

Reducing Information Asymmetry with ICT: A critical review of loan price and quantity effects in Africa

Abstract

Purpose- This study investigates loan price and quantity effects of information sharing offices with ICT, in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period 2001-2011.

Design/methodology/approach- The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries for the period 2001-2011. Misspecification errors associated with endogenous variables and unobserved heterogeneity in financial access are addressed with Generalised Method of Moments and Instrumental Quantile Regressions.

Findings- Our findings uncover several major themes. *First*, ICT when integrated with the role of public credit registries significantly lowered the price of loans and raised the quantity of loans. *Second*, while the net effects from the interaction of ICT with private credit bureaus do not improve financial access, the corresponding marginal effects show that ICT could complement the characteristics of private credit bureaus to reduce loan prices and increase loan quantity, but only when certain thresholds of ICT are attained. We compute and discuss the policy implications of these ICT thresholds for banks with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access.

Originality/value-This is one of the few studies to assess how the growing ICT can be leveraged in order to reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry with the ultimate aim of improving financial access in a continent where lack of access to finance is a critical policy syndrome.

JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55

Keywords: Financial access; Information asymmetry; ICT

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1. Introduction

There have been very few papers that study information sharing for financial access. Most specifically, we are interested in studying the gains that can be made from information sharing in terms of enhanced access to financial services in the context of the African banking sector, where investments are increasingly needed in order for the continent to develop. When compared to the rest of the world, the African continent has more room for information and communication technology (henceforth ICT) penetration. Moreover, there are growing concerns that there is excess liquidity in African banking institutions, due primarily to the growing problems of information asymmetry in the sector. A substantial bulk of the current

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3 literature on African business emphasises the need for more domestic private investment
4 because, for the most part, the structural adjustment programmes initiated over the past
5 decades have failed to generate the much needed external finance (Tuomi, 2011; Rolfe &
6 Woodward, 2004; Darley, 2012; Bartels *et al.*, 2009).
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9 Additionally, as documented by Penard *et al.* (2012), there is ample room for
10 improving the penetration of ICT in Africa because ICT growth is stagnating in the high-end
11 economies of North America, Europe and Asia. For instance, as of 2010, whereas developed
12 countries were experiencing saturation points in mobile phone and internet penetrations of 41
13 percent, the corresponding diffusion rate in Africa was 9.6 percent. Therefore, we may infer
14 that there is considerable potential for leveraging ICT for economic development outcomes
15 in the African continent.
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20 The concerns of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006;
21 Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014, p.70) are traceable to information asymmetry between lenders
22 and borrowers. In this light, policies conducive to the establishment of information sharing
23 offices have been founded on the need to address the surplus liquidity issues as well as a
24 plethora of factors that are endogenous to increasing information asymmetry, namely:
25 physical access, affordability and eligibility to lending from banks (Allen *et al.*, 2011; Batuo
26 & Kupukile, 2010).
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32 Studies on information sharing offices have for the most part been positioned on
33 developed countries. Most specifically, a substantial number of existing papers focused on
34 countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Latin
35 America and Asia. This is ironic because these high-income nations have fewer financial
36 access problems compared with less developed countries (Asongu *et al.*, 2016a). To put
37 things in perspective, no African country was included in the study by Galindo and Miller
38 (2001). Love and Mylenko (2003) considered only four African countries. This was then
39 followed by Barth *et al.* (2009) who covered nine African countries.
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45 The study by Triki and Gajigo (2014), is closest to the positioning of our present
46 inquiry. They used Probit models to evaluate the effects of public and private credit bureaus
47 on access to finance by enterprises in 42 African countries for the 2006 to 2009 period. Our
48 study is distinct from Triki and Gajigo (2014) in three main ways. *First*, we make use of a
49 larger and more comprehensive dataset of countries for a longer time period 2001-2011.
50 *Second*, in terms of methodology, we use a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in order
51 to address concerns of endogeneity by controlling for time invariant omitted variables and
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3 heterogeneity in access to finance. Indeed, Triki and Gajigo (2014) acknowledged the failure
4 to account for such endogenous variable errors as a caveat of their inquiry. Additionally, we
5 investigate the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of access to finance using
6 Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions (IVQR). Such allows us to understand the role of
7 information sharing credit registries in facilitating access to finance in banks with low,
8 intermediate and high levels of intermediation. The policy relevance of this Quantile
9 Regression is that it highlights the deficiency of traditional one-size fits all policies designed
10 to improve financial access across countries through the functions of information sharing
11 offices. Such blanket arrangements may not be effective *unless* they are contingent on
12 existing levels of financial access and tailored to suit the unique characteristics of institutions
13 with different levels of financial intermediation.

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20 *Third*, we integrate ICT-related policy variables into the modelling exercise in order to
21 examine how internet and mobile phone penetrations complement the role of information
22 sharing offices in lessening information asymmetry. Such should enhance financial access, in
23 terms of increased quantity of loans and reduced price of loans¹.

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27 Overall, assessing the impact on loan price and quantity of policies to reduce
28 information asymmetry with ICT is of particular interest to governments in emerging and
29 developing economies. This is because the findings would inform policy makers on which
30 technology platforms could be employed to boost access to financial services. Such should
31 enable poor households and small businesses to increase consumption, investment and
32 productivity which would ultimately culminate in higher employment and economic well-
33 being. Another study closest to this paper is Asongu (2017) which directly investigated the
34 relationship between information asymmetry and financial access, excluding ICT as a policy
35 variable. In the current inquiry, we recognise the need to include those policy instruments
36 which public and private registries could use to efficiently enhance the flow of information
37 between banks and their customers. Therefore, within this policy framework, we employ ICT
38 in terms of mobile phone and internet penetration rates. Theoretically speaking, these are the
39 mechanisms by which the functioning of information sharing offices can be directly
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51 ¹ Throughout the study, the term financial access is used interchangeably with ‘loan quantity’ and/or ‘loan price’.
52 Sections 2.2 and 2.3 link financial access to loan price and quantity while discussing how the role of information
53 sharing offices are related to loan price and quantity. In these sections, we further substantiate the positioning of
54 the current study by justifying how the banking industry collect and shares information with credit registries
55 through the use of technological platforms like mobile phone and internet in order to improve or make
56 adjustment to loan prices and quantity of loans.

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3 supervised by governments. This concept is consistent with recent literature on the relevance
4 on ICT as a policy tool in promoting positive macroeconomic outcomes (Asongu *et al.*, 2017).
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6 Our results broadly show that the integration of ICT with the role of public credit
7 registries for collecting and sharing information on credit transactions significantly decrease
8 the price of loans and increase the quantity of loans extended by banks. By contrast, the net
9 effects from the interaction of ICT with the functions of private credit bureaus do not lead to a
10 marked improvement in access to financial intermediation. Such substantiates our decision to
11 clearly account for the distinction in the main goals and regulatory structures of public credit
12 registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs) in our empirical modelling. Nevertheless,
13 the corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement the functions of private
14 credit bureaus to lower loan prices and raise loan quantity, but only after certain thresholds of
15 ICT penetration rates are attained. We compute and discuss the feasibility of these ICT
16 thresholds which are required to boost the efficiency of these technology platforms.
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24 The findings contribute both to the scholarly and policy literature in two key ways.
25 *First*, by employing the ICT moderating proxies, our study complements a recent strand
26 of African development literature which has exclusively articulated the relevance of
27 information sharing offices in reducing information asymmetry, leading to better access to
28 finance. Examples of these papers include: Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu (2017) which
29 were discussed in the prior paragraphs; Kusi *et al.* (2017) and Kusi and OpokuMensah
30 (2018) confirmed that information sharing reduces bank credit risk and the cost of funding;
31 Muaza and Alagidede (2017) concluded that, the rewards of financial access from collecting
32 and the sharing of information on loan transactions is less apparent in French civil law
33 countries, compared with their English common law counterparts².
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40 *Second*, on the policy front, the study employs policy ICT variables that can be
41 leveraged to modulate the effect of the availability and design of information sharing offices
42 on households' and firms' access to finance. To this end, by providing thresholds at which
43 ICT can effectively complement the activities of information sharing offices to boost financial
44 access, the study provides specific critical cut-off points which policymakers should target
45 where the management of ICT diffusion rate is concerned. The confirmation of positive ICT
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52 ² Moreover, a recent bulk of African financial development literature has failed to recognise the relevance of
53 information sharing offices in financial access (Fowowe, 2014; Daniel, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017;
54 Chikalipah, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Bocher *et al.*, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017;
55 Ofori-Sasu *et al.*, 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017; Boadi *et al.*, 2017).
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3 thresholds is consistent with a recent strand of economic development literature which
4 characterizes the effectiveness of the inclusion of moderating policy variables in empirical
5 modelling in the following terms: “no positive thresholds, no policy” (Asongu et al., 2018a,
6 p.1).
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9 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the stylized facts,
10 background and theoretical underpinnings. Section 3 describes the data and methodology.
11 Section 4 discusses the empirical results with related policy implications. Section 5 concludes
12 and provides future research directions.
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16 17 18 **2. Stylized facts, background and theoretical underpinnings**

