

**Europe as Concept and Discourse:
A Comparative Analysis of Liberal and Radical Right Ideology**

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For my parents, Christine and David.

With gratitude and deep appreciation for all their love and support.

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Contents

Abstract	5
Chapter 1 – Theory and Methodology	7
Chapter 2 – First-Wave Radical Right Europeanism (Appendices)	58 107
Chapter 3 – First-Wave Liberal Europeanism	123
Chapter 4 – Second-Wave Radical Right Europeanism	172
Chapter 5 – Second-Wave Liberal Europeanism	230
Chapter 6 – Conclusion	279
Bibliography	351

Abstract

The central aim of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the treatment and development of the conceptual and discursive theme of 'Europe' within the generic perspectives of liberalism and the radical right throughout the twentieth century. Through an inter-disciplinary combination of conceptual analysis and empirical research, the work investigates areas of convergence and divergence between the two types, providing an explanation of their respective characteristics in relation to specific philosophical traditions.

The theoretical and methodological approach rests upon a form of ideal-typical analysis, influenced by the work of Weber and Freedman. In each case, a proto-typical model is developed, against which empirical evidence is tested and appraised. The liberal conceptual model of Europeanism is therefore located within a tradition of liberal-rational philosophy, strongly identified with the work of Kant, Hegel, Durkheim, Rawls and Popper. The radical right model of Europeanism is associated with a form of anti-rational, primordialist philosophy, evident in the work of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Bergson and Sorel.

Using these proto-typical models as *a priori* points of reference for empirical analysis, the subsequent chapters of the thesis seek to test the validity and heuristic value of these comparative types by applying them in the context of ideological texts. In each case, a wide range of examples is considered and evaluated according to the proto-typical conceptual characteristics. In order to achieve an objective detachment from the subject material, the empirical methodology is based upon a form of postmodern textual deconstruction and discourse analysis, influenced by the work of Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard.

The conclusions of the thesis suggest that a significant degree of convergence and exchange has taken place between liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe. In the post-war period particularly, within a fluid, destabilising ontological context, each type of

Europeanist ideology has adapted itself away from its orthodox profile, following a pattern of cross-fertilisation. Whilst radical right Europeanism has sought to develop an increasingly subtle and complex form of discourse based upon identity and self-determination, liberal ideology has tended to become more rigid, defensive and exclusionary.

The conclusion proceeds to argue that within both perspectives it is the presence of a counter-productive, dialectical, Hegelian dynamic that prevents each from achieving a stable, coherent and enduring paradigm of European identity and community. In opposition to this dialectical approach, the thesis proposes an alternative, consensual strategy modelled on the ideas of Havel.

According to the broad range of literature surveyed during the preparation of this thesis there is no full-length comparative treatment of this subject in existence. Previous analysis has tended to focus upon either one or other model of Europeanist ideology, thereby failing to address the comparative significance of many points. The methodology of textual deconstruction and discourse analysis has also rarely been used in such a comparative context. As such, the thesis makes a significant original contribution to this field of inquiry and its conclusions are potentially of direct relevance to the theory and practice of European integration.

Theory and Methodology

If the analysis of Europe could be described in a single phrase, then we might perhaps say that its principal concern is with the understanding of *boundaries*. This statement may not, in itself, be particularly illuminating; but it has a quality that makes it applicable across a range of disciplinary approaches. It must be remembered that Europe can be understood as a multitude of simultaneous entities: political, economic, historical, geographical, cultural, etc. In each of these fields, though, it is the definition or demarcation of boundaries that is fundamentally important. From whichever perspective one chooses to approach the phenomenon that is Europe, the problem of definition persists. Many attempts have been made to conceptualise Europe, and many analyses of these conceptualisations have followed. However, creating a definition of Europe that has any genuine degree of precision or universality cannot really be done because the conceptual components remain obstinately fluid and idiosyncratic.

Over recent years, and certainly since the end of the Second World War, significant advances have been made in the analysis of Europe and the European idea. Its multi-dimensional nature has been recognized in increasingly sophisticated inter-disciplinary research. One example of this work is Lukacs' study of the historical development of a European consciousness. Without repeating the many useful points made and examples given, it will suffice here to state that references to a concept of Europe have existed since antiquity, emerging in, and never really disappearing from, the historical consciousness to the present day. Lukacs emphasises the importance to the development of the European idea of certain

key periods such as the Renaissance or Enlightenment. However, he accepts the inherent weakness of his own subject and its frequently contradictory or disappointing nature.

Among the peoples of Europe even now the idea of European unity is indistinct, formless, vague, more of an abstract desideratum than a passionate wish...a respectable, but in many ways weak and bloodless aspiration...The disunity of Europe flows from the very condition of the diversity of Europe. (1)

Most importantly in respect of this thesis, Europe must be seen as a project of the imagination. This is not merely to say that creative minds have led the way to new forms of political organization, but rather that the concept of Europe is an imaginative *mythic construct*, i.e. a collection, or mythology, of narratives and discourses. In concrete terms, Europe is not readily definable. Certainly, the structures of the 'Euro-state' have been exhaustively investigated and its various impacts upon social and commercial life are well understood; but it is erroneous to conclude that a purely structural analysis of Europe will suffice. Just as a nation, or other community, somehow becomes tangible through the will and belief of its people, so too it can be said that Europe exists only to the extent that its inhabitants accept its presence as legitimate and *real*, as Newman observes:

...legitimacy suggests that, to a greater or lesser extent, the majority of the population in a given territory believes that the state is 'natural': there is a sense of belonging to a particular state and identifying with it. (2)

It would also be wrong to see Europe as the product of a singular, liberal imagination. The liberal concept of Europe has come to dominate the subject in the post-war period, but that does not make it the only form. By comparing conceptual approaches, we more closely approximate the imaginative core of Europe.

Europe is not a nation in the conventional sense. Though it clearly has a role as a political actor in the form of the EU, the unity of purpose and spirit associated with nationalism is not usually extended to a continental level. However, aspects of the nation may be present in our understanding of European community, or at least, perhaps, the identification of a kind of proto-nationalist potential. Addressing the conceptual problem of the nation, Connor writes:

Defining and conceptualizing the nation is ... difficult because the essence of a nation is intangible. This essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way. (3)

Whilst the liberal EU project has done little to engender a 'subconscious conviction' in its citizens, nonetheless it might be argued that in many indigenous Europeans there is felt a definitive sense of Self and Other in relation to their continent and culture. An indigenous European is likely to recognise his or her own continent as more familiar than, say, the Indian sub-continent. Similarly, the cultural Otherness of Europe may well be felt by those arriving from a distant country. Such a recognition of the existence of intangible cultural barriers, that rather blend than meet at the edges, permits us to make the limited conclusion that a psychological bond may exist between peoples whose region encompasses a number of politically-determined national borders. This bond will largely be constituted by an innate sense of communal Self in relation to communal Other, and will also be manifested at the national and sub-national levels in varying ways. This idea is an application of the theory of ethnic group boundaries put forward by Barth:

The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement...On the other hand, a dichotomization of others as strangers, as members of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings,

differences in criteria for judgement of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest. (4)

In terms of political authority and legitimacy, state-centred actors tend to express themselves in relation to the unit of the nation, (i.e. sub-, national and supra-): a clear political dimension exists in the structure of nation-states and of supranational regional powers. Guibernau identifies five such dimensions constituting a nation: the psychological, political, territorial, cultural and historical.

By nation, I refer to a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. (5)

If, as a heuristic device, we accept that Europe may possess the qualities of a nation in terms of a psychological bond and political presence, a recurrent difficulty remains in determining a sense of the territorial integrity of the European continent. Unlike the Americas, which are far more obviously demarcated geographically, Eurasia is a fusion of two continents: there is no clear point at which Europe ends and Asia begins. No geographical features set up continental barriers, and artificial barriers imposed have proven relatively short-lived; yet the concept of Europe as a separate geographical space persists.

It might be argued that Europe is provided with a territorial self as a projection of its political self. A continental frontier, formed through the amalgamation of national components, via treaty and agreement, creates the impression at least of a legitimate territorial border. As Jerneck suggests, overlapping structures such as those of the EU, EFTA, the EEA and WEU, and agreements such as Schengen, have created a *de facto* territorial self in relation to the expression of European political power:

As a geographical concept territory refers to a defined space, with clearly demarcated boundaries against the world around it. By establishing 'boundaries of order' a distinction is created between those who are excluded from the political space, and those who are included in it and thereby also enjoy power and legitimacy. (6)

The re-orientation of power in the global society, with concurrent movements towards broad regionalisms and localised ethnic communities, leads social scientists to recognise increasingly that the prominence of the nation-state and of state-centred actors in their analysis should be rethought:

...and that past, present and future efforts at organizing European space provide a fertile ground for such reconceptualizations. We are drawing on the growing realization within our respective disciplines that the structural basis of territorial states is, if not disappearing, then at least changing in character.

(7)

Whether such conceptual changes will ever allow us to understand Europe as a territory, the definition of which relates convincingly to its other dimensions, is still in some doubt, though.

Discussion of the cultural and historical dimensions of Europe by those who seek to control the political arena has a tendency to be superficial, paying little regard to a meaningful search for definition. The most common flaw in such approaches is that of assumption, i.e. that some form of commonality is assumed to exist between the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe. Article 128 of the Treaty of Rome, for example, speaks of "bringing the common cultural heritage [of Europe] to the fore", and advocates the "improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples". (8)

An assumption is made here that culture and history exist as a shared experience between the peoples of Europe, and that this experience somehow serves to delineate between the

European and the non-European. In more recent contributions to the liberal debate on Europe, such assumptions are still in evidence. The former President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, for example, writes:

Our national past, our common cultural history and our traditional affinities are an important heritage for Europe and it is in Europe that they will be able to find new vigour and strength. Besides, only an awareness of our past can help us to build the future...to co-exist in a higher and more vigorous synthesis. (9)

In this short passage we glimpse not only the assumptive nature of some interpretations of European history (what, for example, are the 'traditional affinities' of nations whose shared history is peppered with conflict?), but also the powerful metapolitical process by which ideology is created. Returning to Guibernau's five-part model of the nation, it is clear that Europe sits uneasily in any category. It is true that with a certain lateral analysis, elements of the nation can be identified at a supranational level, but generally speaking it is difficult to confer such a definite status on an indefinite and formational entity.

Parameters of research

The focus of this research has been restricted to two conceptual approaches that provide clear scope for comparative analysis, those of liberalism and the radical right. Broadly defined, liberalism has come to dominate economic and political progress since its rise in the period of the Enlightenment, particularly in the contexts of international relations and European integration. For this reason, manifestations of a liberal concept of Europe are integral to this thesis. By way of reaction, the radical right has often expressed the antithesis of liberal values, articulating an organic, romantic form of political philosophy. This comparative model is

potentially the most significant to discuss here as the radical right has, arguably, represented the single most potent challenge to the liberal Europeanist paradigm, particularly during rise of fascism in the mid-20th century.

The research must necessarily restrict the scope of the analysis to these specified areas. The question of European identity is notoriously tangential, and it is all too easy for the researcher to become detached from the focus of the task and be drawn into a multitude of peripheral discussions. It is perhaps best, then, at this early stage to state clearly what this thesis does *not* intend to achieve, and to specify the limits of the investigation. Although the research draws upon the empirical study of 20th century Europeanist ideologies, it most certainly does not wish to offer a ‘potted history’ of modern Europe. Such an undertaking is almost invariably prone to founder for precisely the fact that, just as concepts of Europe are various, it can have no one history. An impartial, historical account of Europe can at best identify notable periods and events in its development, and even then its interpretation will always risk favouring one perspective to the detriment of another. The empirical aspect of this research, therefore, constitutes an exploration of the evolution of certain forms of ideology, aiming both to contextualise and, to a certain extent, define. The historical features of both ideological traditions placed under scrutiny in later stages of this work are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.

It has been necessary to exclude certain paradigms in order to give the research greater coherence and, it is hoped, to sharpen its conclusions. Most conspicuous by its absence is an examination of the Marxist conceptualisation of Europe. Despite its important position in the consciousness of Eastern Europe as an extension of Soviet Russia, revolutionary socialism has existed in the western European psyche primarily as a subversive movement, rather than as an established form of governance. Also, because of orthodox Marxism’s focus on economic, class-based struggle, it is inherently universal in its orientation, by definition rejecting national or even supranational boundaries and divisions. Marxism can provide a powerful critique of

Europe, but it generally fails to deliver a specifically European vision. The omission of this perspective may be regarded as a flaw in the research, but its inclusion would have placed too great a strain on an analysis already broad in scope.

Additionally, the analysis here does not set out to discuss explicitly the significance of another important strand of Europeanist thought, that of Christian democracy. Whilst it is true that some notable contributors to the canon of Europeanist ideas, many of whom are discussed here, came from a Christian democrat background, it would again have placed too much pressure of volume on the research to have included another separate range of comparative points. It is also felt that, whilst Christian democracy has distinct characteristics in its approach towards Europe, it is possible to argue that many of its principles are compatible with a broad, generic definition of liberal values, and as such it can be referred to indirectly within the context of a liberal Europeanist paradigm. This same point can also be extended to address the presence of social democratic influences: in a sense, generic liberal values have become an 'umbrella' of ideological consensus, particularly in the post-war period.

As previously stated, as a subject the concept of Europe is often unwieldy. In order to approach the topic, therefore, it is necessary to arrive at some sort of fixed understanding of the terms of reference, field of inquiry and aims of the investigation. The question at the heart of this thesis is not "What is Europe?" but rather "How is Europe conceived?". In order to begin to explore this question, a few basic points may be asserted which also serve to illustrate the orientation of this research, particularly its concern with rational and anti-rational conceptualisations of Europe.

- Individuals and communities have the capacity to act both rationally and emotionally (anti-rationally).
- Rationally constructed communities adhere to a core principle of progress and mutual benefit through organisation and cooperation.

- Anti-rationally constructed communities are founded rather upon a *faith* in their inherent truth.

Sorel sees it as an empirical, historical fact that people will die for the objects of their faith, though not for the objects of their reasoning [...]. For Sorel, myth arises from people's need for faith and vivid objects of the imagination in order to commit themselves to great collective causes, potentially involving personal sacrifice. (10)

- Rational communities tend to be inclusive and promote a benign civic structure. However, they may make recourse to anti-rational, potentially illiberal elements of myth in order to develop further their density and presence.
- Anti-rational concepts of community are driven by myths of identity, but may also include structural considerations. They tend to be exclusive in nature.
- All communities are, to some degree, constructed through myths.

Modern political myths are narratives of past, present, or predicted future events which their tellers seek to make intelligible and meaningful to their audiences...such as stories of origins and foundings, stories of the exploits of culture heroes, stories of rebirth or renewal... They need to carry sufficient authority [...] to have paradigmatic value as simultaneously a 'model of' and a 'model for' reality among those who believe them. (11)

The above points begin to illustrate areas or characteristics that will be of significance as the thesis develops. However, through generalised observations such as these it will not be possible to penetrate the subject adequately or manage the complexity of the task. The central challenge in this thesis is to make a comparative evaluation of the conceptualisation of Europe as expressed within two distinct ideological perspectives. Given the wide range of sources to be discussed during later stages of the analysis, it is vital that the inquiry is underpinned by an

appropriate theoretical structure. With this in mind an effective methodology must first be established.

Methodological Problems and Ideal-Types

To facilitate this analysis, it is necessary to fix upon certain terms of definition which will form the basis of comparison. Without such terms, no semblance of discussion is possible, and yet semantically these terms contain within them potential for dispute and contestation. By referring to the 'radical right' or 'liberalism', for example, we suggest an assumption of the definition of these ideologies as both existent and accepted. However, there are few instances in the analysis so far produced in these areas in which an agreed definition of either appears. Were such a definition established, it would immediately be subject to scrutiny and attack on the quite legitimate basis that no analyst (and hence no piece of research) can be divorced from the relative position of his or her own perspective. The conundrum presented by the search for definitive terms is recognised, and is discussed by Griffin in his own attempt to establish a definition of generic fascism:

In the social sciences the single concept, the 'it', under investigation, is nearly always a collective pronoun, subsuming a myriad realities. Singularities...are thus code words for entities which have to be consciously or not 'modelled' in the mind to reduce them to manageable proportions for the purpose of investigation. (12)

Such difficulties of definition should not be seen as weaknesses in the research. They are part of the reality which underpins investigation and, if correctly understood and managed, can be made a virtue of the analysis. All research in the social sciences is by its very nature a product of artifice, an attempt to impose regularity in a field of understanding which remains

stubbornly irregular: no manifestation of human society will ever be anything other. An early attempt to address this problem, and to establish terms of reference which take account of the inconsistencies of social research, is to be found in the work of Max Weber. Weber describes the notion of “ideal-typical” research, which takes as a starting premise the view that concepts must needs be described in general terms, with any degree of specificity being understood as a logical inference, rather than a given truth:

This procedure gives rise to no methodological doubts so long as we clearly keep in mind that ideal-typical developmental *constructs* and *history* are to be sharply distinguished from each other, and that the construct here is no more than the means for explicitly and validly imputing an historical event to its real causes...they are pure mental constructs, the relationships of which to the empirical reality of the immediately given is problematical in every individual case. (13)

According to Weber, the ideal-type is heuristically valid when it is employed as a conceptual tool with which to ‘excavate’ the empirical background of a given social issue or political phenomenon. Thus, the researcher fixes upon a loosely agreed definition of the conceptual subject and uses the ideal-typical model created to form judgements of empirical data: “Whatever the content of the ideal-type...it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the *most unambiguously intelligible concepts*, and to understand and explain them causally.” (14)

Weber’s approach is an important starting point for this research. In the discussion below of broadly defined philosophical precedents for the differing Europeanist perspectives, an ideal-typical sense of concepts begins to emerge. In the case of the radical right, key concepts such as ‘tradition’, ‘origin’ and ‘recurrence’ quickly become evident. From the liberal perspective, the concepts of ‘social aspiration’, ‘moral imperative’ and ‘individual agency’ begin to inform an ideal-typical understanding. However, to develop further these ideal-types we

must choose either to continue along a purely conceptual path, or to root our theoretical work in textual evidence and follow its growth. My own disposition leads me to reject the former approach, for an investigation concerned with an entirely pre-conceived model of a concept will falter when it is applied to anything beyond the analyst's pre-determined and culturally relative theoretical position. An over-determination of the theoretical position before some form of empirical application is attempted will do no justice to either and may, as Weber warns, "do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct".(15)

What, then, is the alternative in the application of ideal-typical research? The approach suggested here is to divide Weber's 'ideal-type' into two levels. Firstly, there is the ideal-type that precedes empirical research, which might be termed a '*proto-type*'. This proto-type is a broad description of a concept, and does not pretend to offer a precise definition in itself. Rather, it locates the investigation in generally understood terms, as a precursor to more specific analysis and definition. The second level of ideal-type must be reached through detailed investigation, and will only be truly applicable within the context of that research, though the sense of its conclusions may resonate more widely. In other words, the theoretical aspect of an investigation will develop within the textual study itself, emerging finally as a detailed construct, upon which firmer conclusions can be based.

Weber's approach, though an important starting point, does not provide a sufficiently detailed guide as to how to negotiate concepts within complex and extensive empirical data: in this respect, Freeden's inquiry into what he terms 'ideological morphology' is particularly valuable as a model for development. Freeden's description of ideological morphology more closely approximates the aims and theoretical orientation of this thesis, and through its detailed approach circumvents some of the potential ambiguities of conventional ideal-typical research. His first proposition is that part of the meaning or definition of a concept can be determined by its structural configuration amongst other concepts.

Political concepts acquire meaning not only through temporally accumulative traditions of discourse, and not only through spatially diverse cultural contexts, but also by means of their particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts. (16)

This notion of conceptual structure rests upon the formation of patterns, and the reconfiguration of patterns according to shifts and exchanges. These patterns are the blueprints of ideologies: indeed, ideologies are the political expression of patterns of concepts.

An ideology is thus located at the meeting point between meaning and form: it constitutes a significant sampling from the rich, but unmanageable and incompatible, variety of human thinking on politics, contained within and presented through a communicable and action-inspiring pattern. (17)

The empirical element of research in this thesis will attempt to identify the patterns (*concept-clusters*), within liberal and radical right Europeanist ideology. Through textual analysis, it will be possible to make a detailed, ideal-typical study of each ideology through the relative constancy of certain conceptual points, within what Freeden calls the “spatial structural network”. However, any configuration of concepts must retain a certain degree of fluidity, in keeping with the need to re-assess and re-interpret, which is a mark of the human and social basis of ideologies.

...a degree of fluidity will apply within any ideological grouping...The core concepts of an ideology are non-specific, allowing for many interpretations to be attached to them by means of adjacent and peripheral concepts. By bolting together a large number of concepts...ideologies obtain clear ideational profiles. (18)

Freeden extends his idea to suggest that, in essence, all major ideologies are composed of the same base concepts, and that it is more specifically the relative arrangement of these

concepts as core, adjacent and peripheral which defines the ideology. In the context of this research, such an understanding of the composition of ideologies fits well with the subject: the conundrum of Europe can perhaps best be approached through a type of conceptual modelling which is fluid and three-dimensional.

Ideologies are modular structures, frequently exhibiting a highly fluid morphology...An appreciation of ideologies as multi-conceptual constructs, and as loose combinations of deconstructed concepts with a variety of internal combinations, provides the clue to understanding the linkage between political concepts and the many forms ideologies adopt. (19)

Having suggested ideal-typical analysis as a heuristically useful model of investigation, it becomes necessary now to build upon this foundation, locating and describing the central areas of inquiry in some detail and establishing explicitly the theoretical orientation to be pursued. In many areas of the social sciences, particularly here where attention is being given to ideological subjects that exhibit strongly normative characteristics, it is important to establish a distinct theoretical position.

The normative aspect of both the liberal and radical right approaches to the concept of Europe is central to their propaganda and ideological agenda. In each case, Europeanist ideologues tend to demonstrate a pre-conceived understanding of the nature, function and direction of the European idea. In the later stages of this introductory chapter, a more detailed consideration of the respective philosophical influences that have shaped these perspectives will be provided, and will form the basis of the proto-typical descriptions to be carried forward throughout the main body of the analysis. However, in addition to these, a third perspective must also be established, that of the critical inquiry itself.

Without pre-empting the discussion and conclusions to follow, it is my contention at this early stage that it is the normative aspect of both liberalism and the radical right that presents a

potential weakness in the ideological structures themselves and their conceptualisations of Europe. For this reason, the theoretical position adopted here draws consciously upon an approach that aims to detach itself from normative assumptions and uncritical modes of analysis, an approach that can loosely be described as ‘postmodern’.

Before commencing with a more detailed outline of this postmodern position, and descriptions of the liberal and radical right proto-types, the presentation below of a ‘spectrum’ of community and identity is intended to provide a brief sense of the direction of the inquiry to follow. Community and identity are at the heart of conceptual discussions of Europe, where boundaries are fiercely contested. It is in the prescription of certain forms of community and identity that the ideologies under scrutiny begin to reveal themselves.


At one end of this spectrum, constituting the basis of the radical right approach to European community, is what is termed here a *primordialist* philosophy. Primordialism connotes an anti-rational approach that presupposes certain historical and cultural constants throughout the conceptual development of Europe. These features emerge in the ideology and propaganda of radical right movements and thinkers, developed as myths of belonging and destiny. Primordialism embraces a deeply spiritual and romantic conceptualisation of European community: organic, integral and authentic. ‘Primordialist’ will be the term applied hereafter to the proto-typical model of the radical right.

In the centre of the spectrum is the *liberal-rational* perspective. This is broadly understood as a morally imperative approach based upon reason, which sees human agency as the defining force in the development of increasingly sophisticated structural responses to the challenges posed by the evolution of communities. Liberal-rationalism is rooted in a tradition of Enlightenment philosophy, positivism and scientific understanding. In its purest form, liberal-rationalism is explicitly resistant to irrational myths of belonging, anchoring itself instead in rational concepts such as the civic sphere, individual consent and the social contract. ‘Liberal-

rational’ will be the term henceforth used to describe the proto-typical foundations of liberal Europeanism.

At the far end of this spectrum, and included here not as the representation of a specific political movement but as a philosophical counter-point to the other perspectives, is what is here termed a postmodern perspective. Postmodernism concludes that ideas of community and identity are the product of elaborate narrative construction, or *mythic discourse*. Postmodern analysis focuses critically upon such processes of construction and resists the establishment of normative criteria. It is this critical postmodern attitude that will underpin the theoretical approach here to the two subject perspectives.

The Community-Identity Spectrum



The arrangement of these philosophical perspectives on a simple spectrum is not intended to be indicative of a right-left analysis. Rather, it positions the approaches according to the significance each attaches to a communal European identity. Thus primordialism and postmodernism are polarised – the former holding a belief in an authentic historical community as firmly as the latter dismisses it. Liberal-rationalism falls roughly between the two, its belief in a strong communal identity balanced by the primacy of rational civic values.

Postmodernism: Narrative, Discourse, Myth.

Part of the purpose of this thesis is to identify and compare the development of *myth* in radical right and liberal Europeanism. In order to do this, a perspective must be adopted which is concerned with the analysis of myths, and of the narratives from which they are created. The ideologies of radical right and liberal Europeanism share many features, yet remain distinct from one another. To examine one from the paradigmatic perspective of the other would not permit us to reach objective conclusions about either, nor to discuss the relationships between the two. The action-basis of the paradigms themselves, their teleological commitment to a goal or outcome, dictates a certain interpretative approach to questions of history and philosophy. The virtue of a mode of analysis that is influenced by broadly postmodern theories of deconstruction in this regard is that it has no specific agenda. As Spivak states:

Deconstruction cannot found a political program of any kind. Deconstruction points out that in constructing any kind of argument we must move from implied premises...Deconstruction teaches us to look at these limits and questions. It is a corrective and critical movement. It seems to me, also, that because of this, deconstruction suggests that there is no absolute justification of *any* position. (20)

Postmodernism rejects the possibilities of truth and certainty which, in differing ways, are fundamental to both radical right and liberal Europeanism, and which shackle us to specific forms of both understanding and behaviour. Postmodern approaches, as Rorty states, seek to dispute the bases of such specificity and prescription.

The 'post-modern' repudiation...is part of a larger attempt to abandon the idea that there is a universal natural order. 'Post-modern' philosophers treat the idea that human beings should conform to such an

order as a relic of the doctrine of total depravity...We 'post-moderns' think that we shall never be quite free of the sort of sado-masochism which produces bullies until we cease to believe in such structures. (21)

Rorty's own position on the postmodern is somewhat contradictory. In other work he identifies, quite legitimately, the potential self-indulgence and absurdism of postmodern analysis, and appears to identify himself more as a Habermasian rationalist (22). Nonetheless, his description of the postmodern perspective in the context of this research still stands, albeit with an acceptance that this perspective, in its worst excesses, can become a paradigm of 'anti-paradigmaticism'.

The rejection of absolute truth and universal order permits us to focus on the construction of relative or manufactured 'truths' as understood in the perspectives under consideration. This approach also accords well with the methodology put forward by Freeden, outlined above. The changing conceptual structure of ideologies that Freeden describes precludes the existence of definite and enduring forms of a particular idea. Rather, we can understand ideologies only as the evolving formation of conceptual patterns in which truth itself is but an expression of a particular political ideal.

You never know whether your favourite necessary truth may not be *aufgehoben* – made obsolete by a new vocabulary in which it can no longer be stated...as time goes by, old structures dissolve and new ones emerge. Reason is to be thought of as dialectical and context-bound, rather than as mathematical and attuned to the eternal. (23)

In a parallel movement, the rejection of absolute values and conventional paradigmatic analysis is mirrored by recent trends in policy-network modelling that have been applied to the processes of the liberal EU. Analysts have increasingly begun to apply multi-dimensional network models to more accurately reflect the intricacies of actor-behaviour and policy

formation in a highly complex environment. The analysis of policy networks does not anticipate the formation of a specific agenda-setting perspective: it is neither paradigmatic nor imperative in this sense. Rather, the utility of such an approach lies in its pure, analytical potential, much as a broadly postmodern perspective has the potential to reach an objective understanding in the complex field of cultural and political identity formation.

Within the EU, policy can be determined at a number of levels and, as at the national level, the policy process goes through a number of stages. Also, particular policy areas may be episodic themselves, exhibiting different characteristics in different periods of time. Different models of analysis may be useful at different levels within the EU and at different stages of the policy process...reality is likely to be [...] messy, suggesting that we need a fairly eclectic use of concepts and models. 'Grand theory' must await a much stronger empirical base. (24)

The correlation between recent integration analysis and postmodern theories of communal identity is not exact, but it is close enough to reflect a broad trend towards re-conceptualisation in many areas of socio-political research. The strength of such approaches here lies in their capacity to elucidate the processes by which the conceptual structure (or profile) of a specific ideology is formed.

However, whilst postmodern criticism possesses heuristic value in exposing the often fallacious historicism of agenda-based ideologies, it must always be remembered that from the perspective of these ideologies, no fallacy exists. Primordialism and liberal-rationalism generate truths for their adherents about the nature of history and the composition of communal identity within it. No matter how keenly the academic may perceive the potential transparency of such truths, it is vital that our empirical analysis of ideologies considers them with an appreciation, at least, of how they appear *to their own disciples*. Only thus may we obtain an accurate understanding of their ideational profile.

It must also be remembered that, by definition, the explicit disbelief and scepticism of postmodernism do, in fact, represent a contending viewpoint. By refusing to support any particular paradigm, we effectively oppose all paradigms, which in itself constitutes a form of political decision. The orientation of the theoretical position in this thesis towards a postmodern form of criticism is therefore recognised as a conscious choice.

Whilst the objectives of this approach have been identified above, they remain rather nebulous, particularly in their relation to a distinct methodology. Postmodernism is too loose a term, and too indistinct as an approach, to use unsupported by a more specific method. For this reason, the methodology here will draw upon a form of *discourse analysis* as the precise tool of inquiry. By studying textual examples in detail, by identifying the significance of conceptual and linguistic choices made by ideologues of liberal and radical right Europeanism, it will be possible to gain greater insight into the construction of the ideologies themselves. However, given the breadth of discourse analysis as a discipline, it is necessary to specify further what this method is taken to mean and what specific 'style' of discourse analysis is being attempted here.

In its narrowest and most technical sense, discourse analysis is centred upon the detailed characteristics of language use, its structures of power and its subtle variations. To a certain extent, this approach is reflected in the methodology here, whereby specific features of both written texts and transcriptions of spoken texts are identified, discussed and arranged ideal-typically: the analysis of empirical data is made through the lens of language, text, speech-act. However, such a narrow classification of discourse will not sufficiently describe the approach attempted here. The texts themselves cannot be fully understood simply in terms of their linguistic structure: they must be treated as multi-layered, multi-dimensional expressions of philosophy, views of history, political priority and normative value. Discourse analysis in this sense, then, combines elements of linguistics with historical, philosophical and cultural inquiry. This understanding of discourse analysis may not fit with some more technical descriptions,

but evidence of this interpretation is to be found widely amongst postmodern theorists, most prominently, perhaps, in the work of Foucault.

Foucault's brand of discourse analysis – 'genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method' – offered specifically historicist frameworks which conceptualized epistemic practices and technologies of power as historically situated and contingent...The concept of discourse...offered an approach to culture that drew attention to the specific materiality of symbolic practices and was thus beyond the suspicion of idealism. (25)

This description of Foucault's approach to discourse analysis suggests that there is much more to be considered than language use alone: discourse is about cultural practice, historical context, political impact, etc. As Foucault himself states:

Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories...Discursive practices are not purely and simply ways of producing discourse. They are embodied in technical processes, in institutions, in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion, and in pedagogical forms which, at once, impose and maintain them.

(26)

The term 'discursive practice' is useful in helping to define this wider approach to discourse analysis. The treatment of texts in this thesis is intended to reveal precisely these embedded forms of discursive practice in liberal and radical right propaganda, particularly those surrounding concepts of European identity and community. In each case, I aim to demonstrate that the establishment of value-norms, the assertion of authority, the embodiment of power and the treatment of outside Others are all evident in comparative texts.

In the wide range of examples to be considered during the course of the following chapters, it will be seen just how pertinent Foucault's description here of discursive practice is to an understanding of Europeanist ideology. In the case of the radical right, particularly during the era of the Third Reich, conceptualisations of Europe conform closely to the pattern described by Foucault above: i.e. by delimiting the boundaries of inclusion, defining the norms of membership of the dominant group, and controlling knowledge and discussion of the central concepts. In just the same way, though perhaps more subtly, liberal Europeanism engages in this complex discursive practice. In the development of the modern EU, particularly, we see clear evidence of Foucault's assertion that discursive practice is immanent in the processes and institutions of the system.

The decision to draw here upon a form of discourse analysis as a tool of methodological inquiry is justified in two ways. Firstly, it supports the ideal-typical method discussed above: the analysis of discursive practice reveals the conceptual features of the ideology, and the structure of the ideal-type allows for the arrangement and exhibition of these features within a manageable and recognisable form. Secondly, discourse analysis constitutes the basis of a neutral mode of inquiry, one that can examine normative ideological structures whilst remaining detached from any distinct perspective. This critical neutrality demands what Foucault describes as "a demanding, prudent, 'experimental' attitude" (27), flexible, conscious and responsive within each research task.

We are faced with the unavoidable fact that the tools that permit the analysis of the will to knowledge must be constructed and defined as we proceed, according to the needs and possibilities that arise from a series of concrete studies. (28)

This, then, is the methodological framework that is being shaped and applied within this thesis: the deconstruction of discursive practice, the identification of conceptual

characteristics, and the demonstration of patterns of ideological development. However, before proceeding to the more detailed stage of empirical analysis, it is necessary to establish the proto-typical models of primordialism and liberal-rationalism, the '*a priori*' understanding of each ideological perspective and its roots in a specific philosophical tradition.

Primordialism and the Radical Right

Despite important differences in emphasis and the nature of European identity each movement prescribes, certain basic premises of both liberal and radical right Europeanism are strikingly similar. In each case, specific historical epochs and a broader accumulation of history are manipulated towards a complex justification of the current socio-political project. Key terms become identifiable in this language of historical ownership – heritage, rootedness, shared values and beliefs. Romano Prodi writes that: “At every stage in the development of Europe, there was a profound connection between the ‘European cause’ and its ‘Christian roots...the Christian soul of Europe [...] is the basis for unity.’”(29). Prodi’s comment here demonstrates a specific tendency, common to both liberal and radical right mythologies of Europe, to centre definitions of civilization around moral (and religious) traditions. These traditions are not merely passive nostalgia, but a form of active agency supporting the collective journey towards what Ifversen describes as a “final aim”:

...civilization means an increasing self-consciousness. In this Hegelian way of thinking history is not only a reservoir of accumulated history, but also a process of increasing awareness or consciousness of the final aim of a civilization. (30)

Within this structure of time, the idea of the nation develops. The past is formed into history through the application of differing narratives: each mode of understanding thus

produces its own form of history. Consciousness of the nation *as past* underpins consciousness of the nation *as present*.

The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue to the idea of the nation, which is also conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his...fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity. (31)

Anderson here stresses the importance to this imagined community of “an idea of steady, solid simultaneity through time” (32) which is characteristic of Europeanist ideologies. Radical right and, to a certain extent, liberal approaches to European communal identity contain a definite understanding of precedent in history, as well as goal-driven progression: features that we may synthesise within the term *teleological historicism*.

In the writing of the radical right thinker Julius Evola we can identify similarities to the approach of some liberal ideologues in this pursuit of a historical rationale:

The condition of a truly European entity must be the binding force of an idea and tradition with which Europe is irrevocably linked....the original sense of tradition has been all but lost: *tradition as the formative power of society* manifesting itself in every aspect of social life. (33. *Emphasis mine*)

The accumulated achievements of a society throughout its history create a bulwark against the threat of decadence and destruction posed by internal discord and external attack. Ifversen describes the will to civilization as a quest for virtue – “To be civilised is thus to be virtuous. The opposite of virtue is corruption, which means destruction of social life. Consequently, virtue is the quality needed to uphold society.” (34)

As later stages of this thesis will explore, this need for historical foundation in liberal ideology provides the potential for a partial synthesis with the radical right perspective. Considerations of culture and tradition have entered the core of the policy process, providing a bridge, both conceptual and political, between the mechanism of the liberal EU and the agenda of the Europeanist radical right.

Early manifestations of Europeanism are found most conspicuously in the expansion of the radical right during the inter-war period. At this time, liberal notions of European unity seemed unrealistic against the backdrop of a continental system dominated by rising fascisms. In the post-war period, though, this situation has been reversed. Now it is the political structure of liberal Europe that dominates, whilst much of the radical right has retreated into a meta-political discourse, “one which allows the acutely marginalised or isolated fascist intellectual to feel part of an ‘imagined community’ of ‘warriors against the modern world’ ” (35). For this reason, when we wish to consider Europe in terms of its status as polity, we are at present looking towards a liberal model.

The idea of a communal identity as the projection of a tradition of virtuous civilization is powerfully evocative. It is hardly a surprise, then, that Europeanists of both persuasions have given this idea, to a greater or lesser extent, prominence within their projects. Liberal-rationalism, manifested most recently in the context of this study in the EU project, stresses an overtly reasoned and structured approach. Accordingly, the historical development of European civilization is understood as a series of logically progressive movements towards deeper community. The liberal-rational perspective identifies precedents of unity in early history, but emphasises the increased coherence of such precedents during and beyond the Enlightenment.

By contrast, the radical right sees this later period as one of severe decline in the history of European civilization. Primordialism stresses the *essential* nature of European society, which has existed unchanged since its inception in the classical age. The key difference in this

approach is that the community of Europe is not understood as having been ‘developed’ according to a rational method, but is an essential *truth*, underpinning human agency. Liberal-rationalism has subverted this truth by placing human agency in a position of primacy above other considerations. This understanding of primordialism is supported by criticism of the ideological character of such communities:

This ‘natural’ conception of community is often based within exclusionary lines which can be extremely conservative, racist and chauvinist. As a socio-spatial and cultural discourse ‘community’ has been critiqued as a regressive politics of identity that assumes an organic wholeness amongst members and a hostility to non-members. (36)

In the various manifestations of the Europeanist radical right, the classical heritage of Europe is fundamental to its primordialist interpretation of the development of history and community. Nowhere is this more explicit than in the acronym adopted by the New Right’s “Groupe de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilization Européene” – GRECE – which links the movement, via Heidegger, with the ideals of the Hellenic world, “with its cult of heroism, elitism and beauty”(37). According to GRECE, the ancient origins of Europe provide a crucial sense of rootedness, as well as a projection of the final aim of the historical process:

...the Greek miracle cannot be repeated, but if we allow ourselves to be imbued with the spirit which produced it we will perhaps be able to create something analogous. (38)

Basing the origins of European identity and civilization in the classical epoch also establishes firmly the powerful role of the imaginative process. Arguably, such imagination derives from a Graeco-Roman tradition of mythology, centred around what Morganti describes as, “the mythic figures which throughout the centuries in which society and culture

formed an organic whole operated subliminally as the *atemporal archetypes* of European civilization” (39).

In understanding both modern radical right ideology and the primordialist tradition of philosophy which informs it, a distinction must be drawn between history as an *interpretation* of events and a deeper, *essential* history. Critics of a historical approach to communal identity, such as Barraclough below, draw attention to the inaccuracies of a ‘genealogy of civilization’, particularly with regard to the classical period:

The notion of European unity, the sense that Europe constituted in some sense a distinct entity, was foreign to the ancient world. Unity, of course, there was – a unity anchored in the political structure of the Roman Empire and in a common Hellenic civilization. But this unity was not a European unity, and was not identified with Europe. (40)

Such criticisms are entirely legitimate insofar as they apply to ideologies based upon an interpretation of historical events. However, in the case of primordialism and its derivative ideologies, this rather misses the point, and can lead us away from a clear understanding of the radical right’s approach to community and its role in social evolution. Heidegger makes this distinction clear in his identification of the ‘inception’ of history in ancient Greek society:

By inception we understand the originary decisions which sustain in advance what is essential in Western history...The inception of our history is the Greeks. We see here something essential that harbours still uncompleted decisions within itself. For us this inception is not “antiquity”, and reflection upon it is not an activity aimed merely at salvaging a handed-down cultural treasure. (41)

In response to Barraclough, it is of little consequence to a primordialist interpretation of historical community in Europe that the Greeks (or Romans) did not *see themselves* as Europeans. What is far more important for the radical right is that an essential understanding

originates in certain aspects of classical culture, and is of direct relevance to the continued evolution of European society in the intervening centuries and for the future. Thus, when de Benoist writes of creating a culture “analogous” to that of the Greeks, he does not suggest that precedence exists in terms of classifiable historical features. Rather, he calls for a renewal of the *truth* that was generated in the inception, of “what is imperishable...in the rarity and singularity of each varied return of what is originary”(42). The radical right conceives the *return* of this originative authenticity through the form or process of what Griffin terms *palingenesis*, “the vision of a radically *new* beginning which follows a period of destruction or perceived dissolution.” (43)

At the end of the nineteenth century Europe was in a curious and uneasy state of hiatus. Amongst many intellectuals there was felt a brooding and incipient sense of menace. Nation-states throughout Europe had become economically stronger and militarily more assured towards the turn of the century. As conflict loomed in the early 1910s, a growing understanding of the violent potential of the situation became apparent. However, only through the trauma of the Great War did society in general experience the sense of dissolution and dissatisfaction that philosophers and other intellectuals had been describing for some time.

In some instances, the climate of uncertainty and crisis caused a tendency towards pessimism, and a desire to remove oneself from the prevailing anxiety. The tradition of pessimism in European thought can be seen in Schopenhauer’s frequently bleak assessment of the human condition in the early nineteenth century. His presence can be felt in the intellectual commentary of the *fin de siècle* period, specifically in the perception of early twentieth century Europe as culturally and morally arid. The understanding of Europe by such pessimists forms part of our overall appreciation of the context in which radical right Europeanism emerged and established itself as a political force.

Schopenhauer's vision of futility was formed by his deep sense of unease in the world about him, and by his disturbing understanding of the transience of existence:

The whole foundation on which our existence rests is the present – the ever-fleeting present. It lies, then, in the very nature of our existence to take the form of constant motion, and to offer no possibility of our ever attaining the rest for which we are always striving...Unrest is the mark of existence. (44)

In Schopenhauer's thought, pessimism and negation are the values through which humankind arrives at an understanding of itself, and there is little sense in Schopenhauer's work that this situation can be altered. There is a listlessness and a disappointment in his philosophy with which many intellectuals of the early twentieth century might have associated themselves, and a sense of the weakness and instability of historical time:

Time is that in which all things pass away; it is merely the form under which the will to live – the thing-in-itself and therefore imperishable – has revealed to it that its efforts are in vain; it is that agent by which at every moment all things in our hands become as nothing, and lose any real value they possess. (45)

By stark contrast, others towards the turn of the century were proposing a radically different response to the European crisis. Schopenhauer's negation was, arguably, a starting point for the radical affirmation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche specifically rejects the finality of Schopenhauer's "no", referring to such thinkers as "the consumptives of the soul: they are hardly born before they begin to die and to long for doctrines of weariness and renunciation" (46.). Instead, Nietzsche proposes a powerful "yes" in response to life, overthrowing the decadence of the period and its nervous fatigue with the doctrine of the Will to Power.

When your heart surges broad and full like a river, a blessing and a danger to those who live nearby: that is when your virtue has its origin and beginning....Truly, it is a new good and evil! Truly, a new roaring in the depths and the voice of a new fountain! It is power, this new virtue; it is a ruling idea and around it a subtle soul: a golden sun, and around it the serpent of knowledge. (47)

Amongst other things, the language in this passage (specifically its repetition of ideas of newness) reveals the palingenetic basis of the later radical right. The impact of Nietzschean affirmation, and specifically of the doctrine of the Will to Power, on subsequent radical right ideology can hardly be overstated. Nietzsche anticipated that in an enfeebled society it is the creators of new values who will fill the void left by the demise of previous beliefs.

Man first implanted values into things to maintain himself – he created the meaning of things, a human meaning! Therefore he calls himself: ‘Man’, that is: the evaluator...A change in values – that means a change in the creators of values. He who has to be a creator also has to destroy. (48)

The radicalism and dynamism associated with the thought of Nietzsche, in contrast to the resignation and fatalism of Schopenhauer, helps us to appreciate core elements of an emerging proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right, particularly the powerful metapolitical process of re-birth, or palingenesis. At the heart of this palingenetic impulse in radical right ideology lies tradition, which Evola refers to above as “the formative power of society”. For Heidegger also, tradition represents a continuum between origin and future, a future based upon a return towards the values of the origin itself, rather than rational progress: “Whatever and however we may try to think, we think within the sphere of tradition. Tradition prevails when it frees us from thinking back to a thinking forward, which is no longer a planning.” (49)

Tradition is not so much understood as *felt*, within an individual and communal consciousness that transcends a rational, pedestrian record of past events. As Young shows, Heidegger conceives tradition as the basis for *creative* action against contemporary decadence:

Criticism (or for that matter authentic revolution) always takes the form of 'repetition' of past 'existence possibilities' in a way that constitutes a 'disavowal' of aspects of the today...Heidegger adds that repetition is of course not the attempt that 'something which was formerly actual may reoccur', it does not consist in crusty, absurd conservatism. Repetition is rather a matter of taking a 'creative view of tradition', a matter of the creative re-realisation of aspects of tradition in the conditions of contemporary life. (50)

For Sorel also, rational interpretations of history fail to appreciate the compelling, mythic force of tradition:

Faith in glory...rapidly dissolves into rhapsodies when it is not upheld by myths...It seems to me that short-sighted views of history are not a cause but a result; they result from the weakening of the historic myths which were so popular at the beginning of the nineteenth century; faith in glory perished and short-sighted views of history began to predominate when these myths were disappearing. (51)

The legacy of the Enlightenment, both for Sorel and the radical right generally, is the gradual degradation and dissolution of primordial values (heroism, nobility, the pursuit of glory, etc.), in favour of a scientific classification of being-in-time. "In this philosophy one distinguishes between "duration" which flows, in which our personality manifests itself; and mathematical "time" according to whose measurement science arranges accomplished facts" (52). The understanding of being-in-time is the basis for interpretations of history. Sorel identifies a fundamental difference between rational time and primordial duration, drawing upon the insights of his mentor, Bergson. The Bergsonian concept of *duration* also relates closely to Heidegger's thought, enveloping the individual within the broad scope of a mythic history in which the essence of the self is but occasionally and profoundly beheld:

...the moments in which we are fully in possession of ourselves are rare and that is why we are rarely free. Most of the time, we live outside ourselves; we perceive only a colourless phantom of ourselves...We live for the external world rather than for ourselves; we speak more than we think; we are acted upon more than we act ourselves. To act freely is to recover possession of ourselves, it is to get into pure duration again. (53)

Primordialism, then, is not simply an idea of history; it is a grasp of the historical continuum that leads seamlessly from the past of tradition, through the present of awareness and activism, to the future, ultimately, according to Sorel, of revolution. Revolution in the Sorelian sense implies not just upheaval or the overthrow of a system, but a permanent, radical movement in which mythic history replaces rational history, as Ohana observes:

Myth was not a part of the harmonious order of things. It was an alternative order, a real substitute for the existing order, albeit artificial: in this way myth negated concrete historical existence and tried to eliminate whatever exists. Historical myths tried to negate the existing historical reality. (54)

Mythic history, and particularly its reference to tradition, is often misinterpreted as reactionary and conservative. In truth, Sorel's mythic concept of history is deeply radical, as is the ideology of inter-war (and much post-war) fascism. Ohana goes on to provide some specific examples of mythic precedents in history, including "the myth of early Christianity, the myth of Roman power, the myth of the conquering barbarians" (55). Ohana supports here the observation made previously that the identification of historical precedent by the radical right (in the classical or Carolingian periods, for example) does not imply a direct, rational-historical connection. Rather, an understanding of history as mythic, in the Sorelian sense, allows the radical right to create a metapolitical structure from history, within which to plant the revolutionary agenda.

The rootedness of a people in the cultural tradition of a specific region is derived to a great degree from the sense of attachment that a community has to its physical environment. Primordialist philosophy advocates and demands a deep and genuine involvement with the landscape of the homeland. Foltz describes the physical environment in the perspective of Heidegger as: “the significant landscape that stands in nearness to the inhabitant whose rootedness in the place itself allows a lingering with things...It is, then, ultimately through such a poetic attunement that the earth discloses itself as homeland.” (56)

In this ‘disclosed homeland’, Heidegger sees the conscious individual as being *in communication with* his environment, both physical and cultural. Indeed, the evolution of a cultural community stems from the shared rootedness of individuals within the totality of Being, manifested in the physical world:

Man obviously is a being. As such he belongs to the totality of Being – just like the stone, the tree, or the eagle. To “belong” here still means to be in the order of Being. But man’s distinctive feature lies in this, that he, as the being who thinks, is open to Being, face to face with Being; thus man remains referred to Being and answers to it. (57)

The significance of the community for Heidegger is determined by this shared rootedness in Being. Man is the formative link between identity, which is derived from Being, and tradition, which is the recurring foundation of community. The agency of man, though, is seen here as *revolutionary* in nature, aiming, as Sorel states, “to create a new man in ourselves for the purpose of shattering the historical framework which encloses us.” (58). Agency of this kind should not be confused with the liberal-rational type, which seeks to control the development of history through a detailed understanding of its *process*. In the primordialist tradition which underpins the ideology of radical right Europeanism, “the ‘historical existence

of a people', is 'founded by the poet, organised and brought to knowledge by the thinker, and rooted in earth and historical space by the state-founder'." (59)


This description of the philosophical orientation of the radical right towards a primordialist influence will form the basis of the composition of a proto-typical model, which will be tested and considered against textual evidence throughout later stages of the thesis. With Freeden's ideas on the morphology of concepts in mind, the proto-type described here arranges the various conceptual features already identified within a loose cluster, or sum-concept. It aims to crystallize the conceptual foundation of radical right ideology and provide a point of reference as the analysis proceeds.

The sum-concept in this case represents the generic radical right under the influence of a primordialist tradition of philosophy. Within this broad, generic sum-concept it is possible to identify a range of separate categories or sub-headings (component-concepts), each of which in turn represents a distinct aspect of the ideological profile that constitutes the whole. In the diagram of the proto-type that follows, six such component-concepts are identified. Their arrangement within the sum-concept does not indicate any particular hierarchy or significant configuration between component-concepts.

- **Origin:** the primordialist belief in an inception of history and of organic society; a point of pure becoming and original authenticity towards which gravitate bold aspirations for the future.
- **Civilization:** the concept that human existence has been characterised by great epochs of dominant civilizations, establishing norms of identity through the potency of their cultures. In particular, the concept here refers to a civilization of the Occident, anchored in Græco-Roman antiquity, bound into millennia of learning, governance and art.

- **Virtue:** a primordialist sense of justice and righteousness is based considerably less upon a rational, Enlightenment approach than on a deep organic and spiritual attachment to the civilising tradition which informs it. Virtue in this sense suggests a dutiful, almost chivalric, devotion to the historical civilisation, to its increase and defence.
- **Violence:** a defining characteristic of radical right movements is their dynamic nature and commitment to action, confrontation and violence. Negotiation, compromise and rational consideration are taken to signify weakness, a lack of virulence on the part of the idea-system and, ultimately, vulnerability to decadence and destruction. Energy, physical action and violence act as antidotes to social and cultural degeneration.
- **Myth:** the propaganda of radical right movements is saturated with a rich mixture of metaphor, analogy and narrative. The function and effect of these myths of belonging, identity, community and destiny is to root the individual so deeply within the collective historical consciousness that the divisive characteristics of that individuality begin to dissolve. Through the application of myth, radical right movements appeal to the potent emotional heart of the individual and the community, marginalising reason.
- **Palingenesis:** the radical right opposition to a rational, linear and sequential view of history is consistent with its belief in the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations, and particularly the possibility of re-birth. Palingenesis describes the radical right concept of historical transition, of the decline of one power and the ascendancy of another, through a rhythmic, cataclysmic process of destruction and renewal. The rising phoenix of one civilisation or idea-system can only emerge from the ashes and ruination of another.

The *proto*-typical, primordialist radical right
(Component-concepts in concept-cluster)



Rationalism and Liberalism

The importance of philosophical precedent to both liberal and radical right perspectives is central to our understanding of the development of the European idea. The examples provided in this and the previous section are not intended to be exhaustive, but are indicative of broad, generic movements in political philosophy that have relevance in this context. A division of approach between liberalism and the radical right can be traced through trends in philosophy stretching back over several centuries. The prominent position held by Nietzsche, Sorel and Heidegger in the development of rightist radicalism has already been suggested. Similarly, in the liberal tradition, the work of thinkers such as Kant, Bentham, Durkheim and Popper can shed light on our understanding.

The basis of the liberal-rational community is formed from the synthesis of key principles, e.g. individual freedom, equality, civic duty and universality. Together, these aspects of liberal thought propose a society in which autonomous individuals work towards the greatest collective good, and in which there is a certain element of compulsion through the establishment of a system of morals or laws. Within this moral framework, the agency of the individual is crucial to the fulfilment of society's goals. This point accords well with Delanty's analysis of communitarianism, when he writes that "the promise of community is that it allows people to regard themselves as active subjects shaping the world according to their will" (60). Will, in this case, is the will to construct, rather than a Nietzschean Will to Power. It is also, significantly, the will of the *majority*, pursuing a utilitarian course that binds together the interests of atomised individuals (and states) into a meaningful and purposeful socio-political programme.

Describing the principle of utility, Bentham identifies the artificial nature of the moral community and the logical contrivance of interest within it:

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question....not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government....The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its *members*. The interest of the community then is, what ? – the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. (61)

In his “Principles of Morals”, Bentham asks the reader to question the determination of moral authority within the civic community. He asks, “whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right and wrong, with respect to every other man, or whether every man’s sentiment has the same privilege of being a standard to itself?” (62). In the first case, he argues, the moral authority becomes despotic, in the second, anarchic. In opposition to these alternatives of despotism and anarchy, Bentham proposes the principle of utility, in which emerges a *logical* sense of co-operation and mutual regulation. This principle applies to relationships between individuals *and* between states. According to the realist paradigm (63), international society is an essential state of anarchy: for liberal-rationalists, though, this need not be the case, and may be overcome by extensive efforts towards co-operation and arbitration. As for despotism, this is, arguably, the nature of authority embodied in the Will to Power. Radical ultra-nationalism, and by extension its Europeanist equivalent, is rooted firmly in an authoritarian discourse, whether that be the totalitarian relationship between the state and the individual, or the aggressive expression of national or regional identity within an international system.

Significantly, Bentham stresses that the principle of utility applies equally to the actions of governments as well as to individuals. By extension, therefore, it is possible to relate this principle to the relationship between states, which then becomes the basis of liberal internationalism. According to the liberal paradigm of international relations, states share roughly the same characteristics as individuals in the determination of utility. Accordingly,

writes Mill, “this it is, which, when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard, will constitute the strength of the utilitarian morality. This firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind; the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures” (64). Mill goes on to identify the utilitarian principle with the advancement of civilization generally, articulating another theme within liberal internationalist ideology: progression through co-operation towards a rationally defined, advanced civic society.

The element of moral compulsion inherent in utilitarian ideas is argued to be a necessary component in the efficient organisation of a rational social system. The principle of utility upholds the will of the democratic majority, which in turn must be supported by recourse to some form of moral standard or law. This idea is articulated in Kant’s notion of the categorical imperative:

The categorical imperative, inasmuch as it asserts an obligation with regard to certain actions, is a morally practical law. But, because obligation includes, not only practical necessity (of the sort that a law in general asserts), but also constraint, the imperative mentioned is a law either of command or of prohibition, according to whether the performance or the non-performance is represented as a duty.

(65)

International relations, such as those enshrined under the auspices of the League of Nations or the current EU, have been intended to function according to the principles of utility and moral compulsion outlined here.

For liberal-rationalists, individual and collective *agency* are key aspects of the mechanism of society. Active participation by citizens in the development of a liberal European society is fundamental to any such undertaking. Despite criticisms of the adequacy of this participation in the development of modern, liberal Europe, the project itself is rooted in the principles of democratic agency evolved from an Enlightenment view of the social contract.

