Turkish Teachers’ Beliefs Regarding Moral Psychology and Implicit Moral Education: A Case Study

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Abstract

This thesis reports a mixed method case study of Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding aspects of moral education and moral psychology, and the development of these beliefs and attitudes through teacher training and experience. Both internationally and in Turkey it is generally agreed that teachers are not well enough equipped to carry out moral education. This thesis explores a philosophical argument for why understanding the psychology of moral development could be valuable for teachers in informing their engagement with explicit and implicit moral education. A cross-sectional sample of participants was investigated using a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches to analyse beliefs and attitudes relevant to moral education. The results indicate that Turkish teachers and trainee teachers are not equipped with the relevant set of knowledge and skills to consciously foster students’ moral development; neither teacher training nor teaching experience appear to influence the teachers’ belief development. However, teachers and trainee teachers are willing and interested both to engage with moral education, and to receive training relevant to conducting moral education. Key findings regarding teachers’ beliefs and attitudes concerning conducting moral education include an inclination towards providing pupils with a scaffold to foster moral development, rather than dogmatic imposition of a certain set of values and virtues; and an inclination towards creating a pluralistic moral environment in the school that fosters compassion and cooperation. Based on the understandings gained from the reviewed literature and analysed data, recommendations are made regarding how to improve ITE programmes with respect to preparing teachers to engage with moral education.
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

ITE: Initial teacher education
ME: Moral education
RE: Religious education
RCE: Religious Culture and Ethics
MEB: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education – Turkey)
FCM: Four Components Model
CDT: Cognitive Development Theory
SIM: Social Intuitionist Model
NKA: Neo-Kohlbergeian Approach
MFT: Moral Foundations Theory
TET: Triune Ethics Theory
PCG: Psychological Counselling and Guidance

Student: Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “student” refers to participants who are first-year students of a teacher training programme. This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII, and Appendix B; not in Chapters I and II.

Intern: Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “intern” refers to participants who are fourth-year students of a teacher training programme, and who also are doing their internships organised by the teacher training programme they are enrolled in, or who have recently completed their internships. This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII, and Appendix B; not in Chapters I and II.

Teacher: Within the context of the empirical component of this study, “teacher” refers to participants who are practising teachers. This applies in Chapters III, IV, V, VI and VII, and Appendix B; not in Chapters I and II.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION and PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

This thesis is a study of Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes that are relevant to their engagement with moral education, and how initial teacher education (ITE) programmes in Turkey influence the development of these beliefs. My interest in Turkey stems from my dual nationality (Turkish/British) and my upbringing in Turkey. I have also observed the developments in my country in the last one and a half decades, sometimes with terror and outrage, and sometimes with hope and exhilaration.

Turkey faces many problems, and has been experiencing political turbulence in the past decade. These include the abuse of law through large-scale court cases based on false evidence (Durmuş, 2016) and corruption scandals (Arango, 2013; Steinvorth, 2014), rising authoritarianism (Ant & Harvey, 2016; Vick, 2014) and the initial rise and later purge of an organization that had infiltrated key government offices which led to a failed coup attempt in 2016 (Tüysüz & McLaughlin, 2016). Turkey also hosts the largest number of refugees from Syria (Stone, 2016), and the violence of the civil war in neighbouring Syria episodically spills into Turkey as the interests of the Turkish government, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Kurdish rebels conflict (BBC, 2016).

Furthermore, the reactions of the Turkish people regarding such issues have differed. In response to the corruption scandals, many of the government’s supporters said that those in government “steal, but at least work hard” (Akyol, 2014) and have re-elected the government several times since then, appearing to legitimise their corruption. When a man kicked a woman in her face for wearing shorts in 2016, no one intervened (Embury-Dennis, 2016). Syrian refugees have been assaulted by several angry mobs across Turkey (Idiz, 2015).

On the other hand, the Turkish people also show courage and compassion, and follow through their convictions to the end. A proposed law that could have been interpreted as legitimising rape by allowing the offender to marry with the rape victim, including children (Pells, 2016) was withdrawn due to people’s outrage (Agerholm, 2016). Humanitarian aid to Syrians (The Guardian, 2016), and the generally more welcoming approach of the Turkish people compared to Western governments (Stone, 2016) also point to admirable charity.

Moral education itself may not be able to remedy these problems themselves, but it can address the discrepancy in people’s reactions to such events by equipping the next
generation with the necessary moral skills and dispositions to face challenges better. However, in order to conduct moral education that can meet this aim, Turkish teachers who will carry out this education also need to be adequately equipped. Conversely, there is wide consensus that teachers are not properly prepared to engage in moral education, both in Turkey and abroad (Frey, 2010; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; Sockett & LePage, 2002; Temli et al., 2011; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008). As a result, this study focuses on how teacher training programmes in Turkey equip pre-service teachers in relation to conducting moral education.

The remainder of this chapter sets out the context and field of the research, followed by a statement of the problem. Next, how the stated problem is addressed in this thesis is laid out. This is followed by a ‘road map’ of the thesis, which is followed by a discussion of the Turkish context and it’s relevance to the field. And finally, the philosophical approach employed in this study is explicated in the last section of the chapter.
1. Statement of the Problem

The concept of moral education initially brings to mind the official course of moral education in state schools in Turkey, where moral education is taught alongside religious education (MEB\(^1\), 2010a; 2010b). The current system of moral education in Turkey takes place in the Religious Culture and Ethics (RCE) course, which is a mandatory course in grades 5 through 12 (10-year-old to 17-year-old students). Either one or two hours per week is allocated to this course depending on the grade level. Although the content of these lessons changes from grade to grade, the course books generally consist of six chapters, four of which are devoted to Sunni Muslim religious culture, one chapter to religion and morality, and one chapter focuses on the relationship between religion and either civilization, society, government/secularism, or Atatürk’s (founding father of the Republic of Turkey) principles, depending on the grade.

However, pupils do not learn morality only in an official moral education course. Moral interactions pervade almost all aspects of school life, and these have an influence on students’ moral development beyond the formal curriculum that is followed in the classroom (Freire, 1983; Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Purpel & Ryan, 1983). While the content of education is detailed in the curriculum, pupils also learn morality through what might be called the context of education. The context of education referred to here is relevant to the concept of the hidden curriculum. This concept is more deeply explored in Chapter II, but for the purposes of this introduction, the hidden curriculum is defined not as existing in the form of a written document, but consisting of “the order and regulations of the school, its physical and psychological environment, and the non-official or implied messages that the administrators, or teachers, convey to students” (Yüksel, 2005, p. 330). Because morality is such a ubiquitous part of school social life, moral education inevitably takes place in the hidden curriculum (Purpel & Ryan, 1983). Pupils learn moral values by interacting with their peers, teachers, administrators, and other school staff as a natural part of the school experience. This points to the fact that moral education is confined neither to the elements detailed in the official curriculum nor to the classroom.

One of the most fundamental elements that influences the hidden curriculum, and by extension the implicit moral education pupils receive in schools, is teachers’ beliefs (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005; 2013). Rokeach (1968) indicates that beliefs inform individuals’

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\(^1\) Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı (Ministry of National Education – Turkey)
behaviour, and the theory of learning by observation (Bandura, 1986; 1997) indicates that teachers’ behaviour influences pupils’ behaviour (Renkl, 2014). Furthermore, addressing teachers’ beliefs is important because educators are not always fully aware of the beliefs they hold, and because psychologically fundamental beliefs (Richardson, 1996, 2003) “can be highly resistant to modification, particularly if they are not confronted in an explicit, meaningful way,” for example, during their pre-service training (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011, p. 572). Ausubel, Novak, and Hanesian (1978; p. iv) argue that “the most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach him/her accordingly.”

The need to address teachers’ beliefs regarding moral education, and the problematic lack of it in teacher training programmes, is a point agreed on by many educators (Frey, 2010; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008). In response to this issue, Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011; 2013) have identified four sets of beliefs that are thought to profoundly influence teachers’ behaviour in the context of implicit moral education. These include moral beliefs, psychological beliefs, educational beliefs, and contingent factors (see Chapter II for more detail). Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011; 2013) indicate that attending to these four sets of beliefs that trainee teachers hold during their pre-service training is of paramount importance with regards to their ability to engage in moral education.

However, there is a significant lack of research regarding what trainee teachers’ beliefs are when they enter teacher training programmes. Furthermore, there is also a lack of research in Turkey regarding how current teacher training programmes influence the development of these beliefs. This gap in understanding could potentially hinder efforts in teacher training programmes that attempt to address trainee teachers’ beliefs. Taking this gap in knowledge as the point of departure for this thesis, this study aims to shed light on what Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education are, and how these beliefs develop through teacher training and teaching experience. In light of this aim, five core research questions were identified:

1. How does moral education take place?
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour?
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and development of moral behaviour?

4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education in Turkey?

5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching experience?

It was envisioned that by answering these research questions, recommendations for practitioners and policymakers could be made concerning how to approach teacher training regarding moral education. The answers to the first and second research questions were sought through an extensive review of literature. To this end, Chapter II focuses on the relevant educational and psychological literature.

The answers to the third, fourth and fifth research questions were sought through the empirical component of this study. This entailed collecting and analysing data from a cross-sectional sample of participants from the same teacher training programme of a university in Turkey, including first-year students who have little teacher training and no teaching experience, fourth-year students who have full training but little experience, and practising alumni teachers of the same programme who have full training and several years of experience. Collected data was analysed to shed light on what Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the psychological and educational aspects of moral education are, and a comparison between the beliefs of the three groups of participants investigated has yielded an understanding of how teacher training and experience influence belief development.
2. Road Map

How the thesis proceeds is explained in this section. So far, the first chapter of the thesis has outlined my motivation as the researcher to engage in this research and has briefly explained the context and the problem this thesis tackles. In the remainder of this chapter, the Turkish context and the philosophical approach regarding morality and moral education, and the role training on moral psychology in initial teacher education (ITE) programmes can play in better equipping teachers to engage in moral education, is explicated. The next section details the education system in Turkey in order to provide more background knowledge of Turkey, as well as briefly mentioning the social and political aspects that have been impacting on education in Turkey, and why Turkey is a worthwhile location to conduct this study.

The last section of this chapter aims to make the philosophical argument that it is worthwhile to focus on fostering moral psychological skills in moral education. A mixed approach of virtue ethics, naturalism, and pragmatism is employed. What these skills are is not explained in depth here, because a deeper review of what constitutes these skills is presented in Chapter II. The central theme is that moral education should focus not only on what constitutes morality (focusing on specific values and virtues) but also on how to behave morally (focusing on morally relevant psychological skills), no matter how morality is defined – and in section 4.3 of this chapter it is argued that definitions of morality are likely to be plural; there may be multiple ways of phrasing and defining what constitutes morality.

Chapter II, Literature Review, is composed of two main sections. The first section presents the educational literature regarding moral education and development, seeking an answer to the first research question. Initially, the concept of a theory of moral education is discussed, mainly based on Hand (2014). The historical development of conceptions of moral education in the West and in Turkey are discussed after this, which is followed by a more in-depth explanation of how formal moral education takes place in Turkey, and several lines of criticism to this education. Following this, how moral education takes place implicitly in schools is discussed. This involves a deeper investigation of the concepts of hidden curriculum, moral ecology, and implicit education. Next, literature regarding teachers’ relevant educational beliefs and attitudes are presented. Finally, two methods of moral instruction, fostering moral expertise and role modelling, are discussed.
The second section of Chapter II focuses on moral psychology literature, seeking an answer to the second research question. Theories and models of moral psychology reviewed include the Four Components Model, Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Cognitive Developmental Theory, the Social Intuitionist Model, Moral Foundations Theory, and Triune Ethics Theory. Psychological constructs regarding moral judgement and its development, and moral motivation and its development are presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of how an understanding of reviewed literature of moral psychology is relevant to teachers’ beliefs regarding their engagement with moral education.

Chapter III, Methodology, explicates the methodological approach employed in data gathering and analysis. The philosophical approach taken to conducting an empirical study in this thesis – pragmatic mixed methods research – is laid out. Following this, the research design is discussed. Next, the research tools and the data analysis procedure are explained. This is followed by the section addressing ethical concerns before the chapter is concluded with a description of participant recruitment.

Chapter IV, Quantitative Data Analysis, is devoted to the reporting of the analysis of quantitative data, which was obtained through questionnaires. This mainly involves analysis of descriptive frequencies and results of regression tests run on the data. Following this in Chapter V, Qualitative Data Analysis, analysis of qualitative data obtained through interviews and observations is presented.

In Chapter VI, Discussion, the findings obtained from data analysis are synthesised with the understanding of moral education and moral psychology gained from the literature reviewed in Chapter II. This entails a discussion of a) the influence of teacher training and experience on participants’ psychological and educational beliefs relevant to moral education, b) participants’ general dispositions relevant to their practice of moral education, given the understanding of their beliefs, c) how they may interact with pupils in terms of fostering students’ moral development and d) how they may attempt to influence the school moral ecology, and finally e) how current ITE programmes seem to equip teachers with beliefs relevant to their practice of moral education and several suggestions regarding how ITE programmes may attempt to further foster teachers’ beliefs, attitudes, and knowledge regarding their ability to engage effectively in moral education.

Finally, in Chapter VII, Conclusion, the significant findings of the study are summarised, and the limitations of the study and the generalizability of findings are
discussed. Suggestions for future research are made before the thesis is concluded with some final thoughts.
3. The Turkish Context

This section details the education system in Turkey and why Turkey has been chosen as the focus of this thesis. While there is a significant gap in knowledge internationally regarding how teachers are equipped to carry out moral education, making such a study desirable in any national context, the Turkish context has certain unique features that makes it particularly interesting. Most importantly, the shifting social and political context in the last two decades, and their impact on the education system is of interest.

The education system in Turkey is highly centralized, and the decisions made at the level of the Ministry of Education have clearly felt reverberations throughout the education system. The curriculum is designed by the ministry and all schools except minority schools (e.g. Armenian schools, Jewish schools) and Embassy schools (e.g. British Embassy School in Ankara) are required to follow the curriculum with very limited autonomy. In this regard, public schools and private schools do not differ from each other much – the difference between the two kinds of schools is largely in private schools’ ability to be more selective in which teachers to employ and providing extracurricular activities, such as clubs, due to the greater amount of economic resources individual private schools can devote to these areas. Also of note is that, compared to the UK, where private schools are less common and more expensive, private schools in Turkey are much more common and not very expensive, although it should also be noted that the quality and quantity of private schools in Turkey has changed considerably over the past two decades.