19 20 **2.1 Stylized facts and background**

21 Less than 20 percent of African households have access to formal financial services
22 (IFAD, 2011). The stylized facts maintain that the main factors limiting formal financial
23 access include: poor transport facilities, low population densities and limited communication
24 infrastructure. According to the narrative, even in regions with comparatively higher rates of
25 financial intermediation, some households and small corporations may still be faced with
26 credit constraints allied with strict documentation and considerable collaterals. Moreover, in
27 cases where the underlying lending conditions are fulfilled, financial access could still be
28 limited by high costs (e.g. transaction fees) and substantial minimum saving requirements.
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31 Credit reference offices are institutions that are designed to collect and share
32 information on the financial records of borrowers (both individual and commercial) from
33 many sources. These may include public bodies such as courts, government departments,
34 utilities, retailers, banks and credit card providers (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017a). Once the
35 data is collected, it is cross-checked for accuracy and then consolidated into a comprehensive
36 report for use by lenders to better understand the creditworthiness of their borrowers. The
37 published data would normally encompass both positive and negative borrower credit
38 histories. Examples of positive information include reports on the size of loans and repayment
39 profiles of debtors while negative information is overwhelmingly dominated by default data
40 and court judgements.
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50 According to Mylenko (2008), prior to the year 2008, information sharing offices were
51 solidly established for the most part in Asia, Latin America, European and North American
52 countries. However, the global financial crisis and growing ICT, prompted the creation of
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3 credit reference agencies across Africa. Indeed, before 2008, with the exception of South
4 Africa, not many African countries had well-functioning credit reference bureaus, either
5 private or public. What is more, the majority of institutions for collecting and disseminating
6 credit information were publicly owned with a stated goal of supervising the banking sector
7 rather than satisfying a market demand for reliable borrower information. Consequently, the
8 price of loans in Africa remained high when compared with the other emerging and
9 developing regions for two main reasons. *First*, the inability of credit registries to provide
10 timely and accurate information on borrowers' credit history. *Second*, the limited use of new
11 and innovative technologies by credit bureaus to disseminate credit information on borrowers
12 and their lenders online. This latter point articulates the complementary role of ICT in
13 facilitating the goal of information sharing agencies to reduce information asymmetry and
14 consequently enhance access to finance for all economic operators.
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24 **2.2 Information sharing and financial access: theoretical and empirical evidence**

25 *2.2.1. Theoretical underpinnings*

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27 The objective of this section is twofold. *First*, it links financial access to loan price and
28 quantity. *Second*, it discusses how information sharing offices are related to loan price and
29 quantity. From a logical standpoint, a reduction in loan price signifies greater access to credit,
30 particularly for households and microenterprises which are generally financially underserved.
31 These investors are now incentivised to borrow at the cheaper rate. Similarly, an increase in
32 loan quantity reflects alleviation in the ability of banks to transform deposits into credit. Such
33 should lead to an improvement in access to financial services for economic agents. Therefore,
34 loan price and loan quantity have been used as proxies for financial access in recent literature
35 on the effects of information sharing agencies on household and/or corporate access to finance
36 (see for example, Asongu, 2017; Asongu *et al.*, 2018b).
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43 Two principal views exist in the literature on the theoretical connection between credit
44 reference agencies and access to finance (Claus & Grimes, 2003). The *first* perspective is
45 oriented towards bank liquidity provisions, whereas the *second* considers the capacity of
46 financial institutions to manage credit transactions and associated risk characteristics. Both
47 views however are founded on the premise that the main goal of financial institutions is to
48 boost intermediation by reducing the cost of transforming mobilised deposits into credit. The
49 theoretical foundations of the linkage between information sharing offices and improved
50 financial intermediation are substantiated by the imperfect market information literature. The
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3 principal role of information sharing registries in financial intermediation is to reduce the
4 costs of information on credit transactions that are caused by information asymmetry between
5 lenders and borrowers in the banking industry. By addressing this problem of asymmetric
6 information, credit bureaus aim to lessen the financial constraints and raise competition, with
7 concomitant improvement in the efficient allocation of capital.
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10 In the light of the above, the relationship between financial access and information
11 sharing offices faces two major problems: (i) adverse selection from lenders and (ii) moral
12 hazard from borrowers. On the one hand, information sharing offices reduce adverse
13 selection in banks by providing them with a comprehensive picture of the credit history of
14 borrowers. Consolidated knowledge on information from borrowers reduces incremental
15 interest rates that would have been levied by financial institutions in order to compensate for
16 the risk of adverse selection. On the other, once loans have been granted to borrowers, they
17 are liable of moral hazard — a behaviour that consists of concealing the nature and/or return
18 on the activities to which the loan is granted with the ultimate aim of avoiding and/or limiting
19 compliance with their repayment obligations. Consequently, a key role of credit bureaus is to
20 inform borrowers on the perils of defaulting on their debts including those obtained from the
21 informal sector. The informal financial sector is normally considered as a viable alternative to
22 the formal banking sector by credit registries when compiling credit histories for borrowers.
23 Information sharing offices can thus reduce a borrower's moral hazard by playing a role in the
24 design and enforcement of policies aimed at encouraging market discipline. In summary:
25 information sharing offices help (i) mitigate adverse selection ex-ante of lending and (ii)
26 reduce moral hazard, ex-post of lending.
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40 *2.2.2 Empirical literature*

41 While there is a bulk of literature on the effects of information sharing offices on
42 financial access (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Padilla & Pagano, 2000; Karapetyan & Stacescu,
43 2014a, 2014b; Kusi *et al.*, 2017; Kusi & OpokuMensah, 2018; Muaza & Alagidede, 2017;
44 Boateng *et al.*, 2018c; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018), two main strands are worthy of further
45 explanation.
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49 The first feature in the literature proposes that the free flow of information increases
50 competition in the credit market, disciplines borrowers, reduces moral hazard and mitigates
51 adverse selection. Accordingly, studies within this strand argue that the sharing of information
52 between banks enables them to make quicker and more accurate decisions on the
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3 creditworthiness of their borrowers (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, 2006; Padilla & Pagano, 1997,
4 2000; Bennardo *et al.*, 2015). Some conclusions in the literature include positions that the
5 sharing of information between banks: renders borrowers less likely to default on their debts
6 (Klein, 1992); is related to more compliance on debt obligations from borrowers (Karapetyan
7 & Stacescu, 2014a); reduces bank credit risks (Kusi et al., 2017); mitigates funding cost
8 (Kusi & Opoku Mensah, 2018) and is more beneficial for financial access in countries with
9 English common tradition in relation to their counterparts with French civil law tradition
10 (Muaza & Alagidede, 2017).
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16 The second strand of the literature articulates the negative aspects of information
17 sharing between banks. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) established that the systematic
18 sharing of information is positively linked to banking crisis whereas Jappelli and Pagano
19 (2006) propose that such information sharing has the tendency to increase risky lending
20 and/or the extension of more funds to borrowers that may not eventually comply with their
21 financial obligations towards banks. In summary, it is argued in this strand of the literature
22 that increased sharing of information by credit registries motivates banks to look for other
23 channels of improving their competitive positions. This may involve collecting strategic
24 information that is not subsequently disclosed to information sharing offices
25 (Vercammen, 1995; Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Hauswald & Marquez, 2003; Karapetyan &
26 Stacescu, 2014a, 2014b). Irrespective of positions adopted by the two contending strands, by
27 conception and definition, the mission of information sharing offices is facilitated by ICT.
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36 **2.3 ICT, information sharing and financial access**

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38 While information sharing has been shown to impact on loan price and quantity
39 provided by financial institutions (Triki & Gagigo, 2014; Asongu, 2017), the channel through
40 which ICT interacts with offices involved in the sharing of information to affect loan price
41 and quantity of loans has not been discussed in the literature. Hence, this section further
42 substantiates the positioning of the study by justifying how the banking industry collects and
43 shares information with credit registries through the use of technology platforms like mobile
44 phones and internet in order to improve and/or make adjustments to loan prices and quantity
45 of loans.
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51 ICT is a policy instrument for improving the work of information sharing offices
52 because it is logically connected with the goal of disseminating information and reducing
53 information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Therefore, in order to collect and
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3 share information with banks, credit bureaus are very likely to use ICT mechanisms.
4 Moreover, according to Hellstrom (2008), ICT enables transparency through the free-flow of
5 information by credit agencies online. For instance, Asongu *et al.* (2018c) recently reported
6 that the sharing of information by means of ICT in the banking sector reduces market power
7 for financial access because, ICT enables, *inter alia*: (i) the free flow of information and (ii)
8 credit registries to distribute information more effectively. They further argued that ICT
9 enables financial institutions to have up-to-date information, encourages the participation of
10 customers in the lending process, reduces informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks
11 and reduces the abuse of market power by large financial institutions.
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17 To summarize, the use of ICT by information sharing offices has the potential to
18 reduce information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. *Firstly*, ex-ante of lending, the
19 complementarity between ICT and information sharing offices reduces the risk of adverse
20 selection faced by banks. Such enables them to have more timely and accurate information
21 about borrowers' creditworthiness. *Secondly*, ex-post of lending, moral hazard might be
22 considerably reduced because the diffusion of information enables credit registries to educate
23 borrowers on the relevance of accountability and transparency. Such reduces the likelihood
24 that borrowers will default on their debts once credit has been obtained. It is suggested that
25 information sharing offices are most likely to use various ICT mechanisms to communicate
26 with borrowers and their lenders in an effort to reduce moral hazard. *Third*, the sharing of
27 information by means of ICT has the potential to reduce informational rents enjoyed by a few
28 large sized financial institutions within the banking sector. Such increases financial sector
29 competition and access to financial services including savings and loan extension (Asongu &
30 Nwachukwu, 2017). This is essentially because ICT reduces the power of those institutions
31 with privileged market information, decentralises information and reduces information
32 monopoly (Snow, 2009). This perspective conforms to the literature on the relevance of ICT
33 in management effectiveness (Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Pierskalla & Hollenbach,
34 2013; Grossman *et al.*, 2014; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016). It is
35 reasonable to propose that such management effectiveness naturally extends to the banking
36 industry.
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3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

We examine a panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries³, with data from the World Bank Development Indicators and Bankscope, for the period 2001-2011. The periodicity, choice of countries and number banks are constrained by data availability. For example, information on credit bureaus from the World Bank Development indicators is only available from 2001. In accordance with Coccorese and Pellicchia (2010), dependent variables for ‘*loan price*’ and ‘*loan quantity*’ are respectively the ‘*price charged on loans*’ and ‘*logarithms of loans*’. These variables are used as proxies for financial access in line with the recent financial development literature (Asongu, 2017; Asongu *et al.* 2018b). We have already explained how loan price and quantity are associated with financial access in Section 2.2.1. These dependent variables are also persistent because of a high correlation between their contemporary and lagged values. Moreover, substantial differences between minimum and maximum values of the dependent variables are clearly apparent. As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the persistence and high range of the dependent variables provides justification for the use of Generalized Method of Moments and Quantile regressions as estimation strategies.

Consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices are measured with public credit registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Internet penetration and mobile phone penetration are used to measure ICT. Market-oriented features (*GDP per capita growth, inflation and population density*), bank-related characteristics (*Deposits/Assets and Bank branches*) and binary dummy variables for the unobserved heterogeneity are used as control indicators. The dummies include the following bank attributes: ownership (foreign versus vs. domestic), size (large vs. small) and ‘*compliance with Sharia finance*’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).

In line with economic theory, we expect the following signs with regard to *bank-oriented* features. We expect the ‘*deposit to asset ratio*’ should increase both the quantity and price of loans. This is because deposits are the principal source of bank financing. A higher proportion of deposits in liquid liabilities can increase loan quantity and/or interest rate charges, since good organisation is necessary for effective mobilisation of savings and its management. Intuitively, an increase in the number of bank branches should raise the loan quantity as well as the price of loans. This last is primarily due to the higher overhead costs.

³ The list of countries we are studying is available in Appendix 5.

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3 With regards to *market-related* features, the following signs are expected.
4 Theoretically speaking, GDP per capita (which is included to account for business cycle
5 fluctuations) is expected to influence the quantity of loans positively. Conversely, the
6 anticipated sign for loan price is ambiguous because it is contingent on market dynamism and
7 expansion. For example, if GDP per capita is decreasing over time, it can affect both loan
8 price and quantity negatively as a result of falling demand. We anticipate negative signs
9 because the population on average across Africa has been growing at a faster rate than GDP,
10 leading to a declining GDP per capita for this period (Asongu, 2013a). Population density is
11 anticipated to raise both the price and quantity of loans. This is because a growing demand
12 for loans, owing to high density in population, increases loan price. Moreover, we suggest that
13 inflation is likely to decrease the quantity of loans and increase the price of loans. This is
14 essentially because investors prefer to invest in economic environments that are less
15 ambiguous (see Kelsey, & le Roux, 2017a, 2017b). Hence, given that less investment are
16 observed during periods of economic uncertainty (e.g. inflation), loan quantity is predicted to
17 fall. By contrast, the price of loans is predicted to increase with inflation because the nominal
18 interest rates levied on loans are usually adjusted for inflation.
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30 Establishing the anticipated signs for the dummy variables is difficult. For example
31 both small and big banks (for bank size heterogeneity) can be associated with positive and
32 negative effects resulting from loan dynamics, though big banks are comparatively more
33 efficient at managing and coordinating the several processes needed to improve access to
34 financial services. Furthermore, addressing the challenges that come with increasing bank
35 size is also a cause of inefficiency, owing to problems encountered with resolving the
36 compliants of a growing customer base. Similarly, the incidence of foreign versus domestic
37 banks (ownership heterogeneity) and Islamic versus non-Islamic banks (compliance with
38 Sharia finance) depends on a multitude of features, which include: market dynamism and
39 expansion as well as staffs' organisational capabilities.
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45 Appendix 1 summarizes the expected signs of the control variables and Appendix 2
46 provides the definitions and sources of variables employed in the study. Appendix 3 and
47 Appendix 4 present the summary statistics and correlation matrix in that order.
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3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Generalised methods of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions

The GMM empirical approach is adopted by this inquiry for five principal reasons. While the first-two are basic requirements for using the estimation strategy, the last-three are advantages that are associated with the choice of the empirical approach (Tchamyou, 2018; Tchamyou *et al.*, 2018).

(1) The empirical approach takes into account persistence in loan quantity and price given that the criterion or rule of thumb to ascertain persistence in the two dependent variables is met. The correlation between loan price and loan quantity and their first lags are respectively 0.845 and 0.996, which are above the 0.800 rule of thumb.

(2) The N (or 162) $>$ T (or 11) criterion needed for a GMM technique is also met given that the number of time series in each cross section is lower than the number of cross sections.

(3) Endogeneity is accounted for in all regressors by the estimation technique because instrumental variables are employed for suspected endogenous regressors. Moreover, the use of time-invariant omitted variables also helps to control for endogeneity.

(4) Biases in the difference estimator are addressed with the system estimator.

(5) Cross-country variations are incorporated into the specifications.

As shown by Bond *et al.* (2001), the system GMM estimator used by Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) has better estimation properties than the difference estimator used in Arellano and Bond (1991). This inquiry adopts an extension by Roodman (2009ab) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which uses forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. The advantages of such a modified empirical strategy were documented by Baltagi (2008) and Love and Zicchino (2006) to include a restriction on over-identification or limitation on instrument proliferation. In the specification, a *two-step* approach is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity.

The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure for loan quantity.

$$LQ_{i,t} = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 LQ_{i,t-\tau} + \sigma_2 ISO_{i,t} + \sigma_3 ICT_{i,t} + \sigma_4 Inter_{i,t} + \sum_{h=1}^5 \delta_h W_{h,i,t-\tau} + \eta_i + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

$$LQ_{i,t} - LQ_{i,t-\tau} = \sigma_1 (LQ_{i,t-\tau} - LQ_{i,t-2\tau}) + \sigma_2 (ISO_{i,t} - ISO_{i,t-\tau}) + \sigma_3 (ICT_{i,t} - ICT_{i,t-\tau}) + \sigma_4 (Inter_{i,t} - Inter_{i,t-\tau}) + \sum_{h=1}^5 \delta_h (W_{h,i,t-\tau} - W_{h,i,t-2\tau}) + (\xi_t - \xi_{t-\tau}) + \varepsilon_{i,t-\tau} \quad (2)$$

where $LQ_{i,t}$ is the loan quantity of bank i at period t ; *ISO* is an information sharing office (PCR (Private Credit Registries) or PCB (Public Credit Bureaus)); σ_0 is a constant; τ is the degree of auto-regression; W is the vector of control variables (*GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets* and *Bank Branches*), η_i is the country-specific effect, ξ_t is the time-specific constant and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ the error term. Dummy variables are not included in the GMM specifications because fixed effects are eliminated. Equations (1) and (2) are replicated when the dependent variable is loan price.

With regards to exclusion restrictions and identification, all explanatory variables are considered as potential endogenous or predetermined variables whereas only *years* are acknowledged to be strictly exogenous (this is consistent with Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Tchamyou, 2018), essentially because it is not likely for *years* to become endogenous in first difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, the procedure for treating *ivstyle* (*years*) is ‘iv (*years*, eq(diff))’ whereas the *gmmstyle* is used for suspected endogeneous variables.

With the above background, the strictly exogenous instruments or *years* influence the outcome variables exclusively through the suspected endogenous or predetermined variables. Furthermore, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of this test should not be rejected for the instruments to elucidate loan quantity and loan price exclusively via the predetermined variables. Hence, whereas in the standard instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that instruments do not elicit the outcome variable beyond the endogenous variables (see Beck *et al.*, 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Boateng *et al.*, 2018), in the GMM approach which employs forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion employed to investigate if *years* exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT. Therefore, in the findings that are reported in Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is validated if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (*year*, eq(diff)) is rejected.

3.2.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions

In order to account for existing levels of loan price and loan quantity, the current study employs the Quantile Regressions (QR) technique. This technique is consistent with the

1
2 literature on conditional determinants (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009;
3 Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b). The approach
4 consists of assessing the nexus between information sharing offices and the outcome variables
5 throughout the conditional distributions of loan price and quantity, with particular emphasis
6 on banks with low, intermediate and high levels of financial access.

7
8 The existing literature on information sharing has been oriented towards the
9 conditional mean of financial access (see Asongu *et al.*, 2016b; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). While
10 mean effects are relevant, the underlying literature is extended with an estimation approach
11 that controls for existing levels of loan price and quantity. In addition, studies that use
12 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to emphasise mean effects is based on the assumption that
13 error terms are normally distributed. However, with QR, the hypothesis of normally
14 distributed errors does not hold. In addition, the QR is robust to presence of outliers because
15 parameters are estimated at various points in the conditional distribution of the dependent
16 variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).