Agency, however, cannot exist unregulated for fear that it would drift toward the extremes described above. Mill suggests that society should form codes of behaviour around generally agreed values, and set these as the parameters for action within that society. His ideas in this respect have been echoed more recently in the work of John Rawls:

...there is, at least in a society such as ours, a moral obligation to obey the law...this obligation must rest on some general moral principle; that is, it must depend on some principle of justice or upon some principle of social utility or the common good, and the like. (66)

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Durkheim brought to the idea of participation a more complex sociological method. This corresponds closely with the original basis of EU governance and administration in a tradition of French social modernism, which “was centrally concerned with the conceptualisation of society as a field of human interdependence susceptible to planning and administration through the application of ‘scientific’ principles” (67). In Durkheim’s thought we find a strong sense of moral imperative and a readiness to implement the power of the law to maintain social cohesion:

Like everything which exists, man is a limited being: he is part of a whole. Physically, he is part of the universe; morally, he is part of society...Moral rules must be invested with the authority without which they would be ineffective. (68)

If we observe the rational administration of the EU we find common conceptual ground, particularly when we recall the principles upon which the Treaty on European Union was secured, “liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law” (69).

There is a clear moral imperative at work in the thought of Mill, Durkheim and Rawls, an imperative derived from the ideas of Kant, which rests upon the rule of law. This philosophy

implies a rational, methodical approach to the administration of society within the context of a normative system of values. These key points begin to form the basis of a proto-typical description of liberal-rationalism.

It has been observed that the radical right draws strongly on a Bergsonian notion of duration. Liberal-rationalism, by contrast, has developed within the Enlightenment context of mathematical time. The interpretation of *being-in-time* fundamentally affects the understanding of history within any particular ideology and dictates the nature of historical change prescribed in each case. For the radical right, the most common description of the development of time is as cyclical, revolving through the passage of great civilizations, bringing about a constant return. Rational interpretations of time usually emphasise its sequential, linear structure. In this case, historical change is a matter of evolution rather than revolution; or as Kant has described it, metamorphosis rather than palingenesis. Kant emphatically rejected the concept of palingenesis, particularly its attendant processes of destruction and resurrection. As Williams writes:

Kant sees any purported change of a palingenetic kind as undesirable. He thinks it neither possible nor wise for political leaders to try to wipe the slate clean and start entirely afresh...The idea of a complete political rebirth through the destruction of the previous political system is a dangerous fantasy. (70)

Instead, Kant supported a gradual, non-violent process of change in which the developing society adjusts to the deficiencies and necessities of its current state incrementally. The movement of history is, therefore, constantly forward, not seeking a return upon itself. The structures of today become part of the foundation of the greater structures of tomorrow, but intact, not in ruins. The developing society evolves out of itself: a butterfly emerging from its chrysalis, rather than a phoenix from the ashes.

The distinction, though, between metamorphic rationalism and palingenetic historicism is not always clear-cut in the sphere of *applied* ideology. Liberal Europeanism often employs references to a historical, cultural inheritance, and although these references do not define its perspective as 'durational', at times it clearly adopts the language of historical 'ownership' and an implied sense of the cohesion of *mythic* historical time. This leads to a certain ambiguity in the liberal Europeanist approach to time and history which is symptomatic of its desire to root an overtly rational project in a deeper sense of communal identity. The paradox provided by a rational political project, expressing itself through non-rational forms of historicism, will be central to this investigation. Already it is possible to appreciate that this tendency amongst liberal Europeanists may suggest a certain similarity with the conceptual basis of radical right Europeanism, and that some examples of liberal Europeanist discourse may sit awkwardly within the proto-typical framework of liberal-rational ideas.

This preliminary conclusion is supported by observations made by Karl Popper, specifically in his discussion of comprehensive and critical rationalism. Comprehensive, or *uncritical* rationalism, Popper argues, is logically impossible. Ultimately, it is not possible to justify the *choice* of a rational approach through rational argument. Instead, this choice is made upon the basis of normative assumptions, specifically that rationalism is *better* than other approaches. The paradox that Popper identifies is that this normative choice, or 'faith in reason', is fundamentally irrational, albeit in a moderate sense.

...no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude...The choice before us is not simply an intellectual affair, or a matter of taste. It is a moral decision...arguments cannot determine such a fundamental moral decision. (71)

Primordialism, as an explicitly anti-rational form of thought, does not suffer from this same inherent contradiction. Indeed, the faith-basis of radical right ideology is an integral part

of its very nature. Within liberal-rationalism, though, this faith-act becomes problematic, particularly if it draws upon non-rational forms of historicism to justify its normative conclusions. Historicism, Popper argues, is a highly corrupting influence, particularly in its tendency to derive teleological meaning from history.

Historicism is altogether wrong. The historicist sees history as a kind of river coming down from its source, and he believes he can see where it is going next...but the river or anything like that will always be just a metaphor. It has no reality in it.[]...among the things to be feared is what you call the meaning of history. Because it always misleads, and only misleads. (72)

Popper's criticism of historicism is an explicit rejection of illiberal and totalitarian ideas. However, as empirical analysis will serve to demonstrate, it is not only ideologues of the radical right who are prepared to be wilfully misled by their own metaphors of history. The rational political community, driven by normative liberal ideals, also seeks to be inspired by precedence.

It would be simplistic to suggest that there was no substantial difference between the anti-rational basis of the radical right and liberal (critical) rationalism. Normative liberalism is not the ideology of the concentration camp (Guantanamo Bay, perhaps, excepted), and its emphasis on universality is a powerful check upon the chauvinism of the exclusive community. However, it would equally be negligent to overlook the possibility that the two perspectives have certain features in common, not least the appeal to mythic forms of history.

In summary, liberal-rationalism as a generic type adheres to core principles such as liberty, equality and universality. It upholds these principles through the construction of complex social and political organisations, binding the interests of individuals and autonomous states together, making each dependent upon the whole and obedient to a higher form of political and legal authority. Within this framework, development is effected through individual and

collective agency, following a rational, sequential course of metamorphic development towards an end point, or *telos*, representing the highest achievable form of civic society.


As with the proto-type of the primordialist radical right, the figure below presents the key conceptual components of liberal-rationalism and aims to provide a point of reference, to summarise the theoretical proto-type, in advance of the following stages of empirical investigation.

- **Universality:** consistent with the liberal emphasis upon the private sphere and the primacy of the individual, by logical extension *all* individuals are entitled to parity of consideration and entitlement within the liberal-rational paradigm. Discrimination is symptomatic of a tendency towards exclusion: in its purest form, liberal-rationalism asserts that every individual should be protected by the same fundamental rights and bound by the same core duties.
- **Mutualism:** despite their insistence upon the protected status of the individual, most examples of liberal-rational thought, particularly from the last century, recognise the need for a sense of mutual responsibility between individuals. Setting aside examples of a more extreme, minarchist neo-liberalism, in general liberal-rationalism values the voluntary association of individuals within a community, above outright atomisation. Both in terms of micro-communities, and larger national and supra-national structures, liberal-rationalism adheres to the belief that individuals achieve more for themselves by practising responsibility towards others.
- **Law:** the framework provided by national and international law is of fundamental importance in protecting both the rights of the individual and the normative priorities of the community. Law, in the liberal-rational paradigm, has an emancipatory function, upholding the will of the majority whilst protecting the fundamental rights of the minority. Law is the rational expression of the will of a community of individuals: each person

having contending priorities, but each accepting the need for a written code and standard of practice, by virtue of their reason.

- **Agency:** the liberal conception of society is based upon a mechanistic theory which suggests that social conditions and political institutions can be changed through the actions of individuals and groups of individuals. Agency, in its broadest sense, suggests the belief that change can be effected through the application of the rational will of the community.
- **Structure:** liberal theories of constitutional government are centred upon the structural arrangement of governing institutions. From democratic parliaments to executive agencies and judicial procedure, liberal-rationalism seeks to develop complex, interdependent organisations and processes. These various bodies serve both as arbiters of the public good and as channels through which the agency of the rational community may be expressed.
- **Metamorphosis:** due to its rational approach to the nature of time and historical change, liberal-rationalism rejects the concept of palingenesis, the cyclical motion of destruction and re-birth. By contrast, liberal-rationalism supports the belief that each successive period of political development is historically contingent, and that, therefore, the most appropriate model of change is controlled, gradual and constructive, building new layers upon established foundations.

Proto-typical, liberal-rationalism
(Component-concepts in concept-cluster)



Research Questions and Objectives

The final task to be completed before commencing with a full analysis of the historical and textual evidence is to make a clear statement of the objectives that this thesis sets itself and the key questions that will guide the inquiry. It will be these questions and objectives to which the thesis will return by way of the final summary and conclusion.

Objectives:

- To establish and implement an effective methodology that will provide a sound theoretical framework for the analysis of historical and textual evidence.
- To illustrate the modern origins of the concept of Europe and its development within the subject ideologies.
- To examine, through the analysis of a wide range of examples, the specific characteristics of both liberal and radical right Europeanism, establishing in each case a sense of consistency with the generic types already identified.
- To arrange the treatment of these examples into distinct chronological periods, described here as 'first-wave' and 'second-wave'. The defining separation between these periods is provided by the destructive climax of the Second World War. Thus 'first-wave' liberal and radical right Europeanism conclude in 1945, where 'second-wave' Europeanism begins.
- To focus upon features of discursive practice within each perspective, assessing the significance of language choice, the recurrence of key metaphors and the development of mythic forms of discourse.
- To recognise examples of inconsistency and deviation from the generic type in each case, analysing both the causes and consequences of such divergences.

- To establish the degree to which changes in the ideational profile of each perspective suggest a convergence between the two forms, how significant such convergence is, and what the implications of this hybridity may be for the theory and practice of Europeanist ideology.
- To evaluate the current position of liberal and radical right Europeanist ideologies, identifying their inherent weaknesses and anticipating their future trajectories.
- To suggest new strategies for the conceptualisation of Europe, transcending the dichotomy of orthodox ideological perspectives, seeking to instigate an approach that might resolve such intransigence.

Proceeding from these objectives, the following key questions will provide a focus for the thesis as it develops, and a structure to which it will return in drawing together conclusions.

Research Questions:

- What is the nature of the radical right conceptualisation of Europe, and to what extent are its features consistent with the proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right?
- What is the nature of the liberal conceptualisation of Europe, and to what extent are its features consistent with the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism?
- To what extent do the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe diverge from the proto-typical models, and what are the implications of these changes for the future development of each perspective?
- To what extent, and in what forms, has convergence taken place between the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe?
- What are the current conditions of the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe, their most prominent challenges and most significant flaws?
- What scope is there for the development of an alternative conceptualisation of Europe?

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First-Wave Radical Right Europeanism

At the heart of the process of ideological construction undertaken by radical nationalists during the *fin de siècle* and the period following the Great War, lay a pre-occupation with the cultural strength of the nation and, by extension, with the broader region of Europe. The liberal process of post-war recovery, typified by negotiations at Paris and Locarno, can be distinguished by its essentially political premise that saw co-operation between sovereign states as the starting point for wider agreements and a settlement of the long-term peace, much like an advanced form of the 19th century Concert of European Nations. By contrast, the nascent radical right looked beyond the relative sterility of political, civil nationalism towards a deeper, more rooted sense of cultural belonging.

Typically, much of the focus of radical right ideology has been upon the vitality of the cultural and historical community. The analysis of ‘cultural nationalism’ can support our understanding of this phenomenon at a supranational level, and help us to distinguish it from the ‘political nationalism’ (and supranationalism) of liberal-rationalism. The distinction between these two forms is made clear by Hutchinson:

Political nationalists...tend to look to reason as their ethical source. Their ideal is a civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores like the polis of classical antiquity...The aim of cultural nationalists is rather the moral regeneration of the historic community, or, in other words, the re-creation of their distinctive national civilization. Since a civilization is a spontaneous social order, it cannot be constructed like a state from above but only resuscitated from the bottom up. (1)

In the discussion that follows, and specifically in the contrast between early fascist ideology and the construction of liberal-rational responses to the Great War crisis, this distinction between the cultural and the political will become clear. The same distinction is drawn by Jönsson et al., albeit in slightly different terms:

The ‘ethnic-genealogical’ conception of nationalism, which rests on a sense of affiliation and solidarity with the ethnic community into which one is born and socialized, is often contrasted with the ‘civic-territorial’ conception, which rests on loyalty to the state expressed in terms of citizenship rights and obligations. (2)

Analyses of these phenomena at a national level serve as useful points of reference from which to achieve a sense of their broader application. In general terms, ‘ethnic-genealogical’, ‘cultural nationalism’ can be associated with radical right Europeanist ideology in the early twentieth century. The ‘civic-territorial’, ‘political’ form of nationalism is more appropriate in discussing liberal-rationalist responses to the period. The application of models of nationalism to facilitate our understanding of pan-European developments is both effective and logical, in so far as Europeanist ideologies are understood to be derived from impulses similar to those which created the rise of nationalism in its various forms.

At this stage in the development of Europeanism as a form of radical right ideology, it is difficult to distinguish between purely nationalist discourses and those which, implicitly at least, suggest the possibility of a broader, pan-European application. However, even the most stridently nationalist ideologues of the early twentieth century tend to identify in their ideas a European-wide deterioration of culture, and make exhortations for renewal that are relevant beyond specific national contexts. Consequently, although the language of the radical right

during this period is often concerned with the recovery of the nation, the foundations of a palingenetic Europeanism are also identifiable, if not explicitly then by inference.

The roots of fascism are themselves, arguably, international. Mussolini's radical nationalism was heavily influenced by the revolutionary syndicalism of Sorel and the early French right, by certain aspects of German socialism, as well as by key intellectual figures in post-Risorgimento Italy. As such, there is already some basis for making assertions about the internationalist potential of a movement that was explicitly, even aggressively, nationalistic. The insistence of many early fascists upon a purely national solution to the period of crisis belies the significance of the parallel development of such movements in several countries at the same point in time: we can thus argue that a *de facto* internationalism was already in the process of formation. Admittedly, such an interpretation involves both hindsight and some latitude, since a pan-European consciousness was rarely expressed as such at the time. With latitude, though, we can identify the foundations of a fascist vision of Europe which was to be articulated in clearer terms as the century progressed. Writing on the development of the Italian Nationalist Association (founded in 1910), a group that was later to merge with Mussolini's Fascist Party, De Grand describes the parallel development of the radical right in different national contexts, specifically that of the Italian Nationalists and the Action Française movement:

...similarities between the two movements resulted from the fact that both were part of *a common European reaction*. The younger generation, which had lived through the trauma of the Dreyfus affair and the Italian crisis of the 1890s, and the generation which was just coming of age in 1900 were both tired and impatient with the political and philosophical baggage they had inherited from their parents. Not only were they profoundly antipositivist and antimaterialist, but they were also antiparliamentary in their political psychology. (3. *Emphasis mine*)

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, many of the countries of Europe experienced the same anxieties and traumas, centred around the cataclysm of the Great War. It is hardly surprising, then, that similar circumstances should have produced similar responses from certain sections of the political community.

In the case of the radical right, the militarisation and subsequent de-militarisation of large numbers of the continent's young men is a significant example of such a factor. An aggressive, spiritual fellowship, formed by the experience of the trenches, was to unite groups of radicalised post-war activists, initially in a purely national context, but increasingly with a view to creating some form of European synthesis. Influenced by the Sorelian myth of violence and made real by the experience of war, was the conception of destructive, purifying force.

In France, the trauma of the Great War left a deep impression on the national psyche, and in particular upon the rising ideologies of the right. As Soucy observes, the key spokesman of the Action Française movement, Charles Maurras, demonstrated contempt for those who did not share faith in the cathartic power of violence:

...anyone who attacked the army, or the military traditions it exemplified was an enemy of France. Pacifists were particularly reprehensible in denying the grandeur of the First World War and the need to fight again if France were attacked. Like other French fascists, Maurras taught that to restore France to greatness all means were justified, including violence. A return to order required temporary disorder... (4)

The seminal importance of the war experience was not restricted to the Entente participants. In Germany during the 1920s, as the Weimar Republic struggled to cope with the effects of the Versailles settlement, the heroism and populist nobility associated with the trenches became a powerfully evocative feature of radical right-wing propaganda. Indeed,

violence and the rigours of war were seen by many as the basis for separating the wheat from the chafe in the new era. Militarism was seen not just as an aspect of a nation's foreign policy: it was the key to the rejuvenation of the physical and spiritual health of the entire cultural community. Writing in the mid-1920s, Gregor Strasser thus identified the importance of military service in the foundation of a new elite:

The selection of the best....would be reserved to the trade of arms, which would last for TWO years and therefore attract only the most willing to sacrifice and which would bring with it the mortal danger of war and therefore demand all the heroic virtues!....the military profession would visibly take over the leading role in the state, which above all is its state which it will maintain and protect against all attacks from outside!! (5)

If we study the language of this passage more closely we see how Strasser's discourse conforms to elements of the proto-typical model developed in the previous chapter. Specifically, by promoting individual sacrifice, Strasser appeals to the deep *virtue* of the fascist community. Additionally, he vigorously emphasises the need to defend the historical community by force from outside attack, i.e. in order both to attain *and* protect the fascist society, an overwhelming demonstration of power and resolve was required.

The aggression inherent in fascism's military tradition became the basis of ambitious imperialist projects, which provided the protagonists with an opportunity for glory in the service of the nation. At first sight, nothing might seem further from the idea of European unity than the conflicting agendas of established and developing imperial powers, struggling for dominance over finite territory. However, even here it is possible to identify a proto-Europeanism at work, not in contradiction of national interests, but as a result of common beliefs and a shared cultural tradition. As Griffin points out, though, the significance of such ideological linkage is often underestimated in analysis:

...the national reawakening in Italy was repeatedly seen by zealots of the Third Rome as the local manifestation of *a process of cultural and political regeneration affecting the whole of Europe*. The colossal historical impact of the aggressive imperialist policies adopted by Fascism and Nazism as expressions of exclusivist forms of chauvinism, has led to an understandable tendency for academics to lose sight of the internationalist form which fascist ideology assumed whenever its activists sensed a kindred spirit with the crusades of ultra-nationalists abroad. (6. *Emphasis mine*)

In both Italy and Germany, expansionism was regarded as a cultural (and racial) duty: the irresistible rise of a powerful *telos* through the vehicle of the radicalised state. It was seen as natural and proper that 'backward' indigenous cultures should submit to the dominance of the advanced fascist powers and Africa, in particular, was to be regarded as a resource for exploitation. The sense of superiority, both political and moral, felt by fascist imperialists became a justification in itself for their colonial ambitions. For Mussolini, it was the inherent right of a strong nation to expand, and it was natural also that foreign territories should be drawn willingly to the strength of its ideology.

The Fascist State expresses the will to exercise power and to command. Here the Roman tradition is embodied in a conception of strength. Imperial power, as understood by the Fascist doctrine, is not only territorial, or military, or commercial; it is also spiritual and ethical...Fascism sees in the imperialistic spirit – i.e. in the tendency of nations to expand – a manifestation of their vitality. (7)

As with Strasser, Mussolini demonstrates the will to dominate by force. Mussolini links this Will to Power with the deeper spiritual nature of the historical fascist community. Thus imperialism justifies itself in accordance with our understanding of the proto-typical model, i.e. as a manifestation through violence of the virtue of the historic community, carrying out its civilising tradition in a vital mode of expansion. Increasingly this was effected as a national *and* European endeavour.

Despite differences between the various national positions on imperialist expansion, fascists were consistent in their understanding of the implications for Europe as a continent and as a civilization. The salvation of Europe, based upon the expansion and strength of nations abroad, is a common theme, exemplified here by the German radical conservative, Moeller van der Bruck:

The animal in Man is crawling towards us. Africa is looming from the depths of Europe. We are called upon to be guardians on the threshold of values. (8)

For the European radical right, imperialism was more than simply an opportunity to exploit overseas territories: it was a spiritual mission to redeem the nation, and by extension the foundations of western civilization. Moeller van der Bruck appeals to the myth of action and the principle of force, evoking the dark, Darwinian threat of the Other, and calling for a robust defence of civilization. This urgent call to rescue the West from decadence has much in common with Spengler's description of culture as "an inner passionate struggle to maintain the Idea against the powers of Chaos without" (9). Spengler calls for a revision of the perception of history, and sees culture as the defining element in this. Thus history should be seen:

...not as a mere sum of past things without intrinsic order or inner necessity, but as an organism of rigorous structure and significant articulation, an organism that does not suddenly dissolve into a formless and ambiguous future when it reaches the accidental present of the observer. (10)

As fascism developed in the 1920s, it articulated a highly-politicised version of a disquiet already expressed by Spengler and his contemporaries. The need for 'intrinsic order' and a sense of the 'inner necessity' of the community pervades fascist discourse of this period, as

does its quest for a future full of purpose, not contingent upon 'the accidental present'. The cyclical movement of history promises the possibility of such redemption, or of absolute renewal, and is endowed with a mystical significance by Spengler:

Over the expanse of water passes the endless uniform wave-train of the generations. Here and there bright shafts of light broaden out, everywhere dancing flashes confuse and disturb the clear mirror, changing, sparkling, vanishing. These are what we call the clans, tribes, peoples, races which unify a series of generations within this or that limited area of the historical surface. (11)

These bright flashes of light are reminiscent of the moments of *Erklärung* described by Heidegger: the coming-to-clarity of individual (and communal) consciousness in Being. The community in radical rightist ideology is both a *thing-in-time* and a *thing-of-time*, existing not only in relation to history, but evolved from it, developing into it, appearing, as Heidegger suggested, in 'rare and splendid moments of consciousness'. This community is also far more than a voluntary association of free individuals, as might describe the liberal-rational conception. Spengler is dismissive of such a transitory and contingent form of community, from which "one can join or resign...as one pleases" (12). His conception of a worthy human society is of an "inspired mass-unit" (13) led towards its destiny by a powerful leader, and culture within this society is "an inward form of historical 'becoming' and not a sum of similar objects" (14). This vision of the totalitarian community conforms closely with our prototypical description of the primordialist radical right, particularly its profoundly anti-rational and anti-individualist basis.

...to a cosmic unity one is committed, and committed with one's entire being. Crowds of this order of unity are seized by storms of enthusiasm...They form themselves to the music of chorales, marches

and dances, and are sensitive like human and animal thoroughbreds to the effects of bright colours, decoration, costume, and uniform. (15)

In the pre-1946 period, the practice of fascist mobilisation usually centred upon the ‘cosmic unity’ and ‘inspired mass action’ of the *national* community. However, as becomes increasingly evident, the synthesis of parallel revolutionary processes provided the basis for the emergence of a distinct (if sometimes problematic) pan-Europeanism. Spengler’s rejection of the rational individual and the rationally constructed community, and his celebration of the energised mass, was echoed in many quarters, not least by the Italian fascist, Giovanni Gentile. Although Gentile’s strident nationalism would again seem to preclude the development of an internationalist form of fascism, his mythic conception of the ‘ethical state’ lends itself to a Europeanist fascist alternative and mirrors Spengler’s thought. As Gregor observes:

Gentile’s entire political philosophy was characterized by a conception of collective life that understood individuals to be fused together in an imminence...Where individuals have been corrupted by a protracted period of philosophical individualism and its attendant egotism, they must be made aware that true self-fulfilment cannot be attained without identification “with the universal” – without becoming one, through the state, with the historic community. (16)

This position also closely resembles Bergson’s description of “the organized world as a harmonious whole” which “progresses and *endures* in time” (17). Gentile attempts to mythologise the national community through an appeal to a form of durational historicism. By extension, this was also a mythology of the West and, more specifically, of European civilization.

In Britain, the fascist sympathiser James Strachey Barnes set out a more extensive and explicit case in favour of the development of some form of radical right international in his

Universal Aspects of Fascism. Barnes echoes the spirit of Spengler's historic community in his identification of Mussolini's Rome as part of a continuum in the development of Europe since antiquity.

Fascism has come to stay in Italy. For Europe it stands at the cross-roads looking back towards the two Romes, Imperial and Catholic, that made her civilization, and pointing to its straight continuation as the only safe road by which to advance. Thus its historical function and mission is simply this: to prepare the ground for a new European political and social synthesis, founded on the sure traditions of the past, when Europe was yet one. (18)

Barnes' discursive practice here is interesting. The image he uses of the cross-roads, of the clear sense of direction in the choice of the correct path, reminds us of points made by Popper in the previous chapter. Barnes' historicism is precisely the sort that Popper rejects unreservedly as 'unreal' and 'misleading'. Also, in making his choice on the basis of an essential *belief*, Barnes exemplifies the straight-forwardness of anti-rational political ideologies. Popper makes the point that for the critical rationalist, the will to believe in rationalism is problematic, in that belief is not rational but strongly normative. For anti-rationalists from the radical right, though, no such paradox exists: *spiritual* commitment to the Idea is fundamental.

Barnes stresses the importance and commonality of traditions "which all Europe in a greater or lesser degree shares". He also provides a clear example of what has been referred to as *teleological historicism*. The final aim in Barnes' vision is the creation of 'a new European political and social synthesis', but one 'founded on the sure traditions of the past' (19). This is very much consistent with the vision articulated by Heidegger in his description of a return towards a *creative inception* through the historic community.

Interestingly, Barnes rejects any racial component in the composition of fascism and sees any such tendency as detrimental to the true political and philosophical purpose of the

ideology, referring to it as “a materialistic illusion, contrary to natural law and destructive of civilization. It is the *reductio ad absurdum* of Nationalism” (20). In this respect, Barnes’ vision of universal fascism is faithful to its Italian original, which remained resistant to racial doctrine until the Rome-Berlin axis of 1936, and the subsequent introduction of Nazi-influenced racial legislation in 1938. Indeed, much fascism, and particularly Europeanist fascism, was ideologically distanced from racism before this time. However, in Germany such considerations were of increasing importance, becoming fundamental to pan-Nazi ideology and its hegemonic vision of European unity.

In the meantime, other European intellectuals were voicing loudly their support for the creation of a full fascist federation, which saw Europe as a more robust unit of fate than the Nation. Principal amongst these was the French thinker Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, a passionate advocate of Europeanism, who saw fascism’s action-based programme as the vehicle for such a change. Drieu glimpsed from an early stage the position which was to face post-war neo-fascists, that of a bi-polar power structure between the USSR and the United States. As Cadwallader observes, Drieu was concerned that without a compelling movement towards European unity, the continent would be enveloped by one or other of the new superpowers.

Drieu urges European nation-states to forget their differences, which are, he claims, only superficial, and become one united force. Thus can Europe constitute a third world-force and, at the same time, put an end to internal strife born of differing national interests and culminating in internecine war. He urges his countrymen to consider European federation not as “une rêverie cosmopolite, une imagination de luxe”, but as “une nécessité pressante, une misérable question de vie ou de mort”. (21)

In the Sorelian mould, and consistent with the proto-typical characteristics of the primordialist radical right, Drieu sought to bring about a violent, revolutionary end to the current period of decline, enabling a metapolitical re-birth to occur:

La vie universelle continue: des cendres de l'homme elle va créer un être nouveau. Pour cet être nouveau il y a aura des valeurs nouvelles....pour empêcher la destruction lente que je vois en tous sens, pour arrêter l'évolution pernicieuse, je veux interposer une destruction immédiate, totale, qui ramène l'histoire à ses débuts. (22)

Drieu's European mission assumed a highly spiritual dimension, connecting the lives and shared values of Europeans against the encroachment of Soviet and American materialism. In the above passage, Drieu uses powerful palingenetic images to support his vision of Europe, describing the creation of a new being from the ashes of man. The impact of the Sorelian myth of violence is particularly felt when Drieu calls for the immediate and total destruction of the existing order, returning history to its foundations.

In the turbulent period following the Great War, Drieu pushed for reconciliation between the combatants, believing that the continuation of conflict within Europe would leave the continent vulnerable to the enemies flanking it. In this respect, Drieu was more pragmatic in his analysis than Barnes, and did make some attempt to relate his pan-Europeanism to the political realities surrounding him. In his call for a rapprochement between France and Germany, Drieu was anticipating the basis of the EU project, founded in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Drieu's vision as a Europeanist was challenged, though, by his ultimately disappointing collaboration with Nazi Germany in the 1940s. At this stage in the late 1920s, however, he openly articulated a spirit of fascist internationalism which was widely, if only implicitly, in evidence elsewhere.

There is no single, clearly identifiable strand of thought that can be presented as the 'true' expression of fascist Europeanism. For obvious reasons, German Nazism's ideology dominates the development of radical right thinking during the era of the Third Reich. At the same time, parallel though distinct perspectives exist in the ideology of Italian Fascism.

Additionally, each regime and movement that emerged and flourished during the growth of the radical right in the late 1930s and early 1940s demonstrates its own position with regard to the concept of Europe.

At times these various ideological positions overlap, displaying common features. At other points, each individual strand seems peculiarly specific, and our understanding of their commonality must be more generally inferred. The virtue of an ideal-typical approach that seeks to identify a generic core of fascist Europeanism is that each of these ideological strands may be brought within the scope of the analysis, and may be related to a gradually emerging, impressionistic sense of the whole. This approach captures the aim, if not the exact form, of Freeden's methodology of ideational profiling. Also, by considering the treatment of Europe by the radical right according to generic similarities of discourse, we redress the potential perspectival imbalance caused by the asymmetric relationship existing between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and other fascist movements and states.

Strategic Alignment

1933 is a defining point in any analysis of the development of radical right ideology in the twentieth century. However, we must see the Nazi seizure of power as a symbolic and politically important continuation of a process that was already in existence. We should also be aware that German Nazism was not a straightforward addition to a portfolio of homogenous, radical right ideas. Indeed, what makes Nazism so interesting in the context of this work is the unease with which it sometimes sits in relation to alternative sum-concepts of Europe. Nonetheless, despite these reservations 1933 was, in terms of the development of a pan-European consciousness, a vital point in history.

The principal reason for distinguishing between radical right Europeanism pre- and post-1933 relates to the geo-political development of the continent as a consequence of Nazi rule.

Prior to 1933, Italy stood alone as a representative of state-based fascism. As such, it had commanded admiration from fascist sympathisers and fledgling movements elsewhere in Europe. However, Fascist Italy had remained, until this point, an anomalous political paradigm within a Europe dominated by bourgeois, broadly liberal-democratic and conservative systems, and was more or less obliged to act within the context of those systems, contained according to their rules. No matter how radical the totalitarian domestic agenda in Italy, its ideology found no direct, legitimate support from kindred nations and was unlikely to subvert the established order beyond its own borders.

With the emergence of the National Socialist regime in Germany, a radical shift occurred in the geo-political balance of the European state system. Overnight, effectively, a corridor of fascism was created from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, splitting Europe east from west, providing a viable basis for the 'fascistisation' of the continent. The generic basis of Italian Fascism, and the threats that it identified, were strikingly similar to those of German Nazism. Seeking to establish a firm foundation for this radical right alliance, Mussolini organised a conference in Montreux (December, 1934), at which he intended to promote the idea of a fascist International.

The fact that internationalism was often associated with Bolshevism and Jewry made it unpalatable to many ardent nationalists. However, with the advent of the Nazi state in Germany, Mussolini saw an opportunity to develop the fascist mission in Europe. As Delzell observes, though, such an alliance was never destined to prove straightforward.

Despite the Duce's talk about the "universality" of Fascism, his efforts to organize a kind of Fascist "International"...proved stillborn. Now that Hitler was in power, a new fascistic Mecca had begun to supplant the old shrine at Rome. (23)

After failing to achieve any kind of truly international fascist project at Montreux, Mussolini moved into a strategic alliance with Hitler, in the shape of the Rome-Berlin Axis of November, 1936. Already by this time, Rome was the junior partner in this agreement, but the act itself is of some symbolic value, and the rhetoric surrounding the accord sheds light on the nature of radical right Europeanism at this stage. Speaking on the day of the announcement of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Mussolini described it as: “an axis around which all European states animated by the will to collaboration and peace can also collaborate” (24). Further treaty agreements brought Italy more emphatically into a strategic fascist alliance, with its signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (and Japan) in November, 1937, and the Rome-Berlin ‘Pact of Steel’ in May, 1939, the latter of which provides an affirmation of *European* civilization.

Following this path, marked out for them by history, Germany and Italy intend, in the midst of a world of unrest and disintegration, to serve the task of safeguarding the foundations of European civilization. (25)

In Spenglerian manner, the pact contrasts the outer world of chaos against the solid inner core of Europe, and sets itself the virtuous task of defending this foundation. And Italy was not alone in its participation in a radical right alliance with Germany, as in June, 1936, Franco took up arms against Spain’s republican government in the start of the brutal civil war. Just as the war in Spain became a symbol of left-wing internationalism, so too it assumed importance in the cultivation of the myth of fascist solidarity. The Spanish Civil War became the first occasion where Italians, Germans and Spaniards fought alongside one another in a struggle against Bolshevism and the threat to Europe. The war was used to further the sense that an increasingly powerful alliance of fascist regimes was committed to defending a common European civilization.

In studying the propaganda generated by this conflict we must, to a certain extent, withhold our cynicism and admit the possibility that a sincere form of Europeanist ideology was expressed by the actions of Axis volunteers. This was not, admittedly, the internationalism of socialism, but it was a significant demonstration of ideological unity supported by genuine acts of individual sacrifice (26). The defence of Spain against Bolshevism was seen by volunteers as an affirmation of the expansion of fascism to become something approaching a pan-European ideology. This sense is captured clearly in an address by the commanding officer to a brigade of Italian volunteers in Seville, January 1937:

We, the Volunteers of the 1st Brigade, have asked to come to Spain to fight for the triumph of the Fascist Idea....we, the Volunteers, are true “Crusaders” of the Fascist Idea, which, as a result of our inevitable victory, will triumph throughout Spain, inspiring the enemies with the human and divine Truth inherent in our Idea. (27)

It is significant that the volunteers are referred to here as “Crusaders” of the fascist idea. This is another clear example of the application of anti-rational historicism within the discursive practice of the radical right; in this case, applied directly in the context of battle, ‘grounding’ the struggle in an immanent historical truth.

What also united the Axis forces in Spain, beyond their shared abhorrence of the Bolshevik threat, was their (Sorelian) belief in the primacy of action and, more specifically, violence in attaining the revolutionary goal. As Mussolini makes clear, the opportunity actually to fight for the fascist ideal, shoulder to shoulder with fellow fascists engaged in parallel revolutionary processes, validated and deepened their commitment to an ideology which was both national *and* European.

This community of Italo-German ideas has found its expression in the struggle against Bolshevism....We have acted in this way in Spain, where thousands of Italian Fascist volunteers have fallen to save Western civilization, a civilization which may still experience a rebirth if it turns its back upon the false and lying gods of Geneva and Moscow. (28)

Mussolini's discourse emphasises again the core value of individual sacrifice, and the effort to defend Europe and its 'community of ideas'. In his suggestion that Europe may experience a re-birth, he confirms once more the palingenetic basis of the Europeanist radical right.

Such was its belief in the importance of Fascism's mission in Spain that the Italian regime committed nearly 50,000 'volunteer' troops to the fray. At the same time, Hitler's Germany was supporting the effort, both ideologically and militarily. The analysis of Axis involvement in Spain points to the structural and ideological alignment of European fascist and quasi-fascist regimes. Whilst individually Fascism and Nazism sought *national* revolutions, an international, European dimension was demonstrably emerging. The ideological aims of the movements, their identification of a mutual threat and their glorification of action, brought them far closer to one another than they were to non-fascist nations, creating a *de facto* community of states with a common aim to defend European civilization. As Leitz comments:

Hitler's foremost motive was ideological...he concluded that he had to help the rebels to save Spain from communism...Hitler emphasised that Germany could not accept a Communist Spain under any circumstances. In his ideological motivation to intervene in Spain Hitler was in agreement with his fellow dictator Benito Mussolini, who insisted that 'Bolshevism in Spain would mean Bolshevism in France, Bolshevism at Italy's back, and danger of Bolshevisation of Europe'. (29)

Equally, the 'ungrounded' Europe of shallow liberal democracy was anathema to fascists, who saw it as 'fleeting', 'self-consuming', 'self-deluded' (30). Fascism's mission in Europe was to restore the attachment to the primordial origin, and to overcome the base materialism of

liberalism and Bolshevism. The connection between Heidegger's metapolitical anxiety and Nazism's European programme is readily identifiable: the 'pincer-grip' of American liberalism on the one side and Jewish-Bolshevism on the other; the 'pressure' upon the German people; the burden of the fate of the West (31). This is exemplified here in a speech by Hitler.

...at no moment of my struggle on behalf of the German people have I ever forgotten the duty incumbent upon me and on us all firmly to uphold European culture and European civilization....Those who once faced one another as bitter opponents honour each other today as men who fought bravely in a great struggle that is past and gone and regard each other as the depositories and trustees of a great and common cultural inheritance....I tremble for Europe at the very thought of what would happen to our old and over-populated continent if this Asiatic concept of the world, which is destructive of all our accepted ideals, should be successful in bringing upon us the chaos of the Bolshevik revolution. (32)

Hitler frequently professed his fears for Europe, and for western civilization more generally. A certain reading of Hitler's speeches and letters provides us with a picture of a leader with a strong sense of European mission, in which the defence of Germany against Jewish-Bolshevism is synonymous with the defence of the continent as a whole. The ideological programme developed by Hitler and other Nazi intellectuals was not rationally directed towards specific policy ends, but was a thing-in-itself, centred upon a faith-act in the mission of National Socialism to create a new Germany, and by extension a new Europe.

However, Hitler's attitudes towards Europe are frequently ambiguous, as is demonstrated by his use of the metaphor of the 'family' to describe Europe's internal structures of power. Speaking in March, 1936, he says:

The European nations now form a family in the world. Sometimes it is a quarrelsome family; in spite of everything, the members are related to one another in diverse ways. Culturally and spiritually and economically they are indivisible. In fact, their break up is unthinkable. (33)

Thus 'in spite of' the long history of conflict and divergent national interests that Europe represented, Hitler emphasised the 'indivisibility' of its peoples as "a family in the world", and a hostile world at that. Indeed, Hitler's language of integration goes further still when, in the same speech, he appears to support a form of supranational authority:

In constructing and consolidating a family of nations, such as we have in Europe, it will be wise to apply these inner laws of each State in a super-national manner. It is not wise to imagine that, in so small a household as Europe, there can be a permanent commonwealth of nations in which each nation has its own jurisprudence and in which each wants to uphold its own concept of law and justice.

(34)

The conventional understanding of German Nazism as a form of racist ultra-nationalism does not sit easily with this stated interest in supranational goals. We are inevitably led to question the sincerity of such ideas if, by implication, they anticipate a situation in which Germany would bend its own national laws and interests towards those of other European states. Indeed, in the same speech, Hitler appears to assert the conventional primacy of national interests, when he says: "Although we are quite ready to co-operate as a free and equal member in this world of European culture, we are obstinately determined to remain what we are" (35).

It is difficult to know which Hitler to believe: the committed, Europeanist visionary, or the ruthlessly cynical German nationalist. In fact, the duality of Hitler's position in respect of Europe demonstrates exactly the curious hybridity that characterises Europeanist Nazi

ideology generally: the fate of Germany *was* the fate of Europe, and the racially pure, National Socialist state was to be the centre of a *European* re-birth (36).

Nazi ideologues wished to present the idea that not only was German expansionism not at odds with European interests but that, in fact, it was exactly in accordance with the vital needs of the continent as a community of related peoples. The presentation of fascism as the salvation of *all* European peoples was a vital element in the establishment and (temporary) success of a myriad of pro-fascist, collaborationist movements across the continent, especially in the Occupied Territories.

Hitler was at times suspicious, even disparaging, of fellow-fascist movements that he regarded as inferior to the true, Germanic source of the European revival. Naturally, the Nazis encouraged collaboration from the Occupied Territories and semi-autonomous states within the German sphere of influence, but strictly as subordinates. Thus the conventional view, expressed below by Durand, is perpetuated; i.e. that Nazi Europeanism was simply *de facto* German hegemony.

Lorsque, à partir de 1938, l'Allemagne impose par sa puissance économique et militaire à l'ensemble de l'Europe, son hégémonie, elle trouve partout....des hommes pour collaborer avec ses dirigeants à l'organisation du <nouvel ordre> dit <européen> - en réalité germanique et nazi. (37)

The reality of German hegemony is not disputed here. On the contrary, the veneration of power, and of those who wield it most boldly, should be seen as a fundamental feature of generic fascist ideology. One should hardly expect, therefore, for a system of fascist international relations to be based upon egalitarian consensus. Such a rational, consensual system of international relations was anathema to fascists. If Nazi Germany dominated a 'Nazified' Europe, it was as a result of the natural aristocracy of its people and the 'Will to Power' of its leadership-elite. Fellow-fascists and collaborators should have felt themselves,

like the far-flung citizens of the Roman Empire, privileged to have succumbed to such an irresistible force. Even a staunchly federal Europeanist thinker such as Drieu la Rochelle was able to affirm the dominance of Germany, and to state that “there could be no viable federation without an hegemony’ (38). As Hamilton explains:

...in those first months of German occupation, Drieu’s attitude towards the Third Reich had undergone a transformation. Gone were his fears, his doubts, his hesitations. The defeat of France, so swift, so sudden, so expertly carried out by the enemy, produced in him an irrepressible feeling of admiration. He had always loved strength and, in the chaos of defeat, strength was symbolised in his eyes by Germany. (39)

Ideologues of the collaborationist movements enthusiastically set about justifying German hegemony by appealing to collective European destiny and necessity, presenting Nazi domination as a force for good. This sentiment is clearly expressed by the Belgian Rexist leader, Leon Degrelle:

National Socialist Germany, whether she wishes it or not, will hereafter be responsible for Europe. Either she will build a stable peace, an order not only material but moral, or Europe will be plunged into anarchy. (40)

Virtually all discussion of the structural Europeanist agenda of the radical right at this time is inseparable from the reality of the Nazi German presence in international affairs. This reality became accepted as both irrevocable and just by the ideologues of collaboration. Despite developing their own compatible forms of fascism in a specific national context, they became subsumed within the burgeoning Germanic Empire that was the nucleus of an emerging, fascist conceptualisation of Europe, expressed below by the Nazi ideologue, Werner Daitz:

...a people cannot with impunity transgress the higher law of the community to which it belongs by race or violate the political, economic and cultural interests, rights and duties which arise organically from it...the peoples of Europe must again be Europeanized, so that they once more become citizens of their continent and, thereafter, of the world. Europe for the Europeans! (41)

In an attempt to validate their effective subjugation, collaborationist ideologues immersed themselves in the myth of Europe, adapting it to the new reality, seeking to generate through their enterprise a place in the developing order. Frequently, such efforts were an exercise in wilful naivety, as the example below from the Norwegian Nazi, Quisling, attests:

In due course the Germanic union will be a fact, and then Norway will take its free and honourable place in the new Europe...Germany, the leading power in the reconstruction of Europe, shares this view, and it is therefore all the more incumbent on the Nasjonal Samling to educate the Norwegian people to take a conscious, active part in furthering the new community of nations. (42)

The analysis of the structural basis of fascist Europeanism leads us to conclude that although evidence exists of genuine attempts to establish a supranational dimension in radical right thinking, almost all practical initiatives in this direction were dominated by the reality of Nazi German hegemony. As has been argued, owing to the nature of generic fascist thought this hegemony was not necessarily at odds with a genuinely pan-European idea. However, a purely structural consideration of relations between radical right movements at this time prevents us from appreciating the wider convergence of the component-concepts underpinning the various strands of fascism. From a different perspective, one that emphasises the development of compatible forms of *myth*, the asymmetric relationship between German and non-German ideologies becomes less significant. Instead, what emerges is that throughout radical right ideology of this period, parallel mythic constructs were being

created, and that, directly or indirectly, these constructs referred and contributed to the sum-concept of 'Europe'.

Mythic Europeanism

One of the key components in radical right thought during the inter-war period was the crusade against Bolshevism. Europe was faced with the very real possibility that this radical, 'Asiatic' ideology would penetrate and overthrow western European society, and against the background of this threat, all political thought of the radical right is thrown into relief. In many cases, though not all, the threat of Bolshevism was tied in with a long-standing, anti-Semitic tradition in European nationalism. The result of this, as is well documented in the history of National Socialist movements in various countries, was a hysterical, pervasive phobia. This phobia was no simple conspiracy theory, though: it was a systematically developed 'myth of threat', giving substance and urgency to the fascist programme for the salvation of the nations of Europe. As Kallis writes, in this myth each separate nation was threatened; but equally powerful was the sense of *collective* European destiny, and the spiritual resonance with which, by virtue of fascism's heroic defence, the continent as a whole was endowed.

Bolshevism represented a lethal menace both to individual nations and to the whole existence of 'European' civilisation. Fascism represented, therefore, a dual defence. First, it should safeguard the elite character of the nation against the international forces of corruption. Second, it had to defend the European culture. (43)

Europeanist mythic development in fascist ideology was acutely affected by the perception of the Bolshevik threat. The community of destiny that fascism sought to create between

European nations was only meaningful in the context of a communal danger. Without the threat of Bolshevism, fascism would have lost its urgency and relevance, and a united European front may have seemed little more than a whimsical cultural project. It is the myth of threat that facilitates the synthesis of all other fascist myths of Europe.

The prominence of anti-Semitic propaganda in the conspiracy myths of European fascist movements is varied. Initially, for example, Italian Fascism made virtually no reference to the racial basis of communities, though this position changed as the influence of Nazi ideology became more strongly felt. The anti-Semitic aspect of Nazi propaganda, both in Germany and elsewhere, centred upon the idea that Jews were fundamentally subversive, parasitic and morally corrupt. The defence of Germany against international Jewry was, therefore, as Goebbels warns, part of a collective struggle for western civilization:

“Europe must see and recognize the danger....We shall point fearlessly to the Jew as the inspirer and originator....Look, there is the world’s enemy, the destroyer of civilizations, the parasite among the peoples, the son of Chaos, the incarnation of evil, the ferment of decomposition, the demon who brings about the degeneration of mankind. (44)

Although the obsession with the Jewish threat was not always as vitriolic as that expressed here, it was an increasingly common feature of European fascist ideologies, and even within more mainstream thinking. In Hungary, for example, as Riedy observes: “The Hungarians identified communism and Jewry with a failure to govern and a failure to defend the nation.” (45). The influence of Nazi Germany on the whole of Eastern Europe brought about a significant movement towards the extreme right in domestic politics, and a corresponding increase in anti-Semitic feeling (46). Movements such as the Hungarian Arrow Cross and the Romanian Iron Guard sought to locate themselves within the framework of a pan-European struggle against international Jewry and Bolshevism, supporting the suggestion that despite the

explicitly nationalistic character of such movements, they actively aligned themselves into an ideological federation of sorts. Describing the leader of the Iron Guard, Morgan observes:

Codreanu's support of an alliance with the fascist powers was [...] a mark of the 'internationalism' of this most idiosyncratic and national of European fascist movements...Each country's 'national revolution' was part of a wider struggle to 'save' Europe. (47)

However, anti-Semitism was less significant to the development of a fascist myth of Europe than the response to Bolshevism, which was a universally defining feature of radical right movements. Bolshevism was regarded as a threat to the spiritual integrity of European nations. The emphasis in Marxist philosophy upon understanding human society in material terms denies the anti-rational, spiritual dimension of racial and cultural nationalism. Internationalist communism was directly at odds with the continued existence of European national identities; it was an outright assault upon the core spiritual values of fascist movements, as the quasi-fascist Portuguese leader, Salazar, states: "Communism is the synthesis of all the traditional revolts of matter against spirit, of barbarism against civilization. It is the 'great heresy' of our age" (48). Salazar demonstrates here the prominence of the defence of civilization in fascist thought. This conceptual feature assumes an almost religious significance, founded upon a faith-act in the historical community. It is, perhaps, not unconsciously, therefore, that Salazar refers to communism as heresy, provoking associations with the brutal spiritual purges of the medieval church.

The concerted reaction against the Bolshevik threat by fascist and quasi-fascist movements constituted more than a series of comparable or co-incidental occurrences: it was seen increasingly as the basis of a deep political alliance of fascist nations, united according to their common purpose. The continued existence of the national unit within this supranational myth

was not contradictory. Fascist Europeanism was evolving as a national *and* international idea: the defence of the sanctity of the nation serving as a powerful bond (49).

Propaganda from this time demonstrates the fascist perception of Bolshevism as a pan-European threat, and project the belief in a common response. In political images of the period, the peoples of Europe are represented as united against the common enemy, the massed ranks of European national armies, led by Nazi Germany, heroically challenging the brutal aggression of the Red Army (50). Images such as this are particularly notable as they emphasise the response of the European nations to the Bolshevik threat as separate, yet simultaneously united, pre-figuring the more developed discourse of the post-war radical right. Also, the image portrays a specifically Christian Europe, downtrodden by atheistic savages from the east. The myth of the Bolshevik threat enabled the ideologues of collaborationist movements such as Quisling, Degrelle and, below, the Dutch Nazi, Mussert, to champion the cause of European fascist unity.

After centuries of separatism and decentralization there has again come a time when the European peoples are conscious of their need for solidarity....Victory over the alliance of Asiatic communism with American capitalism must be followed by the victory of peace in Europe itself, the organization of European peoples, their cooperation, mutual respect and consideration, so that the defence of Europe is seen as a common interest and a common duty. (51)

The fear of a Bolshevik revolution in Europe galvanised separate fascist movements to act in a collective, defensive spirit. However, in an ideological conflict so sustained and widespread, it was necessary for fascist ideologues to represent Europe as something more deeply rooted in the historical community of European civilization. Not only were common links identified between separate national cultures, but contained within each national historical myth were powerful, parallel references to a unified historical *telos*. Thus, although

no single historical myth of European civilization emerges, the simultaneous process of 'reaching back' undertaken by fascist ideologues at this time inevitably led to a distinct convergence of interpretation. The myths developed were analogous and, as such, they became increasingly collectivised into a *combined* myth of European civilization.

Within this myth the two pillars around which fascist ideology developed were, not surprisingly, the Roman and the Germanic. The fact that these two foci dominated historical thinking on Europe is a logical consequence of the strategic significance of the respective regimes. However, the existence of rival 'poles' in the historical development of European civilization was potentially problematic. Was it credible to speak of a single European community, when the historical myths upon which this community was founded ranged from the Hellenic, to the Roman, to the Carolignian, to the Norse? The challenge for fascist ideologues was to develop a myth of European civilization which appealed to these separate traditions, yet drew them together by virtue of their universality, i.e. in terms of the universal values that they embodied: heroism, beauty, creativity, steadfastness, etc. In this way, the fascist myth of civilization directly served the propaganda needs of the Axis, emphasising the unity of purpose of fellow-fascist nations, brought together to face a common threat and defending a core set of values. As the fascist Pellizi writes:

For us Italians the ideal, historic nucleus of the European idea...consists in Italo-German solidarity and the Rome-Berlin Axis...In Europe there are many nations, very different in size and character, in their history and languages, race, religion and customs; but for a long time past there has been a common thread of civilization, which today is still more evident, and should be a stronger force making for solidarity. (52)

The fascist community of Europe aimed to realize Sorel's call for mythic history to replace rational history. Indeed, for Sorel, the myth of European civilization would have been clearly

understood as the basis for concerted political action. This assertion is consistent with Sorel's description of myths generally as, "identical to the convictions of a group, an expression of these convictions in the language of movement" (53). Mythic history was also based upon the interpretation of signs, readily engaging with the eclectic symbolism of European civilization. This 'cross-fertilisation' of historical myth is particularly evident in the work of the Nazi ideologue, Alfred Rosenberg.

Rosenberg saw the rebirth of European culture under Nazism as part of a grand historical tradition derived from a Nordic source. His spurious mythology of history, developed at length in his work, "Myth of the Twentieth Century" (1930), sought to relate the greatness of a common European civilization to its rootedness in Aryan Nordicism. As Herzstein comments:

Rosenberg's *Mythos* was a celebration of Nordic blood as the creative source of European culture. Yet he had stretched things quite a bit to see it as the foundation of a European ideology...He argued that the 'Irano-Indians' as well as the Greeks, Romans and Germans had moved from north to south, bringing the racial seed of a higher culture with them. The *Nordic* spirit was thus a source of the cultures of Greece, Troy and India. Modern Nordics should admire the ancient Greeks and Romans, since their Germanic ancestors created those cultures. (54)

In constructing this myth, Rosenberg was attempting to draw together the disparate cultures of Europe into a potent synthesis; in particular, seeking to fuse the origins of the Germanic and Græco-Roman traditions. Given Rosenberg's strong intellectual credentials, we should conclude that his misappropriation of history was a conscious enterprise, a form of historicist conceit, aimed at validating his 'rediscovery' of the sacred heart of Europe in the Germanic tradition. Such an assertion is supported by Rosenberg's own published work, with one essay entitled "Rebirth of Europe as History in the Making" (55).

The compelling, mythic value of ancient European civilization is also seen in propaganda images of the period. In one image, for example, German troops are photographed hoisting the Reich's war banner on the summit of Mount Olympus during the campaign in Greece (56). Rationally considered, there was little meaning or value in this action; but the fascist myth of European civilization was not rationally constructed. As Popper argues, rational thought can never approach or approximate the affective force of an irrationally held belief. By 'conquering' Mount Olympus, Nazi Germany was associating itself with a heroic European tradition of gods and warriors. This association was intended to stimulate a *return* to this classical origin, what Young referred to as a 'creative re-realization'; or as de Benoist described it, becoming 'imbued with the spirit' of 'the Greek miracle'.

Fascists saw themselves as the defenders of civilization, and their mission as analogous to those of the various heroic peoples of Europe who had come before. Such a position was based upon a deeply romantic, anti-rational understanding of European history, and was exploited effectively for recruitment to Himmler's Waffen-SS, exemplified in mobilisation posters of the time (57). The associations created by the images in these posters are essentially the same: soldiers from the modern Nordic alliance of the Waffen-SS, shadowed by their mythic counterparts: the Viking warrior, the medieval knight. The exhortations from the posters to "Fight!" reinforce earlier observations about the prominence of a Sorelian myth of violence in our understanding of the Europeanist radical right. Additionally, the myth of conspiracy or threat is demonstrated by the identification of Bolshevism as the common enemy of the Nordic peoples.

German Nazism cultivated convoluted historical myths in which early Christian symbolism was intertwined with pagan Nordic and Teutonic ritualism (58). Interestingly, this appeal to 'occultist' ritualism also betrayed an implicit rejection of Christian values by many Nazi intellectuals in favour of the pagan warrior-cult. Nazism, after all, was its own political

religion, and set itself implicitly against what Nietzsche had described as the “slave mentality” of Christianity.

...for youthful, vigorous barbarians Christianity is *poison*; to implant the teaching of sinfulness and damnation into the heroic, childish and animal soul of the ancient German, for example, is nothing other than to poison it. (59)

Yet, paradoxically, one of the elements drawing together fascist movements was the belief that the European homeland was Christian. As the Italian Fascist, Mantovani, asserts: “The Christian ideal is the only one on which all are agreed, above and beyond considerations of politics, and it is this which gives form and content to the idea of Europe.” (60). The Christian link between the nations of Europe throughout the ages was significant in enabling fascist ideologues to draw together essentially separate periods (Roman-Christian, Carolignian, the Crusades), and geo-cultural spheres (Nordic, Germanic, Latin, Magyar) into a loosely combined mythic whole.

The dichotomy between Nazi paganism and a pan-European Christian heritage was never properly resolved. It remains as a further example of the fluid and sometimes contradictory nature of radical right Europeanism at this time. Whilst the construction of a myth of European civilization may appear haphazard, though, there are common features that bring the component elements together: the romantic, anti-rational interpretation of history, the identification of core values (heroism, resolve, sacrifice, etc.) as part of a virtuous European tradition, and the commitment of fascist movements to defend Europe vigorously against external threat.

The myth formed around blood-belonging, or biological community, was adaptable and applicable to a range of national settings. As a result, a host of ideological approaches to the question of blood-community are evident at this time. The extent to which the blood-myth

constituted a form of pan-Europeanism is debatable, though. To begin with, not all fascist movements subscribed to the idea of biological determinism, and some explicitly rejected it. Italian Fascism only belatedly adopted a racial component to its ideological programme in 1938, under pressure from its Axis partner. In 1936, the French rightist Croix de Feu movement poured scorn on the racial ideal, describing it as erroneous, “the exclusive appanage of such nations as have remained primitive” (61).

Nonetheless, there were repeated attempts made by fascist movements at this time to identify genuine forms of blood-community, and to develop myths of belonging in relation to these. Although the boundaries of blood-communities tended to vary (often markedly) according to the disposition of the individual ideologue, when looking at the discursive development of blood-myths it is possible to identify in this fluidity a synthesis of approaches, drawn together under the dominant influence of German Nazism.