A detailed account of the curriculum is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, generally, the majority of the mandatory primary curriculum is made of Turkish, mathematics, foreign language (most commonly English), Knowledge of Life (until 3rd grade), and science and social studies (after 4th grade). These courses take 21 of a total of 30 hours of lessons\(^2\) per week up to 4th grade\(^3\), and 21 of a total of 35 hours of lessons per week after 5th grade (MEB, 2017). The remaining hours are divided between various mandatory courses focusing on artistic or physical development, technology related courses, and religion. These courses take one or two hours per week. In addition to this, schools are required to provide 6 hours of elective courses to their students from 5th grade on, including three courses related to religious studies, four courses related to language and

\(^2\) Each hour of lessons takes 40 minutes

\(^3\) Only 19 hours in 1st grade.
communication, extra foreign language courses, four science and mathematics related courses, five arts and sports related courses, and five courses related to social studies. Which elective courses will be provided are selected by the school administration; the students choose from the courses offered by their school.

The curriculum for secondary schools depends on the type of secondary school. These types include Anatolian high schools (the most common type, usually just called ‘high school’ in daily language), and high schools with specific focuses, including science, social sciences, fine arts, sports, and vocational high schools such as religious vocational high schools, teacher high schools or accountancy high schools. The curriculum of secondary schools with a specific focus is dominated by the focus subject matter, while Anatolian high schools have a more balanced curriculum. Further to this, in the last two years in Anatolian high schools, students elect a branch to specialize. These include a focus on the sciences, social sciences, Turkish and mathematics (usually termed ‘equal weight’), or foreign languages. These branches are essentially sets of elective courses that begin students’ specialization in certain subject areas, and influence which tertiary programmes they may enter. This being said, Turkish, foreign language and religion are mandatory courses in all schools in all years.

The education system in Turkey has changed five times in the past two decades, increasing the minimum mandatory education from 5 years of primary education in 1996, to 8 years of primary education in the first instance, then to 11 years of primary and secondary education (8+3 years), and finally to the current 12 years of primary, middle and high school education (4+4+4 years) in 2012. During this period attendance to primary education has risen from 84.7% in the 1997-98 academic year to 94.8% in the 2015-16 academic year (topping at 99.57% in the 2013-14 academic year) (TÜİK, 2017). Attendance to secondary education in the same period has increased from 37.8% in 1997-98 (not mandatory at this date) to 79.7% in 2015-16, which is the highest so far (TÜİK, 2017). The total number of students attending primary and secondary education has risen from 11.2 million in 1997-98 to 16.3 million in 2015-16 (TÜİK, 2017).

From the above two factors – the state’s heavy involvement in the education system and the percentage of school attendance – it is apparent that the state interacts with the vast majority of young people through the education system. Further to this, education in Turkey

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4 TÜİK: Turkish Statistical Institute
is highly politicized, and this has been most clearly felt curriculum changes, especially since 2012. An example of this is that the theory of evolution has been removed from the science and biology curriculum as a political move to appeal to certain segments of the society (Evrensel, 2017; Milliyet, 2017). On the other hand, religion has also received increased focus in the curriculum with the three new religious courses introduced as electives. Further to this, graduates of religious vocational high schools can now enter any tertiary programme, whereas their choices were limited only to theology before 2011. This has raised concerns especially with regards to these graduates entering law schools and influencing the judiciary system in less secular ways (Milliyet, 2011; Vatan, 2006). Also of relevance is the removal of the ban on wearing headscarves in schools. While on the one hand the ban was criticised as an oppression on freedom (Hürriyet, 2013; Yeni Şafak, 2013), its removal was also criticised on the grounds that girls who did not want to wear headscarves but were under pressure from their families to do so no longer had a reason acceptable to their families to take off their headscarves without damaging their relationships with them (Hürriyet, 2014).

Moreover, in recent years, a large proportion of different kinds of schools have been converted to religious vocational schools. Due to this, there has been a surge in the number of religious schools, with religious middle school numbers increasing from 1099 in 2013 to 1961 in 2015, and religious high school numbers increasing from 537 in 2012 to 1149 in 2015 (Eğitimsen, 2016).

The issues mentioned here have impacted the core identity of the Turkish Republic, and the values related to this identity. A breakdown of what these core values are is beyond the scope of this thesis – although it should be noted that the examples given above are mainly related to the secular characteristic of the Turkish Republic and Turkish people – but it should be born in mind that such values are ever-present as the undercurrent for both the values informing this thesis through me, the researcher (I grew up in Turkey), and the data gathered, as all data were gathered from Turkish participants and in Turkey.

The recent conflict surrounding such core values has had reflections in the education system in what might be informally called a bureaucratic war in the game of thrones in Turkey. For example, schools’ selection of elective courses, particularly whether schools elected the new religious courses offered or not has been said to have been used as a means for tagging and profiling the political ideology of specific schools and/or the administrators of such schools (Cumhuriyet, 2013). Moreover, the tagging was not limited to the secular vs
religious divide, but extended to political loyalties: teachers and administrators were tagged as secular, government (AKP – the ruling party in Turkey since 2002) supporter, or supporter of the Gülen Organization\(^5\) (Cumhuriyet, 2013).

The Gülen Organization is relevant to this thesis for several reasons – most importantly for their prominence in the fields of politics and education, and the conflict they have been having with AKP. The Organization is responsible for the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials among others (Aydınlık, 2017; Erdin, 2016), in which a large proportion of high ranking military officers were either jailed or forced to retire. The significance of these trials is that they were conducted very unfairly and this unfairness was public knowledge. Strong evidence supporting the innocence of indicted officers were ignored in favour of guilt-supporting evidence that was either weak or demonstrated to be fake were taken into account (Gül & Yılmaz, 2017). As a result, these trials diminished people’s faith in the judicial system. The Organization is also responsible for instigating the government corruption scandal widely covered in the media in 2013, which brought into public consciousness of how far corruption had penetrated the heads of state. The Organization also attempted to overtake the state by infiltrating state offices (Sözcü, 2015), rather than following more legitimate political routes. Finally, the Organization is also behind the failed coup in July 2016, which resulted in nearly 250 deaths and 2200 wounded (Akşam, 2016).

The tagging mentioned above later found its use in the sweeping purges in education as the dershane\(^6\) system in Turkey, where the Gülen Organization’s presence was overwhelming, was disbanded\(^7\). Furthermore, it has been found that in order to gain exclusive control over academia and the armed forces in Turkey, the Organization stole questions of national and military exams in successive years, in effect committing cheating on a mass level in a period spanning fifteen years (A Haber, 2017; Ataman, 2017).

\(^5\) The Gülen Organization is headed by the Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen, and was an ally of the ruling party AKP until 2011-2013, when the alliance fell apart following the leaking of tapes documenting government corruption by his organization to the media on 17-25 December 2013, and an overarching bureaucratic war began, which also took place in the field of education. The failed coup attempt in 2016 and the sweeping purges since 2014 are connected to this conflict. The organization is now deemed a terrorist organization in Turkey.

\(^6\) Dershane’s in Turkey were a kind of after-school school, where students could get extra tuitions, most often in preparation for national exams such as the University Entrance Exam. All dershane’s were privately owned, and their curriculum was not monitored by the government, although given that the main purpose of the dershane’s was to prepare students to national exams, their curriculum usually consisted only of the academic courses that were assessed in such exams.

\(^7\) The dershane’s that were not affected by the purge became private schools. This was the greatest factor impacting the quantity and quality of private schools in Turkey, as mentioned above.
The Organization’s presence, and the sweeping purges intended to eliminate the Organization from the state structure were not limited to the education system. A similar purge has taken place in the media, police force, judiciary, and the armed forces. Indeed, the failed coup attempt in July 2016 seems to have been precipitated by the removal of key officials in the judiciary system who, up until that time, protected the Organization’s members in the armed forces from legal actions against them (Ataman, 2017). The following coup attempt seems to have been made in desperation to retain power (Ataman, 2017).

All these events form a backdrop to the moral ecology in Turkey, and moral education in Turkey in particular, during the time of this study and the period leading up to it. It would be unreasonable to assume that they have not had any impact on the collective moral psychology of the country. However, tracking how these social and political earthquakes impact on moral psychology and education in Turkey is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, the situation described here points to a clear need to foster cooperative attitudes in Turkey, which is one of the underlying motivations of engaging in this study. Taking the political situation in Turkey into account, understanding Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ comprehension of moral psychology and their ability foster moral development is a worthwhile task. Furthermore, the results and findings of this study maybe applicable to other national contexts that share similar conflicts regarding their identity and core values, and in their respective political fields.

This section has detailed the education system in Turkey, and the social and political environment that makes Turkey a worthwhile location to conduct this study. Information regarding how moral education is conducted in Turkey has been left out here, as this can be found in Chapter 2, alongside an international comparison. The next section explores the philosophical foundations underpinning this thesis.
4. Philosophical Approach

In this section, the underlying philosophy of the thesis is explored. The main argument of this thesis is that including moral psychology in teacher training could equip teachers with better intellectual tools to foster pupils’ moral development. This statement contains several assumptions which need to be made explicit before proceeding to the main body of the study, namely to the practice of moral education and the use of moral psychology in it. While I do not narrowly align myself with the advocacy of any single school of philosophical thought, there is considerable influence from virtue ethics, naturalism, and pragmatism in the underlying philosophy of this study.

The assumptions and foci in the above-stated argument of the study include, first of all, the focus on moral skills and behaviour rather than specific moral values and virtues; secondly, a philosophically naturalist concern regarding the universality of moral values and virtues intended to be fostered in moral education; and thirdly, a concern for what can be normatively prescribed as goals of moral education. Finally, a philosophical discussion will be made considering the use of moral psychology in teacher training.

4.1. Why Virtue Ethics?

The approach that virtue ethics takes, as a moral theory, in understanding human nature, and the nature of moral behaviour, has several advantages over its two main alternatives: deontology and consequentialism, at least for the purposes of the argument of this thesis. Before expanding on the philosophical approach informing this thesis, several problems of deontology and consequentialism need to be highlighted in order to dispel doubts regarding why virtue ethics is a better philosophical fit regarding the use of moral psychology in teacher training.

There are many different strands of deontology and consequentialism (Schafer-Landau, 2013). But what unites them in general, and what I take issue with in both, is that these two moral theories rely on the use of reasoning as a guide to daily behaviour, and their implicit claims to an absolute universal. Kant bases his philosophy on the primacy of reasoning, saying that the human faculty of reasoning is not geared towards happiness and well-being since, essentially, smarter people are unhappier (Kant, 2013, p. 486). Thus, he concludes, the purpose of reasoning is not well-being or happiness but something else. And given that humans possess such pronounced reasoning capacities, the purpose of the life of
the possessors of such reasoning is to be found not in happiness, but in morality, which is in turn defined by behaviour maxims that can be generalized into universal laws.

Consequentialist theories on the other hand do not take reasoning as the basis for morality, but some external ‘good’ (Schafer-Landau, 2013) – defined in different ways depending on the strand of consequentialism. Essentially, consequentialist theories are concerned with calculating which actions or rules would result in the greatest good, following an identification of what the ultimate good is. However, such calculations would involve very complex reasoning processes which are obviously not employed in daily behaviour, such as pocketing an office pen. From this perspective, consequentialism as a moral theory may be more suited to macro level concerns such as legislature, ethics in technology, or politics, but has less to say about developing individuals’ moral propensities through education.

With regards to the claims of universality, Kant famously proclaims that “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Kant, 2013, p. 488, italics original). While the clarity of this statement has intuitive attractiveness, the lack of disclaimer caveats points to absolute universalism, which is either not possible, or redundant. Social and environmental contexts differ too much across time and space. This becomes apparent when one considers the extremely different social and environmental necessities of daily life living in a stone age tribe and in a modern metropolis of the globalized world. For any maxim to be applicable in both cases it would need to be vague to the point that it offers no guidance regarding our moral behaviour in daily life. Such universal rules would need to be interpreted differently in different situations, defeating its absolutist and universalist implications.

In consequentialism universality is an implicit assumption when one identifies an ultimate good which should be pursued (Foot, 1988, pp. 224-5). I am not against this idea per se, as I think that one such ultimate good exists – life in its broadest sense, diversity, quality, and quantity – but the identification of this ultimate value would need to be from a supra-species (for lack of a better word) perspective. The ultimate value would apply to fungi as much as it applies to humans, and perhaps artificial intelligence once it reaches human level intelligence. Consequentialist theories in general tend to take their point of departure as some ultimate human good, and this falls short of true universality. Some, like Foot (1988),

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\[8\] But even this is contentious: What if artificial intelligence and technology can perfectly mimic the animation of life? Is blood flow through flesh inherently more valuable than electric flow through plastic? Perhaps it is not life but the complexity brought about by life itself that is the ultimate value/good.
contend that an ultimate human good may not even exist (p. 241). Furthermore, the vagueness problem of universal rules afflicting deontology also applies to consequentialist goods.

In other words, absolute universalism is not entirely possible whether it is some law or good; interpretations would be necessary to adapt the universal for differing situations. The central value of virtue ethics in this regard is that instead of rationally discerning how to apply moral universals in different contexts, virtue ethicist approaches focus on the development of skills, tendencies, habits, and characteristics that equip a person with the ability to adapt whatever moral universal to specific situations and circumstances. Stated this way, even moral universals discovered through deontological or consequentialist reasoning would require a character formed through the lens of virtue ethics to apply the universal to specific circumstances. Furthermore, the focus on psychological mechanisms that work unconsciously (faster and less effortful than reasoning) alleviates the necessity for relying on reasoning processes that turn out to be not as reliable as they may seem (see Chapter II, for psychological literature supporting this statement). This is the main reason for using a virtue ethical approach in this thesis to understanding morality, and by extension, the approach taken in thinking about how to conduct moral education. Although it should also be noted that this approach is considered to be universal insofar as humans’ morally relevant psychological capacities are concerned, and is not limited to the Turkish context.

However, one also needs to bear in mind the problems of virtue ethics. The ambiguity of what exactly constitutes virtues does not readily lend itself to clear behavioural guidelines, and this further leads to problems of prioritising virtues, and following this, conflicts between virtues. The same issue also raises relativistic and situationist criticisms (Kristjansson, 2013). Yet, this ambiguity is not something that can be pulled this way and that through a combination of relativism and situationism. There is a general understanding of what virtues are (Kristjansson, 2013), and the remaining ambiguity serves as a platform for continuous negotiation and improvement both of our understanding of virtues, and how to apply them in daily life. While virtue ethics does not provide crystal clear guidelines, it recognizes the complexity of life that denies such clear guidelines, and engages with this complexity.

4.2. Practical Wisdom and Habits

The focus of the study is about fostering moral skills, rather than on teaching what certain values or virtues are. The aim of this study is to explore what kind of skills and
knowledge teachers can benefit from regarding how to teach pupils how to be moral, but not on identifying which values and virtues should be taught to pupils. Many virtue ethicists share this concern (Anscombe, 1958; Foot, 1978; 2001; Hursthouse, 1999; 2006; 2007; 2012; Nussbaum, 1993; 2006), and studies indicate that mere knowledge of morality rarely leads to moral conduct (Blasi, 1980; Hardy, 2006). Certain technical skills and deeper moral motivation are necessary for moral behaviour (Blasi, 1980; 1999; Narvaez, 2010a). The focus on moral skills can also be seen explicitly in Aristotle’s comparison of morality to other skills, like archery (Gorski, 2013). Being a good archer includes not only the knowledge of how to aim accurately, but also the ability to calculate distance and the effect of wind, and proper tensioning of the body. Similarly, moral conduct includes the capacity to recognise whether there is a moral issue at hand, being able to make accurate judgements about right and wrong, and the appropriate extent to which a particular virtue should be applied (Hursthouse, 2006; Rest, 1983; 1984).