17
18 The concern about endogeneity is addressed by using an Instrumental Variable QR
19 (IVQR) procedure. The instrumentation procedures for an information sharing office (e.g.
20 private credit bureaus) and an ICT indicator (e.g. Internet penetration) are respectively in Eqs.
21 (3) and (4) below.

$$22 \quad PCB_{i,t} = \alpha + \delta_j(PCB_{i,t-1}) + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (3)$$

23
24 where, $PCB_{i,t}$ is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i at period t , α is a constant,
25 $PCB_{i,t-1}$, represents private credit bureaus in bank i at period $t-1$, η is the bank-specific
26 effects and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ the error term.

$$27 \quad Internet_{i,t} = \alpha + \delta_j(Internet_{i,t-1}) + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (4)$$

28
29 where, $Internet_{i,t}$ is the internet penetration rate of bank i at period t , α is a constant,
30 $Internet_{i,t-1}$, represents internet penetration rate in bank i at period $t-1$, η is the bank-
31 specific effects and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ the error term.

32
33 The procedure of instrumentation in Eq. (3) consists of regressing the information
34 sharing offices on their first lags. The corresponding fitted values are then saved and later
35 used as the independent variables of interest in Eq. (5). The specifications are
36 Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. The θ^{th} quantile
37 estimator of loan quantity and loan price is obtained by solving for the following optimization
38 problem, which is disclosed without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (5)

$$\min_{\beta \in R^k} \left[\sum_{i \in \{i: y_i \geq x_i' \beta\}} \theta |y_i - x_i' \beta| + \sum_{i \in \{i: y_i < x_i' \beta\}} (1 - \theta) |y_i - x_i' \beta| \right], \quad (5)$$

where, $\theta \in (0,1)$.

As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For example, the 10th decile or 25th quartile (with $\theta=0.10$ or 0.25 respectively) are examined by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of financial access or y_i given x_i is:

$$Q_y(\theta / x_i) = x_i' \beta_\theta, \quad (6)$$

where, unique slope parameters are modelled for each θ^{th} specific quantile.

This formulation is analogous to $E(y / x) = x_i' \beta$ in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at the mean of the conditional distribution of loan quantity and price.

For the model in Eq. (6), the dependent variable y_i is either loan quantity or loan price whereas x_i contains a constant term, *public credit registries, private credit bureaus, ICT, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks*.

4. Empirical results

4.1 Presentation of results

Table 1 and Table 2 present GMM results related to loan price and loan quantity respectively. Each table has eight specifications, consisting of four specifications pertaining respectively to public credit registries and private credit bureaus. Each of the set of four specifications has two sub-sets of specifications pertaining respectively to mobile phone and internet penetrations. Each of the ICT-related specification embodies two more sub-specifications reflecting a full sample and a partial sample.

The full sample is from 2001-2011 while the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two main reasons motivate the choice of a partial sample. It enables the study to limit concerns about over-identification or instrument proliferation because T is reduced from 11 to 7. Moreover, the data on information sharing offices in most countries is only available from the year 2005.

1
2 We employ four principal information criteria to assess the validity of the GMM
3 model with forward orthogonal deviations.⁴ Based on the information criteria, the following
4 findings can be confirmed. From the third specification in Table 1, we see that the net effect
5 from the interaction between public credit registries and mobile phones is 0.00198 ((i.e.,
10 $[-0.00003 \times 34.107] + 0.003$), when the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107,
116 the unconditional effect of public credit registries (PCRs) equals (0.003), while the
12 corresponding conditional impact of PCRs is found to be (-0.00003). Consequently, we
137 conclude that there is a negative marginal effect and a positive net effect, for the role
14 of mobile phones in facilitating the essential characteristics of public credit registries for
158 improving access to financial services where the management of loan prices are concerned.
169 In Table 2, we find that there is a positive net effect from the interaction between private
17 credit bureaus and mobile phones (of 0.0006). We find that the significant control variables
18 in Tables 1 and 2, have the expected signs as hypothesised in Section 3.1.
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48 ⁴“First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for
49 the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-
50 identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions
51 that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not
52 robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to
53 restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than
54 the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of
55 instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for
56 the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200).

Table 1: Price Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM)

	Dependent variable: Price of Loans							
	Public Credit Registries (PCR)				Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)			
	Mobile Phones		Internet		Mobile Phones		Internet	
	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample
Constant	-0.006 (0.576)	0.143 (0.149)	-0.001 (0.848)	-0.094* (0.068)	0.0008 (0.927)	0.164*** (0.000)	-0.016* (0.058)	0.021 (0.614)
Price of Loans (-1)	0.686*** (0.000)	0.803*** (0.000)	0.640*** (0.000)	0.781*** (0.000)	0.653*** (0.000)	0.838*** (0.000)	0.690*** (0.000)	0.853*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones	0.00002 (0.706)	0.0001** (0.048)	---	---	0.00003 (0.663)	-0.00008 (0.343)	---	---
Internet	---	---	0.0001 (0.373)	-0.0002 (0.283)	---	---	0.0008*** (0.000)	0.0001 (0.313)
PCR	-0.002** (0.010)	0.003*** (0.002)	-0.001** (0.022)	-0.0003 (0.503)	---	---	---	---
PCB	---	---	---	---	0.0005*** (0.000)	0.00003 (0.851)	0.0002*** (0.006)	0.00005 (0.510)
PCR × Mobile Phones	0.00001** (0.024)	-0.00003*** (0.001)	---	---	---	---	---	---
PCB × Mobile Phones	---	---	---	---	-0.000005*** (0.000)	0.0000006 (0.730)	---	---
PCR × Internet	---	---	0.00002* (0.087)	0.000002 (0.878)	---	---	---	---
PCB × Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.00001*** (0.009)	-0.00001 (0.799)
GDPpcg	0.0007** (0.032)	-0.0003 (0.478)	0.0007* (0.055)	-0.0001 (0.804)	0.0003 (0.275)	0.0001 (0.730)	-0.0001 (0.657)	-0.0003 (0.331)
Inflation	0.0006*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0008*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0005*** (0.002)	0.0004 (0.130)	0.0008*** (0.000)	0.0008*** (0.001)
Pop. density	0.00002** (0.041)	0.00001 (0.148)	0.00001 (0.100)	0.00001 (0.400)	0.00004*** (0.002)	0.00001 (0.333)	0.00004*** (0.001)	0.0000007 (0.430)
Deposit/Assets	0.038*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.004)	0.035*** (0.000)	0.050** (0.029)	0.046*** (0.000)	0.014 (0.427)	0.045*** (0.000)	0.035** (0.036)
Bank Branches	-0.00002 (0.923)	-0.0007** (0.010)	-0.0003 (0.347)	0.0001 (0.573)	-0.0007*** (0.002)	-0.0002 (0.371)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.168)
Net effect of the Mobile	nsa	0.0019	---	---	nsa	na	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	nsa	na	---	---	nsa	na
AR(1)	(0.000)	(0.088)	(0.000)	(0.296)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.221)
AR(2)	(0.811)	(0.189)	(0.803)	(0.433)	(0.850)	(0.693)	(0.847)	(0.355)
Sargan OIR	(0.001)	(0.671)	(0.238)	(0.918)	(0.000)	(0.407)	(0.000)	(0.205)
Hansen OIR	(0.006)	(0.309)	(0.072)	(0.541)	(0.003)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.069)
DHT for instruments								
(a) Instruments in levels								
H excluding group	(0.003)	(0.090)	(0.038)	(0.767)	(0.010)	(0.296)	(0.020)	(0.958)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.159)	(0.647)	(0.295)	(0.345)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.253)	(0.012)
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))								
H excluding group	(0.072)	(0.181)	(0.148)	(0.501)	(0.085)	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.038)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.008)	(0.734)	(0.110)	(0.506)	(0.002)	(0.954)	(0.325)	(0.540)
Fisher	70.20***	105.40***	71.88***	61.99***	48.89 ***	109.18***	41.94***	83.38***
Instruments	42	41	42	41	42	40	42	40
Banks	144	112	144	111	144	109	144	108
Observations	698	140	679	139	690	138	671	137

*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments' Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. nsa: not specifically applicable because the information criteria does not valid the model.

