmeh, 2006). In Hassan Mustafa's own words:

> Then came 'The Troubles' followed by the establishment of the fateful Demarcation Line in 1949 and contact with the outside world ceased. Train service stopped, Jerusalem was inaccessible…and the effect of isolation, loss of income, of health and educational services began to be reflected in bitterness and unhappiness. Something needed to be done if this village was to be saved (Hassan Mustafa, Welcome to Battir, Jerusalem 1959 in Kuntz, 2013).

Battir: the past and the present

Life in Battir was considered by the study's participants in terms of three phases: before 1967 (i.e. the Israeli Occupation); the period between 1967 and 1987 (i.e. the start of the first intifada); then, the years before Oslo, after the second intifada and the construction of the Separation Barrier.

Before the 1967 Occupation: A Traditional Village

After the creation of the state of Israel and the Jordanian occupation, the West Bank communities underwent a massive disruption of their social, political and economic life. Battir was not immune to this, despite the success of the nonviolent resistance strategy to preserve the right to cultivate the land on the other side of the Green Line. Unfortunately, with the railway inaccessible to use, Battiris were prevented from reaching Jerusalem, their main market and centre of social life. Moreover, the traditional systems of community life were dismantled by the demolition or depopulation of many nearby villages, which were destroyed by the Israeli troops after 1948.

The despair and the depression shared by the village inhabitants is a memory shared by

many: "*We were simple farmers. After 1948, the villagers were two things: afraid and poor. Afraid of the Israelis and the occupation; poor because there were no jobs*" (B17). According to the participants, the years between 1948 and 1967 could be described as a bucolic era: when Battir was very small, people conducted a very simple life, living in old houses without electricity or running water, farming and selling the products of their fields in Jerusalem market, helping and sustaining each other. As one participant says: "*I can describe Battir as a small village, the houses were very close to each other. Very small. All the people were helping each other in everything*" (B08). But, even though the villagers remember this period as a very quiet and static one, under the guidance of Hassan Mustafa, the village community was experiencing a very important phase that would shape its sense of community and resilience for the years to come. To counteract the social and economic depression, Hassan Mustafa applied a sort of constructive resistance, embarking on a community development scheme for the village that saw the participation of all the villagers (Rigby, 2010; Kuntz, 2013). In his own words: "*Battir is a living example of what a community can do to help itself*" (Mustafa in Kuntz, 2013).

Applying the concept of community work, the villagers participated in the improvement of the irrigation system and the reconstruction of the fountain; improvements such as the telephone and post office (1955), a clinic (1959), various communal clubs and organisations helped to rebuild the village's social infrastructure, strengthening the community's sense of resilience (Botmeh, 2006). In fact, participants sought to convey the general atmosphere of those years: "*we didn't feel there was occupation in the village" (B03, B04); "we used to sleep without closing the door, and we went to make trips around and we didn't think if we were afraid or not, it was safe to go*" (B03). The development programmes included major improvements to the educational system, most notably the opening of one of the first rural girls' schools in the area (1952), whose effects are still evident today in the sharp increase of literacy among the older women of the village. Finally, Battir was connected to its new economical centre with the 6.5 km road to Bethlehem, funded by UNRWA, together with internal roads linking different parts of the village.

The result of these works and operations is clearly visible in the words and sentiments of the participants, who recall these years as a time when the community was very close and the village was well-kept. As one participant puts it: "*everything was clean and well kept here, every part of the terraces, every piece was green, and the people used it for many issues: sold the fruits to the market, in many places, and it educated the family to save and to protect the family, and used it for food*" (B19). In this

regard, the villagers had opportunities of social improvement; the presence of schools allowed them to receive a certificate and apply for better jobs, as they say in many interviews: "*people took a certificate, got educated, and got jobs and got new income, and developed their lives*" (B03).

However, in 1967, the year of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the train station was completely demolished and travel to Jerusalem was forbidden. A new route opened instead redirecting the village's economy to Bethlehem through the village of Al Khader, which sought only to fragment the area more.

Post-1967: Changes to the Village Structure under Israeli Occupation

The period between 1967 and the first intifada still saw a poor and underdeveloped village economy, but its social occupational-social structure showed visible signs of transformation. Along with other villages of the West Bank, Battir suffered the difficult conditions of the occupation, including the stagnation of local development due to Israeli restrictions. A majority of Battir residents found better work opportunities in the Israeli labour market, mostly in construction and the service industry (Tamari, 1981). This contributed to a labour shift away from agriculture, particularly in the 1980s (Farsakh, 2005; Gordon, 2008), but the physical proximity of Battir to the Israeli border allowed many Battiri farmers to continue their relationship with their agricultural land, and to participate in the village social life.

Nevertheless, the daily absence of the men, who started to commute to the workplace inside Israel, shifted some of the agricultural duties onto women and children, as noted by many of the participants. At the same time, as the annual cycle of olive production did not require a constant process of care, only in the picking and pressing season, farmers were inclined to send their oldest sons to earn better wages in Israel. The wage-labour raised the households' standards of living and the new wealth was signalled in the village's built environment. As Tamari (1981) explains, the average peasant did not reinvest in business opportunities, but tended to put his savings into a separate housing unit for his own household.

The result for Battir was that a great number of new houses started being built by the construction workers, applying the techniques learned during their shifts in Israel. Despite the beginning of new developments, Battir still strove to remain an agricultural village, remembered in the words of the participants as a 'traditional community', where families worked together in the fields and spent time together. The memories of those years are often juxtaposed by images of today, as the villagers recall the changes that occurred: "*we used to stay all the family together, not alone. Today they*

don't come with me to the gardens" (B02). "*It was wonderful, the people were less, the houses were less, there was less development, not like these days*" (B13).

The Oslo Accords: the Changes they brought

Older participants to the study share the opinion that those years of work in Israel are somehow something of which to be ashamed: "*we lost our tradition and our identity by going to work in Israel. They preferred to go away and earn more than studying and work with their fathers their land*" (B14). At that time, these feelings were expressed in the attempt to disengage from the Israeli economy during the first intifada. According to the participants, it was then that people began to suffer economic hardship with the loss of income due to strikes and the boycott of Israeli produce. Palestinians who withdrew from their labour in Israel were easily replaced, while for them it was not simple to find alternative sources of employment and income (Rigby, 2010). Therefore, families in Battir turned to agriculture in an effort to sustain themselves.




Figure 62: Geopolitical zoning of Battir area according to the Oslo Accords maps (Source: Battir Landscape Conservation and Management Plan, 2007)

When the first intifada ended, a rather dark period began, as everyday life required more and more money and the Israeli occupation strongly influenced the economic situation. In fact, in 1994, following the Oslo Accords, the entire village built

area ended up in Area B – outside of the Palestinian Authority's (PA) main jurisdiction – and excluded from any development projects undertaken by them (Fig. 62). Moreover, about 76 per cent of Battir lands were classified as Area C, thereby under full Israeli control and so, at higher risk for land loss to Israeli settlement expansions. In these years, all the different elements of settler colonialism were put in place around the village, creating a situation that continues today.

The main sign of settler colonialism in Battir was the restriction of movement that, since the closure of the railway, blocked the traditional route to Jerusalem and to the coastal towns. The strict permit system has aggravated the situation, preventing most of the villagers to travel to Jerusalem or to Israel and resulting in escalating unemployment and the level of poverty (Rigby, 2010). Most of the participants indicate the Oslo years as the time when everything changed and the occupation started to be harsh: "*in 1993, all changed, and it is with Oslo that Palestinian land on the Israeli side was taken. Now you have to get permission to go to Jerusalem*" (B08). The system of closures and the militarisation of the border areas affected the fruition of the landscape by the inhabitants of Battir, who now describe as dangerous to cross the railway to access the fields on the other side or to walk on trails along the valley (wadi), a common situation in rural areas of Palestine (Shehadeh, 2008).

Today, the closures affect the agricultural economy of the village, as the impossibility to sell the products in Jerusalem has forced the villagers to turn to the already saturated market of Bethlehem. Unfortunately, the cultivation of vegetables proved to be more expensive than economically sustainable and many gardens were abandoned. "*If we would grow products in the garden where could we sell it? We go, we plant, but almost we distribute for free to the people. There is no place to go and sell the products*" (B02). This had influence also on the conservation of the agricultural terraces that were now neglected: "*There is no work like before, because in these days there is no market, see the gardens? They are wild because we don't know where we can sell the products*" (B07).

As the colonial segregation system put in place by Israel after Oslo has wrought an economic crisis, many inhabitants of Battir found themselves without a way to cover the daily expenses of their families. If the village society from before the occupation would find sufficient sustainment in the products of the land, today that would deemed insufficient; more income is needed: "*Now the people are just running to find money to do something just to cover the basic needs, life is so expensive and this makes a big effect on the family and all the community (...) only the basic things were needed before*" (B09).

Since the beginning of the second intifada (2000), all work permits were suspended and the majority of the thousands of Palestinian workers in Israel lost their jobs (Amiry, 2009). Until today, workers are mostly prevented from legally exiting the Occupied Territories. After decades of complete economic dependence on the Israeli market, the Palestinian job market is saturated or less remunerative than the Israeli one. "*I consider that working in Israel is wrong, not good, it should be forbidden (...) but they are looking hard to get work there. The salary is better, here there is no work at all. And earning from the land is nothing*" (B14). In order to continue to work in Israel, to earn better salaries deemed necessary to maintain the life standard of contemporary society (e.g. to pay for electricity bills, internet, mobile phones and food from supermarkets), Palestinian men have found ways to cross the border and enter Israel without a permit. This practice is well-known in the village, and since the border in Battir is not reinforced by the Separation Barrier, this is a common crossing area, very close to Jerusalem and the train to Tel Aviv. "*The shabab (young men)? They do labour, on the Israeli side. But there have no permits, they go to Israel illegally. After Oslo, there, the wages per day are higher. Maybe 300 shekels. Here, they can't afford the cost of cigarettes!*" (B17).

The situation of Palestinian labourers, and the risks they face when working and moving illegally, is very well described by Suad Amiry in her book Murad Murad. In order to earn more than double what they could earn in Palestine, they risk to be caught by the Israeli Border Police and sent to jail with administrative incarceration or even shot by a sniper (Amiry, 2009).

The legal situation in Battir is made even more complex as its land lies in Area C and so, under the complete control of the Israeli military. Many participants commented that not much can be done to improve the situation of the village because of this fact: "*we are in Area C, the Palestinian authority does not control this area. It was better before, now Area C is Israeli and can't be controlled almost by anyone, there is no rule*" (B16). The Village Council lacks authority in Area C and therefore are unable to make policy or rules concerning roads, garbage collections or construction permits. Many of the negative aspects of Battir that people describe, such as the malfunctioning of roads and sewage systems or the lack of decorations to beautify the streets and common spaces, are a consequence of the absence of a civil authority. "*I don't like that there is no law. We need a law to be on the ground, a police that is honest, a government, a good law on the ground would fix anything*" (B09).

Another consequence of Area C rule is the impossibility for local Palestinians to build without an Israeli permit, even on legally-owned land. Today, as the population is

increasing, there is a great need to build new houses according to the social changes that require an entire new building for each new family. "*In the past it was easy, as the young could just build one room in the parents' house, and share the kitchen with the others (...) I think 99 per cent of the people (today) do not expect to live with their parents*" (B03). The land started to shrink when Israel imposed many dispossessions in order to create a buffer area along the border and even more so since the Oslo defined areas. As the participants recollect: "*(in the 90s) there was an economic change, the families were growing and the land was not enough to sustain them. And also because Israel took a lot of land from Battir and the people were afraid to go to their land near Israel*" (B08).



Figure 63: Battir's main centre, in area C, with newer houses crowded among older ones (Source: Author)



Figure 64: New houses built on top of older ones in Battir's main centre (Source: Author)

The main built areas of the village, such as the old centre, the municipality, the mosque and the spring areas, fell under Area C (Fig. 65). Therefore, in the 1990s most of the people in Battir decided to build on top of their old houses, or among them (Fig. 63-64), thereby irreversibly changing the structure of the village: "*Before we had many houses here and here and here, there was space between one house and the other. Today there is no more space, you are so close to your neighbour*" (B19).




Figure 65: Geopolitical map of Battir where it is possible to identify the old village now in area C (towards the railway and Israel) and the new expansion in area B, along the straight road towards Bethlehem (Source: Battir Landscape Conservation and Management Plan, 2007)

Place Attachment: The Significance of Heritage as a Means for Transformative Resilience and Place Making Practices

The Story Continues: The Separation Barrier (2002)

As Battir municipal territory lies exactly on the 1948 border line, since 1967, this area has been strongly influenced by Israeli colonisation: in the Gush Etzion block that spreads all around the village, there are more than 50,000 Israeli settlers in contrast to the 22,000 Palestinian inhabitants of the same area. Since 2002, the integrity of this rich cultural landscape is threatened by the unilateral security measures put in place by the Israeli government, such as the separation barrier and the settlements. If entirely built, the separation barrier would drastically reduce the possibilities of exchange of local agricultural products and of inhabitants' circulation, while also causing a irreversible

destruction of the landscape (Fig. 66).

When the planned route of the Separation Barrier was made clear by the Israeli government in the early 2000s, a strong movement of landscape conservation started to arise around the case of the terraces of Battir and against the construction of the Separation Barrier. International organisations worked together with the local administration in order to advocate the Battir case at a larger scale. Developing from these first stages, a multilevel process of transformative resilience was put in place by different actors, integrating international cultural interests with local politics. This transformative attitude of resilience was employed to oppose the construction of the Separation Barrier on Battir's land through official channels. The whole process was effectively a legal battle for communal rights without the use of protests or violent demonstrations.



Figure 66: Aerial view of Battir terraces and the planned route of the Separation Barrier (Source: Battir Landscape Conservation and Management Plan, 2007)

In 2007, a group of engineers and other technical experts were commissioned by the Palestinian UNESCO Office to produce a study of the village, collecting documents and maps from the British Mandate era as a part of an initial list of heritage sites in danger in Palestine (Barnard and Muamer, 2015). The assessment, oriented around UNESCO's criteria of cultural heritage, was also used to identify the negative effects that the construction of the Barrier would have on the unique historic co-evolution of

the village and its natural landscape (Fig. 67). In 2011, The Landscape Protection Plan of Battir won the Melina Mercouri International Prize for the Safeguarding and Management of Cultural Landscapes (Fontana Antonelli, 2013).




Figure 67: Map of Battir Landscape Conservation and Management Plan Site Location, indicating the route of the Separation Barrier (in dark red) and the Green Armistice Line (Source: Battir Landscape Conservation and Management Plan, 2007)

In the same year that the study was launched (2007), the Village Council filed a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court to protest the passage of the Separation Barrier in its lands. Unexpectedly for the army lawyers, the case was brought in the name of the right of the environment, of nature and of cultural heritage (Weizman). The data from the study supported the case in court, but also served as blueprint for the values that the community of Battir should work to preserve. Battir represents a unique case as its forms of protest never required public demonstrations as in other parts of Palestine, rather, it always took place in the legal court. This is because, in the opinion of the village rulers, the special agreement with Israel is too fragile and the possibility to losing their lands too tangible of a risk. In fact, any behaviour from villagers that could harm access to the railway would result in the villagers being denied access to their lands on the Israeli side (Owen, 1982).

Finally, in 2015, the Israeli High Court of Justice froze the plans for the construction of the Separation Barrier on Battir's land after three years of legal battles conducted by the Village Council and Friends of the Earth, Middle East[2]. This court

decision saved a remarkable cultural landscape from excavation and new construction. This includes archaeological sites from Iron Age and Roman necropolis, urban and rural vernacular architecture; age old olive trees and springs; an ancient irrigating systems as well as the traditional water managing and agricultural products harvesting practices, all of which are still in use[3].

UNESCO and Battir's Cultural Landscape in the World Heritage List (2014)

One of the reasons of the victory in court was likely due to UNESCO's 2014 descision to inscribe the Battir landscape into the World Heritage List and into the List of World Heritage in Danger[4]. In the UNESCO definition: "a cultural landscape is a combined works of nature and by humans, and they express a long and intimate relationship between people and their natural environment" (UNESCO, 2007).



Figure 68: The cultivated terraces of Battir, with the village in the background (Source: Author)

Elements of Heritage and Place Identity

The inhabitants of Battir display a strong association between heritage and place identity. The latter fosters feelings of belonging and continuity, while the former, with its physicality, adds to it a sense of material reality (Lowenthal, 1985). Practices of heritage are customs and habits which, although intangible, inform who we are as collectives and thereby help to create our collective social memory. Communities use vernacular objects of heritage (e.g. artifacts, buildings, sites, landscapes) alongside

common practices (e.g. languages, music, community commemorations, the conservation and preservation of objects or of memories from the past) to define their sense of identity (Harrison, 2013).




Figure 69: The Heritage Cycle diagram (Source: Thurley, 2005)

To illustrate this point in relation to Battir, Thurley's Heritage Cycle diagram (Thurley, 2005) can be used (Fig. 69). Read in a clockwise direction, the quarter parts of the cycle correspond to the activities, so:

1) By understanding (i.e. a cultural heritage), people begin to value it;
2) By valuing it, people begin to want to care for it;
3) By caring for it, the heritage can be enjoyed by people apart of and outside of it;
4) Through this pleasure, a thirst for greater understanding arises.

All participants of the study, young and old, demonstrated knowledge of old habits and old houses, in a demonstration of shared memory of old traditions. As in the first step of Heritage Cycle, the shared knowledge about the old life impresses value on the objects from the past. The old houses are linked to the idea of heritage, together with the agricultural land and local traditions. For the participants, heritage meant "*the education rules, the houses, the spring and the terraces. The old generation told us. We were born and we grew up with this kind of saying*" (B05). The younger participants affirm that the knowledge about the history of the village, and the importance of the old houses and the gardens have been transmitted to them by older relatives, generating a shared attitude towards the village: "*(Heritage) is our existence. It is about the life in Battir how it was, and my family, the other generations, talked to me a lot about it*"

(B11). From this perspective, the old houses and the agricultural terraces of Battir can be defined as "continuing landscape", one that still has an active social role in contemporary society while being associated with the traditional way of life, exhibiting material evidence of its evolution over time (Harrison, 2013).

The Value of Cultural Heritage: The Shared Memories of Old Houses

Almost all of the participants can describe life in an old house, some because they have personally lived in one, others because they have relatives who do so (mostly, grandparents). Some villagers can describe in detail how a traditional house was built and how the whole community used to participate in the process. Younger participants have knowledge of this because of their relatives' stories. Most of the participants agree that there is value in the old houses; some consider them the witnesses of older times when families and the community had stronger ties, and when life was seemingly simpler and easier. From the interviews, it is possible to draw a picture of the life of the villagers inside these old stone houses. The Arabic word they use to describe them, gurfa, literally translates to "room" and that was what they were: "*about 3x3 meters only, not seeing the sun at all, as there were more houses above and beside it, so no sun, one door and one window, in the summer because the roof was in soil, insects were coming from the roof to where I was sleeping! (ahahah) a very simple life. The Bedouins are much better! They enjoy the sun, the fresh air…*" (B17).



Figure 70: Old houses in Battir (Source: Author)

The whole extended family would share the same house, sleeping and living in the same room. When relatives would come to visit, they would also sleep in the same

room; and, when a son would get married, the young couple would share the room with the rest of the family, their privacy protected perhaps behind a curtain or a removable wall. As described in Chapter 4, there were no beds or tables, but only built in cabinets and mattresses on the floor, to be tied up and removed in the morning. There was no running water, just a central fireplace. The bathroom and the kitchen were outside, far from the bedroom.

The participants also recollected the process of building one of these houses, with the information that "*it was very expensive, and the entire village had to come and help to build it. There are pictures of dozens of people working together. To make the roof as well, it was like a party, as around forty people or more had to participate and help the builders. It was not easy. They were not building many houses, maybe three or four per year*" (B16). As Graham notes, "heritage provides meaning to human existence by conveying the ideas of timeless values and unbroken lineages that underpin identity' (Graham, Ashworth and Tunbridge, 2000, p. 41). This transmission of knowledge, prompting an architectural heritage that the people of Battir could experience even among various generations, signals a sentiment of resilience that could arguably be traced back to the legacy of Hassan Mustafa. His attitude towards the importance of memory as an act of resistance against the occupation might have put roots inside Battir's population. As one participant puts it: "*They must know how we lived in Battir. How much the old generation has made efforts to keep them, and how much they resisted the occupation. So if we keep the houses we can know about all that. It is resistance!*" (B05).

Old Houses as Proof of Existence Under Occupation

Since the UNESCO declaration, the local community in Battir has created 'Battir 2020', an initiative that aims to implement sustainable cultural activities through setting up working groups in various fields. The intention was, first of all, to implement awareness programs for the inhabitants about the world heritage site meaning and values. In addition, it encourages tourism both local and international, thereby developing good quality of services with the participation of Battir Ecomuseum and its system of newly restored Guesthouses (UNESCO World Heritage Center, 2017).

The restoration of old houses to be used for tourist reception is an act of transformative resilience that recognises the possibility of a future for the community. For the participants, heritage is connected to a resistance against the occupation insofar as it maintains all the village land (as Hassan Mustafa did). Therefore, the restoration and conservation of old houses are also acts of resistance. In this way, the people of

Battir prevent the erasure of their history. The old houses are seen here as a way to keep the memory of Palestinian ownership and history. In the context of occupation, the old houses "*prove our existence. Because we are under occupation and anytime they (the Israelis) would come and try to destroy our identity. It is a proof of existence. When the Israelis say that Palestine is theirs, this is our proof that this is our place*" (B04). In this context, heritage becomes a tool of opposition in the struggle for sovereignty, land, and resources between the coloniser and the colonised. Heritage is, for the people of Battir, a political and cultural tool that defines and further legitimises their cultural and political identity (Díaz-Andreu García and Champion, 1996; Meskell, 2002, 2003; Crouch and Parker, 2003).