Nazism’s understanding of European community was based upon a fervent conviction in the existence of a distinct blood-community of racially pure, Germanic Aryans. The foremost example of this thinking was Himmler’s vision of the racially elite Schutzstaffel (SS), which selected only those of the purest blood and bestowed upon them a mission of the utmost importance.

We have formed ranks, and now, obeying unalterable laws, march as a National Socialist order of soldiers infused with a Nordic sensibility...into a distant future. We believe that we will be not just the grandchildren who fought the fight more resolutely, but also the ancestors of future generations necessary for the eternal life of the German and Germanic people. (62)

The discursive practice here is familiar in terms of its adherence to the proto-typical model of the radical right. In describing the massed ranks of the SS, marching as one, Himmler demonstrates the rejection of individuality within the combined mass consciousness of the

community. The emphasis on obedience and personal sacrifice in the 'resolute fight' is consistent with the prominence of virtue in radical right ideology.

In Himmler's vision of a racially pure utopia, national political identity was less important than blood-belonging, hence his validation of the Nordic and Germanic alongside the German. This was, arguably, a form of Europeanism, though it would be more accurate to describe it as pan-Germanism or pan-Nordicism, as no mention is made of Latin peoples. Indeed, this is one of the more problematic features of the blood-myth as a component of a broader mythology of Europe. Blood-belonging was, by its very nature, an exclusive concept. The blood community could only be defined in relation to those who were *not* of the community, i.e. the racial outsider, the inferior Other, as Roberts observes:

Weltanschauung ends at the German racial border; outside is a world of darkness whose inhabitants are doomed by nature never to share in this particular *Weltanschauung*. The border is impassable, for no man can change his race. (63)

Awkwardly for the idea of a united, fascist Europe, this narrow, Germanic definition of blood-community threatened to exclude many Axis and collaborationist supporters, including Mussolini's Italian Fascists and Degrelle's Walloon Rexists. In effect what occurred, following the strategic domination of Europe by Nazi Germany, was the domination of Europeanist ideological development by the Nazi blood-myth. Thus, increasingly throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, the ideologues of pro-fascist movements gravitated towards the norm of Nazi Aryanism.

This trend led to some peculiar ideological shifts, typified by an academic paper published in Rome (1938), which asserted (despite earlier disavowals of racist ideology) that Italians were, in fact, Aryans after all. The conceptual gymnastics undertaken to make this ideological shift possible (reminiscent of Rosenberg's *Mythos*) were, significantly, based upon references to

a *European* racial community, the Aryan, which in turn was divided into sub-groups of Nordics, Mediterraneans, etc. What is also made explicit in this paper is the distinction between European and non-European blood-belonging.

Union between different races is admissible only within the ambit of European races, and in this sense one cannot talk of hybridism in the true sense of the term, seeing that these races belong to a common stock and differ only in certain characteristics, while they are similar in many others. An Italian's purely European character is altered by the admixture of blood of any extra-European race that carries with it a civilization different from the many-thousand-year-old civilization of Aryans. (64)

The discursive practice here is worthy of some attention. Firstly, it suggests that the Aryan racial community is a *pan-European* blood-myth, not exclusively Germanic. It attempts to reconcile the divergent nature of European national communities according to their common characteristics (which are, of course, not specifically defined). It strengthens the notion of a European community as distinct from the non-European, the Other. Finally, it relates the blood-community to the idea of civilization, so that the two forms of myth become mutually supportive and enhancing.

The combination of these features demonstrates the malleability of the blood-myth in fascist thinking on Europe. It was a myth that, by twists and turns, could accommodate numerous variations upon the theme of racial identity, provided that all were agreed upon the exclusion of certain inferior blood-groups; i.e. Jews, Slavs, Negroes; and, implicitly, the effective supremacy of Germanic Aryanism at the core of a European revival. Of these variations, a number are especially prominent: the Germanic, Nordic, Latin, and Magyar. Each of these blood-communities had its own distinct sense of self, yet was simultaneously referent to a broader, loosely defined, supranational community of European racial groups.

The Germanic form of the Aryan blood-myth was, logically, focused upon the Greater Germanic Reich at its core. For Nazi Germans, there was no debate over the validity of their claim to racial superiority: what was more problematic was the relationship between Germanic Aryanism and 'inferior' (though politically convenient) parallel myths of racial belonging. Hitler was personally suspicious of statements about the compatibility of non-German racial groups. However, the extension of the Germanic group to encompass, for example, the Dutch and Flemish was potentially advantageous, particularly when linked to Germany's strategic vision of a united, occupied Europe. Collaborationist ideologues, such as Mussert, were thus in turn drawn to the glory of the Germanic blood-myth.

...there must first be a union of all who are of the same blood, the community of Germanic peoples expressed in a political form....In the first place this will of course comprise the homelands of the German and Dutch peoples, the Swedes, Norwegians and Danes. (65)

As with Drieu la Rochelle, Mussert and other collaborators were drawn to the strength of the Germanic race, as well as the Nazi idea. This conforms to earlier observations made about the nature of Europeanist radical right ideology: it would be uncharacteristic of the fascist myth of blood-community to develop as egalitarian and pluralist. Rather, the German blood-myth sets itself at the heart of the European idea, *rightfully* dominating other sub-myths of the European blood-community, which in turn gravitate towards this strategic and ideological nucleus.

Amongst the general population of Scandinavian countries, the idea of a Nordic racial community was not particularly popular. The success enjoyed by Scandinavian fascist movements was largely due to the material influence of Nazi Germany, rather than a genuine enthusiasm for racial ideology. The blood-myth of Nazism was too crude for the majority of

Scandinavians who were, as Wiskemann puts it, “sadly unappreciative of the superior caste status which was offered to them” (66).

Nonetheless, fascist movements in Scandinavian countries did develop their own, parallel myths of blood-belonging, which are striking in their similarity to Germanic Nazism, and which echo the belief in distinct, blood-related, European groups. Nordicism developed as a complementary concept within the broader field of European racial identity. Just as Europeanist fascism developed through the simultaneity of national movements, guided by a *de facto* internationalist ethos, so the same logic can be applied to the overlapping definition of European blood-communities.

In a useful analysis of Scandinavian fascism in the inter-war period, Lindström summarizes the position of the main radical right movements in relation to key ideas and policy areas. From this summary there emerges a common theme of Nordic blood-belonging, shared by the main parties. Thus, for example, the Danish National Socialist Workers' Party (DNSAP) calls for “a regeneration of the Danish people, economically and morally, on a Nordic cultural and racial basis”. In Sweden, the main Nazi movement (SNP) demanded “racial protection in order to preserve our free Nordic creativity”, whilst in Norway, Quisling's Nasjonal Samling (NS) sought connections with ‘racially related people’ (67). Although the importance attached to biological community differs slightly between these cases, the existence of a blood-myth is a feature common to each. The increasingly conformist nature of pan-Nazi ideology under German influence and control post-1940 only served to accelerate the penetration of radical right thought with a pan-European myth of blood-belonging.

Under the symbol of the Swastika we strive to arrive at friendly cooperation with the other Nordic-Germanic people, to whom we feel ourselves connected through the Bond of Blood. (68)

Germanic-Nordicism was not the only focus for 'blood-thinking', though it was certainly the most developed and pervasive form. Elsewhere, parallel myths of blood-belonging were created according to the ethnic and political traditions which informed them. In Eastern Europe, the most significant of these was the Magyar ideology of Szálasi's Hungarian Arrow Cross movement. The Magyars, as Morgan observes, were part of an alternative linguistic-cultural grouping (Turanians) with links to the Finns and Estonians. Although the orientation of Magyar racial ideology differs from Germanic Aryanism, the same mythic process is evident, as well as the same implicit reference to a wider, continental racial identity.

Szálasi's 'Hungarism' was a bizarre version of racial geo-politics, but no more bizarre than Hitler's vision of an Aryan racist-imperialist utopia....Szálasi envisaged a global racial 'new order', where each of the dominant 'master races'....would carve out huge regional and ethnically grouped empires.

(69)

Italian Fascism belatedly developed a theory of racial belonging that was different still. Italian Fascist propaganda relates Aryanism to a *European* racial community, rather than a narrowly defined Nordic or Germanic form. The 'Other' in the case of the Italian blood-myth was the non-white population of Africa, (and particularly, of course, conquered Abyssinia). As Kallis writes:

...the black race was both culturally and biologically inferior to the 'Aryan' race, and therefore its subjugation to white rule was legitimate and its separation from the white peoples essential....Fascism's universal task, it was alleged, was to civilise the inferior races and to defend the purity of western civilization from racial miscegenation, which could harm the intellectual qualities of the white race.

(70)

The examples provided above demonstrate a range of interpretations of the myth of blood-community. Racial ideology did not exist as something separate and divorced from the political reality of fascist Europe. Germanic Aryanism, in its strength of purpose and single-mindedness, was a reflection of the dominant position of Nazi Germany. Similarly, associated forms of collaborationist Germanic ideology and semi-autonomous Nordic thinking were an expression, in part, of the status of the movements to which they were attached. Peripheral ideologies, such as Szálasi's Magyar Hungarism, are of limited significance within the overall scheme of blood-thinking in Europe, as was the movement in political terms. Finally, Mediterranean fascism, with its emphasis upon the primacy of culture, attaches its concept of racial community to a broader myth of civilization.

Thus, there is no single definition of the European biological community: racial groupings were defined in relation to specific conditions and objectives. However, the advancement of the various forms of blood-thinking was often related to the defence of European and/or western civilization. Additionally, and perhaps more consistently, each of these blood-myths was based upon the rejection of a non-European Other: the Jew, the Slav, the Negro, etc. Despite some inconsistencies within blood-thinking, it is possible to assert that a degree of convergence was evident, and that the myth of blood-belonging constituted a significant feature of the generic fascist concept of Europe.

Despite the industrial and technological creativity of fascist regimes, cosmopolitan urban society tended to be associated with the rootlessness and decadence of liberal-capitalism, which had removed the European genius from its primal attachment to the earth, from which it originated. A consistent feature of European fascist discourse is its fascination with the pastoral landscape, and its faith in the rootedness and spiritual constancy of rural life.

This powerful myth of territorial belonging characterised the Europeanist radical right's longing for an origin, an anchor in the world, from which proceeded a deeper comprehension of Being that Heidegger describes as 'knowing the ground':

Knowing the ground is more originary, that is, more far-reaching than common understanding...This knowing *is* character itself. It is that stamp of man without which all firmness of will remains blind stubbornness, all deeds mere fleeting successes, all action a self-consuming busyness, and all 'experiences' self-delusions. (71)

In the totality of Being that Heidegger describes, Man is the only creature who is referent to Being, who can transcend the 'self-consuming busyness' of inauthentic existence, and achieve *authenticity*. The pastoral landscape, in its timelessness and simplicity, most effectively enables this transcendence inward, far more so than the restless metropolis. The appeal of fascism to the rootedness and authenticity of the European landscape is typified in the following extract from the SS "Schwarze Korps" newspaper, written in January, 1945:

The secret lies in unity. In the totality of life, in our way of seeing, conceiving, and experiencing life as an indivisible whole...the village, the farm, the field, the meadow, the forest, the realm of childhood shrouded in the distant glow of memory...everything which has grown and has taken shape, the fruit of centuries and the seed of the future...It is from the heart of Europe that all the streams have flowed which nourished the inner life of the continent. (72)

This particular passage is rich in discursive examples that conform closely to the prototypical model of the radical right. The totality and indivisibility described are closely related to Heidegger's conception of the original totality of Being. The depiction of agrarian life is highly romanticised, and purposefully roots the origin of individual being in the pastoral landscape, which is, of course, a *shared* landscape. The historical community grows from the same soil, and in being so bound to a common origin, the organic nation becomes inseparable from its physical proximity to the earth.

The earth is thus the physical life of the people; those who work the land are most closely bound to this life-giving force and their existence is *authentic* (73). In particular, it is the organic growth of the pastoral landscape, of the very plants and trees, that is drawn into this fascist myth of belonging. The cyclical, repetitive, unbroken chain of the seasonal landscape emphasises these same characteristics in the historical community, which is itself living and growing into the future as part of the process of what Bergson calls “the universal becoming” (74).

The spiritual rejuvenation of the national *and* European historical community depended upon the protection of, and engagement with, the land. Thus, the veneration of physical labour within Nazi German ideology was reflected in the political organization of the Reichsarbeitsdienst-RAD (75). At an organisational level, the efficiency and success of labour was vital to the mission of National Socialism as a whole. On a deeper, more symbolic level, these workers embodied the fundamental aims of Nazi ideology: a return to pastoral simplicity; the exaltation of service and community; physical proximity to the land; and the rejection of individualist, liberal cosmopolitanism. From the earliest stages of National Socialist rule, the health of the German peasantry was regarded as vitally important to the survival of western civilization generally.

If this disintegration ultimately also engulfs the German peasants, we will be confronted by a catastrophe of incalculable dimensions. For not only will this mean the end of a Reich, but also of a two-thousand-year-old inheritance of the highest and loftiest values of human culture and civilization.

(76)

This pastoral myth of attachment was extensively developed by the Nazi ideologue and Minister of Agriculture, Walther Darré. Around the rallying cry of “Blut und Boden” (77) Darré refined a long-standing feature of radical right thinking in Germany, namely the

association between the physical landscape of the homeland and the lifeblood of the *Volk*. As Roberts observes:

The German holds that he is the product of his soil. A race is kneaded by its environment over a long period of time – the original blood is tempered by centuries of contact with the local earth...Hitler declares war on deracializing cities and tries to stop the racial enervation they cause by turning to the land as a revivifying agency. (78)

The association between the physical landscape and the spiritual health of the nation was a propaganda feature of many fascist organizations, and it is no coincidence that the initial support for fascist movements was often strongest amongst rural communities. Through the process of ideological convergence already suggested, it is possible to see this myth of attachment to the land as a form of Europeanist fascist thinking. Reference to a specifically *European* landscape was limited, but the discursive recognition of the commonality of the pastoral ideal, of its traditions and rituals, was an ideologically binding force.

In Italy, the agrarian character of the nation was celebrated as a central feature of the fascist revolution. In propaganda images, labourers are shown harvesting crops grown in the very centre of Rome (79). To a great extent, programmes such as this were both pragmatically and ideologically motivated, intended to affirm the regime's commitment to agrarian values, to demonstrate the rootedness of Italian society in a pastoral myth. They also mimicked the agrarian programme of German Nazism, demonstrating in another respect its gravitational influence.

The example provided by the fascist regimes in Germany and Italy was highly attractive to quasi-fascist, radical peasant organizations elsewhere in Europe. In France, for instance, the Dorgerist, 'Greenshirt' movement was influenced strongly by German and Italian fascist ideology, and the regimes of Franco and Salazar (80). Fearing the threat to their agrarian

existence from the pressures of modernity, the Dorgerists believed that the rural community was the true foundation of a healthy French nation:

They considered family agriculture the one remaining healthy part of a corrupt country. For them, the farms and villages of France were the place where prolific families, simple faith and patriotism, and the discipline of hard work still reigned. Without them, France would be frivolous, sterile, cynical, skeptical – and weak. The peasantry as a moral resource had become a stock item of patriotic oratory. (81)

Elsewhere, pastoral myths of attachment were a central feature of fascist and quasi-fascist ideologies. This is reflected in the programmes of Scandinavian fascist movements: in the Nasjonal Samling's promise of a "national peasant policy which secures a free self owning farmer and smallholder estate"; or in the SNP's call for the "resuscitation of agriculture" (82). Across Europe, fascist movements developed parallel forms of pastoral myth, and the compatibility of these myths with one another is readily apparent: they constituted common ideological ground between national movements and, in combination with other myths of belonging, formed a bond of common European tradition.

The pastoral myth of attachment in fascist ideology was not just a concern with rural social issues. The pastoral myth appealed to the mysticism of primordialist fascist thinking, which again refers us to the thought of Heidegger and Bergson. The engagement with the landscape in fascist ideology constituted an attempt to return to the origin, to rid society of the detritus of decadent modernity. By working the land, the peasant became attuned to the eternal rhythms and movements of the Earth, becoming truly creative. As Gentile wrote: "to live is to participate in the constant becoming of the world and to maintain a relationship between the external and internal that preserves and sustains the center that we occupy" (83). The pastoral existence, with its constituent myths, rituals and traditions, was a common feature of European fascist thinking, transcending fractured modernity through its elemental balance.

Admittedly, this thinking did not always (or, indeed, usually) refer itself to a specifically European landscape, but within the overlapping conceptualisations of a European “ethnoscape” (84) there is a strong suggestion of shared destiny and common identity.

The development of the fascist concept of Europe under the banner of National Socialism was matched in its speed and energy only by the process of eventual disintegration and disillusionment that followed the defeats of Stalingrad and Normandy. As the short, barrelling wave of fascist European integration began to collapse and recede, the hopes of its ideologues unravelled. The failure of German Nazism for figures such as Drieu la Rochelle and Degrelle signified the impending collapse of European civilization. As Hamilton observes:

Gone were the hopes of a national socialist revolution, of a European federation led by a strong European country. Either Europe would be overrun by the communists or the enfeebled democracies of before the war would be reinstated under American hegemony and war would break out all over again. (85)

However, even as the fascist vision was consumed in flames in 1945, its myth of Europe remained defiantly prominent. Significantly, as Baird notes:

When the end came, reality was completely eclipsed by Nazi myth. Instead of announcing the banal truth that Hitler had committed suicide in his bunker, the Nazis claimed that the Führer had died leading a band of loyal followers in a final effort to turn back the ‘Jewish-Bolshevik’ influx into *the sacred European heartland*. (86. *Emphasis mine*)

By the summer of 1945, the fascist European project lay in pieces, its ideologues either dead, captured or exiled. Its myths, however, endured to spawn a new generation and type of radical right Europeanist thought. The next stage of the analysis will examine how a second-wave Europeanism began to be reinstated by neo-fascists in the post-war era.

A Fascist Myth of Europe?

What emerges most clearly from the analysis of the sum-concept of Europe in fascist ideology during this period is the overwhelming dominance of German Nazism. Despite the existence of compatible mythic programmes, notably the Nordic and Latin, the conclusion that these were subordinate to the German model is almost inescapable. The key features of a potential fascist Europeanism are outlined above. The question which remains, though, is to what extent these can be regarded as a coherent conceptual core, distinct from, if inextricably related to, German nationalist ideology.

Judged according to the consensual nature of liberal Europeanism, the fascist variant seems woefully flawed. As German Nazism expanded and proliferated to assume an imperialistic character, it permeated non-German fascist thinking. Non-German concepts of Europe that had preceded Nazi rule, even the bold, federalist vision of Drieu la Rochelle, were overwhelmed by their virulent ideological neighbour; so much so that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish one type from another.

However, as has previously been asserted, the undeniable hegemony of Nazi Germany in both strategic and ideological terms does not negate the possibility that a European sum-concept existed and thrived during this period: in fact, in a paradoxical way, it validates and affirms it. The fascist concept of a European community must be judged entirely differently from its liberal counterpart, and according to our proto-typical understanding of its ideological character. The constituent features of fascist ideology, its Nietzschean principle of power, its Sorelian myth of violence, *demand*ed that the community of Europe be *led* towards its collective destiny, just as the respective communities of sovereign fascist nations were led towards theirs.

Even if we accept, though, that Germany could legitimately dominate a united fascist Europe, we are still left to consider whether Europeanist fascist thought was based upon

broader foundations than this and, with certain reservations, we can conclude that it was. The active, strategic participation by various fascist and quasi-fascist regimes in a teleological programme that frequently referred to Europe (or the West), coupled with the explicit or implicit convergence of their respective mythologies, points towards the significant presence of the sum-concept of Europe in fascist thinking of the period.

This conceptual proximity is summarised in the profile below. The aim of this summary at this stage of the analysis is to provide a limited crystallisation of the sum-concept of Europe in first-wave radical right ideology. Working around the key conceptual components identified in the proto-typical model in Chapter 1, the profile provided here draws together discursive ‘markers’ from the texts analysed above. These markers provide examples of particular conceptual characteristics, and by arranging them in proto-typical clusters we are able to obtain a sense of their commonality in a way that is both manageable and coherent.

It is accepted that such a method of profiling is both limited and open to possible criticism. The texts analyzed throughout this work are but a sample from a vast range of potential sources, and it might be argued that the relatively narrow range of examples used in this profile does not provide a reliable description of the subject. However, even from this sample of sources the trend towards convergence is evident. The restrictions of space inherent in a study such as this impose their own economies: a sample of the available data is all that can ever be realistically treated.

It might also be argued that the arrangement of the data in the profile overleaf is somewhat contrived. However, the very nature of ideal-typical research dictates that we *do* contrive to present, in a lucid form, what Freeden describes as “loose combinations of deconstructed concepts” (87). The presentation of discourse markers within the structure of the proto-typical model is a methodological compromise. It aims to provide a simple, but heuristically effective, supplement to the unfolding analysis.

A Summary Profile of First-Wave Radical Right Europeanism

Origin

- 'the ideal, historic nucleus of the European idea'
- 'the totality of life...an indivisible whole'
- 'intrinsic order...inner necessity'
- 'the endless uniform wave-train of the generations'
- 'the past, when Europe was yet one'
- 'the eternal life of the...Germanic people'
- 'la vie universelle'

Civilization

- 'a great and common cultural inheritance'
- 'a permanent commonwealth of nations'
- 'a two-thousand-year-old civilization'
- 'Following this path, marked out for them by history'
- 'a common thread of civilization'
- 'the fruit of centuries and the seed of the future'
- 'the constant becoming of the world'

Virtue

- 'the most willing to sacrifice'
- 'obeying unalterable laws'
- 'guardians on the threshold of values'
- 'values which are essentially indestructible'
- 'an order not only material but moral'
- 'the higher law of the community'
- 'the duty incumbent...on us all'
- 'the highest and loftiest values of human culture'

Violence

- 'to fight for the triumph of the Fascist Idea'
- 'the struggle against Bolshevism'
- 'protect against all attacks'
- 'the mortal danger of war...heroic virtues'
- 'the will to exercise power and command'
- 'a manifestation of vitality'
- 'une destruction immédiate, totale'

Myth

- 'looking back towards the two Romes'
- 'true "Crusaders" of the Fascist Idea'
- 'infused with a Nordic sensibility'
- 'the many-thousand-year-old civilization of Aryans...the Bond of Blood'
- 'the realm of childhood, shrouded in a distant glow of memory'
- 'the powers of Chaos without'
- 'a world of unrest and disintegration'

Palingenesis

- 'a new political and social synthesis'
- 'des valeurs nouvelles'
- 'a regeneration of the people'
- 'a civilization that may experience a re-birth'
- 'des cendres de l'homme (la vie) va créer un être nouveau'

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First-Wave Radical Right Europeanism

Appendices

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First-Wave Liberal Europeanism

Building from the earlier description of a proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism, the analysis in this chapter will attempt to relate that model to the development of first-wave liberal Europeanist ideology in the pre-1946 period. Through the consideration of a sample of empirical sources and discursive examples it is possible to begin to draw conclusions about the nature of liberal Europeanism at this time, and the degree to which it conforms to the liberal-rational proto-type.

In his comprehensive study of the period, A.J.P. Taylor describes how, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the established European powers drifted towards an uneasy, benign relationship with one another, in an effort to stabilise the development of imperialist projects. During these years, a bourgeois nationalistic sentiment supported the expansion of overseas dominion and was, for the time at least, prepared to attempt relative peace in Europe in an effort to concentrate its attention elsewhere. This consensus was even more dramatically exemplified by the co-ordinated suppression of the Boxer rebellion in China by western imperialist powers at the turn of the century. However, such peace was a facade disguising the accumulation of material power and aggression. As Taylor writes: "A continental league of a sort had come into existence. Every great European question had been put 'on ice'." Like other countries, "Austria-Hungary had a breathing space...she emerged in 1908 with more appearance of a Great Power than she had had in 1897." (1)

The wealth and resources made available during this time fuelled a bellicose nationalism, particularly in recently unified Germany and Italy. When the Great War began, it was amongst

protagonists primed for conflict, ready to test their increasing self-confidence. Domestically also, European nations had become self-satisfied and self-important. It was this combination of patriotic hostility and bourgeois pride that alarmed or aggravated many intellectuals of the time, creating a crisis of confidence which preceded the conflict itself.

The Concert of Europe, a loose and intensely conservative system of diplomatic relations between states, had provided for a period of relative peace in mid to late nineteenth century Europe. Potential sources of conflict were met with diplomatic efforts between the states involved, and the system as a whole was based upon the agreement of a status quo. As Langhorne observes:

...the defence of the status quo was redefined as a general agreement not to allow changes in the existing settlement without the consent of the signatory powers: that is without the form of a negotiated agreement, most usually achieved at some kind of meeting. (2)

This type of inter-governmental arrangement was, arguably, reasonably successful for much of the nineteenth century, and can be interpreted as a precedent for later realist interpretations of the process of European integration. In its own time, though, the Concert of Europe was eventually to prove flawed and ill prepared for the intensity of conflict in the early twentieth century, as Bridge states:

After about 1912 [...] the international system for the peaceful containment of potential conflicts began to break down...The immediate repercussions were felt in an unparalleled heightening of tension and nervousness, an unprecedented acceleration of the armaments race, and a loss of confidence in the machinery by which the Powers had adjusted their differences by diplomacy in the past. (3)

Before the twentieth century and its maelstrom of war and international insecurity, the liberal-rational paradigm had been largely restricted to philosophy and the establishment of

effective domestic law. Earlier thinkers, from Grotius, a pioneer of the principle of international arbitration, through Rousseau, Bentham and Kant had made little or no impact on the actual practice of international dispute settlement. In retrospect, it is easy to confuse the influence of such thinkers on the development of liberal philosophy with an assumed influence on contemporary political practice. Such an assumption is almost entirely erroneous, for whilst the roots of twentieth century international arbitration owe much to the work of these men, in their own times their ideas in an international context were viewed as, at best, fanciful. Virtually no mechanism existed for the resolution of disputes other than by war or by specific agreements between interested parties: the international community, in the sense that we know it, did not exist. As Ralston argues, the application of utilitarian principles to the international stage was not possible until the geo-political system had reached a sufficiently advanced state to make such a notion both feasible and desirable:

The subject was latent until there came about the right conjunction of growth of civilization, softening of manners, general diffusion of intelligence (even though this be yet rudimentary), and a certain rigidity in the structure of nations. There had to be bodies capable of contracting and being contracted with and whose constituents felt responsibility for their actions. (4)

Even as recently as the turn of the twentieth century, no established practice or mechanism existed for the resolution of disputes. The Concert of Europe had operated with reasonable effectiveness over the second half of the nineteenth century, and should be viewed as significant in the development of the international system. However, it had no formal mechanism or institutional structure, and its agreements were no more binding than the goodwill of contracting parties would allow. Seen in its historical context, the Concert of Europe was simply a stepping stone towards international arbitration and reflected the evolving European nation structure.

At the turn of the century, a series of agreements were reached between states through the Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907), initiated by Tsar Nicholas II. Like the Concert of Europe, this mechanism was loose and limited in its application. However, from these conferences there emerged the beginnings of an international consciousness and, perhaps more significantly, a recognition of the need for a formal, institutional approach to dispute resolution:

[The Second Hague Conference's] most significant act was to resolve to meet again in eight years, without waiting to be convoked by the Tsar or by any government: and to set up a preparatory committee two years beforehand, with the mandate of collecting and studying the proposals which would be submitted to the Conference....it was a true international act, indicating that even the dreary diplomatic conference which had dragged on for over four months at the Hague had developed the first beginnings of a corporate life. (5)

This 'corporate life' that Walters describes is central to an understanding of the modern European Union: indeed, it is relevant to the study of any major international organisation. Within such organisations, actors are, as Ralston writes, 'capable of contracting and being contracted with'. The agency of nations within the international system is analogous to the rational agency of individuals within society. The formation of structural bonds also accords well with the proto-typical description of the 'structured community'.

The further development of this new internationalism was interrupted by the calamitous impact of the war in 1914. Almost overnight, Europe fell back into a shattered and conflicting state that would not permit the continuation of a constructive, utilitarian dynamic in international relations. The surge in nationalist feeling was due in part to the growing fragility of conventional belief systems, which had seen the faith-basis of European society severely

eroded by science and philosophy. With the decline of religious faith, many were drawn towards the secular, *ersatz* religiosity of the nation.

However, the essential recognition of the necessity of some form of international system remained intact, dormant, ready to be resurrected after the conflict had subsided. Indeed, such was the extremity of suffering caused by the war on all sides that at its conclusion the internationalist ideal was renewed with an unprecedented vigour. The technological development which had taken place during the preceding half-century led many to realize that in future it would no longer be possible to contain conflicts between the principal belligerents. This lesson was not heeded in time to prevent the Great War, but was doubly apparent in its aftermath: as such, each war would now be potentially the war of all, and peace was in the mutual interest of each nation.

In January 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson famously set out his '14 points'. Most notable amongst these in this context was the last, in which he urged that: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." (6) With this statement, the ideal of the international community was re-invigorated, carried to a new stage in its evolution: in a little over a year, the Covenant of the League of Nations was created.

The League of Nations was the first real manifestation of what we have come to understand as international arbitration. As a system, it was far from perfect and it has received much criticism, both then and more recently. In the context of this study, though, the League of Nations was significant to the development of later European initiatives: arguably, the liberal European project could not have come into being except through this first major step. The emergence of a clearly expressed, utilitarian liberal discourse is evident in the text of the Covenant itself, and may be usefully compared to examples taken from the European Treaties.

The Covenant identifies key areas of concern that we may regard as indicative of the liberal-rational approach:

- **The rule of law in an international context** – (Preamble) ...the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments.
- **An institutional structure** – (Article 2) The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat.
- **Mutual responsibility and responsiveness** – (Articles 10 & 11) The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve, as against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League...Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League. (7)

As with the analysis of the radical right, by examining the text of agreements such as the Covenant above, it is possible to identify examples of discursive practice that conform to the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism. The insistence upon the fundamental role of international law as the ‘actual rule of conduct’ between nations is consistent with the emphasis upon the *legal* basis of utility in liberal-rational thought more generally. The proto-typical element of *structure* is evident in the Covenant’s call for an institutional mechanism through which action shall be affected. In its declaration that a threat to any member of the League is a ‘matter of concern to the whole’, the text demonstrates the importance of the concept of *mutualism* or interdependence within the liberal-rational community.

Interestingly, the Covenant goes some way beyond the limited remit of international security provision and demonstrates also a determination both to civilise and socialise. In respect of the former, the Covenant sets out its desire to develop civilised practice amongst ‘backward’ nations, and sees it as a duty for advanced nations to achieve this:

- (Article 22) ...there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization, and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant. (8)

Under the guise of the mandate territory the League was able, rather cynically some might say, to re-distribute the overseas territories confiscated from the defeated nations under the conditions set out in the Treaty of Versailles. The language of this section of the Covenant is, thus, potentially problematic, and is indicative of the contradictions and inconsistencies inherent in liberal internationalist discourse. One of the key features of proto-typical liberal-rationalism is its insistence upon the principle of universality. In an international context, we should expect this universality to be extended to include all nations and peoples on an equal basis. Any reference to 'a sacred trust of civilization' is in danger of becoming illiberal, evangelical and repressive in its application.

Additionally, the Covenant includes an element of socio-economic welfare provision when it states that the Members of the League:

- (Article 23) Will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organisations. (9)

The extension of international law into the security, economic and social affairs of sovereign states was unprecedented, but not subsequently unparalleled. In the text of the Covenant it is as though we can see, figuratively speaking, the text of the Treaty of Rome

rising through the page. The generic liberal-rational principles of universality, structure and mutual responsibility are clearly articulated in this landmark text.

The realist paradigm of international relations certainly endured and indeed dominated, but it is clear that new ground had been broken by the Covenant, not least in the establishment of institutional practices. Over the following decade, the League of Nations evolved and consolidated itself, following a steep learning curve in untested areas of diplomacy. Even critics such as Howard-Ellis conceded that the League represented a significant step in the history of nations.

...that such pledges should have been implemented, and that such an association of states as the League should exist and be working, is something new in the history of the world, something that fifteen years ago every statesman would have declared wildly Utopian. (10)

Organisations dedicated to the promotion of the League were developed in virtually all signatory states, and highlight its commitment to democratic, populist involvement, “the instructed and enthusiastic support of public opinion” (11). In Europe, particularly, democratic influence was becoming an increasingly important feature of international relations. Compared with the previous century’s elite, clandestine diplomacy, this was a major development and should be seen as an important feature in the evolution of liberal Europeanism, particularly when contrasted with the authoritarian character of its fascist counterpart.

At this point, we might justifiably ask what these early experiments in internationalism reveal to us about the nature of liberal Europeanism. In its very early stages, such as in the case of the Hague Conferences, the structure, and particularly the consciousness of cooperation was so limited that it would be inappropriate to describe it as Europeanism. Later, under the auspices of the League of Nations, internationalism was certainly more developed; however, this was not a specifically *European* internationalism and did not presuppose the

existence of a pan-European consciousness. What these experiments do demonstrate, though, is the emergence of post-national forms of thought and political behaviour that conform closely to our understanding of proto-typical liberal-rationalism. The development of an international institutional and legal framework, and the emphasis upon interdependence, formed the basis for later, more specifically Europeanist initiatives.

In the mid-1920s, encouraged by the relative success and endurance of the League structure, key European nations negotiated a series of agreements, known collectively as the Treaty of Locarno. Whilst the wording of the Locarno texts is closely related to the broader Covenant of the League, it is significant to this study that such an initiative should have been undertaken, aimed specifically at the stabilisation of Europe, and the Ruhr region in particular: “conscients de la nécessité d’assurer la paix dans la zone qui a été si fréquemment le théâtre des conflits européens” (12).

If we consider that the first major step in the later development of post-war Europeanism was the 1951 Treaty of Paris, creating the European Coal and Steel Community (again aimed at the Ruhr), then the progressive, metamorphic development of European liberal internationalism becomes evident. From the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century, through the Covenant of the League and the Locarno Treaty, to the founding treaties of the ECSC / EC, the same fundamental liberal-rational principles have been applied. These principles form the basis of a concerted attempt to impose a rational method upon the disordered European state system. As Delaisi argues, liberal internationalism, even in its relatively undeveloped state, challenged the prevailing orthodoxy, or myth, of national consciousness.

...the myth [of the nation] must lose its absolute character in the minds of mankind...It is not an end but a means. As with all things human, it has no absolute quality. Born of certain needs, it must disappear or change with these needs. Utility is its only justification.” (13)

Delaisi makes a sustained attack on the destabilising, destructive influence of national myths that is consistent with Popper's later criticisms of irrational historicism. His description of political change also conforms to the proto-typical component of metamorphosis, derived from Kant, as we see when he writes that: "Each generation begins by accepting the institutions and ideas that have been handed down by its predecessor. It adapts itself to them to a greater extent than it adapts them". (14) The point made here is an important one; namely, that political change involves a process of layered construction through history, with each generation building upon the successes (and failures) of the past, incorporating previous structures into the fabric of its evolving, metamorphic polity. This view of political change contrasts strongly with the palingenetic idea that features so prominently in the ideology of the radical right. However, as we shall see, liberal Europeanist discourse can sometimes appear to contradict its explicitly rational intent.

As with the development of radical right Europeanism, certain key figures on the liberal side became deeply associated with the evolution of these new forms of ideology. However, whereas J. S. Barnes and Drieu La Rochelle were voices on the periphery of an overwhelmingly ultra-nationalist debate, the early ideologues of liberal Europeanism were reasonably influential. Adherents to a specifically Europeanist idea, such as Agnelli and Cabiati, sought a solution free from the interest and interference of non-European powers, governed through a rational, centralized structure:

...if we really want to make war in Europe a phenomenon which cannot be repeated, there is only one way to do so and we must be outspoken enough to consider it: a federation of European states under a central power which governs them. Any other milder version is but a delusion... (15)

Thus, as early as 1918, a federalist notion of European governance was in existence, and throughout the 1920s this idea gathered momentum, if not general acceptance. A fully integrated, federal Europe was, perhaps, an unrealistically ambitious aim for a continent still convulsed by the effects of war. However, through the existence of the League, Europeanists had begun to believe in the plausibility of previously utopian ideas. As a result, concerted campaigns were launched to foster popular internationalist enthusiasm, aimed at securing a deeper European union, the most prominent of which was the “Pan-Europa” movement, led by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.

Founded in 1923, “Pan-Europa” was the manifestation of Kalergi’s personal passion for the idea of a united Europe. Whilst not opposed to the principle of the League of Nations, Kalergi saw a need for an exclusively European approach to European problems. In his writing, he highlighted concerns similar to those expressed by Drieu La Rochelle, namely that Europe was under threat from foreign influence, particularly Russian and American, and that it must unite its peoples in order to survive. Indeed, Kalergi’s call for a “Europe for the Europeans!” (16) was identical to the rallying cries of fascist Europeanists, such as Werner Daitz. Like Drieu La Rochelle, Kalergi conceived of the unity of Europe largely in terms of its culture.

National chauvinism cannot be overcome by an abstract internationalism; it can be overcome only by deepening and broadening national cultures into a general European culture; by spreading the truth that all national cultures in Europe are closely interwoven parts of a great and homogenous European culture...The cultural unity of the Occident gives us the right to speak of a European nation, which is linguistically and politically divided into a variety of groups. If that Pan-European cultural sense succeeds in asserting itself, then every good German, Frenchman, Pole, and Italian will also be a good European. (17)

Kalergi's description of European culture as 'homogenous' and 'interwoven' is an example of the component-concept of mutualism, i.e. the voluntary interdependence that exists within a rational community. For Kalergi, this mutualism forms the basis of a positive, constructive pan-European society. However, there are elements of his discourse that raise possible suspicions. Firstly, by emphasising the 'cultural unity of the Occident' so strongly, he risks succumbing to the exclusivity and chauvinism that is so much a feature of the radical right. Like other liberal Europeanists, he is guilty of a certain tendency towards historicism and, like Drieu La Rochelle, traces European civilization to a Christian-Hellenic tradition. Secondly, there is an air of evangelism in his call to 'spread the truth' of the 'great and homogenous European culture'. It is precisely this historicism and misleading, irrational superiority that Popper warns against.

In common with Drieu La Rochelle, Kalergi saw the force of popular will as the critical component in the attainment of a European nation, based upon this common cultural heritage. Popular will in this case is not the Will to Power, but the will to construct, and as such conforms to the proto-typical component of human *agency* as the means to bring about the transformation of society: "The only force that can realize Pan-Europe is the will of the Europeans; the only force that can prevent its realization is, again, the will of the Europeans" (18). However, in Kalergi's writing, this dimension of agency does not always assume the moderate, reasoned tone we might expect.

One of the key differences identified between the proto-typical descriptions of liberal-rationalism and the primordialist radical right lies in the nature of political change. As Williams observes in his study of the ideas of Kant, rationalism tends to emphasise a gradual, metamorphic process of change, where new structures emerge from the form of existing ones. By contrast the radical right, in its attempt to affect a *return* to an origin, favours a more fundamental, revolutionary form of destruction and renewal (palingenesis). In the extract

below, it is evident that for Kalergi the conceptual boundaries between these two forms are somewhat blurred.

....constant retrospection is the chief cause of Europe's reaction and disunion. To bring about a change in this state of affairs, is the duty of Europe's youth. Upon them it devolves to build up a new Europe upon the wreckage of the old – to establish European organization in the place of European anarchy...Now, as before, international anarchy, oppression of the weaker by the stronger, latent war, economic disunion, and political intrigue prevail everywhere...Then let it rest with the Europeans whether they want union or disunion, organization or anarchy, resurrection or downfall. (19)

The discursive practice in this extract reveals a great deal about the nature of liberal Europeanism and its problematic relationship with its fascist counterpart. Kalergi saw himself as a democrat, a liberal institutionalist, opposed to the mounting tension and nationalistic belligerence of inter-war Europe. However, there is much in his discourse that reminds us of the anti-rationalism of radical right Europeanism, particularly its myths of chaos, destruction and renewal. If we observe, for example, his repeated description of the anarchy, intrigue and disunion which 'prevail everywhere', we are immediately reminded of the fascist myth of (Bolshevik) chaos. In his call for 'resurrection', for a new Europe built 'upon the wreckage of the old', he is partially appropriating the language of palingenetic radicalism, consciously or otherwise.

In itself, this appeal to the emotive force of language does not discredit Kalergi's credentials as a liberal and a democrat: it does, though, seem inconsistent with the prototypical understanding we have formed of liberal-rationalism. This is not an isolated occurrence, either: repeatedly throughout the development of liberal Europeanist ideology the distinction between the rational and the irrational becomes blurred.

It is possible to argue that Kalergi represents the first true voice of liberal Europeanism. Although not a politician himself as such, his prominence in political circles and his passion for the European idea did much to raise its profile. Ultimately, though, the crucial decisions about the future of Europe were taken by professional politicians. In this respect, Coudenhove-Kalergi's most significant influence was upon one of the key statesmen of the inter-war period, Aristide Briand.

As French Foreign Minister (and subsequently Prime Minister) in the mid-1920s, Briand was heavily involved in the development of the international movement following the Great War. Together with his German counterpart, Gustav Stresemann, Briand worked indefatigably for the peace of Europe, his efforts culminating in the Locarno Treaty (1925). Unlike Kalergi, Briand was a statesman-proper, had been connected with the development of the League of Nations from the beginning and, as such, his influence extended much farther than Kalergi's. Ideologically, though, there was a strong bond between the two men: so much so that Briand became honorary president of the "Pan-Europa" movement.

Briand provided the bridge between the ideological radicalism of Kalergi's Europeanism, and the complex institutional reality of the League of Nations. Like Kalergi, Briand sought a form of European polity that would transcend national differences. His liberal-rational discourse is familiar, as comments made at the Locarno negotiations indicate, but his position at the heart of European diplomacy made it far more consequential:

...can't I remain a good Frenchman and be a good European? Can't you be a good German and think also of that superior interest of Europe, and can't we on that ground come to an understanding? When that is done we will be able to work in common toward the realization of that ideal which is ours, a Europe accomplishing her destiny, remaining faithful to her past of civilization. (20)

In Briand's discursive practice we see again the conceptual characteristics of the liberal-rational proto-type. There is a clear sense of the interdependence (or mutualism) affecting European peoples. In addition, Briand demonstrates the importance of agency in the formation of the new community: through effort, through work, striving towards a collective destiny. Again, though, there is a potentially illiberal tendency contained within Briand's teleological historicism that threatens to undermine its liberal-rational basis. The description of a Europe 'accomplishing her destiny', referent to 'her past of civilization' strays from the path of (Popperian) rationalism. Much as they might like to avoid the conclusion, liberal Europeanists share some features of their discursive practice and mythology of Europe with the radical right. Where the real division between the two approaches occurs, perhaps, is in their implementation.

Following the landmark agreement at Locarno, intended to secure western Europe against further Franco-German hostility, Briand continued to develop his ideas for a deeper European union, based consciously or otherwise around the work of the "Pan-Europa" movement. However, with his background in international diplomacy Briand understood that Kalergi's ambitious vision of a European nation was out of step with the time. What he proposed instead was a European Union based upon the continued autonomy of nation-states, in harmony with the League of Nations, which would nonetheless be committed to a form of complex cooperation. The culmination of Briand's thinking as a Europeanist was his "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union" (1930). Outlined below are some of its key points:

- It is on the basis of absolute sovereignty and of entire political independence that the understanding between European Nations ought to be effected.

- ...it is on the political plane that constructive effort looking to giving Europe its organic structure should first of all be made. It is also on this plane that the economic policy of Europe should afterwards be drawn up...
- ...the justification of the economic sacrifices to be made to the whole should be found only in the development of a political situation warranting confidence between peoples and true pacification of minds.
- ...the Governments might definitively associate themselves in an act of a general nature and of principle which would constitute a simple pact of economic solidarity...to raise to the maximum the level of human well-being over all the territories of the European community. (21)

What is immediately striking about Briand's proposals is the degree to which they recognise the sovereignty of individual nations. It would appear to be inconsistent with the emerging profile of liberal Europeanism that Briand should have emphasised this point. Kalergi, in his stark idealism, wished to see the end of the nation-state and the birth of a new European community. Briand, though, as an experienced statesman, fully understood the complexities of international relations, and this is reflected in the tone of compromise in his memorandum.

In order to understand Briand's position, we must appreciate the context of Europe as it entered the 1930s, with all of the attendant unrest that characterised that decade; a decade that was to see the virtual collapse of liberal supranational development in any concrete form. To the chagrin of committed Europeanists, the nation-state was far from dead. For Briand, as for other pragmatically minded politicians in the years since, this was evident. It would be wrong, though, to misrepresent the character of Briand's plan as conservative or reactionary because of its compromising nature. Rather, Briand's attempt to create a synthesis between his strongly Europeanist principles and the surrounding political reality is an affirmation of the liberal-

rational proto-type; particularly its systemic approach, its emphasis on individual agency and choice, and its insistence upon the mutual dependency of the international community *in spite of* the countervailing irrationalism of the concept of the nation.

Je pense qu'entre des peuples qui sont géographiquement groupés, comme les peuples d'Europe, il doit exister une sorte de lien fédéral; ces peuples doivent avoir à tout instant la possibilité d'entrer en contact, de discuter leurs intérêts, de prendre des résolutions communes, d'établir entre eux un lien de solidarité. (22)

It was not just amongst the most prominent statesmen, or at the most high profile conferences, that the liberal idea of Europe was being discussed at this time. Liberal Europeanism was again entering a state of crisis in the early 1930s, and those committed to a rational, pacific path saw themselves being overwhelmed once more by the tide of nationalism. In an ultimately futile attempt to resist this fate, numerous societies of liberal internationalists laboured to find a strategy that would rescue the continent from another orgy of blood-letting. One such effort that typifies the endeavours of many others was a conference on “The United States of Europe”, held at Dunford House, Sussex, in May 1930. The conference, held within a matter of days of the publication of Briand’s memorandum, brought together authoritative, pro-European voices from across the continent, and its subsequent report provides a useful insight into the delicate state of liberal Europeanism at this time.

On one side, moderate Europeanists, such as Dr. Edgar Stern-Rubarth of the Europäischer Zoll-Verein (European Customs Union) strongly advocated a structure of European union based on economic integration, firmly setting aside more problematic questions of cultural politics. The report notes his insistence that “such union ought to be constructed on almost purely economic principles” and, significantly, that “the new boundaries of an economic and

united Europe should in no way have a ‘protective’ character” (23). This last point is important because it emphasises the universal character of the liberal economic values being set forth and is, of course, in accordance with the universalist aspect of liberal-rational thought more generally. Protectionism, Stern-Rubarth argued, was a feature of the dynamics of (illiberal) nationalism, and should not be allowed to contaminate the new European idea.

By contrast, the position of the Pan-Europa movement, also represented at the conference, was rather more provocative and culturally politicised. Briand himself, writing in the early 1920s, had articulated a fear common to Europeanists of both liberal and radical right persuasion, that of political and cultural subordination: “Nous allons nous trouver bientôt enserrés par deux puissances formidables, les Etats-Unis et la Russie. Vous voyez qu’il est indispensable de faire les Etats-Unis d’Europe.” (24)

In a similar manner, the Pan-Europa movement in 1930, represented at Dunford House by Professor von Schulze-Gaevernitz, spoke in terms that potentially exceed our understanding of the liberal-rational model, terms that hint towards a suspiciously exclusive and protectionist form of discourse.

A new war would make Europe into a mere peninsula of Asia – full of ruins and desolation...Europe must either draw together or break into chaos...A new ideal must be given to the new generation. (25)

A further notable example of the liberal Europeanist perspective at this time is provided in the work of the Spanish writer, Jose Ortega Y Gasset, particularly his “Revolt of the Masses” (1932). Like Briand, Gasset recognized that the dominant force in contemporary society was nationalism, and that any attempt to foster a European community must not deny or underestimate this fact. Gasset’s perspective is interesting in that he presents the European nation as an *extension* of the historical process of nation-state formation, rather than as a

contradictory alternative. For Gasset, the European nation is a *rational* consequence of the metamorphic transition of the community of European peoples.

There is now coming for *Europeans* the time when Europe can convert itself into a national idea...The more faithful the national State of the West remains to its genuine inspiration, the more surely will it perfect itself in a gigantic continental State. (26)

The idea put forward here that the new form of European community will arise from the existing structure of nations clearly conforms to the proto-typical description of metamorphic change. There is no suggestion of revolution in Gasset's thinking, nor of a *return* in the primordialist sense. Rather, he sees historical development as process-driven, though, lamentably, not always rationally governed. Indeed, Gasset's principal concern was that in continuing to pursue plural nationalistic objectives, and thus resisting the transition to the new European super-nation, contemporary ideologues of the right were denying the rational imperative. According to Gasset, this denial of the progressive future of Europe as a unified entity could only serve to exacerbate what he calls the 'dispersion' of sovereignty and the 'provisionality' of modern existence.

Life today is the fruit of an interregnum, of an empty space between two organisations of historical rule – that which was, that which is to be...The groups which up to today have been known as nations arrived about a century ago at their highest point of expansion. Nothing more can be done with them except lead them to a higher evolution. They are now mere past accumulating all around Europe, weighing it down, imprisoning it. (27)

The conceptual themes presented in the passage above are becoming increasingly familiar: solidarity and strength versus disunity and weakness; regeneration and creativity versus chaos and decay. The important question that is beginning to emerge, though, is whether the overtly

rational basis of the liberal European idea be defended by reference to what is, at times, an irrational form of discourse? Furthermore, if violations of the proto-type are deemed to exist, what are the implications of such discrepancies for the *practice* of liberal European union?

The Treaty of Locarno and Briand's Memorandum on European Union at the turn of the 1930s were the closest that Europe came to any form of unification idea before the interruption of ultra-nationalism eventually forced upon Europe a destiny of a different character. Liberal plans for a united Europe were intact and evolving, but plans were all that they remained. The Italian Fascist regime was firmly established, and the political atmosphere in Germany was increasing in tension towards the advent of the Nazi state. In every other nation, the very foundations of liberal-democratic institutionalism were being questioned more vociferously, and governments themselves were beginning to pull up the drawbridges around their national interests.

Briand's ideas were met at the time, as Lipgens states, "with a complete lack of comprehension by most of the ministers and diplomats, unable as they were to think outside of the categories of national sovereignty" (28). This was increasingly the case amongst the political classes and the population in general. In the mid-1920s, there had been strong popular support for internationalist acts of peace, but as time went on and memories of the horrors of the first war became clouded with antagonism, new hostilities flared up.

The Europeanist ambitions of both Briand and Kalergi were dealt a severe blow by the death of their German colleague, Gustav Stresemann, at the turn of the decade. Stresemann, much like Briand, was committed to the European idea, but tempered by a dose of realism. He sought practical measures that would bring Germany into the fold of a peaceful, interdependent Europe. As Zurcher notes:

Stresemann had been the German political leader from whom Briand and other Europeans expected the leadership that might bring Germany to accept a policy of European cooperation. Indeed at Geneva, following Briand's address on European unification, Stresemann had clearly endorsed the broad idea, declaring it was not utopian but a practical necessity. (29)

In his analysis of the European idea during the 1930s, Lipgens confirms that the rise of nationalism was everywhere accompanied by mounting resistance to a post-national alternative. He notes that in Germany, under the Nazis, liberal Europeanists were branded as pacifists, and their organisations prohibited. Even within Kalergi's own movement, support was beginning to dwindle, as was confirmed by poor attendance at the 'Third Pan-Europe Congress' held in Basle, 1933 (30). Moreover, following the outbreak of the war in 1939, liberal Europeanism began to lose its physical, as well as conceptual, position of advantage. As Nazi Germany extended its control into western Europe, its ideologues began to supplant the liberal vision of unity with their own, resulting in a general weakening of the liberal Europeanist position, as Lipgens observes:

The object lesson provided by the collapse and conquest, and by the creation of a single centrally controlled economy, did more to accustom the public at large to think in continental terms than ten years of the Coudenhove-Kalergi movement. (31)

In light of the worsening situation, some Europeanists went into voluntary exile in Great Britain or the United States. By the end of the 1930s they had been joined by a large number of refugees, amongst them the exiled elites of various European governments and aristocracies. These international micro-communities began to develop the dynamics of a new conceptualisation of Europe, reacting against the vividly apparent consequences of previous failures. In addition, the many resistance movements formed against territorial occupation and

Nazi control articulated their own expectations of a Europe eventually united. These two broad forms of discourse on the concept of Europe, from the voices of exile and the voices of resistance, are the next clear examples of the evolution of the liberal European idea, and point towards the project of the post-war years.

Exile

Having found sanctuary in the United States, Kalergi continued his exploration of the European idea, specifically now against the reality of a fascist Europe. All that Kalergi and his supporters had been arguing had been vindicated by the development of conflict in Europe once again. However, this did little in itself to advance the pan-European cause, other than to provide it with a certain recognition of its Cassandra-like status. The new challenge for the Pan-Europa movement was to build its ideology into the coherent basis of potential policy, drafting a blueprint for post-war reconstruction.

Whilst in exile, Kalergi was offered support by New York University, and around this nucleus of activity liberal Europeanists contributed to what would eventually become, in 1944, a "Draft Constitution of the United States of Europe". Zurcher argues that this period of exile was so productive for Kalergi and his movement that their achievements during this short time matched everything that had hitherto been attained (32). Writing in 1941, Kalergi made an interesting extension of his pan-European idea to include what he regarded as the culturally and politically compatible entities of Pan-America and the British Empire. The decision to broaden his focus is particularly significant when we consider how resistant Kalergi had previously been to the influence of exogenous forces within European affairs. The extract below reveals much about the re-conceptualisation of geo-politics brought on by the advent of the war.

After the war, the world will presumably be divided in five huge groups: The British Empire, Pan-America, Russia, Pan-Europe, and the Far East...Among these five huge groups three are associated by a common civilization and tradition: Pan-Europe, Pan-America and Britain...Therefore the Atlantic Family of nations must form a closer association to assure an era of lasting peace, to defend its territory, and its common civilization. (33)

In the same text, Kalergi continues to stipulate that this association would be based upon common ideals and values, and a strong international rule of law. Such elements are consistent with the liberal-rational proto-type, specifically the component-concepts of universality, structure and law. The common 'Atlantic civilization' could be regarded as a reference to a post-Enlightenment, post-1789 inheritance in its broadest sense and again, if so viewed, is consistent with the idea of a community founded on liberal-rational values. However, there are aspects of this text that sit uncomfortably with the liberal-rational proto-type. By discursively separating 'Atlantic civilization' from Russia and the East, Kalergi is defining the boundaries of *Otherness*.

It is straightforward to determine that political expediency was the driving force behind this global re-conceptualisation, particularly the powerful threat of the Soviet Union. It could also be argued that the conceptual model of liberal-rationalism provided by the proto-type, by failing to make allowance for the realities of international relations, is rather inflexible. However, the proto-type is an ideal template against which the reality of political ideology can be tested in its empirical form: by definition it cannot include the conceptual deviations brought about by political expediency. As such, we must say that the exclusivity of Kalergi's vision of an Atlantic community seems to contradict the basic liberal-rational principle of universality, by denying to the Other the same essential qualities and characteristics of the Self.

Another feature of Kalergi's discursive practice here appears to contradict its overtly rational basis. It is possible that his description of western civilization is benignly referent to

the moral and intellectual inheritance of the previous two centuries. However, elsewhere he reveals that his idea of civilization has strong historical references that seem to stretch the liberal-rational paradigm. For example, he compares the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea during the time of the Roman Empire, its coasts forming “the natural centers of a common civilization” (34). Discussing the specific character of a *European* community, he argues that a precedent of its civilization existed in the unifying influence of Imperial Rome and, subsequently, the Roman Church (35).

Explicitly or implicitly, Kalergi is urging a revivification of the classical ideal, identifying the basis of the modern European community with a previous historical manifestation. He does not tend to go quite as far as radical right ideologues in their descriptions of origin or palingenetic change, but comparisons with the primordial notion of return are difficult to avoid. It could be argued that Kalergi’s view of historical change *is* of the metamorphic type, whereby European history might be regarded as having *evolved* from its classical foundation, building layer upon layer. However, as Popper warns, for the rationalist it is dangerously misleading to colour one’s discourse with any form of historical myth.