Table 2: Quantity Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM)

	Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans							
	Public Credit Registries (PCR)				Private Credit Bureaus (PCB)			
	Mobile Phones		Internet		Mobile Phones		Internet	
	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample	Full Sample	Partial Sample
Constant	0.306*** (0.000)	0.089 (0.575)	0.118** (0.042)	-0.255 (0.125)	0.264*** (0.000)	0.004 (0.954)	0.210*** (0.000)	0.150 (0.117)
Quantity of Loans (-1)	0.934*** (0.000)	1.009*** (0.000)	0.962*** (0.000)	0.995*** (0.000)	0.935*** (0.000)	0.997*** (0.000)	0.951*** (0.000)	0.994*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.0006 (0.108)	---	---	-0.002*** (0.000)	0.00004 (0.899)	---	---
Internet	---	---	-0.002** (0.026)	0.001 (0.186)	---	---	-0.003** (0.012)	0.001 (0.166)
PCR	0.004 (0.474)	-0.002 (0.782)	0.003 (0.207)	0.005* (0.054)	---	---	---	---
PCB	---	---	---	---	0.0004 (0.632)	0.001** (0.026)	-0.0003 (0.548)	0.0005 (0.213)
PCR×Mobile Phones	-0.00004 (0.481)	0.00002 (0.736)	---	---	0.000004 (0.544)	---	---	---
PCB×Mobile Phones	---	---	---	---	---	-0.00001** (0.017)	---	---
PCR×Internet	---	---	-0.0001 (0.107)	-0.0001 (0.124)	---	---	---	---
PCB×Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.00001 (0.515)	-0.00006** (0.044)
GDPpcg	0.004** (0.026)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.004** (0.022)	0.006*** (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.185)	0.042** (0.015)	0.005*** (0.000)
Inflation	0.0003 (0.708)	-0.001* (0.058)	0.001 (0.226)	0.00003 (0.970)	0.001** (0.026)	0.0006 (0.546)	0.001* (0.089)	-0.0003 (0.637)
Pop. density	-0.0002** (0.013)	0.00002 (0.826)	-0.00002 (0.678)	-0.00005 (0.468)	-0.0001** (0.016)	0.00001 (0.719)	-0.00006 (0.304)	-0.00003 (0.447)
Deposit/Assets	0.023 (0.803)	0.039 (0.713)	0.124 (0.157)	0.177** (0.042)	0.059 (0.471)	0.136 (0.178)	0.090 (0.223)	0.119 (0.102)
Bank Branches	0.005** (0.012)	-0.002 (0.251)	0.001 (0.294)	-0.005*** (0.000)	0.003* (0.073)	-0.002** (0.060)	0.001 (0.666)	-0.004*** (0.006)
Net effect of the Mobile	na	na	---	---	na	0.0006	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	na	na	---	---	na	na
AR(1)	(0.000)	(0.533)	(0.000)	(0.919)	(0.000)	(0.187)	(0.000)	(0.877)
AR(2)	(0.754)	(0.894)	(0.694)	(0.951)	(0.734)	(0.806)	(0.737)	(0.247)
Sargan OIR	(0.000)	(0.065)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.000)	(0.015)
Hansen OIR	(0.038)	(0.434)	(0.001)	(0.627)	(0.041)	(0.288)	(0.017)	(0.637)
DHT for instruments								
(a) Instruments in levels								
H excluding group	(0.611)	(0.302)	(0.742)	(0.262)	(0.286)	(0.514)	(0.433)	(0.481)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.013)	(0.523)	(0.000)	(0.793)	(0.036)	(0.220)	(0.008)	(0.630)
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))								
H excluding group	(0.038)	(0.525)	(0.005)	(0.609)	(0.023)	(0.337)	(0.018)	(0.657)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.258)	(0.233)	(0.055)	(0.489)	(0.455)	(0.238)	(0.217)	(0.412)
Fisher	761.21***	1665.19***	1553.32***	3038.86***	896.39***	3991.86***	885.73***	2475.98***
Instruments	42	39	42	41	42	37	42	39
Banks	145	115	145	113	145	112	145	110
Observations	735	145	713	143	728	144	706	142

*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments' Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.

Tables 3-6 present IVQR related findings. In particular, Tables 3-4 are related to the relationships between ICT and public credit registries while Tables 5-6 focus on the

1
2 connections between ICT and private credit bureaus. For each information sharing office, one
3 table concentrates on loan price (Table 3 and Table 5) while the other is on loan quantity
4 (Table 4 and Table 6).

5 See Tables 1-2, for the findings in terms of marginal and net effects; for the purpose of
6 the computation of net effects, mean values are based on instrumented ICT values, notably:
7 37.019 is the instrumented mean value of mobile phone penetration whereas 7.809 is the
8 instrumented mean value of internet penetration. For all tables: (i) the consistent differences
9 in estimated coefficients in OLS versus quantiles (with respect to sign, significance and
10 magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of the QR empirical strategy and (ii) 'mobile
11 phone'-related regressions are disclosed on the left-hand-side whereas internet-oriented
12 estimations are presented on the right-hand-side.

13 The following findings are observed from Table 3 on price effects of public credit
14 registries with ICT: The net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and
15 mobile phones is negative for the bottom quantiles; while the net effect from the interaction
16 between public credit registries and internet is positive from the 25th to the 75th quartiles. In
17 Table 4 on loan effects from public credit registries with ICT, the net effect from the
18 interaction between public credit registries and the mobile phone is positive in the 25th
19 quartile whereas the net effect from the interaction between public credit registries and the
20 internet is positive only in the 25th and 50th quartiles.

21 In Table 5, private credit bureaus with the internet have a positive net effect on loan
22 prices in the 75th quartile. In Table 6, private credit bureaus with the internet (mobile phone)
23 have a negative net effect on loan quantity in the 50th quartile (from the 10th decile to the 75th
24 quartile). The corresponding positive marginal effects from the interaction with mobile
25 phones is an indication that positive net effect from mobile phones can be reached if certain
26 thresholds of mobile phones are attained. Most of the significant control variables have the
27 expected signs.

Table 3: Price Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IVQR)

	Dependent variable: Price of Loans											
	Mobile Phones						Internet					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	-0.084*** (0.000)	0.071*** (0.000)	0.065*** (0.000)	0.073*** (0.000)	0.095*** (0.000)	0.098*** (0.000)	0.083*** (0.000)	0.045*** (0.001)	0.065*** (0.000)	0.084*** (0.000)	0.097*** (0.000)	0.094*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones(IV)	-0.0001* (0.091)	-0.0004*** (0.000)	-0.0001** (0.018)	-0.00004 (0.590)	-0.00008 (0.354)	-0.00006 (0.603)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Internet (IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.0007*** (0.008)	-0.0005 (0.174)	-0.0004* (0.084)	-0.0006** (0.025)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.019)
PCR (IV)	-0.002*** (0.008)	-0.004*** (0.004)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002* (0.083)	-0.001 (0.295)	-0.002 (0.293)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.009)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.000)	-0.002 (0.180)
PCR(IV) × Mobile Phones(IV)	0.00001 (0.241)	0.00002* (0.082)	0.00002*** (0.006)	0.000009 (0.475)	0.000002 (0.868)	0.000004 (0.835)	---	---	---	---	---	---
PCR(IV) × Internet(IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.00005** (0.026)	0.00002 (0.483)	0.00005** (0.016)	0.00006** (0.025)	0.00007** (0.031)	0.00003 (0.583)
GDPpcg	-0.0008** (0.046)	-0.0009 (0.105)	-0.00001 (0.975)	-0.0005 (0.247)	-0.0006 (0.233)	-0.001** (0.046)	-0.0006 (0.114)	0.0001 (0.869)	-0.00002 (0.956)	-0.0004 (0.303)	-0.001** (0.011)	-0.0009 (0.153)
Inflation	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0001 (0.837)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0005 (0.423)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Pop. density	0.00006*** (0.001)	0.00004 (0.185)	0.00006*** (0.000)	0.00008*** (0.000)	0.00006*** (0.001)	0.00006*** (0.007)	0.00007*** (0.000)	0.00007 (0.130)	0.00007*** (0.000)	0.00009*** (0.000)	0.0001*** (0.000)	0.00006*** (0.002)
Deposit/Assets	0.017** (0.019)	0.007 (0.503)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.020** (0.012)	0.017* (0.050)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.015** (0.033)	0.007 (0.569)	0.015** (0.035)	0.006 (0.407)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.001)
Bank Branches	-0.0005 (0.120)	0.001** (0.022)	-0.0007** (0.017)	-0.001*** (0.008)	-0.0009** (0.032)	-0.0001 (0.734)	-0.00005 (0.914)	0.001 (0.158)	-0.0006 (0.142)	-0.0003 (0.459)	0.0009* (0.096)	0.0003 (0.740)
Small Banks	0.008** (0.027)	0.012** (0.043)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.717)	0.002 (0.605)	0.008 (0.233)	0.007* (0.072)	0.015** (0.046)	0.008* (0.058)	0.003 (0.537)	0.003 (0.506)	0.009 (0.173)
Domestic Banks	0.001 (0.560)	-0.010** (0.026)	-0.002 (0.362)	0.007** (0.041)	0.008** (0.046)	0.001 (0.852)	0.001 (0.700)	-0.014** (0.022)	-0.001 (0.759)	0.005 (0.118)	0.004 (0.192)	0.002 (0.635)
Islamic Banks	-0.017*** (0.009)	-0.003 (0.791)	-0.016** (0.016)	-0.015* (0.093)	-0.014 (0.175)	-0.013 (0.347)	-0.012* (0.091)	0.009 (0.570)	-0.013 (0.160)	-0.012 (0.248)	0.004 (0.661)	0.001 (0.946)
Net effect of the Mobile	na	-0.0032	-0.0022	na	na	na	---	---	---	---	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.0026	na	-0.0026	-0.0025	-0.0034	na
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.216	0.116	0.150	0.158	0.149	0.136	0.222	0.093	0.151	0.169	0.173	0.142
Fisher	21.67***						22.71***					
Observations	728	728	728	728	728	728	700	700	700	700	700	700

***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.

Table 4: Quantity Effects of Public Credit Registries with ICT (IVQR)

	Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans											
	Mobile Phones						Internet					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	3.806*** (0.000)	2.762*** (0.000)	2.982*** (0.000)	3.361*** (0.000)	4.596*** (0.000)	4.943*** (0.000)	3.920*** (0.000)	2.752*** (0.000)	2.970*** (0.000)	3.495*** (0.000)	4.492*** (0.000)	5.400*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones(IV)	0.003* (0.088)	0.004** (0.012)	0.003 (0.337)	0.003 (0.288)	0.006** (0.011)	0.005*** (0.002)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Internet (IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.039*** (0.000)	0.020*** (0.0006)	0.030** (0.022)	0.063*** (0.000)	0.035*** (0.000)	0.021*** (0.001)
PCR (IV)	0.066** (0.016)	0.104*** (0.001)	0.064 (0.300)	0.080 (0.222)	-0.016 (0.719)	-0.049 (0.229)	0.075*** (0.000)	0.088*** (0.000)	0.081* (0.052)	0.101** (0.016)	0.012 (0.637)	-0.005 (0.734)
PCR(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV)	-0.0005** (0.045)	-0.0008*** (0.006)	-0.0003 (0.615)	-0.0006 (0.302)	0.00009 (0.836)	0.0004 (0.220)	---	---	---	---	---	---
PCR(IV) ×Internet(IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.002*** (0.003)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002 (0.125)	-0.002** (0.033)	-0.0001 (0.821)	0.0002 (0.606)
GDPpeg	-0.014 (0.221)	0.020** (0.048)	-0.019 (0.317)	-0.031 (0.191)	0.002 (0.856)	-0.014 (0.129)	-0.018 (0.118)	0.020** (0.032)	-0.031* (0.083)	-0.031 (0.174)	-0.008 (0.574)	-0.027 (0.027)
Inflation	-0.024*** (0.000)	-0.004 (0.329)	-0.010 (0.329)	-0.031** (0.025)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.637)	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.008 (0.160)	-0.010 (0.344)	-0.028* (0.058)	-0.022*** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.309)
Pop. density	-0.001*** (0.002)	-0.0007** (0.013)	-0.001** (0.024)	-0.0007 (0.386)	-0.001* (0.050)	-0.001** (0.018)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.0009 (0.263)	-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.0009* (0.065)
Deposit/Assets	1.867*** (0.000)	1.057*** (0.000)	2.034*** (0.000)	2.544*** (0.000)	1.306*** (0.000)	1.279*** (0.000)	1.741*** (0.000)	1.217*** (0.000)	2.063*** (0.000)	2.432*** (0.000)	1.173*** (0.000)	1.018*** (0.000)
Bank Branches	-0.063*** (0.000)	-0.043*** (0.000)	-0.055*** (0.000)	-0.072*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.052*** (0.000)	-0.100*** (0.000)	-0.056*** (0.000)	-0.075*** (0.000)	-0.140*** (0.000)	-0.095*** (0.000)	-0.078*** (0.000)
Small Banks	-0.775*** (0.000)	-1.190*** (0.000)	-1.268*** (0.000)	-0.715*** (0.001)	-0.326** (0.028)	-0.250** (0.012)	-0.820*** (0.000)	-1.010*** (0.000)	-1.171*** (0.000)	-0.872*** (0.000)	-0.457*** (0.001)	-0.418*** (0.001)
Domestic Banks	0.401*** (0.000)	0.078 (0.378)	0.408** (0.010)	0.460** (0.010)	0.440*** (0.000)	0.436*** (0.000)	0.451*** (0.000)	0.117 (0.253)	0.447*** (0.005)	0.523*** (0.005)	0.606*** (0.000)	0.600*** (0.000)
Islamic Banks	-0.587*** (0.000)	0.322** (0.031)	-0.085 (0.822)	-0.287 (0.481)	-1.193*** (0.000)	-1.340*** (0.000)	-0.546*** (0.007)	0.081 (0.726)	0.104 (0.815)	-0.357 (0.487)	-0.982*** (0.003)	-1.205*** (0.000)
Net effect of the Mobile	0.0474	0.0743	na	na	na	na	---	---	---	---	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.0593	0.0723	na	0.0853	na	na
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.198	0.085	0.115	0.152	0.111	0.126	0.206	0.089	0.125	0.150	0.111	0.117
Fisher	31.37***						27.13***					
Observations	751	751	751	751	751	751	719	719	719	719	719	719

***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.

Table 5: Price Effects of Private Credit Bureaus with ICT (IVQR)

	Dependent variable: Price of Loans											
	Mobile Phones						Internet					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	0.080*** (0.000)	0.067*** (0.000)	0.077*** (0.000)	0.077*** (0.000)	0.084*** (0.000)	0.093*** (0.000)	0.078*** (0.000)	0.061*** (0.000)	0.057*** (0.000)	0.069*** (0.000)	0.084*** (0.000)	0.091*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones(IV)	-0.0002*** (0.000)	-0.0003*** (0.000)	-0.0005*** (0.000)	-0.0003*** (0.000)	-0.0002** (0.042)	-0.0001 (0.355)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Internet (IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.0003 (0.247)	-0.0003 (0.329)	0.0006 (0.127)	0.0005** (0.035)	0.00006 (0.865)	0.00001 (0.976)
PCB (IV)	0.0008*** (0.007)	0.0002 (0.540)	0.0001 (0.678)	0.0006** (0.017)	0.0006* (0.081)	0.001*** (0.003)	0.0009*** (0.000)	0.0007*** (0.000)	0.0003*** (0.002)	0.0006*** (0.000)	0.0006** (0.010)	0.0009*** (0.006)
PCB(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV)	-0.000001 (0.684)	0.000006 (0.142)	0.0000007* (0.094)	-0.0000004 (0.894)	-0.000001 (0.670)	-0.000005 (0.209)	---	---	---	---	---	---
PCB(IV)×Internet(IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	-0.00003*** (0.000)	-0.000004 (0.700)	-0.00003 (0.186)	-0.00002 (0.174)	-0.00004* (0.071)	-0.00004 (0.120)
GDPpcg	-0.0009** (0.038)	-0.001** (0.012)	-0.0007 (0.284)	-0.001** (0.024)	0.0004 (0.405)	0.0006 (0.316)	-0.0004 (0.316)	0.00005 (0.936)	0.0001 (0.851)	-0.0002 (0.535)	0.0001 (0.734)	0.0005 (0.264)
Inflation	0.001*** (0.000)	0.0002 (0.620)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.0005 (0.283)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)
Pop. density	0.00004*** (0.000)	0.00003 (0.103)	0.00003 (0.189)	0.00004*** (0.004)	0.00005*** (0.001)	0.00007*** (0.000)	0.00005*** (0.000)	0.00005** (0.015)	0.00004** (0.048)	0.00005*** (0.000)	0.00006*** (0.000)	0.00007*** (0.000)
Deposit/Assets	0.022*** (0.001)	0.008 (0.347)	0.014 (0.209)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.038*** (0.000)	0.020*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.872)	0.017 (0.148)	0.016** (0.017)	0.021** (0.020)	0.042*** (0.000)
Bank Branches	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.0004 (0.308)	-0.0009*** (0.008)	-0.001** (0.029)	-0.001*** (0.002)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.004)	-0.002** (0.018)
Small Banks	0.009** (0.012)	0.012** (0.025)	0.006 (0.318)	0.002 (0.512)	0.004 (0.462)	0.010 (0.114)	0.005 (0.198)	0.008 (0.149)	0.002 (0.750)	0.001 (0.633)	0.005 (0.288)	0.007 (0.337)
Domestic Banks	-0.001 (0.736)	-0.005 (0.261)	-0.003 (0.552)	0.0035 (0.325)	0.003 (0.408)	-0.0003 (0.947)	-0.001 (0.699)	-0.012*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.609)	0.003 (0.237)	0.003 (0.506)	0.0006 (0.913)
Islamic Banks	-0.021* (0.058)	-0.001 (0.880)	-0.012 (0.305)	-0.014* (0.093)	-0.005 (0.603)	-0.013 (0.243)	-0.008 (0.139)	0.015 (0.216)	-0.003 (0.826)	-0.010 (0.260)	-0.012 (0.321)	-0.015 (0.306)
Net effect of the Mobile	na	na	na	na	na	na	---	---	---	---	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.0006	na	na	na	0.0002	na
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.245	0.155	0.181	0.171	0.156	0.140	0.232	0.136	0.160	0.167	0.155	0.135
Fisher	23.83***						21.73***					
Observations	729	729	729	729	729	729	701	701	701	701	701	701

***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.

Table 6: Quantity Effects of Private Credit Bureaus with ICT (IVQR)