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Figure 71: The advertisement of a ghuesthouse in Battir, created in a restored old house (Source: Dar Abu Hassan Guesthouse, 2019)

This activity of transformative resilience spread to the entire village and has since become renowned in the larger geographic area. Battir has always been famous

for the beauty of its landscapes and the welcoming attitude of its inhabitants. Battir 2020 exploits this popularity to make the village a known tourist destination. In collaboration with the Ecomuseum, which is based in a restored old house in the village old area, a trail has been opened to the Makrour valley. Families and school groups can explore it and learn about the local history, flora and fauna. Moreover, local women work in the guesthouses to offer traditional cuisine to the visitors and to sell their art crafts in a common shop. The community works to restore public spaces, such as the main spring next to the agricultural terraces and the water piscine, declaring its intention to do it all by itself without any external interference with signs that say, 'works funded by the families of Battir'. These transformative resistance activities continue and develop each year, while Battir grows in the mind of the visiting Palestinians and international groups.



Figure 72: The Roman Pool in the village in 2015 (Source: Author)

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Figure 73: The Roman Pool now, with a restaurant created by the community (Source: Al Jenan Terraces Cafè, 2019)

Place Making in Battir

During the place making exercises, the participants expressed their views on the condition of the village separating what they consider as negative aspects (usually related to public services) and positive aspects (or what makes Battir special and worth visiting). It is important to note that, because of its particular history, Battir is the only case study that has become a tourist destination for Palestinians and foreigners alike, and so that has frequent contact with local or international visitors. Wadi Rahhal has never any outside visitors and the access to Tel Rumeida is so restricted that, even if Hebron Old City is a tourist destination, no one can access Tel Rumeida or would do so given security reasons (except pro-Palestinian activists), as will explained in the next chapter. Therefore, it is interesting to note that the perception of the village inhabitants is often related to what might attract visitors and why visitors should prefer Battir over other similar Palestinian localities, so they tend to define its positives as 'special' qualities, not available in other places.

As for the negative aspects of the village, they often concern the reality that there is no care for common goods. The comparison with the past imposes itself often in this narrative, as "*it was better than today, the people worried about public spaces, the other people, the relations…*" (B09). Today it would seem that the inability for the Village Council to effectively rule (as the village is situated in Area C) trickles down into the perceptions of the villagers, for it affects the condition of the road and the streets; the sewage system is highly defective, the garbage collection is inefficient. At the same time, the envisioned solution lies for everyone in the end of the occupation, thereby bringing more power to the authorities and more job opportunities and hence wealth to the young generations. In an ideal future, the village would be cleaner and regulated by laws, and the old houses and agricultural terraces would all be restored and well maintained. The need for regulations in construction and the use of soil is expressed by many participants, as "*we have to start thinking more effectively about how we use our land (...) there is the need of a policy from decision makers, for the permissions to build, it shouldn't be given randomly*" (B03).

On the other hand, the positive aspects of Battir are described as the friendly attitude of its inhabitants, and in the historical and natural importance of its landscape and heritage. In the map drawing exercise, every single participant inserted the main spring as an important site in the village, even the ones who did not live close to it. Along with the spring, the agricultural terraces were described as the centre of memories and life. The agricultural roots of the population are often a starting point in the description of the ideal house, which has to be near the village and possess a garden.

The effects of the work around heritage sites, which were done by Battir 2020, could be seen in the choice of the ideal house, that should be an old one or at least look like one, made with natural materials found in the fields, as it was done in the past. The need of being in contact with the nature and the tradition motivates the desire for a garden, where to cultivate or just enjoy spending time outside. As they comment: "*this is my identity; I can't build any house without my land and my garden*" (B04). Isolation and privacy are other features that the ideal house should provide, as in Battir today the houses are very close to each other and the younger people complain that it is impossible to have any privacy. In fact, the many new houses that are being built in the only zone of Battir that lies in Area B, along the road towards Husan and Bethlehem, express this need for privacy and desire of including only the close family circle. These are single-family villas, with big gardens, built on the family land. The owners left the old part of the village, where the built areas were saturated, and came here to provide a better living condition for the family. Moreover, they consider this act as an expression of adaptive resilience, as they build a new house even though the occupier would not want them to, and by doing so they create on the ground the proof of ownership of this land, right there and right now:"*The old houses proofed the life at those times, but the new houses proof the ownership of today to these houses and lands*" (B04).



Figure 74: The Roman Pool and the village main centre (Source: Author)

Notes

[1] Most of the archaeological remains that can be found in the village area, around the springs and along the valley, have yet to be excavated. Few excavations have been carried out in the area, but those few can already confirm that the first settlement in the valley towards Jerusalem can be dated to the Chalcolithic period, circa. 4,000 BCE (Emek Shaveh, 2013). As such, the area had already been settled in by the late Roman Period, 2nd and 3rd century CE (Ussishkin, 1993).

[2] The Supreme Court is the highest court of Israel and the final court of appeals. The Basic Law states that the Supreme Court is not bound by its precedents and can deviate from them. The Supreme Court is the highest Court of Appeal in the State of Israel, and also sits as a High Court of Justice, hearing petitions by any person (not only citizens or residents) against public bodies and governmental authorities. The Israeli Army is also subject to the High Court of Justice's judicial review. Palestinians from the West Bank can petition to the Supreme Court against military orders about land confiscation or house demolition, among others (B'Tselem, 2002).

[3] There are eight groundwater sources in Battir 'Ein Al-Balad', 'Ein Emdan', 'Ein Bardamo', 'Ein Al-Qseir', 'Ein Abu-Al-Hareth', 'Ein Jame'a', 'Ein El-Bascine', 'Ein El-Haweyyeh'. Over the whole water system, at the entrance of the village historical centre, the main source is the Ein Al-Balad, called Al-Jinan, a name praising the gardens of Paradise, which feeds a roman pond surrounded by cultivated terraces. The traditional form of social organisation, called Maa'dud, establishes this distribution. The quantity of water accumulated every night is measured in the small hours by two representatives of the Village Council and is to be shared equally every day of the week between each of the eight clans of Battir (information sourced from an interview with a local informant).

[4] The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) became the first U.N. agency to grant Palestine a full member status in 2011. Membership of Unesco was mostly symbolic, but it allowed Palestine to demand world heritage status for historical sites. As a consequence, the United States blocked their funds for the agency and then in 2017 left the Unesco together with Israel.

Chapter 10.

Case Study 3:
Tel Rumeida Neighbourhood (Hebron Governorate)



Figure 75: View of the city of Hebron from Tel Rumeida's olive grove (Source: Author)

Understanding the Specific Context of Hebron

In 2017, UNESCO recognised the old city of Hebron in the West Bank as a Palestinian World Heritage site. UNESCO also put Hebron on the 'Heritage in Danger' list, which is designed to alert the international community to endangered sites. Hebron is called al Khalil (the friend) in Arabic, in reference to Abraham who in sacred literature was known as the "Friend of God" (Mattar, 2004). The city is holy to all Jews, Christians and Muslims alike because it is the location of the Cave of Machpelah or Ibrahimi Mosque, which contains tombs of the biblical and Qur'anic figures Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, along with their respective wives, Sarah, Rebekah, and Leah. This is a tradition accepted by all the faiths, but has yet to be verified by archaeologists. The tombs are enclosed by a sacred compound known as al-Haram al-Ibrahimi (the Sanctuary of Abraham), housing a Saladin-era mosque, which had been converted from a large rectangular Herodian-era structure. Judaism ranks Hebron as the second holiest city

after Jerusalem (Kunin, 1998), while Islam regards it as one of the four holy cities. The religious significance of the city has made it a focal point for Israeli settlers. For them, Hebron is crucial in maintaining the fundamental and indissoluble link with the Land of Israel, as the very roots of Judaism are located here (Røislien, 2015).

Nestled into the central mountain ridge, Hebron stands 930 meters above sea level and 30 km south of Jerusalem. The UNESCO resolution acknowledges Hebron's claim to be one of the oldest cities in the world, dating from the Chalcolithic period (3,000 BC) and which has been ruled in turn by Romans, Jews, Crusaders and Mamluks. The more recent history of rule over Hebron is marked by an episode of violence following the end of the British Mandate: given tensions in Jerusalem, in 1929, the Jewish inhabitants of Hebron were attacked by Arab assailants and more than 60 people were killed, despite numerous efforts to hide and protect them by sympathetic Arab neighbours (Campos, 2007; Cohen, 2015). This prompted all Jewish residents to leave the city, at least until 1931 when the small community was restored as surviving families returned. These families persevered only for a few more years until, during the Arab revolt of 1936, the British authorities evacuated the community in fear of another massacre. As such, as the years passed, the symbolic significance of restoring the ancient Jewish community in Hebron grew and maintained important for Zionists and Orthodox Jews. Hebron became a symbol of both martyrdom and territorial struggle (Campos, 2007).

After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, in 1967, the Israeli government was under great pressure to resettle members of the Jewish community in the city of Hebron. In 1968, during the Passover holidays, a group of Israelis rented rooms in a hotel and then refused to leave until they were allowed to create the first settlement on the hills in the outskirts of Hebron, Kyriat Arba, formally established in 1971 (Clarke, 2000). Within a few years there were hundreds of housing units and today Kyriat Arba is home to around 7000 Israeli Jews (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2017).

The first settlement inside the city of Hebron was created in the Beit Hadassah building in 1979, when ten women and their children from Kyriat Arba occupied the empty building that was once an UNRWA school for Palestinian refugees. At first, the Israeli government did not recognise the settlement, but neither did it remove the settlers. The settlement was eventually acknowledged and even officially supported by the government a few years later. Much in the same way, between 1980 and 1984, three other settlements were created near the Abraham Mosque in the Old City of Hebron: Avraham Avinu, Beit Romano and Tel Rumeida settlement. Hebron is therefore the only Palestinian municipality in which Israeli settlements reside actually inside its borders.

According to Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Census, the total population of Hebron city in 2016 was approximately 215,452 Palestinian residents, making it the largest city of the West Bank, and between 500 and 850 Jewish settlers concentrated in and around the old town (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016), with the presence of up to 5000 Israeli soldiers. The presence of the settlers has led to years of violence between Jews and Palestinians, of which the worst episode occurred in February 1994, when an American-born settler shot and killed twenty-nine Palestinian people worshipping in the Haram al-Ibrahimi mosque. Riots followed the massacre and Israel subsequently imposed a yearlong curfew on the Palestinian residents of the Old City, banning the use of Palestinian cars from the streets.




Figure 76: The Hebron Protocol map, with the positions of the settlements (Source: Passia)

In 1997, the Oslo Accords led to the Hebron Protocol (Fig. 76), an agreement on the redeployment of Israeli forces and on the division of the city into two sectors: H1, controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and H2 (which incorporates the entire Old City, wherein lie the settlements of Beit Hadassa, Beit Romano, Avraham Avinu and Tel

Rumeida), making up roughly 20 per cent of the city wherein Israel retained responsibility for security matters.

At the rise of the second intifada (2000), the situation undoubtedly worsened, especially when, for security reasons, the Israeli Army denied Palestinians access to many sites in the Old City. The area was surrounded by roadblocks, fences, and checkpoints, which granted the Israeli Army complete control over the zones surrounding the Israeli settlements. The shops on the main commercial artery of Hebron, Al Shuhadah Street, which had already suffered increasing limitations on access and movement, were now completely shut down and Palestinians were denied any access to the road. The main bus station as well as the fruits and vegetables market, located in the same area, were then closed and later turned into a Yeshiva[1] and the settlement of Avraham Avinu.




Figure 77: Settlements and Israeli segregation system along Shuhadah street (Source: alt-arch.org)

Settler Colonisation of Tel Rumeida Neighbourhood

Tel Rumeida is a historic neighbourhood of the city of Hebron, located to one side of the Old City, going uphill from the street of Shuhadah, half a mile west of the Abraham Mosque. In Tel Rumeida, the remains of ancient urban settlements can be found, some more than three thousand years old, that have provided evidence for a 4th century AD Christian Pilgrim Centre (ICOMOS, 2017).

In 1984, a group of seven Jewish families placed caravans in the middle of the neighbourhood, directly on the hilltop overlooking the old city of Hebron. Under the

settlement there is an excavated Bronze Age site believed to be the City of David and the area has been declared an archaeological site by the Israeli military (Platt, 2012). The settler colonial process in Tel Rumeida proceeded with the official recognition by the Israeli government, who approved the settlement in 1998 and in 2001 a tall building with more housing units was built on the site, now called the Admot Yishai or Jesse's Land. The apartment block was built over the excavation area, in a way to allow Jewish visitors access to the archaeological site. Another cluster of homes, still in the form of caravans, is situated at the edge of the excavation area overlooking the Palestinian neighbourhood. The local Palestinian residents do not have access to the areas occupied by the settlement, so they can only see the buildings from afar, as the participants explain during the interviews: "*I think that there is a new building on the top Tel Rumeida. There is a new building for settlers. That is what I think, what I can see from the window. But I can never go there*" (TR06).



*Figure 7*8: Tel Rumeida settlement residential block (Source: Author)

The presence of the settlers in the heart of the neighbourhood has posed many issues for the residents, whose lives have become hostage to the segregation process that the Israeli military enforce to protect the settlers as ordered by the Israeli government. The Palestinian participants to the study often comment on the situation during the interviews, highlighting the fact that they associate the presence of the settlers with the beginning of the occupation: "*what changed was to see the settlements and the caravans, the brown caravans with settlers living in side these caravans and they are kicking you out of your own house. Tel Rumeida was not occupied but it became occupied by them*" (TR15).



Figure 79: Tel Rumeida settlement: the brown caravans and the residential block in the background (Source: Author)

Elements of Segregation

Restrictions of Movement for Tel Rumeida's Inhabitants

The participants to the study are all residents of Tel Rumeida so they share many of the same memories of the changes that happened in the area. While the source of those changes appears to be the presence of the Israeli settlers in the middle of the neighbourhood, this research shows that the event that influenced most Palestinian lives was the second intifada, together with the consequent security measures imposed by the Israeli military.

The closure of Shuhadah street and the surrounding area to free Palestinian circulation is evidently the most life-changing event that participants can remember. Shuhada Street stretches from the entrance to H2 from H1 at Checkpoint 56 to the opposite side of H2 and Checkpoint 209. For centuries, this used to be the main thoroughfare connecting north and south Hebron, and residential neighbourhoods to its commercial and social centre. The road was full of activity with customers of stores of any kind as well as travellers from outside of town visiting the wholesale market. The families of the shopkeepers used to live above the stores in the beautiful limestone houses dating from the Mamluk period between 1250 and 1517 (UNESCO World Heritage Center, 2017). The residents of Tel Rumeida would cross it every time they went to the Old City or to the Ibrahimi Mosque for prayers. They would feel it as an extension to their neighbourhood, an integral part of the Old City. As one participant recalls: "*I can remember the city centre, and Shuhadah street and the market, that all*

the shops were open and it was always full of people! But now you see it is a dead place, it is like a ghost town, nobody is there, there are only cats and dogs, Palestinians are not allowed to be there so you see only internationals…" (TR15).

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Figure 80 a-b: Shuhadah street before (above) and after (below) the closure, from a busy street to a ghost town (Source: B'tselem, 2007)



Figure 81: Beit Romano settlement (Source: Author)




Figure 82: Map showing Tel Rumeida area, with checkpoint 56 at the entrance from Bab a-Zawiya (bottom centre), Shuhadah street to the left, Tel Rumeida street going up towards the right and the settlement on top (yellow), in white the Palestinian houses (Source: Tel Rumeida Project, 2005)

With three Israeli settlements facing this street (namely, Beit Hadassah, Beit Romano, and Avraham Avinu), a complete segregation process was seen as necessary by Israel. In order to provide safety for the settlers, Palestinians have been denied access to Shuhadah street since 2000, except for a small stretch towards the Tel Rumeida neighbourhood. This tiny strip begins at checkpoint 56 (separating area H2 from H1 between Tel Rumeida and Bab a-Zawiya) and ends near the settlement of Beit Hadassah. From here, the settlers can reach Kiryat Arba on the outskirts of Hebron via a settler-only road (and then take a bus to Jerusalem or Tel Aviv) and they can also drive to the Tel Rumeida settlement by bus or private car. Palestinians, conversely, after they pass the security control at the checkpoint, can only walk uphill to their homes as they are forbidden to drive on these streets. This is one of the limitations that comes up more often than not in the interviews: "*in the past my car could reach my house, but now it is not permitted to bring the car inside*" (TR18).

Many residents are old or with large families, thus they struggle with carrying all their groceries by foot. Palestinian cars are forbidden to circulate on these streets close to the settlements. Children, sick and pregnant women; no one is exempted, they all must walk to the checkpoint and only then can they take a taxi or even ambulance to their destination. The residents who own a car have to park it outside the area, beyond the checkpoint, so that they can use it only in area H1. "*When my sister married, she moved from the home walking, to arrive to a car that was waiting after the check point*" (TR10).



Figure 83: Tel Rumeida street going uphill from Checkpoint 56 (Source: Author)

At the time of this field work, in 2015, the Israeli authorities declared this area as part of a closed military zone, therefore, the neighbourhood of Tel Rumeida was closed off to all Palestinians apart from its registered residents, leaving the inhabitants within entirely isolated from the remainder of the Palestinian community. Access to Tel Rumeida became for Palestinians something akin to the navigation of a maze: between Israeli military-enforced checkpoints, roads where they can only walk, settler-only roads, closed military areas and physical roadblocks. The checkpoints and closure systems are employed to implement a complete separation between the Hebronites and the Israeli settlers, regardless of the fact that they occupy areas nestled in-between Palestinian dwellings and businesses.



Figure 84: Checkpoint 56 to access Tel Rumeida from area H1 (Source: Author)



Figure 85: Deserted Shuhadah street, arriving from Checkpoint 56, leaving Tel Rumeida street to the right (Source: Author)

The Effects of Curfews

In 1994, immediately after the massacre of Ibrahimi Mosque, Israeli imposed for the first time a prolonged curfew on Palestinian residents of Hebron. Later on, when the second intifada erupted, the army placed a three-month long curfew on H2 residents, a measure that later became a routine mechanism of control, especially in the vicinity of the settlements. A curfew meant that Palestinians in the area under Israeli control were required to stay inside their homes for weeks and sometimes months, with only few hours once or twice a week to go out and replenish their provisions of food or medicines. The segregation that this system of collective punishment put in place is evident in the fact that settlers living in the same areas were never placed under curfew, and were thereby allowed to continue with their daily activities (B'Tselem, 2001).

In the context of settler colonialism, curfews can be seen as an absolute restriction on movement. The prohibition, imposed for days on end, to go outdoors directly harmed every aspect of Palestinian lives: "*So three of four months it is not allowed for you to go out, it is not easy for people*" (TR06). The combined effects of curfew and of restrictions on movements have created many obstacles in the life of the residents of Tel Rumeida. Always afraid that a curfew might be imposed on the area without warning, families express resilient behaviours as "*for precaution we became used to stack in the house things like meat and flour…my wife has become very good at making bread and everything at home…*" (TR12). Therefore, they buy conspicuous quantities of food, though they must still face the obstacle of not being allowed to carry

it home by car to their home. Many comment on this limitation during the interviews and the possibility to drive in their street is certainly one of the biggest desires they have. "*Before they put the container, the check point, we were allowed to drive our cars, to go everywhere with them, to drive our children, to carry our groceries and everything. But now that I am an old lady and I can't walk, and I went to visit my family and I arrived up the hill and I was so tired and couldn't walk anymore. I really need a car*!" (TR02).

The prolonged curfews had devastating effects on the economic life of the neighbourhood. As shops will not open, they lose their customers (who were also effectively constrained to their households); workers could not go to their jobs, losing the source of livelihood for their families; students could not continue with their education and ill people could not receive the medical care they needed. As a result, in the first years of the second intifada many Palestinian residents from areas near the settlements decided to leave their houses and moved mostly into area H1. Many participants expressed the desire to move to another area of Hebron, where there would not face the impositions and restrictions of curfew.



Figure 86: Towards Checkpoint 56 coming from Tel Rumeida street, Palestinians walk while Israeli settlers are allowed to drive (Source: Author)

Architecture of Occupation: Checkpoints and Closures

As described in Chapter 6, the architecture of occupation is part and parcel of the system used to control the territory and the population in the case of settler colonialism, as in Tel Rumeida. The military makes wide use of checkpoints and road closures in order to control the movements of the Palestinian population (Pullan, 2013). Indeed, they pursue a complete segregation between the two main social groups given that these

control apparatuses are not imposed on the Israeli settlers. The residents of Tel Rumeida in fact remember the moment when the checkpoints started to control their lives: "*the first thing that happened was that the soldiers started to close all the entrances of the area, like the check point near the city centre, there is another gate on top of the hill (Fig.87), and another one on the other side*" (TR16).

Every time Palestinian inhabitants want to leave or access the area, they must cross a control, thereby having their ID and their belongings checked. Moreover, they might be stopped or detained for as long as the soldiers need to ensure that they do not pose any danger for the Israeli settlers. The restriction on movement imposed by the checkpoint started gradually: at the beginning, cars could still cross (even if checked) and not everyone was checked. "*We used to go to school without check points, without anyone checking our bags or anything with us. And then slowly you couldn't leave the house, you couldn't go to the toilet without your ID*" (TR13). These controls influence the attitude of the inhabitants towards every daily activity, as they feel that every time they cross the checkpoint they are not in control of what might happen to them. Many participants appeared to share the same impression: "*I can remember that this place did not have a check point. Now you have to be checked every time you go to your house, you go to buy something to a shop…many things have changed*" (TR15).