In fairness, the Pan-Europa movement’s analysis of the European situation is typically constituted by pragmatic considerations, and it would be wrong to emphasise its anomalous conceptual features without giving credit to its explicitly rational basis. The 1944 “Draft Constitution of the United States of Europe” is a clear expression of the liberal-rational core of this exiled Europeanism. Some examples of its content will serve to illustrate this:

- (Preamble) - The states of Europe...to guarantee the personal, national and religious freedom of all Europeans and to make a positive contribution to a more orderly world, have agreed upon these ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND UNION.
- (Article 5) - Accession to the UNION shall be a voluntary act.

- (Article 19) - Every person is equal before the law; there shall be no discrimination among persons or classes of persons.
- (Article 37) - Every member state of the UNION agrees to incorporate a statement of the rights stipulated in this section (Articles 19-36) in its own constitution, to provide effective administrative and judicial process for their enforcement. (36)

The familiar conceptual characteristics of the liberal-rational proto-type are evident in these extracts. For example, by offering a guarantee to every individual of the same basic rights of ‘personal, national and religious freedom’, the constitution is emphasising a form of *universality*. The fundamental importance of universal human rights has been central to every stage in the development of the liberal European project, and is part of a legacy of Enlightenment thought (37).

The voluntary nature of association within the proposed system of the United States of Europe is an example of the conceptual component of *agency*. Unlike the fascist model of European community where the dynamism of the association is derived from the hegemonic influence of the most powerful state (i.e. Germany), the liberal model depends upon free and willing cooperation: the formation of community resting upon the *action* of association.

Articles 19 and 37 remind us of the *legal* and *structural* basis of the liberal-rational community. Obviously, these conceptual features cannot be totally separated from one another: rather, in practice, they are mutually reinforcing. Thus the insistence that every person shall be equal before the law is not just an illustration of the importance of the legal basis of the community; it also emphasises the *universality* of that law in its application. Similarly, the ‘effective administrative and judicial process’ prescribed is both an example of the conceptual component of *structure* within the liberal-rational model, and an indication of the voluntary creation of said structures by a community actively engaged with itself.

The liberal European idea flourished in the USA during the period of exile, and whilst much of this activity was centred around the Pan-Europa movement and its leader, it also attracted support more widely. One reason for this is the ideological relationship between American federalism and its projected European counterpart. The influence of the US system on Europeanist thinking was manifested in the increasingly cooperative language of Kalergi's 'Atlantic union', and the growing interest of American intellectuals in the goal of European federation. As Zurcher notes:

Because of America's constitutional traditions, the idea of ultimately federating the European Continent seemed like an implied compliment to America herself. Moreover, the scope and grandeur of the notion, and even the very obstacles in the way of achieving it, had the effect of firing American enthusiasm. (38)

This raises the possibility that the eventual form of post-war liberal Europeanism owed much to a *non*-European source. This possibility can be met with two observations. Firstly, as Kalergi seemed increasingly convinced, the USA and Europe were part of a common ideological and moral tradition which was, ultimately, of European origin. Secondly, and of most significance to us here, we must consider the limited impact of the Pan-Europa movement on the *actual* construction of post-war liberal Europe. Despite its prominence during the period of exile, it was far from being the only representative of liberal Europeanist ideology. It is to other examples that we must now turn in order to achieve a broader understanding of the nature of liberal Europeanism at this time.

Although Kalergi and his closest supporters were based in America, the centre of the exiled European community was London, where many of the pre-Occupation governments and monarchies had fled. The foundation of these movements was decidedly fragile and yet, as Conway observes, the process of cooperation did much to enhance their position.

...the resources they possessed, in material, human and financial terms, were often little more than derisory...And yet within a few years the fortunes of war and their own determined efforts had transformed these exiles from the irrelevant flotsam of lost battles into the recognised leaders of their countries, cloaked in the improvised trappings of legitimacy and the more substantial apparel of Allied military and diplomatic support. (39)

It would seem, therefore, that the exiled European governments had some success in establishing their legitimacy, yet the reality of this in the experience of the populations of occupied Europe is debatable. Conway notes that returning exiles who had escaped the misfortunes of the Occupation were often greeted with a mixture of scepticism and resentment by their long-suffering compatriots (40). However, what is of real interest to us in the context of this analysis is not so much the fortunes of each exiled national elite, as the development of a pan-European consciousness through their cooperative activity.

The significance of the contribution of the London exiles to the eventual form of post-war Europe is vigorously contended. Some, not least the exiles themselves, have insisted that the experience of collective isolation imposed by exile did much to foster the European idea. Others have disputed this, arguing that the period of exile was characterised more accurately by distrust and disagreement. However, as even Conway, himself something of a sceptic on the matter, concedes:

...the almost promiscuous proximity...with other exile groups, provided a context in which the Europeanist ideas often latent in the multilateral diplomatic and economic agreements of the inter-war years could finally come to the fore. (41)

These Europeanist ideas, as we might expect, often conform in their conceptual characteristics to the liberal-rational proto-type. In the examples discussed below we can

identify the liberal-rational core running through the discourse of exiled Europeanism. What is also evident, though, is that in some respects there is divergence within the conceptualisation of a liberal, united Europe. In some cases, this divergence takes the form of internal disagreement about the nature of the European community, particularly the scale and structure of its organization. In other cases, the divergence occurs between the preconceived paradigm of the liberal-rational community and its occasionally anomalous conceptual and discursive manifestations.

As early as 1939, the British Labour leader Clement Attlee articulated the utilitarian character of a future European federation. This federation would also be pluralist in its construction, allowing for the free expression of separate identities within the framework of the mutual interdependence of the federal community. Thus he argued that each community should have “the right to live and to develop their own characteristic civilization, provided that they do not thereby infringe the rights of others”, and equally, “in the common interest there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual States” (42). In his language, Attlee demonstrates the central position of utilitarian interdependence within the development of liberal Europeanism.

The conceptual problem of ‘diversity within unity’ has been a recurrent feature of liberal-rational internationalism, emerging most recently within the communitarian debate over cultural politics (43). This problem involves negotiating the balance between the fundamental liberal principle of self-determination and the urgent needs of the wider community. To overcome the tension between these two positions liberal Europeanists, such as Maritain below, have sought to inspire new forms of creative organisation.

...what is needed above all is the collective vision and inspiration that depend on a great constructive ideal – the awakening of an immense, heroic hope for a new civilization...The nations must choose between the prospect of aggravated, irremediable chaos and a strenuous effort at cooperation. (44)

Maritain's language demonstrates once more the liberal-rational emphasis on constructive agency which, in its vigour here, sounds almost like a call to arms. Indeed, it is significant to note that the tone of liberal Europeanist exhortations goes some way beyond the dry clarity that we might expect from a purely rationalist approach. This is indicative of the fact that committed Europeanists at this time and since have felt it necessary to *inspire* support for their ideal: it was not sufficient simply to *persuade*. This inspirational discourse tries to capture the heroic, and in so doing has a tendency to drift towards an irrational form – not inevitably, but potentially. At the same time, the constructive ideal *is* properly in accordance with the liberal-rational concept of metamorphic change, i.e. building upon existing social and political structures, evolving forward towards a new form of civilization, rather than laying waste to society in a revolutionary upheaval.

One key disagreement that can be noted within the exiled Europeanist movement at this time is in the definition of the regional community. In some cases, the future form of Europe is described as an advanced supranational entity, based upon a federation encompassing all the former nations of the post-Westphalian continent. In other cases, a more fluid solution is sought, allowing for the creation of regional 'sub-groupings' within a looser continental federation. A prominent example of the latter type is provided by Baron Hervé de Gruben in his 1942 "Plan for the International Organization of Europe". Like Briand before him, de Gruben emphasised the need to recognize the political reality of distinct regionalisms within the aim of European unification. He was particularly concerned to protect the existence of smaller national communities against the encroachment of their more powerful and aggressive

neighbours. It was for this reason, he argued, that smaller nations must group together within a decentralised federal structure.

Small states cannot preserve complete autonomy; the myth of absolute democratic equality as between states has been exploded by the battle of giant empires. The small states must be grouped into federations or attached to other powers...so that they can enjoy the greatest desirable measure of autonomy and individuality. (45)

De Gruben goes on to suggest that regional sub-federations might be formed around the Danubian basin, the northern land of the Slavs, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries; all under the protective governance and administrative function of a supranational federal authority. Such a structure would maintain peace through what de Gruben describes as “a certain equilibrium of natural strength...an organization of more or less equal forces balancing each other around a central pivot” (46). The description of this proposed equilibrium is almost scientific in its application, seeking to create a *physical* balance in the community of Europe, strongly in accordance with the component of *structure* in the liberal-rational proto-type. As before, the difficulty lies in maintaining the diversity of existing local identities whilst creating a wider unity.

De Gruben was not alone in suggesting that a pan-European solution should include some form of regional sub-federation. The Polish diplomat, Alexander Lutoslawsky, suggested the development of a pan-Slavic ‘Middle Zone’, or Central Union of Europe, between western Europe and the frontier with Russia, whilst emphasising the vital importance of maintaining “a close community of interests” throughout the broader region (47). Similar ideas for a Central European Federation were explored by the former Czechoslovakian leader, Milan Hodža. In both cases, the regional sub-unit of a Central European Federation was seen primarily as a form of strategic defence within a continent dominated by large, industrialised

nations, particularly Germany. The overriding concern was to ensure that within the new Europe, weaker nations would not be at a disadvantage.

Central Europeans...are anxious to present themselves as a unit; not in order to be self-sufficient, but to be, instead of small, helpless would-be sovereignties, partners on an equal footing through the intermediary of their federated unit. (48)

In this respect, these conceptualizations of Europe are far more pragmatic and benign than their fascist counterparts. If we compare, for example, Hodža's description of a Central European Federation with Szálasi's Magyar Hungarism, we see that the former is essentially not referent to cultural or racial loci. It is, on the contrary, an attempt to brace the region against such chauvinistic aggression through the formation of a mutually defensive union. However, arguably the potential still exists for a certain exclusivity to enter into even the best intentioned of such structures. This potential is evident, for example, in an article taken from the *Vrij Nederland* publication, in which it is argued that for a broader union of peoples to occur, "Groups with similar ideas, traditions and interests must first be formed" (49). The group suggested in this case is a type of Nordic cultural union between the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. In itself this proposed grouping is not an expression of an illiberal tendency, but by referring to cultural proximity, and particularly the idea of shared tradition, there is a danger of emphasising an irrational form of association, in contradiction of the conceptual norms of the liberal-rational paradigm.

In contrast to the sub-group structure, other exiled ideologues of Europeanism emphatically rejected any such approach as fundamentally divisive. In an anonymous contribution to the Italian journal, *Il Proletario*, the author's insistence upon an unequivocally supranational, federal system is indicative of the influence of socialist ideology, and prefigures

the post-war development of social democratic federalism as an integral feature of Europeanist thought.

The creation of a United States of Europe is only possible if the 'States' accept the premise of ceasing to be 'States'...Every part of the federation must be the affectionate and jealous homeland of all its children, and every citizen must be able to look on the federation and every square inch of its territory as a mother-country and not a stepmother. (50)

The aim of this description of a united Europe is to rid the continent of the destructive identification with distinct nationalisms, and to replace these with a continental identity based upon an advanced civil structure. What is particularly interesting, though, is the extent to which this new community already begins to assume an irrational character through the emotive discourse of identity politics: 'the affectionate and jealous homeland', the 'mother-country'. The persistent danger for liberal Europeanists is that in shaping their vision of the new 'Jerusalem', it becomes ring-fenced with the razor-wire of an evolved, exclusionary ideology.

This tendency towards an irrational description of the community of Europe, be that a single, supranational entity or an interlocking structure of sub-regional units, is repeated elsewhere in the development of liberal-rational Europeanist ideology at this time. Paradoxically, in an effort to overcome the powerful propaganda of Nazi Europeanism, more moderate ideologues were drawn into the trap of an evocative discourse that *mirrored* the counterpart it so vehemently reviled, exemplified here by the exiled German ideologue, Kurt Hager:

It is hard to describe the cleansing hurricane that is raging across Europe and sweeping away the brown vermin. Captive nations are bursting their bonds, and rousing themselves in newly won vigour and vitality... There is indeed a European community of fate. (51)

So as not to distort Hager's position, it should be stated that he conceives of this community of fate as being anchored in the core principles of 'friendship', 'cooperation', and 'equality of rights'. However, there is much in his discursive practice that is reminiscent of the more strident and radical tone of fascist propaganda. The reference to fate, in itself, is misleading if we adhere strictly to a rational model of human agency and metamorphic change. Fate is not a rational idea; it does not suggest that the community of Europe is the consequence of the constructive will of the population. Rather, fate suggests a destiny that *always was*, and is therefore more consistent with the model of the primordialist radical right. Similarly, Hager's description of the 'cleansing hurricane', well intentioned as it might have been, is suspicious, simply as a consequence of its emotive direction and force.

It could reasonably be argued that a tendency towards irrational, emotive discourse on the part of exiled Europeanists at this time was indicative of a sense of impotence and isolation that had developed throughout the course of the war. Their European hypotheses, in a strictly rational form, were in danger of being little more than what Lukacs referred to as 'weak and bloodless aspirations', and thus their appeal to the emotive force of an irrational form of discourse might be explained by this almost tangible frustration. In order to gain a greater sense of the accuracy of this explanation, it will be useful now to devote the remainder of the analysis of this period to the development of Europeanist ideology amongst resistance movements in the Occupied Territories.

Resistance

It would be misleading to suggest that Europeanist ideology as expressed by exiled groups in Britain or America was fundamentally different from that put forward by resistance movements in the Occupied Territories. After all, in many cases the exiled ideologues were the free and direct voice of their resistance comrades, differing in nothing but their circumstances. However, in a more subtle form differences are observable, particularly the greater strength with which resistance ideologues seem to support full federation within a supranational political structure. There is an obvious reason why this might be the case: having endured five years of occupation under an ideology derived from an intense form of nationalism, their affirmation of a post-national, federal alternative is likely to have been all the more ardent. Compared with the relatively passive experience of their exiled comrades, resistance movements had been deeply scarred by the devastating potential of nationalism, and were thus resolutely committed to eliminating the possibility of such rivalries emerging again in the future.

Another difference that can be suggested between these two forms of contemporary Europeanism is evident in the unity of purpose exhibited by the resistance groups. In exile, to a certain extent, bourgeois politics went on as normal: without the pressure of immediate danger it was possible for ideologues to debate their contending priorities for the liberated continent. Under occupation, though, there was really only one priority: to achieve liberation. As such, all discussion of post-Occupation Europe was centred upon a common goal, and this served as a strong, unifying influence, much more so than in exile. As the Dutch resistance Europeanist, Hans-Dieter Salinger, wrote in 1944:

...in these five years all the peoples of Europe have had a common experience that has harrowed their souls...European man has seen and learnt too much of Europe to be content in future with a stale, narrow provincial existence...Never have there been so many people in our continent whose greatest experience has been shared with one another. Even terror is a bond between those who have endured it together. (52)

Salinger's emphasis on the significance of the shared experience of suffering is closely compatible with the component feature of interdependence, or mutualism, in the prototypical, liberal-rational model. The struggle against Nazi oppression, as something common to all resistance movements, subsequently formed the context of Europeanist planning for the post-war period of reconstruction. Before liberation came, though, this bond of common purpose manifested itself in the coordination of activities aimed against the Occupation. At first sight it might seem that resistance was a local, or at most a national movement: a loose structure of semi-autonomous cells. However, beyond the day-to-day reality of local resistance there emerged an extensive strategic and ideological network between European resistance movements, as Hæstrup observes:

...they all had certain things in common: Occupation, and the will or necessity to oppose it with all the means still available to them. It may seem difficult to accept that there was a connexion between a leaflet in Cracow, a strike in Utrecht and a fierce guerrilla engagement in Bosnia, and yet such a connexion did exist. The Occupation powers experienced it...It is for this reason alone that one can permit oneself the overall designation: European Resistance. (53)

Hæstrup's comments here, particularly his assertion that a pan-European resistance movement could be identified in the mid-1940s, indicate the potential significance of this movement to the overall development of a liberal-rational sum-concept of Europe. In order to understand the emergence of this sum-concept more clearly, though, we must study the

core values binding the various movements together. These core values are expressed in a range of sources, some of which are cited below. Of these, two are of particular importance and will be examined closely: the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941, and the Geneva Declaration of 1944.

Certain discursive characteristics that we might expect to see in the ideology of a liberal movement emerge frequently in the work of Europeanist resistance ideologues. These include repeated references to ‘freedom’, ‘human rights’, ‘diversity’, etc. It should be acknowledged, though, that not all of the conceptual foundation of what is here described as a liberal-rational approach can be attributed to a narrowly defined form of ‘liberalism’. The influence of socialist thought on the evolving composition of liberal/social democratic Europeanism was extensive. However, the vast majority of socialist thought expressed in this context was of a relatively moderate, *evolutionary* nature, and as such should not be regarded as being at odds with a form of modern liberalism. Rather, it constitutes part of the same broad impulse towards liberal/social democracy, set against the countervailing force of fascist authoritarianism. In the context of this investigation it is not inappropriate, therefore, to group these perspectives together under the broad, generic heading of liberal Europeanism. It should be stated and understood that the ‘social’ dimension of the liberal-rational model (i.e. the components of mutualism and universality) directly acknowledges the significance of moderate socialism in the evolution of the liberal-rational sum-concept of Europe.

Given the large number of individual resistance movements, it would be laborious and unnecessary to examine each one. It will suffice to provide a number of illustrative examples of the conceptual and discursive features that help us to identify them as part of the liberal-rational generic type. In the extract below from the federalist French publication, “La Marseillaise”, we see a particular emphasis upon economic interdependence as the cornerstone of a reconstructed European society.

...the interdependence of different parts of Europe is such that economic barriers have become as artificial and obstructive as tolls and provincial customs duties were under the *ancient régime*. Moreover, scientific progress has caused individuals and nations to become...interdependent. No man and no nation is self-sufficient any longer; each one needs all the others as much as they need him. (54)

Economic union has been the bedrock of liberal Europeanism throughout the post-war period. In this extract the author links the development of the interdependent economy with progressive modern science. In addition, by making the comparison with the economic backwardness of the *ancient régime*, the author emphasises the metamorphic character of this economic development, evolving from the context of one historical period to the next. It is this understanding of the rational basis of historical progression that distinguishes liberal-rationalism from its primordialist counterpart, which explicitly maintains that such 'progress' is an illusion of transitory modernity.

The component of metamorphic change is vital in distinguishing the liberal-rational approach. Revolutionary change, whilst apparently inevitable in some contexts, is almost invariably prone to arbitrary excess and acts of irrational prejudice. It is the duty of liberal-rationalism, therefore, to strive for a more moderate process of change that reflects the need to preserve stability, whilst achieving the aims of the evolving society. For many liberal Europeanists, such as Spinelli below, federalism was the logical next stage of development for a European community responding rationally to historical experience.

The federalist idea, although it involves radical change, is flexible enough to become, in a revolutionary situation, a touchstone of existing passions and political elements, not opposing itself to them but impregnating them with itself and thus immunizing them against the fatal defects of the old attitudes.

(55)

In Spinelli's mind, the revolutionary potential of European federalism would be tempered by the restraint of a rational methodology aimed rather at *evolution*. His use of the metaphor of impregnation is significant in this respect, suggesting as it does the growth of a new form out of existing elements.

Spinelli was to become one of the most important contributors to post-war Europeanism, and it was during the period of resistance that many of his firmest views were formulated. In particular, it was during his time as a political detainee on the island of Ventotene that, with others, he helped to create one of the clearest articulations of liberal Europeanism from this period. The Ventotene Manifesto sets out to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy of nationalism and asserts in its place the progressive ideology of European federalism. As the text illustrates, this approach disputes nationalism not only on the basis of its destructive potential, but equally on the grounds that it represents a reactionary, regressive tendency, opposed to the vital *forwardness* of the modern society of Europe. Society, in the description of the Manifesto's authors, is based upon inviolable principles of universal rights, reinforced by the voluntary commitment of each individual to the broader well being of the community. This voluntary, structured relationship between individuals is at the core of the liberal conceptualisation of Europe. Set against this liberal-rational model is the mythic authoritarianism of the fascist European alternative.

Modern civilization has taken as its specific foundation the principle of liberty which says that man is not a mere instrument to be used by others but that every man must be an autonomous life centre...The permanent value of the spirit of criticism has been asserted against authoritarian dogmatism. Everything affirmed must have reason in itself, or it must disappear. (56)

In this extract we see fundamental distinctions asserted between the totalitarian character of the primordialist radical right and the more moderate communitarian discourse of liberal-rationalism. The choice, according to the Ventotene authors, was between a fascist Europe based upon anti-rationalism, anti-individualism, authoritarianism and hegemony, versus a liberal Europe based upon liberty, universality, common interest, and rational social construction. The decision to pursue either of these two visions of Europe was fundamentally a matter of choice and individual agency: be that an individuality subsumed on the one hand within an energised totalitarian community, or contained in the voluntary relationship that is the basis of liberal federation. It was this individual agency and choice to which the Ventotene authors appealed, describing the creation of a European Federation as an expression of “a grand vision [] of common participation...It will be the moment of new action, it will also be the moment of new men: the movement for a free and united Europe.” (57).

The rational, metamorphic character of the liberal conceptualisation of Europe is repeatedly articulated. Despite the peripheral influence of more radical communist ideas, the majority of liberal/social democratic descriptions of the new Europe are notable in their opposition to any sort of revolutionary tendency. Where the term ‘revolution’ is used at all, it is usually in a moral and metaphoric, rather than literal and political sense. However, even in the clearest assertion of its rational ideological basis, liberal Europeanism often draws upon a form of discourse that is ambiguous, as the passage below from Goerdeler illustrates:

It must be our object to create an inner, organic unity of federated states...Divergent interests and conflicts must find solutions...Once these things are achieved, Europe will awake from her nightmare into reality and be transformed from a heap of debris into a garden...Reason and efficiency must be the beacon guiding our forward march. (58).

Goerdeler's emphasis on gradual political change is consistent with the liberal-rational resistance to the destructive potential of radicalism. However, it must be acknowledged that the discursive practice here is not dissimilar to examples taken from the analysis of radical right Europeanism from the same period. The image used of the transformation from the debris of destruction to the 'garden' of a new state of being illustrates the fine line that sometimes exists between metamorphic change and a more radical form of palingenetic renewal. In addition, there is a teleological association with the images of a guiding 'beacon' and a 'forward march' that to some extent echoes the propaganda of radical right Europeanism.

Goerdeler's use of a potentially irrational form of discourse does not necessarily contradict the explicit content of his ideas. However, it is a further example of the tendency of liberal Europeanism to undermine its own theoretical position in order to generate enthusiasm and inspire. Examples of this tendency are provided by other resistance ideologues, some of which are striking in their use of irrational metaphors. An instance of this occurs in a text published by the Mouvement National Belge resistance group in 1941. In it, the authors locate their national identity within the context of a broader community of Europe, rooted in the consideration of a shared historical and *racial* inheritance. At the same time, the authors are adamant that the new Europe should be founded upon a *civil* conception of society, shunning the excesses of internecine belligerence that had brought the continent "Eleven centuries of war, destruction and blood" (59). There is a contradiction inherent in this approach that cannot be overlooked. It does not seem consistent to reject the antagonism that has evolved between distinct racial and cultural groups, whilst at the same time emphasising the historical and political validity of such distinctions.

Such a contradiction can only be overcome by seeing 'Europeanness' itself as a historical and racial phenomenon, distinct from other regional identities, for which it becomes the duty of the true European to suppress his or her national priorities in the service of the higher ideal

of continental unity. This is a sentiment familiar from the analysis of fascist Europeanism in the previous chapter, but is also the conclusion implicit in some liberal, post-national solutions to the European crisis.

To prevent Europe falling a prey to this monster we must all take up arms and fight to the death...all those who are able to hold a gun must go and reinforce the glorious armies that are fighting for Europe and civilization...This is Europe's struggle...This is the great European crusade. (60)

The extract above from the Legion Noire movement demonstrates the centrality of individual and collective agency in defending European civilization, not against Bolshevism this time, but against Nazism. However, what we are considering here is *liberal* Europeanism, explicitly founded upon rational values: it is for this reason that we must be suspicious of any attempt by liberal ideologues to appeal to irrational, and potentially illiberal, forms of identity definition, such as the image of the great crusade, for example. This is what the French resistance ideologue, Paul Bastid, warns against when he describes the danger of seeing Europe as “the nurse of civilization...this privileged corner of the earth which the superior races of mankind must unite to organize and defend” (61). By definition, a rational, universalist approach should see Europe as a component of the wider community of humanity, and should resist exclusive definitions.

To explain the fusion between the rational basis of liberal Europeanism and its occasional lapses into irrational discursive practice we must return to the insights provided by Karl Popper, i.e. that the *practice* of reason in society can only be brought about by *faith* in reason: an apparent paradox. Similarly, the defence of liberal European values of civilization can only be achieved by *inspiring* the defence of that civilization, with the inherent risk of contaminating those values with a chauvinist exclusivity. Clearly this is not acceptable within the limited conceptual boundaries provided by the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism, and yet in

the 'reality' of the liberal construct of Europe it is clear that historicism and the claim to civilization are persistent ideological features.

The contradiction identified here is not a fundamental flaw in the construction of the liberal sum-concept of Europe, but it is something that we must remain aware, and wary, of. Properly managed and controlled, the historical validation of liberal civilization that is often attempted by Europeanist ideologues can serve to strengthen its power to persuade, in a way that an appeal to dry, civil values perhaps cannot. However, uncontrolled historicism can become the basis for an exclusive, illiberal conceptualisation of Europe. The balance between civil asceticism and cultural evangelism is hard to achieve within the liberal-rational framework, and yet examples exist which demonstrate that such a compromise may be possible. In the extract below from the journal 'Résistance', the French writer, Emil Janvier, tries to provide a logical description of the relationship between the defence of liberal values and the metamorphic development of European history.

At this moment in history we do not wish the long, slow work of centuries to be interrupted by the brutal, barbarous hegemony of Hitlerism. We wish it to develop towards the harmonious creation of a European federation, a logical though not final development of the age-long movement which, in the course of centuries, has united tribes into clans, clans into cities, cities into provinces and provinces into states. (62)

Janvier's description of the formation of civilization is reminiscent of Spengler to a certain degree, and yet there is a significant difference. Spengler's primordialist conception of civilization was referent to an original, ontological state from which historical change has proceeded as cyclical and palingenetic. For Janvier, this is not the case. Rather, historical development in his view is linear and sequential. The progression from primitive to advanced forms of community is consistent with metamorphic historical change. The creation of a

united Europe, then, becomes the *logical* next step in the evolution of human history, aspiring eventually, one must assume, to the foundation of a united world community.

The single most effective deterrent to the contamination of the liberal-rational sum-concept of Europe by an exclusionary, chauvinistic tendency has been to enshrine the values of the liberal society in the structural and legal basis of a benign federal state. Despite occasional inconsistencies, this was increasingly the position taken by liberal Europeanists in the early-mid 1940s, particularly towards the end of the war, as the victory of their paradigm seemed imminent.

In 1944, anxious to present a reasonably unified position on the future of Europe, representatives from resistance movements across the continent met for a landmark conference on European federation in Geneva. Even more so than the Ventotene Manifesto, the declarations produced at the Geneva conference formed a bold and lucid statement of the common aspiration towards a new concept of Europe. From the Geneva declarations we can trace clear lines of development to the ideology of post-war liberal Europeanism and, to a certain extent, the structure of the fledgling European Communities in the 1950s.

- ...the sacrifices and suffering accepted for the same cause have created ties of brotherhood...and have given birth to a new awareness of solidarity among the free peoples.
- ...the life of their peoples must be based upon respect for the individual personality, security, the planned exploitation of economic resources for the benefit of the whole community.
- European peace is the keystone in the arch of world peace.
- ...frontiers will be nothing but demarcation lines between administrative districts.
- The Federal Union must be based upon a declaration of civil, political and economic rights which would guarantee democratic institutions and the free development of the human personality.
- The Federal Union must possess the following essential features:

- 1) A government responsible...to the peoples, who must be under its direct jurisdiction in the spheres to which its powers extend.
- 2) An army at the disposal of this government, no national armies being permitted.
- 3) A Supreme Court acting as authority in interpreting the Constitution. (63)

These points exemplify the rational basis of liberal Europeanism and demonstrate that, despite some notable inconsistencies, its discourse *is* distinct from its fascist Europeanist counterpart, remaining largely consistent at this time with the proto-typical description of generic liberal-rationalism. In particular, the text emphasises the pragmatic, structural determination of a peaceful European community, rather than a more aggressive group identity based upon cultural or racial determinism. The text stresses the need for planning and administration, and for the guarantee of individual autonomy and consent within the framework of an interdependent community. It does not seek to remove the national identities of member states, or the minority identities of sub-national groups. However, it does seek to remove the capacity for aggression bound up in national political and military sovereignty. A peaceful, well-administered society is the overriding concern of liberal Europeanists, and in this respect they differ greatly from their fascist counterparts, for whom physical conquest and the danger of war are integral conceptual features. For this peace to be achieved, full national sovereignty could not be permitted to continue. In an earlier draft of what was to become the second Geneva declaration, this demand was forcefully articulated.

Peace, liberty, social justice and the autonomous development of national life, which are the basis of European civilization, can in future be guaranteed only if men have the courage to abandon the principle of absolute state sovereignty. This principle is...repugnant to the conscience of all who are devoted to social and political progress. (64)

What are presented here are the conditions for a society based upon the principle of ‘diversity within unity’, a well-established feature of recent communitarian discourse. By eliminating nation-state *sovereignty*, national and sub-national *identities* can continue to co-exist without the risk of shattering the peace. The ‘neutered’ nation makes a rational, utilitarian contribution to the broader community of Europe, through the legal and institutional mechanisms of the federal state.

As was the case with the position of radical right Europeanism, the conclusion of the war brought a dramatic change of fortune for liberal ideologues. In the post-war period, with fascism to all intents and purposes defeated, liberal Europeanism began to evolve into the institutional complexity that is the modern EU. The next stage of this analysis will discuss the second-wave development of the liberal concept of Europe in the post-war period and, by comparison, its relationship to the neo-fascist alternative.

As a final summary, the profile below draws together discursive features from the texts and presents them within the framework of the proto-typical model. What emerges is a ‘snapshot’ of first-wave liberal Europeanism, which becomes particularly effective when compared directly with the profile of radical right Europeanism in the previous chapter.

A Summary Profile of First-Wave Liberal Europeanism

Mutualism

- 'a close community of interests'
- 'prendre des resolutions communes...[] établir entre eux un lien de solidarité'
- 'all national cultures in Europe are parts of a great and homogenous European culture'
- 'scientific progress has caused individuals and nations to become...interdependent'
- 'ties of brotherhood...a new awareness of solidarity'
- 'Europe must either draw together or break into chaos'

Universality

- 'to guarantee the freedom...of all Europeans'
- 'there shall be no discrimination among persons'
- 'all the peoples of Europe have had a common experience'
- 'partners on an equal footing'
- 'every man must be an autonomous life centre'
- 'respect for the individual personality...for the benefit of the whole community'

Law

- 'there must be recognition of an international authority'
- 'the firm establishment of...international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments'
- 'A Supreme Court acting as authority'
- 'effective administrative and judicial process'
- 'Every person is equal before the law'
- 'Governments might definitively associate themselves in an act of...principle'

Agency

- 'a great constructive ideal...a strenuous effort at cooperation'
- 'This is Europe's struggle'
- 'we will be able to work in common toward the realization of that ideal which is ours'
- 'constructive effort looking to give Europe its organic structure should...be made'
- 'Accession to the Union shall be a voluntary act'

Structure

- 'a federation of European states under a central power which governs them'
- 'an inner, organic unity of federated states'
- 'a closer association to ensure an era of lasting peace'
- 'let it rest with the Europeans whether they want union or disunion, organization or anarchy'
- 'the keystone in the arch of world peace'
- 'a certain equilibrium of natural strength...an organization of more or less equal forces'

Metamorphosis

- 'the long, slow work of centuries...a logical, though not final development of the age-long movement'
- 'The federalist idea [is] a touchstone of existing passions and elements, not opposing itself to them but impregnating them with itself'
- 'Each generation begins by accepting the institutions and ideas that have been handed down by its predecessor'
- 'nations arrived about a century ago at their highest point of expansion. Nothing more can be done with them except lead them to a higher evolution'

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Second-Wave Radical Right Europeanism

In the analysis of first-wave radical right Europeanism, it was demonstrated both that distinct forms of Europeanist ideology existed in the period leading up to the defeat of fascism in 1945, and that these Europeanist ideas remained largely consistent with the prototypical model of the primordialist radical right. In the following chapter, the analysis will focus on the continued development of Europeanism within radical right ideology during the post-war period. During this time, expressions of an explicit form of Europeanism have become commonplace, though they may differ in substance from case to case. What is perhaps more striking than the internal differences within post-war Europeanist radical right ideology, though, is the strongly revisionist tendency that has characterised its propaganda, creating a clear distance in many cases from the often crudely hegemonic character of inter-war fascist visions of a culturally and racially united Europe.

Before commencing with the next stage of the investigation, it is appropriate to review the theoretical and methodological approach adopted in this study, and if necessary to discuss any weaknesses that may have emerged so far, or might be likely to arise as the analysis develops. It has been argued that the value of a form of ideal-typical investigation lies in its capacity to provide a relatively clear picture of ideological patterns and conceptual characteristics. It was also suggested that in treating ideologies that possess such distinctive, normative profiles, a theoretical perspective that can loosely be described as postmodern might allow for greater flexibility of analysis and a more appropriate sense of detachment from

the subject. The attempt to pursue a form of discourse analysis in the development of the ideational profiles in Chapters Two and Three has constituted a significant element of this applied perspective. However, another crucial point put forward in Chapter One was that we must resist the temptation to create an analytical structure so rigid that it becomes normative in its own right.

Rorty's note of warning about the contingency of truth should be heeded, not just by ideologues of one sort or another, but by the academics who attempt to understand and categorise their views and assertions. Looking back over the preceding analysis of radical right Europeanism, a reasonably distinct picture has emerged. In brief, this picture suggests that the central conceptual components of radical right Europeanism are consistent with the initial, proto-typical description of the generic radical right; i.e. it emphasises certain core values such as radical virtue and a tendency towards extreme forms of action; it accentuates the historical, cultural community and makes use of a powerful historical mythology; and it views the development of historical time as originating from a point of inception, constantly seeking a return towards that point within a cyclical process of metapolitical rebirth.

One of the more conventional views of the radical right treatment of modernity is that its ideologues are essentially hostile towards its degenerative processes of systematisation and progression. The emphasis placed by the radical right upon origin and mythic prefiguration often suggests that its conceptualisation of Europe is fundamentally *anti-modern*, rejecting urban cosmopolitanism in favour of a more authentic, pastoral simplicity. This view is strongly supported by statements made by Nazi ideologues in particular, but is also evident in more sophisticated conceptual examples related to the proto-typical model, such as Heidegger's quest for authenticity. Nazi mysticism permeates many expressions of radical right Europeanism in the pre-1946 period, emphasising Man's attachment to the physical landscape of the European continent, which is the source of Europe's creative energy and spiritual nobility.

However, fascist regimes have also embraced the technological potential that modernity has afforded them, particularly with regard to the development of the industrial-military complex. Fascism in Italy was strongly associated in its early development with the proto-fascism of Marinetti's Futurism, which celebrated modernity and vilified conservative nostalgia. German Nazism vigorously pursued the industrial and military objectives of a scientific method whose rational, positivist basis it explicitly rejected. Similarly, the suppression of individual identity within the totalitarian structure of fascist societies could perhaps be indicative of an *affirmation* of modernity, despite frequent disavowals of such a proposition. To an extent, of course, these features may be attributed to pragmatism, but the ambiguity inherent in the radical right's treatment of modernity at this time can lead us to question the assumption that its anti-modern position was either straightforward or predominant.

At a deeper conceptual level, this ambiguity may lead us to question some of the assumptions put forward so far about the radical right view of progress and historical development. The assumption is that these conceptual features constitute a yearning *backwards*, towards the re-creation of a better age that has already passed. If this is the picture that has so far been presented, then certain qualifications need to be made at this point.

In an analysis of modernism in the context of fascist ideology, Griffin makes a number of important assertions that appear to challenge this conventional understanding. He argues that the defining feature of modernity is a constant state of liminality, what he describes as "a marginal or threshold (*limen*) state...an ontological condition of permanent transition, of being confined to an airport transit lounge with no flights to wait for" (1). He also suggests that the response of inter-war fascists to this crisis of liminality is itself fundamentally *modern*, despite the trappings of anti-modernism. Indeed, from this perspective we should regard the anti-modern, anti-cosmopolitan rhetoric of fascist ideologues as *a symptom of the experience of modernity itself*. Modernity and postmodernity should not be seen as paradigms that can be either

supported or opposed: they are contestable descriptions of conditions surrounding all forms of activity and expression. As such ideologies, as products both *of* and *for* their age, are liable to be permeated by the cultural and intellectual forces surrounding them, and will bear the character of their experience. In this way we might justifiably describe totalitarian fascism (and more obviously, communism), as modern.

We may still question whether fascism can be appropriately be described as modernist, though, if we understand this to entail a positive disposition towards modernity. However, despite fascism's shrill renunciation of the decadence of the era, it embraced the dynamic potential of modernity, and was in this sense positive towards it as an ontological condition, not least because the teleological struggle with the material reality of modernity was a fascist rite of passage. It is in this context that Griffin describes fascism as a variety of 'palingenetic pessimism', a movement overcoming the malaise of modernity, that in so doing pursues a fundamentally modern, revolutionary impulse:

...modernity stimulates an instinctive urge to flee away from decay and entropy and towards rebirth and renewal, thus predisposing its most disaffected inhabitants to palingenetic rather than entropic forms of pessimism. (2)

The proto-typical model of fascist Europeanism as a form of primordialist, palingenetic thought is not contradicted by this perspective on modernity: rather, its component characteristics should be considered, perhaps, not as originating in themselves, but arising out of the experience and conditions of modernity. This additional insight helps to explain the key features of the proto-typical model when we understand them as responses to the prevailing ontological condition. Similarly, as the analysis here progresses to consider the development of the radical right concept of Europe in the post-war period, we should aim to establish an understanding of what may loosely be described as the 'postmodern world' as a point of

reference, as the ontological background against which conceptual development is thrown into relief.

Arguably, as a direct consequence of the failure of inter-war fascists to achieve the palingenetic momentum that would have carried European society out of its liminal crisis, degenerative modernity was not overcome, but rather gathered pace to become a 'hyper-modern' ontological condition in an age of chronic 'disaffection' and 'saturation'. The variance of radical right visions of Europe in the post-war period should be seen in the context of the failure of the first fascist project and this consequent ontological progression. We can begin to see the implications of this for the development of radical right ideology in Baudrillard's analysis of nihilism, in which he characterises the experience of postmodernity as 'melancholic'. Significantly, though, he also notes the possibility of reversal, of rebellion against the system.

Melancholia is the inherent quality of the mode of the disappearance of meaning, of the mode of the volatilization of meaning in operational systems. And we are all melancholic. Melancholia is the brutal disaffection that characterizes our saturated systems...The more hegemonic the system, the more the imagination is struck by the smallest of reversals. The challenge, even infinitesimal, is the image of a chain of failure. Only this reversibility without a counterpart is an event today, on the nihilistic and disaffected stage of the political. Only it mobilizes the imaginary. (3)

If this disenchantment, this hyper-modern fatigue and anxiety over the loss of meaning is a characteristic description of the state of postmodernity, then it is possible to see the challenges to this system, the attempts at reversal, as the appropriate political landscape to be inhabited by the radical right, which has emerged from the context of this ontological environment and has crafted its political programme and visions of Europe with this context always in mind. Second-wave radical right Europeanism has embraced the political expediency of

postmodernity and even harnessed its intellectual tools to create increasingly sophisticated models of a future Europe. In this way it attacks its host parasitically from within: the development of the radical right in the post-war period has been characterised by its subversive accommodation with the system, though clearly towards its own ends.

The 'reversals' brought about by the radical right's challenges to the prevailing political culture are attempts to thwart the proliferation of a meaningless society. Its continued appeal to the core proto-typical principles of tradition, civilization, social virtue and renewal, consistent with its inter-war precursor, is indicative of its resistance now to a *postmodern* condition that has created and shaped it. As Harvey argues, in a sense it was the 'ideologues' of postmodernity who were responsible for the emergence of a radicalised counter-movement.

In challenging all consensual standards of truth and justice, of ethics, and meaning, and in pursuing the dissolution of all narratives and meta-theories into a diffuse universe of language games, deconstruction ended up, in spite of the best intentions of its more radical practitioners, by reducing knowledge and meaning to a rubble of signifiers. It thereby produced a condition of nihilism that prepared the ground for the re-emergence of a charismatic politics and even more simplistic propositions than those which were deconstructed. (4)

In the examples of discursive practice that follow, we can observe the radical right's response to this nihilistic condition of postmodernity, and in particular its rediscovery and use of the sum-concept of Europe. As well as determining the nature of this sum-concept and the commonalities that exist to create a generic, ideal-typical core, the analysis will also aim to identify the disposition of the post-war radical right towards history and development, particularly its notion of renewal.

Exile and reconstruction

Just as the Europeanist strand of fascist ideology had been fundamentally affected by the rise of Nazi imperialism over the previous decade or more, so too, amidst the ruins of the Third Reich, Europeanist ideas once more responded to the changing context. For some fascist ideologues the immediate challenge was to survive, and centres of exile such as Franco's Spain and Latin America became the focus of efforts to regroup and rebuild. For others, the most urgent challenge was to the fundamental conception of the fascist community. Nationalism had failed to secure the broader defence of the cultural and biological integrity of the West and it was now time to re-conceive the radical right community of Europe according to the new geo-political reality of continental superpowers. As Tauber writes in his valuable work on the period:

Out of the crisis of the nation state, some nationalists...developed the conception of a Nation Europa. The post-war nationalist still projects his feelings of personal weakness and insecurity onto the larger community; but that larger whole is no longer exclusively his own country...Strength in the mid-twentieth century, he insists, lies only in continental powers. Hence the importance to the nationalist of the unity of a continental Nation Europa. (5)

The decade following the end of the war became a period of reformation and revision amongst large sections of the radical right ideological fraternity. Whilst some continued to maintain an orthodox view of the fascist national community, others began to move towards the post-national position expounded by Drieu la Rochelle some two decades previously.

It is indicative of the turbulent development of fascist ideology that what was once its founding concept, the nation, had become so deeply problematic, particularly in so far as it engendered intra-European conflict and vulnerability. The nation would no longer be enough in itself: a more powerful cultural and physical force was needed, first to bind the interests of

all Europeans tightly together, then to mount a robust defence of western civilization against the global forces of materialism, what Heidegger had already described as the “pincer-grip” of the United States and the Soviet Union. Prominent dissidents within the radical right ideological community, such as Otto Strasser, articulated very early on the weakness of a Europe divided by internal disagreement, and its susceptibility to exogenous coercion.

...continental Europe has ceased to be an active political force and is, for the time being, no more than a political objective for the USA, the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth...A sober analysis of Europe’s political position during this post-war epoch, leads to the conclusion that she has lost her position as a significant item in the political world and that she will remain divided into two or perhaps three separate spheres of influence. (6)

In place of the ‘old’ European nationalism of the pre-war period, Strasser proposed an organic unity of European nations that would defend the interests of all. This concept of a diverse organic structure of nations and identities bound around the common core of Europe has become current amongst a range of post-war radical right thinkers, particularly Alain de Benoist and the GRECE circle of the Nouvelle Droite. One of the great challenges for the Europeanist radical right in the post-war period has been to reconcile the supra-national dimension of a *Nation Europa* with the continuing diversity of national and sub-national identities. Strasser’s call for an “organically unified” Europe represents a significant early step in this direction.

The nations of the European continent must be bound to one another by common vital interests and common vital aims, but they should not be welded together into uniform compactness; neither should one preponderate over another, but each should unfold its strength in the best interests of Europe. (7)

The discursive practice here reveals a change in emphasis that is characteristic of much the post-war radical right: solidarity without conformity, voluntarism, mutualism and balanced fraternity. In other examples from the period, we can observe that this Strasserite, communitarian notion of 'diversity within unity' becomes a regular feature of Europeanist radical right discourse.

Having referred earlier to the appraisals of modernity put forward by both Griffin and Harvey, the change in emphasis and direction suggested here by Strasser should also make us pause to consider what these features begin to tell us about the relationship between radical right Europeanism and changing notions of modernity and socio-political structure. The attempt by inter-war fascists to generate an absolutist image of a united Europe can be regarded as a response to, and corollary of, the fractured, liminal state of modernity experienced at that time: i.e. it was an attempt to project *onwards*, teleologically, towards a mythic end point of cultural and spiritual unity, underpinned by a powerful narrative rooted in a pre-modern (Jungian) discourse (8). Just as we may regard inter-war fascism's ambiguous relationship with modernity as being in some way indicative of a fundamentally *modern* perspective, so too we need to consider what Strasser's diverse, organic Europe means in relation to a post-war understanding of time, history, community, etc. The reconstitution of modernity in the post-war period is reflected by Strasser in the loose conceptual structure of political pluralism that he begins to suggest. As this chapter proceeds and considers a range of other examples, we will observe that the themes of relativism and pluralism become increasingly prominent.

In the first instance, the nucleus of the post-war fascist international emerged through the community of Nazi evacuees and exiles fleeing Allied tribunals through the ODESSA network (Organisation der ehemaligen SS-Angehörigen). Similarly, the Waffen-SS Mutual Aid Association, HIAG (Hilfsorganisation auf Gegenseitigkeit der Waffen-SS) formed a focus for neo-Nazi activity and solidarity. As Del Boca and Giovana suggest, it is consistent with earlier

descriptions of SS troops as an elite, as the saviours of western civilization, that these organisations should have emerged as the first step towards a fascist recovery.

The rebirth of Nazism which we have witnessed during the past few years was...an operation decided upon and planned at least a year before the German collapse...the Waffen-SS have been rehabilitated, and posterity is now being told that they were the only real 'defenders of Western civilization'. (9)

By the early 1950s, neo-fascists had reorganized to a sufficient degree that they could begin to articulate more formally the change in orientation of the movement towards less orthodox, post-national models of unity. At this time, several explicitly internationalist forms of radical right organization came into being, including the Europäische Soziale Bewegung (or Malmö International) and splinter organisations such as the Nouvel Ordre Européen (NOE). By the 1960s, post-war revisionists had developed a volume of propaganda to support the reconceptualisation by nationalists of Europe as the first and most vital line of defence.

One of the most potent expressions of this early post-war radical right Europeanism is Frances Parker Yockey's 1948 work, "Imperium". Yockey was a resistance activist and writer: in this case resisting the failure of the fascist experiment in Europe, and the encroachment of anaemic materialism. He lived very much as an outsider and is not especially significant as a member of an organisation: however, his ideas anticipate those of subsequent radical right Europeanists, particularly those of the Nouvelle Droite. Writing before the publication of "Imperium", Yockey's bleak vision of the defeated Europe was evident, as was his deep commitment to its redemption and salvation.

I will go from one end to the other of my beloved Europe...Beloved dead lie buried there...I shall fall down and kiss these stones, these endless ruins, this blood-drenched, sacred earth, and weep...and

swear the solemn oath that to my last breath I will fight tooth and nail against those who attempted, in vain to be sure, to destroy the cradle of our Western Culture. (10)

Yockey's language in this extract is very much consistent with our reappraisal of the view of modernity put forward by the Europeanist radical right. His emotive commitment to resist 'liminality' leads him into a palingenetic drive towards redemption, a restitution of meaning in a world where meaning has collapsed (11).

Yockey's vision of Europe is tinged with mysticism. Under the direct influence of Spengler, Yockey writes with a grand, tragic sweep of the rise and fall of empires, of heroism, nobility and the threat of degeneration. Like Spengler, Yockey describes a "world-historical struggle" between powers and, like Strasser, calls for an "organic unity" of Europe that will hold firm in the face of disintegration.

The word Europe changes its meaning: from now on it means the Western Civilization...This has not happened through *logical* necessity, but through the organic advance of the History of the West. It is this *organic* necessity which is the source of our imperative, and of the integration of Europe...Either Europe will become totally integrated, or it will pass entirely out of history. (12)

Several discursive features in this extract fit well with the earlier analysis of the primordialist radical right. The description of Europe as a community born of organic necessity, and the rejection of a process of logic, demonstrate the anti-rational basis of Yockey's approach. Also, his urgent call for 'total integration' versus annihilation is typical of the emphatic extremity of radical rightists, vowing to rid the healthy European organism of "the traitor within...the symbol of Chaos and Death" (13). Against this chaos, Yockey sets the rootedness and authenticity of the European community, bound to a specific culture and

tradition: a feature common to examples of first-wave propaganda, and echoed in the work of one of Yockey's more significant contemporaries, Oswald Mosley:

Europeans shall never be slaves either of West or East, either of finance or bolshevism...We in Europe have deeper roots, a higher culture, a greater tradition, a longer and more tested strength, a harder vitality, a finer purpose, and a further vision than any other power on earth. (14)

Yockey dismisses the rationalist processes and functions of post-war society as subordinate to Man's deeper symbolic attachment to his community and environment. However, despite the strenuous disavowals of materialist modernity exhibited by both Yockey and Mosley, it is possible now that we might regard these yearnings for a restoration of order as a fundamentally modern anxiety. Further, we can begin to see their reaction against materialist rationalism as both a repudiation *and* a product of an emerging postmodern condition: i.e. through the creation of a new conceptual landscape where meaning is *signified* and symbolically bestowed, not measured.

Man's world is a world of symbols...The animal is solely concerned with economics – but Culture-man regards his high symbols as the content of Life...To a High Culture, economics has the same significance that the function of eating has to an individual...The significance an individual has is the reflex of his personal connection with the symbols of the Culture. (15)

In this regard, Yockey once again points the way towards later radical right intellectual projects, and the fusion between the political and spiritual. Anti-rationalism and symbolic attachment are familiar features of fascist propaganda, but what begins to emerge during this period is what might be termed a (counter-)postmodern revival of a pre-modern idealism: i.e. the ideal of an authentic, spiritual society as a paradigm of resistance against the disintegrative forces of postmodernity. Yockey meets the defeat of one fascist utopia with the vision of

another more complex still, indicating a process of ideological 'transcendence' for the Europeanist radical right, away from the hubristic disappointment of the Third Reich, towards an increasingly *meta*-political form of discursive practice. Thus, despite Yockey's violent antipathy towards the *actual* forces of threat prevailing against Europe, his articulation of the final idea of a European 'Imperium' is strikingly opaque: more a meeting of Bergson and Spengler than a clarion call to arms.

The Synthesis is the period of the Future. It exists everywhere in the Culture-bearing stratum of the West. [T]here *is* inner necessity in the final passing of the age of nationalism and annihilation-wars. The great Synthesis, Imperium, replaces it...[U]ppermost now is the Idea of Imperium, the return to superpersonal origins. (16)

Yockey's vision of synthesis in the European Imperium is both counter-postmodern and, at the same time, essentially *derived from* the experience of postmodernity. In terms of the ideational profile of the post-war Europeanist radical right, Yockey's writing is a milepost on the road of ideological revisionism and *meta*-political creativity. His discourse of 'synthesis' is a response to the shattering impact of liminality, and his reference to 'superpersonal origins', in close accord with the primordialist foundations of his discourse, constitutes a palingenetic projection *onwards*, to a point in the future where the unresolved destiny of Europe achieves closure.

The work of Europeanist radical rightists developed swiftly throughout the early post-war period and in the 1950s began to exhibit a structural and organisational dimension. However, in terms of the general tone of neo-fascist propaganda, the main focus for change appeared to be philosophical, or *meta*-political. In order to understand the composition of radical right Europeanism at this time, and the nature of the ideological changes that were taking place, we must examine the work of one of the most influential post-war revisionists, Julius Evola.

Evola is perhaps more significant to radical right Europeanism than any other figure in the post-war period. His influence derives most strongly from the quality and resonance of his writing and he is one of the most lucid exponents of the second-wave ideological position that would become the basis of the Nouvelle Droite, the Third Position and other revisionist radical right movements. As the voice of a particular historical consciousness, Evola is more directly comparable with figures such as Spengler or Gentile, than with the demagogues of inter-war mass movements. His ideas are expressed on a plane above conventional political discourse, and in this regard his work can be seen, rather like Yockey's, as creating and setting new boundaries of discursive practice that were to become the foundation of a revised and reconstructed radical right.

Evola is of particular interest in the context of this research because not only was he a revisionist, he was also an explicit post-nationalist. Like Yockey, Evola was deeply critical of conventional 'nineteenth century' mass nationalism and rigorously proposed some form of post-national European community that would be both united *and* diverse.

Modern nationalism is not based on a natural unity, but on an artificial, centralizing one...the natural and healthy sense of nationality was lost [...] as individuals approached the state of pure quantity, of being merely the masses, after every authentic tradition and qualitative articulation was destroyed...Regardless of its myths, the substance of modern nationalism is not an *ethnos* but a *demos*, and its prototype always remains the plebeian one produced by the French Revolution. (17)

Evola's rejection of the centralising function of nationalism represents a significant shift from the inter-war, orthodox conceptualisations of both the fascist nation and a 'fascistised' European community. The authority behind the hegemonic Nazi European project was founded upon a belief in the nation as a centralised, energised mass, shaped by the experience of modernity. Yet here, Evola seems suspicious of the loss of identity inherent in the

formation of such a nation, specifically the loss of micro-identities within whose structure the authentic traditions of a people reside. Consistent with other thinkers, particularly Heidegger, Evola craves the pre-modern ideal of an ethnically and culturally determined 'patchwork' of identities within a pan-European 'Imperium'. Evola's criticism of modern nationalism is a rejection of crushing authoritarianism and mass-identity, and a movement towards a synthetic-pluralist identity politics. The conceptual identity patchwork that Evola begins to articulate may thus be seen as the product of an emerging (postmodern) repudiation of absolutism and uniformity.

Evola's writing, whilst challenging the orthodoxies of inter-war fascism, remains strongly elitist. He believes, much in common with other radical rightists of the post-war period, that the revolutionary response against the forces of materialism will be led by a vanguard or spiritual elite, and calls for a return to the spirit of the Knights Templar, an order of warrior-priests of the new Empire:

...something like a new Templarism, an order, a block of men united by a common idea and relentless in action who could give in every country a living witness to the return of a superior human type...the representatives of the pure traditional spirit...capable of extirpating the hotbeds of the rationalistic, illuministic, and scientific mentality. (18)

This notion of elite resistance, of a political crusade against the odds, has come to characterise much of the discursive practice of the post-war radical right. Coupled with his overtly historicist view of a chivalric order, Evola imagines a great quest for the redemption of Europe from the forces of materialism, "*son éconómisme, son rationalisme et les autres facteurs d'involution et de dissolution*" (19). Taken together, this elite isolation and sense of heroic mission inform both the style and content of Europeanist propaganda: "We must create a 'unity of fighters'...The notion of European unity is spiritual and supranational...The

European Imperium will belong to a higher order” (20). Evola’s discourse here, despite its explicit leanings towards a ‘conventional’ primordialist historicism, also exhibits characteristics that we may attribute to the formative experience of postmodernity: isolation, alienation, resistance to the prevailing dissolution of the fabric of society.

As for the structure of the European Imperium, Evola, much like Strasser, envisaged a new balance of sovereignty within a supranational system. No longer would a united Europe be the dominion of a single conquering nation; now, Europe would exist as a sovereign entity in its own right, and all nations therein would have a defined, *voluntarily subordinate* position.

Ce qu’il faut dépasser et laisser définitivement derrière soi, c’est le nationalisme...[Il faut] coordonner les forces dans une structure hiérarchique et établir un ordre fondé sur un principe central d’autorité et de souveraineté. (21)

This fundamental change in the approach towards sovereignty is a significant alteration in the ideology of this period. Though both Evola and Yockey tend to express themselves in terms somewhat detached from the physical reality of the struggle for Europe, other groups and individuals were emerging in the early 1950s, keen to develop radical right Europeanism as a *working* project with a political structure. This structure would reflect a post-national, (counter-)postmodern synthesis, and its aims would address the fundamental question of European national sovereignty. Most prominent amongst these early groups was the Europäische Soziale Bewegung (ESB), the so-called ‘Malmö International’, developed under the influence of the radical right activists Karl-Heinz Priester and Per Engdahl.