	Dependent variable: Quantity of Loans											
	Mobile Phones						Internet					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	3.829*** (0.000)	2.386*** (0.000)	3.271*** (0.000)	3.345*** (0.000)	4.624*** (0.000)	4.862*** (0.000)	3.787*** (0.000)	2.277*** (0.000)	2.888*** (0.000)	3.489*** (0.000)	4.771*** (0.000)	5.156*** (0.000)
Mobile Phones(IV)	0.002 (0.354)	0.003** (0.030)	-0.001 (0.745)	0.007*** (0.003)	0.004* (0.088)	0.005*** (0.000)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Internet (IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.047*** (0.000)	0.018** (0.048)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.047*** (0.000)	0.049*** (0.000)	0.029*** (0.002)
PCB (IV)	-0.024*** (0.006)	-0.008* (0.096)	-0.027** (0.018)	-0.029*** (0.001)	-0.056*** (0.000)	-0.008 (0.150)	-0.006 (0.303)	-0.0009 (0.856)	-0.0002 (0.984)	-0.017** (0.029)	0.0006 (0.879)	0.005 (0.197)
PCB(IV)×Mobile Phones(IV)	0.0002*** (0.008)	0.0001** (0.036)	0.0003** (0.011)	0.0002** (0.039)	0.0006*** (0.000)	0.00009 (0.140)	---	---	---	---	---	---
PCB(IV) × Internet(IV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.001* (0.061)	0.0005 (0.253)	0.0002 (0.759)	0.001** (0.018)	0.0005* (0.078)	0.000004 (0.987)
GDPpcg	-0.004 (0.172)	0.014* (0.087)	-0.013 (0.431)	-0.008 (0.565)	0.001 (0.940)	-0.013* (0.061)	-0.0002 (0.983)	0.008 (0.349)	-0.038* (0.051)	-0.015 (0.386)	0.008 (0.468)	-0.018* (0.096)
Inflation	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.010** (0.010)	-0.011 (0.228)	-0.029*** (0.000)	-0.022*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.761)	-0.015** (0.022)	-0.009* (0.095)	-0.017 (0.104)	-0.020* (0.068)	-0.017*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.392)
Pop. density	-0.0009*** (0.002)	-0.0002* (0.096)	-0.002 (0.583)	-0.0009** (0.039)	-0.001*** (0.005)	-0.0007** (0.028)	-0.0008*** (0.009)	-0.0007*** (0.001)	-0.00002 (0.964)	-0.0005 (0.370)	-0.001*** (0.005)	-0.0009** (0.048)
Deposit/Assets	1.883*** (0.000)	0.949*** (0.000)	1.160*** (0.000)	2.525*** (0.000)	1.482*** (0.000)	1.327*** (0.000)	1.789*** (0.000)	1.157*** (0.000)	2.240*** (0.000)	2.314*** (0.000)	1.266*** (0.000)	1.162*** (0.000)
Bank Branches	-0.050*** (0.000)	-0.010* (0.073)	-0.026** (0.049)	-0.063*** (0.000)	-0.059*** (0.000)	-0.056*** (0.000)	-0.106*** (0.000)	-0.022** (0.023)	-0.098*** (0.000)	-0.111*** (0.000)	-0.115*** (0.000)	-0.082*** (0.000)
Small Banks	-0.830*** (0.000)	-0.824*** (0.000)	-1.318*** (0.000)	-0.819*** (0.000)	-0.400*** (0.004)	-0.216** (0.019)	-0.920*** (0.000)	-0.689*** (0.000)	-1.388*** (0.000)	-0.759*** (0.000)	-0.656*** (0.000)	-0.508*** (0.000)
Domestic Banks	0.392*** (0.000)	0.085 (0.239)	0.407*** (0.004)	0.517*** (0.000)	0.465*** (0.000)	0.404*** (0.000)	0.415*** (0.000)	0.035 (0.698)	0.524*** (0.002)	0.485*** (0.001)	0.622*** (0.000)	0.556*** (0.000)
Islamic Banks	-0.544*** (0.000)	0.434*** (0.005)	0.085 (0.796)	-0.388 (0.121)	-1.172*** (0.000)	-1.294*** (0.000)	-0.350 (0.127)	0.389* (0.079)	-0.060 (0.900)	-0.043 (0.913)	-0.659** (0.013)	-0.940*** (0.000)
Net effect of the Mobile	-0.0165	-0.0042	-0.0158	-0.0215	-0.0337	na	---	---	---	---	---	---
Net effect of the Internet	---	---	---	---	---	---	na	na	na	-0.0091	na	na
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.204	0.085	0.113	0.160	0.124	0.131	0.226	0.083	0.122	0.164	0.132	0.137
Fisher	34.85***						30.37***					
Observations	754	754	754	754	754	754	722	722	722	722	722	722

***, **, *: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.

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2 It is important to note that the presentation of the findings has been limited to net
3 effects because with interactive regressions, interpreting individual effects can be misleading.
4 This is essentially because the issue of multicollinearity between interactive variables is
5 overlooked in the specifications (Brambor *et al.*, 2006). In the presence of multicollinearity,
10 variables with a high degree of substitution have opposite signs in the regression output (Beck
116 *et al.*, 2003). Therefore, focusing on net effects (i.e. the sum of unconditional and conditional
12 effects) for policy implications is essential for a comprehensive assessment of the relevance of
137 the policy variable in moderating the effect of the independent variable of interest on the
14 outcome variable (Brambor *et al.*, 2006). Moreover, the analysis is not exclusively limited to
158 net effects because where, marginal effects are consistent with theoretical expectations,
169 thresholds at which the policy variable effectively modulates the independent variable of
17 interest to achieve the desired effect on the outcome variable are computed. These findings
18 are discussed in Section 4.2 with regards to the role that ICT policy reforms could pay in
19 modifying the key functions of credit registries which are relevant for increasing access to
20 credit.
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29 **4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications**

30 This section reconciles the findings of the present inquiry with existing literature.
31 Additionally, it explores the policy implications of our findings in terms of how unexpected
32 results can be leveraged for enhanced financial access for both households and firms. From
33 the several regression outcomes it is obvious that the relationship between ICT and public
34 credit registries (PCRs) leads to greater access to finance compared with the nexus between
35 ICT and private credit bureaus (PCBs). Our results are not directly comparable with the
36 previous studies reviewed in the introductory section which have directly examined the
37 effects of information sharing offices (i.e., PCRs and PCBs) on financial access. Our
38 assessment of the nexus between information sharing offices and access to credit is not direct
39 because the relationship is contingent on the role of ICT. Nonetheless, we take a minimalist
40 approach by assuming that ICT also indirectly influenced those characteristics of information
41 sharing offices which are essential for promoting financial access.
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50 From a broad perspective, the findings are not consistent with Singh *et al.* (2009) who
51 reported that African nations which have information sharing offices enjoy comparatively
52 higher degrees of financial access. The results are supported by Galindo and Miller (2001)
53 who found that nations with better developed credit registries are associated with less
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2 financial constraints, relative to countries with less developed information sharing offices.
3 This narrative is consistent with the present study because from our sample, public credit
4 registries are more developed compared with private credit bureaus. The suggestion is
5 supported by evidence in Appendix 5 which shows that public credit registries are more
6 widespread than private credit bureaus in many African countries.

10
116 Conversely, our findings do not align with Love and Mylenko (2003) who concluded
12 that private credit bureaus are associated with more financial access when compared with
137 public credit registries. Besides, our results are not supported with Triki and Gajigo (2014)
14 who reported that countries with private credit bureaus enjoy higher levels of financial access
158 relative to countries with public credit registries or neither institution.
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19 It is also important to explore how the unexpected findings from private credit bureaus
20 can be leveraged to enhance financial access. Accordingly, we have seen from the Quantile
21 Regressions findings that private credit bureaus increase (decrease) loan price (quantity).
22 Fortunately, corresponding marginal effects are negative (positive). This implies that at
23 certain thresholds of ICT, the unconditional positive (negative) effect from private credit
24 bureaus on loan prices (quantity) can be changed to negative (positive). Thus, the price effect
25 of private credit bureaus with internet penetration in the 75th quartile of Table 5 can become
26 negative if internet penetration reaches a threshold of 15 (0.0006/0.00004). This internet
27 threshold makes economic sense because it is within the range (minimum to maximum) of
28 internet penetration provided by the summary statistics (0.037 to 51.000).
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32 Table 6 shows that the positive marginal effects from the interaction between mobile
33 phones and private credit bureaus can convert the unconditional negative effects of private
34 credit bureaus on the quantity of loans into overall positive effects on the quantity of loans.
35 Hence, mobile phone penetration thresholds of 80 (0.008/0.0001), 90 (0.027/0.0003), 145
36 (0.029/0.0002), 93.33(0.056/0.0006) are needed respectively in the 10th decile, 25th, 50th and
37 75th quartiles to convert the unconditional negative effects into overall positive effects. These
38 thresholds also make economic sense because they are within the range of mobile phone
39 penetration disclosed by the summary statistics (0.000 to 147.202).
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48 In the light of the above, the significant net negative effects may be taken as evidence
49 that the penetration of ICT in Africa is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in the
50 modulation of the role of information sharing offices in promoting financial access. This may
51 be due to the low penetration of ICT or the ineffectiveness of ICT in providing timely and up-
52 to-date credit information that are required by information sharing offices. The poor
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2 infrastructure associated with ICT such as electricity outage and poor connection networks
3 may also hamper the effectiveness of ICT in complementing information sharing offices to
4 reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry in order to enhance financial access.
5 As a policy implication both the quantity and quality of ICT need to be improved. In term of
10 loan quantity, in order to increase ICT penetration, governments of our sample of African
116 countries should design and implement policies that promote universal access and low
12 pricing. On the quality perspective, information sharing offices need to be endowed with
137 modern ICT infrastructure as well as information systems that enable the accurate, timely and
14 effective collection and distribution of information on borrowers' characteristics between
158 banks.
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20 **5. Conclusion and future research directions**