Figure 87: Towards the checkpoint on top of Tel Rumeida hill, coming from Tel Rumeida street (Source: Author)

In Tel Rumeida (and in the entire Old City of Hebron), the segregation system is designed in order to restrict the freedom of the Palestinian population, while the settlers' control over the same territory expands and grows stronger. Constantly controlled by

the soldiers, located, checked and categorised, the Palestinians are subjected to the disciplinary mechanism described in Chapter 2, which are typical of carceral societies.

The constant confrontation with the soldiers for every daily activity and movement causes high levels of stress in the local population: "*we face the soldiers stopping us from doing what we want, and every time there is a big anger and a big fight with them*" (TR13).

The Main Impacts of Segregation

The Unraveling of the Socioeconomic Fabric

As a result of the restrictions on movement and of the prohibitions on opening shops and businesses, thousands of residents lost their source of income. Many shops were closed because of an army order requiring it, many others did not even need that: it was no longer worthwhile to operate a shop in an area inaccessible to customers and to suppliers. Even non-commercial services to the community moved outside of the area, for reasons of operational efficiency, to avoid the continuous interference by settlers and Israeli military. The impossibility to move freely and gain a decent livelihood raised the rate of unemployment in the area, and most of the participants stressed the difficult economic conditions they have to endure: "*the economical situation is very bad*" (TR17). Moreover, as already explained, the families who had the economic opportunity to have anew house elsewhere left the area, so the residents are mostly families in difficult economic conditions. Many shop owners lost their shop, located in the Old City and closed by the military without having the possibility to open a new one. Tel Rumeida used to be a lively neighbourhood, but today, as one participants notes while being interviewed outside a local shop, "*Tel Rumeida has 3 shops now. A market, this one here, and this here making shoes. Just three. In the past we had many*" (TR11). Other participants to the study share similar comments.

The External Locus of Control

The 'external locus of control' (Rotter, 1966) has been defined as the feeling of not being in control of one's future. People with external locus of control attributes what happens in their life to luck or to fate, that is, to something beyond their immediate control. Therefore, they would find it difficult and somehow useless to struggle and try to be resilient, as there is nothing they can do to influence their future. Alternatively, they would blame outside forces for the outcomes of their actions. Conversely, people with an internal locus of control believe strongly that they have power over the events in their lives and that they can influence their outcomes.

Many inhabitants of Tel Rumeida show characteristics of people with an external locus of control for they are constantly afraid that external forces may change the course of their daily life. For example, they fear that a sudden a curfew will be imposed, hence they cope with it by stockpiling food and groceries in order to have enough for the family to last many days. Even worse, they are afraid that they may be separated from their loved ones indefinitely, therefore, they try not to leave the house too often. Many agree: "*We are afraid of curfews. Maybe we go for a visit and we live our children home alone and if there is a curfew when we come back, our kids will remain at home alone*" (TR05).

Above all else, they are afraid of settlers' violence and the effects of military intervention. Firstly, acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians have been occurring undisturbed since their arrival and despite a massive presence of Israeli army soldiers. The settler attacks on Palestinians are documented by many international organisations and they include physical assault, stone throwing, destruction of shops and doors, shattering of windows, thefts, cutting of fruit trees, and verbal insults (B'Tselem, 2007). The area of Tel Rumeida is where most of these attacks happen, as the settlers here are in close contact with the residents, living among them and using the same streets (whereas in the other areas of the Old City the two groups utilise more separate zones of life). The Palestinian residents express fear and stress, as "*here we are afraid that they will do something bad to us*" (TR02). Fear seems to be a feeling that never leaves the residents; fear for themselves, for their houses, for their families. "*I am constantly afraid for my children and everyone in my family*" (TR09). Secondly, the soldiers pose a threat as they might invade the house at any moment in time without notice and without a clear indication of when they will leave. The unpredictability of these home invasions is here used as a form of terror, exacerbating the external locus of control. When the military enters the house, the Palestinians are potentially deprived of their possessions and must oblige any order they receive: "*When the soldiers enter the houses, to search and damage the house, this is a big problem*" (TR10). The residents feel helpless in the face of these actions, which stem from the occupiers: the soldiers as well as the settlers. Fear orientates around the loss of their house and as a result residents tend to stay inside for as long as they can; "*I am afraid that if I leave my home for a visit, I will find soldiers occupying it when I come back*" (TR03).

Social Isolation of Residents

As a result of all the segregation mechanisms, the population of Tel Rumeida feels completely isolated from the rest of the community of Hebron. Stuck between the fear

that their house will be occupied if left empty for a moment and the fear to be locked outside the area by a curfew, they remain inside the precarious safety of their four walls for days and weeks at a time. In the course of the interviews, they recall the past when things were different, before the presence of the settlers, when they "*used to every night to go and visit a family, and to have a nice chat*" (TR02). Today, this would never happen, as Palestinians do not go out after sunset, fearing to meet soldiers or settlers, and the neighbourhood looks empty and dark. Moreover, the disruption of social activities has isolated the community from the rest of Hebron, as "*not many people come to visit us here today, as they think it is not safe because of the situation here, as they fear settlers and soldiers. Yes we go to visit, but we don't stay long, as we are afraid of what we could find when we come home*" (TR05).

The purpose of social control and isolation, integrated in the practices of segregation, seems to be fully developed here in Tel Rumeida. This situation is affects marriage prospective heavily, particularly for girls living in the area, as the potential husbands would not visit them in the danger of assault or detention. Traditionally, mothers would walk around the neighbourhood and explore the possible candidates for their sons, but today no one would dare to cross the checkpoint. Mothers complain: "*nobody will come to ask for girls to marry and the other families will not come to your home because of the Israeli soldiers, because of the settlers on the street*..." (TR06).

Therefore, the only possibility for the girls is to marry outside the area, thus contributing to the disruption of social ties and to the reduction of Palestinian residents. As one participant explains well: "*Girls from here can get married with people outside, for example. The occupation took our freedom*" (TR10). This goes to show again how the residents of Tel Rumeida feel isolated and helpless in the hands of the Israeli occupier for any activity they undertake outside the walls of their home, such as, going to work or going to meet friends or even to tend one's garden, requires some level of resilience.

The Meaning of Heritage: Place Identity and Imposed Narratives

Place making in the Form of Narrative

Tel Rumeida is part of the wider settlers' narrative regarding the biblical past of Hebron. An archaeological excavation at the top of the hill commenced in early January 2014, in an area above the Jewish settlement and in between Palestinian households. The excavation was organised by the Israeli IAA and the University of Ariel as part of the development of an archaeological park for tourists. In fact, the settlers' community in Hebron has worked to create a tourist route signposting the area with new biblical

names and developing facilities for tourism. The route focuses on the age of the biblical patriarchs and is filled with religious content. The plan to create a biblical park attracting a specific kind of visitors to the middle of a Palestinian neighbourhood is another tool of the settler colonisation of the area. Palestinians do not exist in the settlers' plans for this neighbourhood, with the implication that they either should leave or become somehow invisible. The land on which the park will expand was agricultural land of some families still living next to it (Fig. 88), and Israel expropriated it and uprooted the almond trees that were growing on it, as one resident recalled: "*settlers started to destroy this area, to kill the trees, with their digging, because they don't want anything to connect us to the land*" (TR01).



Figure 88: Israeli archaeological excavations on top of Tel Rumeida hill, created on Palestinian private property uprooting an orchard. The Palestinian owners live in the house with the red roof at the back, and to the left it is possible to see the brown caravans of Tel Rumeida Israeli settlement (Source: Author)



Figure 89: Israeli archaeological excavations on Tel Rumeida hill, among Palestinian houses (Source: Author)

Archaeology becomes a weapon in the hands of the coloniser, who is using historic narrative in order to legitimise its ownership of the land. The settlers are imposing on Tel Rumeida (and the rest of Hebron) their own narrative that connects them to the area since the origins of this place, and is designed to attract the attention and support. Palestinians are aware of this operation, as many share the sentiment that "*the place is targeted by the settlers, they want to take it, they make archaeological excavation as an excuse*" (TR15). Settlers are using place making as a mode of expansion and as a mode of imposition of their own place identity onto a land, something that Palestinians cannot afford to do due to the restrictions they are subjected to.

Place Attachment and Common Memories

While the settlers are creating and imposing new narratives on the area, the Palestinian residents often remember the old houses as part of the memory, the heritage and part of a personal history. Old houses in the mind of the participants (especially the ones involved in anti-occupation activities) are to be protected from settlers or Israeli policies. They bear many memories of happier moments before the occupation. "*I like the old house, maybe the reason is that I am not allowed to enter in it, or maybe because I lived there and therefore I like it…*" (TR01). Tel Rumeida did not have many ancient houses as until the 1970s it was a small neighbourhood with around seven houses in total; most of them had been incorporated into the new construction of the next decade. But, they are present in the memories of the people as a symbol of local identity and of home.

Before the segregation and the isolation, Tel Rumeida and the Old City were a part of the same neighbourhood, so the population was familiar with the built environment of the historic areas. They express place attachment with unconditional love for the home, of which old houses are the idealised representation. For the participants, the household is the place where they can feel comfort even despite the occupation, whereas outside "*I don't feel safe, because of the occupation and settlers around the home, but I don't know I feel that I am happy in my home and that gives me the relax*" (TR19). The feelings of belonging and identification with a place will often expand from the house to the whole area. The most resilient participants were also the ones who would declare the strongest bond with the area. "*If I didn't walk everyday in Tel Rumeida I would feel my legs burning, and if I didn't breath Tel Rumeida's air, I would feel as if there was something wrong with my lungs*" (TR02).

Restrictions affecting Palestinian Place Making

The Palestinians living in Tel Rumeida are subjected to the same restrictions on construction activity as the ones living in Area C of the rest of West Bank, but here the limitations appear to go further. The policy of the Israeli military is to forbid any construction in the area. Therefore, the last houses that have been built are the ones made before the closure of 1994, in the typical substitution of old houses with new ones that happened in the whole West Bank in the first decades of occupation. Today, the owners are not allowed to restore or fix problems in their houses, as many explain: "*now I can't fix my house as the soldiers don't allow me*" (TR07). Sometimes, in an act of resilience, they restore at least the inside of their houses, but they have to do so in secret, therefore usually at night at the risk of being caught by the soldiers.

Even if residents have permission to do construction works, it would be very difficult for them to find the workers to complete it, as the access restrictions to the area deter many from entering Tel Rumeida, and the limitations on vehicular traffic would mean that all the construction materials would have to be carried by hand to the site. As one resident comments: "*in the past people didn't need the permission to rehabilitate their houses. Now it is not easy for them to bring the material to their home and a lot of people are afraid of coming to work in Tel Rumeida. So you can't have the materials or the people to work with it*" (TR06).

The impossibility of building new homes has meant that families either live in overcrowded spaces or send their sons away from Tel Rumeida. Again, the division exists between those who have the money and those who do not and are thereby forced to remain in the area under the duress of the Israeli occupation. Only very few young families deliberately decide to remain in the area and to rent a house from the many who left, invoking an act of resilience which is also a form of resistance.

Different Ways of Sumud

As a result of the restrictions and harassment, many families have left the area. Around 42 per cent of the Palestinian population in the city centre of Hebron (area H2)—some 1,014 families— had already left their homes in 2007 and mostly moved to area H1 (B'Tselem, 2007). The ones who remained in Tel Rumeida did so for several reasons. During the interviews and group discussions with the residents, a pattern of different levels of resilience arguably emerged.

The first reason why families did not leave their houses in Tel Rumeida is the lack of alternatives. The bad economic situation does not afford a more expensive house in area H1 of Hebron (assuming that the family does not own other houses elsewhere).

"*Who is not rich has to stay here, because they don't have other houses to go to or the money*" (TR09). This lack of choice still requires resilience to cope with the situation and to be able to continue life regardless of the daily harshness. These conditions have been documented throughout the Old City, wherein most of the middle class bourgeoisie have left and been replaced by poor families from other areas, who were initially attracted by the prospect of living in the centre of the city at a very low rent, even if next-door to the settlements (De Cesari, 2010).

Other families stay in the area as a deliberate decision to remain in the family house, where they have memories of their past life, demonstrating a strong sense of place attachment that helps them to adapt to the situation: "*But I don't want to leave Tel Rumeida. My heart is in Tel Rumeida*" (TR11).

Finally, there appears to be a third level of resilience, expressed by those who deliberately decide to stay as an act of resistance against the Israeli occupation. Some families feel the duty to stay to protect their house from settlers' occupation, as they are convinced that "*if we leave we will lose it, they will take it*" (TR14). Inhabitants of the area fear that if they vacate their house even for just a few hours, settlers might enter and occupy it. They express preoccupation for the future of their own family and of the neighbourhood in the case that the settlement would expand. By protecting the community and maintaining a presence on the land, they express sumud, a resilient act of giving new meaning to home while protecting it (Teeffelen and Giacaman, 2008). In fact, as one participant explains: "*settlers have tried many times to take this land from us and expand their settlement but they failed*" (TR02). The homes of these families come to represent the occupied land of Palestine that they protect as the last stronghold on the line of struggle against the colonisation. As many here said: "*If you leave your house you leave your identity, you are losing your dignity*" (TR15).

Transformative Resilience against Violence and Militarisation

Place Making as Transformative Resilience

The Palestinian houses facing the streets of Tel Rumeida display peculiar characteristics: metal fences at each window (at least on the ground floor), more fences around the gardens or even stronger barriers against intrusion made of metal panels. In fact, constantly harassed by violent settlers, the last residents of Tel Rumeida decided to made changes to their houses in an act of transformative resilience. The windows are almost always shielded with metal fences as settlers use to throw stones to break them. Many participants tell the same story: "*I remember the houses without fences on the windows, but now you have to put fences, as the settlers throw stones and different*

things to your windows. If you put fences you don't need to change everyday the glass for your window. You don't have to pay money every day. And your family will not be hurt. You will be annoyed by them, of course. But you will protect yourself from being hurt" (TR15). While walking in the streets it is rare to see a garden, but in the memories of the participants this is described as a very green area. All the private spaces are shielded from outside view, not only to protect the privacy of the family, but mostly to prevent settlers or soldiers raids (Fig. 90 a-b-c-). "*We put many tall walls around our house to protect us from the soldiers and nobody can see the trees through the walls*" (TR06).



Figure 90 a-b-c (below): Palestinian houses in Tel Rumeida displaying metal barriers and gates as a protection from settlers harassment and army invasions (Source: Author)



Transformation of the Urban Landscape and Destruction of Natural Heritage

In order to both safeguard the settlers and allow the operations needed to facilitate their protection, the military has profoundly militarised the urban fabric. Elements of the architecture of occupation described in Chapter Six, such as security cameras, reinforced concrete T-blocks walls, and military checkpoints, have been imposed on the neighbourhood engendering a conflict-like landscape. Some other military artefacts are still part of the view even if now abandoned, as for instance some watchtowers installed on the roofs of Palestinian houses which are not in use anymore (Fig. 91-92-93).

The panopticon analogy is well represented in this place, wherein one feels constantly watched by cameras or military snipers, or by settlers behind fences. In fact, it is difficult to associate the image of Tel Rumeida today to the one that emerges from the memories of the participants. The landscape has changed a lot from the green, agricultural area of the past, with gardens, orchards and trees. In fact, "*the land was full of grapes and olives, all kind of plant and trees, but today there is nothing*" (TR03). In what could be defined as a negative form of place making, trees and gardens are disappearing. Palestinians are not allowed to plant trees or to attend their gardens most of the time, as soldiers prevent them from doing so. Some families, in a resilient act of place making, continue to plant trees and to expand their gardens, but mostly the people have stopped taking care of their land. Some of them to avoid confrontation with the soldiers, as some say: "*once I planted trees and soldiers came to tell me I was not allowed and I had to remove them*" (TR02). Others because of the difficult economic situation are unable to buy seeds, which cost money they do not have, and to see their efforts erased by the decision of the soldiers would make it unbearable.

Settlers play their part in this destruction of place by burning the olive trees that

belong to Palestinian farmers. These trees are told to be as ancient as the Roman presence in Tel Rumeida, and they are a symbol of the historical roots of the place for the Palestinians. Moreover, this destruction has a strong symbolic meaning, as the olive tree is an international symbol of the Palestinian sumud, unmovable with its roots planted deep into the land for centuries despite the adversities. All the Palestinians in Tel Rumeida feel strongly attached to the orchard of olive trees that overviews the city of Hebron from the hill, and they all feel a duty to protect it from the settlers. One participant recalls that "*they [the settlers] tried to burn even the olive tree that I showed you, when I saw it even if it is not mine I became like crazy and tried to stop the fire*" (TR01).



Figure 91: Palestinian house surrounded by a military T-block wall (Source: Author)



Figure 92: Fences to protect a Palestinian house from settlers' attack and, on the roof, a dismissed Israeli watchtower from which the soldiers controlled the neighbourhood during II Intifada (Source: Author)



Figure 93: Militarized landscape (Source: Author)



Figure 94: A Palestinian house with fences at every window, a military checkpoint on the corner and military CCTV cameras on the roof. The road going uphill brings to Tel Rumeida Israeli settlement (Source: Author)

During the group discussions, the participants felt moved by a historic picture representing people sitting under some olive trees, and they commented that it must have been Tel Rumeida, or at least similar to what it used to be like. Today, the olive trees are part of the contested territory and the times to sit and relax in their shade are long gone, something that all the participants regret. The olive trees remain as a symbol of Palestinian identity and their resilience against the harshness of the occupation, despite all the actions by the soldiers and settlers. A local youth organisation, called Youth Against Settlements (YAS), has made its headquarters in a Palestinian house between the settlement and the orchard (Fig. 96). They deliberately chose this building

in order to be the last obstacle between the settlement in Tel Rumeida (Fig. 95) and the ones on Shuhadah Street. They watch over the olive trees and guard them, offering a protection that they would do for any other inhabitant of Tel Rumeida.



Figure 95: The arrival of the road to Tel Rumeida Israeli settlement, on the right side there are Palestinian houses (Source: Author)

Fostering Sumud through Advocacy and Local Initiatives

YAS defines itself as a nonviolent direct action group, trying to stop the expansion of Israeli settlements in Hebron through non-violent popular struggle and civil resistance. YAS works to raise awareness in the local and international community about the issues of the local Palestinian population under the harassment and pressure of settlers and military. They maintain constant contact with the local population in particular situations of threat, supporting the Palestinian presence on lands vulnerable to confiscation by the Israeli military and government. Their activities focus on the younger generations through empowerment and education, thus encouraging the population to remain in the area, stand firm, and mount nonviolent resistance and resilience campaigns. In so doing, YAS has built a network of supportive organisations and their work is locally shared by the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), a Palestinian movement founded in 2001, committed to the resistance of the systematic oppression and dispossession of the Palestinian population, with non-violent, direct-action methods. The ISM has members from all over the world, therefore, it can provide international presence in the most threatened areas such as Tel Rumeida, where it was based at the time of this study. The activities of these groups have instilled in the people of Tel Rumeida (and Hebron Old City) a sense of shared support against the pressure of occupation and fostered resilience in the whole community.



Figure 96: The entrance to YAS house, with an olive tree in the garden (Source: Author)

Another local organisation that fosters sumud in particular through the preservation of the historic built environment is the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee (HRC). Established in 1996, the HRC works on architectural preservation, restoring buildings for housing purposes in order to preserve heritage and identity, while improving living conditions for residents and counteracting the effects of the Israeli colonisation. The HRC started by renovating the properties closest to the Israeli settlements in H2, as a deliberate strategy to hamper their expansions. As the occupation damages the architectural fabric and the social fabric it mirrors, architectural heritage becomes a tool for resistance, as explained by an HRC architect. The HRC employs local labourers and buys construction materials from local suppliers as much as possible. Prior to its birth, 95 per cent of the Old City's original population had left as a result of high tension and dire living conditions (B'Tselem, 2007). The HRC was able to bring more than 70 per cent of the population back, especially poorer families who were attracted by the economic incentives (De Cesari, 2008, 2010). The work of the HRC has been obstructed by the many limitations to Palestinian activities set by the Israeli authorities: stop-work orders, arrest of the labourers, ban of vehicular traffic and delivery of construction materials, etc. These difficulties never stopped the renovation works, however, and the HRC has been an example of resilience for the whole community, local and international.

In the Old City, it is worth mentioning other international presence that monitors the activity of the Israeli settlers and soldiers. The Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI) works in the Old City at deterring attacks on civilian by accompanying the daily activities of children and families, plus, by

raising awareness through witness reports of harassment at the expense of Palestinians. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the presence in area H2 of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), an observer mission established after the 1994 massacre in the Ibrahimi mosque, reporting to the Israeli and Palestinian authorities[2]. The TIPH personnel can only observe but cannot intervene in disputes, even if its mandate is to enhance peace and Palestinian prosperity. All the international presence in this area might help to reduce the intensity of confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, especially in those areas that are not accessible to the majority of Hebron residents, such as, Shuhadah street and Tel Rumeida.

Options for an Ideal Place Making in Tel Rumeida

The situation in Tel Rumeida is so hard that it has become difficult for the residents to even imagine a life without all the restrictions of the occupation, where they could have a normal existence and a house that satisfied their desire for a comfortable life. When imagining their ideal home, they would see it here, in the neighbourhood, as leaving has become unthinkable. The main desired characteristic is a garden, wherein they could relax with their family, and the possibility to drive to the front door. "*A simple life, I can move easily around, and a car that can come inside the house! A garage in the house*" (TR18). The restrictions that prevent them from renovating or enlarging their houses today made them dream for a bigger house, whereby the whole family would be comfortably accommodated. For the same reason, the need for privacy and quiet is something many expressed. "*Outside I would like a garden, with some flowers and trees (...). Yes, a nice place to sit, look at the children playing, a quiet place to relax*" (TR03).