In virtue ethics literature, the capacity of the correct and appropriate application of a virtue in a particular situation is called practical wisdom. Hursthouse (2006) suggests that practical wisdom is not simply theoretical knowledge of the virtues and their application, but a set of intellectual capacities that allows the possessor of practical wisdom to perceive when and how to apply virtues, and avoid moral “mistakes” (p. 285). However, practical wisdom is gained through experience (Hursthouse, 2006). According to Hursthouse (2006), Aristotle draws a distinction between “natural virtue” which is usually possessed by adolescents, who mean to do well but make mistakes in the meanwhile, and “full virtue” which is generally possessed by adults who have had experience and cultivated their application of virtues in an appropriate way. Hursthouse (2006) indicates that “the claim that practical wisdom requires experience might just be an alternative description of the parallel between practical wisdom and techne (technical expertise) as regards habituation” (p. 286). Just as technical expertise requires experience and habituation in any practice of skill, “so practical wisdom requires experience of habitually doing what is virtuous” (p. 286).

On the other hand, pragmatists like Dewey are also concerned with habituation. Dewey (1922) indicates that there are three broad levels of moral conduct: impulses, habits, and reflective action. Impulses are in essence what we are born with, and they later get refined by interaction with the environment (such as parents, society) or experience, into habits. Anderson (2014) indicates that habits can be considered as dispositions that have been shaped socially for certain kinds of behaviour or responses to the environment. For example,
a child’s hunger, through experience and interaction with the (cultural) environment develops into a taste for certain foods on certain occasions (e.g. birthday cake), or avoidance of certain foods (e.g. prohibition of pork in Islam). While habits may have had rationales when the behaviour first originated, over time the rationale can be forgotten, and habits start to operate unconsciously. This can pose a problem: as the environment changes, habitual behaviour might also need to change. However, since people form emotional attachments to their habits and customs, change may not come easily (Anderson, 2014). Once a way of living is established, people may resist change. Anderson (2014) indicates that in order to learn how to change habits psychological and sociological inquiry is necessary, beyond conscientiousness and willpower.

In Dewey’s (1922) moral philosophy, intelligent conduct (self-reflection, deliberation, reasoning) is offered as a way of maintaining and reforming habits when they prove to be inadequate in a given situation or a change in environment. This can be considered as part of practical wisdom, for it too is concerned with the correct and appropriate application of a moral value or virtue in changing circumstances. Dewey (1922) further suggests that education is the key to instil habits more amenable to change through reasoning skills.

Studies of moral intuitions and moral reasoning have yielded results that move in parallel with both the pragmatist and the virtue ethicist arguments. Recent research on moral psychology (Haidt, 2001; Graham et al. 2013; Narvaez, 2010a) indicates that moral habits (moral intuitions) are formed based on our morally relevant innate capacities such as disgust and compassion, and later get refined by experience (Graham et al. 2013) in line with the naturalist claim of the innateness of virtues cited by Hursthouse (2012): “[V]irtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them and completion comes through habituation” (p. 169). Moral intuitions drive our moral conduct. However, they are not immune to moral reasoning, and through self-reflection and moral deliberation, moral intuitions can be altered and lead to refined moral behaviour (Fine, 2006; Narvaez, 2010a).

Research on moral psychology also points to certain capacities that are potentially part of the set of skills Hursthouse (2006) alludes to as practical wisdom, such as those explored in the Four Components Model (Rest, 1983; 1984) (see Section 2.1., Chapter II). Some researchers, such as Darcia Narvaez (2010a), also point to how expertise in these skills can be developed through education and experience, in line with the virtue ethicist focus on
Considering our deepening understanding of moral psychology, and how to foster and develop morally relevant psychological skills, this points to the possibility that the development of moral skills could be fostered in education more adequately by focusing on psychological constructs and capacities relevant to moral conduct. The moral psychological literature is explored in greater depth in Chapter II, Section 2.

There is a particular take on human nature and morality explored here and the following sections. In a nutshell, I think the moral nature of humans is the collection of their characteristics – habits and emotional dispositions that give shape to behaviour – that foster the quantity, quality and diversity of life in the broadest sense. The claim that ‘life’ is at the core of morality begs far more questions than can be engaged with in this thesis, and is thus beyond its scope. However, this definition of human moral nature – habits and emotional dispositions – has more of a psychological character, and accordingly, while not exhaustive, the literature reviewed in Section 2 of Chapter II explores certain aspects of this psychological nature in-depth.

4.3. Nature, Universals, and Pluralism

Concerns about the universality of moral values and virtues are also relevant considering the focus on moral skills in this thesis, as opposed to moral values. Morality is not an end in itself; it serves the greater purpose of living a good life. The definitions of ‘good life’ may change, but the fact that morality contributes to it is an idea shared by many, especially virtue ethicists (Hursthouse, 2012; 2013; Nussbaum, 2006; Peterson, 2011). Naturalistically conceived, morality contributes to the survival, reproduction, and thriving (SRT) of many species such as chimpanzees and bonobos as well as humans (Clay & de Waal, 2015; Currey, 2008; de Waal, 2014; de Waal, et al. 2014; Miller, 2008; Narvaez, 2010a; Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). Humans are defined as an ultra-social species, and survive and thrive much better in interdependent social groups than in complete isolation (Hogh-Olesen, 2010; Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, 2007; Simpson & Beckes, 2008). The evolution of morality is thought to be an adaptation to environmental challenges (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). Evolutionary approaches to morality take into account our psychological mechanisms, and how they have interacted with our environment which has led to our present moral psychology. According to Darcia Narvaez:

“For our ancestors, virtue corresponded with actions that promoted survival, reproduction, and thriving (SRT), such as various forms of cooperation. As humans
moved into more complex societies, notions of virtue changed and became culturally transmitted rather than grounded in everyday causal learning; the clear links among virtuous action and SRT were less apparent.” (Narvaez, 2010a; p. 172)

While in our evolutionary past the challenges faced by our ancestors were largely natural and confined to relatively smaller social circles than the present; today such problems can come in the form of political and economic concerns as well as social and/or natural concerns (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Iyer et al. 2012; Koleva et al. 2012). Given that political, economic, social/cultural and environmental challenges to human well-being are not uniform across the globe, the moral solutions or adaptations people create in different societies are naturally different from others’ solutions or adaptations. As a result, morality constitutes different things in different cultures.

Variation in morality across the globe does not result only from differing challenges to human well-being. There can be more than one way to solve the same problem. Just as people create different solutions to the problem of finding or creating shelter, they also find different solutions to the problem of maintaining in-group harmony (Currey, 2008; Miller, 2008). Studies with the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Iyer et al. 2012; Koleva et al. 2012) have shown that conservatives and liberals have different conceptions of what is morally relevant. This suggests that people who face similar or even the same challenges in the same environments find different solutions to their (moral) environmental challenges.

This points to a kind of ethical pluralism that results from the plurality of morally relevant challenges to life and the plural solutions to them. Gorski (2013) indicates that ethical pluralism is related to within-species variation:

“While human beings do share a number of distinctive capacities, these capacities are variably distributed across human individuals. If the art of living well consists in identifying and realizing these capacities, then there will not be any one-size-fits-all model of the good life. The good is itself plural.” (Gorski, 2013; p. 550)

The plurality of “good” that Gorski relates to within-species variation can also be explored through the variation in environments. This can be studied through the concept of moral ecology (Brinkmann, 2004; Hertzke, 1998). Moral ecology gets its name from the biological concept which emphasises the interconnectedness among living beings in a given environment. Frey (2010) offers the definition that “the various social and organisational
environments that form the backdrop to conduct constitute a moral ecology” (p. 617). As a framework, moral ecology is sensitive to the variability of situations where moral skills are applied and moral virtues upheld. It acknowledges that moral conduct takes place within a given universe (the moral ecology), and recognises the pluralistic nature of social environments and their “moral properties” (Brinkmann, 2004, p. 57).

Just as biological ecologies are unique (albeit sharing some fundamental characteristics), so are moral ecologies (Brinkmann, 2004; Hertzke, 1998). The more localised the focus is (for example, from global moral ecology to the moral ecology of a single family living in the slums of Mumbai), the greater the degree of the relativity of moral values would be (Frey, 2010). This creates a problem for moral education that focuses on fostering specific values and virtues, as a clear definition of the universe one is focusing on needs to be considered. How certain can one be in prescribing specific moral values and virtues to be fostered in education, given the variability of their use in daily life in moral ecologies at differing levels? In order to create a moral education that is pluralistic enough, a focus on the shared fundamental characteristics that apply to the variety of universes one is addressing in education is necessary, and this requires a clear definition of these universes.

Conversely, the existence of shared psychological constructs and capacities relevant to morality are somewhat more uniform across our species than values (Banerjee, Huebner, & Hauser, 2010). Given the relativity of moral values, and the universality of morally relevant psychological constructs and capacities, it can be concluded that it is a worthwhile endeavour to focus on moral psychology in moral education. This does not necessarily imply that this needs to be at the expense of a focus on specific moral values and virtues. Focusing on both specific values and virtues on the one hand, and psychological constructs, capacities and skills on the other would arguably be more likely to result in better moral education. Nevertheless, fostering moral psychological skills and capacities can be done at a larger scale compared to specific values and virtues.

A cautionary note is also necessary. Naturalistic pluralism should not be confused with the moral relativism of ‘anything goes.’ Gorski (2013) indicates that:

“Ethical naturalism can … evade the trap of cultural relativism by focusing on the social preconditions of human flourishing. Specifically, it will adjudge some social orders to be better than others insofar as they allow individuals enough freedom to discover their capacities and enough resources to realize them.” (p. 550)
Naturalistic pluralism acknowledges that while there are many means of achieving “good,” the good as an end can be described in terms of things that enhance SRT, especially when it comes to “thriving” (Hursthouse, 2012; Miller, 2008), or from a pragmatist perspective, in terms of how well the means meet the ends (Anderson, 2014) - which in the naturalistic case would be a naturalistically defined “good life.” Both naturalistically and pragmatically, any claim to what is “good” should be open to empirical investigation (Anderson, 2014; Besser-Jones, 2015; Hursthouse, 2012). This makes morality a social science more than anything else (Besser-Jones, 2015). On the other hand, normative claims (that can perhaps be set as moral educational goals) made from a naturalistic perspective do not always hold philosophically (Mackie, 1977). This issue will be addressed in the next section.

4.4. Goals of Moral Education

Moral naturalism has been hailed as a robust descriptive philosophy, but is usually considered to be an inadequate normative philosophy (Mackie, 1977; Moore, 1903). The reason for this is the well-established distinction between facts and values, that descriptions do not serve as prescriptions, and what “is” has no bearing on what “ought” to be (Gorski, 2013; Moore, 1903). Given the naturalist foundation of this thesis, how can any normative claims be made concerning the goals of moral education, such as the potential benefits of including moral psychology in teacher education?

One of the aims education in Turkey is responsible for pursuing is to equip pupils with the skills necessary to thrive individually in their future lives and to contribute to their community (MEB, 1973). In virtue ethicist terms this can be described as eudaimonia (Besser-Jones, 2015; Hursthouse, 2006; 2013; Nussbaum, 2006). Eudaimonia is loosely translated as happiness, well-being, flourishing, or thriving by different authors (Hursthouse, 2013). In this thesis, eudaimonia is taken to be flourishing or thriving (interchangeably) as this term is shared with the natural sciences (survival, reproduction, and thriving).

A caveat in the approach of the thesis needs to be highlighted at this point: goals and aims for moral education can be sought through different avenues. For example, an alternative avenue is through civic concerns and citizenship education, as Peterson (2011) suggests, and for which a nuanced argument can be found in Beck (1998). However, citizenship is much more bound by time and location compared to the more universalizable aspects of the nature of morality of interest to this thesis. Beck (1998) focuses on morality...
only in the context of citizenship education in the UK. This has little bearing on the moral education context in Turkey, and civic education in Turkey is completely separate from any notions of moral education—from the domain of RE. Moreover, civic education is very closely related with its temporal and geographic environment (e.g. UK between 2000-2010). When investigating the nature of morality, the psychological nature of human morality is the primary interest here.

There is no consensus among philosophers regarding a detailed description of what eudaimonia consists of. While Peterson (2011) describes it as “living in accordance with human nature” (p.23) of which participation in politics is an essential element, most virtue ethicists continue to debate the term. Taking a pluralistic stance, there may not even be a single universal description of eudaimonia that applies to all people beyond its translation as ‘thriving.’ Instead, eudaimonia can be different for each individual, considering the within-species variation of talents, tendencies and capacities among humans that Gorski (2013) mentions, and the variety of environments in which people live. The application of one’s capacities and skills to the environment as best as one can to the benefit of oneself and others could be thought of as thriving in one’s environment. Concerning moral education, this could be translated into an aim as fostering moral skills and capacities, and directing pupils in how to apply these within their given moral ecology. In other words, fostering flexible moral habits and practical wisdom in order to enhance and foster thriving in pupils’ future lives.

There are several ways of approaching the issue of applying oneself to the environment as best as one can. The kind of thriving characteristic of a species is posited to be eudaimonia for that species by naturalist virtue ethics. Lenman (2014) suggests that:

“In the case of plants, to say an individual is a good member of whatever its species may be is to evaluate how well its parts and operations contribute in ways characteristic of that species to the two ends of survival and reproduction. With at least some animals a third end becomes salient—freedom from pain and pleasure and enjoyment of sorts characteristic to the species in question. And with social animals a fourth dimension comes into play: the good functioning of the group.”

In the case of humans, the latter two (pleasure, enjoyment and freedom from pain; and the good functioning of the group) can be conceived as thriving. This suggests that the concept of ‘good’ can be defined by natural and social sciences and that the descriptions would also serve as prescriptions of how people ought to behave. This leads to the question
Besser-Jones (2015, p. 4) poses: “Can we, on naturalistic grounds, pick out the best form of human life?”

Two criticisms can be directed at this idea. The first one is the fact that not all characteristics of a species might enhance thriving or *eudaimonia*. That some behaviour is characteristic of an animal does not necessarily mean that it is the best possible behaviour to enhance SRT. The fact that certain characteristics have contributed to SRT does not mean that they are the best means of enhancing SRT. Certain characteristics can turn out to be not so good, or even defective, upon investigation. When compared to humans, other animals that have less cognitive control over their instinctual habits are at a disadvantage when they need to change a defective behaviour. However, we have much more developed reasoning skills, which give us the capacity to identify our defective characteristics better, and consciously address them. This points to our ability to keep revising moral education, goals, prescriptions, and even descriptions. But this does not mean that naturalism should be abandoned, since our reasoning skills are one of our natural characteristics that enhance thriving in our environments as well (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008).