The ESB began to form at a conference of internationalist neo-fascists in Rome, 1950, and was followed by further meetings in Malmö and by the eventual establishment of the National European Party (or Venice International) in 1962 (22). It brought together prominent

internationalists from across Europe with the aim of overcoming the continent's tragic 'defeat' and instigating a new imperative.

In order to offer resistance to the oppressors of Europe and Germany, the front generation is holding out its hands to the nationalist forces of all countries to work together to make Europe a great third force in the world. To do this the front generation in all countries must destroy the barriers of parochial nationalism...work and fight and sacrifice for a Nation Europa on a folkish, nationalist basis.

(23)

In common with other examples that conform to the proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right, Priester here emphasises the virtuous struggle of resistance and eulogises sacrifice. The geo-political reality of the post-war system is reflected in his acknowledgment of the future continental basis of power and results in the strongly post-national position adopted, candidly attacking the 'parochial' mentality of orthodox nationalism, moving beyond the conditions of modernity and achieving a new synthetic formula that is consistent with a postmodern ontological context.

By the time of the second conference of the fledgling International in Malmö, 1951, a more definitive set of aims was prepared, and delivered in the form of the Malmö Manifesto (like Wilson's 14-points, for the neo-fascist International). The manifesto, as it turned out, was of little broader political significance, and the movement itself quickly began to experience difficulties. However, as a concise and public articulation of the position of the Europeanist radical right at this time, the manifesto is an important document. Included in its statements of purpose are the following:

- Defence of Western culture against communism;
- Creation of the European Empire;
- Prices and salaries controlled throughout the European Empire;
- The armed forces of all countries under the control of the central government of the Empire;
- The aim of this European Revolution will be the spiritual regeneration of man, society and the State. (24)

Whilst the first point regarding the defence against communism is generically standard, the other points are remarkable, particularly given that they are made by prominent representatives of what had been essentially *ultra-nationalism*: this is a post-war, *ultra-supranationalism*, and the conceptualisation of sovereignty has entirely changed. In some respects, the centralisation proposed under a single European government here contradicts the vision of diversity put forward by Strasser and others. This perhaps reflects the greater practical urgency and significance of this project felt by the various representatives, i.e. it was a radical attempt to institute a renewed form of actual social organisation, driving Europe onwards, through its liminal crisis. As such, the geo-political proposals put forward, and their implications for internal national sovereignty, are correspondingly radical. Unlike the meta-political discussion that was taking place about the nature of the new Europe, the Malmö International was a genuine attempt, at least, to take firm political action as radical right Europeanists.

It is also important to note that the Malmö Manifesto emphasises the spiritual nature of the European struggle, taking an anti-rational position that is in accordance with the prototypical model of the radical right. The spiritual dimension of Eurofascist ideology is evident in the work of those who contributed to the ESB: spiritual in the sense of being opposed to a rational, materialistic analysis of mankind and the universe, rather than religious, as such. In his critique of technology and defence of culture, the Swedish neo-fascist Per Engdahl

demonstrates a yearning for spiritual authenticity consistent with our understanding of the primordialist radical right as a generic type, but now set in relief by the increasingly urgent context of dissolution.

La civilisation technique nous donna la possibilité d'un bien-être jusqu'alors inconnu...Mais dans le même temps la science a supprimé notre ancienne conception du monde...Les facteurs matériels n'ont de valeur que s'ils maintiennent la culture de l'homme...C'est la culture qui nous donne les formes d'une plus haute vie communautaire humaine. (25)

Engdahl's spirituality is exhibited in his anxiety over the loss of an 'ancient conception of the world', one consistent with the primordialist description of an *origin*. However, paradoxically, we should see this fascination with the ancient as a yearning *forwards*, not backwards: a spiralling, linear-cyclical form of *progressive* palingenesis.

An associate of Priester and Engdahl and co-founder of the ESB, the French writer Maurice Bardèche, was another who turned his back on the experience of conventional 'modernist' fascism and sought instead for 'un nouvel fascisme'. He criticises the dogmatic authority of first-wave fascist regimes, what he calls "ces fascismes froids", and looks instead in a Spenglerian or Bergsonian manner for a movement and idea "portés par les grandes vagues mystique qui brassent un peuple et lui révèlent son vrai visage." (26). Again here we see an exhibition of mysticism or spirituality of the sort that has become central to many examples of second-wave radical right *meta*-political discourse. Bardèche conceived of a Europe isolated and insulated from the geo-political pressures surrounding it, what he calls "L'île d'Europe", a post-war fascist haven from the liminal tempest of postmodern materialism.

Cette île idéale placée entre les deux continents ennemis surgit dans l'imagination des doctrinaires fascistes entre 1946 et 1948...le néo-fascisme ne veut pas être entraîné dans la querelle du capitalisme et du marxisme et il recherchera toujours une *troisième voie* pour affirmer son caractère propre entre les deux camps. (27)

This 'Third Way' isolationism became a core aspect of radical right Europeanism at this time. However, in practice the ESB struggled to overcome internal disagreements within the organisation, particularly concerning the question of race in the new Europe. A significant faction quickly ascertained that the ambiguous position taken by the ESB on the racial issue indicated a movement away from a hard line on biological determinism, which was partly an attempt to shake off the unpalatable image of Nazi brutality. These more distinctly neo-Nazi voices were not satisfied with the position of the ESB, breaking away to form splinter organisations such as the Nouvel Ordre Européen (NOE). Despite its radicalism in addressing questions of national sovereignty, the Malmö International was too moderate in other respects to maintain cohesion within the radical right. It was, as Del Boca and Giovana observe, "an abstract creation of moderates like Mosley and literary men like Bardèche...[it] never succeeded in consolidating its structure or exerting influence on a European scale." (28).

One of the first to lead the separation of explicit racists from the ESB was the French neo-Nazi, René Binet, an extreme right-wing founder of the NOE. Binet's conceptualisation of the new Europe was definitely post-national, but it was a biological post-nationalism, a supra-nationalism based upon the central principle of biological determinism. The virulence of Binet's racism is clearly expressed in a 1953 essay, from which it is straightforward to determine why it proved impossible to aggregate these interests with other, more moderate factions of the revisionist radical right within the Malmö International.

Fanatiques...! Oui, nous le serons, et nous le voulons être; nous le serons d'autant plus que notre peuple et notre race seront plus menacés...aussi longtemps que, dans nos états, règneront le capital international et la masse des sous-hommes...jusqu'au jour où, sur notre peuple libéré, sur notre socialisme triomphant, se lèvera l'aube de la résurrection. (29)

Binet's discourse here articulates familiar themes in radical right propaganda, such as threat, defence, retaliation and liberation, even making reference to an image of resurrection and rebirth. In many respects, he most closely resembles virulent inter-war racists, such as Himmler. However, Binet's racism is based upon a consciously post-national construct, as can be seen in the declarations from the first NOE congress in 1951 which call, for example, for "a European racial policy...marriages between Europeans and non-Europeans must be subject to controls...the hereditary qualities of our peoples must be improved by medical and scientific measures" (30). The character of racist supra-nationalism exhibited here remains ostensibly unchanged from its inter-war equivalent. However, upon closer examination the discursive practice is again indicative of the influence of a postmodern context. Binet celebrates European racial integrity and its indigenous diversity, reacting against the homogeneity of an indeterminate, post-racial, universalist materialism. In this regard, his discourse is strikingly similar to that of the cultural differentialism of the later Nouvelle Droite. In due course, the NOE began to suffer the same internal disagreements that had afflicted the ESB and failed similarly to achieve significant influence. However, the NOE remains relevant as an example of radical right internationalism, albeit of a specific and virulent type.

Two further examples from this period will serve to complete an impression of the radical right and its ideological development towards new forms of Europeanism in the 1950s and 1960s: Jean Thiriart's 'Jeune Europe' movement, and Oswald Mosley's 'Eurafrican' proposal. Thiriart was a revisionist neo-fascist, the Belgian founder of the

Mouvement d'Action Civique (later known as the Jeune Europe movement), and a strong internationalist influence at conferences in the early 1960s (31). Thiriart, like Binet, was a revisionist with radical ambitions for Europe. In speeches from this period we can see both a fascist-influenced Sorelian dynamism and a salute towards centralisation under Stalin: a leftist, 'red' fascism which remained explicitly "Gegen den Dogmatismus des Kommunismus. Für die Wirksamkeit eines gemeinschaftlichen Sozialismus." (32).

We have created for the first time the movement of a Europe with the will to survive, with the will to power...The conventional nationalists are against Europe; the democratic Europeanists are for a Europe without nationalism; we want a Europe with a pan-European nationalism...The Fourth Reich will be Europe, the Reich of the people from Brest to Bucharest. Our preference for Europe is the centralized state, unitary, monolithic. Stalin understood this unity...We want a unitary Europe, because we want a strong Europe. (33)

Thiriart's post-national conception of Europe is thus more politically strident than that of the ESB, or even the NOE. His 'national bolshevik' Europeanism implies a *material* re-organization of the European political and social system, well beyond the thinking of most ethno-cultural Europeanists. Despite Thiriart's leaning towards Stalinism, his discursive practice retains features typical of the generic radical right, illustrating the extent to which his thinking was a synthesis of *meta*-political anti-rationalism and political power-realism. Thiriart's call for a centralisation of the European project under a 'unitary, monolithic' state *does* seem to challenge the general idea that the post-war radical right was seeking a flexible social model of pluralism and differentialism, and to a great extent this is true. Leftist fascism of this period, as a consequence of its association with Stalinist authoritarianism, differs substantially in this regard from other examples. Its perception of the disintegrative processes of postmodernity is

consistent, but its proposed solution is anomalous, suggesting as it does a return to static uniformity: less the 'Europe of a hundred flags' than the Europe of a single state.

For Thiriart himself, the distinction between leftist and rightist ideas was of limited significance. He believed that the old distinctions were no longer adequate to describe the ideological phenomenon of the European nation, and in doing so he prefigures many attempts by exponents of the Europeanist radical right to describe an ideological 'third way', a post-national politics qualitatively different from conventional systems.

...after the last warning the patriots of Europe will unleash their war of national liberation...Possibly your policemen of the CIA will reassure that the European nationalists are "communists" or "nazis" or both simultaneously. As they lack a modern index they are reduced to using old clichés and classification systems...We are the avant-garde of the European idea...We shall be to Europe what the Jacobins were to the French Republic and the Bolsheviks to Marxism. (34)

Thiriart's rejection of 'clichés' and 'classification' provides us with an illustration of the movement of the post-war radical right away from a clear ideological current (if, indeed, such a thing ever existed), towards the murkier waters of a postmodern *meta*-politics; or rather, a simultaneous response to and reaction against the ontological context of postmodernity.

Thiriart's work also reminds us of the revolutionary zeal of Sorel. Unlike other figures such as Evola, Engdahl or Bardèche, whose discursive practice is either more moderate or transcendent, Thiriart has the voice and intent of a true European revolutionary, of the fascist *mujahiddin*, resisting materialist colonisation in the most aggressive way possible.

European unity will come about more or less when 200 or 300 American occupiers will be killed in every corner of Europe just to prove our point. Then there will be no going back...The whole of Europe, from Stockholm to Naples, must know about each American who is killed within 48 hours of the event. (35)

In common with figures from the inter-war period, Thiriart demonstrates here a propensity towards revolutionary violence that corresponds with the analysis of Sorel in the first chapter. Violence and power are not unpleasant or even incidental features of Thiriart's vision: rather, in accordance with the proto-typical inclination towards force identified as a constituent part of generic radical right ideology, they are an expression of the Will to Power of the neo-fascist European society, a physical reversal of post-war degeneration.

Like Thiriart, Mosley was also an explicit post-nationalist. Despite his sympathies towards German Nazism in the inter-war period, Mosley had explored Europeanist ideas as early as 1936, and was one of the first, along with Yockey, to articulate a post-war vision of *Nation Europa*, with his 1947 work, *The Alternative*. Mosley is also an interesting example of a second-wave Europeanist because his ideology sits outside the norm: it has an idiosyncratic, Anglo-European character that distinguishes it from other examples. This is particularly reflected in Mosley's crusade for a European-African empire, an autarkic continental system, owing much in its conceptualisation to Mosley's British imperialist mindset.

Mosley is consistent with other post-war Europeanists in identifying the weaknesses in conventional 'modernist' nationalism and he became a zealous advocate of the post-national alternative, readily admitting to the errors of orthodox fascism.

In reality, we were all too National – too narrowly concentrated upon securing the interests of our own nations. That was the true fault of all real National Socialist or Fascist movements;...our political ideology and propaganda were far too Nationalistic even to mould the minds of men in a new sense of European kinship and solidarity which might have avoided disaster by universal consent. (36)

Mosley's post-national alternative constituted an attempt to secure Europe against the repressive forces of materialism. It is significant that in this extract he emphasises the consensual basis of this project, suggesting a strongly voluntaristic, rather than internally

hegemonic, tendency. Mosley believed that the movement from a national consciousness towards a European one would be achieved through what he calls “the extension of patriotism”, “an acceleration of evolution” (37), whereby citizens of Europe would come to think of themselves as such, just as in previous ages national identities had been formed from smaller, autonomous regionalisms. Mosley often refers in this context to the model of the formation of the United Kingdom through the Acts of Union, and suggests that in the future such would be the process of the creation of a nation of Europe, exemplifying Mosley as an ‘anglicised’ Europeanist.

Once complete, though, Mosley’s vision was of a European *nation*, not a “miserable federal compromise” (38). He was just as emphatic as other post-war Europeanists that the age of ‘parochial’ nationalism had passed.

...when we say Europe a Nation we mean it...If you maintain national divisions, sovereignties, - call them what you will – you are merely creating states within the State...Europe must be a great unity imbued with a high sense of mission, not a market place of jealous, battling interests. (39)

As well as his anglicised model of nation-building, Mosley brought with him an ambitious and distinctive programme for deepening the colonisation of Africa and creating an imperial realm for Europe that would serve its long-term interests. This idea was far from alien to fascists, and was discussed in some detail by Otto Strasser in 1947 (40): however, Mosley goes furthest in describing a system which is not just an amalgam of national colonial possessions, but a genuine *European lebensraum*, a continental resource.

Mosley’s European imperialism was tied to a conventional form of fascist racism: Africa would be the workshop of Europe owing to the inherent racial superiority of ‘the West’. At the same time, Europe itself should be conceived as a racial community, not just a political

project. Mosley uses a conventional racist approach but fundamentally changes the parameters of inclusion and belonging to suit a pan-European ideal.

The difference between our biological approach and the political approach of internationalism is fundamental...the idea of the Union of Europe may be placed in an altogether different category to attempts at internationalism like the League of Nations or the recent United Nations Organisation...The inhabitants of Europe and the Americas are related, and have all history and much nature in common. You may blend like with like, but you cannot mix oil and water. (41)

Such was the importance placed upon racial integrity by Mosley that he also proposed the segregation of Africa into white and black homelands, emphasising that the white and black peoples “will live in friendship in adjacent territories; but they will not live together.” (42). Mosley presents this racial separatism as perfectly reasonable and humane; beneficial economically to both whites and blacks, whilst preserving a distinct *European* racial identity. Whilst this racist position seems conventional at first sight, a closer inspection suggests strong similarities with the revisionist cultural differentialism of later Nouvelle Droite propaganda. There has been an increasingly sophisticated attempt by ideologues of the post-war radical right to use a defensive discourse of difference to mask what might ordinarily be considered an extended form of racist bigotry and xenophobia.

The examples studied here show a range of sometimes competing interpretations of the idea of European Imperium, but in terms of the core concepts and their consistency with the proto-typical features of the radical right, it can be stated that there existed at this time a distinct, generic form of ‘Euro-fascism’: an ideological grouping of revisionist radical rightists who, despite specific differences, exhibit a broadly homogenous ideational profile as Europeanists.

Other examples of neo-fascist internationalism did appear in the 1950s and 1960s, none of which had a demonstrable impact upon the reality of political life in Europe. It should be remembered that the radical right was still reeling from the most catastrophic of implosions and that these ambitious projections of a European empire, racial or otherwise, were in practice often little more than fantasies around which to rally and plot. Throughout the late twentieth century, the radical right has often existed in a position of effective retreat. However, these early transformations of neo-fascist propaganda made it possible for later ideologues to develop a more sophisticated alternative discourse on the nature of European identity and community, and to begin to infiltrate once more the landscape of mainstream political activity.

Differentiation and cultural rebellion: the Nouvelle Droite

The movement of much of the radical right in the post-war period away from a monolithic, statist conceptualisation of a united Europe towards a more diverse and culturally pluralist form was not an immediate or universal consequence of the defeat of fascism in 1945. As we have seen above, some ideologues of radical right Europeanism in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly Thiriart, remained committed to a centralised, statist form of European integration, a 'red fascism' that was in many ways comparable to the pre-war strand of leftist, Strasserite Nazism. This continuing enthusiasm for an authoritarian European superstate may be regarded as a 'hang-up' from the ontological context of inter-war modernity. However, even these Europeanist 'centralisers' came increasingly to use the discourse of diversity and cultural differentiation to support their ideas. Elsewhere, in the work of writers such as Evola, Strasser, Bardèche, etc., the movement towards fundamentally new forms of conceptualisation was clearer, but as yet incomplete.

The 1950s and 1960s, then, were decades during which the radical right, in reconstructing itself, generated the discursive foundations of a new illiberal identity politics which would flourish during the 1970s, 1980s and beyond. It is this later period which has produced some of the most directly revisionist forms of the Europeanist radical right and has also witnessed a major geo-political shift from the bi-polar tension of the Cold War, towards an age of monocentric cultural and political homogeneity. It is this shift which has given rise to the changing Europeanist model of the Nouvelle Droite, gradually loosening its attachment to paradigms rooted in the experience of modernity and seeking new terms of ontological reference. As Taguieff observes, the nature of the struggle undertaken by the radical right has changed with the historically evolving threat:

...l'ennemi absolu n'est plus représenté par les forces de nivellement pas le bas, mais par les tendances homogénéisantes, les puissances assimilatrices, les pulsions d'indifférenciation. Défendre la diversité du monde: voilà une devise qui ne pouvait manquer de séduire...La Nouvelle Droite recentrait son <combat culturel> sur la critique de l'universalisme... (43)

The Nouvelle Droite (ND) is difficult to categorise, not least because it exists as a loose, intellectual movement, rather than a coherent organisation or party, describing itself as “une école de pensée” (44). Exponents of ND thought are to be found throughout Europe and, indeed, the movement as a whole can be strongly associated with a distinctively Europeanist agenda. The key figure in the development of the ND is the French academician, Alain de Benoist, co-founder of the think-tank GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes pour la Civilisation Europeene), and a prolific writer on the subject of European culture. It is this field of cultural or identity politics that has become the main focus of ND activity, reflecting both a retreat from conventional politics, and a recognition that the deconstructed arena of the late post-war political system provides rich, new opportunities.

Again, with the case of the ND, the transition from a modern to a postmodern ontological context was not immediately complete. The ideology of the ND emerged initially within the context of the great stand-off of meta-narratives that characterised the Cold War, and placed heavy emphasis upon the development of a European cultural and political identity as a barrier against further degeneration and colonisation. However, from a relatively early point, the ND was articulating its critique of the legacy of modernity in terms that demonstrate its movement towards postmodern discursive practice, terms that would create the basis for its reappraisal of the nature and form of the European ideal. The language in the following example from the prominent ND ideologue, Guillaume Faye, clearly illustrates a link between characteristics of the proto-typical radical right, engaged in a Spenglerian world-historical struggle, and the postmodern tendency towards reversal and rebellion:

The struggle is almost literally between life and death, for the Western system, physiologically and intellectually, destroys popular energy...Our world has become a world without purpose. As Jean Baudrillard and Michael Meffesoli have shown, the Western system has destroyed **communal responsibility** by homogenising societies and “liberating” the individual...the world is not only meaningless but **incomprehensible**. (45)

Faye’s critique, particularly in its evocation of a great struggle and quest for meaning, is consistent with the proto-typical model of the radical right. However, it should also be noted that he creates a description of an ontological condition which demonstrates a postmodern influence, illustrating his ideas by reference to figures closely associated with postmodern thought, particularly Baudrillard. Interestingly, elsewhere in his critique Faye sets out the idea that Europe as a cultural entity is at odds with ‘the West’ as a bankrupt political project. In particular, it is the western, Enlightenment values of universality and equality that are anathema to thinkers from the ND, values which seem to threaten the diversity of the

'patchwork' of European ethnic identities, a sentiment echoed by Robert de Herte in the ND journal, "Eléments":

...l'Occident n'a jamais cessé de vouloir convertir, assimiler, imposer. Il a violé les âmes, dépossédé les communautés de leurs terres, colonisé leur imaginaire, détruit leur système de croyances...[L]'universalisme menace lui aussi la vie humaine, car il ne garantit de libertés et de droits qu'aux convertis, à ceux qui se conforment au modèle dominant. (46)

It is true that first-wave fascism was equally vehement in its opposition to the levelling universality of post-Enlightenment liberalism. However, unlike the approach of the ND, earlier fascist ideology tended to support the defence of an integral European community on the basis of an explicit assertion of superiority. The ND, by comparison, consistently denies any such racist or supremacist position, insisting instead that its defence of European cultural diversity in the face of materialist homogenisation possesses a logic equally applicable to *all* indigenous peoples. In opposition to the principle of universality, the ND proposes the principle of differentiation, whereby the cultural distinctiveness of each ethnic group is celebrated and protected. This principle is clearly related to a postmodern intellectual influence under which meaning and value are regarded as relative and culturally contingent: as such, notions of universality are regarded not only as conceptually redundant, but potentially coercive and repressive. The ND casts itself in the role of a resistance movement, struggling for diversity and freedom in a world threatened by suffocating homogeneity. This is a guise somewhat removed from the blunt, imperialistic model of inter-war fascist Europeanism seen in earlier examples, and reflects the perceived development of historical and ontological conditions.

Face à l'utopie universaliste...la ND affirme la force des différences, qui ne sont ni un état transitoire vers une unité supérieure, ni un détail accessoire de la vie privée, mais la substance même de l'existence sociale...La ND défend la cause des peuples, parce que le droit à la différence est selon elle un principe qui ne vaut que par sa généralité: on n'est fondé à défendre sa différence que si on est aussi capable de défendre celle des autres. (47)

From the above extracts we can determine the ND's view of itself as the defender of European culture against external threat. For much of the post-war period, this threat was associated equally with the materialism of the liberal United States and the post-Stalinist Soviet Union. Following the collapse of Soviet communism, the discursive themes of the ND remained essentially the same, but with the change in the geo-political balance the overwhelming focus of ND criticism has become the homogenising impact of US-led globalisation. It is particularly within the last 15-20 years that the ND has completed the transition from the model of first-wave radical right Europeanism, developed within the ontological and geo-political context of modernity, to a more sophisticated discursive practice that attempts to exploit the deconstructed political space of late post-war Europe.

The model of European integration proposed by the post-war radical right is itself both diverse and complex. During the course of the investigation so far, we have seen that there are significant variations between the working conceptual models of Europe put forward by ideologues of the radical right. Just as in the inter-war period, when Nazi-dominated visions of a New European Order shared space with Latin, Nordic and Magyar variants, so too in the post-war period we find that no single definition or organisational blueprint for Europe exists. The differences between examples of post-war Europeanism revolve around the relative treatment of national, sub-national and supranational structures and identities, i.e. the balance between these levels of organisation put forward variously by ideologues of the radical right. These range from the highly centralised, leftist neo-fascism of Thiriart to the looser and more

pragmatic association of racially and ideologically related nations supported by explicitly neo-Nazi movements, such as Colin Jordan's World Union of National Socialists (WUNS). Somewhere between these two polarities (which are roughly equivalent to the supranational and inter-governmental strands in liberal integration theory) lies the 'ethno-federalist' model of European society supported by the ND.

Federalism, of course, in the European context, is intimately associated with the liberal European project, particularly some of its more prominent ideologues, such as Schuman and Monnet. However, liberal experiments in supranational organisation are squarely dismissed by critics from the ND, who argue that the Europe of Rome and Maastricht is a shallow, mechanistic travesty. The federalism pursued by the ND is rooted in organic culture, rather than the economic activity of Europe. In addition, the ND strongly supports the principle of subsidiarity, which proposes the greatest possible degree of autonomy for regional and sub-national groups, within the framework of a supranational authority that can provide effective resistance against the disintegrative forces of globalisation, what de Herte refers to as 'integral federalism':

Seul le fédéralisme <par le bas>, dit aussi fédéralisme intégral ou sociétal, fondé sur une application rigoureuse du principe du subsidiarité, peut permettre, en faisant partir la construction européenne du niveau communautaire, local et régional, de rejeter d'un même mouvement l'impuissance et le nivellement...et de faire resurgir une vie locale fondée sur des valeurs partagées, aujourd'hui menacées par la montée de la rationalité anonyme, des valeurs marchandes et de la mondialisation. (48)

De Herte describes a form of federalism that suggests a return to a pre-modern ideal of localised community. However, this pre-modern localisation is a response to the repressive influence of post-Enlightenment systematisation, and as such constitutes a rebellion, or reversal. In other words, the proto-typical features of origin, return and rebirth are, once again, not a yearning backwards, but a forward imperative, a complex form of teleological

historicism. This more developed view of the proto-typical component of palingenesis is supported by comments made by de Benoist when he describes the nature of cyclical return:

The closer one cycle gets to its end, the closer we are to the beginning of a new cycle. Nothing resembles the dawn as much as a sunset: only the freshness of the air can tell us which it is. (49)

De Benoist's language in this extract illustrates the ND's adherence to a mythic variant of discourse, typical of the generic radical right. In this example, the beginning of the new era is inextricably linked to the passing of the previous one: the advent of the new Europe depends upon the passing of the old order. In itself, this may simply appear to illustrate the conventional notion of palingenesis. However, de Benoist's language demonstrates an *acceptance* of the progressive nature of the palingenetic process: in other words, he is describing a cyclical process of re-birth that possesses a *forward momentum*. This assertion, when taken with other examples, suggests again that the 'palingenetic pessimism' of the radical right in this period is indicative of a spiralling, linear-cyclical struggle *through and beyond* the current ontological crisis. The Europeanist post-war radical right, in certain guises, has captured Heidegger's sense of the longing for tradition, which is not a yearning backwards, but is instead fundamentally progressive.

It should also be noted that in the description of Europe put forward by ideologues of the ND, the development of mythic narratives and romantic allusions is often more subtle and deeply embedded than is the case in examples taken from the inter- and early post-war period. In pan-Nazi visions of the New European Order, or in the work of Yockey, the recourse to powerfully evocative, bold exhortations of a European re-birth is commonplace. However, in the work of the ND, this mythic discursive tendency dresses itself more modestly, or rather, perhaps, camouflages itself. The cultural supremacy of Europe implicitly present within ND ideology does not vaunt itself. Rather, mythic references to the culture of a Europe with a

broad, common heritage are built into the ND's cultural-scientific analysis, giving their publications a semi-legitimate air of social anthropology, as opposed to political propaganda.

This feature is evident in the socio-historical analysis of indigenous European cultures found in ND publications (50). Here, the notion of a European federalism 'par le bas' is expressed and signified through the 'The Europe of a Hundred Flags', i.e. a strong European authority binding together a multiplicity of compatible identities and traditions, offering collective resistance to the disintegrative forces of 'mondialisation' (51). This vision of Europe differs from its first-wave fascist predecessors in that it lacks a hegemonic centre-focus. Also, it is articulated in terms that harness the postmodern repudiation of homogenous identity, as de Benoist demonstrates, citing Baudrillard in support of his pan-European, counter-globalisation struggle.

Political Europe and, more broadly, the regionalization of a number of large continental ensembles, could effectively confront globalization...Faced with the globalization of exchange and the universalization of signs – this tidal wave which erases all differences and values – what remains is the singularity of forms: languages, cultures and other social links patiently recreated from day to day...“all that matters today does so against the universal – against this abstract universality”. (52)

The concepts of 'difference', 'integrity', 'singularity', etc. are repeated throughout ND discourse. It is through the ND's exploration of identity politics that the radical right has been able to challenge the liberal norms of universality and homogenisation, whilst deflecting direct associations with inter-war fascism or more virulent post-war examples.

The Europe described by the ND is one that resists the perceived liminal crisis of the current age and seeks redemption in a future of reawakened authenticity. Despite the meta-political focus of much ND activity, it is a form of conceptualisation and discursive practice that has begun demonstrably to permeate European electoral politics. In order to have a sense

of the prominence of the sum-concept of Europe in the ideology of the electoral radical right, we must consider how it has been manifested, and to what effect. Before this, though, it will be useful to examine some further examples that illustrate the development of the concept of Europe within the ideology of more peripheral, groupuscular movements.

Europeanism on the fringes: the groupuscular radical right

The Nouvelle Droite, as discussed previously, is not a political movement as such, but an 'école de pensée'. Though links may exist informally between the ND and more actively subversive groups, the general orientation of ND activity is towards analysis and publication. As a result, the ND has managed to gain a certain degree of credibility and authority, supported not least by de Benoist's admission into the Academie Française. The ND's treatment of the concept of Europe is largely concerned with an intellectual and cultural rebellion, rather than a physical struggle or revolution. However, there are a number of militant fringe movements who have dealt with or alluded to the sum-concept of Europe within their organisational structure and ideological output.

Most of the examples dealt with so far in this chapter have demonstrated links with an Evolian, neo-fascist strand of the radical right, rather than one deriving its ideological position from a more virulent form of neo-Nazism. However, this strand has also been active, from the racist Europeanism of Binet's NOE, to the international skinhead movement of the late twentieth century. Whilst the intellectual radical right has sought to distance itself in the public mind from the atrocious regimes of inter-war fascist Europe, other groups, influenced by the racist propaganda of Rosenberg, Himmler and H.S. Chamberlain, have developed a parallel view of Europe as a bastion of racial integrity, threatened by the pernicious impact of mass immigration. This world-view, in its effective denunciation of the processes of globalisation, is comparable to the critique from the ND. However, the Europeanism of the neo-Nazi

movement is far less evasive than that of the ND in its invocation of racial unity as a source of renewal, mirroring to a certain extent the tension between racial and cultural fascisms during the inter-war period.

Perhaps the most significant movement in neo-Nazi internationalism, alongside Binet's NOE and Thiriart's Jeune Europe, is the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), founded by Colin Jordan in 1962. Although this movement aspired to an internationalism that embraced racially-related peoples in America and South Africa, the overwhelming focus of its ideology is upon the original racial integrity of Europe, specifically a Nordic / Aryan racial unity. The virulence of its ideological orientation can be seen in its declaration from a meeting in 1962 between European and American neo-Nazis, known as the Cotswold Agreement, which set out the aims of the WUNS:

1. To form a monolithic, combat-efficient, international political apparatus to combat and utterly destroy the international Jew-Communist and Zionist apparatus of treason and subversion.
2. To protect and promote the Aryan race and its Western Civilization wherever its members may be on the globe, and whatever their nationality may be.
3. To protect private property and free enterprise from Communist class warfare. (53)

At first glance, the sentiments expressed in the above extract appear to represent an unreformed and unrepentant brand of Nazism that displays conventional characteristics of conspiracy, belligerence and acute racism. Unlike the ND, the ideology of neo-Nazi splinter movements reveals little attempt to create a distance from the crudity of their inter-war precursors. However, the universalist tendency expressed in this extract through a commitment to members of the Aryan race 'whatever their nationality may be' does suggest a distinct and conscious shift from the orthodox pre-war Nazi position. This can be accounted

for as a pragmatic step in the face of the disintegration of the foundations of National Socialism in the immediate post-war period, and to a great extent this is true. It is also, though, an indication of, and a response to, the challenges of the prevailing ontological condition; i.e. the attempt to found a holistic International from the fragments of a shattered ideology is a response to the perceived disintegrative impact of postmodernity. In other words, it is an attempted reversal or rebellion aimed at challenging the liminal crisis and (re-)constituting an authentic state of Being.

From the perspective of this analysis, it is especially significant that this neo-Nazi internationalism remains referent to an Aryan concept of unity, i.e. one that is grounded in a *European* racial identity. Neo-Nazi variants of radical right ideology tend to be more adherent to a fundamentally ultra-nationalist position, and it is therefore, perhaps, unsurprising that the sum-concept of Europe is usually not expressed more explicitly. However, in examples such as the one above, a European identity is implicitly present through the intensity of the Aryan racial myth. This is a point developed by Goodrick-Clarke in his analysis of neo-Nazi racial paganism as the distortion of a Jungian cult of Wotan:

Wotansvolk celebrates Jung as...the discoverer of the Aryan mysteries of the European peoples, especially the Germans, before the imposition of an alien, Semitic Christianity that severed them from their primordial sources of life, their gods, myths and archetypes... "As the sickness of this lost society becomes too much to bear, the need for neo-tribalism and a return to our folk gods will become ever more apparent. To this, the Aryan path of Wotanism [...] provides a dynamic storehouse of ancestral knowledge and ethnic identity". (54)

Goodrick-Clarke's analysis reminds us that this strand of radical right ideology remains consistent with the proto-typical model of a mythic primordialism. The citation within this example from the American pagan racist, McVan, illustrates how this primordialist mythology

has become employed as an antidote to the liminal 'sickness' of western materialism. Implicitly, it is a *European* racial identity that lies at the heart of this redemption and the palingenetic movement beyond a state of pessimism and crisis.

Elsewhere, there are examples of neo-Nazi ideology that demonstrate a more conscious invocation of Europe as a galvanising principle. The treatment of Europe as a sum-concept in these cases has little of the (pseudo-)academic gloss associated with the propaganda of the Nouvelle Droite, though it does mirror the NDs attempt to create a sense of unified resistance in the face of the onslaught of materialism and miscegenation. Of particular interest in this regard is the Europeanist propaganda of the ultra-nationalist skinhead movement, whose rapid growth and pan-European potential is clearly identified in the European Parliament's 1991 Report on Racism and Xenophobia:

During the 1980s the skinhead cult spread from Britain to West Germany, Belgium and Holland and then to Scandinavia. The cult also gained popularity among young unemployed racists in France, and it eventually reached Hungary, Poland and East Germany, where skinheads were involved in brutal attacks on guest workers and overseas students...It was also discovered that young people from Scandinavia were being taken via Britain to Northern Ireland for paramilitary training. (55)

There are distinct differences between the meta-political rebellion of the Europeanist Nouvelle Droite and the organised violence of the international skinhead movement. However, at an ideological and discursive level, there are characteristics which identify both as belonging to the broadly defined, proto-typical radical right, and which demonstrate a common reaction against the perceived ontological crisis of postmodernity. What each movement has in common is a desire to create a metapolitical reversal, an undoing of the present that will carry society beyond its state of liminality, through the resurrection of a pre-modern ideal. As with previous examples, the following extracts, taken from the song lyrics of

the White Power skinhead group, Skrewdriver, illustrate the synthesis between conventional component-concepts of the proto-typical model, and an ideological project exploiting the deconstructed political space.

We are Mother Europe's sons, and we are the chosen ones

We are Mother Europe's sons, and if a fight's worth fighting, I'm goin' to carry on...

'Mother Europe's Sons'. Skrewdriver.

Ground beneath the heels of red jack-boots,

With half of Europe ruled by the red beast,

Whilst the other half were fooled to thinking they were free

As kosher power ruled at every feast.

Beloved Europe's on my mind now,

It's on my mind and in my soul

Liberty and justice is our goal.

'Europe on my Mind'. Skrewdriver. (56)

These lyrics express ideas that are directly in accordance with the proto-typical model. Specifically, there is an emphasis upon physical violence, Judeo-Communist conspiracy, the degeneracy of liberal notions of freedom, and a pervading sense of urgency and crisis. In addition to these more conventional discursive features, the songs are distinctive in that they link the struggle of ultra-nationalists to a pan-European cause. This constitutes a significant step away from the narrow fixations of the xenophobic ultra-right and reflects the desire to create a form of unified resistance. It is also an interesting feature of the lyrics that they refer

so explicitly to the terms 'liberty' and 'justice', as though this struggle were somehow comparable to that of the abolitionists or suffragettes. In effect, what these neo-Nazis are trying to achieve here is the same as the more sophisticated project of the ND, i.e. they are attempting to confer victim status upon themselves, to cast themselves in the guise of a heroic resistance against the suffocating influence of homogenous materialism. By using the 'catchphrases' of resistance (liberty, justice) they aim to capture the ground of deconstructed meaning and make it their own. In this way, the radical right struggle for the cultural and racial integrity of Europe ceases to be based upon a discourse of hegemonic imperialism, and instead dresses itself in robes stolen from the closet of a differentialist form of identity-politics. If this act of ideological piracy were actually to prove effective, it would represent a remarkable coup for the radical right; and, as we shall see below, there is evidence from the arena of electoral politics to suggest that the coup has already begun.

Examples of Europeanist ideology taken from the fringes of radical right activity share much in common with the general thrust of the more moderate ND. Organisationally, though, these groups tend to be far more disparate and subversive: in many cases, they exhibit an almost cellular structure of independent, but interconnected subgroups, sometimes described as *groupuscular*. The groupuscular nature of subversive, semi-autonomous radical right activity is symptomatic of the shattered ideological framework of the post-war context. In some cases, this tendency has been manifested in the ideological and paramilitary activity of the ultra-right, loosely associated into some form of internationalist network. Equally, though, groupuscular movements influenced by a leftist form of neo-fascist radicalism have demonstrated a desire to forge a pan-European consciousness, as Bale observes:

The history of neo-fascism...is replete with a kaleidoscopic array and bewildering variety of organizations, personalities, and doctrines, many of which were the direct or indirect outgrowths of a complex process of fission and fusion precipitated by bitter internal struggles and rivalries. On the

other hand, some of the very same groups which could not manage to find a basis for cooperation with similarly-minded organizations inside their own countries made strenuous efforts to “internationalize” and link up with their counterparts in other nations. (57)

As has already been identified in this and previous chapters, there exists a certain tension within the radical right between those more strongly influenced by a racist, ultra-nationalist agenda and those whose fascism leans more towards a form of leftist ‘national-bolshevism’. In the post-war period, this difference in the interpretation of fascism’s mission has led to the emergence of a plethora of competing, groupuscular movements. In addition to the more explicitly neo-Nazi, racist strands of radical right Europeanism exemplified in the ideology of the NOE, the WUNS and the international skinhead movement, a parallel, leftist tendency has been demonstrated by ideologues such as Yockey and Thiriart, and continues to exert influence to the present day. The Europeanist form of leftist ‘neo-fascism’ in the later 20th century is most clearly exemplified by a series of inter-connected groupuscules, focused around the ideological activity of French movements from the late 1970s onwards, but drawing together an increasingly eclectic range of subversive groups from across the continent to create an explicitly international rebellion.

The groupuscular structure and marginalised status of this strand of second-wave radical right activity is once more symptomatic of the ontological context of its development. The state of dispersal or atomisation, coupled with the effort to regroup and re-conceptualise the self, has become a component feature of its ideational profile. This is particularly evident in the radical right’s articulation of a sum-concept of Europe, as has been demonstrated through examples already discussed from the ND and the racist ultra-right, but is also true of the leftist Europeanism of the National Bolsheviks and Black-Red-Green alliance.

Bale’s analysis of the evolution of the Nouvelle Résistance (NR) movement provides further evidence to justify the extension and re-application of the proto-typical model within

the revised conditions already described. The NR evolved from the political activity of the late 1970s and 1980s of the Mouvement Nationaliste Révolutionnaire (MNR), subsequently re-styling itself in the late Cold War context as the Third Positionist “Troisième Voie” (58). With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and the re-orientation of geo-political rebellion, this leftist branch of the Europeanist radical right began a further process of adaptation and transfiguration.

NR in fact promoted a left fascist “national revolutionary” ideology with a Eurasian “Nation Europa” and Third World solidarity orientation. Like all left-wing fascists, NR’s leaders strongly emphasized socialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist themes along with revolutionary nationalism – in this case in the form of pan-European nationalism (“from Galway to Vladivostock”) and micro-nationalist self-determination...[The] task of revolutionary groups like NR was to pursue an arduous, long-term “counter-power” strategy...a veritable “counter-society” consisting of a decentralized network of alternative institutions operating within the interstices of mainstream society... (59)

The anti-systemic response of leftist neo-fascists closely mirrors the approach adopted by the ND in particular and, to a lesser degree, by ultra-rightists also. Bale’s description of the underlying strategy of groupuscules such as the NR suggests an ongoing connection with the proto-typical basis of the radical right, particularly with the Sorelian myth of revolutionary violence and the sense of heroic mission. Additionally, the NR seems to demonstrate the impact of an ontological disenchantment in its eclectic, anti-systemic rebellion. Like the ND, but even more explicitly, the NR in the post-Cold War period embraces a diverse range of resistance ‘myths’ in its construction of an overarching mythology of reversal, of rebellion against the inauthentic state of hyper-modern materialism and ontological degeneration. Its parallel development of an ideology of micro-nationalism within the framework of a pan-European supranationalism is reminiscent of previous examples, particularly the Nouvelle Droite’s ‘Europe of a Hundred Flags’.

Rather than abandoning the core proto-typical features of the radical right, groups like the NR (and the ND) illustrate the evolving nature of the rightist rebellion, particularly in their increasingly sophisticated conceptualisations of the European cultural and geo-political space. Like the ND, the NR uses a leftist world-systems analysis and a discourse of cultural differentialism to support its attack on the dominant paradigm of western, liberal 'fast-capitalism' and cultural homogeneity. The result is a somewhat bizarre 'smorgasbord' of conceptual and discursive characteristics, intimately related to the proto-typical model, yet distinct from the hegemonic form of inter-war fascist Europeanism. This analysis is supported even further by the subsequent evolution of leftist, Europeanist neo-fascism during the 1990s.

As Bale proceeds to note, the NR formed the basis for the development of a pan-European movement of 'red-fascists' known as the Front Européen de Libération (FEL), founded in 1991 (60). This umbrella movement brought together anti-systemic rightists from across the continent and paid explicit homage to the influence of Yockey and the European Liberation Front.

In due course, the FEL extended its model of anti-systemic rebellion to embrace not just leftist Europeanists from the radical right, but also representatives from the anti-globalization and radical ecology movements, re-forming to create the National-European Communitarian Party (NCP) in 1996. It is this movement which most clearly illustrates the leftist-fascist exploitation of the deconstructed political space, and which has made one of the most explicit statements of radical right Europeanism in its 'European Manifesto'. The composition of the NCP provides a vivid sense of the degree to which the post-war radical right has re-created itself and sought to develop new channels of rebellion. It is particularly striking to note the extent to which the radical right has now infiltrated the ideology of radical ecologism, though in itself this is not inconsistent with the proto-typical description of radical right thought. In particular, we may be reminded of the strong connection between cultural / racial integrity

and the defence of a mythic, pastoral European landscape in the ideology of inter-war fascism, and thus the notion of a Black-Red-Green alliance is not altogether unprecedented.

In terms of the ideological content of the NCP's European Manifesto, a selection of its key principles will serve to provide an indication of its generic orientation. We should note in particular, though, the NCP's rejection of micro-nationalism in favour of a strong, statist conception of Nation-Europa. This feature sets it apart from earlier expressions of both NR and ND ideology, and places it firmly within the quasi-Stalinist tradition of Thiriart / Jeune Europe.

- Freedom can only be guaranteed by force. Europe must be in European hands.
- The unification of Europe will be possible if it revolves around several axes: mystic – the European Nation; political – the European State; and a state-making device – a united political party with a genuine European dimension.
- If we aspire to freedom, we must be strong and to be strong we must build Europe. The European Nation or Future Nation is radically opposed to the “nostalgism” of ancient little nations.
- We condemn Left and Right nationalism which divide Europe and are thus, consciously or not, *anti*-European. Present national borders must cease to exist...
- We reject micro-regional nationalism which is chimerical and noxious to the European cause...the more Europe is divided, the weaker it will be...
- Our European Communitarianism is an aspiration to liberation in stark opposition to bellicose expansionism. It is the will of men who share a common destiny.
- Our European Communitarianism is progressive, since far from negating the rich cultural heritage of the various European nations it combines them in a constructive synergy to face the great socio-economic mutations of this ending century.
- Our project can be seen as a European Revolution. (61)

The above principles illustrate once more the strong connection in such post-war ideology between the generic characteristics of the proto-typical radical right, and a revisionist Europeanism articulating a complex discourse of cultural resistance. In component features such as the uncompromising invocation of the necessity of violence, we see familiar characteristics of the primordialist radical right. Similarly, the synthesis between the conception of a ‘mystic’ European nation and a powerful, radicalised state is reminiscent of inter-war variants, as is the teleological orientation explicitly present in the notion of a ‘common destiny’.

At the same time, the discursive practice in this extract indicates a transition away from the monolithic ideological form of first-wave fascist Europeanism towards a model that seeks to exploit a perceived ontological fluidity and plurality. In so doing, the NCP mirrors the attempt by the ND to ‘colonise’ the discursive space of leftist differentialism and remould itself as the guardian of diversity, the true *anti-racist* defender of authentic ethnic identity, against the deracinating influence of ‘Big Mac mondialisme’. This is evident in the NCP’s description of its form of communitarian politics as ‘progressive’, a ‘constructive synergy’ and an ‘aspiration to liberation’, terms which indicate also the forward momentum of its rebellion, i.e. its quality of teleological, palingenetic cultural pessimism.

From the Nouvelle Droite, through the groupuscular structures of ultra-right and leftist fascist variants, to the most recent synthesis of anti-systemic rebellion, it has been possible to identify core generic features of the later post-war Europeanist radical right. Like their inter-war precursors, these variants exhibit specific differences from one another, whilst overlapping in other key areas. This observation is much in accordance with Freeden’s description of the morphological structure of ideologies generally. We might begin to extend Freeden’s thesis by suggesting that, on the basis of the preceding examples, it is not just the conceptual *content* of these ideological products that can be studied in this way. In addition, we should also consider their underlying discursive structures, their modes of expression in an

evolving ontological context. Before venturing further into these more complex theoretical conclusions, though, we should first pay some attention to the arena of recent electoral politics, and the impact that the sum-concept of 'Europe' has had on the behaviour of radical right parties.

Identity politics and the electoral strategy of the radical right

It is undeniably the case that the radical right has enjoyed a period of electoral resurgence throughout Europe in the last decade. Parties such as Vlaams Blok, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Danish People's Party, the Front National in France, the Italian Lega Nord, the British National Party and the Swiss People's Party have had varying, but nonetheless striking, degrees of electoral success. In themselves, these breakthroughs do not tell us a great deal about the emergence of a sum-concept of Europe, given that these are all examples of a radical nationalist politics. However, as was the case during the inter-war period, the simultaneous response of nationalist movements under common conditions, and their parallel reference to a sense of European solidarity, may reveal something of an implicit Europeanism at work. As Betz argues:

Irrespective of the electoral impact, the recent adoption of differentialist positions by the populist right represents a significant development. With their adoption, the populist right has found a "common core doctrine"...Central elements of this core doctrine of exclusionary populism are the fundamental rejection of...the United States and American culture, seen as the main promoters of globalization and multiculturalism...and an even stronger hostility to Islam, considered a lethal threat to the very survival of European culture...[R]adical right-wing populism presents itself as the militant guardian and defender of European civilization, culture, and identity, i.e. European distinctiveness. (62)

Betz's use of the term 'common core doctrine' is significant and suggests the continued relevance of a methodology based on generic, ideal-typical analysis. He indicates the convergence of the electoral radical right around certain core themes that are linked, more or less explicitly, to the defence of European culture. We are reminded by Betz's analysis of Barth's description of ethnic group boundaries, i.e. of the bond constituted by the sense of communal Self in relation to the communal Other. It is this process of the 'fortification' of European ethnic and cultural identities, pursued simultaneously by parties of the populist radical right, that provides the basis for exploring the sum-concept of Europe within the arena of an explicitly nationalist and xenophobic identity politics.

Perhaps more than any other figure from the post-war radical right, it is the leader of the French Front National, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who embodies the ambiguous relationship between nationalist and Europeanist radicalism in an electoral context. Despite the stridency of his party's cultural protectionism, and the xenophobic tone that underpins much of its propaganda, Le Pen has been and remains an ardent *European* nationalist (and MEP!), seeking to create a synthesis between the defence of French national identity and the integrity of the pan-European cultural community. Through his emphasis during the Cold War period on the common threat of communism, and particularly through his post-Cold War, anti-Islamic stance, Le Pen has sought to draw together the perceived common interests of all European nations in an ideological narrative that remains faithful to the core conceptual features of the proto-typical model.

La nouvelle Europe ne sera pas seulement celle du passé, ni celle des musées mais aussi celle du renouveau de sa culture et de sa civilisation technologique toujours humaine...L'Europe, notre Europe, est la terre qui porte notre population européenne, ensemble de peuples divers mais ayant en commun l'espace géopolitique où s'est inscrit leur passé en lettre de gloire...C'est un nouvel Empire, celui du XXI^e siècle, qu'il vous faudra construire. (63)

Le Pen's description of a sum-concept of Europe founded upon the common cultural and historical inheritance of the European peoples, coupled with a palingenetic, renovating impulse, is clearly compatible with earlier examples of the generic radical right. Additionally, Le Pen articulates themes that are indicative of the ontological context of the later post-war period. Specifically, he hints at the principle of 'diversity within unity', which has become the mantra of many both radical and mainstream communitarians (64), and which demonstrates the widespread process of synthesis now present within radical right ideology and political organisation. Also, his acceptance of technological advancement and constructive synergy indicates a certain refinement of the themes of inter-war fascism. Le Pen's notion of 'humane technology', whereby development serves man and not the other way around, is reminiscent of Heidegger's description of an 'authentic' technology, opposing as it does the scientific materialism of hyper-modernity.

Le Pen's attitude towards conventional scientific materialism is part of an assault on the foundations of liberal European society which he and many others connected with the post-war radical right are conducting. As Holmes suggests, this strategy pursued by European 'integralists' represents a subversive counter-movement against the prevailing historical and geo-political conditions.

...increasing market liberalization and structural reform erode the complex architecture of solidarity that has formed the distinctive substructure of modern European society...In the face of the EU's faltering science, political economy, and metaphysics of solidarity, they [integralists] cast "culture" and "tradition" as alternative idioms of solidarity and as a basis of authority. This approach reopens the field of society as a domain upon which European integralists can forcefully cast their populism, expressionism, and pluralism. (65)

The strategy of the later post-war radical right, much as Holmes suggests, is not to attack the paradigms of liberal governance and society bluntly from without, but rather to subvert them from within. In this way the radical right conceptualisation of Europe presents itself as a liberating alternative, the defender of a tradition of pluralism and diversity, against the prevailing repression under a homogenous liberal 'imperium'. This strategy and form of subversive propaganda have become commonplace within the electoral radical right across Europe in the past fifteen years, constituting, indirectly at least, a model of *de facto* Europeanism.

Unlike Le Pen, however, not all representatives of the electoral radical right are comfortable in designating themselves as explicitly pro-European. After all, the *raison d'être* of many of these electoral groups is to promote and defend *national* cultural interests. It is unsurprising, therefore, that some analysts have been tempted to conclude that these parties occupy a fundamentally *anti*-European position. However, in approaching this topic we must be careful to distinguish between the Europeanism of the institutional, pro-capitalist, liberal EU, and that of the integralist, primordialist, cultural 'revolution'. Whilst the radical right is clearly opposed to the former and its logic of liberal universality, it strongly supports the latter form, creating in its common response an effectively united position. As Fieschi observes:

Looking at European election material, one is struck by their similarity: calls for a Europe of the Fatherlands and for the preservation of a unique mosaïque of European identities in the face of a homogenising, soulless Brussels....[T]he far-right's attitude to Europe as a cultural entity differs from their attitude to Europe as a set of institutions. It has always been committed - more or less explicitly, depending on the party - to a shared European civilization. Hence the reconciliation of attitudes through the concept of a Europe of the Fatherlands. (66)

Recent election material would seem to support Fieschi's assertion. As with examples taken from the inter-war period, it appears that there is no fundamental contradiction between a strongly nationalist position and pan-European objectives. Whilst the examples below do not support the same degree of unifying action as that proposed by movements such as the NCP, there is clear evidence of a common conceptual core, centred upon the sum-concept of Europe.

- Europa ist mehr als ein geographischer Begriff. Es gründet in der christlich-abendländischen Wertegemeinschaft. Die durch gemeinsame Schicksale verbundenen Völker und ihr kulturelles Erbe bilden und tragen Europa. - Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (67)
- ...les nations européennes possèdent une même civilisation et ont à faire face à des menaces planétaires identiques. - Front National (68)
- ...het is al 'EU' wat nu de klok slaat. Het Vlaams Blok is bijzonder kritisch tegenover de weg die ondertussen is ingeslagen: die van de geleidelijke politieke eenmaking van Europa. Wij menen dat deze evolutie een ernstige bedreiging inhoudt voor de soevereiniteit van de lidstaten en op termijn voor de rijke culturele diversiteit van de Europese volkeren. - Vlaams Blok (69)

In the above examples we can identify the radical right emphasis upon Europe as a cultural community or distinct civilization. This is, of course, consistent with earlier, proto-typical examples, but is afforded even greater significance within the context of the recent Europe-wide reaction against immigrant (and particularly Islamic) cultures and communities. The FPO's identification of the pan-European community with a Western-Christian destiny; the Front National's reference to a common civilization and mutual threat; and Vlaams Blok's warning of the fragility of Europe's rich cultural diversity: taken together these features constitute a common discursive response to the perceived failure of liberal universality and the

growing menace to indigenous European identities. To appreciate just how deeply this ideology of cultural fortification has penetrated European electoral politics, we need only examine the Political Charter of the European Parliament group of the 'Union for a Europe of the Nations' (UEN), which declares itself:

United by the values of respect for the individual which form the basis of European civilization...in favour of a Europe based on the freedom of nations to decide, where diversity is the first of all riches and not a Federal Europe which would subject sovereign nations and take away the identity of European peoples. (70)

Whilst we may not be unduly surprised by the ideological zeal of groupuscular movements such as the NCP or WUNS, the UEN is a mainstream political group, representing ordinary European voters. It is a mark of the success of the radical right's ideological piracy (i.e. its capture of the conceptual territory of diversity, identity and self-determination) that the UEN now represents the political interests of nationalist parties such as the xenophobic Danish People's Party and the Italian post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale at the highest level of European democracy. What brings these parties together is a recognition of the sum-concept of Europe and a determination to protect European civilization against exogenous (and indeed endogenous) threats. Whilst the vision of Europe developed by the electoral radical right lacks some of the detail and vigour of those put forward by movements such as the ND and NCP, it nonetheless illustrates the extent to which virtually all areas of radical right ideological activity have been penetrated by the European concept. Cultural (and racial) Europe has become a vehicle for the radical right's resistance to the deadening impact of liberal homogenisation and process-politics. As the philosopher John Gray warns:

Europe's far-right parties encompass a variety of tendencies. What they have in common is that they use the social dislocation produced by the global free market, now the chief icon of modernization, as fuel for a new politics of identity...The far-right understands the frailty of liberal societies; the centre parties do not...Once again, Europe looks set to give birth to a version of modernity that encompasses its darkest traditions. (71)

A Neo-Fascist Myth of Europe?

The picture presented in this chapter of the development of the radical right concept of Europe confirms much that was suggested by fascist Europeanism during the inter-war period. In particular, it has been shown that the evolution of radical right ideology remains consistent with its generic characteristics, summarised in the proto-typical model. In the profile below, an attempt has once more been made to illustrate the extent to which the characteristics of generic radical right discourse conform to this model, despite the variations that exist from one example to the next. In short, there is more evidence to suggest a convergence of radical right thought and discourse around a sum-concept of Europe than to suggest the opposite tendency. Although this attempt to create a simple profile may be somewhat contrived, it remains heuristically valid.

The development of the radical right in the post-war period, and of its evolving description of a sum-concept of Europe, is closely related to the geo-political and historical context of the time. In the immediate aftermath of the war, when fascism as an ideology had reached a state of crisis, the responses offered by ideologues were various. On the one hand, some sought to resurrect a highly centralised, statist form of European 'Imperium' that drew its inspiration from the experience of inter-war fascist Europe and Stalinist Russia, reflecting the monolithic tendency of their rebellion within the continued ontological context of modernity. Others at this time were anticipating a more 'deconstructed' form of European integration that made

reference to an emerging politics of identity. In these cases, ideologues demonstrated their sensitivity to the acceleration of modernity in the post-war period and to a perceived dispersal of meaning.