The importance of the family is a strong feature of Palestinian identity, and it is present in all the interviews. As seen in Chapter Four, traditionally, the extended family would live in the same hush, expanded by the father for the newly married sons. In Tel Rumeida this would not be possible for the above-mentioned restrictions on construction, so the sons moved to live in H1 area or other towns. In an ideal future, the families would be allowed to stay together in the same neighbourhood and sons would not leave their mothers; as one participants says, "*I would build more buildings and make my sons live in this area, not to leave*" (TR02), compared to another,"*I would like new buildings for us to live in, for my children to live in the future, to stay close to us*" (TR03).

In general, the main place making action the participants would dream of realising is the end of the occupation, as "*when the settlers and the occupation leave you can live a normal life like any people in the world*" (TR08). In almost everyone's

words, the disappearance of the settlers would bring the occupation to its end: "*When the settlement and the settlers leave there is no check points, no attacks, no closed gates, and I can walk free*" (TR07). Settlers mean occupation, so unless they leave there is no future that the community perceives as possible. The diffused feeling of a lack of control applies also to this exercise, as the participants explain how the occupation has deprived them even of the chance to dream of something else, as one participant says dramatically: "*they destroyed all my dreams*" (TR12). The lives of these people are so entangled with different elements of the occupation (i.e. restrictions, segregation, militarisation, violence) that even in their dreams place making can happen only if these elements stop existing. New houses could be built only if the occupation ceases, no compromise is considered possible, the situation is too extreme. But when pushed, they allow themselves to dream: "*We would like new buildings for our kids to live in them, everyone has a dream, to be a doctor, to be a lawyer, so we want our kids to have a home where to fulfil their dreams*" (TR04).



Figure 97: Tel Rumeida olive orchard overlooking Hebron old city (Source: Author)

Notes

[1] A Yeshiva is a Jewish school dedicated to the study of traditional religious texts, primarily the Talmud and the Torah.

[2]TIPH and EAPPI were present in Hebron at the time of the fieldwork for this study, but they ceased their activities there in 2019, the former due to security reasons linked to settlers violence and the latter because Israel decided not to renew its mandate.

Chapter 11.

Discussing the Case Studies

Introduction

The three cases, as explored in the previous chapters, demonstrate characteristic elements of settler colonisation as manifest in the Palestinian occupied territories. Different forms of the architecture of occupation have been analysed in the three respective localities of Wadi Rahhal, Battir, and Tel Rumeida. The case studies were not meant to provide grounds for comparison and yet, some common features and key differences can still be highlighted. The data and interviews collected provide an important analysis of the occupation's influence on Palestinian place making activities since 1967. Based on this analysis, the following aims to synthesise the results and further relate the findings back to the theoretical frameworks provided in the preliminary chapters. This synthesis will therefore comprise a reiteration of the settler colonial paradigm as it manifests in the case studies; of particular note will be the loss of a Palestinian architecture culture and of a sense of belonging. Moreover, this chapter will analyse how conscious transformation and resistance was fostered through place making activities.

As such, in what follows, I will elaborate on the significance of this research and, indeed, its contribution to existing knowledge and understandings of Palestinian place making. Most prominently, I endeavour to provide a tool to read the landscape and architecture of the West Bank, not singularly in terms of occupation and colonialism, as other have done before (Gordon, 2008; Weizman, 2007; Efrat, 2006), but in terms of Palestinian place making and resilience.

Settler Colonialism: Three Case Studies

Much of this research is based on the premise that Zionism is a textbook case of settler colonialism. As such, this research stands alongside a rich source of literature that has emerged in the last decade that promulgates, through analyses of historical developments and contemporary realities, and thereby asserts this claim. There are a number of historians and social scientists that have analysed the ways in which Zionist colonisation took form in Palestine since its origins in the region, how it interacted with the indigenous population and how it continues to develop today (Hawari, Plonski and Weizman, 2019). Much of this work is done in an effort to counter mainstream and

often pro-Israeli narratives (Salamanca et al., 2012). My own historical analysis, in Chapters 5 and 6, shows that Palestine is not only a textbook example of settler colonialism, but also an exceptional case in and of itself given that Zionism's main focus was control over the maximal portion of land (Sack, 1986).

In this regard, what I have sought to show is that, while Zionism's relationship with the indigenous Palestinian people reproduces settler-colonial relationships as seen in South Africa, Rhodesia and French-Algeria (Veracini, 2018), it has also found numerous obstacles in doing so due to its main focus. In the West Bank, the continued presence of Palestinians poses denies the perfect realisation of the Zionist project. This subsequently informed and continues to inform Israeli state policies, subjecting Palestinians to structural forms of dispossession as well as land appropriation and community erasure in the attempt to establish a singularly Jewish state and society. In looking to the West Bank, we witness not merely a conflict situation (as much of the mainstream media would have the world believe), but a colonial one as well.

The Historical Impact of Settler Colonialism

The historical part of this study has shown how settler colonial objectives have informed Zionist actions pre-1948, post-1948, and post-1967. After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the expansion of property over land remained the goal of the new government, at first by way of the Absentees Property Law, dispossessing thousands of Palestinians of their land. Then, after the 1967 occupation, multiple planning masterplans orchestrated the construction of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. After 1967, the occupation became a means to a particular end: making possible and facilitating settlement (Veracini, 2013; Dana and Jarbawi, 2017). In fact, settlements represent the absolute core of the Zionist practice. Indeed, James Belich puts this focus on the act of settlement in the context of a global "settler revolution" that he locates in the 19th Century (Belich, 2009), but the Zionist movement could easily prove that it lasted longer.

The village of Wadi Rahhal provides a clear example of the use of planning by the occupation authority to displace local residents. As far back as 1967, Israel enacted its vision for the region through the "Greater Jerusalem plan". Wadi Rahhal and its neighbouring villages and towns have since had many dunums of their agricultural land seized by the state of Israel for the construction of settlements of the Gush Etzion block – which functions as an extension of the Jewish state inside the West Bank and the Palestinian side of the Green Line. While expansion of settlements is constant, the provision for Palestinians is few and ever decreasing. The water sources of the village

have been incorporated into the settlement's boundary, giving the occupier power over the direction of life, economy, and of agricultural production in the region.

As Israel adopts another master plan for the "greater Jerusalem", erecting and incorporating more satellite settlements inside the municipal borders, its appropriation of Palestinian lands by military orders becomes legally permanent. This quest for land appropriation has been sanctioned by the Oslo II Accords (1995) that have put 60 per cent of the land of Wadi Rahhal in Area C, where the only authority is the occupant's military one. The inhabitants of the village witness the daily expansion of the neighbouring settlement of Efrat on their confiscated land, while they are not allowed to build on the land still available to them. Their only option is to apply for the permit to expand inside Area B and so permission from the village council; the only alternative would be to build illegally. The planned construction of the Separation Barrier, that would furthermore isolate the settlement and therefore Jerusalem from the Palestinian localities, required additional land seizing by the Israeli authorities, thus affecting even more of the villagers, who lost numerous green lands traditionally used by the community.

A similar series of problems emerged in the village of Battir, just a few kilometres away from Wadi Rahhal. Battir sits on the Green Line, and had to fight against the Israeli forces with arms and diplomacy in order to maintain its agricultural lands since 1948. Hassan Moustafa's strategic actions during the war and in its aftermath means that Battir's population can still tend to the fields on the Israeli side of the Green Line, but this does not mean that they do not face the same issues that afflict Wadi Rahhal's area. Especially after the Oslo Agreements, the area has witnessed a similar degree of land shrinkage: 76 per cent of Battir's land has been catalogued as Area C (Applied Research Institute Jerusalem, 2010), and the construction of the Separation Barrier that is undergoing in the area of Battir, Husan, Al Walajah, and Wadi Fukin villages is creating them further issues. If the construction proceeds as planned, these communities will be severed from the rest of the West Bank, isolated in enclaves and separated from their agricultural lands. The survival of those communities is uncertain and until now only Battir has managed to slow down the process of isolation and of bantustanization: the disintegration of the Palestinian West Bank into hundreds of small, disconnected entities, surrounded by Israeli architecture of occupation system, akin to South African bantustans[1].

A process that seems quite accomplished in the case of Tel Rumeida, an area in which the Palestinian community lives in isolation from the rest of the city, access is restricted to residents and regulated by the Israeli army; free movement and the use of

spaces is limited by the contact with the settlers; and even the private space of the home is in danger of violation by soldiers. The settler colonial activities of Tel Rumeida is very unique as it develops in between Palestinian houses, therefore, the spatial separation that the colonial system seeks to obtain is in practice still prevented by the presence of Palestinian residents. The situation in Tel Rumeida is complicated by the fact that the neighbourhood belongs to the major Palestinian city of the West Bank. As such, the colonial ideal of an empty land in which to settle is void. At the same time, the stronger military, political, and economic power of Israel makes it possible for it to impose its settler program with vigour. Israel rules this neighbourhood as well as area H2 of Hebron with the same methods it uses in Area C: land confiscation, construction halt, movement restrictions, permit system, barriers and administrative detention. This reveals how the logic of settler colonialism underpins the struggles and problems posed for Palestinian residents in all three of the case studies.

Segregation and the Effects on Place Attachment

Since the second intifada, the architecture of occupation (as described in Chapter 6) has increased exponentially. The areas of Battir and Wadi Rahhal have witnessed, in particular, the construction of permanent check points, road blocks, fences, by-pass roads, not to mention, the creation of new settlements buildings. Azmi Bishara defined the process that started with Oslo as a bantustanization, as Palestine becoming “a place that lacks sovereignty and at the same time is not part of Israel. It is neither one nor the other. Its people do not have the right to enter to neighbouring countries. They are even more restricted than in the Bantustans of South Africa where at least you can travel to work” (Bishara and Usher, 1999). In the West Bank, Palestinians cannot leave their designated areas without a permit issued by the Israeli authorities. It is my contention that the system of occupation has severely influenced the development and the nature of Palestinian place attachment to the region. Indeed, the Israeli policy to restrict movement of Palestinian communities afflicts them both materially and emotionally.

In Wadi Rahhal and in Battir, the permit system and the closures policies have de facto stopped the movements towards Jerusalem, previously the main economic centre. Battir, in particular, used to direct its agricultural products towards the Jerusalem consumer market and has since had to redirect itself towards the already saturated market of Bethlehem. Wadi Rahhal, a smaller village with fewer public transportation options, is today even more isolated as the direct road towards Bethlehem has been cut off by Efrat’s boundaries. In Tel Rumeida, the situation is even more extreme: because the Israeli army seeks to limit face-to-face interactions between Palestinians and the

Israeli settlers, movements of the former are severely restricted around the town itself. Restriction to movements have been the cause of social and economic impoverishment and prompted great material changes to the urban landscape.

Place identity is both threatened and strengthened by the occupation as places of significance to the Palestinian imaginary and social life have and continue to disappear. It is impossible to assign to these cases the exact qualities that foster place identity, as sometimes seen in theoretical analyses: for instance, making one feel unique, in control or good about oneself; consistence with their subjective ideas of who they are (Anton and Lawrence, 2014). It remains clear nonetheless that such threats to place identity may simultaneously strengthen it (Breakwell, 2015). Many scholars note how place attachment deepens in times of loss and hardship (Relph, 1976; Taylor and Townsend, 1976) and describe how people's awareness of their attachment increases when the place they are attached to is put under threat (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff, 1983; Twigger-Ross and Uzzell, 1996).

In all of the three cases studied, interviewees demonstrated a strong sense of attachment to their place of residence and its locale as a whole; these places functioned as a container for all their experiences, memories, values and preferences. Palestinians still feel attached to places that are fading away or that no longer exist because they still perceive them as part of their and of the Palestinian identity. The sense of threat may even lower their aversion to risk and influence their desire to stay in the place of their attachment (Billig, 2006). I will argue, however, that the desire to stay in a dangerous place is not a stubborn, if not naïve reaction to a perceived threat, rather, it is representative of an attitude of resilience. The Palestinian reaction is constructive and resistant, not an undervaluation of the risks involved.

This point can be shown in the ways place attachment becomes more focused on singular artefacts, like the household. In Tel Rumeida, as in Wadi Rahhal, the Palestinian household becomes the focal object of attachment, due to the dangerous reality of the surrounding environment which is thereby associated with the loss of security, privacy and serenity. The house is the place for the family, which is probably the most important reality for Palestinians; in fact, interviewees often talk of the house when talking of their family, and vice versa. The incursions of the Israeli military and the attacks by the settlers on these households do render even this home an unsafe place, but it also engenders creative solutions for security and protection. Deprived of all their rights inside their place of residence, they strengthen their households and the ties between family members as a resource for resilience: protecting one means to protect the other from the violence of the settlers and from invasion by the army. By

continuing to live in the neighbourhood, Palestinians put themselves and their families on the line of resistance against the occupier, and they make their houses the last strongholds in the dispute for territorial possession with the settlers.

Battir, in contrast, represents a more specific case of place attachment. The occupation has stimulated, not necessarily a strong association between house, family and resistance, but an attachment to old houses and landscape that embody the cultural memory of the population. Threats to the traditional landscape have thereby triggered resilient reactions that have opened the way up for pervasive processes of transformation that we are witnessing today: as discussed, community-led economic and cultural initiatives based on local heritage. The case of Battir is in fact highly significant and so, will be considered in more detail in relation to the Israeli policy of landscape erasure.

Colonisation and Landscape Erasure

As explained in Chapter 2, the settler colonial power pursues the completion of its colony by erasing the indigenous landscape together with the indigenous population (Gordon and Ram, 2016), as can be seen in the cases of North America and Australia. Critics use this description to deny Israel's colonisation of the West Bank as one of 'settler colonialism'. It is clear nonetheless, as shown by the cases presented here, that settler colonialism is very much alive in the West Bank. The native landscape has changed dramatically since the 1967 Israeli occupation. The participants of this study often recall old green areas or olive groves that have now disappeared under the cement of Israeli settlements or of the Separation Barrier. The architecture of occupation, which includes the tools of land confiscation, settler civilian presence and their segregation from natives, is fundamental to erasure of the Palestinian landscape, colonising it with its own features (Graham, 2002).

Architecture has a strong presence in the occupied landscape as the apparatuses that are designed to restrict and complicate the life of Palestinians pervade the environment. In some cases, they are more evident than others: take for instance the settlements or the surveillance towers in Tel Rumeida compared to surveillance cameras which scan Battir's railroad as well as the fences and gates that create a myriad of enclosed spaces. This architecture of occupation ensures that Palestinians feel confined and constantly watched by the guards. The plan of colonisation behind these elements becomes more readable when connected to the Oslo system that has created a system of graduated incarceration for the occupied population. The effects of this system are more palpable in Wadi Rahhal and Tel Rumeida than in Battir. Many Palestinians in the first

two localities compare the land and neighbourhood in which they live to a prison, one surrounded by an architecture of settlements, checkpoints and blocked roads.

Wadi Rahhal's history embodies the story of landscape erasure and can thereby be used as a case for many other similar situations in the West Bank and in other occupied territories. Two categories of segregation and occupation can be identified as per the historical trajectory of Wadi Rahhal's landscape. The first category concerns the material disappearance of the traditional landscape with which inhabitants were familiar and deemed part of their socio-material inheritance. The uprooting of olive groves, the seizing of land as well as the appropriation of water sources causes severe damage to the agricultural fields. Together, they effect deep changes in the landscape and in its perception by the occupied population. The second category is more indirect, but nevertheless still imputable to the occupation: that is, the loss of the traditional built environment (e.g. houses, common areas) caused by the land shrinkage subsequent to the Oslo Accords and Israeli land rulings.

In Wadi Rahhal, the old houses that could inspire attachment and connection with memories are all gone (and the village used to be so small that there were very few to begin with). The existing houses are not seen as representative of a specific Palestinian identity or past, instead they are seen as something inferior especially in relation to the housing of the neighbouring settlement, Efrat. In many of the interviews and discussions, the houses of the settlement as well as the ones imagined to exist in Tel Aviv are described as modern, well-equipped and upscal. The houses of Wadi Rahhal by contrast display characteristics of local underdevelopment and Palestinian hardships.

The main feeling of place attachment is expressed in relation to the green areas of the landscape, like the agricultural land which serves as the backdrop to collective memories of past gatherings and of relaxed activities with the family as well as of farming with the older relatives. In this regard, place attachment is oriented by the occupation that has erased the village identity, as it is associated with village architecture. The occupation further endangers the remaining green areas of the region, as it continues to be seized for the expansion of the settlements and the construction of the Separation Barrier. The connection with nature and the open view on the landscape, so necessary for their sense of place, is something for which the people of Wadi Rahhal continue to deeply long. The place making choices of Wadi Rahhal's inhabitants are thereby strongly influenced by the situation; it is not possible to know if the same choices would have been made sans the occupation. As this research shows, the disappearance of the historic houses in the village (and, in general, all around the West Bank) has been caused by the Israeli settler colonial policies, in a mix of reduction of

available land, restrictive building regulations and imitation of the powerful coloniser's buildings.

A Process of Modernisation or the Colonisation of the Mind?

Modernisation is often said to have perpetuated a universalisation of architectural change such that similar buildings can appear throughout the Mediterranean region, if not the world (Tafuri, 1982; Smets, 1983; King, 2004). Evolution and progress was proved through a disconnection with the past, which was common to European construction after WWII (and all the issues that derived from uncontrolled urban sprawl and demolitions), and a similar situation manifested in Palestine after the conflict. In Europe, new techniques and cheap materials were available as well as eager workers and towns in need of reconstruction. The need for new houses in a short period of time was a strong enough motivation for planners and politicians alike to leave large margins of operation to the real estate sector. At the same time, in Palestine, the history of architecture is paired with a condition of settler colonialism that imposed the military and economic order of the occupier onto the occupied population. Construction in Europe was a means to boost the post-conflict economy whereas, in Palestine, it was used by the Israeli government as a means to increase its control over Palestinian land. In the desire and endeavour to modernise, Palestinians often ended up in collaboration with this restriction of alternatives.

In 1980s, Israel applied a model of social and economic subjugation over the natives of the occupied territory. Settler colonialism first seeks to exploit the local population as a labour force. Because Palestinian men would find better work opportunities inside Israel or in the settlements, they would be able to channel more wealth into their respective communities (Tamari, 1981; Farsakh, 2002, 2005). In Wadi Rahhal and Battir, in particular, as they are located near the Israeli border, it was easy for the men to commute to their labour work inside Israel every day and then return to their fields and families. This cash influx would translate into increased construction activity in the Palestinian villages, as families would use their newly acquired wealth to build separate houses for their newly married sons. Familiarity with Israeli forms of construction would engender a shift away from vernacular architecture and towards a form of building that was cheaper and perceived as more modern. New houses would be built in concrete and iron, extended so as to provide more than one floor and more rooms than normal. The old houses would still exist, but no one would consider building in the same style, as it was perceived as a process too expensive and too time consuming.

Palestinian villages were once an agglomerate of very few stone houses or even caves, seemingly built into and thereby camouflaged by the landscape. By the late 1980s, however, the Palestinian village seemed to reflect the process of modernisation that was occurring just across the border; Israelis sought to modify their surroundings by planting pine trees and constructing neighbourhoods in the styles prominent in Europe. Palestinians followed in the same manner, engendering a construction craze by substituting structures perceived as old-fashioned with modern ones. The Palestinian new houses were similar to those they helped build in the Israeli settlements of the West Bank, but the materials and the techniques they used were not at the same level of the Israeli ones, especially in the villages where economic resources were limited. This resulted in poor quality buildings, whose inhabitants today still miss the comforts of traditional old houses.

This research in part sought to understand why many Palestinians moved away from the traditional Palestinian way of building houses, a reason upon which most interviewees seemed rather agreed. Increased contact with Israeli society and the proliferation of television and media as a window into different cultures and into different ways of living inspired above all else new models of dwelling. The extended family of the past, all sharing the same space inside the single-room house of the village, would seem at that point archaic. Life in small villages, like Wadi Rahhal and Battir, while still a relatively simple one linked to agricultural activities and traditional societal rules, was changing. Young people in particular would desire improvement in relation to life as it was for their grandparents. This would be materialized through the construction of a house, embodying newly acquired wealth and modern thinking. They explain that they were no longer willing to share their private space with the whole family - it felt like a habit of the past.

Studies have shown how territorial occupation causes damage to the natural landscape due to its lack of consideration for nature and for values culturally imbedded in the landscape (Efrat, 2006). The occupier's actions are exploitative and based on sovereign aims that are not comparable to the slow and gradual evolution of the region. This research shows that Israel as a colonising entity most certainly displays this behaviour, with land dissection, aggressive and strategised land-use, including the destruction of orchards and groves as well as the damaging of archaeological sites and historic buildings. This behaviour, as I have sought to highlight, has fundamentally harmed the fabric of life of thousands of Palestinian people who have been affected by the damage executed upon their environment.

The Built Environment as Catalyst for Resilience

This research shows that the transformation of Tel Rumeida into a militarised urban zone has motivated Palestinian residents to resist occupation through acts of resilience. As described in Chapter 2, the panopticon model is applied by the Israeli military; the use of uncountable cameras and watchtowers, that, visible or camouflaged, provide a constant reminder to the Palestinians of the all-knowing presence of the (military or civilian) occupiers. As such, this urban landscape tells a story of an on-going conflict in a way that words are unable. It has the features of a war zone, similar to the images of urban areas in conflict-times as in Iraq or Syria: debris, military apparatuses, T-blocks walls, iron panels to protect houses, armed civilians, and so on. War takes place in landscapes and the aim of the war is usually to take control of that landscape/territory (Larsen, 2004). An idealised image of the landscape is often used as a promised trophy for which to fight, but in Tel Rumeida the reality is far from the ideal picture. It is a landscape of siege, a landscape of war, a landscape of life under stress, but also of lives lived through resilience.