The second criticism, which is related to the first, is the well-established fact/value distinction in philosophy (Gorski, 2013; Mackie, 1977; Moore, 1903). According to this distinction, which is partly based on Hume’s philosophy and partly on Kant’s (Gorski, 2013), we cannot make logically valid deductions about what ought to be based on our empirical knowledge. But this distinction does not always hold. Gorski (2013) indicates that facts influence values and values influence facts. Pragmatists like Dewey (Pappas, 2009) and Anderson (2004) have drawn attention to how researchers’ values affect not only the research questions they set out to answer but also their interpretations of their findings. Thus, the values of researchers not only influence which facts are sought but also the meaning ascribed to them; our interpretation and expression of facts are value-laden.

Conversely, our values are also fact-laden. Gorski (2013) indicates that evaluative judgements about someone’s character such as ‘brave’ or ‘cruel’ are both factual and evaluative. Such judgements ascribe a positive, neutral or negative evaluation to a person’s character in relation to a normative ideal on the one hand, and on the other, they are descriptions of facts: of that person’s behaviour. For example, someone who inflicts unwarranted damage on others is called cruel. Whether an action is warranted or not may be dependent on a normative ideal state; however, ideal normative states are not based on purely
philosophical values independent from natural states. Nature can offer some normative ends. In his research on chimpanzee societies, Frans de Waal (2014) defines their moral behaviour. He indicates that there is an ideal normative state in chimpanzee communities – social harmony – which individual chimpanzees try to preserve through various kinds of conduct, to achieve this ideal normative state (de Waal, 2014). This suggests that investigating human behaviour could also allow researchers to define the normative ideal people strive for in their daily lives. While this normative ideal may be interpreted by purely philosophical methods, everyday life itself would not be based on pure philosophical conceptions, but on the natural demands of daily living.

Besser-Jones offers a potential naturalistic normative framework, which she names the health model (Besser-Jones, 2014; 2015), in answer to the question she poses, cited above. According to the health model, eudaimonia, the ideal normative state of thriving (for humans), is characterised by the realisation of one’s talents and capacities to the fullest extent, and their application to the benefit of one’s own life and the lives of others. The social sciences can identify what these capacities are, and define the limits of the extent to which they can be realised. Furthermore, the sciences can also describe how the application of such capacities can bring about the greatest benefit for their possessor and others.

Making use of social sciences (such as moral psychology) in moral education can philosophically hold from naturalist and pragmatist perspectives. However, informing moral pedagogy does not need to be entirely based on ontological and epistemological philosophy. Morally relevant psychological capacities and constructs do not always depend on establishing certain normative prescriptions independent from natural states for them to be discussed. As an example, moral sensitivity is necessary to recognise that there is a moral issue at hand, no matter whether we are talking about generosity, courage, or temperance. This does not mean that we should consciously recognise the moral issue, for when it becomes habitual, conscious recognition becomes intuitive moral sensitivity (Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1983; 1984. See Chapter II).

4.5. Moral Psychology in Teacher Training

Given that natural and social sciences can factually describe what can be prescribed as normative ends, moral psychology can help us define psychologically sound aims for moral education with a flexible amount of universality. The flexibility suggested here is grounded in the naturalist and pragmatist philosophies that our current knowledge is not infallible, and
what we know today as true and right might turn out or become false and wrong in the future. Following such shifts, the normative goals we set for moral education would also need revision. The universality suggested here refers to the morally relevant psychological constructs shared by all people (except, perhaps, ‘morally disabled’ people like psychopaths), but not to categorical principles.

Moral psychology has so far defined some psychological capacities relevant to morality (Graham et al. 2013; Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1981; 1984; Narvaez, 2008; 2010a; 2010b; Rest, 1983; 1984) and how they can be further developed through education (Bebeau, 1994; 2008; Morton et al. 2006; Narvaez, 2008; 2010b; Narvaez, Gleason, & Mitchell, 2010). (This is discussed in detail in Chapter II.) Furthermore, studies indicate that without paying due attention to psychological constructs, moral behaviour and character do not develop solely based on fostering moral reasoning (Hardy, 2006). Could teaching moral psychology to trainee teachers equip them with the necessary academic knowledge to foster the development of these psychological capacities in pupils (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013), and work towards helping pupils achieve their personal eudaimonia?

As Lexmond (2012) puts it, “policies to build character should … be about building the foundational skills necessary to pursue a good life; not about setting out exactly what that life will look like” (p. 3). This would include what Krebs and Denton (2005) call enlightened self-interest, which is related to the conception of eudaimonia. They argue that the “key to moralization” resides in both “inducing people to understand the nature of morality,” and “why it is ultimately in everyone’s best interest to uphold systems of cooperation” – how it is in their interest to behave morally and encourage others to do so as well (Krebs & Denton, 2005; p. 646). While they take a pragmatist approach, Krebs and Denton’s (2005) argument is deeply related to naturalistic virtue ethics in that they argue that peoples’ conception of eudaimonia (their best interests) is dependent on cooperative/moral behaviour. Furthermore,

9 For example, one might say that a (categorical) principle is ‘killing is wrong,’ but this obviously changes, or is systematically disregarded, in times of war. I would amend that principle as ‘inflicting unwarranted harm on others is wrong;’ however, what constitutes ‘warrant’ can change from one social/cultural environment to the next, or even from one event to the next, considering all the situational and psychological elements (including, for example, religious beliefs and political situations) influencing convictions and practical necessities. In order to understand universal moral principles one needs to decipher the structure of how (in this example) the things that constitute warrant change. But this structure has eluded philosophers and scientists so far. Nonetheless, this does not mean that such a structure does not exist. My belief, as of this writing, is that the most fundamental, perhaps the only universal principle is ‘ensuring the continuation of life,’ applying even to non-human animals, with all other principles being in service of this ultimate principle. But the discussion of this assertion is beyond the scope of this thesis, as it has no direct practical relevance to teacher training regarding moral education or to moral education itself.
This would also entail pupils to realise their morally relevant psychological capacities and understand how to apply these capacities to their daily lives in order to achieve eudaimonia, as Besser-Jones (2015) suggests.

This points to the fundamental importance of moral education in schools, and to the equal importance of teachers’ role in this education. This is based on a consideration of moral ecologies. Being in the classroom, teachers are better situated than philosophers or policy makers to understand the moral ecologies in which pupils live and are likely to live. Thus, having direct access to pupils themselves and their moral ecologies situates teachers in a place where they can judge with better nuance how and which values, virtues, and morally relevant psychological capacities to foster in pupils.

Furthermore, teaching something as ubiquitous as morality would require a broader approach than addressing moral development and moral issues in a few lessons per week following a pre-defined curriculum (Osguthorpe, 2009; Sanger, 2008). Kohlberg (1983) argued that the vast majority of moral education takes place in what is called the hidden curriculum, and Purpel and Ryan (1983) indicate that moral education takes place outside the pre-defined curriculum inevitably. How moral education takes place beyond the curriculum is discussed in Chapter II.

In summary, the central philosophical approach to moral education in teacher training programmes undergirding this thesis considers both specific values and virtues, and psychological skills and capacities relevant to morality. While the prioritisation of specific values and virtues can change from one community to the next, morally relevant psychological capacities are thought to be universal. Considering this, this study focuses on how Turkish teachers are equipped, particularly during their university training, and through experience of teaching, to foster students’ morally relevant psychological capacities.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, the answers to the first two research questions are sought:

1. How does moral education take place?
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour?

Initially, educational literature is explored in the first section, in order to shed light on the first research question. The review of educational literature initially explores the idea of a theory of moral education. The section following that provides greater context regarding the history of moral education in the West and Turkey, and the current Turkish moral education system and reviews some of the criticisms of the system. This is followed by an exploration of the concepts “hidden curriculum” and “moral ecology” in relation to implicit moral education. Next, a cross-cultural review of teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education is presented. The first section is concluded with a review of two pedagogical methods.

This is followed by the review of the moral psychology literature in order to address the second research question. The section broadly reviews several theories and models of moral psychology and moral development, and focuses on moral judgement and moral motivation. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of how an understanding of moral psychology can benefit teachers in their endeavour to engage in moral education.
1. Moral Education

This section focuses on moral education in schools. The previous chapter laid the philosophical foundations for why including moral psychology in teacher training could work towards fostering students’ moral development. This section explores the educational literature in relation to the same topic. In summary, moral interactions pervade almost all aspects of school life, and these have an influence on students’ moral development beyond the official curriculum that is followed in the classroom. For teachers to understand the school’s subtler effect on students’ moral development, it would appear to be beneficial for them to understand the moral atmosphere of the school (Kohlberg, 1983), and the psychology of moral development.

This section thus concentrates on a) how the theory of moral education is conceived in this thesis, b) trends of moral education in the West and Turkey and the problems of focusing on the official moral education curriculum in the Turkish context; c) how moral education takes place implicitly in schools with regards to the moral ecology of the school and psychological constructs; d) the importance of addressing the beliefs of teachers relevant to moral education and moral development; and e) how moral education can be conducted taking into account the psychological capacities and the moral ecology of the school. Morally relevant psychological capacities are explored in more depth in the next section but are briefly explained here where necessary.

1.1. Theory of Moral Education

This section is mainly based on Michael Hand’s (2014) views on what a theory of moral education might be, and positioning myself in reference to Hand’s arguments. Hand initially makes a distinction between two kinds of theories. The first kind is called ‘scientific theories’ that are solely explanatory, but make no normative claims. Most theories in the natural sciences fall into this category, as, for example, there are no normative claims made by the theory of gravity. The second kind is called ‘practical theories’ and these theories involve normative claims of some sort, and often suggest methods of meeting these normative aims. Hand also adds that conceiving practical theories and their methodological suggestions as set in stone would be misled; that no theory is, nor should be, “teacher-proof” (p. 520), indicating that the implementation of any theory of moral education is and should be dependent on individual teachers’ practice of moral education.
Hand (2014) then moves on to distinguish between practical theories that are *thematically* related to practice, where the theory is relevant to some aspect of practice but not entirely prescriptive, and theories that are *pragmatically* related to practice, which prescribe specific methods for meeting normative aims set out. Hand implies that such theories have a much narrower focus on some current issue.

The underpinning philosophy of morality explored in the previous chapter draws heavily from scientific theories explored in this chapter alongside various schools of philosophical thought, but insofar as a theory of moral education is endorsed in this thesis, it is normative. The main normative claim here is that moral education ought to foster students’ moral development, and in terms of its relation to practice, it is argued that theoretical knowledge of moral philosophy, psychology and education should be employed in this endeavour.

This raises a question of the content of moral education. While it might initially seem as the arguments of this thesis suggest that intricacies of moral philosophy and psychology should be taught to pupils, this is not the case. The argument here is that teachers would benefit from the theoretical understanding this literature would provide to them in their endeavour to engage with moral education.

Hand’s (2014) suggestion regarding the content of moral education is that it should include moral standards. While acknowledging that not all moral standards fall into the following category, Hand maintains that the following are criteria for moral standards on which it can be assumed that everyone would agree. He argues that those standards that are deemed to be universally-enlisting (applying to everyone) and penalty-endorsing (failing to comply with the standards is worthy of punishment) are moral standards. However, it should be noted that this argument seems to intend to identify the minimal necessary content for moral education, rather being the centrally defining aspect of all content for moral education.

Hand (2014) continues his discussion of moral standards on which everyone can agree by borrowing a term from Copp (2009, cited from Hand 2014):

“…moral standards are justified when their currency in society serves to ameliorate what Copp calls the ‘problem of sociality’, the ever-present risk in human social groups of breakdowns in cooperation and outbreaks of conflict. This risk is ever-present because of certain contingent but permanent features of the human condition: namely, our
vulnerability to one another, our limited capacity for sympathy, and a limited supply of needed or wanted resources.” (Hand, 2014, p. 528).

The argument is maintained that were we not susceptible to the dangers quoted above, no moral standard may have been necessary. However, this is not the case in our current lives, and certain standards of behaviour are required in order to curb such dangers and avoid social breakdowns. This is posited to be the main justification for defining the criteria for moral standards as universally-enlisting and penalty-endorsing, for the demand of compliance to such standards incurs a cost to the individual in favour of group cohesion: if everyone does not act in accordance with these standards free-riders will be better off than those who comply, and if there is no threat of penalty, there is no incentive for individuals to refrain from free riding constantly and on a mass scale.

This view of morality overlaps with the understanding of morality underpinning this thesis. Human morality evolved into its current state over the past hundred millennia in hunter-gatherer societies (Sinnot-Armstrong, 2008). This environment is very different from the current environment in which much of humanity lives (nation-states in which the vast majority of people live in villages, towns or cities much larger than what would have been common or even feasible in the stone age). While in stone age conditions our evolved, innate (organized in advance of experience, Graham et al, 2013; see section 2.2.2 below) morality may have been sufficient and alleviated the necessity for moral standards, these mechanisms are no longer as applicable in daily life as they used to be, and as a result, proper functioning of groups rely more on our flexible cooperation, on which mass subscription to moral standards put reasonable limits with a view to protect group stability.

Having set out the minimal necessary content for moral education – moral standards crucial for ameliorating the problem of sociality – Hand (2014) proceeds to exploring pedagogical methods which may be employed in the teaching of moral standards. Two main methods are identified: moral formation and moral inquiry. Moral formation refers to teaching students how to act in accordance with moral standards. Although this involves cognitive elements (how to do something, recognizing something has to be done), it does not involve in-depth thinking about the justifications for the moral standard. This is mainly the area of the second method: Moral inquiry is mainly focused on discussion and understanding the justifications for moral standards, and by extension, subscribing or rejecting the standard.
Hand (2014) further distinguishes between two kinds of moral inquiry: directive and nondirective. Directive inquiry involves the teacher to direct the students into subscribing to or rejecting certain moral standards by emphasising how un/sound the justification for that norm is. For example, rejecting racism would necessitate a directive method of moral inquiry in Hand’s view, involving a very clear emphasis on the unsoundness of the justifications of racism, and the soundness of the arguments against it. In nondirective inquiry the teacher does not endorse any justification, and everything is open for discussion, with the teacher mostly refereeing the discussion. Hand suggests that this method is more appropriate to controversial issues.