Throughout the remainder of the post-war period, it is this model of deconstructed identity politics that has come to dominate the Europeanist ideology of the radical right. Even recent movements such as the NCP, who support a statist conception of the European Imperium, have woven the language of identity and cultural rebellion into the fabric of their discourse. Other movements, such as the Nouvelle Droite, have consciously pursued this as a strategy against the suffocating homogeneity of the liberal-institutional political agenda. Conceptual deconstruction has become both a weapon and a form of camouflage, enabling the reconstituted radical right to distance itself in many cases from an overt attachment to racism, whilst practicing an essentially racist-differentialist discourse. This strategy has been so effective that it now threatens to penetrate to the very heart of liberal-democratic, universalist Europe: like a virus attacking its host from within. The success of the differentialist strategy across the continent of Europe owes much to the perceived ossification of mainstream electoral politics. As Ignazi states:

The mistrust towards political institutions and their performance produces that sentiment of alienation and detachment which leads either to the rejection of politics...or to radical anti-system options of which the support for the extreme right is one of the outcomes. The latter is so attractive nowadays because it permits the highest expression of extraneousness to the system and offers a world apart from the political mainstream. Even more appealing is the perspective of a new integration in an ethnoreligious homogenous and holistic community...tied up with strong and hierarchical social relationships within the boundaries of a *völkisch* community. (72)

Ignazi's observations provide a useful summary of the orientation and direction of the Europeanist radical right in the post-war period, illustrated in the ideational profile below. In its anti-systemic rebellion and detachment from the political mainstream, the radical right remains true to its subversive nature. In its attempt to substitute integralism for materialism at the heart of European society, it demonstrates a clear connection with the proto-typical model of the radical right and its powerful yearning for authenticity.

A Summary Profile of Second-Wave Radical Right Europeanism

Origin

- 'Organic necessity...is the source of our imperative'
- 'notre ancienne conception du monde'
- 'the return to superpersonal origins'
- 'the great Synthesis, Imperium'
- 'the pure traditional spirit'

Civilization

- 'the cradle of our Western culture'
- 'deeper roots, a higher culture, a greater tradition'
- 'a block of men united by a common idea'
- 'the will of men who share a common destiny'
- 'les nations européennes possèdent une même civilisation'
- 'the rich cultural heritage of the various European nations'
- 'The Fourth Reich will be Europe, the Reich of the people from Brest to Bucharest'

Virtue

- 'a great unity imbued with a high sense of mission'
- 'a finer purpose...than any other power on earth'
- 'work and fight and sacrifice for a Nation Europa'
- 'une plus haute vie communautaire humaine'
- 'each should unfold its strength in the best interests of Europe'

Violence

- 'a Europe with the will to survive, with the will to power'
- 'a longer and more tested strength, a harder vitality'
- 'Freedom can only be guaranteed by force'
- 'a monolithic, combat-efficient, international political apparatus'
- 'the patriots of Europe will unleash their war of national liberation'
- 'Our project can be seen as a European Revolution'

Myth

- 'this blood-drenched, sacred earth'
- 'Cette île idéale'
- 'Man's world is a world of symbols'
- 'neo-tribalism and a return to our folk gods'
- 'something like a new Templarism'
- 'portés par les grandes vagues mystique'
- 'des menaces planétaires identiques'
- 'the international Jew-Communist and Zionist apparatus of treason and subversion'

Palingenesis

- 'La nouvelle Europe...celle du renouveau de sa culture'
- 'sur notre peuple libéré...se lèvera l'aube de la résurrection'
- 'faire resurgir une vie locale'
- 'The closer one cycle gets to its end, the closer we are to the beginning of a new cycle'
- 'a living witness to the return of a superior human type'
- 'the spiritual regeneration of man, society and the State'

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Second-Wave Liberal Europeanism

In Chapter Three, the analysis dealt with the development of the liberal concept of Europe in the period leading up to the conclusion of World War II. From early attempts at international arbitration and governance, such as the Hague Conferences or the abortive League of Nations and Locarno Treaty, through to the federalist optimism of the European resistance movement in the 1940s, liberal formulations of the concept of Europe at this time generally conformed with the proto-typical description of generic liberal-rationalism set out in Chapter One. Each of the many descriptions of a united, liberal Europe centred upon core component-concepts such as the rule of law, interdependence, rational methodology, universality, and progressive, metamorphic development.

The period immediately following the end of the war was one of tremendous activity and achievement for liberal Europeanists, with the establishment of the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community and, in due course, Euratom and the European Economic Community. The treaties and agreements secured at this time formed the basis not only for the current European Union, but for a new era of European political consciousness. Despite the many flaws and criticisms associated with the liberal European project, it has succeeded in establishing itself in a way that vastly exceeds all previous efforts and has prompted a wholesale reassessment of the nature and potential of international organisation.

In addressing itself to the realities of post-war Europe, liberal ideology has been faced with many of the same challenges as the radical right. In Chapter Four it was argued that whilst the

basic proto-type of the primordialist radical right had demonstrated heuristic value in describing the nature of inter-war Europeanist concepts, in the post-war period it was appropriate to tackle these shifts in structure and consciousness in even greater depth. It was demonstrated that the perceived breakdown in the conventional structures of modernity had created new and more sophisticated variants of radical right Europeanism. Similarly, before embarking upon an empirical investigation of post-war liberal Europeanism, it would be useful to reconsider the proto-typical model and perhaps suggest some revisions or additions to the approach.

The acceleration of modernity has not affected liberal Europeanism in the same way that it has the radical right, at least not immediately or at first sight. The major distinctions between the two forms rest upon the relative success of each in the post-war period. As has been demonstrated, radical right ideology generally struggled to re-establish and re-organise itself, and this precipitated the fragmentation of conventional approaches into a range of groupuscular, micro-ideologies. The demise of state-sponsored fascism split the radical right into many pieces and it is only from a certain perspective that we are able to identify the common conceptual core that links the various movements together. Liberalism, by contrast, was essentially triumphant over fascist totalitarianism and its Europeanist ideologues were carried along on a wave of post-war optimism. Not since the unification effected under the Nazi empire had Europe been closer to the possibility of a genuine and extensive form of co-operation, and liberal Europeanists themselves were generally in accord over the direction taken. It is an important distinction that each ideology met the post-war experience under very different internal conditions.

In order to understand fully the response of liberal Europeanism at this time we must re-examine the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism, focusing again particularly upon the nature of historical change and its implications for social organisation. The response of the radical right demonstrated a peculiarly ambiguous approach to this post-war experience,

particularly in its attempt to colonise and appropriate the evolving political landscape. By contrast, what distinguished the response of the early liberal European project was its further commitment to the determination and unity of purpose of Enlightenment idealism. Liberalism suffered no real crisis of confidence in the immediate post-war period: quite the opposite. The experience of the defeat of fascism gave the architects of the new Europe an almost evangelical faith in their undertaking, and in the fundamental justice of their moral values. Although the establishment of the preliminary structures of the European communities may be seen as radical, revolutionary even, in truth this was simply the acceleration of a process that was already in motion, grounded in a discourse that dates to the real age of revolution, i.e. the late 18th century. The core principles of a liberal-rational model of Europeanism, (universality, structure, law, etc.) were already deeply embedded in the political consciousness of (Allied) Europe, but were given coherent expression and momentum by the political process of the late 1940s and 1950s.

This, then, was the basis for liberal Europeanism's confrontation with the ontological environment of the post-war period: not under conditions of retreat and fragmentation, but boldly and with a good degree of self-righteous confidence. It is to this confidence in the justification of liberal values that Fukuyama alludes in his landmark text, 'The End of History and the Last Man'. In his discussion of the principle of universality found in Kant, and particularly Hegel, Fukuyama provides insight into the assumptions and contradictions of liberal-rationalism which will help to establish an understanding of its accommodation with this period. Fukuyama's analysis of the Kantian view of history, universality and the civic constitution reminds us of the proto-typical description of liberal-rationalism, and suggests also the strong correlation with the normative political project of the European Union.

Kant's ideas help to form a basis for our understanding of liberal-rationalism as a generic type. The component-concepts of the proto-typical model are evident in his views on rationalism, the rule of law, civil society and a distinct teleology. In the same way, as we shall observe below in the analysis of second-wave liberal Europeanism, these Kantian, liberal-rational principles remain at the heart of the EU project. However, before proceeding to this stage it is necessary to undertake further consideration of the nature of historical and political change implicit in liberal thought, and to anticipate the implications of this in terms of the liberal Europeanist experience of post-war ontological conditions.

In order to address this issue we must turn, as Fukuyama does, to the Hegelian principle of the historical dialectic. Briefly summarised, this principle can be understood as a process whereby an ideology or social system that suffers from strong internal contradictions is usurped by a more dynamic type with fewer internal contradictions. This, according to Hegel, is the process by which humanity progresses inevitably towards a higher form of human civilization and what he himself termed 'the end of history'. The principle is expanded by Hegel as follows:

The history of a single world-historical nation contains (a) the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self-conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history; and (b) the period of its decline and fall, since it is its decline and fall that signals the emergence in it of a higher principle as the pure negative of its own. When this happens, mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another nation for world-historical significance. After this period, the declining nation has lost the interest of the absolute. (3)

The nature of historical change described by Hegel conforms closely to the proto-typical liberal concept of metamorphosis, rather than the palingenetic concept employed by the

Kant suggested that history would have an end point, that is to say, a final purpose that was implied in man's current potentialities and which made the whole of history intelligible. This end point was the realization of human freedom...The achievement of such a just civic constitution and its universalization throughout the world would then be the criterion by which one could understand progress in history. (1)

In line with Kantian thought, liberal Europeanism, as embodied in the texts of the early European institutions, saw the establishment of a deep community of interests within a framework of legal-rational guarantees as the expression of this universal civic constitutionalism, as perhaps the 'final purpose' of human society. It is interesting that Fukuyama mentions also the notion of 'intelligibility' in the context of this final purpose or *telos*. One of the features of a confrontation with postmodernity may be described as the loss of intelligibility and the death of the grand narratives of human history. Liberalism, though, in continuing to pursue a Kantian view of universal history and civil society, challenges (or refutes) this process at the deepest conceptual levels. Liberal Europe is an articulation of an intelligible universe, where normative moral values are not scattered by the winds of relativism, but are bound tightly into a justifiable world-view rooted in foundational universality. This world-view is liberalism's objective, the end-point of a process of metamorphic development whose momentum is logically irresistible.

In the teleological theory of nature, an organ that is not intended to be used, an organization that does not achieve its end, is a contradiction. If we stray from that fundamental principle, we no longer have a lawful but an aimlessly playing nature, and hopeless chance takes the place of reason's guiding thread...Thus there must be a society in which one will find the highest possible degree of freedom under external laws combined with irresistible power, i.e. a perfectly rightful civil constitution, whose attainment is the supreme task nature has set for the human species; for only by solving and completing it can nature fulfil her other objectives with our species. (2)

radical right. Hegel's view is of a new society emerging from the decadent and contradictory state of the old, building out of its defeated logic rather than razing society to the ground and beginning afresh.

The universality that is conceptually omnipresent in post-war liberal thought is an indication of more than just a belief in the equal application of principles: it represents a normative faith in the inherent superiority of liberal values, which is widely evident in the discursive practice of liberal Europeanists. For them, the liberal European project is a demonstration of the cogency and ultimate necessity of their world-view. In the context of the triumph over fascism (and subsequently over communism, by other means), liberal-rationalism emerged in the post-war period as the dominant paradigm, reinforcing not just its confidence but also its sense of righteousness. However, all is clearly not well within the European project as it enters the second half of its first century of existence. There is an almost tangible disquiet amongst ideologues of the new Europe, the causes of which can be linked to this Hegelian dialectic of history and liberalism's confrontation with the evolving ontological context of the later post-war period.

In a separate analysis of Hegel, Kojève provides further insights that may help to form a revised understanding of the evolution of the liberal European paradigm. He argues that by using the dialectical method it is possible for the ideologue to refute less positively justifiable approaches: in other words, "by becoming a dialectician the man of myth or opinion becomes a scientist or philosopher" (4). In dialectical terms we can regard the rise of post-war liberal-rationalism as the next and rightful stage of ideological evolution: its internally more cohesive logic had usurped the more contradictory and disintegrative thought of inter-war fascism. This point, of course, does not really address the vital role played by the simple force of arms, and particularly the force of Soviet arms, in securing ideological victory. However, what is less straightforward is how the subsequent and prolonged dominance of the liberal-rational paradigm can be explained, or indeed justified, by the dialectical method. Can we, for example,

conclude that ideological history has reached its end-point, that the liberal constitutionalism articulated in the founding texts of the European Communities represents the closure of the Hegelian process and the attainment of its ultimate historical objective? Perhaps more importantly, what are the potential consequences of wrongly assuming that this is the case?

History stops when Man no longer acts in the full sense of the term – that is, when he no longer negates, no longer transforms the natural and social given through bloody fighting and creative work. And Man no longer does this when the given Real gives him full satisfaction by fully realizing his Desire...According to Hegel, Man is nothing but Desire for recognition...which is fully satisfied in and by the universal and homogenous state. (5)

It could be argued that a presumption to have reached, or at least identified, the end-point of history lies at the heart of any normative ideological approach. Even more so in the case of liberal Europeanism, the creation of the framework of the European institutions was an effective statement of the logical finality of the ideological-historical process and the dawn of an indefinite golden age of values. In making such a statement, liberal Europeanists, both during the 1950s and more recently, have effectively ceased to defend or battle for the ideas that they assume to have triumphed already. This tendency was first exhibited in response to the demise of fascism, but was subsequently reinforced by the collapse of communism, both of which have served the aim of liberal-rationalism of continuing to view itself as the most complete and internally coherent of idea-systems. The perceived absence of an ideological alternative to liberal-rationalism has removed the possibility of a continuing dialectical process (though more recent events, such as the rise of religious fundamentalism, clearly demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case). As such, liberal-rationalism has no interlocutor, and its core conceptual principles, arguably, have reverted to, and re-entered, what Kojève refers to as

the period of Myth: “The period of Myth is a period of monologue, and in this period one demonstrates nothing because one ‘discusses’ nothing...” (6).

The central proposition made here is that in adhering to its core, proto-typical principles, second-wave liberal Europeanism has normatively asserted its own conclusions about the moral and political basis of society, and has pursued objectives that help to realise these conclusions in a concrete form. This approach is entirely consistent with the Kantian roots of liberal-rational thought. However, it may be argued that in pursuing such normative objectives, liberal Europe has wilfully ignored or misinterpreted the impact of history, and has not properly understood its own position within an evolving ontological context. By extension, it is possible to conceive of a liberal Europe that fails (or is failing) to address the most urgent moral and social problems, particularly with regard to the question of individual and collective identity. A liberal Europe that cannot address such questions runs the risk of becoming distanced and irrelevant. We have already seen in the previous chapter the extent to which the electoral radical right has managed to infiltrate mainstream political processes in Europe: this is in no small part due to the perceived failure of liberal institutions effectively to deal with issues of European identity. There is a potential danger that liberal Europe might become trapped in a kind of ideological *stasis*, propagating myths of reason and universality when the argument has long since moved on. It is partly the objective of this thesis to determine whether such a situation exists and, if so, to consider what might be done about it.

The possibility of stasis in an ideological system has been clearly illustrated in the past by Maoist and quasi-Stalinist regimes which monopolised the right to determine the definition of social progress and insisted always on terms that suited that their own discursive practice (e.g. North Korea). We must question whether liberal universality, in its insistence upon certain normative values, has itself attempted to define the terms of what is morally and socially progressive, in a way that risks leaving it stranded between the overbearing and the obsolete.

In his discussion of the concept of 'thymos', or recognition, Fukuyama provides further argument to support the view that liberalism may have become weak in the face of its ideological opponents. He suggests that the 'isothymotic ideals' of liberal society (i.e. proposing the universal and mutual recognition of all within the context of the civil constitutional state) may become so complacently held that they fail to stimulate creativity in society. In other words, the notion of membership of a civil community such as that proposed by liberal Europeanists may not be enough to engage the citizen or excite creative political action. Such an approach may fail to satisfy the yearning for something deeper and more strongly felt, something well understood by the radical right.

...is the recognition that one receives by virtue of citizenship in a large contemporary democracy necessarily more satisfying than the recognition that people used to receive as members of small, tightly-knit, pre-industrial agricultural communities? For although the latter had no political "rights" in the modern sense, they were members of small and stable social groups, bound by ties of kinship, work, religion and the like, who mutually "recognized" and respected one another...By contrast, residents of modern cities living in huge apartment blocks may be recognized by the state, but they are strangers to the very people with whom they live and work. (7)

Indirectly, Fukuyama addresses a problem that has emerged prominently during this investigation, namely the question of social and cultural recognition within the European community. The radical right, consistent with the proto-typical model, has continued in the post-war period to pursue an agenda that seeks to recognise and re-establish a more authentic identity, founded upon culture and sometimes race. Liberal Europeanists, by contrast, have pursued what we might call a more abstract, universal identity within the proto-typical framework of the liberal-rational model of the civil constitution.

Universality and liberal institutionalism

Although the Europeanist tradition within liberal thought was already well established by the end of the war, the activity creating the European institutions in the decade or more following its conclusion demonstrates an unprecedented vigour and scope. Within a dozen years of 1945, some six or seven significant organisations or institutions, underpinned in every case by an explicitly internationalist undertaking, had been established. The substance of each of these ventures varies from case to case, but all share the proto-typical characteristics of the liberal-rational model.

One of the earliest and most striking examples of post-war liberal Europeanism comes in the form of The Congress of Europe meeting at The Hague in the early summer of 1948. This conference brought together ardent Europeanists from across the continent to make a statement about the nature and direction of European integration in the future. Although it may not be seen as much more than a coincidence, it is interesting to recall the earlier series of Hague conferences at the end of the 19th century, and to consider the establishment of the post-war liberal European institutions as acts descended more or less directly from such experiments.

The Congress of Europe received broad support, particularly from those quarters in continental European politics that were now beginning to dominate the foreign policy agenda. The Congress was a step towards the more specific, diplomatic negotiations that would follow over the course of the next decade and which would create the concrete institutions of modern Europe. At the Congress, pan-European ideas could be expressed with renewed dedication, rid now of the menace of fascism. The optimism and sense of high mission that characterises much early post-war Europeanism was exhibited at the conference by one of its most prominent delegates, Winston Churchill, representing the Movement for European Unity. In the passage below we once more find conceptual features that direct us towards the

proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism. However, we see also further evidence of the affective and mildly historicist tone of some liberal Europeanist discourse, particularly as it strives to engage the listener in an *act of faith* in the new Europe.

We shall only save ourselves from the perils which draw near by forgetting the hatreds of the past, by letting national rancours and revenges die, by progressively effacing frontiers and barriers which aggravate and congeal our divisions, and by rejoicing together in that glorious treasure of literature, of romance, of ethics, of thought and toleration belonging to all, which is the true inheritance of Europe, the expression of its genius and honour...The Movement for European Unity must be a positive force, deriving its strength from our sense of common spiritual values. It is a dynamic expression of democratic faith based upon moral conceptions and inspired by a sense of mission. (8)

Churchill's zeal was echoed by other prominent figures at this time. The above extract provides us with insight into the dynamic nature of such liberal Europeanist thought. What we see here is not a dry, legalistic description of Europe, but an ideological call to arms. Churchill's speech is a good illustration of the problem and contradiction identified by Popper of affective, faith-based rationalism. The Europe that Churchill conceptualises conforms to the rational model of liberal-democratic governance, but the discourse developed here is much grander and more provocative. It consciously uses language to inspire faith in the future potential of Europe and as such it is not inconsistent with the discourse of the radical right, particularly in its references to Europe's 'genius and honour', its 'common spiritual values' and 'moral conceptions'.

A year after the Congress of Europe, in May 1949, the statute establishing the Council of Europe was signed in London. This organisation, running parallel to the subsequent development of economic institutions, was intended to promote fundamental freedoms and human rights, and to pursue the aims of social, economic and cultural integration generally. The liberal-rational basis of this statute is evident in some of its provisions:

- ...the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international cooperation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilisation.
- ...to achieve a greater unity between its members.
- ...open to any country willing to accept the principles of the rule of law. (9)

What are also evident, though, are by now familiar references to a deeper, less rational, spiritual and moral bond existing between the peoples of Europe, a theme which has endured over the last sixty years or so. In the text of this statute, the concept of Europe is described in a way that less than strictly conforms to the liberal-rational model, for example where it speaks of “the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples” (10). What will interest us particularly during the course of this chapter is the extent to which post-war liberal Europeanism has emphasised a non-rational core of European identity, and the impact this may have had in terms of cultural exclusion and resistance to the Other.

The sense of high moral mission described by Churchill is strongly in evidence in the writings of Jean Monnet, often described as one of the ‘fathers’ of European integration. Monnet, along with his counterpart, Robert Schuman, was highly influential during the early formation of the European system. He was essentially a bureaucrat, but demonstrates in his thought the vision and ambition of liberal Europeanism at this time. As with ideologues of the post-war radical right, for Monnet Europe possessed a unique genius that represented a social and cultural legacy. Indeed, in the passage below, Monnet makes a direct (Hegelian) link between the development of civilisation and the possibility of betterment, i.e. the attainment of a higher synthesis.

Men who are placed in new practical circumstances, or subjected to a new set of obligations, adapt their behaviour and become different. If the new context is better, they themselves become better: that is the whole rationale of the European Community, and the process of civilization itself...Today's Europeans, like previous generations of Europeans, are capable of making a contribution to the development of civilization. But if their creative genius is to blossom again, we need to unite. (11)

Monnet emphasises the importance of human agency in the adaptation to new circumstances and demonstrates an orthodox liberal-rational faith in the capacity of individuals to better themselves. Monnet's insistence upon an evolutionary model of civilisation is also consistent with the proto-typical, liberal-rational understanding of metamorphic change. It is also interesting to note, though, that Monnet refers in a mildly historicist sense to Europe as a legacy passed down the generations, and emphasises Europe's 'creative genius'.

Even at a relatively early stage in this chapter it is possible to offer some observations about the apparent contradiction between the liberal-rational features of early post-war Europeanism and its occasional but prominent references to emotive and historicist motifs. Since before the war, during the era of Coudenhove-Kalergi, liberal Europeanists have been keenly aware of the need to generate enthusiasm for the idea of Europe, and to root the liberal project in an explicitly European identity. The difficulty with a strictly rational approach was that it would fail to inspire the necessary dynamic that would be required to bring the project to life: people had to *believe* in it for it to happen. It is for this reason, perhaps, even if only sub-consciously, that liberal Europeanists have allowed their rational discourse to become imbued with the spirit of something much more provocative, of something like a common European culture. It is through, and by reference to, a European culture that second-wave liberal Europeanists have sought to validate their efforts and harness Europe's 'creative

genius'. As Bauman suggests, culture can be seen as the process by which human activity becomes possible.

Culture...is an incessant activity of drawing the world, fragment by fragment, out of the serene yet somnolent inertia of *zuhanden* and transplanting it into a uniquely human realm of *vorhanden* – making of the world an object of critical inquiry and creative action. This feat is accomplished ever anew, daily, everywhere where humans live; the perpetual rebirth and reincarnation of the world is what all and any human mode of being-in-the-world consists in. (12)

The purpose of the liberal European project (and of politics generally) is to make the world an object of 'creative action' – one corner of it, at least. Out of the inertia of indifference and fatigue, liberal Europeanists have sought to create a political renaissance: in this context it is interesting to note Bauman's description of 'perpetual rebirth and reincarnation'. We might ask why liberal Europeanists appear to demonstrate a need to invoke such a renaissance, why the force of rational logic will not in itself prevail. We might also consider, as the chapter progresses, what the recent and current state of European culture tells us about the health of the liberal European project. Has the European Union managed to stimulate the continuing transfer from *zuhanden* to *vorhanden*, or has it succumbed to an enveloping stasis, whereby Europe no longer creates but simulates acts of culture? As Bauman warns, "Europe as a whole has lost its urge and will for adventure – for the excitement of risk-taking, for chasing new and unexplored horizons and blazing new and untried trails" (13).

This remains the enduring danger for liberal Europe: that it should slip into dull irrelevance. As Orwell recognised immediately after the war, "The greatest danger is the apathy and conservatism of the people everywhere, their unawareness of danger, their inability to imagine anything new" (14). Liberal Europe, in its post-war infancy, was still engaged in an

adventure, in exploring the newest trail of integration. The extent to which that continued to be case will be discussed below.

Along with subsequent treaties establishing the European Communities during the 1950s, the 1951 Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) embodies the nature of liberal Europeanism at this time. The treaty was first and foremost highly functional, and this is consistent with the proto-typical basis of liberal-rationalism. The treaty was an instrument of sense, but it was also a statement of conviction and direction. One might argue that the treaty's focus on coal and steel, instrumental in limiting the possibility of future belligerence, was also symbolic of the process by which liberal Europeanism constructed something meaningful and purposeful from the broken pieces of industrial Europe. Such a view would be consistent with the liberal-rational notion of metamorphic development, and recognises the sense of high purpose expressed by the conclusion of the treaty, where the signatories declare themselves:

- Convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable;
- Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests...to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared. (15)

The treaty, then, is characteristic of liberal Europeanism at this time, being both highly pragmatic and carefully conceived, but also audacious in its rhetoric: this was the spirit in which these first undertakings were made. The ongoing impact of these initial steps is reflected in speeches given in Luxembourg on the tenth anniversary of the ECSC's creation. The Italian President of the ECSC High Authority, for example, speaks of the community as a "higher fellowship", "a source of spiritual enrichment", "a common destiny and a single hope" (16). To a certain extent, the boldness of early Europeanist discourse has endured, in

the texts of subsequent treaties including Maastricht, Nice and even the abortive Constitution (now the Treaty of Lisbon).

During the years between 1958, when the Treaty of Rome came into force, and the present day, the theory and practice of European integration have developed. However, the fundamental character of liberal Europeanism remains fairly consistent. Implicitly acknowledging the belief that history and ideological progress have reached some form of final synthesis, its ultimate goals are, by definition, largely immovable: to question the core liberal-rational principles underpinning the project would be to challenge its *raison d'être*.

The most significant statutory development of the European project after 1958 was made initially with the Treaty on European Union (TEU-Maastricht, 1991). Evolving from the structure of the Single European Act (SEA, 1986), the Maastricht Treaty represented a substantial increase in the breadth of the project and an attempt simultaneously to deepen the bonds between member-states. What is of interest to us here is not institutional or policy development as such, but the prominence of the liberal-rational model (and deviations from it) in the body of the text. For example, the treaty's commitment to "the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law" (17) is clearly in line with the proto-typical description of liberal-rationalism. This consistency was reflected also in the equivalent section of the later draft Constitution:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. (18)

The conceptual themes present in the liberal-rational model are readily demonstrated in both cases. Universality, the rule of law and a strong sense of mutual responsibility continue to characterise the explicit intent of the liberal European project. In other parts of this text,

though, there are discursive characteristics that point to a Europe looking in a rather different direction. By definition, the universal, foundational and pluralist basis of European integration must respect the diversity of identities present within the Union's territory, and explicitly it does. But, in common with earlier examples, even these landmark texts betray evidence of conceptual influences that sit less comfortably with the liberal-rational proto-type. For example, the Maastricht Treaty describes a desire "to deepen the solidarity between [...] peoples while respecting their history, their culture and traditions" (19). In itself, there is nothing untoward in this point, but it illustrates an enduring preoccupation with European identity that has led, in other examples, to more anomalous assertions. Even in the draft Constitution (perhaps especially so), one is struck by the prominence of conceptual themes that seem unusually provocative and ambiguous.

- Europe is a continent that has brought forth civilization.
- Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe.
- ...while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny.
- ...the great venture which makes of [Europe] a special area of human hope. (20)

It is not suggested here that the European project has wholly lost sight of its liberal-rational basis: treaty statements and decades of policy initiatives have, to a certain extent, confirmed the EU's credentials as a representative of the liberal-rational world-view. What is of interest here is the prominence of other conceptual themes that may cause us to question the exact nature of liberal Europeanism. What is the significance of the presence in liberal European texts and propaganda of conceptual and discursive elements that appear to fall outside of the liberal-rational model? What do they tell us about the pressures upon the liberal-rational

paradigm, both from within and from without? To answer these questions effectively we must consider further examples of liberal Europeanist discourse, particularly the pro-European statements of the project's various architects.

Grand designs: propaganda of the European project

Winston Churchill has already received some attention above in connection with his involvement as a representative of the Movement for European Unity. He was an important advocate of the European idea in the early stages of the post-war period, not least because of the degree of seriousness and significance that his association lent to the movement's intentions. We have already seen examples that suggest that Churchill's discursive practice was influenced by conceptual themes that, arguably, diverge from the liberal-rational model. In a speech in 1950 to the Council of Europe, Churchill makes a statement which exemplifies the potential contradiction in liberal thinking when he describes the European project thus: "We are not making a machine. We are growing a living plant." (21). Liberal-rationalism, unlike, say, conservatism or fascism, should, by definition, view a political project such as Europe as a rational *structure*, a mechanism of sorts. Churchill's 'plant' metaphor is therefore interesting in that it suggests a more organic view of European society, one which we might more ordinarily associate with the radical right. In themselves, individual statements such as these have limited significance, but a closer analysis of a wide range of examples reveals something of a pattern, which may have far more important ramifications.

In Robert Schuman's now famous declaration of 1950, the core conceptual elements of the liberal-rational model are evident. His drive to create a European Coal and Steel Community was founded upon a thoroughly pragmatic and rational approach, one that recognises the structured, metamorphic development of the political community.

A United Europe will not be achieved all at once, nor in a single framework: it will be formed by concrete measures which first of all create a solidarity in fact...conditions will be progressively created which will automatically insure the most effective rationalisation of production on the basis of the highest level of productivity. (22)

Schuman's description here is indicative of a rational, positivist approach, in that the development of the European project is seen as measurable, fact-based and constructive: it is not a revolution, but a transformation. In all the years of its evolution, the European Union has remained adherent to this basic approach. Economic and political development is governed by a multiplicity of frameworks that rationalise the passage of integration. However, at this point we should recognise the potential weaknesses in such an approach, weaknesses that provide something of an explanation for liberal Europeanism's simultaneous pursuit of a more transcendent form. Schuman's 'rationalisation of production', momentous though it was in political history, does not create sufficient *spiritual* engagement with the European people. It is, indeed, the potential crisis of modern Europe that the project does not deal with the issue of a deeper identity, one that treats Europeans as more than the sum of their parts, and it is this conceptual space that is vulnerable to colonisation by the radical right. We see a recognition of this short-coming in the development of liberal 'systems theory', which seeks to describe a more holistic view of European unity. As Rifkin writes:

Taking the measure of a man – knowing his place of birth, age, height, weight, physical and emotional characteristics, etc. – tells us little of value about who he really is. It is only by understanding his relationship to the larger environment in which he is embedded and the many relationships he shares that we get a sense of him...Systems theory holds that the nature of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. That's because it is the relationship between the parts – the organising principles that animate the whole – that creates something qualitatively different at the level of the whole. (23)

Systemic analysis has been applied to the European project in a number of forms over the years. Much of this analysis, though, concentrates on institutional and power-based relationships (24). This is not quite the same thing as Rifkin is describing, though it shares characteristics in terms of methodology. Rifkin discusses a form of post-Enlightenment rationalism that seeks to discover a broader, more holistic understanding of individuals and social structures. Implicitly, this tendency is a recognition of the failure of other liberal-rational approaches really to address the nature of European society as a whole, rather than as a series of autonomous parts. The discourse of liberal Europeanism repeatedly alludes to this other perspective, this other dimension, in its descriptions of mutual dependence, of collective destiny. However, the practice of liberal European integration is more a matter of the parts rather than the whole. There is a sense of dislocation, of atomisation, present in the structure of the European project, a dislocation that is potentially absorbed by Europe's disinterested citizens.

Liberal systems theory and radical right identity politics reach similar conclusions about the complex, multi-dimensional nature of European society and social identity. However, we would expect liberal discourse to resist the normative cultural conclusions of the radical right, fearing their exclusionary quality. Liberal Europe is torn between a desire to transcend its own mechanistic structure, and a vigilance against intolerance, derived from its universalist, prototypical nature.

This is a problem confronted by Blaut in a critique of what he terms 'Eurocentric diffusionism', where he attacks "those arguments and theories that falsely attribute historical superiority or priority to Europeans over all other peoples" (25). If liberal Europe emphasises its 'creative genius', its great historical legacy, it may be in danger of propagating Eurocentrism in a way that adversely affects its liberal-rational orientation. But without stressing these features, liberal Europe may struggle to promote a holistic European identity: this is the 'Catch 22' at the heart of European integration and expansion. The problem is precisely illustrated by

Blaut when he cites Max Weber, a pioneer of rational sociology (and ideal-typical analysis), as a proponent of Eurocentrism:

[One who is] a product of modern European civilisation, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilisation, and in Western civilisation only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having *universal* significance and value...In fact the State itself...is known [in the full sense] only in the Occident...[The] concept of the citizen has not existed outside the Occident. (26)

This passage from Weber is a good example of the erroneous direction in which ideologues of a liberal-rational world-view can be led. His discursive practice is Eurocentric. It is mildly supremacist. It is not fully consistent with the proto-typical model, but it *is* indicative of the pattern that emerges in liberal Europeanist propaganda in the later twentieth century. Weber demonstrates a certain arrogance that is perhaps inevitably to be associated with a liberal, neo-Hegelian perspective that imagines itself at the pinnacle of historical and ideological development. As Blaut observes:

...he [Weber] held to the typical conceit of his time and place, and class, in thinking that contemporary European capitalism is the culmination of social evolution – if not the end product of evolution, at least its highest achievement thus far. (He had doubts about further ascent in the future). (27)

Later examples of pro-European propaganda reveal a similar story about the balance of tendencies within liberal ideology. As the project developed, it continued to be a focus for a rational methodology, and the growth of its institutional and statutory framework reflects this. Comments made in the post-war period by Europhile politicians show a faith in the potential of Europe to fulfil the aims of a liberal-rational paradigm. The then British Prime Minister,

Edward Heath, for example, demonstrates features consistent with the proto-typical model when describing the metamorphic nature of the European Community as “a living, changing, developing organisation” (28). Heath also exhibits a faith in the institutional capabilities of the Communities, reflecting a proto-typical concern with structure and law.

They [have] proven means for dealing with the problems inside the Community – through the Treaty, through the Commission, through the Council of Ministers these matters are being handled the whole time. (29)

In numerous examples, national politicians whose ideological orientation falls broadly within the boundaries of the liberal-rational model have been drawn to the European project because it continues to embody those core features and allows the possibility of furthering socialisation. Liberal Europe explicitly aims to achieve political equality and universality, concepts that have proved appealing to social democrats as well as liberals. This is reflected from the other side of the British political spectrum by Roy Hattersley, who states in 1971 that he remains ‘for Europe’. “I have taken that stand virtually all my public life for reasons which I can only describe not only as consistent with my view of social democracy but essential to that view” (30).

Central to this liberal/social democratic support for the European project has been the development of the concept of European citizenship, acting as a vehicle for extending principles consistent with the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism into the sphere of public rights and entitlements. Whilst the main focus of the early post-war development of the European Communities was economic and political, later progress into the social policy arena, so called “Social Europe”, has been indicative of an attempt to establish a meaningful notion of citizenship.

What is of particular interest to us here is the extent to which European citizenship is contained within the boundaries or constraints of the liberal-rational model, or the degree to which it potentially oversteps these boundaries in its pursuit of something more compelling: a citizenship-identity. Identity as a concept within a liberal-rational context is subversive: it demands to be responded to, not considered; it evokes rather than constructs. Also, identity is usually bound to a specific locality, leading to the possibility of identity concentration and the exclusion of 'the Other'. As Van Gunsteren observes:

Citizenship, as we have known it up till now, is time, place, and cultural bound. It is a scarce resource that can remain a resource only as long as certain boundaries are maintained. The price for effective standing and equality among citizens apparently is inequality between citizens and non-citizens, between insiders and outsiders. (31)

It is the susceptibility of citizenship to a more Eurocentric definition that constitutes our focus here. It is in more recent years, particularly, that the discussion surrounding European citizenship-identity has intensified. In its early stages, despite the ambition of statesmen like Monnet and Schuman, liberal Europe remained essentially intergovernmental in its orientation. However, the debate concerning the nature of European citizenship-identity has now moved up a gear. This can be explained by a number of factors:

The changing geo-political context of the later 20th century.

From the 1950s to the late 1980s, political action in Europe had taken place against the backdrop of the superpower structure. Owing to the presence of NATO especially, European identity failed to establish itself in some important arenas. Early supranationalism in Europe was focused on economic issues, leaving a vacuum that continued to be filled by existing national identities. More recently, with the disintegration of the communist system and the

end of the bi-polar power structure, Europe has been challenged to re-define itself and to project itself onto the world beyond. The urgency of the need to achieve such development was made all too clear during the fragmentation of the Balkans in the 1990s. Thus, the changes in the geo-political balance of power have, to certain degree, compelled Europe to become more conscious of itself and to pursue an identity of some form.

The success of early-stage integration.

Despite its relatively modest start, liberal Europe has evolved to embrace a wide range of political responsibilities and has penetrated to the heart of national political and legal systems. It was with the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty that the potential of liberal Europe to express a deeper political identity was increased. In effect, the irresistible process of integration that began with the fusion of the coal and steel markets has led to a *de facto* European political 'personality' that requires a more distinct expression as identity. Whether or not this identity has indeed been *provided* by deeper political integration is another matter entirely, but it is a factor that helps to explain the increased prominence of the issue of identity in recent years.

Globalisation and post-national contours.

The destabilising impact of globalisation has placed pressure upon liberal Europe to defend itself and even extend its sphere of influence. As vast areas of territory become drawn under emerging political influences, a process of 'mega-regionalisation' is in evidence. Europe has responded, as others have, by attempting to assert an identity through the projection of a collective self. The challenge of globalisation has provoked Europe into a consideration of its defence, with the concurrent development of the concept of "Fortress Europe". This concept would have seemed less relevant at an earlier stage of Europe's post-war evolution, but by the later 20th century it was identifiable in economic policy and was forcing questions concerning

the deeper implications for identity. The disintegration of European imperialism throughout the 50s and 60s had also contributed to this need for collective security. No European country was really what it once had been, and increasingly member-states looked towards Europe as a means of magnifying their geo-political 'ego', e.g. EU representation on the WTO.

The increased prominence of the notion of European citizenship-identity in recent years is thus accounted for to a certain extent. Recent ideologues of liberal Europe have had to contend with the pressure that they are subject to in this respect. In later examples of liberal Europeanist discourse we continue to find an articulation of values and ideas consistent with the liberal-rational proto-type, exemplified in this case by Jacques Delors.

The time has come to return to ideals, to let them penetrate our lives. Let us continue to consider, in everything we do in the field of politics, economics and social and cultural life, what will enable every man, every woman, to achieve their full potential in an awareness not only of their rights, but also of their obligations to others and to society as a whole. We must sustain our efforts to create a humane society in which the individual can blossom through contact and cooperation with others. (32)

We see here Delors' affirmation of universality in the application of his ideals to 'every man, every woman', and the feature of human agency in his desire that each should achieve his or her full potential and in his call for 'sustained effort'. 'Through contact and cooperation', Delors anticipates the continued interdependence of the European community, whilst his choice of the 'blossom' metaphor can be seen, albeit perhaps subliminally, as an expression of the conceptual feature of metamorphic change, of one form emerging out of another. However, in Delors' speech, as with many other examples from the later post-war period, there is a certain ambiguity surrounding the discursive practice that is sometimes used. Examples such as the one below suggest that liberal Europe in the past twenty years has acted

and viewed itself in an expansionist, one might almost say mildly imperialist, manner. Delors' conviction, expressed here in the optimistic context of the collapse of communism, reminds us of earlier observations about the end of history and the summit of ideological development.

Communist Europe is exploding before our eyes. Gorbachev has launched Perestroika and Glasnost. Poland and Hungary are carrying out political reforms, ushering in an era of greater freedom and democracy. East Germany totters as tens of thousands of its people flee to the West. The virus of freedom has reached Leipzig and East Berlin...[It] is our community, a community based on the rule of law, a democratic entity and a buoyant economy, that has served as the model and the catalyst for these developments. (33)

In this extract we see something of the juxtaposition of tendencies that has characterised liberal Europeanism throughout the post-war period. On the one hand we find features consistent with the liberal-rational model, such as democracy, the rule of law, etc. On the other, it is not difficult to discern through the triumphalist tone a sense that western liberal democracy, embodied in the practices of European integration, represents a high-point, perhaps even the end-point of social and political development. In the early 1990s, as European political integration was deepening and the former communist states were apparently opening themselves up like so many flowers, pro-European voices became increasingly self-assured and self-convinced.

It is not suggested that this liberal-rational euphoria masks anything particularly malevolent. Rather, we should simply consider the possible impact of such ideological self-righteousness in terms of the direction it suggests for further political action. Just as in the field of economics, Europe has sought to dominate the former Eastern Bloc in the past ten or fifteen years with its system of values, in a manner that may draw accusations of cultural imperialism, not consistent with a tradition of pluralism and self-determination.

In other examples, we again see the fusion between core liberal-rational values and a tone that is somehow more pressing, more urgent, more strongly persuasive. Liberal Europeanism has consistently tried to manage this conceptual paradox, this marriage between the rational and the symbolic, the pragmatic and the inspirational. This is exhibited in Vaclav Havel's symbolic reference to the twelve stars of the European Union flag as analogous to "the rhythmical passage of time, with its 12 hours in the day and 12 months in the year" (34). It is even more explicit in the words of the Council of Europe, cited and discussed here by Shore.

'Twelve was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sons of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day, the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. Lastly, the circular layout denoted union.'...The twelve gold stars is also a Christian symbol representing the Virgin Mary's halo (Revelation 12:1). For the Commission, this was 'the symbol par excellence of European identity and European unification.' (35)

It is useful at this point to pause and consider what an example such as this tells us about the liberal Europeanist view of identity formation. In very little sense does the symbolic discourse exemplified above conform to the core features of generic liberal-rationalism, and in many ways it is far more reminiscent of the historicist and culturally Eurocentric language of the radical right.

What, for example, is the place of Judaeo-Christian, Græco-Roman mythology in relation to the rational, (humanist) goals of the liberal EU? Once again, we are reminded of Popper's criticisms of historicism and the uneasy synthesis of 'rational faith'. Liberal Europe has sought to define itself in terms that will inspire popular identification and loyalty, using familiar and resonant European themes and cultural sources. In doing so, it may be argued, liberal Europe risks deviating from its liberal-rational basis of civil universality, supplanting this with an identity source that is altogether more culturally specific and potentially Eurocentric. This is

evident also in Romano Prodi's comments in 1999, where he blends the liberal-rational conceptual construct of European citizenship with a deeper, less rational longing.

What we now need to build is a union of hearts and minds, underpinned by a strong shared sentiment of a common destiny – a sense of common European citizenship. We come from different countries. We speak different languages. We have different historical and cultural traditions. And we must preserve them. But we are seeking a shared identity – a new European soul...All of us...must work together towards our common destiny: a wider European area offering peace, stability and prosperity to all. A 'new European order'. (36)

The key to this fusion or conceptual paradox is identified by Prodi in the first of the above lines: 'a union of hearts and minds'. It is the engagement with the citizen that has been glaringly obvious by its absence in the evolution of liberal Europe. The discourse of early post-war construction was too strongly contained within an elitist project really to develop a meaningful notion of citizenship. Later efforts to address this failure have been committed and enthusiastic, but at what price? It could be argued that recent pro-European propaganda and policy, particularly that surrounding the process of enlargement, has deviated from the liberal-rational model in order to engage the citizen in a deeper form of spiritual attachment. Such an attachment, of course, is something that we would more normally associate with the discourse of the radical right. However, it seems evident from a range of examples that this form of emotive identity-politics has taken root in the somewhat arid soil of the functionalist, liberal project. This synthesis is perhaps most alarmingly expressed above in Prodi's reference to a 'new European order'; a term coined, of course, by Nazi Europeanists during the Occupation. There is no suggestion here that there is a *direct* comparison to be drawn between liberal Europe and its fascist predecessor: liberal Europe clearly continues to articulate principles consistent with liberal-rationalism. However, as these extracts demonstrate, liberal Europeanists can sometimes be drawn into articulating their ambitions in terms that struggle

to be included within the proto-typical description of the liberal-rational paradigm, and are indirectly redolent with the anti-rational characteristics of the radical right.

Further examples provide additional confirmation of the inherent tension between the liberal institutional framework of the European Union and its incursions into a discursive practice grounded in culture. Jean Monnet himself recognised retrospectively the importance of the dimension of cultural identity, declaring that if he were to start the project again from scratch, he would begin with an emphasis on culture (37). This admission by Monnet helps us to appreciate the origins of the conceptual tension within later examples of liberal Europeanism. In effect, many ideologues of liberal Europe, either implicitly or explicitly, have recognised the shortcomings of a political project founded on elitism, technocracy and complex institutional structures. The consequence of this realisation has been an increasingly ambiguous treatment of a European identity, constituting an effort to harness popular support and create a concept of Europe that is emotionally and spiritually substantial. Liberal Europeanist ideologues have attempted to present or redesign the rational basis of the project in terms that both emphasise the inherent superiority of such a foundation and draw upon common cultural and spiritual references, as exemplified below in the words of the former French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin.

Of all the regions in the world, it is in Europe that the rule of law is best implemented. Europe is the only political entity in which the death penalty no longer exists. It is the land where respect for the human person has reached its pinnacle. Europe is called upon to make this message heard more broadly...One of the most valuable parts of mankind's heritage is its diversity of cultures. And today that is under threat. The market drives uniformization of consumption patterns and concentration of cultural industries...we must protect ourselves, collectively, from the threat of uniformity and the invasion of cultural products from a single source. This is a crucial issue for civilization...For us as Europeans, culture is not, therefore, merchandise. It is first and foremost part of our identity. (38)

This extract is especially rich in ambiguity. Firstly, we see the continued presence of liberal-rational values and concepts in Jospin's celebration of Europe's liberal constitution: defence of human rights, the rule of law, etc. Jospin defines both himself and the EU project according to political and philosophical norms that *should* be readily identifiable within the conceptual boundaries of generic liberal-rationalism. However, we are also struck by conceptual and discursive features within this passage that sit very uneasily within those boundaries.

To begin with, in the manner of his celebration of Europe's civil constitution, Jospin adopts a tone that is unashamedly supremacist. His description of Europe's ethical uniqueness and superiority over other cultures and political systems represents a potential contradiction of core liberal-rational principles. Europe cannot be simultaneously committed to the equal status of all peoples and at the same time emphasise its own distinct supremacy.

Perhaps even more strikingly, Jospin describes the defence of Europe's cultural identity in terms that are very familiar from the discourse of the Europeanist radical right. If we focus on key examples of discursive practice within the passage, such as 'threat', 'concentration', 'uniformity' and 'invasion', we are strongly reminded of the paranoia and urgency that often characterise the propaganda of the radical right. Quite legitimately, we may question the appropriateness of such language in relation to the core conceptual features of liberal-rationalism.

Jospin's sense of the superiority of the European constitutional model can be accounted for in terms of the Hegelian description of the end of history, of the highest ideological synthesis, identified in previous examples. It is, perhaps, almost irresistible for proponents of liberal Europeanism to conclude that their world-view represents the furthest stage of political development in comparison with more authoritarian forms; but this conclusion is liable to draw accusations of ideological arrogance and would-be hegemony.

Even more striking though, in terms of its similarity to the radical right model, is Jospin's fear of cultural homogeneity and the acceleration of ontological conditions. This concern is

echoed by Romano Prodi in his own warning about the “dangerous features of the postmodern age” (39). It is important to consider why these features should have emerged within an explicitly liberal-rational form of discourse. The answer lies in the confrontation between liberal-rationalism as a monolithic grand narrative and the perceived disintegrative forces of postmodernity. Like ideologues of the radical right, liberal Europeanists, particularly in the later post-war (post-bi-polar) period, have reacted against the possible disappearance of meaning and certainty from social life: they have experienced a corresponding, though perhaps not entirely identical, liminal crisis.

The principle difference between the responses of liberal and radical right Europeanisms to this perceived ontological condition is that in the case of the latter, cultural distinctiveness and a discourse of counter-homogeneity create no internal contradiction within the anti-rational structure of the ideology. However, liberal-rational Europe is built on a foundation of universality and ethical homogeneity. Its rational value-system and all the features we would associate with the proto-typical model should prohibit the forms of discourse we see above. It is as though liberal Europe, having encouraged social, economic and political acceleration, is now struggling to accommodate the disintegrative forces that this process has engendered.

References to ‘a shared identity’, ‘a common destiny’, and a ‘new European soul’ are all demonstrative of a desire to transcend the ascetic constraints of the liberal-rational model and achieve deeper political and social engagement along the lines of the nation-state model. But as the report below from an EUI reflection group warns, deviation from the liberal-rational paradigm is fraught with hazards.

The emergent European polity will have to rest on shared commitment to rules and procedures perceived as fair and efficient, on the principle of toleration and institutional guarantees of respect for diversity. This might be seen as a weak, ‘thin’ form of legitimacy, in contrast to the ‘thick’ common

cultural identity which has underpinned powerful nation-states; but this only poses insuperable problems if we envisage the EU as a kind of nation-state writ large. (40)

The key point here is that many liberal Europeanist ideologues clearly *do* envisage the EU as possessing the attributes of a nation-state, both in political and cultural terms. If this does, indeed, pose ‘insuperable problems’ then we must identify what these are and analyse further the conditions of European identity. In order to illustrate these points more effectively, the case study below will focus on a specific and current example that is accurately representative of the liberal European ‘paradox’: the accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU.

An Illustrative Case Study: Turkish Accession Negotiations

The examination of Turkish accession negotiations provides more than just another example of the conceptual difficulties confronting liberal European integration and enlargement: in a sense, it is the definitive example. More than any other new, acceding or potentially acceding member-state, Turkey as a geo-political and cultural entity tests the boundaries of ‘Europeanness’, addressing every problematic level of identity and inclusion.

Geographically, only 3% of Turkey’s land mass lies within what is conventionally considered to be Europe. Politically, Turkey has, in the past, struggled to meet the standards of an open, civil society, the model of which lies explicitly at the heart of the liberal-rational EU. This element includes the transparency of the democratic political system and the application of a universal conception of fundamental human rights, (though substantial progress appears to have been made in this respect in recent years). Economically, Turkey is much weaker than pre-enlargement (EU 15) member-states, and presents a greater potential burden than was imposed by the recent accession of ten new members (EU 15/EU 25).

The full extent of the economic impact of Turkish accession can be seen through comparative statistics provided by the European Commission. With enlargement from 15 to 25 member-states (and later including the accession of Bulgaria and Romania – EU 27), the landmass of the EU increases by approximately 30% and its population by roughly 25%. The increase in the total GDP of the EU is a modest 5%, whilst the GDP per capita falls by around 13%, leaving average per capita GDP (EU 27) at just 87.4% of the pre-enlargement period (EU 15 = 100). However, whilst the impact of this phase of enlargement may be great, it needs to be considered that it involves the integration of 12 states: admitting Turkey on top this expansion would cause a substantial extra burden by itself. Through accession, Turkey would increase the total landmass of the EU by a further 18% (EU 27/ EU 27 + TR) and its population by a further 15%. Despite this boost in physical and human resources, total EU GDP would only increase in the first instance by around 2%, with GDP per capita falling by over 9% at a stroke and average GDP per capita left standing at just 79.4% of previous (EU 15) levels (41). In the long run, of course, enlargement should bring growth and economic opportunities that make the initial sacrifices worthwhile. In the short-term, though, expansion to include Turkey might be keenly felt on top of previous enlargements, bringing with it the associated political pressures of labour mobility/economic migration.

Strategically, Turkish accession presents obvious challenges to the collective security of the EU, extending European borders in the Middle East to Iran, Syria, and Iraq as well as to the Caucuses. The effective interdependence of EU states in strategic matters, reinforced by complementary structures such as NATO, particularly in relation to the inviolability of EU member-state sovereignty, makes such volatile borders an issue of great concern to some. Additionally, the enlarged border would bring Europe directly in contact with the non-European 'Other', an 'Other' previously kept at arms length by the buffer provided by Turkey.

It is this 'Otherness' of the Islamic world that is of greatest interest to us within the context of this analysis, particularly its cultural and religious 'confrontation' with Europe. There is a

feeling well-established within certain ideological and political perspectives that Turkey simply is not European, specifically because as an Islamic nation it falls outside of the implicit normative criterion of Christian culture as the key to membership and acceptance. It is Europe's reaction to Turkey as an 'alien' presence that will constitute the principal focus of this section. Given that the liberal EU project explicitly adheres to liberal-rational principles of universality and pluralism, one would expect for it to oppose any form of cultural or religious prejudice. And yet, as we shall observe, cultural bias, prejudice and even hostility towards the Islamic world is evident in numerous examples at the very heart of liberal Europe. An explicit instance of this is provided by the former Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, in a now notorious public comment, where he states:

We should be conscious of the superiority of our civilization, which consists of a value system that has given people widespread prosperity...and guarantees respect for human rights and religion. This respect certainly does not exist in Islamic countries. (42)

The contradiction in a statement such as this does not lie deep beneath the surface. How can Europe claim to promote tolerance and religious diversity within its own borders if it harbours such Huntingtonian prejudices against the Islamic world? We must ask how deeply ingrained such prejudices are and what impact they may have on the prospect and practice of Turkish accession.

It is not only in such obvious examples as that provided by Berlusconi that we can identify a tendency towards what some might call Eurocentrism or even cultural imperialism at the heart of the EU project. The European Commission, in one of its recent assessments of Turkish accession prospects, makes it clear that a highly normative ideological foundation underpins the EU's approach to Turkey. To begin with, the statement summarising a Commission report to the Council and Parliament in 2004 emphasises that "accession cannot

take place before 2014...to avoid endangering the achievements of over fifty years of European integration” (43). We should be immediately struck by the note of anxiety exhibited here and perhaps wonder if the same urgent and official concern was expressed with regard to earlier acceding members considered more obviously European. Essentially it was not.

Beyond this, the Commission’s statement also makes it clear that the terms of accession are very much its own. Membership of the EU, according to the conventions of previous enlargements, should be extended to a new state according to its eligibility on legal, economic and geographical criteria. However, recent eastward enlargements, and particularly the prospective inclusion of Turkey, have brought out a previously uncharacteristic emphasis on normative cultural and political values. It is not that the values themselves are incongruous within the liberal-rational context of the EU. Rather, it is simply striking how forcefully the EU, through the Commission, is articulating these values.

The Commission may recommend suspending the negotiations if there is a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms or the rule of law on which the Union is founded...Existing legal obligations relating to alignment with the *acquis* must be fulfilled...Long transition periods may be necessary. (44)

There are features of liberal Europe’s discourse on Turkish membership that may lead us to question its containment within the boundaries of the liberal-rational paradigm. However, in many respects the commitments and statements made by actors on behalf of the EU are entirely consistent with such a paradigm. The question we are being drawn towards once more is whether the active, normative *application* of liberal-rational principles can, in itself, be consistent with those principles. In asserting its political philosophy as a fully conditional model for enlargement, liberal Europeanism may risk drifting towards Eurocentric self-righteousness in a way that could create a fundamental contradiction and ideological weakness.

Significantly, this internal contradiction is something that, by definition, does not afflict the Europeanist model of the radical right. Returning to the immediate context of Turkish accession, we should perhaps begin to address this question by analysing the structural and institutional features of the accession process, before proceeding to discuss the more striking issue of the 'cultural dialectic'.

The structural basis of Turkish integration into the EU has been developing slowly (somewhat agonisingly so) since the first Association (Ankara) Agreement of 1963/4. Turkey has demonstrated a desire to accede to the EU that is matched in its consistency only by the procrastination of the Union itself. Liberal Europe has been hesitant about endorsing the accession of a country which has, in the past particularly, failed to live up to the explicit expectations and requirements of membership. The most coherent and significant of such statements of expectation in the recent history of the enlargement process comes in the form of the accession criteria set down at the 1993 Copenhagen summit of the European Council (the so called 'Copenhagen criteria'). In extracts from the Council Presidency's conclusions, the normative, liberal-rational basis of the enlargement process is made clear.