Many of the interviewees acknowledged that the healing of the spirit of the Palestinian community is strongly connected to the healing of the environment which has been intensely damaged by the conflict. All that affects the participants' state of mind, such as living in constant fear and isolation, the feeling of not being in control of one's future, is caused by the occupation and this state of mind is further embodied by the settlements and the checkpoints that impose their presence in the urban fabric. The solution to this, invoked by all of the interview's participants, is the end of the occupation which would be accompanied by the destruction of all the built elements that reinforce it. Tel Rumeida serves as a relatively small case example of a situation in which an occupying force uses the destruction of the environment as one of the tools to force a community of residents to take the decision to leave, together with all the instruments of segregation and carceral system.

As a landscape of siege and of war, the buildings and streets of Tel Rumeida have been destroyed by the Israeli military in order to replace them with Israeli settlements and with the other structures of carcerality and segregation. Subsequently, only adding to Tel Rumeida as a landscape of life under stress, areas which used to be green have now been dug up for archaeological excavations and regulations which prevent the safeguarding of historical buildings have now been imposed. This landscape of occupation has nonetheless stimulated in turn the Palestinians' sense of resilience, as can be seen in the behaviours of the participants that have decided to stay in this landscape to protect their homes, to even restore them despite military rules.

Tel Rumeida could, in this regard, be considered a laboratory of humanitarian intervention in a community under occupation. The strategies adopted here by people and by local organisations show how the environment can influence people's quality of life. The activity of local advocacy groups, like Hebron Rehabilitation Committee choose to focus on the built environment and its restoration because of this. Youth Against Settlements, for instance, responded to a need of the community by creating a kindergarten on a rooftop, which would thereby be protected from settlers' attack; the kindergarten is looked upon as a symbol of both resilience and continuity. Tel Rumeida, in this respect, concentrates a number of material and social effects of the occupation on people and environment. The Palestinian people feel attached to an environment, one which does not in effect exist anymore as it was swept away by the architecture of occupation. They are nonetheless influenced by personal experiences and memories.

The Pervasive Presence of Occupation in Palestinian Perceptions

In focusing on the histories of the research participants, I was able to collect stories about their life and their land. During the interviews, it emerged that all the participants refer to their life in relation to historical dates of the occupation; depending on the age of the participant, their steps in life were linked to the phases of the occupation. For instance, the older participants would describe life as before and after 1948 or before and after 1967. The majority of the participants would agree that their life changed considerably with the Oslo Accords even though it used to be a shared opinion of scholars that the changing moment for Palestinians was 1967 and the Israeli occupation (Efrat, 2006). For the younger interviewees, the creation of the Separation Barrier (2002) figured as the main event in the determination of the quality of their life. The history of the occupation dominates the self and collective perceptions of the Palestinian interviewees, almost as if they would not exist without it.

As shown in Chapter 2, many activists and scholars have reflected upon the instruments and material effects of the occupation on the Palestinian population: this has been described in terms of the architecture of occupation, its elements and of their impact on Palestinian life. In line with this, this research has drawn attention to the effects of prolonged occupation, in particular, the deep marks it has left on the consciousness of the occupied population. These deep marks can be connected to the notion of the "colonisation of the mind" (Dascal, 2009), already mentioned in Chapter 2, and the how this colonisation has all-encompassing presence in their lives. This seeks to reflect how every day activities in the lives of Palestinians are so entangled in the occupation matrix of control (Halper, 2000) that they are unable to eschew it from their

mind, even for a moment.

Indeed, the people from Wadi Rahhal who need to travel to Bethlehem are constantly reminded that the journey used to be shorter and easier before the settlement was built. The Battiris who need to sell their produce compare their struggle to make ends meet in a saturated market like Bethlehem with how much they would have earned in Jerusalem's market a few years ago. Students going to the university have to anticipate daily the time spent at the checkpoints on their way to and from lectures, even when this can change from hour to hour. The people of Tel Rumeida cannot really plan for anything because the declinations of a possible Israeli intervention are infinite. The occupation has such a pervasive presence in Palestinian lives that the only foreseeable way to heal the minds is its complete cessation.

Decolonizing the Mind and the Land

As a process, decolonisation means using various strategies to liberate or to adapt oneself and to survive oppressive conditions; it means, depending on the context, endeavours to restore or to reclaim oppressed cultural practices, thinking, beliefs, and values which are still relevant and necessary to the survival of a colonised group of people. Decolonisation can also refer to the production of new ideas, thinking, technologies, and of lifestyles that contribute to the advancement and empowerment of Indigenous Peoples (Yellow Bird, 2005). In fact, as critical theorists such as Frantz Fanon and Paulo Freire have also pointed out, colonialism encompasses not just politics and economics, but consciousness (Fanon, 1965; Freire, 2000). Therefore, in the last section, I began to note that a process of decolonisation for Palestinians in resistance to the Israeli occupation must occur first and foremost in the mind.

In addition to this, Albert Memmi (1957), drawing from his experience of French colonialism in North Africa, describes the "absoluteness" of the colonised situation insofar as it involves an absolute loss of pre-colonial traditions and culture, but also a loss of self, authenticity, community unity and of belonging to a place. He asserts that the colonised man or woman attempts to change their attitudes, practices, fashion and even their skin by adopting the ideologies and behaviours of the colonisers. In this lies the hope that they will ascertain along with their adaptation the corresponding privileges. By way of this research, I have sought to provide certain means to define this phenomenon, the colonisation of the mind, in the Palestinian context. The following characteristics are manifest: a) the intervention of an external source (i.e. the 'occupier/coloniser') in the mental and physical sphere of a subject or group of subjects (i.e. the 'occupied/colonised'); (b) the existence of a marked asymmetry of power

between the parties involved; (c) the effects of colonisation that are pervasive and not easily removed.

Fanon (1965, 1967) identifies the rediscovery of a pre (and post) colonial culture – its beliefs, habits and behaviours – as a constructive way to remove this embedded colonisation of the mind and thereby as a means towards liberation. As such, the importance of collective memory cannot be underemphasised. Collective memory is fundamental to this research insofar as it was instrumental to discussions of decolonisation and its means during protracted occupation. Collective memory refers to the history of a social group and consists of common customs and/or significant historical events involving the built environment (Rossi, 1966). Place is often seen as the "locus of collective memory", wherein the identity of a group is created by linking it to the past (Harvey, 2002). Therefore, collective memory contributes to the satisfaction of the fundamental need of creating an affective bond with places through memories, feeling of ownership and through the pride of creation.

In the case of Palestine, a stronger subject is occupying the place of local dynamics and collective memory, and erasing the environment on which these collective memories were built upon. This situation underlines how our presence in a place involves us, whether we like it or not, in the lives of others who also happen to be in the same place at the same time (Massey, 2005). The occupation of place by the Israeli state does not allow for negotiation or for the common social production of place as such, and as showed in the previous paragraphs, the resulting imposition of changes in the environment results in the alteration of individuals' perception and their sense of attachment to a place or to places. In the case of a protracted colonial situation like this one, what is arguably needed then to mend the fragmented place identity of the occupied population is a 're-framing' of place. By this, I mean an essentially active process that does implies neither the complete rejection nor complete acceptance of any of the systems in conflict (Chinweizu, 1987).

Among the three case studies of this research, only Battir has shown the ability to construct a new mental framework, pursuing the goal of a liveable and creative process of decolonisation, without making a tabula rasa of the occupation experience, but at the same time without accepting it. In what follows, I will explain how place making is the material expression of this re-framing as it manifests by way of the example of Battir.

Resilience through Place Making: A Model for Decolonisation

Paulo Freire defined praxis as "reflection and action upon the world in order to

transform it" (Freire, 2000). As in Massey's conception of a constantly evolving place, shaped by connections and encounters (2005), Mary Douglas (1986) defines knowledge as built by people communicating and responding to one another. Following Freire and Douglas, we can see place making as an instrument to facilitate and encourage skills of critical thinking while offering recommendations for fostering community discussions and plans for purposeful community action. One of the key findings of this study is the interconnection between place making and resilience under occupation. The three case studies show how the place making activities are influenced by the conditions of segregation and colonisation that Palestinians are subjected to.

Underscoring Place Making in the Case Studies

Moving to the specifics of the case study, Wadi Rahhal and Battir are very similar given that inhabitants in both locales were at the time resolved to build as much as they could in Area B, thereby congesting the already filled up land. As many new houses had already been built in the 1980s, the available space was limited. The result was that in Wadi Rahhal the old houses have been demolished or absorbed into new bigger houses, with more than one floor to accommodate growing families. In fact, upon walking in the village today, it is almost impossible to find an old house still inhabited or recognisable. They are few, around six or seven remained, and even these had been transformed into the ground floors for new buildings or into barns next to the new house of the family. In Battir, the situation was more or less the same, but there was more available land on the new road to Bethlehem, moving away from the border and from Jerusalem. Many new houses have been built there in the past twenty years, and this area is now called "New Battir", named by the village council members as if it were a whole new village.

The availability of this land made it possible for the Battiris, who chose to move there from the old village, to build single-family villas with a garden. This granted them a better quality of living, but it also forced them to renounce the place to which they felt most attached. This was made evident through the comments of interviewees during the group discussions and through the mental maps the participants designed. These activities of place making have been defined in this study as acts of adaptive resilience, which can be shown in the decision of inhabitants to exploit Area B instead of making use of all the land they owned thereby circumventing the rules of colonisation. Given the complexity and high cost of the application process for construction permits, the Palestinians decided to use (and sometimes abuse) the available resources. Therefore, the old area of Battir and the core village of Wadi Rahhal are today filled with houses,

leaving little to no room for any private gardens or open space. Most if not all of the participants complained about the ever-decreasing quality of their surrounding environment (especially in Wadi Rahhal) and about the social problems of sharing limited space.

As described in Chapter 4, the family house was a place where privacy was granted even in outdoor spaces, where women could gather without fear of strangers being able to see them. Today, however, the houses in the villages are so close to one another, (almost 'one on top of the other', as one participant remarked), that no one can avail of such privacy. Women in particular notice the absence of a place where they can relax and 'have a cup of tea' without concern for what the broader community might see or say. Place making did present the solution to the reduced availability of land, but at the same time it did not prevent the emergence of other social issues.

Being in area H2 makes Tel Rumeida similar to Area C in the rest of the West Bank. Palestinians in Tel Rumeida cannot build any new buildings, nor are they permitted to fix or renew the houses that already exist. The built environment is again a tool of settler colonialism; the obstacles emplaced in taking care of their own houses might inspire Palestinians to move to another area, rendering space available for the settlers. While many families have left due to the harshness of the situation, many others have decided to employ resilience: these Palestinians endeavour to fix their houses in secret, mostly during the night, and only inside or behind closed doors. Simultaneously, they have applied acts of transformative resilience to make their homes more resistant to the daily assaults of rock-throwing and window breaking by settlers and the military. In a number of ways the inhabitants of Tel Rumeida endeavour to protect them and their families from the daily violence of occupation: household windows have been screened by metal grids, the gardens by metal fences or metal panels, sometimes even the roof of the yards required metal safety net ceilings. The closer to the settlement, the more protected the houses became, as in the "cage house" of the Abu Ayisha family. Palestinians are trying to protect themselves and this has resulted in a transformation of their living environment. The transformation of these buildings into something like cages represents in a particularly stark manner the effects of the Israeli occupation on their lives.

A Closer Inspection: The Example of Battir

Battir is the locality that displays, as I see it, a more developed form of resilient place making from which an interesting exemplar can be drawn. An explanation for this could be found in the history of the village: Battir's community has deep roots in social

mobilisation and a strong awareness of its cultural heritage; indeed, Battir had a historical figure of leadership in this regard that still lives in people's memories and hearts. It could be said that in Wadi Rahhal people are more or less coping with the situation, only discovering the significance of place making, whereas in Battir the inhabitants were already taught that places embody community identity and achievements. They understood the value in defending one's place and, following the success of their legal battle against the construction of the Separation Barrier on their historical terraces, the possibility of doing so even against a more powerful entity. As such, in Battir, the relation between heritage and place making has become the distinctive trait of the village.

Social mobilisation plays a strong role in shaping the development of the guesthouses and tourist attractions of the village and place making has thus now become a source of economic improvement. The community of Battir is evolving from the simple farmers of their past into something new and different, an evolution which is strictly linked to the local environment though it is connected to the wider reality of occupation and resistance as well. Indeed, the occupation is still the main obstacle to free expression and improvement, and the participants never forget to mention this point. But, at the same time, the more disastrous effects of the occupation seem temporarily superseded by the possibilities that the new developments are offering.

By contrast, in Wadi Rahhal and Tel Rumeida, the overasrching sense of a possible future is shadowed by the constant presence of limitations and restrictions that are perceived as impossible to overcome. In Battir, the spirit of resilience is stronger than that of these two other locations, and it is nurtured by the comfort and pride provided by the tangible success in preserving the national heritage. For this reason, I would argue that the case of Battir provides an example of the possibilities and potential uses of place making as a step towards decolonisation of both the mind and place. It is a case that all Palestinian localities could perhaps follow as a form of resilience. Indeed, in tackling the impact of the occupation on the village, Battir found a response that considered the needs of all social groups and provided opportunities for social inclusion and economic development, while still acknowledging the specific needs, priorities, and identities of the community. This sense of place making was participatory insofar as it involved all the villagers of the community, or at least the ones who desired to contribute to the process.

The essential instrument to place making in Battir is culture: that is, a tangible cultural heritage mixed with creativity and entrepreneurship. The use of culture as the foundation that integrates people-centred with place-based policies is strongly

recommended. It could be of great benefit to many other and similar cases in the West Bank in the effective restoration of the physical and social fabrics of the communities. While Palestine cannot be considered a post-conflict situation, the case of Battir still arguably provides a roadmap for development and management of community-led social, spatial, and economic transformations, while simultaneously addressing small-scale reconstruction and recovery processes and thereby enhancing their effectiveness and sustainability (UNESCO, 2018).

In this way, the case of Battir shows how much truth there is in the assumption that being responsible in shaping a place empowers communities and fosters a sense of place attachment. Battir's place making activities have created a built environment to which the community feels as if they belong and which they are willing to share with others. This environment is a reminder to its inhabitants of what really matters to them: namely, the embrace of shared living and the resistance of occupation in their daily difficulties (Al-Sabouni, 2017). In this regard, a resilient community must foster and encourage community-led initiatives in order to increase the effectiveness of place making activities (Dionisio, et al. 2016).

Moreover, Battir's community, while addressing its own condition of occupied population, was also able to connect its struggle with other global emergencies. Its projects included a land-based educational model and decolonisation strategies for youth in unemployment and in distress. Demonstrating an open mind and a strong connection with the world impending crisis, Battir refused to accommodate the project of modernity and economic development as a pathway to self-determination. Battir's model of transformative resilience is based on the assumption that the future is intimately linked with the health of the land and with the integrity of its ecosystems as well as with the image of the Palestinian people as the role of defenders of the land. This is a role that could easily be shared by all Palestinians in the West Bank.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to highlight this research helps to expand on existing knowledge about the effects of the Israeli occupation and policies of segregation policy on Palestinian communities in the West Bank. In providing a greater close-up of the situation through the examination of particular cases, this chapter highlights and analyses further how Palestinians endeavour to resist this settler colonialism through practices of place making, thereby demonstrating socially and materially transformative resilience. As such, the cases examined by this research could be helpful in understanding other situations of settler colonialism and resistance in both Palestine and

perhaps even elsewhere in the world.

One of the main claims of this chapter is that the Israeli occupation has colonised the mind of many Palestinians in a way that they relate every moment of their life to specific phases of the occupation. More so, the findings of this research draw attention to the fundamental role played by the occupation's built objects, from settlements to checkpoints and military apparatuses, in the damage of the occupied communities' sense of place and place attachment. A definitive decolonisation would necessarily involve the erasure of these elements from Palestinian landscapes. Threats to place identity seem at times to strengthen it (Breakwell, 2015), however, and Palestinians show their attachment to a particular place as a container for all their experiences, memories, values and preferences. As such, collective memory can be an instrument for the process of decolonisation when used to strengthen an affective bond with a place through memories, feelings of ownership and by taking pride in their creation of the place.

Wadi Rahhal presents the destructive effects that the story of occupation has had on the traditional built environment and landscape, showing how the place making choices of Palestinians are forced by the need to adapt to an ever-evolving situation. Similarly, Tel Rumeida is an extreme example of the Israeli's policies of segregation and militarisation, but of an urban environment. Place attachment, in this case, shows signs of resistance and place making is certainly an instrument of resilience. Tel Rumeida is proof of the intense bond between people and their environment, especially when the sense of place is deeply damaged. In Tel Rumeida, the identity of the community is created with the help of collective memory, as the people feel more connected to the place of their past than to the one of their present. Nevertheless, they operate on the present with actions of collective place making, actions that are often supported by internal or external advocacy groups. These groups foster in turn a sense of place attachment in opposition to the violence committed onto the people and onto the place itself.

Battir, in somewhat contrast, is the perfect example of a community under occupation that has been able to construct a mental framework that foresees a possibility for decolonisation. In this way, Battir provides to all communities under occupation a roadmap for development and though community-led social, spatial, and economic transformations. It does so by knitting together the elements of architectural tradition, sustainable development, land-based knowledge diffusion and imprinting all this with the label of Palestinian tradition. Battir teaches us how it may be possible to use (architectural) culture and tradition to address small-scale reconstruction and

recovery processes (Unesco, 2018). Battir's community works in the spirit of Massey's conception of a constantly evolving place shaped by connections and encounters (2005) and connects its struggle with the global context of search for a sustainable development. By showing the interconnection between place making and resilience under occupation, this research brings the discussion to the general arena and illuminates place making as the instrument to facilitate plans for purposeful community action.

Notes

[1] The term "Bantustan" is borrowed from South African literature and relates to the confinement of black Africans to Bantu homeland, out of which they could not exit without a permit (see the Bantu workers Authorities Act of 1951, Promotion of Self-Government Act of 1959, and Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970).

Chapter 12.

Conclusion

Research Aims and Objectives

The main aim of this research is to investigate the segregation mechanisms in the West Bank and its impact on the experience and practices of Palestinian place making. I further sought to understand if place making could be conceived as an expression of resilience. My investigate thereby sought to answer the question of the effects of the occupation on the perception of space and place rhetoric by the Palestinians as well as on the way in which they shape their own space and relation to it?

Methodologically, I approached this investigation by way of three steps. First, relevant scholarship was identified in order to describe the complex set of structures and processes of settler colonialism that produce the contemporary reality of the West Bank. Second, a focus on place and its related theories was argued for in order to understand the social implications of Israeli territorial practices of segregation on the Palestinian perception and the material reality of the West Bank environment. Third, through the lens of resilience, Palestinian tools of place making were analysed so as to assess how individuals adapt to and, eventually, transform that perception and reality (Collins, 2012). In summary then, the objectives of this study are as follows:

1- The identification of the Zionist movement as a case of settler colonialism;
2- The description of forms and practices of segregation in the West Bank context;
3- A study of the influence of the practices of Israeli occupation on Palestinian place identity and place attachment;
4- An analysis of Palestinian place making as an act of resilience.

From Research Objectives and Questions to Investigation

In reflection of this research's objectives, it is possible to identify the following achievements and results. In relation to the first objective, Chapter 2 provides and advances the relevant interpretative framework of settler colonialism in order to critically study the context and narratives of Zionism. The comparison between Israel and more historical cases, such as South Africa, Australia and North America, offers conceptual and political possibilities for reading the contemporary situation of the West Bank. For Palestine, it means the definition of Palestinians as an indigenous people

(Salamanca et al., 2012) and of Israeli policies as focused on land appropriation and indigenes disappearance. Tracing from the early Zionist movement and the first alyiah of 1882 until Israel's declaration of independence and beyond, Chapter 5 thereby endeavours to uncover the history of the land of Palestine from the perspective of colonialism and its objective of territorial possession.

The review of literature about the different historical events that led to the actual situation has shown that the interpretation of the Zionist enterprise varies from the one of classical colonialism, as the process of conquest and control of other people's land and goods (Loomba, 1998), to one of settler colonialism. This study follows the latter interpretation as it considers land appropriation, elimination of the natives and the expansion of land property as the goals of Zionism since its inception. Indeed, a vast body of literature discusses the many years of conflict and interactions between Jews and Arabs in this area. I opt to approach the subject, however, from the point of view of the shifting territorial control and its effects on the Palestinian society. Settlers migrate from a country to which they have no intention of returning, and then create their own society in another land. This land needs to be conquered, however, such that a sovereign claim can be established over it. The indigenous population is at first exploited, then dominated, and subsequently, if possible, removed (Wolfe, 2007). Land acquisition, in this regard, is central and motivates in turn the creation of a settlers' narrative about an 'empty' land that they have come to cultivate and inhabit.

In response to the second objective, Chapter 6 describes the Israeli use of planning practices as tools of territorial control inside the Green Line, at first, and then in the Occupied Territories post-1967. The selected literature narrates the effects that losing the coastal regions to the conflict had on the Palestinian society, destroying its urban bourgeoisie (Tamari, 2009; Migdal, 1980). The series of settlements plans and the legal framework built by Israel to control the land grab process after the occupation affected even further the Palestinian lives by segregating and controlling their lives and territories. Since the birth of the state, Israel has developed a whole system of territorial control, comprised of settlements, Jewish-only by-pass roads, checkpoints, roadblocks, and barriers called the 'architecture of occupation' (Weizman, 2007), that heavily affects the occupied population and the landscape. Indeed, as I have shown in detail, the system of segregation that was implemented since the Oslo Accords, followed by the millennial construction of the Separation Barrier, has enclosed the local population into enclaves and isolated areas with limited options for movement (Gordon, 2008; Efrat, 2006; Halper, 2000).