While the philosophy of this thesis might be in agreement with the minimal definition of the criteria for identifying moral standards, as discussed above, there is an argument to be made for a broader conception. One of the reasons Hand (2014) focuses on a minimal definition of moral standards is that these standards are liable to be broken, and that moral education should focus on equipping students against this temptation, at least as far as the problem of sociality is concerned. However, I think the concern of temptation is misguided. Properly articulated standards will be consistent, and it will turn out that people do not break their standards. The issue in understanding subscribed standards is one of priority. The questions of interest here are ‘do I have the character of a person who prioritizes self-interest, or morality?’ ‘Is there truly a difference between self-interest and morality, or is it simply short sighted character traits and moral standards versus far sighted ones?’ The justifications for standards are the standards, what is otherwise referred as the ‘standard’ is a summary of the justification. As a result, the articulation of a justification requires precision and a clear-eyed and impartial view of oneself and others. In this reasoning, the matter becomes one of Aristotelian character education. As Kristjánsson (2010a) puts it, the point of moral education should be to “infuse pupils’ selves with moral concerns” and to equip them with the necessary elements of practical wisdom (pp. 235-236).

This thesis mainly explores the psychological mechanisms relevant to moral formation, although mechanisms relevant to moral inquiry are also discussed (e.g. moral reasoning). However, such an approach to moral education would constitute a radical departure from how moral education is and has been understood and conducted in the Turkish context currently and historically. Due to this reason, an exploration of how moral education has been understood historically, and is understood currently in Turkey is necessary.
1.2. Moral Education in the West and Turkey

This section briefly reviews the historical development of approaches to moral education in the West and Turkey, and sets moral education in the broader political and social contexts with regards to how it has related to the goals of education more broadly conceived. Approaches to moral education in East Asia and other parts of the world are not discussed here for concerns of space, as Turkey has positioned itself with reference to the West rather than the East, making East Asian moral education beyond the scope of this thesis.

Moral education has evolved and changed over the ages since Aristotle. The clearest analysis of this evolution in the West has been conducted by Walker et al (2015) who use Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology to build a genealogy of moral education starting from the 18th century. The authors indicate that in the 18th century the central theme of moral education was based on the religious doctrine of original sin, and moral education revolved around disciplining students to behave according to Christian morals. The central theme in the 19th century then shifted to class differences, and was based on the notion of ‘the polite pupil’ (p. 83), in imitation of the manners of high society gentlemen and ladies. Walker et al argue that in the early 20th century moral education experienced a revival when schools were considered as ‘moral communities’ (p. 83) where students were morally adjusted into prosocial habits. Later on in the second half of the 20th century, with the introduction of Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory, the central theme of moral education became one of fostering students’ cognitive development regarding moral judgement. Around the turn of the 21st century the central theme of moral education shifted once more, this time being based on strengthening students’ ‘fragile emotional selves and self-esteem’ (p. 84). Finally, the authors argue that the currently emerging trend centres around the theme of ‘the flourishing pupil’ (p. 84), which is based on the recent revival of virtue ethics and Aristotle, as well as the gain in momentum the positive psychology movement has experienced. The philosophical approach taken in this thesis, as explained earlier, falls in the general vicinity of this final trend.

A similarly detailed account of the evolution of moral education in the Turkish context does not exist; the few studies that are relevant have been conducted recently (e.g. Çoban, 2014; Kaya, 2013; Yazıbaşı, 2014). But it should be borne in mind that most of these studies are authored by theologians rather than historians, philosophers, or educationists, and are biased towards exalting religion and religious values in opposition to more secular approaches, in accordance with the current political trends in Turkey outlined in Chapter I.
During the Classical Ottoman Period (15th century to 18th century) morality did not exist as a field of study separate from religion (Yazibaşı, 2014), and education was not widespread – it was mainly confined to state elites, and was geared towards creating and maintaining the state system and state officials. During the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) the Ottoman Empire embarked on a period of modernization, in which a more developed and Western influenced education system was introduced, and moral education was given space in the curriculum as a separate course, yet still heavily influenced by religion. A greater focus on ‘duty’ was also incorporated into the curriculum; Yazibaşı (2014) claims that this was influenced by the rise of Kantian ethics in the West, from which the model for the new education system was taken. At the turn of the 20th century there was a clearer change in the discourse regarding morality and moral education. As European style institutions and intellectual advances in the West made their way into the Ottoman state and intellectual life, notions of nationalism (both in the narrower ethnic sense, and the wider imperial, i.e. Ottomanism, sense) and rationalism were incorporated as legitimating references for morality alongside religion (Gurbetoğlu, 2007; Yazibaşı, 2014), pointing to the early phases of secularisation Turkey was undergoing.

Starting with the Tanzimat Period, there have been explicit and implicit expectations regarding moral education on the part of the Ottoman state in order to achieve certain goals through education. In the Tanzimat Period the main expectation was the unification of the diverse peoples that made up the population of the Empire, in an attempt to resist the wave of separatist nationalistic sentiments (Kaya, 2013; Yazibaşi, 2014). From the turn of the 20th century to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the surge in interest in moral education has been connected to a perception that the losses the Empire was suffering on the political front were due to a collapse in the morals of society (Gurbetoğlu, 2007; Yazibaşi, 2014). This period is followed by the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, and the founding of the Turkish Republic.

In the early years of the republic, Turkish society underwent seismic revolutions; the multicultural empire of six centuries that had become more theocratic towards its end, had collapsed, and was replaced by a secular and somewhat more homogeneous republic. The country underwent rapid industrialisation, the old Arabic script was replaced with a modified Latin alphabet, the Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished, and a centralized education system was instituted, among numerous other reforms in the legal, economic, political, and social arenas.
This was accompanied by a change in the discourse of moral education as well. With secularisation in full swing, there was a major shift in legitimation of morality from religion to humanism and nationalism in the formative years of the Republic (Çoban, 2014; Kesgin, 2011). This lasted until the 1950s when religious education was re-introduced to the education system; however, this return to religion was not at the expense of humanistic and nationalist references. In 1982 moral education and religious education were combined into a single mandatory course, and this revived religious legitimation of morality to a greater extent. Finally, since the ascension of the AKP government into power in 2002, humanistic and positivistic elements of legitimating morality have been systematically removed from education (e.g. Evrensel, 2017 and Milliyet, 2017 mentioned in Chapter I). Government officials have explicitly stated that they are encouraging a more religious youth (Hürriyet, 2012). However, the main motivation regarding changes in moral education seem to be tied more closely to pragmatic politics, and any change made to education in general and moral education in particular may be reversed depending on political necessities.

The history of moral education is closely tied with the social and political contexts in both the West and in Turkey. Accordingly, the content of moral education has been influenced deeply by these contexts. However, while the above accounts of the history of legitimating principles of morality are concerned with their influence on the content of moral education, one aspect is not considered: the schooling structure itself.

It has been argued that the current system of schooling is based on the model of factory lines, and creates an environment conducive to the development of values relevant to industrial age factory workers (Godin, 2012; Robinson, 2015). While the relevance of this is not exclusive to moral education, it is deeply related to the implicit moral education students receive through the hidden curriculum (see below for more on the hidden curriculum). When this structure was imported into the Ottoman Empire and adapted in the new Republic, creating an environment relevant to factory line values may not have been an explicit intention. But this may have had its use in the period of rapid industrialisation Turkey went through between the 1920s and 1950s.

In contrast to this, John Dewey himself has had a major influence on the Turkish education system, as he was invited in 1924 to survey the newly founded Republic and make suggestions regarding how to create a new education system. Dewey produced two reports, and based on these reports schools with a highly progressive structure were introduced, called
Village Institutions (Şahin, 2017). I will refrain from going into greater depth regarding Village Institutions here for concerns of space, as these schools had a very different structure from the current school structure, and they were closed in 1948 for both domestic and international political reasons (İnce, 2009), and remain a controversial topic. However, they are worth this brief mention as both the philosophy and the controversy surrounding the institutions during the formative years of the Republic have been influential. The remainder of this section focuses on the current state of moral education in Turkey.

Explicit moral education in the Turkish Education System consists of a single course devoted to religion and morality. The course is titled Religious Culture and Ethics (RCE), and it is mandatory in grades 4 to 12 (ages 9 to 17). It was introduced to the curriculum as a compulsory course after the 1980 coup d’état, on the grounds that the lack of compulsory moral education had led to the social instability and violent clashes between the youth of opposing political convictions of the 1970s (LePage et al., 2011). The course today is allocated one lesson per week in middle school, and two lessons per week in high school. The textbooks for this course are comprised of 4 chapters on (Sunni) Islamic religious culture (e.g. how to pray), one chapter on morality, and one chapter on the relationship between religion and secularism, civilisation, or another topic, which changes from textbook to textbook depending on the grade level. Apart from this course, there is no explicit attention devoted to fostering moral development in the Turkish Education System.

There are several problems associated with the current practice of moral education in Turkey, as well space for improvement in some respects. These include normative and practical problems as well social and political concerns. Teaching morality alongside religion has been criticised outside of Turkey (Tillson, 2011), and secular circles in Turkey have raised concerns over the recent increase in the focus on religion (Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009). Moreover, the specific focus on Sunni Islamic culture at the expense of the Jewish, Christian, and Alevi Muslim minorities in Turkey (Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009) has received criticism that the current mandatory moral education curriculum is not sufficiently pluralistic (Okçu, 2009; Şaşmaz et al., 2011; Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009). These criticisms point to a need to revise the current official curriculum for social and political reasons.

Furthermore, the course does not address moral skills as much as it addresses religious culture. Apart from the lack of pluralism to reflect the values and virtues of differing traditions within Turkey, the course does not explicitly focus on the development of morally
relevant psychological capacities. While the current curriculum may foster valuable skills in students (such as acquainting them with the moral norms of the dominant culture), a review of the course’s curriculum reveals that it does not overlap with the moral psychological skills and capacities that this study focuses on.

A philosophical argument for why psychology should inform moral education has been made in the previous chapter. However, the current lack of psychological focus is also contrary to the aims of moral education of the Turkish Education System. When the foundations of the goals of the Turkish Education System were being laid in the 1930s, a policy-maker of the time, İsmail Hakki, argued that the “ethics of a democratic republic should be completely positivistic and worldly which eliminates religion from the sphere of morality” (cited from LePage et al., 2011; p. 367). The emphasis on ‘positivistic and worldly’ refers to a greater focus on scientific perspectives as opposed to religious perspectives in ethics, which were far more prominent in the public sphere during the Ottoman era, from which the new republic was distancing itself at the time. This implies that including training on moral psychology in teacher training programmes would align with the original aims of the Turkish Education System. While the exclusion of religion is no doubt contrary to pluralism, the lack of a psychological focus in moral education also risks failing to achieve the original “positivistic and worldly” aims of moral education in Turkey.

All these issues might point to a need to revise the official curriculum. However, such an intervention might still be short of achieving the desired goals of moral development. According to some authors (Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg, 1983; Ryan & Purpel, 1983; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013), something as ubiquitous as morality and moral development cannot be adequately addressed in only a few lessons per week. Thus, a broader approach to moral education, beyond the curriculum of a single course, is necessary. Hence relying on revising the existing curriculum to foster moral development may not be an adequate approach to moral education. This broader approach would consider several aspects of school life and education. Two of these aspects are the implicit education students receive from the moral ecology of the school, and teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education.

1.3. Implicit Moral Education and the Moral Ecology of the School

Many authors have noted that education is a morally laden endeavour (Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Jackson, Boomstrom, & Hansen, 1998; LePage et al., 2011; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008) and that moral interactions pervade nearly all aspects of school life (Ryan & Purpel,
It is thus important for educators to understand the moral ecology of a school. A term that has striking parallels with moral ecology in the education literature is the hidden curriculum. While the official curriculum can be described as the content of education, the hidden curriculum can be defined as the context of education. Yüksel (2005) indicates that the hidden curriculum does not exist in the form of a written document, but “consists of the order and regulations of the school, its physical and psychological environment, and the non-official or implied messages that the administrators, or teachers, convey to students” (p. 330). Following Frey’s definition of moral ecology that “the various social and organisational environments that form the backdrop to conduct constitute a moral ecology” (2010, p. 617), the moral ecology of the school can be said to consist of both the official and hidden curriculum. However, according to Kohlberg (1983), the majority of education takes place in the hidden curriculum; which implies that the hidden curriculum forms the greater part of the moral ecology of the school.

Frey (2010) maintains that there is a feedback loop between moral ecology, and the character traits and the resulting behaviour of individuals and organisations. Moral conduct of individual elements (individuals, institutions, organisations, etc.) comprise their moral ecology, and their moral ecology, in turn, influences their behaviour, and their character (development) by extension (Frey, 2010). In the educational context, this idea finds support from the multitude of studies that indicate that moral education takes place beyond the classroom activities following the official curriculum (Çubukçu, 2012; Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Jackson, Boomstrom, & Hansen, 1998). In the Turkish context, Çubukçu (2012) found that activities which are part of the hidden curriculum in Turkish elementary schools have a significant effect on students’ internalisation of values.

Purpel and Ryan (1983) indicate that moral education in the hidden curriculum is inevitable. The authors make a list of sayings and activities that carry various moral messages to students, such as the story of Robin Hood which “shot holes through the notion that stealing is categorically wrong” (p. 270). Furthermore, Narvaez (2001; 2002) indicates that what the students learn from stories is not always the intended moral, pointing to the possibility that even explicit activities with well-defined goals might result in implicitly teaching different moral lessons. The moral that students might take from Robin Hood’s story might not be to stand up for the disadvantaged and oppressed, but that stealing can be acceptable.
Hierarchical relationships in the school (student – teacher – administrator), rules, and the way rules are practised also teach students about authority (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983), right and wrong, fairness, and justice (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983), and by extension ‘democratic’ lifestyle (Giroux, 1983; Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg 1983). The emphasis on managerial and technical skills in teacher training programmes (Carr, 1994; Giroux, 1983) at the expense of a “wider concern of values education,” (Carr & Landon, 1998, p. 28) shape teachers’ conception of education. Furthermore, the similar emphasis on technical skills in the curriculum (Freire, 1983) at the expense of values education shapes students’ conceptions of society and influence students’ moral development in relation to these conceptions. This emphasis and the resulting understandings can sometimes be contrary to democracy, alongside the teacher’s and/or administrators’ absolute authority in making final decisions that influence students’ school lives (Freire 1983; Giroux 1983; Higgins, 1991; Kohlberg 1983). This indicates that training students to live in a democratic society in an institution with an undemocratic culture may not foster the values associated with democracy in students.

Just as democratic practices in the school, or lack thereof, influence the development of democratic values in students, the school’s moral atmosphere affects students’ moral behaviour. Power, Higgins and Kohlberg (1989) define the school's moral atmosphere as the values and norms that regulate informal interactions between students, teachers, staff, and administrators to the degree that these norms and values are shared between the people of the school. Brugman et al. (2003) conducted a comparative study between the Netherlands and Russia, involving 752 students from 40 Grade 8 and Grade 10 classes. Their research assessed whether adolescents’ perceptions of school moral atmosphere exerted an effect on their moral behaviour by conducting pre-intervention and post-intervention tests on students’ perception of school moral atmosphere and comparing the results with students’ norm-transgressive and pro-social behaviour before and after the intervention. The intervention was designed to “increase the accuracy of students’ perception of the moral atmosphere in their school, i.e., to reflect better the majority perspective among the students” (Brugman et al., 2003; p. 290). Their findings indicate that students’ perceptions of the school’s moral atmosphere increase their moral behaviour even more than the degree of their moral skills and capacities do. They note that one of the reasons for this is the greater concern for social desirability in adolescents.
The moral atmosphere of schools may change from culture to culture, or even school to school. However, students’ perception of their school’s moral atmosphere, and the reflection of this perception in students’ behaviour can be generalised beyond the Russian and Dutch contexts to the Turkish context.