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union...The Community proposes that the associated countries enter into a structured relationship with the institutions of the Union within the framework of a reinforced and extended multilateral dialogue and concertation on matters of common interest. (45)

In this extract we see familiar conceptual features of the liberal-rational proto-type. In particular, it indicates the prominence of the conceptual themes of law, institutional structure, mutualism, and universality (in the sense of both the universal application of these principles

and as a Natural Rights argument). The text also appears to emphasise the agency of acceding states in terms of *achieving* certain standards, *coping* with pressures and *entering voluntarily* into progressive negotiation and agreement. So far, so good. However, the strong normative basis of statements such as these, the imposing projection of the sense that Europe has somehow 'got it right' and sets a standard that *must* be adhered to, has coloured recent accession discussions with Eastern European nations, and with Turkey in particular. It has led some to criticise the moral and political hegemony of the EU in the entire enlargement process, rechristening the Copenhagen criteria the 'Huntington criteria' (46). This criticism is supported some way by the effective exemption of existing member-states from consideration themselves under the Copenhagen criteria. One might imagine, for example, that earlier UK governments would have found it problematic to square some of their policies in Northern Ireland with the letter and spirit of the Copenhagen criteria. No such demand was ever explicitly made though and, for critics of the Copenhagen process, that is entirely the point. As an EUI reflection report succinctly explains, this normative rigidity in the enlargement process can be taken as a signifier of feelings more deeply entrenched.

These political criteria merely made explicit what had hitherto been implicit; but the fact that it was found necessary to do this only now, in connection with eastern enlargement, has provoked certain misgivings in some circles in the applicant countries because it seems to imply a lack of confidence in their "European" credentials, reflecting West European fears and cultural prejudices about the 'barbarian east'. (47)

This sensitivity on the part of eastern acceding states has been particularly keenly felt by Turkey, which seems to be subject to a disproportionately high level of scrutiny and disapproval (as some Turks would argue, on cultural grounds). The European Commission itself admits a certain bias against Turkey when it states that "the European strategy for

Turkey has been more narrowly focused than for the other candidate countries. In particular the financial support from the EU, which could have underpinned the process of alignment, has been limited.” (48). So despite the universal basis of European integration and enlargement, it appears that there is something in the nature of Turkish accession that tests the boundaries of the EU project and elicits a sometimes vigorous resistance to the idea in its entirety.

In this last point we are reminded of the very first line of this thesis which stated that the study of ‘Europe’ as a concept is concerned with the definition and understanding of boundaries. With the example of Turkish accession, the pertinence of this initial observation is brought home with great strength. Turkish membership of the EU, beyond its immediate implications for the Union, begs the question ‘Where next?’. It is logically clear that the European Union cannot remain what it is and continue to expand indefinitely. There must, eventually, be some discernible parameters for the project, particularly geo-politically but also, for some, culturally. Without a finite identity, the European project begins to be displaced by the swirling conceptual fluidity of its own boundaries. This threat of the void outside, beyond the structures of a liberal European civil society, incites some to rally around the demarcation and defence of Europeanness, and Turkish accession is on the front line in this war of attrition. In economic, political, strategic and cultural terms, Turkish accession does not simply create problems: it fundamentally challenges what liberal Europe is, where it is going and what it is capable of. The resistance by many to the inclusion of Turkey is symptomatic of a creeping, liminal crisis of identity within an EU that needs desperately to anchor and determine itself, as Hill suggests:

...where there is an outside, there must not only be an inside but also a line of demarcation between the two...The sense of an unrolling EU border could provoke just as much instability as it is able to reduce through ‘the power of attraction’. Furthermore, the problems of absorbing some new members

are likely to go beyond temporary attacks of indigestion...[T]he EU will have to abandon its current policy of creative ambiguity in favour of a blunt statement that 'enlargement stops here (or there)', explaining precisely why some states cannot be included, whatever their political and economic progress. (49)

Nowhere more so than in issues relating to culture, and religion in particular, does this perceived instability surface so prominently, at times calling into question our assumptions about the nature of liberal European integration. The cultural debate surrounding Turkish accession tests the boundaries of the liberal European idea and is both indicative and symptomatic of the unspoken agenda of some forms of integrationist thought. We can understand this agenda by referring back to the Hegelian notion of an ideological 'end of history', a summit of moral and political achievement, as discussed by Fukuyama. If, as has been suggested, liberal Europe implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) regards itself as constituting the pinnacle of modern civilization, then it is perhaps not surprising that liberal Europeanists are staunchly defensive of the values that underpin that civilization. With the case of Turkish accession to the EU, sensitivity to such issues, which has never been tested to the same degree elsewhere, has led to provocative assertions by figures at the very heart of the liberal establishment. A clear example of this is provided by the former head of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. Whilst President, Prodi explicitly upheld the liberal-rational values of pluralism and toleration, and insisted that there was no place in Europe for any form of religious or cultural discrimination. Yet at the same time he, like many other European Christian Democrats and conservatives, was unswerving in his conviction that at the heart of the EU project lies a *Christian* tradition.

Europe cannot be understood without its Christian roots. Christianity has left its mark on Europe, and that mark is still there...Europe's destiny is not inherently Eurocentric, but one of universality. It should therefore reassert its role as the 'beacon for world civilization'...Such a role could eventually revive the Christian soul of Europe which is the basis for unity. (50)

Here we see an example of the contradictory duality (some might say duplicity) of some forms of liberal Europeanist discourse. On the one hand, Prodi makes an explicit reference to universality as a core conceptual theme. Yet at the same time, though he rejects the notion of Eurocentrism, he evangelises Europe as a 'beacon' of civilization, as though only Europe could provide that great, guiding wisdom. And of course, this wisdom is Christian, derived from a grand, western tradition. We should not only be struck by how forcefully Prodi expresses the religious and cultural basis of his political ambitions for Europe; it is also important to remember just how prominent a voice for liberal Europe he has been. Thus, in the year 2000, when this work was published and when enlargement was pressing ahead (including the development of negotiations with Turkey), the President of the Commission of the pluralist, (secular), liberal European Union was propagating a very public myth of the powerful bond between Europe as a concept and Christianity as a faith. How, we might wonder, is Muslim Turkey to be included in the Union against the backdrop of such exclusive criteria for accession and acceptance? Is it in fact the case that, in a sadly paradoxical way, the 'Christian-Enlightenment' values associated with the European Union have become the source of a form of Eurocentrism, even cultural and moral imperialism? As Guild writes:

'The Idea of Europe' has a long and dubious history. Mikkeli characterises it as an identity which is structured around the difference of the other, be it skin colour, religion, culture or whatever..."non-white residents and citizens of the European Union (EU) have no role to play in the 'Idea of Europe', which remains an ideal of unity drawing on a Christian-Enlightenment heritage to bridge the diversity of European national cultures". (51)

It is not just the affirmation of Christian values that becomes problematic in the context of Turkish accession: it is also the response of liberal Europe to Islam and its (arguably) competing value system. Much as Huntington predicted, there is a 'clash of civilizations' taking place between 'Christian' Europe and the Islamic East. At present, that clash is still rumbling deep beneath the superficial structures of the liberal West: it has not yet erupted in inter-communal strife (notwithstanding the conflict in Bosnia). In future, though, continuing on the current trajectory, it is quite conceivable that serious fissures may appear in the cultural fabric of European society. It has already been observed the extent to which fear of the Other penetrates the Europeanist ideology of the radical right, focusing particularly in recent years on the 'threat' of Islam. However, in such cases, hostility to difference and an aggressive stance are entirely consistent with the proto-typical conceptual model: no ideological contradiction is created by the racist interpretation of cultural value presented by the radical right. In the mainstream arena of politics, though, that is not the case, and this is the dilemma for liberal Europeanist ideologues: how to mount opposition to cultural and religious dissolution whilst remaining consistent with core liberal values. In an increasing number of cases, it seems, any sort of balance in this respect is not being maintained. This assertion is supported by analysis produced by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) which confirms that the European far-right exhibits "a very strong xenophobic theme that inferred that Islam presented a direct threat to the core of European religious values and identity" (52). More significantly, the report goes on to warn:

...there is some evidence to suggest that the distance between the acceptability of the mainstream and the previous unacceptability of the more extreme, far-right is coming closer together...So whilst the far-right continued to reiterate its same ongoing messages, such messages may have begun to find a

more consensual and sympathetic ear in the wider mainstream...[A] greater receptivity towards anti-Muslim and other xenophobic ideas has, and may well continue to, become more tolerated. (53)

Where this clash between west and east becomes most evident is in examples such as the Turkish application for membership of the EU, where a limited form of Islamophobia is linked to other cultural and geo-political objections. If it is indeed the case that the EU is afflicted in some quarters by what can only be described as a form of liberal/Christian prejudice against Turkey, then the impact is twofold. Firstly, it has an immediate effect on the principle and practice of Turkish accession, leading to increased doubt and hostility on both sides, particularly if such resentments and animosities become firmly attached to religious identities. Secondly, it throws in question the normative basis of the European Union if it can be demonstrated that liberal Europe does not practice what it preaches in terms of a pluralist, non-discriminatory civil society. Discrimination is practised in many forms, but in the case of the EU it manifests itself in a structural and institutional bias which has real implications for the prospect of Turkish accession. In other analyses of the suitability of Turkey for membership, such as that prepared by the Independent Commission on Turkey, we find a distinct normative prejudice levelled against Islamic traditions that is not simply critical, but has a tone of Eurocentric superiority, exemplified here in comments on discrimination against women in Turkish society.

...this situation is intolerable in a modern state and cannot be justified by social and cultural traditions or a region's lack of economic development...the Turkish authorities have pledged firmness in totally eliminating such practices belonging to another age...The completion of the government's reform process, progressive modernisation and the anchoring of Turkey in the union of European democracies would therefore be the best way to bring about a change of mentalities in more backward parts of society. (54)

Despite full sympathy with the aims of the equal rights agenda presented here, the use of phrases such as 'practices belonging to another age' and 'backward parts of society' possesses a clear undertone of self-righteousness. It is not difficult to appreciate that the tone of discourse such as this does little to promote goodwill between the cultures of Europe and Turkey, or to give Turks the sense that they will ever be welcomed as anything more than migrant workers and second-class Europeans.

Liberal Europe: liberal no more?

During the course of this chapter it has been demonstrated that the liberal Europeanist paradigm continues to conform in many respects to the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism developed in Chapter One, and applied with equal relevance in the analysis of first-wave liberal Europeanism. The ideational profile presented below summarises the incidence of core conceptual themes within the discourse of post-war liberal Europeanists. We see from these examples that the European Union, and parallel organisations such the Council of Europe, adhere to a liberal-rational world-view. This value-system represents an Enlightenment, neo-Hegelian idealism that views liberal Europe as, potentially, the pinnacle of social and political achievement, the highest synthesis, the effective 'end of history'.

However, we can also observe a certain disquiet amongst some liberal Europeanist ideologues, particularly with regard to the more recent challenges provided by globalisation, radical nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. It is as though liberal Europe, somewhat prematurely and hubristically, had assumed the triumph of its ideological model, neglecting the possibility of further challenges, antitheses and reversals. Now, more radical and assertive ideologies are calling into question the basis of the liberal-rational value-system, leaving the ideologues of liberal Europe on the defensive. It is necessary to question whether liberal Europe any longer possesses the wherewithal to protect and promote its world-view through

the institutions of the EU and, if so, whether this might be at the price of contradicting and contravening the very value-system upon which it explicitly bases itself.

According to Baudrillard, it is the inability of the liberal West to conceptualise evil that has caused its acute vulnerability to the shifts and displacements associated with the postmodern political landscape. Other ideological types, he argues, particularly a radicalised form of Islam, possess the capacity to confront the universe in all its unrefined violence, in some cases even embracing this violence. Such ideologies are not daunted by upheaval and uncertainty: rather, their virulence and radicalism represent a counter-offensive of values, one that is not afraid to confront the arbitrary brutality of Being, making this brutality its own. In this sense, the suicide bomb attack by Islamic extremists and the firebombing of an asylum hostel by extreme rightists are analogous events: they demonstrate the capacity of these value-systems to engage with evil, to become, as Baudrillard asserts, recipients of “the Satanic energy of the rejected” (55). By contrast, western liberal universality struggles to confront the inherent violence of the universe. The value-system that liberal Europe is built upon pre-supposes to a great extent the attainment of a benign condition in which ‘evil’ is eradicated or neutralised in the higher synthesis of the civil constitution. But it is, arguably, the complacent and dogmatic adherence to this value-system that leaves liberal Europe vulnerable in the face of challenges and reversals.

We have become very weak in terms of Satanic, ironic, polemical and antagonistic energy; our societies have become fanatically soft – or softly fanatical...All we can do is discourse on the rights of man – a discourse which is pious, weak, useless and hypocritical...invariably deployed in a self-defensive, austerity-loving, negative and reactive mode. (56)

Baudrillard’s remarks here concisely and effectively articulate the fundamental crisis facing liberal Europe: that it should become trapped within an ideological stasis, a self-referential

discourse which merely repeats worn-out mantras that lack both content and import. As Hegel well understood, internal discord and the loss of certainty is a sign of weakness and decadence in any system of belief, and this is the potential danger facing liberal Europe. Simultaneously, through the challenges of radical nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, liberal Europe is provoked into an engagement with values and practices that are uncharacteristic of its generic type. It is as though western society, once protected by the antibiotic of its universal, liberal-rational values, is now experiencing a fear associated with the decreasing efficacy of this protection and the increasing resistance and virulence of ideological challenges. This is the nature of liberal Europe's confrontation with postmodernity, as Young explains:

Postmodernism can best be defined as European culture's awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world...a self-consciousness of its own cultural relativization...[As] "History" gives way to the "Postmodern", we are witnessing the dissolution of "the West". (57)

Liberal Europe has thus been cast upon a landscape of confrontation and motion, and its passage across this landscape has begun to contort the liberal-rational basis of the project. This may lead us to question the reliability and continuing validity of proto-typical descriptions, but also to understand how the liberal-rational basis of the European project has been subverted by other pressures and values.

A Summary Profile of Second-Wave Liberal Europeanism

Mutualism

- 'international cooperation is vital for the preservation of human society and civilization'
- 'the merging of...essential interests'
- 'a common destiny and a single hope'
- 'to deepen the solidarity between peoples'
- 'united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny'
- 'a union of hearts and minds, underpinned by a strong shared sentiment of a common destiny'

Universality

- 'progressively effacing frontiers and barriers which aggravate and congeal our divisions'
- 'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality'
- 'a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination'
- 'what will enable every man, every woman, to achieve their full potential'
- 'Europe's destiny is not inherently Eurocentric, but one of universality'

Law

- 'the pursuit of peace based upon justice'
- 'a community based on the rule of law'
- 'open to any country willing to accept the principles of the rule of law'
- 'Of all the regions in the world, it is in Europe that the rule of law is best implemented'
- 'a value system that...guarantees respect for human rights'
- 'legal obligations relating to alignment with the *acquis* must be fulfilled'

Agency

- 'a dynamic expression of democratic faith...inspired by a sense of mission'
- 'The contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable'
- 'the great venture which makes of [Europe] a special area of human hope'
- 'We must sustain our efforts to create a humane society'
- 'the model and the catalyst for these developments'
- 'All of us...must work together towards our common destiny'

Structure

- 'the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared'
- 'concrete measures which first of all create a solidarity in fact'
- 'proven means for dealing with problems inside the Community'
- 'Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions'
- 'a structured relationship with the institutions of the Union'

Metamorphosis

- 'Men who are placed in new practical circumstances... adapt their behaviour and become different'
- 'A united Europe will not be achieved all at once...conditions will be progressively created'
- 'a living, changing, developing organisation'
- 'long transition periods may be necessary'

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Conclusion

The analysis of the ideological treatment of Europe presented in this thesis demonstrates that the subject is very broad indeed, both in terms of the range of contributions from ideologues of the liberal and radical right traditions, and also the variety of conceptual and discursive practice in evidence. The challenge at this stage is twofold: firstly, to draw together observations already made into a coherent and effective summary that illustrates the fundamental characteristics of each approach to the conceptualisation of Europe; secondly, to identify and engage with the most striking weaknesses that each perspective exhibits, building from these insights to suggest a viable reorientation of theory and practice.

The visions of Europe scrutinised in the earlier sections of the thesis emerge as reasonably coherent, if not always consistent. They illustrate distinct conceptual themes, overlapping in places, which provide scope for specific and comparative conclusions. Whilst maintaining an objective detachment, it should still be possible to propose some kind of direction, some reconsideration of thought and practice in this area. It will be the task here to find a form of reconciliation between the critique of normative, monolithic ideology and the need to encourage positive action and development in this much contested field of European identity and community.

At the end of the first chapter a series of key research questions were set down which aimed to provide distinct criteria for assessing both the ideological subjects under investigation and the methodological and heuristic objectives of the inquiry itself. It is to these questions that the analysis now returns, using them as a means of imposing a discipline and structure upon the potentially nebulous conclusions that, by the very

nature and breadth of the task, could emerge. This thesis does not attempt or pretend to offer 'the solution' to Europe's various dilemmas: rather, it sees the process of Europeanisation, both structural and conceptual, as the product of dialogue and exchange, with this inquiry representing a further addition to this debate. Where it is hoped that this research provides new insight and adds something distinct to the discussion of Europe is through the comparative recognition and analysis of conceptual and discursive patterns surrounding the ideological treatment of Europe. Though liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe differ substantially in some respects, they share an increasingly significant number of features. Both ideological perspectives are subject to similar pressures, be they more immediate socio-political issues or deeper ontological questions, and both have exhibited corresponding responses to these pressures.

Each ideology has also demonstrated its internal inconsistency and vulnerability, its susceptibility to challenge. Each has been seen to react against this environment of contestation, seeking to establish a form of ideological practice that is meaningful and effective. What seems clear, though, is that neither liberal Europeanism nor its radical right equivalent has been entirely successful in overcoming the deep challenges posed by questions of European identity and community, and neither has delivered a working model of Europe free from internal dichotomy. The final and most significant aim of this thesis, then, is to identify exactly why both ideological perspectives fail to deliver a wholly viable realisation of Europe, and to suggest a strategy that might alleviate some of the tensions inherent in the conceptual development of the European project.

Responses to Research Questions:

What is the nature of the radical right conceptualisation of Europe and to what extent are its features consistent with the proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right?

The establishment of a model of primordialist thought during the introductory stages of this thesis, serving as the basis for an understanding of the generic character of rightist radicalism, represented a conscious attempt to create a heuristic strategy and methodological framework. This proto-typical model or description, though a contrivance, constituted an explicit effort to provide defined terms of reference, terms that could be used to 'thread together' the wide range of discursive examples under analysis. This proto-typical model created a working generic core, around which conceptual characteristics and specific ideological examples could be allowed to coalesce. It has been possible to observe that the proto-typical characteristics of the primordialist radical right are prominent throughout its Europeanist discourse. The profiles of both pre- and post-war forms of 'fascist' Europeanism provide many examples of conceptualisation and discursive practice that fit readily into these ideal-typical descriptions. We can also observe that there is a strong consistency between pre- and post-war forms, though their manifestation in propaganda reveals some evolving distinctions, in the late post-war period especially.

It has been demonstrated, then, through the analysis of many examples of rightist Europeanist discourse, that the foundation provided by the generic model of the primordialist radical right is reasonably accurate in its application. The central conceptual characteristics, summarised diagrammatically in the first chapter and repeated here, have been supported by empirical investigation and suggest that the models themselves,

though contrived, do possess a strong degree of reliability and validity. By way of summary, it may be useful here to reiterate this proto-typical model, and the consistency between its core generic themes and the actual practice of radical right Europeanist ideology and discourse.

Origin - The core conceptual feature of *origin* emerges prominently in the Europeanist discourse of the radical right. In terms of philosophical precedence, this theme is evident in examples such as that provided by Heidegger's description of authenticity, or in references to Bergsonian notions of time; pure, complete and indivisible. In such examples, there is a strong suggestion or insistence that current ontological conditions and possibilities are rightfully contingent upon, and inextricably linked to, previous ages of being-in-the-world. In a sense, this is a retrospective view, drawn inexorably towards a past point of infinite certainty that constitutes the origin of organic cultural existence. At the same time, though, this origin becomes the source of an outward and forward-looking perspective, one that embraces this organic historical certainty at the heart of its fierce and absolute repudiation of alternative perspectives.

In the discursive practice of the Europeanist radical right we have seen the wide prevalence of this conceptual theme. Time and again we find references to a (largely indeterminate) point of origin, often expressed within specific instances of historical precedence. These previous historical examples embody and express the spirit or character of this origin, signifying the trajectory of an authentic mode of being, conjoining past and future. We have witnessed this particularly in the development of ideological myth by the Europeanist radical right, whereby the authenticity of previous 'existence possibilities', often rooted in defined historical narratives and events, creates a deep yearning for the ontological certainty of the spirit of origin, revived in the conditions of the present.

Civilisation - The conceptual theme of *civilisation* in radical right Europeanist thought, taken as a fixed state within a perpetual process of becoming, reflects an understanding that the pattern of authentic historical development is clearly expressed across time; its colossal, wave-like movement being traced in the emergence of each glorious epoch (e.g. Hellenic, Roman, etc.). This view of civilisation attests to the cyclical motion of time, revolving through both the zenith and nadir of human creativity. In this sense, civilisation is a dialectical (Hegelian) process, whereby great and dynamic cultures are engaged in a constant battle against the forces of decadence. By striving for an authentic form of culture and community, by honouring and celebrating previous incarnations of this original authenticity, radical right Europeanists join this 'world-historical' struggle for the salvation of mankind. The radical right view of civilisation is revolutionary, in the truest sense, in that it has a firm conceptualisation of this constant, dialectical engagement, revolving through the peaks and catastrophes of successive cultures. The cultures of Europe, distinct from the non-European Other, embody the heroic processes of creation: radical right Europeanism is simply the latest, and most self-conscious, manifestation in this regard.

Virtue - In the radical right Europeanist profile, *virtue* is expressed in relation to an organic identity that is interwoven through the historical community. Honour, duty and sacrifice, etc. are virtuous to the extent that they serve and promote the community, the culture, the civilisation. It is in defence of these that virtue emerges, in obedience to the most profound values. We see prominent examples of the conceptual characteristic of virtue in the propaganda of the Europeanist radical right, particularly in its exhortations to defend the authenticity and integrity of European civilisation.

Violence - In the ideology of the Europeanist radical right, the galvanising concept that unleashes the anti-rational energy of the European myth is the glory of *violence*, the purity of force. The virtuous defence of a sublime and deeply spiritual European tradition

creates a powerful motivation for confrontation with the forces of decadence, and it is in acts of violence, in the Sorelian sense, that the European community of the radical right finds its highest expression. This is particularly evident in the propaganda of fascist and Nazi visions of Europe during the war years, but is also readily identifiable in the discursive practice and paramilitary tendencies of many post-war Europeanist movements and ideologues.

Myth - The Europe of the radical right is a mythic creation. Powerful conceits are fashioned from the radical right's mythic treatment of European history, environment and identity, from its fanatically anti-rational position. We have only to consider the romantic potency of Rosenberg or Himmler's propaganda, or the virulent imagination of Yockey and the Nouvelle Droite, to appreciate the centrality of myth to the radical right European project. Myth is the port of entry to the idealised world of an authentic, historical community: it is the gateway to the origin, expressing through elaborate narratives the ecstatic realisation that the spirit of the origin may be re-created.

Palingenesis - The radical right in European history has not only embraced palingenesis on an intellectual level, but has also made a significant and dramatic effort quite literally to raze European society to the ground and begin anew. From the violent process of destruction arises a new condition of society, of a community of absolute integrity and full possibility. This is most evident, of course, in the effort made during the expansion of the Third Reich to destroy the last vestiges of bourgeois, materialist decadence in Europe. The seizure of Europe by the Nazis, and the creation of a thousand-year Reich, was regarded by many Europeanists as a triumphant phase in the perpetual process of destruction and renewal, as the concrete manifestation of a mythic and eternal truth. In the post-war period we continue to see the prominence of images of re-birth in the discursive practice of Europeanist ideologues. Even where no realistic potential for a

revolutionary, palingenetic event seems evident, the mere existence of the possibility of reversal and renewal serves as a powerful point of focus and an enduring inspiration.

In response to the above research question, it is clear that there is a strong degree of correlation between the proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right and the manifestation of these characteristics within the Europeanist branch of the ideological tradition. The methodological approach taken within this thesis has encouraged these characteristics to reveal themselves and has allowed for them to be arranged and understood through a heuristically effective device. However, the thesis has not unduly contrived to place the evident textual features within this format. Where anomalies and inconsistencies have emerged through the analysis of conceptual and discursive practice, these have been recognised. In subsequent stages of this conclusion the prevalence and significance of these anomalies will be properly evaluated.

What is the nature of the liberal conceptualisation of Europe and to what extent are its features consistent with the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism?

As with the construction of the proto-typical model of the primordialist radical right, the generic description of liberal-rationalism, anchored in a tradition of Enlightenment thought, was intended to provide a firm point of reference against which it would be possible to locate the conceptual and discursive characteristics of the liberal Europeanist perspective. By establishing an approximate sense of philosophical orientation in the work of rationalist thinkers it would become possible to determine the extent to which the conceptualisation of Europe within the liberal paradigm conformed to this experimental standard.

Analysis of the liberal model of Europeanism has revealed that it remains largely consistent with the proto-typical outline of liberal-rationalism. It is also apparent that there are significant differences between the liberal and radical right perspectives. The tone of liberal Europeanist discourse is generally characterised by its Enlightenment tradition, by its opposition to zealous romanticism and anti-rationalism. Despite some inconsistencies, liberal Europeanism, both pre- and post-war, retains its core proto-typical features:

Universality - The philosophical foundations of liberal Europe are evident in the conceptual theme of *universality*. Universality is both logically and morally an imperative of the liberal-rational society, and throughout the ideology of liberal Europeanism we find references to the doctrine of legal and political equality. The liberal commitment to the individual requires a defence of the absolute and universal entitlement of all people to such individuality and personal sovereignty. The concept of universality is thus fundamental to, and immanent in, all forms of expression of a liberal-rational world-view. In addition, universal equality, in the sense of rights and duties, enables free individuals to engage and contract with the community, secure in their equal and universal status as citizens. All of the key European treaty documents allude to a defence of the universal rights of individuals, and we can clearly trace the evolution of this theme from the Natural Rights theorists of the 18th century to texts such as the European Convention on Human Rights.

Mutualism - The conceptual theme of *mutualism* describes the principles of interdependence and mutual responsibility that are at the heart of liberal conceptualisations of Europe. Mutualism should be seen as a logical consequence of rationalism, by which the individual understands and accepts his/her responsibility for others, and in so doing participates in a balanced, just community. Mutualism refers to

more than simply the classical liberal view of the personal realm of the individual, interacting or colliding with those of other individuals. Rather, it is more consistent with a modern liberal theory in which the freedom of each individual is upheld and promoted by the participation of all in an active, purposeful and morally bound community. The liberal European project, from its utopian pre-war hypotheses to its current, highly developed manifestation, has consistently emphasised this theme.

Law - The conditions of society in a liberal Europe, particularly the upholding of universal rights and values, are defended by *law*. In the same sense in which the state, in a modern democracy, can be understood as an expression of the collective will of the people, so too can law be described as the will of the state and the people writ large. The legal basis of much liberal Europeanist discourse on identity reflects this proto-typical characteristic. Repeatedly, and particularly in texts that articulate the status of individuals and institutions, we have seen that liberal Europeanism looks to the rule of law and the legal framework to provide a rational and just approach, one that demonstrates rigour and integrity.

Structure - Liberal Europe has been developed with a strong sense of *structure*, evident in its commitments to constitutionalism, the separation of powers and the establishment of systems of checks and balances. Institutions have been created to defend the proper application of the law, to provide a reasonable degree of scrutiny and accountability, embodying at the highest political level the interdependent nature of the community. Despite the many reservations that have been expressed about the performance of this institutional structure over the years, we must recognise the vital importance and consistency of this conceptual feature within liberal Europeanism, in terms of both principle and application.

Agency - Irrespective of criticism to the contrary, liberal Europe is not an inert structure: it has the capacity to act. The conceptual component of *agency*, at both an

individual and a collective level, is reflected by the liberal Europeanist commitment to enacting change, to constructing progress. The agency of liberal Europe is determined by the simultaneous activity of interdependent individuals. Europe acts through its people acting *together*: it is compelled towards further development by the collective, rational will of its citizens. The evidence to suggest the importance of this conceptual feature within the ideology of liberal Europeanism can be found throughout the political development of the European project itself. The constant question hanging over the process of integration and enlargement has been, “What next?”, “What can we *do* next?”. If liberal Europe is not actually engaged at any given moment in a phase of action and expansion, then it is occupied in the doldrums bemoaning the absence of progress. The conceptual theme of agency accurately expresses the liberal Europeanist support for a widening of collective participation in the geo-political sphere and an extension of institutional responsibility in domestic issues.

Metamorphosis - The nature of change proposed by liberal Europeanism is clearly identifiable within the discursive practice of its ideologues. Where the radical right seeks a palingenetic form of change, liberal Europeanists, echoing Kant, have consistently preferred *metamorphosis* as the more appropriate and desired description of political and social transition. The violent processes of destruction and renewal are rejected in favour of more moderate, gradual development. This feature is also strongly connected to the liberal-rational view of mathematical, as opposed to mythic, time and history. Just as history is understood by liberal Europeanists as linear and sequential, so the nature of change itself must reflect and allow for a rational pattern of cause and consequence.

As with the proto-typical description of the primordialist radical right, the generic model of liberal-rationalism is well supported by the discourse and practice of liberal Europeanism. The core conceptual characteristics of a liberal-rational world-view are

consistently reflected in the individual ideas of liberal Europeanists and by successive achievements in the process of liberal European integration. Once more, where inconsistencies with the proto-typical model are evident, these have been acknowledged and will be discussed in further detail below.

To what extent do the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe diverge from the proto-typical models and what are the implications of these inconsistencies for each perspective?

If the empirical analysis has revealed one thing it is that both these ideological perspectives are strikingly diverse and fluid, and a simplistic picture, such as that provided by the proto-types, requires further development and evaluation. The ideal-types here, such as they are, have been developed in relation to liberal and radical right concepts of Europe and presented through the aggregation of discourse markers within the structure of a generic framework. They are by no means definitive, but they do give greater substance to the form of the subject, revealing a recognisable ideational profile through the analysis of what Freedman calls 'the tradition of usage':

...the tradition of usage acts as a rough indicator of the presence or absence of a political concept, though not of its agreed content...The merit of this approach is to relate empirically to those concepts that exist as linguistic and cultural artifacts and that are, further, in reasonably general use...The main political concepts – those found both in political theorizing and in ideological discourse – consist of both ineliminable features and quasi-contingent ones. (1)

The profiles created give a sense of the tradition of usage of certain concepts within the perspectives of liberal and radical right Europeanism, supporting the identification of

ineliminable, core features. However, as we have also seen, the two ideologies are not neatly defined and each has the capacity to produce deviations. In the post-war period, especially, we see the emergence of hybrid ideological forms, often illustrating a degree of convergence between the two core types. It is the ‘borderlands’ of these conceptual structures that provide the basis for comparative analysis and evaluation. It can be argued that it is precisely this murky area of ideology that most needs to be explored, as Holmes suggests:

...it is the unsettling potential of this politics to join, fuse, merge, and synthesize what might appear to be incompatible elements that is heart of its distinctive power and its perplexing ethical character. (2)


What Holmes identifies in the integralist radical right is a challenge to the analysis of modern ideology: it is the emergence of these hybrid forms that subverts conventional understanding. By discussing examples that have emerged throughout the analysis on both sides which deviate from the proto-typical conceptual model, examples from the post-war period especially, we are able to create a clearer picture of the peripheral or anomalous elements of each perspective, placing them in a spatial relationship with core concepts.

The core-variant model of radical right Europeanism

By extending the ideal-typical description of radical right Europeanism it is possible to include an appreciation of the wider elements of the ideological structure, and to illustrate these within a more developed diagrammatic model. The diagram below and the

discussion that follows serve to demonstrate the extent to which the conceptualisation of Europe by the radical right has diverged from the proto-typical norm.

The core-variant model of radical right Europeanism



The diagram here demonstrates the continuing presence of the proto-typical characteristics of the primordialist radical right, the ‘ineliminable’ core features, whilst also recognising the prominence of new conceptual themes. Again we must acknowledge that contrivances such as this have only a broad, generic value and do not offer a comprehensive description of the subject. However, their heuristic quality lies once more in their capacity to summarise and clarify the principal features of the ideational profile. The additional conceptual characteristics identified here have been evident, to a certain

extent, throughout the evolution of radical right Europeanism. However, it is in the post-war period, particularly, that these have come to the fore.

Integralist – This view of society is closely related to a perennial concern with the strength and authenticity of the bond of community. This is a conceptual feature that is easily identified in pre-war forms of fascist Europeanism, though differing somewhat from later, post-war expressions. Where orthodox fascism embraced totalitarianism, so revisionist rightist radicalism adheres to the doctrine of social and cultural *integralism*, e.g. through a strong, secure indigenous culture. Integralism is less aggressive and more diffuse than totalitarianism, reflecting a general distancing of many examples of post-war Europeanist ideology from an overt association with the monolithic brutality of first-wave fascism.

Identity – The treatment of *identity* by ideologues of the Europeanist radical right has tended to vary considerably over time. In pre-war examples, identity is often treated purely as the expression of a singular political and cultural consciousness, whether that consciousness exists at the national or European level. The notion of individual identity or personal sovereignty was treated with a great deal of suspicion by fascist ideologues, as a consequence of its association with liberal values. By contrast, post-war variations of radical right Europeanism have often taken a more subtle approach, strongly emphasising regional identities, for example, as expressions of a diverse model of indigenous belonging and self-determination within a larger European whole. Identity can have many meanings for the revisionist radical right, and many applications as part of a subversive political strategy.

Differentialist – Difference has always been a characteristic of the psyche of the radical right, though previously this usually manifested itself in an air of explicit supremacy. More recently, radical right Europeanism has articulated the more moderate propaganda

of *differentialism*, which purports to promote the separateness and integrity of *all* individual cultures, but particularly its own. Differentialism draws upon the critical insights of postmodernism and the political agenda of minority rights to create a defensive rationale of the *right to difference*.

Fluidity – The variant conceptual characteristic of *fluidity* represents the changing approach of radical right Europeanists towards aspects of political action. Where once the strategy of the radical right was deliberately blunt, rigid and monolithic, reflecting the dominant conceptual themes of the period, more recently ideologues have embraced a wider variety of discursive practices and political ideas. These diverse influences have created an approach that is now more fluid, less dogmatic and more difficult either to define or condemn.

Anti-systemic – Fascism has always opposed the established systems of bourgeois society and has invariably risen to prominence in a subversive role. In this sense, then, the term *anti-systemic* could be appropriately applied to all forms of radical right Europeanism. However, more recently the radical right has sometimes seemed to challenge the existence of any overarching form of cultural sovereignty, be it liberal or otherwise. The defence of cultural diversity against the forces of homogeneity has led radical right Europeanism, in some cases, to assume the characteristics of a kind of *cultural anarchism*, defending self-determination against the threat of coercion. This trend is particularly evident in the critique of globalisation provided by the Nouvelle Droite and others.

Rebellion – *Rebellion* has emerged as a consistent feature of radical right Europeanism and often this has been connected to the core proto-typical concept of violence. However, owing to the substantially altered fortunes of the radical right in the post-war period, rebellion has taken on other meanings, signifying now the possibility of challenge and reversal. Where once rebellion entailed overthrow and a great surge of revolutionary

momentum, now it often supposes a strategy of subversion, and the exploration and exploitation of flaws within the ideological edifice of liberal Europe.

Self-as-Other – In support of its revised agenda of anti-systemic differentialism, the radical right has also begun to reconsider the status of Europe as Self. A strong sense of Self has been a consistent feature of radical right Europeanism, though in the past this was more conventionally expressed in terms of Self *vs.* Other. More recently, the view of Self has become more subtle, reflecting the changed status of the radical right itself and the more complex character of post-colonial Europe. *Self-as-Other* expresses the differentialist view that Europe has become somehow a cultural prisoner within its own borders, a refugee from the forces of globalisation.


By arranging these variant characteristics within an ideal-typical description of the Europeanist radical right, it is possible to appreciate that its divergence from the orthodox proto-typical model in more recent years has been significant. What we find is that radical right Europeanism does not abandon the core conceptual features of the proto-type in the post-war period: rather, it evolves into a more sophisticated hybrid form, its adaptations reflecting alterations in context and circumstance. The same approach as this can be taken to develop our understanding of liberal Europeanism and its more recent conceptual variations.

The Core-Variant Model of Liberal Europeanism

As with the more developed ideal-typical description of radical right Europeanism above, the model here includes conceptual features of liberal Europeanism that have emerged as divergent from the proto-typical norm. Again, it is in the post-war period that these variant concepts have become more readily identifiable as a consequence of

responses to the prevailing socio-political and ontological conditions. By representing and discussing each of these features within the form of an extended ideal-type we can more effectively evaluate the extent to which liberal Europeanism has deviated from a more orthodox paradigm.

The core-variant model of liberal Europeanism



Monocentrism – Given the philosophical foundations of liberal Europeanism in a tradition of Enlightenment rationalism and individualism, we would ordinarily expect its conceptual treatment of Europe to be open to the ethos of pluralism and polycentrism. The core conceptual theme of universality would suggest an acceptance of the universal

validity of the status of many different attitudes and perspectives. However, we have also seen that liberal Europe has increasingly tended to emphasise a singular, *monocentric* vision of the European project, resistant to diversity and challenge. This tendency reveals another aspect of the liberal-rational tradition that has already been identified in the 'end of history' theses of Hegel and Fukuyama. As liberal Europe has become more convinced of the superiority of its own world-view, particularly with the deeper consolidation of EU power, so a creeping orthodoxy and centralism has entered the conceptual and discursive practice of liberal Europeanism.

Hegemony – In recognition of the principle of self-determination, we would expect to find in the ideal-typical model of liberal Europeanism a willingness to demonstrate respect for the sovereignty, both political and cultural, of other nations and regions. Indeed, to a great extent the ideology of liberal Europeanism, as articulated in the formal texts of integration, does express this concern. However, as has been evident in the treatment of CEE countries and Turkey in accession negotiations, Europe behaves in a manner that increasingly suggests a form of political, cultural and moral *hegemony*. Furthermore, through its position in global economic and trade issues, this maturing, hegemonic authority is felt widely beyond Europe's borders.

Exclusion – In the spirit of universality, liberal Europe should exhibit openness and acceptance towards exogenous influences, and this is the explicit position reflected in much of the propaganda of liberal Europeanism. However, the effective reality of a 'Fortress Europe' suggests that a much more *exclusive* conceptual theme has become evident in the practice of European integration. As a consequence of the material success of the liberal European project, and in an effort to protect and preserve the achievements made, ideologues of the new Europe have altered the discursive character of their propaganda to reflect at best a reticence, at worst outright hostility, towards the non-European Other.

Evangelism – It is apparent from the tone of liberal Europeanist discourse that there is a desire to celebrate the distinct character and rich achievements of the European project. The increasing sense of self-righteousness that has become associated with the discursive practice of liberal Europeanism has created an *evangelical* form of propaganda. Thus, the liberal model of ideological synthesis is ‘exported’ beyond the territory of Europe, becoming a normative paradigm in international affairs. This conceptual characteristic has achieved greater prominence over the last two decades, with the European Union exerting its influence more determinedly through the enlargement process.

Identity – In a conventional liberal-rational approach to issues of *identity* we would expect to find an understanding that individual identity is contained within the private sphere (the realm of freedom) and should not be unduly affected by actions in the public sphere (the realm of coercion). In its strictest manifestation, liberal-rationalism should support the universal right to an unfettered individual identity. To a great extent this remains true of liberal Europeanism, particularly in its explicit commitment to individual sovereignty and self-determination. However, in practice, as the liberal European project has become more expansive and consequential, the issue of identity is increasingly discussed in terms of the public sphere. In the later post-war period especially, we have witnessed the creation of formal European citizenship, running parallel to national status, but attempting to stimulate an increase in the public consciousness of a pan-European identity. This trend is also evident in examples such as the promotion of a European flag and anthem, both explicit and potentially significant incursions into the cultural identity of the individual.

Symbolism – To further the development of a European consciousness and strengthen the bond between the *idea* and the *people* of Europe, liberal Europeanism has often strayed into the discussion of emotive, cultural factors. *Symbolism* has been identified in

the discursive practice of many ideologues of liberal Europeanism and, for the most part, such symbols are employed benignly, and largely unselfconsciously. However, this symbolic practice in liberal Europeanist discourse has sometimes demonstrated a divergence from the proto-typical norm of liberal-rationalism. By definition, these symbols have little rational value, and connect with the individual on an overwhelmingly emotional, spiritual and non-rational basis. In some cases such symbolism has revealed a tendency towards exclusivity, even mild xenophobia, anathema to the core, generic values of a liberal-rational world-view. This is particularly evident in the emphasis of a Christian tradition in the foundation of Europe.

Self vs. Other – From an understanding of the generic principles of liberal-rationalism, we might expect liberal Europe to hold a view of the Self that entailed an equal, open and fully reciprocal relationship with Others. Just as the sovereignty and integrity of the individual is respected and guaranteed by that of other individuals, so too should liberal Europe regard its position amongst others in the global community. Indeed, in many instances this view of ‘Self *and* Other’ predominates, particularly through the participation of the EU in genuinely international, intergovernmental negotiations. However, as the stakes become higher, and Europe finds that it has more collectively to defend, the emphasis in the liberal conceptualisation of Europe is upon protection *against* the Other. Not only does this entail a certain hardening of the political exterior of the EU, it has also been exhibited in more aggressive, asymmetric relations with the developing world. This, in turn, is reflected in the discursive practice and propaganda of ‘*Self vs. Other*’ of the liberal European establishment.

As in the case of radical right Europeanism, the conceptual variations described above illustrate a wider view of the proto-typical model of liberal-rationalism in the evolution of liberal Europeanism. We can observe that to a great extent the core conceptual

characteristics of the proto-typical model remain consistent throughout the historical development of the liberal European idea. At the same time, though, anomalous features that would not be part of a conventional description of a liberal-rational form of politics are evident in the discursive practice and propaganda of liberal Europe. This more developed ideal-typical description helps us to appreciate that liberal Europeanism, in the post-war period especially, has created ideological and conceptual variations that deviate significantly from the proto-type. In the liberal Europeanist model we see the promotion a form of identity politics, though different in substance to the conceptual variations of the radical right. Rather than an anti-systemic ideology of rebellion, liberal Europeanism has often expressed itself in more recent times through a discourse of hegemony, exclusion and a Huntingtonian, cultural dialectic.

To what extent, and in what forms, has convergence taken place between the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe?

By comparing these two more detailed models we are able to appreciate not just their fundamental differences, but also a strong element of convergence and fluidity between them. This convergence does not take the form of a direct exchange of ideological positions, not least because the political status of each type is at a different level of development. However, each form demonstrates a particular set of responses and within these new boundaries we are able to determine a certain degree of similarity.

The radical right, in its meta-political, anti-systemic development has drawn closer to a form of discourse that emphasises conventionally liberal concerns: diversity, plurality, difference. Its treatment of these ideas is not straightforward, signifying as it does a conscious conceptual manoeuvre that aims to mask intolerance with the liberal discourse of self-determination. Nonetheless, this ideological variation is significant: it is the ability

of the radical right to disguise its deeper intentions and values that has made possible a resurgence of integralist electoral politics.

What is perhaps most significant in the variation of radical right ideology, and its treatment of Europe in particular, is the relative ease with which this transition appears to be taking place. In the current balance of status between established liberal Europeanism and the challenge of the radical right, the latter is very much the Hegelian *antithesis*, the subversive possibility. Liberal Europe, as the dominant *thesis* in Europeanist ideology, is now the Goliath to the radical right's David. We might have expected that following the collapse of fascism as a viable regime in the 1940s, the radical right would have been thrown into an irreversible decline, unable to re-conceptualise its vision of Europe or the context it now found itself in. In practice, though, this has only partly been the case. The radical right was, indeed, thrown into disarray in the early post-war period and has taken time to adjust. However, its adaptation to the context of late 20th and early 21st century Europe has been remarkably effective. Through a process of conceptual variation, radical right Europeanism has begun to subvert the dominant *thesis*, resurrecting its challenge to the liberal world-view.

Because the radical right does not find it uncomfortable, or indeed unusual, to embrace a certain eclecticism in its ideological structure, it has found it relatively easy to respond to changing conditions, penetrating the arena of liberal ideas and slowly colouring them with its own. In this respect, the rise of rightist identity politics could be seen in much the same way as the growth of European social democracy. Just as revolutionary socialism began to give way to an electoral, gradualist form of social democracy in the early 20th century, so too it could be said that the integralist, electoral radical right represents a similar evolution of revolutionary fascism. If we can accept that this parallel may be true, we would do well to remember that, in real terms, social democracy has arguably done more to transform the nature of western European society

than revolutionary socialism ever did. In the same way, we could project the possibility that the long-term effect of a transitional, fluid form of radical identity politics could dramatically affect the cultural and political landscape in the future. In this scenario, the Hegelian *synthesis* emerging from the confrontation between these idea-systems would tend to favour the radical right orientation towards cultural integrity, exclusivity, and hostility towards the Other.

At the same time, the shift in liberal Europeanist discourse towards themes of exclusion and self-protection sees it beginning to occupy territory that might more usually be associated with the radical right. However, owing to the much higher status and development of the liberal model, it has not followed the anti-systemic path of objection. Rather, its value-structure has hardened into a defensive shell, increasingly emphasising Europeaness in the form of moral and cultural distinction. This hardening effect, and the corresponding assertion of a more centralist, dogmatic discourse, is the consequence of a position of dominance in ideological terms. At no point was the Europeanist discourse of the radical right more closely in line than when it had achieved a position as the dominant *thesis* in the early 1940s. At this stage, most expressions of radical right Europeanism gravitated towards a Nazi centre. The long-term effect of this ideological dominance was never demonstrated by the radical right, of course, because power was physically lost before this could be properly judged. The hegemony of liberal Europe, though, has lasted far longer, and for this reason we can observe a hardening, or ossification, of its defensive ideological position.

Liberal Europeanism has become the victim of its own conceptual success. When Europe chose to reject the *thesis* of fascism after the end of the war, its *antithesis*, liberal Europe, was bold, dynamic and to a great extent pure in character. The model of liberal Europeanism in the early post-war period is much more closely related to the proto-type than that we find today. Paradoxically, it is in defence of the values that saw liberalism

triumph over fascism that liberal Europe has begun to diverge from the orthodox characteristics of the liberal-rational paradigm. The monolithic, centralist and hegemonic features that can be associated with liberal 'Fortress Europe' today remind us most strongly of certain aspects of the ideology of first-wave fascism. This is not to say that liberal Europe has real equivalence to fascist Europe. However, it is at least fair to say that conceptual variations within the political strategy and discursive practice of liberal Europeanism have exposed characteristics such as self-righteousness, exclusivity and a dominant identity, and that these are not wildly dissimilar to those features found within the radical right.

By contrast to the radical right, liberal Europe has not adjusted quite so comfortably to a process of evolution and conceptual variation. The divergence between the orthodox conceptual nature of liberal Europeanism and the practice of liberal Europe does not, as in the case of the radical right, provide a subversive opportunity: rather, it suggests flaws in the dominant *thesis*, cracks in the edifice, that can become the target of antithetical attack. Liberal Europe is trapped in a dilemma whereby to defend its significant liberal-rational achievements, it is drawn inexorably towards a more authoritarian, centralist form of action and discourse. The extent of the correlation between variant liberal and variant right radical Europeanism is reflected in the tables below.

Areas of correlation between variant liberal and radical right Europeanism

Variant Liberal Europeanism	Radical Right Europeanism
Monocentrism	Strongly consistent with the character of the orthodox radical right. Corresponds with the desire to establish a single source of authority and strength.
Hegemony	A prominent feature of radical right Europeanism. Demonstrates a belief in the inherent superiority of the paradigm and a willingness to exert authority externally.
Exclusion	Echoes the radical right belief in the separation of cultures and the assertion of firm boundaries of inclusion. Cultural basis of exclusion suggests a process of 'Othering'.
Evangelism	Often exhibited in radical right propaganda. Evident in mythic discursive practice that promotes a glorified model of political and cultural unity.
Identity	Identity becomes a matter of more than the individual. Group identity and a sense of shared belonging are vital components in the promotion of a particular world-view.
Symbolism	Highly consistent with the discursive practice of the generic radical right. Symbols are used to elicit an emotional, non-rational response to questions of identity and collective purpose.
Self vs. Other	Consistent with the radical right view that sees cultures in a constant state of antagonism. This negative view of the Other necessitates a vigorous defence of the indigenous community.

Areas of correlation between variant radical right and liberal Europeanism

Variant Radical Right Europeanism	Liberal Europeanism
Integralist	In this sense, not strongly consistent with orthodox liberal thought. However, partially reflected in the concept of mutualism, and the importance of close interdependence.
Identity	Closely related to the liberal concept of identity as a feature of individual self-determination. Strong emphasis placed on the right to choose and assert one's cultural and political identity.
Differentialist	Arguably connected to the liberal idea of defined sovereignty. At face value, differentialism requires a <i>mutual</i> guarantee of communal difference and equal respect for the integrity of the Other.
Fluidity	Reflects a certain recognition of diversity and plurality in the formulation of ideas, evident to an extent in the generic model of liberal-rationalism and its pluralist approach to goal-formation.
Anti-systemic	Finds a form of precedence in the anti-systemic challenge of 18 th century liberal ideas. Now, though, liberal Europe <i>is</i> the system with which the radical right seeks confrontation.
Rebellion	Parallels can be found with the origins of classical liberal ideas, particularly Locke's assertion of the individual's inherent right to challenge and overthrow bad government.
Self-as-Other	Takes full advantage of liberal discourse on the rights of individuals to self-determination and freedom from coercion. Draws on a distorted form of multiculturalism.

These comparative observations must be considered alongside the established framework of the proto-typical descriptions of each ideology. It is not being suggested that each perspective has entirely abandoned its original position and values, but rather that the evolution of the ideological structure in each case has created interesting and significant examples of hybridity and exchange.

What are the current conditions of the liberal and radical right conceptualisations of Europe, their most prominent challenges and most significant flaws?

Radical Right Europeanism

A Europe modelled on the evolving paradigm of rightist radicalism would almost certainly entail an increase in tension between indigenous tradition and exogenous diversity. For diversity, in the radical right sense, is a matter of difference *against* universality. Whilst the cultural 'patchwork' of European identities may well flourish under the guidance of the radical right, it would do so with a corresponding limitation of 'alien' influences, those perceived as non-European. This assertion follows logically from the observations already made and is supported here by Maier:

...the existing nationalist and xenophobic parties have exploited, in a more or less successful way, the real problems European countries are confronted with. These parties and their spokespersons have introduced a further step which has a typically racist character in explaining why [...] migrant populations constitute a problem group. These groups are portrayed as problematic...because of their origin, in other words their culture, which is depicted as 'non-western'. Their religion or their ethnic origin explains why they do not fit into the European social fabric. (3)

There is a strong likelihood that the growth in xenophobia and integralist identity politics will continue, and will begin to alter the fabric of European society in both direct and subtle ways. The point of entry for the radical right into the mainstream political agenda, as previously identified, is through the dissemination of a discourse of fear, permeating liberal consciousness and reconstructing a political culture that was founded

upon the principles of toleration and diversity. As already discussed, the meta-political influence of movements such as the Nouvelle Droite, coupled with a resurgent right-wing electoral strategy, has the capacity to inhabit and reshape even the most established of liberal structures.

For the radical right to affect Europe in a profound way, it must enter and attack the bastion of liberal values: the democratic process itself. It has already established a firm foothold in the electoral system and if this influence should increase, then the next objectives for a radical, integralist assault will most likely be the legal and institutional mechanisms that help to enshrine the liberal-rational basis of moderate Europeanism. Statements of universality and pluralism (such as the ECHR and founding Treaties), secure though they may seem, are vulnerable to politicians responding to negative public pressure, fuelled by the activities of overtly xenophobic parties within national and supranational institutions. In the wake of the London 7/7 attacks, even the mainstream Labour government of the UK hinted at the possibility of a derogation from its commitments to the ECHR, or an outright withdrawal, thus enabling the liberal state to shield itself in (illiberal) anti-terror legislation. It takes only a small stretch of the imagination to see the possibility of the collapse of pan-European initiatives designed to uphold the rights of diverse communities. Should Turkey ever achieve full membership of the EU, its status may also be called into question under the influence of xenophobic identity politics, with the mainstream political system once again responding to the disproportionate presence of rightist values.

A relevant event in this regard was the formation of the radical right “Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty” (ITS) group of MEPs in the European Parliament in early 2007. Following expansion of the EU to include Romania and Bulgaria, and the subsequent inclusion of six new MEPs sympathetic to the ideology of the radical right, the new group was formed *in accordance with* European Parliament statutory provisions.

Under terms for the formation of a political group in the Parliament, a minimum of 20 members representing at least 7 member-states must be brought together. In return for establishing its official status, the group was entitled to more prominent parliamentary debating time, in addition to as much 1 million Euros in political funding each year.

This development in the European Parliament was striking and, though not unprecedented, had not occurred for more than a decade. A closer analysis of the group's formation confirms much that has already been suggested about both the current state of the Europeanist radical right and its possible future trajectory. Firstly, the establishment of this political group illustrates the clear potential of the radical right to act as a parasite within the host of the liberal system, and to thrive in that environment. Almost openly mocking the liberal institutionalism of the EU, the radical right parties, most of whom opposed enlargement to the east (which, paradoxically, increased their strength), used their constitutional entitlement to status and funding to attack the EU, and its liberal values, from within. Although in this case the ITS grouping was rather weak and has already encountered internal failure, its emergence illustrated that in its commitment to structure and due institutional process, the EU provides its enemies with subversive opportunities.

The formation of the group also suggests that public perception of the radical right may change. With greater perceived legitimacy, the views of the radical right may well continue to broaden their support, particularly amongst individuals dissatisfied with the condition of liberal society. The fact that the group was entitled "Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty" is a clear illustration of its consistency with the generic radical right and its relation to post-war Europeanist trends in particular. Tradition is familiar as a concept within the generic character of the radical right: it suggests a primordialist attachment to a distinct civilisation or culture, embodying a specific and unique historical experience.

The inclusion of Identity as such a prominent feature of the group's image and discourse highlights the acceleration of radical right strategy and thought. Identity may typically be seen as a feature of *liberal* discourse, accentuating as it does a concern for the individual as distinct. Instead, as Baudrillard suggested, liberal Europe could be losing its grip on this debate, with the danger of its political and conceptual territory being wrested from it by the radical right.

The inclusion of the term Sovereignty in the group's title indicates an alliance between right-wing *nationalists* first and foremost, most of whom are vehemently opposed to liberal integration. However, in line with earlier analysis, there are still grounds for interpreting this political group in terms of a Europeanist dynamic, particularly as its chairman, the French FN MEP Bruno Gollnisch, described its mission as to "properly defend Christian values, the family and European civilization" (4)

Other discursive characteristics reveal that this development is strongly in accordance with the trend in radical right Europeanism already identified. Elsewhere, Gollnisch asserts that the programme of the ITS is to defend human rights, using aspects of liberal discourse to disguise views that are often clearly xenophobic. He tries to distance the notion of identity from an aggressive preoccupation with outsiders, and instead treats it as an act of affirmation: "If the defence of one's identity is racism or negative, that is a major new political development. That is not the way we see it." (5) This development in the European Parliament clearly illustrates the ongoing effort in European radical right strategy to test the response of the liberal paradigm.

One of the most striking features of radical right Europeanism in the current period is the relative absence of flaws in its ideological structure. As an antithetical movement, the radical right is not beset by internal inconsistency and can respond robustly to ideas in a way that liberal Europe is unable to. The Europeanist radical right can say the things that many people want to be said, ideas that mainstream politicians and ideologues toy with at

their peril. This reminds us of Baudrillard's observations on the nature of evil. The radical right is able to articulate evil, albeit in a subtly controlled way, and this situation provides it with a powerful, dynamic advantage.