The third objective required me to move beyond the critical work that has

already established the efficacy of the settler colonial paradigm and focus on the architectural effects of the settler colonial tools on the Palestinian localities, thereby setting up the main contribution of this research to the field. In order to set the scene and establish the reality of a local Palestinian built environment, Chapter 4 demonstrates the existence of a vernacular architecture that shared many characteristics with the Mediterranean one prior to Israeli occupation. Few have in fact written on this architectural reality of the villages. It is important nonetheless to do so because the descriptions of the built spaces of Palestinian villages connect to the description of the Palestinian society that gave birth to the construction model of the hosh, as explained by the Palestinian architect Suad Amiry (Amiry and Tamari, 2008).

In this regard, as done in Chapter 3, an elaboration on place identity, as the sum of collective memories that contain the informal history of a social group and its main events, is significant. The notion of place identity is vastly interpreted in contemporary scholarly literature, but I have placed stress on the interpretations of humanistic geography, whereby place identity concerns physical settings as they emerge in relation to people's perceptions and memories, inspiring feelings of comfort (Relph, 1976). The Israeli practices of occupation are threatening to the place identity of Palestinians who have come to perceive their environment as something dangerous or even alien. The presence of soldiers and violent settlers, the growth of settlements on confiscated lands, and the destruction of orchards and historic olive groves, are affecting Palestinians' perception of their environment and threatening their affection for it, indeed, their sense of place attachment. Place attachment is here interpreted as a bond one forms with an environment that is not only scenery, but is imbedded with historic, cultural and social meaning (Giuliani, 2003; Hidalgo and Hernàndez, 2001).

Each case study, on which this research is based, provides evidence for the fact that, given the conditions, place attachment is threatened but not altogether erased by the Israeli practices of settler colonialism. It is for this reason that the last objective of this research sought to explore the place making activities of Palestinians as resilient acts. What I argue is that, under various levels of segregation and of the occupant's presence, place making can manifest in ways that resist the spatialised effects of the occupation. At least three core elements influence the activities and value of place making in the case of the West Bank, Palestine. First, the geopolitical value of the location, which might be under Israeli rule, thereby totally inhibiting Palestinian place making. Second, strong social ties among the population might foster the desire to manage and change the situation through changes in the environment. Third, the extent to which a particular community is aware of the importance of heritage in representing

their identity.

The activities involved in Palestinian place making are depicted here through the definition of levels of resilience as acts of absorption, adaptation or transformation of the conflict situation. As such, through acts of adaptive resilience, Palestinians make choices aimed at mitigating the effects of conflict and, by doing so, they can explore new ways of living their lives under the severe conditions of segregation. In the case studies, community-led spatial and social interventions were able to knit together both acts of local development and attempts of decolonisation. Therefore, Palestinian place making is not simply about a return to tradition (or a vernacular architecture even), but endeavours to satisfy the needs of a changing society and still to navigate, if not challenge, the limitations imposed by Israel's policies and acts of violence. When the community feels empowered and is given awareness of the importance of its heritage, acts of transformative resilience then become part of place making choices, as in the case of Battir, wherein a possible future of decolonisation is foreseen.

Further Research Suggestions

One study is unfortunately unable to cover the multiple aspects of such a complex situation as the one in Palestine. The findings of this research highlight how practices of Palestinian place making have transformed in relation to the Israeli architecture of occupation and practices of segregation, provided more than fifty years of settler colonialism. Moreover, by reading the practices of Palestinian place making through the lens of resilience, this study identifies the boundary conditions that may lead to a more positive sense of transformation in a crisis situation. It goes to show that the community use of the built environment can often help them thrive despite hardness and oppression. Further studies of the topics of heritage, place attachment and place making under colonisation should follow. Those listed here below are some examples.

The Affects of Vernacular Architecture: The Example of Riwaq

In Chapter 3, I described vernacular architecture as both a historical and a technical phenomenon, reproducing in architectural objects the social and cultural values of a community. At the same time, however, I also stressed its role in developing a sense of place attachment. Heritage architecture should therefore be studied not as a romantic value of the past, but rather as a dynamic form of enacting change. Offering communities means to improve their environment and living conditions entails responding to the issues they face daily under occupation. An example is the work of Riwaq, which is an architectural association based in Ramallah that is looking at ways

to mend the fragmented heritage of Palestine, especially before it is lost forever. For Riwaq, the concept and definition of heritage has gradually advanced; conservation and historic restoration are seen as tools for social and economic advancement, demonstrating a new avenue of possibilities for understanding the relation between places and individuals. These possibilities embrace contemporary activities, meanings, and practices that one can draw from the past to shape the future. Further research could thus explore what could be done in Palestine with the limited resources available, thereby moving away from a conventional restoration approach, to cultivate a Palestinian historic fabric and to create spaces wherein contemporary communities can thrive (Riwaq).

The Importance of Self-awareness in the Preservation of Cultural Heritage

From Riwaq, another interesting development of this study could be the development of a focus on the role of international bodies, like UNESCO, in the preservation and enhancing of Palestinian identity and social community through the particular frame of cultural heritage. A study could analyse how UNESCO has operated for the re-unification of the Palestinian fragmented identity, starting from the effects of its recognition of the State of Palestine. The UNESCO office in Ramallah builds on massive education and cultural policies in order to improve Palestinian living conditions. The importance of these policies in building a self-awareness of heritage in communities could be part of a study of resistance against the annihilation of the Palestinian identity.

Trauma-affected Heritage and its role in Community Resilience

Assuming that heritage, hence vernacular architecture or the cultural landscape, has a positive value for the human collective that identifies with it, trauma to heritage in crises or conflict situations should be considered a collective trauma and treated as such (Pullan, 2017). When this heritage disappears or changes irreparably, then the community's sense of identity or sense of belonging is also damaged. Therefore, in order to recuperate trauma-affected heritage, new practices in architecture or rehabilitation should be considered and explored together with the community. This argues then that by treating the notion of heritage accordingly, the community itself could thrive. Battir is an example that could be used as a start point, but more should follow. For example, more certainly could be said on and done in regards to those areas of the West Bank frequently affected by the demolition of Palestinian heritage. Many of these demolitions have been carried out by the Israeli military, such as, the destruction

of Nablus' historical centre during the military operations of 2002 (Amnesty International, 2002) or the closure of Hebron city centre (B'Tselem, 2007); these demolitions may also be the indirect result of the architecture of occupation, such as, the destruction of archaeological sites for Israeli excavations in order to build settlements or, in the last two decades, the Separation Barrier (Rjoob, 2009).

Religion and its Effects on Palestinian Place Making

In addition to culture and identity awareness, religion has shown its importance in resilience to the occupation. The attitude of the Palestinian community to religion has changed throughout the years, often in parallel to the increase of Israeli segregation policies. Religion has become more important in the life of people, and as a social characterisation. Especially among the Muslim worshippers, this new religious attitude has affected social habits and the use of local spaces. Such changes could be analysed against the more general background of increasing Islamic fundamentalism or against, in the specific case of settler colonialism, the background of a population searching for its identity through religion. Moreover, the shift in religious attitudes could be analysed as an act of resilience insofar as it strengthens the identity of the community that is perceived as under threat. In Battir, which was once politically a Marxist village, these changes in religious attitude towards a more fundamentalist strand of Islam have been contested by many participants as signs of regression of the society and as obstacles to social and material development. As such, the subject of religion could be studied together with its effects on place identity and place making.

Final Conclusion

A summary of this study's achievements serves as a close to the project, but also as a framing of potential new horizons. This study has firstly explored the Zionist enterprise in Palestine and the occupation of the West Bank through the lens of settler colonialism, not only deepening the awareness of the subject, but also broadening knowledge by building on a rich theoretical framework to bring together settler colonialism, segregation and carceral studies with issues of place making and resilience. Indeed, the findings of this research have focussed on explaining the relation between segregation and activities of resilient place making in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, thus contributing to knowledge about segregation, place attachment and place making under occupation. It is my contention that the theoretical and practical framework developed by this research can help other analyses of both the Palestinian and of alternative contexts which are subject to militarisation, social controls and

territorial occupation. In this regard, assuming Massey's conception of a constantly evolving place shaped by connections and encounters (2005) can help us see that the Palestinian struggle in relation to a more global context, illuminating place making as the instrument to facilitate plans for meaningful community action. As such, the current study has sought to contribute to reducing a gap in the research on the role of heritage awareness in relation to place making and the prospects of resilient attitudes and activities under colonialism, prospects which, I believe, have an important future in shaping pro-Palestinian research and political endeavours.

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Appendixes

Appendix A.

Interview Questions

CASE STUDY:

PARTICIPANT:

GENDER: AGE: JOB: EDUCATION:

LOCAL HISTORY/PERSONAL HISTORY

1. Were you born here? How many years ago?
2. What are the first memories of this place that come to your mind?
3. Can you tell me more about the history of your village/neighbourhood?

PERCEPTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

4. How did the landscape change since then?
5. What are your feelings when you look at your landscape now? Do you like it? Why?
6. What is your favourite spot in your village/neighbourhood? The place where you like most to go or the one you miss when you are away? Why?
7. What is your favourite building in the village? So you have one? Why?

INFLUENCE ON PLACE MAKING

8. if you could change something in your house/village/neighbourhood what would that be? Why?
9. Can you describe your dream house to me? Why do you like it?

Appendix B.

Sample of interview transcription

IB03

Were you born in Battir? When?
I was born in Kuwait, I came here when I was 3, in 1973.

What is your first memory of Battir?
I remember I was in this house, it was not a old old house, but old. Built in the rocks, up the street. You see it here in the road, just look up and you will see it. The street is up from here, you will see that.

That was your home?
Yes the first one.
We had two rooms and one kitchen, the entrance was not separated.

Did your parents build it?
No it was rented.
There are many ages here, and different houses. This was a new house from that time. But now it is kind of old.

Were there many houses in Battir like yours?
Maybe 20 houses were like mine. The others were one room and the bathroom outside, they had to walk there. Some houses in that time I think there was no kitchen. It was part of the room and the tools for the kitchen were outside. You know, to clean the dish, with some water…I remember they put it in the sun to make it dark. I had a dog and my father was keeping him in the house in the day and let him go free outside in the night. And he used to collect all the dishes from the neighbours. And they started to say there was a thief. And I remember I was going to feed him, and he had a cave where he lived, and every week I was cleaning it and I found all the kitchen tools there! Dishes and glasses and knives…and we started to say there is no thief, there is a dog. As religious, we are sensitive to things bitten and touched by a dog, so I took all the tools for me and my father gave the neighbours new one. It is the idea, no? that there was no place to keep the tools inside the house, but they kept them outside, to dry and become shiny.

(*interpreter: it was not like today that you can buy in the store, at those times it was expensive, so they were something for the people*) they had to borrow form the neighbours if they had guests. They didn't have enough tools.
But it was very nice at those times. There was cooperation between people. They felt about others. I have to help you because sometime I will need your help. If you think about buildings, at that time they didn't have tools like today, technology. They made concrete by hand, not with mechanical machines. They needed a lot of people to build one room. We use a word "al aone" which means cooperation. To give your help to help somebody to build, to collect olives…at that time the population of Battir was small and we had a big land. So to collect this big quantity of olives, it might take 100 days. But for olives we have only 20 days, one month to collect all the olives.

How much smaller was Battir?
Battir as an area? It was only in this part, the centre of town, some houses there, some houses by the west of the village, some in the harik, where you enter Battir, just some houses, you can count on your hand. But then we started to make more houses. I remember 25 years ago the Israeli did not give us the permission to build at the entrance of Battir. Near the Castle, my house is there, about 500 meters from it, where there is no house. My father asked the permission to build there, but Israel did not allow it. Other people from Battir who have land there were not given the permission at that time. Then there was Oslo, so they started to give us permission to build new houses. But we started to build our new house around 1998.

And like you everybody? Now Battir is everywhere
After the Palestinian authority everybody can build their house in area B. but we still have area C, where we still need permission form Israeli. And the Buffer Zone, where it is not allowed at all. It is the firing area. From 1948. We have the Rhodes agreement, so there is this area from west to east of the Green Line. So not in C and not in the Zone.

In your opinion what is the difference that you see in the buildings that were built after Oslo and how Battir was before? How would you describe the different houses?
I have two points of view. One is that I like to see Battir as a natural place. There is no technology that can make Battir…the whole picture of Battir is the nature, the mountain, the wadi, the spring…these buildings are making the nature smaller, and that makes me sad. Maybe. But on the other hand the population is bigger and people need new houses. But the kind of buildings, they are different. The culture is different. We

have modern culture now. In the past you could take your wife to your house, and the house was one room. Your kitchen was outside, the bathroom was outside. There was no solar system for water, you didn't have water tank, so the wife had to go to the spring and take the water home. It was not expensive to take a wife and make a house! (he laughs) But young people cannot marry as their parents ask for a full house, at least two rooms, one for salon, one kitchen, two bathrooms…a complete house. Not near your parents, not in a big building with the family…they start to ask more.

So the ideal house for a young couple is like a villa?
Yes they ask for a villa, like a villa.

But in the past?
The same, just one room

But the family was all living together?
Yeah, with the parents. At that time it was easy, as the young could just build one room in the parents' house, and share the kitchen with the others.

But now no?
I think 99% of the people do not expect to live with their parents. At that time it was part of the culture, to be with the brothers or sisters to share the work. But now? They don't even wan tot share the entrance with the brother or the uncle

When did it change?
The culture

But when?
Maybe 20 years ago it started

But what changed?
The knowledge itself. At that time how could we reach the knowledge? School, read a book, maybe television. At that time we didin0t have satellite. When you have satellite you start to see other people's life. With internet even more, you see other cultures, other people. The idea starts to become bigger…and became one of our solid culture. The TV, internet and the different kind of media.

What are the models for the people?

It is not one place, not only Europe or Japan…it reflects the world.

The Palestinian tradition was this house that was growing with the family…

What is the idea of the building? Before, the idea was to be safe from the sun and warm from cold and to be safe from the wild animals. This is the basic idea why you take houses. Yeah? But it is different form culture to culture how to build this house. In our culture there are two different rules, the private rules and the public rules. In the private rules you have to be careful that your wife, sister, daughter are not seen in the house by anyone when there are not dressed. They have to be confident to do their work in the house, or to be in the house, without been seen. So how to build a house so that the private life is not seen. We had one room, but around the house there were trees and walls to protect the women. This is our culture. The oriental culture. But new culture came, maybe 25 – 20 years ago we started to use the American kitchen. What is that? It is open to the room. It is not suitable to our culture. You have to bring your friend to the kitchen where your wife can be seen. That means that your wife has to be fully dressed in the house. Which is not suitable. *(interpreter: not comfortable)* So what they started to do is to put one room so that the friends not from the related family had a sitting room (salon). But the sitting room with the kitchen was only for the family. But we have in Battir a salon for everybody. So it depends on how you believe.

I did this kind of interview also in other places, one is the village of Wadi Rahhal. And the things that come out are often similar. But for them the problem is the space.

Because they are surrounded by settlements

Yes, and so they have to build vertically., so all the young couples are complaining as they had to live with their parents upstairs and the uncle downstairs, so there is no privacy for them and the houses are small…

There is a big difference, what the wife parents ask and what the young people can do. Here if I want to build a house for my son, if he wants to get married, I start to build a house in a new area…it costs a lot of money. But I can build on the roof of my house, and that costs less, and it is acceptable for the wife and her parents. Maybe in a few years you will not find free areas to build new buildings. We have to start thinking more effectively about how we use our land.

But if you think about this kind of tall buildings, how do you see them in Battir?

There is the need of a policy from decision makers, for the permissions to give to who wants to build. It shouldn’t be given randomly. Not only because you have money you

can build. They make eagle eye view of built areas. I asked to the village council to do the same in Battir, so we can see the landscape and the areas.

I know tourists come here for the beauty of the landscape. Do you think they like the new part of Battir?

He laughs (*interpreter: it is a mess*). Maybe you will find a difference between the people of Battir and the other villages. Battir people (different from Husan and el Khader) when he starts to build his house he starts also a garden. Our culture is not the house. You can see in Husan big buildings and the entrance to the garden with some blocks. But when you come to the entrance of Battir on top of the hill, each house has a garden, with trees and flowers…this culture you can't find in any other place. I think these new houses might be liked by the tourists. But some places near the street I don't like to see them. Not the tourists, but I myself don't like it. It is not something you can be proud to be seen by other people. (*He laughs.*) But there are many things in Battir that you can be proud to show to other people. One of my rules in the ministry of education is to instruct teachers and supervisors is to use trips for education. I take Battir as example, I bring some good teachers and some good supervisors. We start from the first station here, why we are here, what we are going to see, and what we want you to bring us after this journey. And we have many stations. At the last station we have presentation from each one about what they have seen. After that the teacher and the supervisors do the same thing with the students. Why am I telling you this? I learned more and more about Battir when I started these journeys about 5 or 6 years ago. One question I ask people, "why Battir stands here? Why Battir people built their houses in a mount? Maybe something political? Maybe social? Maybe history?" When I talk to small groups, there was some Battir people who were there and they said "really? This is the reason?" they didn't know! We worked on a project to assess the knowledge of the people here. And they found out that many people don't know a lot about the old history, the middle history and the new history of Battir. The houses, why we are here, why we stand on this part, what is the relation between Battir and Jerusalem. What is the relation between Battir and Hebron…I think we have to make a big awareness inside Battir, both ways with tours, and invite to tours from outside Battir. How you ask people to help you, about what help you, what is the idea? Most of the people need to get awareness.

In a way Battir is special, because it seems you know the importance of heritage, of landscape, agriculture, tradition. In many places in Palestine they don't care about

these things.

They don't care because they don't know

Yes, they are surprised when they see that tourists are interested, they don't understand why as for them those are only old stuff (he laughs) but then when you start talking they all say it is true the old houses where more comfortable, warmer in winter and fresh in the summer, but now our houses are very cold and we have a lot of problems. But it is difficult to understand why they abandoned the old ways. One day everybody stopped building…

Some tools we use since 20 or 25 years ago, we can ask the name of the tool to my son. You know the tools we use to dig the land with the horses or donkeys. (*interpreter: we also don't have any in Battir. I think the last time we had the Eggplant festival we collected some old tools to put in a sort of museum for the people to see. Do you what I recognized in different areas when I visited Europe? There are villages in Sweden or Italy where they are very traditional and keep everything!*) I saw that in Modena, and also in Bolzano, the same! They have technology and university and modernity, but you have agriculture where they use also traditional agriculture. When they make the wine they still use the old tools, to spill it and to taste it. And also for the cheese.

That is because in Italy we care a lot for tradition. And when I come here I see so many changes and it is a bit strange.

But in Battir we still use the old things because most of our land is not allowed to be used the new technology. For example the areas form 1948 it is not allowed to bring there new tools to take care of your trees. If you go to Husan, they don't know anything about agriculture. But here, as we have the gardens, we have to take care of them, and so we use the old tools and we know them. Beside the railway (to the west side) you cannot bring modern mechanical tools. It is very difficult to go there. Before there used to be many tunnels but now I don't know what happened. They made them now very low, as 1.5 meters. (*interpreter: it is very close to my height. I can walk, in most of it, but he can't*) Many people were crossing directly the railway, but if the train passes they start to shout go away and it is all very difficult!

What is your favourite place in Battir?

Two places. One the top of the mount, where you see the entrance to Jerusalem and the west wadi. Another place is el Khirbe, where the Canaanite remains are. From the west side you can see the wadi going to the sea. These two places, when I feel that I need to relax, I go and stand there at least one house. Just to close my eyes and smell the fresh

air. And maybe I reach Oxford, some time I reach Tokyo…
(*interpreter: do you feel free when you go to these places?)*
what do you mean free?
(*interpreter: because you seat alone and feel that you are in Tokyo*)
The idea is not about free that I can go or not, but it is to open my mind, free-minded. If you mean that. But if you mean that you open your eyes and see another side of the mountain in front of you that you cannot reach by yourself, you have to close your eyes again and reach it with your dreams.
Y*ou are a poet! What is this mountain that you cannot reach?*
It is Qabu, the village Qabu, Sataf, el Jurah…the other side. It is the occupied area from 1948, there are no people there, they damaged the houses. I went there. We met some people, we are from Ras Abu 'Ammar, it is a village damaged and occupied, down there in 1948 area, and the people ask me: Did you see or reach our village sometime? Yes I was there. And what is there? And we started to remember, about the lemon tree, and olive trees and the spring, and some houses damaged but you can see the door or windows…and it is not easy but they ask me a lot about it. Because 30 years ago we could go, but now if you don't have permission you can't go. I was walking, I like to walk, so I went there. I am a football coach. I am also director of Battir sport club.

So you used to walk around and see all the places and one day you couldn't go anymore?
Yes. From here I used to go to Jerusalem, walking. Go and back. But after the Iraq war, they started to ask for permission and we could not go anymore. Before that we could go to Jerusalem or 1948 area without permission. After al Aqsa Intifada they put the wall and it was not possible to go anymore.

Did also Battir area change a lot?
Battir area is not so much different. We can still reach the 1948 area, but not easy. Sometimes when we have friends visiting and we take them to our 1948 land and if the soldiers ask for their ID and they are not resident here it is a problem but they don't ask every time. And for us from Battir as we have the Rhodes agreement it is not a problem.

Would you like to live somewhere else?
I work in Ramallah, in the ministry of education. And I started to work there in 2001, maybe 2002. And my father asked me to get a house there and take the family there. When I started to think about it I felt bad. There is no place like Battir!

Not that I am from Battir so I say that. Every day that comes I know something new about Battir that makes me more confident when I say that I will never leave Battir. If they told me to do it. Maybe they take me by power…

So you wouldn't stay in Ramallah…

I like to travel! But not to live. I live to be in Tunisia, in UK, in Estonia, in Korea…but not to live there.

What is so special here?