This points to the importance of understanding the moral ecology of the school, how teachers’ and administrators’ behaviour is a part of the school’s moral ecology, and the considerable effect it has on students’ moral development. Thus, attending to teachers’ perceptions and beliefs regarding the implicit elements of moral education in schools and moral development in students is of central importance concerning the broader approach to moral education mentioned above. On the other hand, the fact that students’ perception of the moral atmosphere of the school influences their moral behaviour more than their moral skills and capacities should not mean that fostering students’ moral skills is not of importance. As Frey (2010) indicates, the feedback loop between moral ecology (moral atmosphere of the school) and its elements (students’ and teachers’ behaviour) make the cultivation of moral skills even more crucial.

1.4. Teachers’ Beliefs and Attitudes

There is general agreement that teaching is a moral endeavour, and what teachers do, think, and believe have moral repercussions (Bullough, 2011; Buzelli & Johnston, 2001; Colnerud, 1997; Giroux & Purpel, 1983). This position appears to be shared by many pre-service and in-service teachers. Research studies from the West, Turkey and East Asia indicate that most teachers enter into the profession at least partly for moral reasons and believe that they have a moral responsibility as educators (Brookhart & Freeman, 1992; Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000; Goodlad et al., 1990; Joseph & Efron, 1993; LePage, et al, 2011; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013; Temli, Şen, & Akar, 2011; Wang & Fwu, 2002). This suggests that the problems of moral education do not stem from teachers’ lack of moral character or unwillingness to address moral issues in education, but from a lack of educational skills, accurate beliefs (see below), and a moral language over which moral issues can be discussed (Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013). Recently, Revell and Arthur (2007) demonstrated this issue in the UK by analysing over 1000 teachers’ attitudes and experiences regarding character education. The authors found that while teachers are willing to develop their skills regarding moral education, their training does not adequately equip them, and whatever
equipment their training provides is contingent on their course and teaching placement school.

Addressing teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education is crucial for equipping them with better intellectual tools for fostering the moral development of students. The need to address teachers’ beliefs regarding moral education and the problematic lack of it in teacher training programmes is a point agreed on by many educators (Frey, 2010; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; Revell & Arthur, 2007; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2005; 2008).

Rokeach (1968), Donovan and Bransford (2005), and Pajares (1992) indicate that teachers’ beliefs are at the core of their teaching practice and behaviour, and Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Theory of Learning by Observation shows that teachers’ behaviour influences students’ behaviour. Furthermore, addressing teachers’ beliefs is important because educators are not always fully aware of the beliefs they hold, and because psychologically central beliefs which are based on experience “can be highly resistant to modification, particularly if they are not confronted in an explicit, meaningful way” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011, p. 572).

In this thesis, the notion of ‘belief’ is described relatively broadly. Beliefs are taken to be, following Rokeach (1968), “any simple proposition, conscious or unconscious, inferred from what a person says or does, capable of being preceded by the phrase, ‘I believe that’” (p. 113). Beliefs also involve preconceptions and understanding (Donovan & Bransford, 2005); someone’s belief is what a person takes to be true in the world, and thus, is related to that person’s knowledge – either arising from knowledge, or giving rise to knowledge. The central argument here is that, stated superficially, inaccurate knowledge relevant to moral education arising from uninformed beliefs, insofar as they exist, should be replaced with informed beliefs based on accurate knowledge (within the limits of what the academic literature has to offer) through teacher training.

What has more direct relevance to this thesis is the psychological function of beliefs, and requires a more nuanced description. Beliefs cause people to behave in certain ways – organize their time and energy towards certain goals. For example, the belief that it will rain today could lead a person to take an umbrella in order to keep dry and thus avoid ill health. Taking a functionalist approach, the aspect of beliefs of most interest to this thesis can be described thus:
“Believing that performing action $A$ would lead to event or state of affairs $E$, conjoined with a desire for $E$ and no overriding contrary desire, will typically cause an intention to do $A$” (Schwitzgebel, 2015)

Translated into the aims of this study, the above statement would read as “believing that engaging in a pedagogical activity informed by moral psychology would lead to the fostering of students’ characters, and given that teachers enter the profession partly for this moral reason, a contrary desire is not expected, and will typically cause a teacher to intend to conduct moral education informed by moral psychology.”

The neurology of how exactly beliefs translate into behaviour is beyond the scope of this study. The concept of ‘belief’ is most deeply explored in this section of the thesis, as the discussion is particularly relevant here, but it is also relevant in the moral psychology section of this chapter, and the qualitative data analysis and discussion chapters. However, the term ‘belief’ throughout the thesis is used in the manner described here.

Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011) have developed a framework for teacher training programmes which addresses teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education and prepares them for the moral work of teaching. They delineate four areas of beliefs to address “which [are] treated as sources of explanation that should be considered in analysing, comparing, evaluating, enacting, and designing studies of moral education” (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005, p. 573). These four categories are psychological beliefs, moral beliefs, educational beliefs, and contingent factors. Psychological beliefs regarding morality include beliefs about what features moral psychology encompasses, how these features develop, and how they interact with variables in the environment. Moral beliefs refer to meta-ethical assumptions (the nature and scope of morality) and normative assumptions (about right and wrong, good and bad). Educational beliefs include assumptions about the aims of education and the nature and scope of teaching and education in society. Finally, contingent factors refer to more autobiographical information: personal, historical, social, political, and institutional beliefs (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2005).

Several studies have been conducted regarding some of the areas of beliefs Sanger and Osguthorpe identify. In relation to educational beliefs relevant to this study, Carr and Landon’s (1998; 1999) investigations focused on Scottish teachers’ perceptions of the hidden curriculum and the teacher’s role in moral education. Carr and Landon (1998; 1999) conducted discussions with teachers of six different Scottish schools whose students and
ethos varied considerably on socio-economic, racial, religious, and ethnic lines. Their study was published in two parts. The first part of their study focuses on teachers’ perception of the teacher’s role in moral education (Carr & Landon, 1998), and the second part of the study focuses on teachers’ perception of the hidden curriculum (Carr & Landon, 1999). Both studies were conducted by recording and analysing teachers’ responses to the discussion tasks entailed in the study.

Carr and Landon’s study (1998) on teachers’ beliefs regarding the role of the teacher in moral education reveals that Scottish teachers think that moral education should be a separate area of study that is not the domain of a specialist such as the religious education teacher and that teachers should be role models. The Scottish teachers also inclined towards a philosophical middle ground between moral authoritarianism and moral permisivism, and supported fostering critical thinking regarding moral matters; however, they also admitted that they did not know how to determine this middle ground, and sought some philosophical certainty to take an approach confidently. Carr and Landon (1998) also indicate that the teachers tended to take a pragmatic approach to morality; “the prevailing view seemed to be a kind of social-contractual ethics of agreement, whereby a given attitude or action counts as unacceptable if it transgresses or offends against what the reasonable majority would be inclined to agree upon in a given context” (p. 172).

The authors’ study regarding teachers’ beliefs about the hidden curriculum (Carr & Landon, 1999) reveals that Scottish teachers’ conception of the hidden curriculum is ambiguous. Teachers could agree neither on whether hidden meant unofficial or unintended, or deliberately concealed, nor on what was actually conveyed implicitly. Upon further discussion with the teachers regarding whether the implicit elements of moral education should be made explicit, Carr and Landon (1999) found that two views prevailed: Firstly, some teachers believed that any implicit education concerning values must be made explicit, no matter whether both the value and the intention of teaching that value is benign or malign, in order to secure a “general climate of rational openness” (p. 25) about values. Secondly, other teachers believed that making explicit the inexplicit teaching of positive values could have adverse effects such as demoting the practice of such values from moral aspiration to duty to the school or hubris or narrow tribalism. Carr and Landon (1999) also add that “despite the evident interest in, readiness to address and ability to discuss such questions—clearly apparent on the part of all with whom we worked—it emerged that teachers had not been well equipped for this task during their professional training” (p. 28).
These two reports indicate that there is considerable variety among teachers’ beliefs, and more interestingly, that there tends to be more variation in such beliefs among the teachers of the same school, rather than between different schools. This points to the richness of the diversity of ideas that are part of school moral ecologies, adding further importance to the need to pay attention to teachers’ perception of school moral ecology.

Furthermore, similar characteristics can also be seen in more recent studies in other courses related to moral education: Peterson et al (2015) found that teachers in England similarly held diverse beliefs in the context of citizenship education. Considering that both moral and citizenship education in the UK are not clearly structured in the National Curriculum (Peterson, 2011; Peterson et al 2015), the issue of diverse beliefs and practices in both kinds of education may be related to ambiguous aims and definitions set by respective governments.

Temli and colleagues (LePage et al., 2011; Temli, Şen, Akar, 2011) have also conducted similar studies in Turkey, which show some correlations among Turkish and Scottish teachers’ beliefs. Their study involved a questionnaire survey of 824 primary teachers from 15 different provinces in Turkey. According to Temli, Şen, and Akar (2011), Turkish teachers believe that the role of the school is to give students not only academic skills, but moral education as well so that students can acquire the values of the society, in line with the Scottish teachers’ belief that moral education should not be the responsibility of a specialist. Scottish and Turkish teachers also shared the belief that teachers are expected to be role models “especially, in the way they acted in society” (Temli, Şen, and Akar, 2011; p. 2064). Furthermore, Turkish teachers also took a pragmatic approach to moral education, in that they believed it should be about solving social problems. Turkish teachers also added that moral education should help students acquire global values (such as honesty, respect, and tolerance, in the teachers’ words) and not be driven by a political or religious agenda, despite the fact that most stated that their values were deeply influenced by their families and religion. Turkish teachers were also concerned about the potential negative effect of the media, but this difference might be related to the increase in media channels in the decade separating the two studies. Another similarity between the Scottish and Turkish studies is that in both studies, the authors conclude that, despite their willingness to deal with moral education, teachers were not equipped with the necessary skills to engage with moral education in their teacher training, and the teachers from both countries would have liked to receive such training. Temli, Şen and Akar (2011, p. 2065) state that Turkish teachers
“thought that the amount of moral education they undertook was rather insufficient to understand how to deal with moral education and how to cope with moral dilemmas in the school context.”

Temli, Şen, and Akar’s study was also used in a cross-cultural comparative study with American teachers (LePage et al. 2011). The most significant difference to emerge between Turkish and American teachers’ beliefs turned out to be their conception of a moral person. The authors indicate that “for Turkish teachers, if a person is to be considered moral, they need to hold global values: honesty, reliability, and respect for others and the environment” (LePage et al., 2011, pp. 369). On the other hand, American teachers emphasised that a moral person was someone who acted in moral ways. Another important difference that emerged from the cross-cultural study was not in the statements to the responses to the surveys, but in the number of surveys returned. In the Turkish study, the researchers received nearly 800 responses for the 1200 (73%) surveys sent out, while the American researchers received 203 responses of the 2300 surveys (8%) sent out over two years. While most studies report that nearly all teachers are willing and interested in engaging with moral education, this disparity in responses between the American and Turkish teachers may point to a greater willingness among Turkish teachers to engage with matters regarding moral education compared to American teachers. However, it must be noted that the authors of this study thought that other factors, such as American teachers receiving educational surveys too frequently, might have contributed to the low response rate.

The findings from the above-reviewed six studies shed some light on Turkish, British, and American teachers’ educational beliefs, considering the framework developed by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011). Most importantly, these studies indicate that teachers from all three countries share the belief that moral education is the responsibility of the school, rather than a specialist teacher. Secondly, teachers from each country believe that the teacher should be a role model and should help students acquire moral values. However, teachers’ beliefs regarding the method of teaching values, and to what extent the teacher can explicitly influence students’ values shows difference among the teachers from the three countries.

Some suggest that teachers’ willingness but inability to engage with moral education is caused by a lack of moral language (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013; Sockett & LePage, 2002; Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2008). Borrowing from Vygotsky and Bakhtin, Tappan (1991) indicates that language is a psychological tool that helps people make sense of
their experiences, and maintains that a moral language mediates moral experience and moral functioning, helping people understand their moral experiences, discuss moral issues, and make moral decisions. Sockett and LePage (2002) argue that despite how morally rich school life is, teachers lack the moral language to make sense of these experiences from a moral perspective, and instead use the technical language they have been equipped with in their pre-service training. As a result, they deal with moral matters with students using a technical language as opposed to a moral one, further transmitting a technical perspective to their students. Sockett and LePage (2002) further add that moral language is missing not only in the classroom but in teacher training programmes as well, resulting in the current state of teachers who are under-equipped to conduct moral education. This is further supported by the study of Willemse, Lunenberg, and Korthagen (2008) which involved discussions with 54 teacher educators. Their study concludes that the preparation of trainee teachers to the moral work of teaching is left to individual teacher educators who conduct this education in an unplanned and implicit manner. Furthermore, the authors add that teacher educators themselves lacked the necessary moral language to discuss moral issues and moral education with their students – even those teacher educators who were more interested and invested in moral education (Willemse, Lunenberg, & Korthagen, 2008). Although the relatively small number of participants requires some wariness in generalising these findings, they could also apply in the Turkish context, as there is no specific attention given to morality in education faculties in Turkey.

The use of moral language is closely related to teachers’ beliefs regarding morality and moral education. Carr and Landon (1998) state that an aversion of imposing values, characteristic of teachers with liberal views, caused “something close to intellectual paralysis regarding the open discussion of values issues” (p. 167). Sanger and Osguthorpe (2011) caution teacher educators against similarly paralysing beliefs and suggest that these beliefs should be addressed in teacher education. Conversely, Carr and Landon (1998) also report that the explicit attention paid to moral matters in Catholic and independent schools had not led to a dogmatic acceptance of any kind of moral position, but to “heightened awareness of the need for appropriate rational justification of actual practice” (p. 167). This suggests that the moral language used in these schools, presumably borrowed from religion at least in Catholic schools, had provided an adequate platform for discussing moral issues with confidence.
The framework mentioned above for preparing trainee teachers for the moral work of teaching suggested by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005) could also provide both teacher educators and trainee teachers with a moral language which can be used to address their beliefs and foster student teachers’ skills of moral education. Just as a religious perspective provides Catholic schools with moral language to address moral issues and teach morality, as implied by Carr and Landon’s (1998) findings, Sanger and Osguthorpe’s framework could bring psychological, philosophical, and educational perspectives that contribute to trainee teachers’ moral vocabulary, and thus help them make sense of their moral experiences and beliefs in a more structured way, equipping them with better intellectual tools to engage with moral education. These perspectives would also align with and foster the original ‘positivistic and worldly’ aims of the Turkish Education System as stated by İsmail Hakki.