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22 This study has investigated loan price and quantity effects of information sharing
23 offices with ICT in a panel of 162 banks consisting of 42 African countries for the period
24 2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments and
25 Instrumental Quantile Regressions. The following trends are uncovered.
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29 *First*, the findings broadly show that the use of ICT to complement the functions of
30 public credit registries would significantly decrease the price of loans and increase the
31 quantity of loans. By contrast, the net effects from the interaction of ICT with private credit
32 bureaus do not lead to a noticeable improvement in financial access. Nevertheless, the
33 corresponding marginal effects show that ICT can complement the role of private credit
34 bureaus to raise loan quantity and lower loan prices when certain thresholds of ICT usage are
35 attained. These thresholds were computed and discussed for banks with low, intermediate and
36 high levels of finance access.
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42 *Second*, the statistically significant negative net effects demonstrate that ICT remains a
43 necessary but not a sufficient complementary mechanism with which information sharing
44 offices can reduce information asymmetry in the banking industry in order to promote
45 financial access. This could also imply that the current policy to raise the ICT penetration rate
46 in the regions has been unsuccessful both in terms of quantity and quality. Therefore, the
47 feasibility of the estimated negative net effects should not be judged within the framework of
48 publication bias or the file drawer concern in social sciences (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco *et al.*,
49 2014). There authors remarked that whereas strong and expected results are more likely to
50 be accepted and published in scientific journals, weak, null and unexpected findings such as
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2 the negative net effects reported in this study are readily discarded or consigned to the file
3 drawer in social sciences. As a main policy implication, ICT needs to be improved for the
4 sampled countries of the study both in terms of quantity and quality. With regards to quantity,
5 governments of African countries need to design and implement policies that promote
10 universal access to and low pricing of ICT. From a quality perspective, credit agencies need to
116 be equipped with modern ICT infrastructure as well as information systems that enable the
12 accurate, timely and effective collection and sharing of information between them and their
137 clients, including banks, individual households and corporations.
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158 Future studies can improve extant literature by assessing if the established linkages
169 could withstand further scrutiny when investigated within comparative economic frameworks,
17 notably, in terms of bank: ownership (foreign vs. domestic), size (large vs. small) and
18 ‘*compliance with Sharia finance*’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs

	Variables	Expected sign on loan price	Expected sign on loan quantity
Bank-oriented features	Deposit/Asset ratio	+	+
	Bank Branches	-	+
Market-related characteristics	GDP per capita growth	Uncertain	+
	Population density	+	+
	Inflation	+	-
Characteristics of the unobserved heterogeneity	Small versus(vs). Big banks	Uncertain	Uncertain
	domestic vs. foreign banks	Uncertain	Uncertain
	Islamic vs. non-Islamic banks	Uncertain	Uncertain

Appendix 2: Definitions of Variables

Variables	Signs	Definitions of Variables	Sources
Mobile Phones	Mobile	Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people)	WDI (World Bank)
Internet Penetration	Internet	Internet penetration (per 100 people)	WDI (World Bank)
Loan Quantity	Quantity	Logarithm of Loans Quantity	BankScope
Price (charged on Loans or Quantity)	Price	(Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets	BankScope
Public credit registries	PCR	Public credit registry coverage (% of adults)	WDI (World Bank)
Private credit bureaus	PCB	Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults)	WDI (World Bank)
GDP per capita	GDP	GDP per capita growth (annual %)	WDI (World Bank)
Inflation	Infl.	Consumer Price Index (annual %)	WDI (World Bank)
Populaton density	Pop.	People per square kilometers of land area	WDI (World Bank)
Deposits/Assets	D/A	Deposits on Total Assets	BankScope
Bank Branches	Bbrchs	Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank branches per 100 000 adults)	BankScope
Small Banks	Ssize	Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50	Authors' calculation and BankScope
Large Banks	Lsize	Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets in all Banks for a given period) >0.50	Authors' calculation and BankScope
Domestic/Foreign banks	Dom/Foreign	Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative information: creation date, headquarters, government/private ownership, % of foreign ownership, year of foreign/domestic ownership...etc	Authors' qualitative content analysis.
Islamic/Non-Islamic	Islam/NonIsl.	Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial statement characteristics (trading in derivatives and interest on loan payments...etc)	Authors' qualitative content analysis; Beck et al. (2010); Ali (2012).

WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.

Appendix 3: Summary Statistics

		Mean	S.D	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
ICT	Mobile	34.107	32.409	0.000	147.202	1776
	Internet	7.268	8.738	0.037	51.000	1757
Dependent variables	Price of Loans	0.338	0.929	0.000	25.931	1045
	Quantity of Loans (ln)	3.747	1.342	-0.045	6.438	1091
Information sharing	Public credit registries	2.056	6.206	0.000	49.800	1240
	Private credit bureaus	7.496	18.232	0.000	64.800	1235
Market variables	GDP per capita growth	13.912	96.707	-15.306	926.61	1782
	Inflation	10.239	22.695	-9.823	325.00	1749
	Population density	81.098	106.06	2.085	633.52	1782
Bank level variables	Deposits/Assets	0.664	0.198	0.000	1.154	1052
	Bank Branches	6.112	6.158	0.383	37.209	1129
	Small Size	0.195	0.396	0.000	1.000	1255
	Large Size	0.804	0.396	0.000	1.000	1255
Dummy variables	Domestic	0.753	0.431	0.000	1.000	1782
	Foreign	0.246	0.431	0.000	1.000	1782
	Islamic	0.037	0.188	0.000	1.000	1782
	Non-Islamic	0.962	0.188	0.000	1.000	1782

Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.

Appendix 4: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size : 684)

Market-Level Controls			Bank-Level Controls				Dummy-Controls				ICT		Info. Sharing				
GDP	Infl.	Pop.	D/A	Bbrchs	Price	Quantity	Ssize	Lsize	Dom.	Foreign	Islam	NonIsl.	Mobile	Internet	PCR	PCB	
1.000	0.136	0.007	-0.008	-0.068	-0.014	-0.026	-0.0002	0.0002	0.034	-0.034	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.261	-0.122	0.019	-0.163	GDP
	1.000	-0.028	0.037	-0.236	0.256	-0.009	0.046	-0.046	0.028	-0.028	-0.050	0.050	-0.315	-0.238	-0.205	-0.178	Inf.
		1.000	0.112	0.410	-0.029	-0.125	-0.098	0.098	-0.045	0.045	-0.088	0.088	0.056	0.335	0.546	-0.233	Pop.
			1.000	-0.041	0.080	0.306	-0.041	0.041	-0.062	0.062	-0.210	0.210	-0.087	-0.036	-0.038	-0.083	D/A
				1.000	-0.266	-0.227	-0.078	0.078	0.135	-0.135	-0.051	0.051	0.610	0.747	0.602	0.139	Bbrchs
					1.000	-0.075	0.094	-0.094	0.016	-0.016	-0.097	0.097	-0.206	-0.219	-0.342	0.094	Price
						1.000	-0.171	0.171	0.052	-0.052	-0.067	0.067	-0.096	-0.118	-0.096	0.007	Quantity
							1.000	-1.000	0.026	-0.026	-0.020	0.020	0.146	0.089	-0.084	0.080	Ssize
								1.000	-0.026	0.026	0.020	-0.020	-0.146	-0.089	0.084	-0.080	Lsize
									1.000	-1.000	0.089	-0.089	0.151	0.039	0.010	0.187	Dom.
										1.000	-0.089	0.089	-0.151	0.039	-0.010	-0.187	Foreign
											1.000	-1.000	-0.045	-0.039	-0.014	-0.071	Islam
												1.000	0.045	-0.032	0.014	0.071	NonIsl.
													1.000	0.634	0.304	0.519	Mobile
														1.000	0.513	-0.010	Internet
															1.000	-0.151	PCR
																1000	PCB

Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Ssize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks. Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. Internet: internet penetration.
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684.

Appendix 5: Country-specific average values from information sharing offices

	Public Credit Registries	Private Credit Bureaus
1) Algeria	0.216	0 .000
2) Angola	2.412	0.000
3) Benin	8.037	0.000
4) Botswana	0 .000	48.150
5) Burkina Faso	1.750	0.000
6) Burundi	0.212	0.000
7) Cameroon	2.312	0.000
8) Cape Verde	17.042	0.000
9) Central African Republic	1.412	0.000
10) Chad	0.400	0.000
11) Comoros	0.000	0.000
12) Congo Democratic Republic	0.000	0.000
13) Congo Republic	3.400	0.000
14) Côte d'Ivoire	2.487	0.000
15) Djibouti	0.200	0.000
16) Egypt	2.062	5.271
17) Equatorial Guinea	2.566	0.000
18) Eritrea	0.000	0.000
19) Ethiopia	0.087	0.000
20) Gabon	12.716	0.000
21) The Gambia	0.000	0.000
22) Ghana	0.000	1.700
23) Guinea	0.000	0.000
24) Guinea-Bissau	1.000	0.000
25) Kenya	0.000	1.750
26) Lesotho	0.000	0.000
27) Liberia	0.280	0.000
28) Libya	na	na
29) Madagascar	0.162	0.000
30) Malawi	0.000	0.000
31) Mali	2.812	0.000
32) Mauritania	0.187	0.000
33) Mauritius	27.866	0.000
34) Morocco	1.200	4.812
35) Mozambique	1.637	0.000
36) Namibia	0.000	50.362
37) Niger	0.825	0.000
38) Nigeria	0.025	0.000
39) Rwanda	0.425	0.275
40) Sao Tome & Principe	0.000	0.000
41) Senegal	3.787	0.000
42) Seychelles	0.000	0.000
43) Sierra Leone	0.000	0.000
44) Somalia	na	na
45) South Africa	0.000	57.312
46) Sudan	0.000	0.000
47) Swaziland	0.000	40.216
48) Tanzania	0.000	0.000
49) Togo	2.550	0.000
50) Tunisia	15.975	0.000
51) Uganda	0.000	0.512
52) Zambia	0.000	0.975
53) Zimbabwe	0.000	0.000

na: not applicable because of missing observations.

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