People! People, it is more than the area itself. Maybe we don't know the value of the people here, as we see each other every day. But if someone comes from outside Battir and see the people here, they would see what I say. When you are a stranger from Battir, you will see almost everybody with a smile on their face and "can I help you?" "where are you going?" "you want to visit Ahmad? Ok I can take you to Ahmad". There is some culture here you won't find in any other place or village. And a beautiful area. Both of them have to be in place, you like to be there. If the people without the area and the area without the people, it means nothing.

Aren't you afraid that Battir will change?

I am afraid of change, but of fast change. It is like fast food. Fast food is fast to eat but it takes a long time in the stomach. Fast change is fast for you because you change your appearance, but inside you are the same. I like the change that is built and solid, outside and inside. We use the modern life but we stay traditional inside, for me it means nothing. Because you put yourself in place where you are not ready for the new rules. It is not an easy life. Because you must know the rules. And respect the others. It takes time.

There must be something in Battir that you don't like if sometimes you have to go up in the mountain and relax?

No no it is just because of the work, not Battir. I don't feel bad about Battir. Maybe as we have a life, sometimes we are not confident, we have problems with the wife or the parents. But it is life. Nothing makes me go to the mount. What makes me go to the top of the mountain is more of national issue. Where we are going? why we are here? What is after life? You need to go there. Our prophets used to go up the mountains. And we learned form them, we have to go and rethink about everything around here.

Last question, can you describe to me your dream house? Imagine you could build

anything you want or everything you want…

I am thinking about that many times. My grandfather and maybe others that age, in winter used to go to their house made in stone in the center of the village, but in September they took their family and go to the fields. And they took a small stone house that is called manahir (skife in dialect). There are in the fields, like a tent, and you have skife and tent. (interpreter: like a trullo, with one room, very small) and from april to the end of September they would go back to their house. I always dream that I can live in that skife and live in the traditional way, no internet, no computer…and I plan that I will do it! I will invite you, as I will bring there barbecue, and zarb, you know zarb? You make a hole in the ground, and fire, and you can make chicken and lamb…and some chicken around to have eggs…it is a dream, that is my dream! I dream the dream!

So not like the castle on top of the road?

Never! I never see myself living in that big castle!

Don't you think that life in this house in the countryside could be modern?

The area I dream to do this thing is waiting for me to do my dream, but the area around on each side there are new buildings!

Do you have to build the skife?

I had one, but it was damaged as we didn't use it. But I have the stones, I have to clean them…

But you know how to make it?

Yes yes

Who told you?

I was vocational student, I did things with my hands, I built my house. My modern house I built it.

Where did you learn that?

Itidal we are neighbours, form one big family, and at that time they told me you are like a modern sheik, you believe in old things but in modern way. I was young at that time, but I am the same now. I dream the dream!

Appendix C.

Transcription of interview with key informant

Khaldun Bshara - Director of Riwaq
March 19th 2015

The idea is to find situations that are in a way typical of the variety of the cases that you can find in Palestine. It is difficult to generalize.
Wadi rahhal is the village, Tel Rumeida is the urban case with many troubles…and now I am looking for a third case.
I was surprised. Or better deceived, by the lack of awareness that I found in the people about their …
Built environment?
Yes. sometimes the case is that they feel that there are more important issues than keeping an old house. But there is also this idea that old houses are not as well built as the new ones.
Yeah, that is fair. Fair!
Ok first of all, let's start with this thing. Because I always say it, as I wrote this paper about colonial legacy and post colonial discourse. Which speculates and talks about why people do appreciate their built environment, and I call it colonial survivors, almost. Because we used to embody the colonial to act as such, to feel good to feel like we are equivalent to the colonial. We appreciate their values, and their aesthetics. And part of this aesthetic is the "*frangi*". The "*frangi*" we call it "*frangi prangi*" which means the foreign is good in Arabic ("frangi" from faransi=French and "prangi" because in Arabic the letter f does not exist).
And this is part of a rhetoric of the Ottoman era, late ottoman era, frangi prangi, foreign or French is good. So imagine if you are civilized you will be talking, eating, and dressing like a colonial. And this is a psychological complex. We cannot, really we can understand it from a foreign point of view. Also Fanon, in his postcolonial theory or colonial theory and stuff, he talks about this: the colonized who wants to practice the prohibited and this prohibited is the colonial so you want to act as such to feel good about yourself it is like a resistance but in a very negative way. And Fanon says I want to be a colonial but not on their terms, I don't want to embody but I want to practice, I want to practice freedom. I want to practice excess of material. I want to practice art on my terms. So I think what we got from the successive colonizing of Palestine is the

valuating of our culture and our building forms, and our habits in favour of the colonizer habits. And this is really almost logical I cannot blame anybody. I can blame our culture, because we are not educated, because our educating system as well is a colonial system, so we learn what the colonizer wrote on us, so our history, our politics, our geography, is not ours. In a way you want to combat colonization and its manifestations in a post colonial theory using their materials and their tools, so we fail from the beginning. So we fail form the beginning. Using the tools of the colonizer against the colonization. We don't use our tools. Our tools should have something to do with our culture, like we have long lived practices of building arts, of decorations, of communal public spaces. And we have to look to them not to reproduce them, but to learn and to continue. We are cautious to repeat. But we don't want to reproduce older forms, because it would mean the colonizer is right, there is something primitive in us as we want to reproduce old forms. No! Palestinians are evolving. When they had tents, we had tents, when we were living under the romans we were building like the romans, when we were under the ottoman empire we were building in stone, but in Jericho we were building in mud. Our building forms evolved as history evolved. We were not static, and this is what the colonizer wants us to be. To be static. Something we can bring back. To be primitive, like abracadabra. Be primitive! And this is what they like in us, they want us to be primitive.

So, from a psychological point of view, I see why people are resistant to the traditional buildings. From a psychological point of view they don't want to be primitive, they want to advance. And they are wrong, because they incorporate the colonial discourse while combating the primitivism. They don't use their tools to advance. They don't look back and say "ok we built differently in the 17th century, in 18th century, without colonization. And in 19th century and in 20th century. Now we have to build according to 21st century now. We have to, it is nice, there is nothing to dig down. This is why I give an excuse to practice the prohibited, to practice the colonizer's aesthetics. Because the colonizers divided things into the colonizer and the colonized, there is nothing in-between, or you are on this side or you are on that side. Another thing which I thing contributed to the deterioration of our built environment is the absence of the public, or what we call the private common, or the common public space. Because the colonizers divided geography into two: the public (which is the state) and the private, which is means yours, the land deed, or the house. But there is nothing in-between. But over the history there were many spaces in-between. There was the mosque, the "saha", the plaza, the spring, the grazing areas, the mountains, all common, they are private, but they are common, you can graze, you can get the water, and so on. Now, with the

colonization, especially the Mandate era, they divided this, radically, into two spaces that you cannot have anything in-between. Now you cannot put a chair in the street because according to the colonial rule you don't own the street. The street is the colonial property and this contribute on own we treat the street in our postcolonial era. Because the street is not ours, we destroy it. Because the lights are not ours we break them. Because the trees we did not plant them, we destroy them. So things which are not socially sanctioned. They were valued, to destroy the colonial. Even the train, we destroy the train, okay, because this is a value, if you want to destroy the colonial you destroy its infrastructure. And we still destroy our infrastructure, or we don't treat them as ours. Just imagine the implication on public spaces or built environment, if we don't treat them as ours.

Here you have the added issue of occupation. But the civic behaviour is something common in many countries. Even in my country.

But at least I see the public spaces in Italy, I won't say there is…and I think society must be judged by their public spaces. It is not about staging the war or the stupid platform of power, but at least the places where people can meet. Here in Palestine it is the minimum, it is the minimum! There is no place…

Is it cultural? Traditional?

No, traditionally there was a lot of common space. Hegemonically, or colonizically there is no space to gather, because meeting and interacting was a threat to the colonial regime. And here we go, what is the relation between colonial regime and our own regime? I think our own regime is indirectly a colonial regime. I am sorry, it is my country I love and this is why I am critical to it. This is my regime. I love this country and I critique it. We critique what we love we don't critique the enemy, that is stupid. I care about my government and I care about my authority. And I think they have to, they are obliged to change their mentality about the public space. And if only change this mentality which is to ground in the common. It is not communism, it is not to have communist ideas. To proud in the spaces for people to interact. This will change the attitude of people towards each other. They will feel good to interact, to talk to each other. But as far as we don't have this kind of space I think we will be stuck in the colonial era. Everybody has his own shop and his own house and he does not care.

As you said the architectural style was evolving through the ages. Do you think now there is still architecture? Or just real estate?

I am sorry you touch a very important point. We were building things for our own use which was not considered real estate for very long time. Villages were constructed in terms of needs, in terms of proper needs. If I am a peasant I will build a peasant house,

if I am rich or a shop keeper I will build a shop and a house, if I own a factory I will build a soap factory in Nablus and on top of it and my house, if I am a governor I will build a palace and a castle and a prison, it is like that, the real estate did not come to play. Unless in the Mandate era, starting the commoditisation of land, to buy land and to transfer it to the Jews, it is normal and I don't care about this, but we are replicating it nowadays. We are encroaching the villages and we are taking this land, and we are taking the productive means of this land out of the context. Actually land is treated now as pure commodity. The exchange value rather than the productive value. So a land with a house is less valuable than a land without a house. Believe me. Because the house is an obstacle. This is like the Renaissance, rebirth. People believe that things should be carte blanche and then we add to it. We don't want to renew, to renovate. This is like stupid. If somebody sees me, as I am currently rehabilitating an olive orchard, that I bought in a village area. And I invest a lot of money to rebuild the dry stone terraces, and I plan to put a watch tower, like in old times, of course inside it will be modern, but people will say what a crazy guy, invest all this money in rural area? He should leave the land and the olives to die and you will sell it as a real estate".

So there is no idea about cultural landscape?

Yeah.

I know there is not even a word for "landscape"...

At Riwaq, we tried to advance two things.

The first study on cultural landscape was done by Riwaq in the Bireq Suleiman, in the al Khadr area, where you have the system of pools, and then you have the place where they grow the cactuses, and you have Artas, and so on. We studied this, we studied it in terms of history, how it evolved, what is changing, how the people use the land, what does it mean cultural landscape. But at the same time, I think in 2003/2004 we were advancing a new protection law, a new heritage law, which included cultural landscape. Not only intended as heritage, but cultural heritage can not be separated from cultural landscape. You have to protect the zones around the buffer zones, the prospective points, we had this prospective law. And this law was put in the drawer by the ministry of tourism and they never put it in the process, because it takes some of the authority they claim. Anyway, they claim right or they claim wrong, but this is how things happen in Palestine. There are some intentions to change the status quo, but it is not easy with the structures being inherited from the colonial era because for instance the law is a 1920 law, the British law of protection, our heritage is defined by a colonial law. Which is still respected very much. So if we respect the colonial law, what does it say about the postcolonial? Are we living a postcolonial if we respect the colonial. We shouldn't be

subversive. But at least to change our values system. So the cultural landscape, we did some work on it, and nowadays Riwaq is doing the 50 villages project, about changing geography almost. To design a new map. For Palestine, there are villages in Palestine? Yes there are, there are more than 400. We prioritized 50 and these 50 they have traditional fabric, they have landscape around them, they are worth protecting and wasting more time than smaller villages, not smaller but with less fabric, less heritage. Because we are an heritage institution and we concentrate on it. But the thing that we moved from urban, from the monumental to rural, to the village, I think that we already contributed to the discourse on heritage and landscape. So we don't claim that we are successful, but at least we don't use the same colonial discourse in informing our heritage discourse. This is important for Riwaq. And we have been working on blurring these boundaries, public/private, and artistic architectural, urban, rural-istic. Just go and do something you need, something that satisfies your needs. I think Riwaq has been successful, because we have been there for 25 years and people respect Riwaq, because they do something in the field. Okay, people are more familiar with the rural areas in Palestine because of Riwaq, I would say, because we visit villages, we take people to villages, even our biennale, which is usually Liverpool biennale, Venice biennale, Sau Paulo biennale, which is huge, Istanbul biennale, and suddenly Riwaq Biennale, going to Yatta, going to Daaria, oops! We change things. What kind of biennale is this going to rural districts? So you see, we are trying even to change biennale concept. So this is why I think if we want to contribute to the future of Palestine we should inform our future not be informed by something else.

(From 19' he talks about his thesis about the refugee camps as the village social construction that still exists there and is urbanized there.)

In the camp the separation between public and private does not exist.

In the village of Wadi Rahhal I found a similar condition.

Yes, the boundary, it is trembling! In Ramallah they recently put a lot of chains for the streets.

Also in Hebron.

Yes!

There are lot of changes, it is not about occupation for me, but some communities are disappearing, my father spoke to me about them, but …(read the article in "This week in Palestine").

But this is really not my work, because my work is in heritage, but I want to put my reflections out, and for people to take them somewhere else.

We don't have a training in aesthetics in our schools. Here they don't take you to see

buildings in schools. The maximum is to see the Hisham palace in Jericho. The first time I went to see the al Aqsa mosque I was shocked. I was trained in architecture in Birzeit and what we studied in traditional architecture it was all about structure we had to reproduce, nothing about history or meaning. I am an anthropologist now, and I can see the meaning of buildings now, to go from a little decoration in the house to the universe. Out professors were trained in the 50s and 60s so they missed the 70s and 80s discourses, when you had all these spatial studies, like Lefebvre, Harvey, De Certeau, all these produced in the 70s and 80s. We still study Le Corbusier, I like him he is a colonial master, but what can I do, he did the colonial city in Algeria, Casablanca, but what can I do with it? So there is no systematic, not systematic, I think people should do comparative studies, for example Ramallah from 16th century until now. What kind of political changes changed the plan, how political power played in planning of neighbourhoods, of monumental buildings, where do we put Arafat tomb or Mahmoud Darwish tomb? Should it be a nice place for people to gather and not tombs, shrines I mean? I don't know, but this is important, it is about how things, how decisions are made in Palestine? What kind of planning supreme council of planning, what they do in their life? Colouring? Colouring people's life? One of my teachers of restoration in Belgium used to say "take care of your colours as they will change people's life". The word abracadabra is how we are trained. In planning I remember my teacher was like "put this colour here, residential there, and where is the industrial zone, ok make it here, ops", this is like the most rudimental industry of planning. I will be blunt, we are still living a Bedouin mentality, it is like there is no interdependency, there is no cultural cluster. Think about the Riwaq thing, we think about Palestine as a whole, even if we do the 50 villages, we believe these 50 villages are cultural clusters and they have to influence the others, they have to be connected with the others, they cannot survive alone, and so on. But in Palestine, every stupid village wants to survive on their own, we want our own village council, we want our garbage to be collected on our own, and they cannot fail. But it is normal they will fail, because they don't think beyond. But Ramallah municipality, Bireh municipality, Beytunya municipality, Kafr Aqab municipality, ok Kafr Aqab village council, but Kafr Aqab has more population than Ramallah, Bireh and Beitunya together. It is a village council with resources, but is has more than 120000 people. Legally or illegally, formally or informally it is not a question. Like Istanbul, it has been all informal, 17 million, most of it, 12 million, is informal, yeah, and still it is one of the biggest city in the world. And Kafr Aqab, where I live, is the city. Ramallah for me is a Bedouin community. Al Bireh is another Bedouin community. Unless they change their mentality about the others they will

always be villages. And maybe a village like Dahariya, in the south of Palestine, they have a market and they serve all the surrounding areas, and they have a religious court that marries everybody in the area, and they have Bedouins coming from Be'er Sheva, to get something form there, and they traffic things, I don't know for what, but really I feel like that is a city and this one is not a city. And you should read Salim Tamari as a finishing point, "*the mountain against the sea*" as it says a lot about the changes in the Palestinian society.

Appendix D.

Photographs shown during the group discussion in Wadi Rahhal



19th century photograph of a Middle Eastern village (Source: Jesus Story.net)
Retrieved at: https://www.jesus-story.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/19th-century-photograph-of-a-Palestinian-village.jpg



Palestinian women washing clothes in the courtyard 1910 (Source: Ynet)

Retrieved at: http://www.ynet.co.il/PicServer2/24012010/2451674/13_wa.jpg



Street in Bethlehem beginning 1900s (Source: American Colony Jerusalem Photo Dept)



The village of Samaria from the minaret of the mosque, along the eastern slope of the Samaritan mountain (Source: Wikimedia Commons) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Samaria_from_the_Minaret_of_Mosque_(4879149239).jpg



Wadi Rahhal today (Source: Author)



Wadi Rahhal houses with the settlement of Efrat in the background (Source: Author)

Appendix E.


Photographs shown during the group discussion in Battir



Historic photo (Source: Shokeh, 2015)




Battir in the early 1950s (Source: Shokeh, 2015)




The Roman pool (Source: Shokeh, 2015)



Battir today (Source: Author)



Battir today (Source: Author)



Building a house, early 1900 Ramallah region

Retrieved at: https://mohammadhamdan64.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/img_4617.jpg

Appendix F.

Photographs shown during the group discussion in Tel Rumeida



Road to Hebron to the South, 1900 (Source: American Colony Jerusalem, Photo Dept. Retrieved at: https://picryl.com/media/road-to-hebron-mar-saba-etc-hebron-from-the-south?zoom=true)



Hebron 1900 (Retrieved at: https://www.alamy.com/road-to-hebron-mar-saba-near-view-of-hebron-1900-west-bank-hebron-image220682781.html)




Halhul village, circa 1940 (Source: Library of Congress)
Retrieved at: http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/mpc2010005806/PP/



Hebron view (Source: S. Narisky Photograph Collection)
Retrieved at: https://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/158975



Hebron old town 1898 (Source: G.Eric and Edith Matson Collection)
Retrieved at: https://whc.unesco.org/en/documents/159122



Men under olive trees, 1898 (Source: Liszt collection)


Retrieved at: https://c8.alamy.com/comp/PR26RE/typical-palestinian-village-1898-middle-east-israel-andor-palestine-PR26RE.jpg




Bethlehem old gate, 1898 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)
Retrieved at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bethlehem_gateway_people_donkey_1898.jpg



Hebron, 1925 Retrieved at. https://i.ebayimg.com/images/g/OCEAAOSwPYZU-qem/s-l1600.jpg



View from Tel Rumeida, in the centre al Shuhadah street (Source: Author)



View of Hebron old city, the Ibrahimi mosque at the centre (Source: Author)



View of the old city and Tel Rumeida from the roof of the Ibrahimi mosque

(Source: HRC)



View of Tel Rumeida from afar (Source: Author)

Appendix G.

Focus Group Discussion

WADI RAHHAL
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION WOMEN N.1
FEBRUARY 9TH 2015

This focus group is made with the use of pictures to stimulate some discussion. In order, pictures of old Palestinian houses, pictures of the village as it is today, with pictures of the nearby settlement, are shown. Each phase lasts 30' and the discussion is closed with a short comparison of the two groups of pictures.

Participants: 10 women

13.10/13.40: discussion on the old pictures
The researcher shows the pictures from of the old houses.
I would like you to look at these pictures and then to tell me if you know what these pictures represent.
Old villages, very old.
Before the nakba.
So do you think these villages are in the West Bank or are from 1948 land?
Nakba! From the 1948 lands, from Israel.
Why do you think they are in 1948 lands?
Because buildings are so attached to each other…
This are old buildings.
The way people are living and working…In Artas they were using the same technique of washing.
Each house used to have two small rooms attached to it and this kind of building architecture is also here.
But here houses did not use to be so attached.
In the first period they came to live here there were only two units with two rooms each, and that was it, less density than in this pictures.
In Nablus there is also.
In Artas they have something like that, same architecture style.
Almost in every village I have visited there is something in this same architectural style.

Have you seen this in Wadi Rahhal?

Yes.

But some people demolished their houses and then built on them, so we used to have but now we haven't.

I live in a house like this!

What do you think about these houses?

They are more beautiful than new houses.

Why?

Yes! They are more modern. They are environmentally friendly as they are cool in the summer and warm in the winter.

The design is very beautiful.

Do you know that there was no running water and no electricity in these houses?

But the social life was very rich and the house was more environmentally friendly.

We feel nostalgic.

We really like these pictures.

Do you remember if you ever lived in one of these houses? I visited Nour's grandfather house here in Wadi Rahhal for example…

Is it good for you who live in an old house to live there?

Yes it is very good, and we rehabilitated it and we have water and electricity.

Are you planning to move to a modern house? No no, I like to live in the old house, and as it has been rehabilitated, it is not exactly as the old ones.

From which year do you think these pictures are?

Before nakba, before 1948.

Maybe not all of them are so old.

We have to look at the clothes of the people.

There are a lot of people in one picture, it seems maybe a wedding party, there was an event there.

(they ask which places are in the pictures, but the researcher only knows they are around Bethlehem)

Yes the pictures are before nakba, that is true, they are from the beginning of 1900.

(*Ustaz Moussa arrives, an old man who used to he the principal of the local school, very respected here, and he warns the ladies to participate seriously and to answer only if they have correct info as this is an academic research)*

So about these pictures, can you tell me what is happening here?

They are washing clothes!

Now you have washing machines?

Yes yes!

Now we have washing machines.

In the past they used to do like it.

Washing was a kind of sport at that time, to make muscles!

Now we don't practice sports, because we wash with the machine. We are weaker. Women were stronger in those times.

And we are all fat! Because we are lazy…

We have to lose weight!

Do you have an idea about how life was in those times?

Simple, hard.

Beautiful!

Tiring.

Simple!

It was more beautiful than today because social life was richer, people we always meeting and gathering, and they care about each other, more than these days.

But did you live these experiences or were you told about them?

We don't remember everything, but our families told us.

Our parents have seen these things.

My mother in law told me, she was harvesting and selling her harvest (like tomatoes…) while she was pregnant! One morning, she gave birth, put the baby in the bed, and went to the fields, and she came back in the evening and the baby was still there.

Now this would not happen: there is a hospital, more schools, more awareness about health, we are less farming than before.

They were planting and farming the land all together, men and women, now only men go to work.