1.5. Role Modelling and Expertise

Such intellectual tools can be utilised by teachers for moral education in many ways. Here I focus on two methods, one implicit and one explicit, that can aid teachers in helping students achieve their personal eudaimonia. The two methods that I focus on, role modelling and fostering moral expertise, can be applied complementarily in moral education, as fostering moral expertise would be likely to involve demonstrating specific values in action – i.e. modelling them.

The first method to be considered is role modelling. Several recent studies (Sanderse, 2014; Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011; 2013) have shown role modelling to be the most widely used method of teaching moral values. The same studies also imply that teachers most commonly believe that students learn moral values by observing role models. Conversely, Sanderse (2014) argues that role modelling as a concept is under-researched and not well enough developed in teacher education programs. In his review, Sanderse (2014) reports that teachers and pre-service teachers in the Netherlands and the U.S. most firmly believe that students acquire moral values from their teachers when the teachers embody these values and make an example of them, i.e. become a role model for the value. Furthermore, Sanderse (2014) maintains that most teachers in interviews and questionnaires fail to make a reference to any alternative method of teaching morality. While teachers may be highly confident about the impact of role modelling, they are not always aware of its limitations, nor how this learning takes place, e.g. learning through observation. This implies that teachers hope that students will simply pick up values following their example. This is further complicated
when teachers take a liberal point of view (Klaassen, 2002) which Carr and Landon (1998) also mention, and consider values as a matter of personal choice which makes them avoid trying to influence students’ choices and remain as neutral as possible. Furthermore, teacher educators’ lack of skill, knowledge, and language to prepare student teachers to the moral work of teaching discussed above may also add to this problem.

Sanger and Osguthorpe (2013) indicate that Albert Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Observational Learning Theory could “help to extend, refine, and/or ground beliefs about how modelling works” (p. 172). Bandura (2003) states that:

“Modelled activities… convey principles for generative and innovative behaviour. In abstract observational learning, observers extract principles or standards embodied in the thinking and actions exhibited by others. Once they acquire principles, they can use them to generate new instances of the behaviour that go beyond what they have seen, read, or heard.” (p. 169)

Four types of processes are emphasised in observational learning: attention, retention, reproduction, and motivation (Bandura, 1986). Renkl (2014) indicates that for learning by observation to take place, attention must be paid to relevant behaviour, the demonstrated activity must be encoded and remembered (retention), the learner has to be capable of reproducing the activity, and also the learner has to be motivated to produce the behaviour to be learned.

Demonstrating the value or behaviour that is desired for the student to learn is much more effective, as enacted models attract and sustain attention more than when they are conveyed verbally or in written form (Renkl, 2014). Retention processes are necessary to embed brief observations into more permanent memory traces. While it is very hard, if not impossible, to recall an observation in full detail, the retention process allows the learner to remember the core idea and the gist of the model behaviour to be transferred to future instances where it may apply. The reproduction process converts the extracted abstract principles of the model behaviour into appropriate action. However, reproduction can be hampered if the observed behaviour is not retained well enough or if the action requires some other sub-skill which the learner lacks. Motivation to reproduce a modelled behaviour can become problematic under certain circumstances (see Section 2.3.). In terms of moral behaviour, a well-known “gappiness problem” was identified by Blasi in 1980, which refers
to the lack of motivation for people to act morally even when moral reasoning and moral intuition processes work well – even when they know the right thing to do.

However, Bandura (2003) argues that models can also convey motivational aspects of their character and behaviour. Teachers as competent models convey skills, strategies and knowledge, while also through their example of pursuing challenges they can inspire resilience and aspiration in their students (Bandura, 2003; Osguthorpe, 2009). Identifying with a model also increases motivation to learn from the model and reproduce behaviour (Bandura, 1986). Renkl (2014) indicates that multiple examples or models are much better than a single one, as the student would then have a greater range of models to identify with and learn from effectively. Not only this, but multiple models also provide a larger and more diverse pool of activities that can be modelled for the student.

Role modelling (and learning by observation) is an implicit method of teaching morality. The kinds of behaviour that teachers model in the classroom, and what students learn from those modelled behaviours cannot be accurately stated in the official curriculum, due to its spontaneous nature. While the nature of role modelling does not prescribe a certain structure to teaching, it does allow flexibility for the teacher. Being a value-neutral method of conveying values – any value can be modelled – this method can be adapted to the moral ecology in which moral education takes place.

The second method discussed here is fostering expertise of moral skills (Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b). Developing expertise, similar to role modelling, is a value-neutral method of teaching morality since it focuses on morally relevant psychological skills rather than specific values themselves. This allows some flexibility for the teacher in choosing which values to emphasise, given their background understanding of the moral ecology in which they teach. Unlike role modelling, however, fostering expertise can be implemented in a more structured and explicit way.

In this thesis, a skill is considered to be a unifying structure for sets of behaviours and abilities relevant to achieving a given end. The end of interest here is moral behaviour, making psychological skills relevant to moral behaviour the focus of this thesis. These skills do not necessarily exist only in observable behaviour; moral skills can involve what might be tentatively called ‘mental behaviour’, including abilities and capacities such as sensitivity to emerging and subtle moral issues, recognition of the moral salience of a situation, and making decisions and passing a moral judgement on which to act. This is in opposition to
more directly observable behaviour such as things said, movements made, approval or disapproval expressed, etc.

A skill is generally taken to be the ability to do something well, or expertise (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). However, the meaning as in ability, rather than expertise, reflects the use of ‘skill’ in this thesis better. A skill does not necessarily have to be an intricate and complex ability. The complexity and intricacy of a skill will be greater at greater levels of expertise, and lower at more novice levels. The literature reviewed below gives an indication as to how morally relevant skills can be developed from more novice levels to greater levels of expertise through education.

The issue of whether skills require conscious effort to execute should also be addressed. While at first sight it might seem intuitively correct that complex and intricate skills require high levels of conscious effort, it makes sense that this conscious effort is necessary only when the skill in question is in the process of being developed (see below and section 2). Once high levels of expertise have actually been attained in any given skill, especially relevant to moral behaviour, one telling sign of expertise (in any given skill) is that the execution of the relevant behaviour does not require conscious effort, as the behaviour has now become ‘second nature,’ so to say, and all mechanisms relevant to carrying out the skill have become habitualised and automatized.

Skills relevant to moral behaviour can be discussed in terms of general skills and further sets of sub-skills. For example, skills of empathy and role taking contribute to the overall moral sensitivity skill of a person (see section 2 below for why moral sensitivity is considered a skill). But for concerns of space, this thesis focuses on the general skills without listing and exploring in detail the relevant sub-sets of skill for any of these general skills. One notable exception to this is the exploration of moral reasoning and moral intuitions in relation to moral judgement in section 2 of this chapter. There are brief mentions of specific skills here, when they become relevant, however; the main exploration of specific morally relevant psychological skills is in section 2 below. This section is concerned with how such skills can be fostered in education.

Narvaez advocates novice-to-expert training in order to foster students’ moral development (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). She indicates that education is viewed as the development of expertise in various domains (2010b) and that moral behaviour can be conceived as a set of abilities which can be developed to greater degrees of expertise.
Narvaez and Lapsley (2008) state that “experts are more efficient at solving problems in the domain, monitoring their progress, and deriving workable solutions” (p. 164). Expertise is a deep and refined understanding that can be found in practice and action.

Experts and novices differ from each other in a number of ways. First of all, experts enjoy larger, richer, and better organised “networks of concepts (schemas)” than novices do (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008; p. 164), which contain greater amounts of declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge about the domain. Declarative knowledge refers to knowing what to do; procedural knowledge refers to knowing how to do it; and conditional knowledge refers to knowing when to act and how much action is required. Furthermore, experts also have negative knowledge which refers to knowing what not to do and when to refrain from action altogether and wait. Secondly, experts and novices perceive the world differently and act accordingly in different ways. Experts see greater detail than novices and notice opportunities that novices miss. And lastly, experts and novices behave differently. While developing their expertise, novices use conscious and effortful methods to reach the desired goal, whereas experts tend to have automated skills, which demand less cognitive effort.

Expertise is also domain specific. Narvaez and Lapsley (2008) indicate that “individuals build their knowledge over time during the course of experiences related to a particular knowledge domain, thereby increasing in expertise.” (p. 164). It is acquired by deliberate cultivation over years and thousands of hours of practice (Ericsson & Charness, 1994) and it involves “reflexively activated, context specific schemata” (Ritchhart & Perkins, 2005, p. 789). Well-educated expert intuitions require complex, automatized, unconscious deep knowledge which is very different from the naïve intuition of novices (Narvaez, 2010a).

Narvaez (2010b) maintains that social and moral expertise start to develop from birth. Intuition and reasoning development regarding social cognitive and moral domains are established in early experiences. Earlier, she noted that frequent and repeated experiences develop conceptual schemata that can be later accessed in relevant situations (Narvaez et al., 2006). According to Narvaez (2010a), “experts in training have extensive, focused practice in particular contexts” (p. 85). A person with greater expertise than theirs about the domain keeps “whispering in the ear” about how and what to notice, practice, do and why. This kind of “caregiving” (Narvaez, 2010b; p. 85) provides the necessary guidance for developing expertise in various domains. According to Narvaez (2010b), the criteria and limit of such guidance should not be the age of the developing novice but the level of expertise.
In order to cultivate ethical expertise, education would need to follow a series of steps and stages of instruction through a novice-to-expert approach involving “mimicking naturalistic learning within a climate of support: immersion in examples and opportunities, attention to facts and skills, practicing procedures, and integrating across contexts” (Narvaez, 2010a, p. 171). Narvaez explains this process in greater detail:

“In level one, immersion, the teacher provides multiple examples of capable skill performance at developmentally appropriate levels… In level two, the educator draws attention to particular sub-skills that the students can practice in class… In level three, practice procedures, the teacher models skill sets … and students practice in role play and in actual everyday situations… In level four, integrating learning across contexts, the educator sets up ways for students to practice problem solving in multiple settings, to learn how to adjust skill application to different situations.” (Narvaez, 2010b; p. 87)

This four-stage structure of fostering skills presents a method of providing experiences where students can practise the moral skills in the controlled environment of a classroom. For students to apply their moral skills in environments less controlled, attention also needs to be paid to different kinds of decision making.

Goldberg (2002) demonstrates that there are two types of decision making: veridical decision making where the conditions are preselected (e.g. psychological experiments), and adaptive decision making where the person making the decision has to make sense of a wide range of incoming information simultaneously. This involves prioritising certain input while checking what feels right (intuitions) and what seems logical (reasoning) and considering possible courses of action among other things. Overall, adaptive decision making requires more effort and reflects real life situations better.

To foster adaptive ethical expertise in students, Narvaez (2010b, p. 86) makes suggestions regarding the environment in which this education may take place. First of all, establishing a secure and caring relationship between the student and the teacher in which the teacher has an unconditional positive regard for the child, recognising his/her needs and individuality allows the child to thrive as a person and a student. A supportive climate, in which the students perceive that the teacher emphasises understanding, leads the students to adopt a mastery orientation to learning, as opposed to a performance orientation. Vaydich, Khmelkov, and Narvaez (2007) indicate that a mastery orientation to learning fosters
prosocial attitudes and behaviour. Viewing the students with a growth mindset instead of a fixed mindset allows the teachers to realise that students need structure and guidance in order to develop various skills required for a good life (Narvaez, 2010b). Using the above-mentioned novice-to-expert pedagogy teachers would be able to foster the moral development of students. Fostering autonomy and self-authorship cultivates self-monitoring skills and self-reflection which help students, for example, to change strategies to solve problems when there is a need to, “whether working a math problem or a moral problem” (p. 88). Pointing out that each community has its own approach and understanding of moral character (the moral ecology of the community), Narvaez recommends that restoring the ecological system of support in the community would foster the flourishing of the child since it is the community where students as persons practise and apply their ethical skills.

Narvaez’s approach to developing expertise in moral skills could be seen as the psychological counterpart of Aristotelian naturalistic virtue ethics discussed in the previous chapter. Narvaez identifies certain psychological skills that can be developed into moral expertise. These psychological skills form part or the whole of techne (Hursthouse, 2006) in the philosophical literature. In this kind of education students are taken to possess natural virtue (or less), and the development of these virtues (from scratch or their natural form) to greater degrees of expertise can be seen as part of the accumulation of experience required to gain full virtue. Furthermore, the concept of practical wisdom overlaps with adaptive ethical expertise; Narvaez seems to prefer a psychological term with some welcome naturalistic philosophical baggage. Practical wisdom seen as a set of skills and capacities, as Hursthouse (2006) suggests, would refer to greater degrees of moral expertise, including negative expertise (Minsky, 1997).

1.6. Summary

The primary aim of this section has been to answer the first research question: How does moral education take place? In the Turkish context, moral education is given alongside religious education in the RCE course; however, the course has received criticism on the grounds that it is insufficiently pluralistic. The lack of pluralism is problematic not just on social and political grounds, but also on philosophical grounds, given the plurality of moral issues and their appropriate solutions in daily life. The course also lacks a clear psychological focus on fostering moral skills, which further contributes to the problematic lack of pluralism.
while also failing to achieve the original ‘positivistic and worldly’ aims of moral education in Turkey.

Furthermore, moral education does not take place solely in the official curriculum. The majority of moral education happens implicitly in the hidden curriculum and through the moral ecology and atmosphere of the school. It is inevitable that moral education takes place implicitly, beyond the official curriculum: students learn from their experiences and observations, and the interactions that constitute school life provide a far richer source of experiences and observations than the official moral education course.

Yet the implicit nature of moral education does not necessarily imply that it must take place unconsciously and that it has to lack structure or a deliberate approach. Given that teachers’ interactions with students form one of the most central aspects of implicit moral education, teachers can consciously engage in implicit education and approach it in a deliberate and systematic manner, provided that they understand how implicit moral education takes place.

This draws attention to teachers’ dispositions that are relevant to how they engage in moral education. Teachers’ beliefs and assumptions regarding moral education, moral psychology, and moral philosophy are critical in this respect. These central beliefs and assumptions direct teachers’ behaviour, and in return, their behaviour influences students’ moral development.

Several studies that shed light on some of the beliefs pertinent to teachers’ understanding of implicit moral education have been reviewed. Most importantly, while teachers may be willing and interested in engaging in moral education – they appear to think that it is their responsibility as teachers to engage in moral education, and that it is the school’s responsibility to foster students’ moral development – it seems that their initial training has not equipped them to engage effectively with moral education. This finding appears to hold cross-culturally; similar findings have been reported in Turkey, Scotland, and the USA.