However, radical right conceptualisations of Europe are not entirely free from weakness, and the choice in practice that a radical rightist Europe represents is stark indeed. Owing to the highly diverse composition of modern day Europe, the pure conception of European integrity is realistically unobtainable. Historically, Europe has always been a diverse society, and any vision of indigenous cultural purity is, and always has been, a mythic fantasy. The radical right then faces three effective choices. Firstly, it could pursue its ideology of separation and antipathy to the genocidal conclusions it has experimented with in the past. Alternatively, it could become locked in a civil war of cultural attrition, endlessly clashing with the forces of Otherness within Europe. Finally, the radical right could accept some strategy of compromise, some meaningful form of dialogue and constructive action that could substantially satisfy most, though not all, of its many objections. The most significant flaw within radical right conceptualisations of Europe is the adoption of a closed strategy of subversion and confrontation. This inherent weakness cannot be overcome unless the radical right adopts the third of the above possibilities and enters into an open process of dialogue.

Liberal Europeanism

Analysis has demonstrated that there are many features of liberal Europe that are strongly in accordance with its orthodox philosophical and conceptual foundations. However, it has also been observed that liberal Europe has diverged in some respects from this paradigm, hardening its shell around its value-system and developing a hegemonic economic and cultural status. This response is indicative of both a profound

sense of vulnerability on the part of liberal Europe, and at the same time an expression of hubristic self-confidence, a certain arrogance that places it at the centre of the civilised world. As Dodd writes, this insular, protectionist form of European identity is not unprecedented:

As far back as the seventeenth century, thinkers were seeing Europe as a political idea and assuming that it had nothing to learn from the rest of the world. As Voltaire put it, Europeans shared 'the same principle of public law and politics unknown to other lands'. (6)

Under the influence of rationalist thinkers such as Kant, liberal Europe has evolved with a certain complacency in its own moral superiority and an attitude to other cultures that can express this superiority in an aloof manner. Even very recently, as highlighted earlier in the study of the Turkish accession process, European leaders and ideologues have sought to construct cultural, political and economic barriers against the external Other, against a perceived void of relativism and threat. If we are to imagine Europe in liberal terms, then this movement towards insularity, hegemony and cultural imperialism cannot be ignored.

There are two clear possibilities in terms of the future of liberal Europe. The first is that it might continue to establish itself as a monolithic presence in global affairs. The second is that it may become weak and irrelevant, eclipsed by more dynamic regions and bolder ideas. One of the key conceptual problems for liberal Europe now is its understanding and application of universality. The problem originates in a conflict within liberal values themselves, specifically between the recognition and acceptance of diversity, and the simultaneous desire for shared, universal understanding and order. Diversity is produced by a recognition and acceptance of the individual and, as such, is entirely consistent with a liberal tradition. However, the need to establish values and

norms is also very powerful. Normative direction, then, must be determined by strong moral referents that are considered universal. Where these two priorities conflict, a sense of impending vulnerability or crisis can sometimes encourage liberal Europe to seek security in a stronger collective consciousness. Out of this tendency arises an insular, self-important belief in a universality that is distinctly European and effectively unquestionable. As Rietbergen warns:

...taking pride in one's cultural inheritance should not imply uncritically or unthinkingly imposing it on others. In the recent past, many of the values and other cultural forms that have originated in or been elaborated by 'Europe' have all too easily been termed 'universal'. We should do well to discard this much-discussed notion of universality as scholarly irrational and morally irrelevant. (7)

Liberal Europe has tried to propagate a culture of the Enlightenment, to emulate within this culture a depth of attachment and conviction. However, liberal Europe continues to struggle in its attempt to establish a 'thick' identity, and in its relative failure is snatching at conceptual straws, drawing in anxieties and responses that muddy the waters surrounding the liberal-rational paradigm.

A liberal Europe that heads down the path of hegemony will develop this culture of the post-Enlightenment to a much greater degree, absorbing and confusing historicist influences and from them forming a hybrid structure of 'liberal-historicism'. Liberal Europe will need such a structure of collective identity, to feel secure in its sense of 'Europeanness' as it extends its moral and economic influence increasingly further. The urgency of this point is made clear by Chalmers:

Nothing less than the success of the EU rides on such a European 'historical dimension' and, in fact, as Habermas states with confidence, 'governments beyond the nation-state' in general are dependent on Europe as a guiding light...[A] new exigency arises as to the exact nature of such a crucial historical dimension that would ensure solidarity among the European member-states. (8)

In a future where liberal Europe wished to increase its power as a moral force, determining the conditions for inclusion in the international civil sphere, strong internal cohesion based on genuine cultural attachment would be necessary. Coupled with a Eurocentric view of the universal, the liberal project may increasingly drive its moral interests forward through political and economic hegemony.

The other prospect suggested for the future of liberal Europe is that of irrelevance. Advocates of the EU sense something anomalous in the presence of historicist and culturally-driven norms, yet simultaneously are aware that their ascetic liberal-rational model is thirsty for an identity. They seek to uphold the values of tolerance, diversity, self-determination, etc., yet they are fearful of the (Islamic) Other and rally to the defence of universal (Eurocentric) norms. All this suggests a Europe moving towards a crisis of both confidence and conscience, a Europe unable to confront Evil and therefore paralysed by moral indecision and an indefinite identity.

In this condition of ideological stasis, Europe may be unable to defend its conceptualisation of society from the forces of opposition and rebellion. Under these conditions, in a Hegelian sense, the *thesis* of liberal Europe should submit to transcendence, succumbing to a new, more vigorous *antithesis*. However, in an equally Hegelian sense, liberal Europe has already determined that it has reached the pinnacle of moral and intellectual development, the end of history, and so cannot entertain the possibility of being usurped. This Europe will only reinforce redundant conceptions of itself, leading the EU into a state of self-referential irrelevance, preventing it from

properly addressing the deep cultural and ontological issues that will be fiercely contested by fundamentalists and the radical right. As Bialasiewicz describes in her critical analysis of the liberal west, European society may suffer “a *double* indictment: in the first instance a ‘*blindness*’ to *external threats* brought by the diffusion of the ‘doctrines’ of multiculturalism and political correctness but also the *moral-political decay* of Europe and its leaders.” (9) It is perhaps the greatest threat to liberal Europe that it should simply become ignored. If rival ideological paradigms successfully exploit gaps in the liberal model then a European subculture of radical identity politics may emerge fully, disregarding the authority of liberal-rational structures as an irrelevant obstacle to be circumvented or subverted.

The suggestion that emerges from these points is that it may, in fact, be the radical right, with fewer internal inconsistencies, that is better equipped to cope with the challenges ahead, and that liberal Europe may have to rethink fundamentally its strategy for continuance. Liberal Europe needs to find a much more effective balance and relation between its commitment to core liberal values and its need to express a stronger, more defined cultural and political identity. As with the radical right, the only real alternative open to liberal Europeanists, aside from the possibilities mentioned above, is to enter into a process of dialogue and compromise, one that will meaningfully address the confrontation between the liberal *thesis* and radical *antithesis*, one that will allow either a higher and more effective *synthesis* of ideas or, perhaps preferably, dispense with the Hegelian dialectical process altogether.

What scope is there for the development of an alternative conceptualisation of Europe?

The approach to political ideologies pursued in this thesis has suggested that they can be effectively studied and understood as generic types expressing specific normative priorities. Despite the anomalies and divergences already presented and discussed, each perspective of Europeanist ideology has demonstrated a forthright self-conviction and, as such, has provided a basis for creating a model of *actual* political and social existence. In this sense, they emerge as distinct forms of ideology, rather than political philosophy: i.e. they consist of action-oriented ideas, rather than concept-oriented ideas. In each ideology there remains an understanding of purpose, a belief that European society can be shaped and determined by successful political action, underpinned by normative moral constructs.

The intent of this research was to maintain detachment from the two perspectives under consideration, believing that no proper examination of either could be made from a position that was not, as much as possible, ideologically neutral. However, in terms of the conclusions to be made here, it seems somewhat unsatisfying not to be able to offer something more to the debate than an objective analysis of other paradigms. We must look to address the fissures in Europe's identity and to reconcile the civil and ethno-cultural dimensions of European community. Whilst the methodology of this thesis has pursued a loosely postmodern approach through the analysis of discursive practice, the great weakness of the 'pure' postmodern perspective is its intrinsic inability to provide a foundation for more proactive solutions. The challenge in creating a revised conceptualisation of Europe is to see beyond the critique of normative ideology, whilst at the same time maintaining a resistance to strongly normative practice. As White

identifies, a more open and pragmatic approach must guide postmodern scepticism, in order to allow greater problem-solving insight to develop.

The resistant state of mind often manifests itself among postmoderns in a way that is maximally 'impertinent' to the shibboleths of modernity. The rationale for this tone is to shock or jolt the addressee into seeing the contestable quality of what he takes as a certainty. But there is a danger when the resistant state of mind lets this tone predominate...there is sometimes a loss of attention to a broader, more diffuse 'state of mind'...It is this mood and the attempts to turn it in an affirmative direction that constitute the most subtle challenge to modern ethical-political reflection. (10)

As White suggests, there is scope to conceive of an approach to politics that can be both constructive and at the same time resistant to a dangerously normative tendency. It is in this context that Lyotard has developed the concept of 'pluralist justice', whereby a "global principle of pluralism" is combined with "specific procedural principles providing further normative guidelines for situations where plural forms of life come into conflict" (11). Lyotard emphasises the need for ordinary identities to be expressed and considered within the construction of these normative resolutions. "One must", he says, "maximize as much as possible the multiplication of small narratives" (12). In these suggestions we may begin to see the possibility of reconciling ardently anti-normative inhibitions with proactivity.

According to Lyotard, a system of "free, flexible" contract (13) should govern social relations, allowing for a greater mutual interpretation of respective differences whilst congregating around accepted normative procedures. Simultaneously, this system of contract should be coupled with what White describes as 'a sense of responsibility to otherness': in other words, the pluralist society should become responsive within itself, a

community of mutual giving and receiving. What Lyotard aims for is not a normative utopia, but a greater sense of common understanding, particularly perhaps an understanding of one's own relative futility in the world, and by extension the absurdity of attempts to dominate society with one particular point of view or another. Such attempts, according to Lyotard, represent a fundamental failure on the part of orthodox ideologies to see beyond a zero-sum situation. As White states:

...the urge to dominate constitutes a refusal to bear witness to one's limits, a refusal to recognise finitude. Actions that dominate or systematically manifest a failure to respect others are a wilful forgetting of an inescapable dimension of human being. (14)

It is the 'urge to dominate' that is one of the strongest themes in the European political system, an urge derived from the condition of the nation-state and its concomitant features of tension and competition. Despite half a century of deepening integration, Europe is still unable adequately to re-conceptualise relations both within and beyond the Union: unity has always existed within the context of national interest, which is a form of this urge to dominate others. Equally, the EU's collective presence in global society shows a tendency towards dominance in its application of normative, Eurocentric values and, in some cases, the effective prohibition of the Other. One of the main aims of a revision of the European project, then, must be to encourage a fundamental reconsideration of the relative interests of Self and Other, and to foster a definitive movement away from the dichotomous tension that has hitherto been engendered in the general ontological condition.

A constructive approach must, therefore, serve to reconcile the respective priorities of the Europeanist perspectives, again by seeking a non-confrontational attitude that allows both sets of priorities to be expressed and eventually combined in a new state of political,

social and cultural consensus. There must be a reconciliation between the civil orientation of Europe and its multi-layered, ethno-cultural identities. At present, liberal Europe is on a path of collision with the anti-rational forces of the radical right because it does not know how to accept the validity of a genuine historical and cultural identity. The *ersatz* identity that liberal Europe offers in its place is insufficient to dissipate the build up of these forces at a grass roots level. Liberal Europe must reach the understanding that the only way to neutralise the energy of the radical right is to accommodate the very features of existence that it seeks to promote. Such a step would not be a capitulation to extremism: rather, a future Europe must combine the best traditions of civil society with a recognition of the deeper cultural and spiritual yearnings of human beings in such a way that *all* forms of Otherness, all ‘small narratives’, can fruitfully coexist through the procedural guidance of benign, mutually acceptable normative principles.

Europe must move towards a more fluid understanding of the interaction between the internal Self and the external Other, reducing the effect of polarisation, allowing multiple existing identities to coalesce around *consensual* moral and procedural norms, rather than those driven culturally and asymmetrically. In order to achieve this, though, Europe must relinquish its grasp upon the absolute definition of the moral and social ‘good’, particularly where this norm is derived from questionable cultural and historical sources. This is what Diez refers to in his description of a “border paradox”:

...the values and identity necessary for normative power to operate are constructed through processes of Othering that represent the EU as a force for the good, and others as deviant from this normative standard and therefore to be changed...The normative power paradox therefore erects borders in the moment of a declaration of universal validity, with the effect of elevating

the Europeans to an example of universal good while reinforcing the border between the EU and the outside world. (15)

Paradoxically, one of the effects of this 're-bordering' is to accentuate liberal Europe's conceptual vulnerability and to create space within which an aggressive differentialism can flourish. Only through a fundamental re-conceptualisation of European society, one modest and responsive enough to accept a healthy balance of difference, can we move towards a social model that can be more universally endorsed. Rumford describes how some success has been achieved in the development of a polycentric European civil society, embracing various sources of geography, power and identity: "decentred, deterritorialized and dynamic" (16). However, such experiments remain very much of an elite nature. They do not address the ordinary, shared experience of Europeans and non-European Others, or begin to approach the degree of re-conceptualisation necessary. A truly polycentric and constructive approach must pursue a diversification of social and political structures, an awakening of minor identities, and the establishment of consensual, apolitical norms based upon a genuinely universal core of human identity, morality and experience.

In this respect the work of the Czech playwright and former president, Václav Havel, stands out as an attempt to reconcile normative liberal principles with non-rational elements. His work, though not without certain flaws and inconsistencies, represents a genuine effort to engage with this problem and bring to the debate a perspective that is rooted in *existential* considerations. Havel simultaneously rejects the repressive normative traditions of existing political paradigms and the ineffectual posturing of postmodern theorising. He seeks, for want of a more original term, a 'third way' between the rehearsed scepticism of postmodernism and the real-world urge towards workable normative principles. In doing so, Havel favours the exploration of fundamental

existential conditions as the basis for achieving social consensus and the development of what White has termed a 'felicitous weak ontology'.

...a felicitous weak ontology must respond to two pressing concerns: first, it must be capable of being folded back in such a way as to enhance the inherent contestability of 'all fundamental conceptualizations of self, other and world'. Second, it must recognize that 'such conceptualizations are nevertheless necessary or unavoidable for an adequately reflective ethical and political life'. (17)

The approach described here, and evident in Havel's own work, combines a rejection of absolutism with a simultaneous recognition of the need for universal moral practice. This is, of course, a potential form of paradox. For Havel, the basis of this approach lies in the appreciation of core ontological concerns, those which have universal significance and resonance. Coalescence around these core concerns provides the foundation for moral pragmatism in a non-exclusionary public sphere. At the same time, it accommodates diversity and the assertion of difference in the private sphere. Effectively, this 'weak' ontological context serves to neutralise normative cultural power whilst retaining the moral universality that is essential for positive social engagement. In contrast to many postmodern adherents, Havel is a believer in 'truth' and in the dimension of human spirituality. It is this arena of the spirit that Havel sees as the point of unification in human experience.

It is my firm belief that, if there is a bond uniting the diverse religious and cultural worlds that make up our civilization today, it can only be their unwavering certainty that the key to solid human coexistence, and to a life that does not become a hell on earth, lies in respect for what infinitely transcends us, for what I call the miracle of Being. True goodness, true responsibility,

true justice, a true sense of things – all these grow from roots that go much deeper than the world of our transitory earthly schemes...I am speaking of [...] the need to grasp and articulate anew humanity's essential, fundamental spiritual experience and to infuse the spirit of this experience into the creation of a new world order, one that would allow us all to live and work together in peace without forcing anyone to give up his cultural autonomy. (18)

Havel's ideas are potentially highly significant in the context of this analysis. His insistence upon a benign public sphere, coupled with an appreciation of humanity's spiritual dimension, provides the conceptual bridge between the normative priorities of the liberal-rational Europeanist paradigm and the agenda of the primordialist radical right.

The defining feature of this reconciliation lies in the recognition of what Havel describes as the "absolute horizon" of Being (19), understood in the universal context of death. Death, for Havel, is the condition that provides for the absolute unification of human purpose because it is in the understanding of mortality and our *resistance* to a corresponding, overwhelming sense of futility that human society finds its true sense of purpose. We are united by our determination that there should be more to our existence than the 'absolute horizon' of our finite selves. This spiritual yearning is, of course, strongly consistent with the theme of political primordialism, identified particularly in Heidegger. However, Havel's work is distinct in that it combines this existential urge with the description of a civil sphere rooted in liberal moral concerns such as decency, justice and tolerance.

Genuine politics – politics worthy of the name, and the only politics I am willing to devote myself to – is simply a matter of serving those around us: serving the community, and serving those who will come after us. Its deepest roots are moral because it is a responsibility, expressed through action, to and for the whole, a responsibility that is what it is – a "higher" responsibility

– only because it has a metaphysical grounding: that is, it grows out of a conscious or subconscious certainty that our death ends nothing, because everything is forever being recorded and evaluated somewhere else, somewhere “above us”, in what I have called “the memory of Being” – an integral aspect of the secret order of the cosmos, of nature, and of life. (20)

Havel’s insistence upon core values of respect, tolerance, modesty, responsiveness and a unifying humanity make his work strongly consistent with the aims of liberal philosophy. At the same time, his recognition and articulation of transcendence, his powerful affirmation of duty and cultural authenticity, provide a conceptual bridge to the meta-political landscape of radical right integralism. In each case, of course, Havel is also rejecting aspects of the existing paradigms: specifically, the hegemony of orthodox liberal universality and the exclusionary, ethnocentric character of rightist differentialism.

Havel’s contribution to the debate on identity and community is important because it opens up the possibility of establishing a new political space where revised concepts can be applied so as to overcome the tension and dichotomy that confronts Europe. The principle point that can be taken from Havel’s work is that a reconciliation between normative, liberal procedures and values, and a deeper, integralist appreciation of human identity and community is both possible and urgently necessary. Within the overarching context of globalisation, it becomes ever more requisite that Europe achieves progress on this issue. Europe, as a complex and advanced political entity, has the capacity to offer guidance through its example to other regions of the world, but this guidance must be completely benign and its example must have full credibility and integrity. It is vital that Europe’s encounter with the outside world is open to reciprocity and symmetry of understanding. In addition, Europe’s internal dialogue must generate a shared political space that can accommodate and appreciate a multitude of attitudes. It is in this spirit that the Bergedorf Round Table discusses the possibility of “intercultural deontology”:

...a process consciously willed by self-selected agents – thinkers, artists, politicians and decision-makers in other fields – who seek to build encounters between individuals and groups that oblige each of them to mobilize the basic characteristics, local categories, symbols and myths of their respective cultures on a shared terrain that is *new to each and belongs to none alone*. (21)

The group also emphasises the need to engage local communities through a much more extensive system of inter-cultural contact between local representatives with influence over ordinary people. Europe, they suggest, must cease to be a project of the political elite and must be returned as a concept to its citizens through such processes of engagement (22). At present, the liberal EU seems far less appreciative of this point than the radical right.

Europe needs the stabilising influence of guidelines and norms for social interaction, without which we would be left in a paralysing state of relativism. It also craves the cultural artefacts and non-rational symbols that remind us that to possess a human identity is to engage with Being as an unknown state of mystery. Without some form of normative, universal foundation, Europe will never be able to manifest the structural presence needed to bind a community of many millions together. Without a meaningful sense of identity, Europeans will grow increasingly resentful of the ‘machine society’, and refuse to accept the validity and necessity of its universalising functions.

A neutral ideological position must provide for the spirit of reconciliation and an escape from what Derrida calls the “anguished experience” of cultural contradiction (23). As Burgess writes:

Cultural identity has always taken the form of a crisis of cultural identity, but a *crisis* which unifies and disperses at the same time. The cultural history of Europe is the history of crisis. Cultural identity thus cannot recall a time when it wasn't a *question* of cultural identity, when cultural identity was not in question, when some form of disequilibrium, dispersion, rupture was not present, sounding the alarm and the call to redefine, re-establish the identity presumed lost or threatened. Crisis is a constant. (24)

The task, therefore, is not so much to solve this crisis as to reconcile us to it, to make a virtue of this fluidity as a source of creativity. If cultural or social norms are not precisely defined or definable, then they can be modelled according to our experience, reason and will.

From the Hegelian dialectic to a Havelian consensus

From an examination of the integralist, radical right discussion of European identity we are able to ascertain the most basic, non-rational identity needs of European citizens. Foremost amongst these is the desire for cultural rootedness through collective engagement in tradition and myth. These myths surround us, saturating European culture in their richness and diversity. A unified European social culture must then, paradoxically, rest upon this diversity, genuinely celebrating the myriad myths from which it is constituted and looking for every possible opportunity to accentuate and share this richness within the community, fostering greater mutual understanding and respect.

In concrete terms this might mean raising the prominence of all forms of local and national cultural tradition: festivals, customs, idiosyncrasies, artistic and linguistic expression, regional cuisine, etc. Currently, the liberal EU fundamentally misses the point about local cultural diversity, this being that it *really matters* to local communities and is

not simply the subject of elite rhetoric emanating from the Parliament or Commission. A 'framework' or 'directive' for cultural diversity, dehumanised by pompous institutional language, alienates the people: not from the experience of their distinctive culture, but from the recognition that we all share the same ontological instinct.

Initiatives generated by the elite to foster cultural diversity generate, at present, little more than a 'Legoland' of local and national identities, robbed of their inherent meaning for fear that that this meaning will disperse the binding force of universality. This technocratic treatment of culture does not actually remove it from its source, because the people are immanently bound to their diverse traditions. However, it does encourage ordinary people to believe that universality and commonality are the enemies of their diversity, and creates resentment towards the notion that a unified European culture and civil society can co-exist alongside local and national mythologies. This in turn drives local communities inexorably into the arms of the aggressive differentialism of the radical right, because by contrast its discourse appears honest and affirmative.

Liberal Europe, if it is to overcome this predicament, if it genuinely wishes to address the identity-deficit, must encourage us as European citizens, sharing in a common social experience, to witness and experience one another's diversity wherever possible, thus recognising that our ontological cravings do not separate us, but bind us indisputably together in our self-determination and creativity. In an optimistic, though perhaps premature statement, this is precisely the direction suggested by Wijffels in his description of the biotope as a metaphor for European diversity:

I see a new Europe forming, a society on this old continent that strives towards peace, prosperity and cultural multiformity. The latter is especially important, as Europe has to be a concept in which every citizen can feel at home. This new Europe that is developing lacks a classical, central power structure; instead it is an intelligent combination of large and small scale organizations. I

hope and believe that this concept proves viable: cooperating on a large scale when needed, but leaving room for regional and local structures, ideas and values...A good metaphor for this post-industrial European society is a biotope: different species living together in harmony, influencing each other, and as in any biotope, the richer it is, the better. (25)

Wijffels is pertinent in every aspect of his description, but erroneous in his presumption that this biotope has already been created. If ordinary European people felt secure and confident in the synthesis between a local and European identity, then the radical right would not be nearly as successful in articulating their increasing anxieties.

In its relations with the outside world, with the Other, Europe must also change. The liberal form of Europe must reconsider its hegemonic relationship with the developing world in terms of trade and culture, and with acceding states in terms of normative practice. Simultaneously, hostility to the non-European Other within Europe's borders, vociferously supported by the radical right, must in some way be pacified. At present, liberal Europe is unable to detach its self-understanding as a proper political and social paradigm, in the tradition of Enlightenment norms, from a sense of superiority towards non-European cultures. The Hegelian, 'end of history' conclusion of the EU's moral and political attitudes does little to create a genuine dialogue with regions of the world where cultural and political practice varies. Simply telling these regions that Europe sets a better example, one that should be adhered to, produces at best indifference, and at worst antipathy.

Non-European national and regional societies must be encouraged to participate in a process of dialogue based on shared understanding. This entails a symmetrical exchange of ideas and concerns that will enable all participants to feel valued, encouraging the development of a stronger international community based around core human interests. This is the conclusion of Stråth's report produced for the European Commission:

The Enlightenment quest for improvement and mastery, with a fundamentalist and totalising core, formulated as a *mission civilisatrice* or a white man's burden, would in this 'new activism' scenario be transformed into a more communicative performance based on preparedness to listen to other views and promote dialogue among them. Slogans like 'cultural diversity and a common heritage' or 'unity in diversity' would expand from terms used in a European self-reflection to take on global dimensions. In the long-run, the intercultural dialogue should rather become a **trans**-cultural dialogue, transgressing established boundaries. (26)

There is substantial evidence to suggest that, rather than 'transgressing established boundaries', the liberal EU has thus far promoted the strengthening of borders in a number of areas. In economics and trade, liberal Europe has acted defensively to protect the interests of Europeans, particularly against the threat of the developing world. In doing so, it undermines its own position as a champion of the values of the free market and exposes itself to accusations of hypocrisy that weaken its authority in this and other areas. Openness to the outside world has to include an honest and symmetrical engagement through trade that will empower other regional communities. They must feel confident that they can develop and prosper *in partnership with* Europe, not as subordinates in a Eurocentric, neo-imperialist system. An obvious target for scrutiny in this respect would be the EU's activity within the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Equally, just as economic interests *within* Europe have become reconciled to cooperation and free trade, so private and public interests in Europe should be encouraged to engage with other regions in a co-operative exchange. The normative spirit of nationalism that informed the establishment of a 'Fortress Europe' mentality in trade is alien to the ontological reality of the global community. By contrast, the true freedom of a responsible and non-hegemonic market can be endorsed.

Reducing the normative hegemony of Europe in economic terms would encourage a simultaneous effort to achieve more varied forms of cultural and political interaction, forms that seek to coalesce around mutually defined morals and practice. At present, it is not so much the content of Enlightenment European values that creates the problem as the manner in which these values are presented as a *fait accompli*. This presentation of Europe is a symptom of its own sense of anxiety, an anxiety which it must try to overcome through novel, benevolent strategies of engagement with the Other in cultural and political spheres. To do otherwise is to continue a process of 'bordering' that is based on a false notion of security. As Diez observes:

Borders are the main sites of securitizations in the sense that the existential threat that they centre on consists of a violation of the border. As much as the community and its identity, securitization also re-inscribes borders in that it differentiates between the Self and the threatening Other, (re)establishing the existing or a new border as the demarcation line...the border and the identities it delineates...owe their existence to their continued re-articulation in securitizations.

(27)

The sense of security provided by a strongly-bordered 'Fortress Europe' is misplaced, though, because such processes of securitisation may serve to antagonise the very forces that are perceived to be a threat. So long as Europe is viewed from beyond as jealous and protective of its moral and political superiority, it will continue to contribute to the growth of ideologies that challenge this superiority and inspire a virulent pride in Otherness: political and religious fundamentalism particularly. Only by participating in political strategies which allow for a weakening of Europe's hegemonic identity and the strengthening of multi-lateral regionalisms will a condition of global society emerge in which Europe can be more secure in peace and freer from threat.

There is a balance to be found between the affirmation of principles that can be endorsed by all human beings and the creation of over-bearing norms rooted in cultural practice. A successful Europe should develop its role as a catalyst for encouraging social and political improvement elsewhere, rather than as the omniscient author of monocentric values. Unlike the current EU, a future Europe should genuinely encourage multiple regionalisms, allowing for parallel alternative structures to develop with which it can in turn co-operate, creating *mutually endorsed* forms of universality and action.

This is precisely the approach suggested by Rumford in his description of polycentricity (28) and is echoed by Sjursen in her discussion of multi-polarity and “cosmopolitan logic” (29). An obvious area for the development of multi-polarity would be the strengthening of other democratic regional structures, unions based on geographical proximity and common interest which could increase the coherence of a benevolent, non-antagonistic global society. An embryonic framework for such development already exists in the form of regional organisations such as the African Union, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). Europe could play a positive role in global society by acting *unselfishly* to strengthen such initiatives, benefiting itself far more in the long-term through increased stability and more balanced prosperity in the global community. Regional structures of cooperation could in turn be built into an effective set of universal procedures at a global level that would enable human society to confront challenges that are themselves truly universal, particularly in the areas of environment, health, education, food production, etc.

In this respect, Europe could offer guidance and encouragement, rather than direction. This benign guidance must come at the price of accepting that in the long-term interests of both Europeans and non-Europeans alike, the West must be satisfied with a smaller, fairer share of prosperity. It must also relinquish any normative moral or cultural

grip on universality, substituting instead a de-politicised *procedural* universality that can facilitate meaningful, constructive dialogue and consensus, what Bauman calls:

...an effective planetary policy based on a continuous polylogue rather than on a planetary government...We feel, guess, suspect what needs to be done. But we cannot know in what shape or form it will eventually happen. We can be pretty sure though that the shape will not be familiar – it will be different from everything we've got used to...We may well sense that the passage from 'international' agencies and tools of action to 'universal' institutions for all humanity has to be a qualitative, not merely a quantitative change. (30)

The suggestions made above as to areas of policy in which Europe might choose to address its position and conduct are all very well, but they remain the superficial product of a deeper issue and a greater problem. Simply to restate vaguely and optimistically that Europe should become something other than what it currently is, does not go far enough towards tackling this deeper issue or making such reconciliation possible. As Bauman states, a *qualitative* change has to take place, and an *unfamiliar* mode of political practice must be entered into. In order for policy to change and for institutional approaches to adapt, we must first attack the root of confusion in European identity and in our means of understanding and shaping it. We must address the internal discord that afflicts Europe and discover if there is a viable way of alleviating this dichotomy, of reconciling the force of reason with the spirit of tradition. Any form of consensus, such as that alluded to by Havel, must involve a form of compromise between these two (ostensibly) diametrically-opposed points. I think it possible to demonstrate that these positions are *not* inherently conflicting, but can be brought together through the power of genuine consensus.

Disputing the Hegelian dialectic

The Hegelian dialectic is a crucial underlying feature of both liberal-rational and primordialist conceptualisations of Europe, each form being referent to this supposed confrontation and struggle, particularly in the spheres of culture and identity. In this feature we find, encapsulated, the deepest dilemma to affect the progress of the European idea. Each form of Europeanism that has been analysed in this thesis has *attacked* the concept of Europe with one or another set of normative principles. Each has pursued a teleological, 'end of history' agenda that necessitates, by its very logic, confrontation with rival theses. However, what the analysis has also demonstrated is that this process of confrontation appears to lead inevitably to division within the European 'psyche', and a constant state of fragmentation and dispersal. It will not be possible to overcome the degenerative effects of ideological confrontation unless we cease to adhere to the principle of dialectic upon which it is founded. This principle is implicit in the dualistic approach to questions of ontology, which creates a pre-disposition towards thinking dialectically, evident here in Durkheim's discussion of Kant.

Not only are [] two groups of states of consciousness different in their origins and their properties, but there is a true antagonism between them. They mutually contradict and deny each other. We cannot pursue moral ends without causing a split within ourselves...Thus the soul is opposed to the body, which is regarded as profane. (31)

We may take as a starting point for a critique of the Hegelian dialectic the very issue of ontological duality. Duality facilitates the separation of categories and the subsequent process of confrontation. To avoid this at the outset we might adopt, in ideological terms, what can best be described as a *singular, existential* and *consensual* approach. Singular

in the sense that all apparently conflicting ideas and values are derived from a single source: humanity. Existential in the sense that we become aware of our ideas and values through processes of experience. And consensual in terms of our effort to reconcile our ideas and values with one another, rather than seeking to dominate. Dualism, in its very nature, is a force for disharmony.

Whilst dualism arguably lies behind the evolution of confrontation in European ideas, its more immediate and important source is in the Hegelian notion of the historical dialectic. Both liberal and radical right variations of Europeanism subscribe, explicitly or otherwise, to the contestation of values, the overthrow of alternative theses and the assertion of their own ideal as the supreme historical event. This is evident time and again in the discursive practice of Europeanist ideologues and is described most effectively by Hegel himself.

The question of the perfectibility and *Education of the Human Race* arises here. Those who have maintained this perfectibility have divined something of the nature of mind...since it apprehends that which it is, to have a form higher than that which constituted its mere being. But to those who reject this doctrine, mind has remained an empty word, and history a superficial play of casual, so-called “merely human”, strivings and passions...for them the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible. (32)

The mild arrogance of Hegel here is reflected in the arrogance of ideological traditions based upon a Hegelian approach to historical change and its misleading notion of perfectibility. The attitude that Hegel dismisses here so abruptly is precisely the vital ingredient thus far missing in the approach to the idea of Europe. It is when history responds to the powerful drive of normative forces that an unending series of ideological and physical confrontations ensue. Only when this approach is replaced by an attitude of

true consensus and reconciliation, based upon existence-experience, can the cycle of the Hegelian dialectic be broken. Equally, only when abstract notions of Providence or divinity are separated from the course of human history can we appreciate that it is no more than a combination of reason and will that determine how our society evolves. Hegel's thesis of the dialectic, whilst it perhaps has some value as a *description* of historical change thus far, serves little useful purpose as the basis or inspiration for genuine progress on the issue of Europe.

Hegel's suggestion of an 'end of history' is plainly utopian when held against the 'reality' of recent history. In two prominent examples, the Hegelian 'final synthesis' has failed to fulfil itself, despite assumptions made in both cases that the end of ideological evolution had been achieved. With the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, the shallow foundations of the Marxist thesis of the 'end of history' were exposed. Equally, the resurgence of nationalist extremism and fundamentalist religion in the 1990s turned the liberal notion of the 'end of history' upside-down. It is true that an apparently dialectical process is evident in global politics today, and in this sense, perhaps, Huntington makes for more relevant reading than Fukuyama. But this is entirely the point. Huntington's thesis of the 'clash of civilizations' is indicative of what we may expect from a dialectical approach: dichotomy without end, with no final harmony.

The dialectical approach holds no possibility of closure, of reaching a final point of perfectibility. Hegel's thesis, somewhat paradoxically, is flawed by the logic it purports to profess and rests ultimately upon *utopian faith*. The evolutionary ideological process of *thesis-antithesis-synthesis* will never be fully achieved, precisely because the lingering presence of further challenges is an inextinguishable characteristic of confrontation. Just as the forces of threat and counter-revolution will never really leave the pre-occupations of the revolutionary, so the dialectic never really loses the element of antithesis. The dialectic is a process of confrontation locked upon itself, with only a utopian vision of

the highest, final synthesis offered as an illusory salvation. The real antithesis in Hegel's paradigm of historical change *is antithesis itself*, a feature that will never disappear so long as the approach to all things is based upon confrontation. By this measure, synthesis must be derived logically from *consensus* rather than conflict: a consensual strategy not offered as a new type of antithesis, but as an alternative approach, requiring a different set of attributes and conditions.

The nature of rational abstraction

In order to address the problems of the dialectical approach to historical change, and to suggest an alternative model of consensus, it is necessary to identify logically the areas of weakness that need to be considered, and the opportunities for reconciliation that may present themselves. A consensus cannot be properly established unless the key areas of ideological failure are dealt with.

An interesting example of the conceptual tension within the liberal-rational model of Europeanism emerged in 2004, with lyrics to accompany the EU's anthem, Beethoven's 'Ode to Joy', proposed by an Austrian academic, Dr. Peter Roland, inspired by liberal Europeanist values. The lyrics, originally in Latin, read:

Hymnus Latinus Europae

A Latin Hymn for Europe

Est Europa nunc unita
et unita maneat;
una in diversitate
pacem mundi augeat.

Europe is united now
United it may remain
Our unity in diversity
May contribute to world peace

Semper regant in Europa
fides et iustitia
et libertas populorum
in maiore patria.

May there forever reign in Europe
Faith and justice
And freedom for its people
In a bigger Motherland

Cives, floreat Europa,
opus magnum vocat vos.
Stellae signa sunt in caelo
aureae, quae iungant nos.

Citizens, Europe shall flourish
A great task calls on you
Golden stars in the sky are
The symbols that shall unite us. (33)

Two features from this example are particularly relevant, both relating to aspects of conceptual abstraction. Firstly, we find the *rational* abstraction of values that is familiar from the discursive practice of liberal Europeanism. Amongst these we find ‘unity’, ‘diversity’, ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’: all values consistent with a proto-typical description of liberal-rationalism. In addition, the lyrics employ a different form of abstraction. Descriptions of the ‘Motherland’, ‘golden stars’ above us, and ‘the symbols that shall unite us’ are all redolent of an alternative, *primordial* abstraction more typically associated with the radical right. It is significant that Roland chose to compose these lyrics originally in Latin, the ancient *lingua franca* of Europe: in doing so he was consciously seeking unifying terms of historical and cultural reference. Despite the howls

of acrimonious derision with which Roland's lyrics were greeted by the Eurosceptic press, his effort perhaps provides a suggestion of the reconciliation that is needed between the rational and primordial foundations of European identity. The tendency of each ideological type to 'cross-over' into the conceptual territory and discursive practice of the other has already been discussed. The more difficult challenge is to demonstrate the relationship between rational and primordial abstraction, and to use these observations as the basis of a consensual model of Europe that can dissolve the Hegelian dialectic.

The origin of our understanding of rational abstraction lies in the points cited from Popper in the introductory stages of this thesis. Popper cautions us that rationalism cannot ultimately justify itself in a rational way, in a way that it is contingent upon a form of 'faith in reason'. The values that are presented as cornerstones of the liberal European project are derived from rational abstractions, such as 'freedom' and 'justice'. However, owing to the nature of critical rationalist approaches, these values are actually no more than statements of *faith*, articulations of an *abstractly determined* general will. Additionally, these values are often presented through a teleological lens, whereby they become further abstracted towards the future. These aspects combine to weaken the coherence and inspirational power of the values upon which liberal Europe is constructed, as though the whole edifice were resting on hollow egg-shells.

If reason is ultimately built upon *faith* in reason, then it *can no longer be regarded as rational*. The manner in which liberal Europeanists have treated core values reflects this. The rational basis of the liberal project has come to be regarded by many ordinary people as empty and un compelling and, though they may not know it, this is precisely because it has become a travesty of itself. Rational abstractions of value are *logically* flawed by their irrational determination, and the consequence of this is to reflect liberal values as poorly founded, propagated by suspect piety.

Far too little in the rationalist perspective is actually empirically-grounded; certainly far less than we might expect. Uncomfortable, often, in relating to the forces of history, rationalist abstraction projects its values more readily into the neutral 'near future', reflecting a constant mode of aspiration. This weakens the perspective because it does not allow citizens to become grounded experientially. It also undermines the rational credentials of liberal Europe as it appears to adhere more to a teleological myth than to rational, empirical evidence.

In constructing a model of consensus we must address this problem of logic that afflicts the foundation of liberal-rationalism. At present, we are expected to take the mantras of liberal Europe at face value, like peasants receiving a sermon in Latin from the medieval pulpit. However, this can leave Europeans detached and alienated from the very values that pertain to them, with no real sense of engagement, and a strong feeling of conflict with deeper cultural attachments. A European identity founded upon ostensibly rational (but actually pseudo-rational) principles will remain unconvincing, and will invite open challenges from more virulent (and more honest) belief systems. To create consensus, a method must be sought that will not only reconcile rival theses, but also provide an authentic and compelling grounding in values, freed from utopian, 'end of history' myths.

The nature of primordial abstraction

If liberal Europeanism is guilty of attaching itself to a form of abstraction, then the same can also be said of the radical right, though in this case the nature of abstraction is somewhat different. Where liberal-rationalism creates abstract descriptions of reason, primordialism expresses itself through abstract descriptions of tradition. Where values such as valour, duty and sacrifice are adhered to, it is in the abstract sphere of tradition.

If rationalism creates an abstraction of reason and judgement, primordialism is rooted in an emotional and spiritual abstract. This difference is articulated in Spengler's critique of Kant.

Knowledge, for Kant, is mathematical knowledge. He deals with innate intuition-forms and categories of the reason, but he never thinks of the wholly different mechanism by which historical impressions are apprehended...which suffuses the whole of mythological religions and artistic thought and constitutes the essence and kernel of all history...but is unapproachable through the cognition-forms which the 'Critique of Pure Reason' investigates. (34)

However, rather than being rooted in *actual* historical tradition, primordialism draws upon an idealised *myth* of tradition, and in this sense is equally a form of abstraction. The key difference here, one that is evident in the analysis of the discursive practice of each form of Europeanism, is that the product of the emotional abstract is *more compelling* than the abstract of reason. This is the case because the emotional abstract draws upon the compelling narratives of historical myth. If the rational abstraction of values can seem hollow and cold, primordial abstraction creates a warm centre of pure belonging. This is why the radical right has so effectively been able to colonise this aspect of identity and why liberal Europeanism has struggled so awkwardly to do likewise.

Whilst the primordial form of abstraction may appear more coherent and successful in this respect than its rational counterpart, this does not mean that it is without weaknesses. The emotional compulsion inherent in the primordial construction of values is unstable and dangerous when not properly grounded, paradoxically, in *reason*. The peril of emotional abstraction is that it can 'run away' with the individual, drawing him/her into the intoxicating excesses of group identity and the historical community. The messianic character of leadership within the radical right, and its tendency towards

violence and exclusion, are typical of the processes of intoxication bound up in the unconstrained abstraction of the emotions. The great tragedy of primordial values as they have hitherto been expressed, as Heidegger discovered to his cost, is that they are easily rendered spurious and destructive by those who have only a rudimentary grasp of their significance.

Any consensus that may be established in the approach towards the question of European identity must wrestle with these two diverging aspects of abstraction. On the one hand, it must deal with the conceptual weakness of rational values that appear to be logically questionable, yet which articulate important themes in European life, and are a necessary part of social balance. Abstract rational values must become more deeply rooted in empirical observation and experiential meaning. At the same time, the overbearing impulses of a primordial, emotional abstraction must be 'reined in' and made to serve the interests of a stable, harmonious community. Abstract primordial values must also be justified in terms of empirical observation and experiential meaning, and made to promote the well-being of the organic whole. This task may be achieved by creating a 'synthesis' of *reason* and *tradition*: not a synthesis born out of a Hegelian, dialectical confrontation, but from a Havelian model of consensus, understanding and reconciliation.

Experiential reason and empirical tradition

The key to creating consensus in the formation of European identity is a movement away from abstract forms of value towards those grounded in social and historical *experience*. The flawed internal logic of rational values arises because they are no longer sufficiently rooted in actuality. The excessive dynamic of primordial values arises similarly because they are no longer tempered by the constraint of experience. The

reckless abstraction of values contributes greatly to the powerful normative impulses within modern ideology and the subsequent inevitability of the Hegelian process of confrontation between idea-systems. To overcome these difficulties, a strategy of consensus must be built upon an effective reconciliation, whereby the conceptual features of each perspective become mutually supportive and interdependent.


In order to achieve this reconciliation, the conventional approach to reason and tradition must be substantially reconsidered. Where tradition has previously been received as non-rational, this must be reversed: tradition must be considered, in a sense, *inherently rational*. Indeed, tradition is potentially more authentically rational than abstract reason precisely because it can be grounded in *empirical observation*. Similarly, reason itself must become more experiential, so that it is rooted in values derived from observation rather than pure abstraction.

What has hitherto been considered non-rational engagement with Being, exemplified in Heidegger's description of *authenticity* and Bergson's thoughts on *duration*, should be reconsidered as a potentially valuable approach to tradition, as a means of 'sensing' tradition *as the basis* of reason. If we take a value such as 'freedom', for example, currently we might expect to find it defined through rational abstraction, whilst simultaneously contested by primordialist interpretations of history. The strategy of consensus must aim to combine these two approaches, using historical tradition as the substance from which rational social values can be constructed. In this way, the values of the community are attached to specific historical aspects of the traditions of the community, but are simultaneously tempered by a rational, empirical understanding of the significance of those values.

Tradition is thus formed from the empirical observation of previous ontological engagements, such as during antiquity, the Renaissance, etc. The cultural memory of such engagements is attached to history itself, understood in relation to specific historical

experiences, and maintained in the historical culture of the period, i.e. its art, literature, philosophy, etc. Tradition is thus conceived as a living feature of rational judgement, and reason as tied to the narratives of history, the past possibilities of Being immanent within the ontological engagement of the individual in the present. This approach is consistent with Bergson's attempt to reconcile the shifting plane of present experience with the accumulated memory of the past.

If I represent by a cone SAB the totality of the recollections accumulated in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, while the summit S, which indicates at all times my present, moves forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P of my actual representation of the universe...



...it is from the present that comes the appeal to which memory responds, and it is from the sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.

(35)

To expand on Bergson's model, we can suggest that the historical consciousness of the community can support its engagement with the social and political present. It is the past that acts as a *reservoir of reason*, feeding into the judgement of the community. The conventional, ostensibly rational approach is too narrowly focused at point S, paying only clumsy and superficial attention to the cultural memory of tradition, and mainly then as a

source of 'instant identity', rather than reason. The primordialist approach has a tendency to become too emotionally and aggressively identified with the point AB, the origin of tradition, seeing the engagement at point S as a source of inevitable confrontation, rather than an opportunity for constructive, reasonable consensus.

It is experience, preserved in cultural memory, that can form the basis of rational social values when received as the sum of previous individual choices and existence possibilities. The failure of the primordialist approach in this respect is that it has often obscured the true nature of tradition in sentimentality. Rather, tradition should be seen as an ongoing *didactic* process, as a means by which the most rational choices for the community in the present can be understood in the full context of historical precedence, experienced in learning as memory and culture.

In this way, cultural tradition can become the basis of civil unity, but in an authentic, rather than a superficial or reactionary way. Rational, normative values can be derived from the empiricism of tradition, embedded and observable in culture. This consensual approach has the strong advantage that it allows aspects of cultural tradition to be included meaningfully in political debate, whilst maintaining a historically rational and questioning attitude. Social values and cultural norms can thus be determined through consensus, a consensus shaped by the *empirical lesson* of tradition. These norms would promote active cohesion within the community: they would provide for a kind of *historical utilitarianism*, an evolving, majoritarian consensus on values and identity.

Application and implications

In relation to the existing approaches to European identity pursued by liberalism and the radical right, the important question is whether the approach outlined above constitutes something new; and the answer to this is both yes and no. By aiming to

reconcile the core conceptual elements of reason and tradition, a new synthesis is arguably created. However, this synthesis is formed on the basis of the existing conceptual characteristics of the rational and primordial paradigms, *drawing each towards the other* in a way that aims to overcome the inherent tension between them.

The Europe of pure reason, in the conventional, Enlightenment sense, has become dogmatic and sterile, detached from the stronger and more immediate sources of identity derived from tradition and the engagement with cultural memory. As Baudrillard comments:

The invention of Reality, unknown to other cultures, is the work of modern western Reason, the turn to the Universal. The turn to an objective world, shorn of all hinterworlds...We have exchanged one illusion for another, and it turns out that the material, objective illusion, the illusion of reality, is as fragile as the illusion of God and no longer protects us, once the euphoria of science and the Enlightenment is past, from the fundamental illusion of the world and its absence of truth. (36)

At the same time, history has taught us that the anti-rational forces of the primordialist radical right, whilst perhaps expressing something absolutely vital to European society, seem almost bound to cause the degeneration of its public sphere into a state of hostility and malevolence. What the radical right is reacting to with violence and confrontation, particularly in its most recent manifestations, is the creeping universality of rational abstraction and the prohibition of authentic cultural memory.

These two contending political forces have led to the effective paralysis of European identity as a sphere for constructive political engagement. Only by replacing the dichotomy between pure reason and irrational emotion with a more pragmatic, experiential reason, rooted in tradition, can we hope to overcome this position. The

experience of culture, the engagement with tradition as a source of civility, creates the possibility of binding the diverse cultural identities of individuals together in a meaningful point of social cohesion, of encounter and exchange.

In terms of the individual, participation in a cultural tradition is a vital aspect of identity, connecting us with the 'horizon' of Being, a point of infinite context against which our own existence may be measured. Rational abstraction does not address this aspect of identity because its derivation of values is stubbornly objective. A more fruitful approach would concentrate instead upon the *existential* engagement of the individual, with both the present and the past, as a rich potential source of consensual values.

To some extent, the position described here is echoed in Pilbeam's discussion of 'postmodern conservatism'. He suggests that through a stringent resistance to metanarratives and ideological dogma, postmodernists and conservatives are united in their scepticism. Postmodern conservatism seeks to locate its sense of values in the existential engagement of individuals, in the 'multiplication of small narratives', and the organic development of the historical consciousness of the community.

With similar intent to Burke, a preference for knowledge of a practical nature is contrasted with the lamentable favouring by rationalists of 'technical' knowledge. Practical knowledge is that which is acquired through experience rather than abstract reflection, from the concrete traditions in which people live...By viewing it in this way, we 'initiate a form of post-modern individualism that is fully conscious of its own historical particularity'. The place of conservatism in this postmodern philosophy derives from its appreciation of the particular, local character of our experience of individualism, and its ability to rein in liberalism's overweening pretensions. (37)

This pragmatic approach allows and encourages the individual to develop and celebrate culture as a mode of existential becoming, upholding a core element of human

individuality. It also promotes the creation of shared cultural spaces, and participation in rituals that connect individuals to one another in a process of experiential reasoning and dialogue. This cultural 'forum' need not form the basis of exclusion and xenophobia. Rather, this approach should encourage the recognition of the diversity of cultural memory and tradition, but simultaneously create the possibility of bringing these diverse traditions together through contact and exposure, through a benevolent reciprocity. By achieving agreement through dialogue, education and the exchange of culture, the basis for a viable, consensual mode of identity will be achieved, an identity that in turn will contribute to the establishment of social norms rooted in experiential reason. In this way, culture and tradition are no longer part of a fading process of reaction, but of a dynamic process of social construction, based on the practice of a *liberal* form of differentialism.

The complexity of this process of engagement through tradition is unavoidable, and should actually become a fundamental characteristic of its successful application. As Havel states:

There is no simple set of instructions on how to proceed. A moral and intellectual state cannot be established through a constitution, or through a law, or through directives, but only through complex, long-term, and never-ending work involving education and self-education...a constant stress on moral deliberation and moral judgement; continued self-examination and self-analysis; an endless rethinking of our priorities. It is not, in short, something we can simply declare or introduce. It is a way of going about things, and it demands the courage to breathe moral and spiritual motivation into everything, to seek the human dimension in all things. (38)

At present, culture is something around which we 'circle the wagons', acting in a defensive and reactionary way to promote a model of cultural tradition that validates our own identity, more often than not at the expense of Others. This is once more

symptomatic of a dialectical approach towards social and political forces, one that sees the emergence of cultural identity from a confrontational position amongst other rival identities. The consensual approach creates far more constructive possibilities than this. Through widespread, sustained and multi-layered processes of cultural engagement and dissemination, it would be possible to encourage the assertion of individual identity in a way that is conducive to the simultaneous appreciation of *all* identities. The belief underpinning this idea, alluded to frequently by Havel, is that all humans are *fundamentally similar* in their aspirations and core personal values, irrespective of the nature of their individual cultural tradition. What the individual brings to the community through their own processes of experiential reasoning and cultural engagement becomes part of a shared, organic whole. The full complexity of this interlocking structure of cultural, social and political identities is most lucidly articulated in Havel's description of the pattern of 'concentric circles' that surrounds each individual, emanating outwards from within and forming the basis of an infinitely varied, multi-dimensional process of encounter and exchange.

What a person perceives as his home can be compared to a set of concentric circles, with his 'I' at the centre. My home is the room I live in, the room I've grown accustomed to, and which, in a manner of speaking, I have covered with my own invisible lining... My home is the house I live in, the village or town where I spend most of my time. My home is my family, the world of my friends, the social and intellectual milieu in which I live, my profession, my company, my work place. My home, obviously, is also the country I live in, the language I speak, and the intellectual and spiritual climate of my country expressed in the language spoken there. The Czech language, the Czech way of perceiving the world, Czech historical experience, the Czech modes of courage and cowardice, Czech humour — all these are inseparable from that circle of my home. My home is therefore my Czechness, my nationality, and I see no reason at all why I shouldn't embrace it since it is as an essential part of me as, for instance, my masculinity, another aspect of my home. My home, of

course, is not only my Czechness, it is also my Czechoslovakness, which means my citizenship. Ultimately my home is Europe and my Europeanness — finally — it is this planet and its present civilization, and, understandably, the whole world...I certainly do not want, therefore, to suppress the national dimension of a person's identity, or to deny it, or to refuse to acknowledge its legitimacy and its right to full self-realization. I merely reject the kind of political notions that attempt, in the name of nationality, to suppress other aspects of the human home, other aspects of humanity and human rights. (39)

The value of Havel's conceptualisation of identity and community in the context of this research lies in its capacity to articulate a meaningful sense of personal identity, balanced against an inviolable respect for the identity of others. Havel has a passionate appreciation of difference, of the compelling force of an inarticulate, existential mode of *being-in-the-world*. However, where the primordial inclinations of this personal and cultural authenticity are so often soured by populist, exclusionary politics, Havel remains fiercely protective of his *liberal* integrity. As Havel demonstrates above, it is possible to conceive of oneself powerfully through the imagination, yet remain voluntarily bound by a moderate *civilité*. This consensual approach, if pursued in good faith and with an experiential openness, could provide liberal Europe with a genuine and practicable alternative to the futile, Hegelian confrontation between the forces of rationalism and counter-rationalism.

Similarly, the flexibility of this organic structure of interlocking cultural identities lends itself well to the establishment of consensual norms between *global* cultural traditions. The formative 'lessons' of history extend across cultures, providing a substantial basis for learning, discussion and exchange. Indeed, the great strength of this pragmatic, organic and consensual response is that it can be implemented multi-

dimensionally, i.e. within a multi-layered, multi-contextual environment of varied individual and communal identities.

The conventional understanding of the non-rational forces of tradition portrays them as the enemy of reason, as a powerful vortex of blind cultural obedience. It is conceptually very challenging to consider tradition as part of the active foundation of reason, consistent with a healthy, questioning attitude. However, though difficult, it is by no means impossible to do so. What Baudrillard rightly identifies is that there is an absence of *inherent* meaning and ontological certainty in the universe, and that our normative ideological projects are simply attempts to escape from this sense of futility. However, what Havel's approach makes possible is the pursuit of *derived* meaning, and the establishment of benignly normative social attitudes on the basis of experiential reason and interlocking cultural traditions.

This consensual approach has the potential to satisfy the powerful yearning for cultural and historical engagement within the individual, whilst constraining this urge through the overall context of social harmony. This balance is achieved by more effectively uniting the elements of reason and tradition, and encouraging the widespread engagement of people throughout all forms and levels of society in parallel processes of understanding, discovery and self-evaluation. Liberal-rational and primordial Europeanisms can thus find common conceptual ground through the initiation of an *existential* Europeanism, in an experiential practice that soothes the attrition between '*being-there*' in the world, and the yearning for '*being-oneself*' in a mode of transcendence (40). This spirit of reconciliation between ostensibly countervailing cultural and social forces echoes the internal reconciliation of the individual in the thought of Karl Jaspers. It is through the rigour and integrity of such an existential attitude that Europe must seek peace with itself.

The formula is: 'I will that each other shall be what I strive to become, that he be himself in sincerity and truth'. This appeal to the other is accompanied by self-revelation without reserve; one dares 'to be naked' before the other;...The truth of each is the truth of himself and for him there is no alternative, his uniqueness is a vital assimilation and affirmation which is his alone: there is no other truth, but there is the truth of others. The 'loving struggle' of communication is the corrective of the unavoidable arbitrariness in this necessary solitude of truth. Existences are linked by reason and in communication strive to bring themselves to the unity which they have by faith. (41)

A Europe shaped on this model of consensus could escape from its current dialectical trap of confrontation between the forces of reason and tradition. As Europeans, we sense the wealth and distinction of certain aspects of our cultural history, but at the same time are aware of a need to maintain safeguards in the form of normative principles in our public life. By reconciling these two aspects we make it possible to celebrate the strength and vibrancy of historical culture, whilst retaining a healthy, critical and rational attitude, one that protects and enhances the inner harmony of the community. In terms of policy, Europe must pursue every opportunity to encourage discussion, transmission, co-operation, education, observance and participation across all levels and contexts of society. In terms of structure, Europe should perhaps favour a flexible, uncoded, evolution of institutional arrangements, allowing as much as possible for a multi-dimensional political space to emerge. This process does not need to be unduly state-organised, and much of it may well thrive spontaneously within and between micro-communities. It is the challenge for Europe as a project to stimulate the conditions through which this reconciliation may emerge, to encourage attitudes of mutual interest, exploration and respect. In this way, individuals can feel secure in their multi-faceted personal, cultural identities, knowing that these form a genuine part of a wider social consensus.

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