Some of us witnessed this lifestyle, not all of us.

I used to live in Artas, and to take my water from the spring, and even now there are still people who collect the water by hands from the spring, the use it for washing clothes, for washing dishes, for having water …and as they have water they do more farming. Not here because we don't have springs here.

So what you are saying is that for women in the past life was harder and full of things to do, but you prefer the idea to have more things to do…?

No no, it is so much easier nowadays with the electricity. In the past they had to use candlelight, there was no tv, no education, no hospitalization

And who is used to this kind of modern life, it would be difficult to go back to that life.

But the social life was richer?

Yes yes!
We all agree with that.
They used not to have internet and tv , any kind of media, so they had no other choice but to sit and gather and have coffee and tea and talk to each other.
That is why they used to have a social life.
But today everyone is on his laptop.
But for example Nour you remember from when you were a child and you were coming here, do you remember if there was still this time spent together with the whole village?
I am not that old!
So it was in your grandparents' time?
When I was a child there was no internet, only TV.
22 years ago they used to have only one TV, two or three channels, and everyone sitting around that TV.
But the village was different 20 years ago?
Yes yes
Very few homes
There was 600/700 people, now we are 1200. It has expanded. I got married in 1992, that is the time I remember.

13.40/14.10: discussion on the pictures of Wadi Rahhal today

Now I will show you new pictures. Can you tell me what you see?
This is Wadi Rahhal! *(lot of excitement)*
This is Sawsan's house! I can see her bedcover hanging outside as usual!
Here's the mosque.
(they recognize houses and list the owners)
Most of these houses were not there when I got married in 1992.
Many houses are new. They started to expand, to build houses outside the core of the village.
Here's Efrat.
So you recognize the place, it is Wadi Rahhal today, does it look similar to the places in the other pictures?
They are not similar.
There are more houses, roads, houses are bigger, new buildings.
The stones of buildings were bigger in the past.
This picture of Efrat is more beautiful, they don't have water tanks, all this chaos on the

rooftop. They have multi-storey buildings.

Did you all see this picture?

Yes it is Efrat.

There is people in the old times pictures, there is no people here! (*speaking of the picture of Wadi Rahhal).*

Yes, is it often like that?

Only late afternoon it is almost empty, in the morning there are more people.

When did you take this picture?

Monday afternoon.

So it was lunch time! Everyone was inside home.

And what about this? (Efrat)

This are our enemies.

They take our land, kill our boys, so they are our enemies.

Do you remember when this was not here?

Yes yes

The way to Wadi Rahhal was from there. It took 15 minutes to go to Bethlehem, now it takes nearly one hour.

They took the most beautiful land.

When someone has a heart attack or a medical emergency they die in the street as there is no way.

There used to be a doctor but now there is no more.

We didn't renew the contract for him.

It takes such a long time to wait for the taxi or the public transportation, and then the way is so long. So it is not only the length of the road. Sometimes the wait for the service is so long that people give up and don't go.

Recently I have been waiting in the service for three hours in order to have people to fill it, so we almost didn't go.

We used to have our water supply, but then the Israelis took control of it and now they leave us very often without water. Now we have been for 15 days without water.

Is that why you have tanks?

Yes!

And the settlement is beautiful as they have no tanks. Do you think it is because they have water?

Yes of course, it is more beautiful without the tanks on the roof.

If we didn't have water tanks on the roof we would not survive. As we are left without water for such a long time. So when there is water we fill the tanks and then we can

survive for around 3 days.
We also used to have wells in the houses, not all of us, some people.
But now not only we have to depend on tanks for water supply, but sometimes we have to buy water to fill the tanks from private companies.
Do you remember what was there where the settlement is now?
Nothing, only fields.
We used to plant and farm this land before the settlement came.
Trees: almonds, grapes, olives…
And there was the road to Bethlehem.
I was told it was a nice place where families could go to have a picninc.
Yes yes
We used to have barbeques there.
There are some woods up there, and trees, so we used to go there to have barbeques and enjoy the place.
People used to have some properties there and each family used to go there to take care of the land and to enjoy the place. They had barbeques and stayed for the weekend.
We made like picnics, we took the meals and went there.
We also had sheep and goats there.
Now there is not another place where we can go.
There is one other space, there are some woods there, but we are afraid of settlers there.
It is area C.
My father in law has a house there, but they didn't give him the permission to build, so they demolish it lately.
It is called al nahleb area.
And last week they shot a man there! They shot him in his leg. They called him and he didn't answer, he tried to go back to the village, and they shot him they were settlers, in their car. So the settlers now control the line.
So today we use the yard in front of our door, at home, to have barbeques and to enjoy our time.
So today you have to stay home? If you want to do a picnic?
Yes we are afraid.
They are also controlling the road, controlling the movement and sized large portions of land from our property.
I used to have a fruit trees field, but they confiscated it.
Even when some internationals came to demonstrate against the seizing of land the settlers took the fruits and the trees from our land.

I have another land besides Efrat so I completely lost it, in the lower part of Efrat.
We have to have picnics almost inside the house!
And we also don't have permission to expand outside the village.
Is the village in area C or B?
C! C!
No no it is B (*Nour*), part of it is B and part of it is C.
Settlers they put some tents on our land, that is in area C, so now I am afraid to go to my father in law house as the settlers are so close. And the settlers are constantly there, 24 hours a day. They put these tents this year.
Some people they work with an ngo who supports people who want to claim their land, and to try to expand area B on more land so that they can build.
If you look at this picture (old houses) and this (today Wadi Rahhal). Do you think Wadi Rahhal was looking like this in the past?
Yes for sure.
There are still some houses like these.
But not as much as there used to be.
What are your feelings when you see these pictures? When you see the past and present, do you think of the future?
I am afraid to go there.
(*now the discussion becomes political and the researcher tries to move it back to the subject)*
but If you look at the houses, what do you think?
We are expecting to have more historical buildings.
Like those?
There is no more land and we don't have enough money to build like these houses.
But do you think it is more expensive to build like this?
We can't find anywhere to build, for our children…there will be less land in the future!
People they built small shelter, they had more money to build more buildings, they had more land, but we cannot!
But if you could change the houses in Wadi Rahhal, if you had the money, would you make them like these?
We will build something like that.
No I don't like.
I like my house more than the old ones.
I prefer in this picture of the settlement that the houses have more gardens, more than in here in the village, but we don't have enough land here!

So the problem is that there is not enough land to build as you want?

Yes!

The Israelis have taken all our land.

But I have seen on the other side of the village there is land…

That was my personal point of view, that I think they have more land and more back gardens.

Others think they don't have a lot of land, they are compact buildings, because don't have more confiscated land so they don't really have lot of space between the buildings, they built very densely.

It is much better if we are a bit more apart and the density is not so high so that would avoid problems between families.

(*the participants keep discussing about what could be the best house and finally they reach an agreement)*

so what did you agree on? What is the best house?

Detached houses. That each family had his own house with a garden.

But we don't have land! We don't have enough land nowadays, so we have to build very close to each other.

The good house has got a nice view and a garden.

And also a fountain!

This togetherness of things, water and view, helps to release the soul and to relax and to think.

So do you think that you would be more relaxed in a house like that?

Yes yes!

We could avoid a lot of problems coming from the neighbours.

You have your garden, your personal space and you can relax there.

In my house I have only one main window, we always stay inside the home and there is no way to sit privately outside.

So do you all have problems with neighbours?

Yes!

Maybe if we have very close neighbours, we can watch, we can hear if they discuss, everything. You feel like you are sharing their life's, their house.

Do you think in the settlement it is the same?

No! it is not the same

they all have their own gardens…

but there are no gardens in the picture.

on the other side they have gardens!

First of all the settlers they have to thank god they found a place to host them! It is very good for them that they found a good place to host them! Second, in terms of religion, our religion asks women to cover themselves when they go out, they can't be the same as they are in the house. So it is difficult for us to be outside in public. But for the settlers it is not the same, they can stay outside, they have more freedom, and so they have more public gardens and parks. And that is the thing I would like to have in our village, parks. But most of the land here is private so it is not easy to buy it to make public gardens.

We only have one playground, the one near the school. The only where we can go. And now it is not easy because Israelis are passing by, on the road, and so it is more dangerous than before.

Israelis have money, they can travel! The have more accessibility to the outside world, and to go and enjoy places outside Palestine. We don't have money and they don't give us permission to go anywhere, not even Jerusalem!

So where would you go if you could?

To Paris (t*he student)*. I like France. I guess it is the land of fashion. Even if I study English I want to go to Paris.

(some laughing about the fact that the researcher comes from Milan and where then is the land of fashion?)

I would like to go to Mecca, to do the small pilgrimage (umrah).

Palestine is very beautiful, the most beautiful land, but we are restricted, we cannot move. They have confiscated the most beautiful lands, the 1948 lands are the most beautiful, but we can not go anywhere.

Why are 1948 lands the most beautiful?

Because we see them from TV that these areas are more beautiful than these. And also because our grandparents talk about them. And also there is the sea there, as in Jaffa, Aqqa, but we cannot go there.

They took the most beautiful and they gave us the leftovers.

Well, they took there, but your village was here already.

In 50 years they will have taken it!

It is not about specific places, but it is in general that they took the best places.

Even here, Efrat is now on the highest area, the best one.

Efrat will be the next Tel Aviv, they will expand it so much…

Would you like that?

No no!

What do you think about Tel Aviv?

I visited Tel Aviv (the *student*).

Most of us haven't, only one or two of us.

They have green areas, and big buildings.

(*the student*) although it is part of Palestine, it looks like another country, like the Western world, I felt like I was in another country.

Did you go to Tel Aviv or Jaffa?

Tel Aviv.

It has all the modernity, tunnels, highways, bridges. Here we don't have bridges.

It is more developed. here it is different. The buildings here are more beautiful. It is a more civilized area, nothing messy, it is cleaner.

Is it not clean here? Whose fault is that?

Because we are poor.

In terms of cleanliness, they are different there, they are more organized and have more rules.

(some ladies need to leave, and ask when we are going to finish, we agree on 15 minutes and they stay)

(Ustaz Moussa comes back and asks when I intend to interview men and starts a long discussion. He explains that the focus group with men is better to be done on Friday as they all work during the week, but then we agree on a Saturday in the evening)

ok let's finish this. Ladies, when we talk about Palestinian architecture, do you think at Wadi Rahhal as it looks today or to old pictures? (showing the pictures)

this is the Palestinian house!

that is!

That is the Palestinian house! *(all pointing at the picture with old houses)*

For me it is that kind of house *(the actual Wadi Rahhal)* but with some traditional details.

Most of them: The settlement style cannot represent the Palestinian house, but the old pictures represent the traditional house. They new houses are typical Palestinian today (the modern vernacular) the most Palestinian architecture nowadays.

So what does this Palestinian style consist of?

All together: A house with three, four rooms, a small garden, more detached houses than condensed houses, a place for chickens, pets, a stable, an oven (tabun), many big windows, covered outside with stones, water-tanks on the roof, plants outside the door, not very clean and tide around, dogs, cats, clothes hanged outside to dry, like Sawsan's bed cover, always outside in the sun! and recycled objects. We don't throw anything, we recycled everything, we re-use. That is why you find all this rubbish outside the house,

it is not rubbish, we keep things and re-use them.

Not always the houses maybe you enter a very modern villa, but then inside you find it is traditional and more vernacular.

The traditional elements are the tabun (oven), the coffee grinder, the stove, the tools for agriculture.

Do you all have a tabun?

Not all of us.

And what about the building?

Some details, like the arcs, windows, openings like arches, and also inside the house there are details like those to look like a traditional building, now it is kind of fashion. And the house is made of stone. Now most of the buildings are stone. But it is not the same stone as in the past.

You don't like the old stones anymore? (showing the picture)

The new stone is more refined, the stone cutting is sharper. We have stone factories here in Wadi Rahhal. So today the structure is not in stone anymore, but the façade is covered with stones, more refined than in the past.

The old stones are very nice and beautiful but the links between the stones were not very good so the water was coming in the house and create many problems. And also the old stones were very heavy and so they needed many workers and it was not easy to build a house.

But the old houses were more environmentally friendly and not in all the houses water was coming inside.

And what about the new houses?

We have even more penetration of water!

Water always finds its way in!

Appendix H.


Tel Rumeida guided tour

25th February 2015
(all photos by the researcher)




So this street is used everyday? Where does it go, to Shuhadah street?
It goes to Shuhadah street and to the centre of Hebron, here it is allowed to us Palestinians to go but not to drive, then we will go to Shuhadah street where it is allowed not to drive and not to walk.







So these are Palestinian houses?
Yes, and this is the Jewish cemetery and if you look there, that building is the Hebron hospital (the big yellow one) and if we need in emergency an ambulance, they will not come from here, they will go all around the city, they will go to Kyriat Arba, enter the gate, and then coordinate with the military, with the red cross, and then they can come through Shuhadah Street. Many times, the soldiers stop the ambulance in the middle of the street, they search the ambulance, and in one case a person died as the ambulance

was stopped at the check point 23 minutes. That is the time we filmed, but it is possible the ambulance stayed there more, before we were called by the residents, so maybe even 30 minutes.

So this is the cemetery?

The cemetery for the Israelis. All these houses are Palestinian houses.

And this is considered still Tel Rumeida?

Yes. Usually here Palestinians are not allowed to rehabilitate their houses. So sometimes they work in the night. If they want to do anything they have to work as thieves, during the night. If not the Israeli military will stop them. The Israeli policies are that they want to deport Palestinians from their houses.




My cousin used to work here, as a carpenter. But already he closed his store, after they gave him military order that it is a military zone and it is not allowed for the Palestinian to open their shops.



Here it is the international solidarity movement house, this morning soldiers came and wanted to invade their house. They refused to open the door.





This is my grandfather house. This is my uncle's, but this one is my grandfather, I was born here, then after my grandfather died, it became my uncle's. In 2000 the military came and they demolished the toilet and the kitchen that was outside. They demolished a part of the house and they closed all the doors with metal bars. Now my brother lives here, these are all houses of my family.



Here you see election posters, this is Baruch Meizel, he is a settler who lives here, just up the road. Here is our metal recycle factory.



That house we call it the cage house, it is surrounded by fence as the settlers are attacking it. The other building is the settlement. And our centre is on the other side (*he means the Youth Against Settlements house*).



You can see here this is my uncle house he used to have a supermarket here. They closed it. And he put these fences to protect his store. And he still lives here, above the supermarket. This is all for my family. My father is the youngest of 7 brothers and sisters, and everyone has his building. That one is my uncle's.

This house is my uncle's. This one is for my uncle and his cousins, this one as well, this is for me and my brothers, but now my brother lives in it. This building is for my uncle. This is the factory (small building there).

Do you know when your family started to live here? With your grandfather?
My grandfather built this house in 1937.

It is a beautiful house.
Thank you but you know now we cannot use it. See the stone here it says 1936. I lived in this house 3 years, and then I went to live in my father's. My father and his brother started to build this house.

These cars, all these cars, even the buses, are settlers buses and cars, as the Palestinians cannot drive cars here. Before 2000 we entered with our cars, then they closed the area, they put blocks up and the closed the entire street at the entrance of Shuhadha street. They closed Shuhadah street in 1994. After the massacre in the mosque by Baruch Goldstein. Before, to go to the centre it took to us 2 minutes from here, but now we are not allowed to drive.

So this is still Tel Rumeida?

Yes this is still Tel Rumeida area, all the houses are Palestinian, only the caravans there are settlement, they even built caravans on the street. Here they put a wall on the side of the street.





Why? What is on the other side?

Nothing. They want to close the area. Then the owner said how can I enter to my house, so they stopped it and made it in a way that it can stay open.



Here you can see they put military watch tower on the roof and then it became a military zone area and the people cannot do anything. As YAS we came and put the fence, and rehabilitate the house. Usually the settlers enter from here, go on the roof of the house, and throw stones from here to the house. Many times we put a fence here and the settlers come and destroy it.



They want to deport all the Palestinian families. Like this house, this shop, is empty. Like this house. These two houses, the two families are still in the house. This is house is very old, is for shaheen family. We can rehabilitate it for the people who live in it, but it is very small. Also this building we should rehabilitate, but it is very big. In the past maybe 8 families lived in it, but now only one.

You see, they talk a lot about security, but look this girl is a settler, and she walks alone here, usually it is them who attack the Palestinians, they are very aggressive.

This is our neighbour, he is a doctor, his house used to be a hospital, to give birth, then after they closed the street and nobody can enter and he had to close his hospital.

(we stop to talk with the doctor)

there are 300 families who live here. They water pipes here are very old and needs repairing. Some pipes are broken and the water cannot arrive to a few houses. They have been 3 months without water, the municipality sent a team to fix it, they need to break the road to fix the pipe, and they are not allowed to do it. They are now waiting for permission. But to deport the Palestinians they don't need permission! I know of one time they waited 4 months to have permission to fix the water pipes. You know the cage house, they waited 5 years to have the permission to have materials for repairing brought to their house. But if you want to leave and you need a truck to come and get your things maybe in the same day or in the second day after you ask for the permit you get it! As they want you to leave.

Maybe I can show you more old houses in another road next to here.

I was here one year ago and I also work with the HRC and one of their engineers took me around the area…

That means you know!

oh no not much.



So look here. They want to change the name of the streets.

What does it mean?

I don't know, they put names of the street and we don't even know what it means.

It says that in 1929 67 Jews were massacred by Arabs in Hebron.

There were clashes here, we don't say that nothing happened. Something happened. And also you know the Jews arrived in Hebron from Spain during the civil war in Spain. Around 500 years ago. And they lived in Palestine, they were Palestinians. Zhen the Zionist movement after Balfour promised … Oh hello (*to a passers by*), he lives in the gate house. Now to arrive to his house you have to pass from 3 check points. And look here at the check point the detained this man. *(he goes to see what happened)*



This family who live on Shuhadah Street they have another door on the other side. As the military closed the door on Shuhahdah and even put the garbage container in front of it. And they opened another door on the other side.

So Tel Rumeida finishes here?

Yes Tel Rumeida ends here. Here we are in Shuhadah Street.

So you can see very beautiful houses.

So these are the houses of the shop owners?

Some are houses, some shop owners lived on top of the house. Some of these shop owners had a shop here for hundreds of years. I remember when they closed them, at that time I was 21.

Here for example lives and old woman, who sleeps in this house, but every day goes to her son's to spend the day and eat. But now she is prevented from doing it by the soldiers.

And also you know what they did? When the shops were closed the settlers entered from the back, the broke the wall and we didn't know about it as the doors were welded. They also took the electricity. And one day there was a fire inside a shop. So the owners and the fire brigade came and forced the doors open and they found they made holes in all these shops. They opened one and then move to the others.

But to steal what was inside?

They stole what was inside!

He lives here *(a passer by)*

I think I was in this house once…does he have a brother?

His brother is in Germany now, for our campaign. He invites us to enter, do you want to go?

As you want…

It is up to you.

Ok then thank him but maybe another time.

Ok.

So how did it happen? They were informed, they received a military order telling them you have some days to close your shop or it happened in one day?

What happened is that the massacre on Friday early 25 February, in that day, after the massacre, they put curfew, people can't open the shops can't go to work. So they pushed the Palestinians to stay in their houses. It lasted 40 days.

But all the city or only here?

All the city, in that time there was no h1 and h2.

After the curfew we came and found that all the shops were welded.

So they didn't have time to take all their goods.

No nothing.



Here there were shops also, they demolished in 1980. Then 2 years ago they built the wall and put flowers. The settlers. Then 3 weeks ago their president came to visit and they put this plastic grass and they put a tent here and they celebrate. Then they left, they took the tent and they use it as a park or something. It belongs to Palestinians but they cannot enter here.

(we climb up on the stairs towards Cordoba school and the YAS centre).



Same story here, they put a watch tower, then they didn't need anymore but they left it. And we can't touch it or rehabilitate the building under it as there is a military watch tower.

For us, to arrive to the city centre used to take 1 minute, now it can take around 15 minutes, if we walk without stopping.

3 weeks ago me and Ahmad from Yas we found that these olive trees were on fire. Then we started to bring the water but it was very hard to extinguish the fire as the fire brigades can't arrive here and the life in the olive trees is here, outside, not inside the tree. Then it gives oil so it means there is oil in the wood. When they burned it the holes in the tree provided oxygen to the fire and it became like a oven, so we put soil inside the holes and with water we managed to stop the fire.

Also this tree, we came a little bit late. So we didn't manage to save it. Also they put

lines white and blue, another way to change the identity of the area.

Did you put the green ones?

No the military did.

(we keep walking towards the YAS centre)


in the past, we used this street, this car belongs to the owner of the house, before they closed the road to the Palestinians.


this other house is occupied by settlers, and 3 years ago the Israeli court said that they should move out in 2012 but 3 years after the decision the settlers are still inside the house and the military occupied the land. And it is a Palestinian house.

Appendix I.

Samples of mental maps produced during the group discussions.




fatoom → 25 years old
Battir
- tak a Taxi to go to Battir
when you arrive you will see
a sign its
Battir
Hossan
mousqe
whits House
Trees
Alzoqeer
Super market
Here you will
my House
when
you arrive
to my House
then we can
go walking to
(Pools Ain)
(ABu Alharith)
its a Beautiful
places


Battir Village
8 KM's South of Bethlehem
Nice sites - green lands -
Mustafa
67 years
- Beautiful village
Bethlehem
Mustafa house
Main Road
Jerusalem
Dome of the Rock
North
8 KM's
Water spring
Mosque
Terraces full of vegetables & Olive trees
Teraces
full of vegetables
Rail
Train from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv
Valley
Boys
School


Check Point
Mesquite
Mesquite
Mesquite


خط التماس
محوم
محوم
مكعبات اسمنتيه
العياده
مقبره اليهود
مقبره المسلمين
نقطة جيش
مكعبات اسمنتيه