This is especially exemplified in teachers’ faith in role modelling moral values: while they seem confident that role modelling has an impact, they are not always aware of its limitations. Furthermore, teachers cannot always think of alternative methods of teaching morality and tend to rely solely on role modelling.
It is likely that the root cause of this result is that initial teacher training programmes do not focus sufficiently on addressing the central beliefs that teachers hold, which determine how they engage with moral education. One further potential cause is also identified as the lack of “moral language.” While teachers are well-equipped with the technical aspects of teaching and education, this is done at the expense of a focus on morality. The heavy emphasis on the technical aspects of education and the lack of a focus on the moral aspects of teaching is thought to preclude teachers from making sense of their experiences in school through a moral lens. Instead, they revert to the technical lens with which they have been equipped. This is thought to hinder teachers’ ability to engage in moral education.

This issue could be addressed by attending to the moral aspects of the school in initial teacher training. Training regarding moral philosophy, moral psychology, and moral education could potentially help teachers understand the nature of morality, how moral development occurs, and how implicit moral education takes place. Furthermore, including training on these topics in ITE may also provide teachers with a moral language through which they can better understand and engage in moral education.

In the case of role modelling, Albert Bandura’s Theory of Learning by Observation (1986; 1997) could help teachers better understand how role modelling may foster students’ moral skills. Furthermore, teachers need not rely solely on the spontaneous nature of role modelling to foster students’ moral skills. A more deliberate and systematic approach can be taken with the structure Narvaez (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008) proposes for fostering moral expertise.

In summary, moral education happens largely unconsciously. While this applies in the Turkish context, it also seems to hold cross-culturally. However, this does not need to be the case. By attending to teachers’ beliefs relevant to their engagement with moral education, and by equipping them with a moral language in their initial training, it is possible to conduct implicit moral education in a much more conscious, structured, and effective manner.

The next section explores several morally relevant skills and capacities in greater depth. These skills and capacities form part or the whole of what teachers can foster in students towards greater moral development and moral expertise.
2. Moral Psychology

In this section, an answer to the second research question is sought: What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour? In order to answer this question literature regarding some core aspects of moral psychology is presented and reviewed. This review of moral psychology literature, while not exhaustive, represents a comprehensive picture of moral development. I should note, however, that the main aim in attempting to understand and describe moral psychological processes is not to identify content matter for moral educators, but to consider whether an understanding of moral psychology constitutes part of the knowledge teachers could benefit from concerning their engagement in moral education. The following review selectively presents the literature on moral psychology; discussion regarding how an understanding of the literature reviewed here can help teachers better engage in moral education can be found in sections 2.6 and 3.

Given that the purpose of this chapter is to identify psychological processes relevant to moral behaviour, a definition of behaviour is in order. Throughout history there have been three broad philosophical approaches to understanding what behaviour is (Cziko, 2000). These include psychic approaches which indicate that behaviour is rooted in the soul; materialist approaches that reject immaterial entities such as the soul and employ only physical explanations based on matter, energy, and their interactions; and dualist approaches which assume that behaviour has roots both in physical material and the soul (Cziko, 2000). In line with the naturalist underpinnings of this thesis, the conception of behaviour is purely materialistic.

The Oxford Dictionary has two definitions of behaviour: “The way in which an animal or person behaves in response to a particular situation or stimulus” and “the way in which a machine or natural phenomenon works or functions” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). References to behaviour in this thesis are almost exclusively in the former meaning. This indicates two things: a) that a behaviour is an action, and b) that it is in context – ‘in response to a particular situation or stimulus.’

Here, behaviour is taken to be an action, but it also involves an intention, in opposition to actions without intentions such as reflexes. Intentionality also implies agency, but this is dealt with in section 2.3 with reference to the concept of identity. This being said, I do not take it that intentions have to be conscious – moral behaviour, especially moral judgements (see section 2.2 below), can be driven by subconscious mechanisms, and it is
argued that most moral judgement happen subconsciously. Indeed, given that conscious mechanisms require more effort, and thus are not employed as often we may think they are (see section 2.2.2 below), it is desirable that moral behaviour is rooted in subconscious psychological mechanisms, and by extension, intentions.

Furthermore, I do not take it to be that a behaviour is just what meets the eye – that a behaviour is a behaviour only if it affects a person (or something else). Moral behaviour is a much more unified whole, where moral judgements passed inside a person’s mind are as much a part of the same behaviour as the reflection the judgement has in words uttered, movements made, or affects others in any other way.

It is also worth pointing out this thesis is specifically interested in moral behaviour, as opposed to behaviour in general, as evidenced by the fact that 58% of all occurrences of the word ‘behaviour’ in the main body of the thesis are immediately preceded by the word ‘moral’. Moral relevance constitutes the context (situation or stimulus in the above definition) that conceptually turns an ‘action’ into a ‘behaviour’. What kinds of behaviour qualify as moral behaviour is dependent on how one defines morality, the definition of which has been argued to be plural in Chapter I. However, the psychological mechanisms that are concerned with moral behaviour do not rely on defining morality; certain mechanisms, such as reasoning, intuitions, and motivation, have been identified as relevant to moral behaviour. This is the reason that literature on the psychology of moral behaviour has been deemed to be the most relevant field to understand moral behaviour.

Certain aspects of moral psychology have been researched in greater detail than others in this review. James Rest’s Four Components Model (Rest, 1983) has been included because it provides an overview of the occurrence of moral behaviour. Rationalist and intuitionist approaches to moral judgement, including the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (Rest et al. 1999; 2000) to Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory (1981; 1984) and Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (2001), have been reviewed because of their descriptive power regarding the occurrence and development of moral judgement. Concepts related to moral emotions and moral identity have been included for the understanding they provide regarding moral motivation. Graham and colleagues’ Moral Foundations Theory (2013) offers support and greater depth for the intuitionist position and an understanding regarding innate moral structures. Finally, Narvaez’s Triune Ethics Theory (2008), once again alongside the Moral Foundations Theory, is included for depth of understanding regarding moral ecologies.
Conversely, some aspects of moral psychology have not been discussed in depth. First of all, the most conspicuous is the absence of discussions related to culture and religion given their relevance to morality (e.g. Shweder et al., 1997), even though concerns regarding the influence of cultural practices and religious sentiments on moral development and understandings of morality become more prominent in Chapters V and VI (Qualitative Data Analysis and Discussion chapters, respectively). However, this thesis focuses on teachers’ understanding of moral developmental psychology, and thus theological and cultural aspects of morality are beyond the scope of this thesis, due to concerns of space. Similarly, due to a lack of space, more in-depth discussions of aspects of moral sensitivity and moral implementation were not possible in this thesis. These discussions were omitted from the final draft of the thesis not because they are not important and do not deserve space here, but discussions regarding moral judgement and moral motivation have greater priority. Moral judgement is prioritised because moral reasoning is a major element of moral judgement, and an in-depth understanding of moral reasoning is thought to be educationally the most relevant aspect of moral psychology (see Sections 2.2, 2.6, and 3 below). Moral motivation is prioritised because one of its major elements is the moral self, which is also educationally very relevant (see sections 2.3, 2.6, and 3 below). Discussions regarding the moral self can also lend themselves to discussions regarding moral implementation, but this was also omitted due to concerns of space. The other models and theories that have been explored in this thesis were given greater priority due to the reasons explained in the above paragraph.

Each of the models and topics of moral psychology reviewed below could contribute to teachers’ psychological beliefs, based on the suggestions of the Moral Work of Teaching framework developed by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2011; 2013). While philosophical arguments are more prominent in some sections below, as opposed to empirical psychological studies (e.g. discussions regarding the moral self), all reviewed literature has direct relevance to how one might understand the psychological aspects of morality, especially developmental aspects.

2.1. *Four Components Model*

This section provides an overview of James Rest’s (1983) Four Components Model (FCM), briefly describing the components and citing some of the research conducted in relation to the model. Individual components are explored in depth in the following sections,
and the model is later discussed in terms of how teachers could use it to foster their students’ moral development at the end of the chapter.

The FCM is a theory which gives an overview of moral psychology. According to the model, for moral behaviour to be elicited a person would need to (a) recognize the moral significance of a given situation, (b) decide on a course of action s/he deems to be morally right, (c) prefer to act on moral values than other non-moral values or not to act, and finally (d) show the determination to follow through the chosen course of action even under pressure (Bebeau, Rest, Narvaez, 1999; Rest, 1983; 1984). These four processes are named moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral implementation, respectively. While these four processes can be conceived as moral skills (Narvaez, 2008; 2010a), it should be noted that they also interact with our emotions and identity (Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 2006; Hardy, 2006). Rest and his colleagues suggested that the combination of knowledge from all four components would allow people to make more reliable predictions of moral behaviour (Rest et al. 1999) and that all four processes are required for moral development (Rest, 1983).

Although these components can be studied in relative isolation, and are to some degree independent of each other, the components are interconnected (Morton et al. 2006). Rest et al. (1999) state that “logically, Component 1 (sensitivity) precedes Component 2 (judgment), but the components do not follow each other in a set temporal order—as there are complex feed-forward and feed-backward loops, and complex interactions” (p. 102, emphasis added). For example, a person’s judgement (Component 2) of which values deserve more priority may lead them to be motivated (Component 3) to be more sensitive (Component 1) to certain kinds of moral issues (e.g. justice-related issues). In turn, with a new experience where the person carries out a moral action (for example, one they did not think they were capable of) (Component 4) may lead them to realize (Component 1) something new, and alter their moral judgement (Component 2) and/or the kinds of motivation (Component 3) they find to act morally. These rather crude examples are intended to show the possibilities of how each component could affect another.

2.1.1. Moral Sensitivity

Moral sensitivity is defined as the awareness of the moral salience of a given situation and how our actions affect other people (Hoffman, 1984; Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986; Rest & Narvaez, 1994). This involves understanding that there is a moral issue in a particular
situation, the people who are the participants of the situation and are affected by it, being able
to identify the variety of possible courses of action that can be taken in reaction to the
situation, and imagining the consequences of each course of action for all affected parties. An
understanding of the rights and welfare of others is central to moral sensitivity, particularly
when these conflict with one’s own interests (Hoffman, 1984). Rest (1986; 1994) assumed
that moral sensitivity involves being able to imagine different possible scenarios of the
situation and how different lines of action could affect others.

The majority of studies concerning moral sensitivity have been conducted in relation
to professional ethics, especially dental care and nursing (Bebeau, 1994, Bebeau, Rest, &
Yamoor, 1985; Clarkeburn, 2002; Johnson, 2011; Karcher, 1996; Latané, Nida, & Wilson,
1981; Lind & Rarick, 1999; McNeel, 1994; Robichaux, 2012; Staub, 1978; You, Maeda, &
Bebeau, 2011). Results indicate that for most people it is not a case of whether the person is
morally sensitive or not. Myyry (2003) argues that “there are substantial differences in
persons’ emotional sensitivity to the needs of others” (p. 10) and that “sensitivity is not
usually viewed as a general personality trait but rather a process which may vary from
situation to situation” (p. 11). There can be a variety of degrees of moral sensitivity among
people and even within persons themselves. Some people can be more sensitive to moral
issues in certain contexts than others. For example, a parent may be highly sensitive to moral
issues within the family while not as sensitive to moral problems in the workplace. On the
other hand, another person could be equally sensitive to moral issues in all contexts but may
be more sensitive to justice-related issues than to care-related issues. It is generally agreed
that moral sensitivity develops with age along with social cognitive abilities involving
perceiving events and behaviour, and inferring intentions, emotions, and motivations (Myyry,
(1983) also suggest that recognising and recalling information relevant to the event increases
with age.

Studies indicate that social intelligence (Curzer, 2014), moral imagination (Narvaez,
2008; Werhane, 1999; Yurtsever, 2006), empathy (Hoffman, 2000; Jordan, 2007; Myyry,
2003) and role-taking (Flavel, 1968; Hoffman, 2000) are especially important for moral
sensitivity. Robin, Reidenbach, and Forrest (1996) point out that in many difficult decisions,
moral concerns are not in plain sight and are fused with other, competing interests. People
who do not recognise moral problems, in other words, are morally insensitive, because they
fail to apply their moral beliefs and theories into everyday situations (Curzer, 2014). Curzer
(2014) maintains that the application of social intelligence – the set of cognitive and affective skills that allow a person to imagine his/herself in the other’s shoes – in moral dilemmas, is rather uncommon due to “the bare fact of otherness,” because people come from different backgrounds and “perhaps…simple self-centeredness” (p. 108).

Moral cognition cannot be separated from affect (Rest, 1986). Research suggests that empathy and role taking foster motivation for moral sensitivity (Flavel, 1968; Hoffman, 2000; Jordan, 2007; Myyry, 2003). Social intelligence also has common concepts with empathy and role-taking in that it requires people to imagine themselves in the others’ shoes (Curzer, 2014). The central aspect of moral imagination with respect to moral sensitivity is the ability to take the others’ perspective, either cognitively through role taking, or emotionally through empathy. However, moral imagination is a much wider concept that can sometimes lead to negative consequences (see Triune Ethics Theory below).

2.1.2. Moral Judgement

The second component of the FCM is moral judgement. It is described as the ability to choose the most appropriate course of action from among the recognised possibilities (Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986; 1994). Logically, this process follows moral sensitivity as here the needs of affected parties have been recognized, possible courses of action identified, and the potential consequences of actions and their effects on other individuals have also been considered (Bebeau, Rest, & Narvaez, 1999; Rest, 1983, Rest et al. 1999; 2000). However, it should be highlighted again that the order suggested here in only logical, not temporal.

Moral judgement has received the largest amount of scholarly attention, starting from Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory (1981; 1984) in the 1960s to the present. Arguably, Kohlberg’s theory has made the greatest contribution to moral psychology research, as studies on cognitive development of moral judgement (Barriaga et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Kohlberg, 1981; 1984; Myyry, 2003; Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Nisan & Kohlberg, 1982), criticisms from various lines of thought (Baril & Wright, 2012; Gilligan, 1982; Krettenauer & Edelstein, 1999; Locke, 1986; Sandberg & Juth, 2011; Schweder, 1982; Turiel, 1983; 1997), and reactions to criticisms (Feinberg et al., 2012; Rest 1983; Rest et al., 1999; 2000; Thoma et al., 1999) have so far dominated the field. Moral judgement and its development are investigated in greater depth in section 2.2. below.
2.1.3. Moral Motivation

Rest (1986) defines moral motivation as an individual’s value priorities. It is concerned with how (and whether) an individual prefers moral values over non-moral values. Once the moral salience of a situation and how a possible course of action may affect others has been recognised, and a course of action has been judged to be the best to follow in the given situation, moral motivation is required for the individual to feel driven to act on the judgement. Moral motivation thus refers to a commitment to act in accordance with one’s moral values, “whether or not to try to fulfil one’s moral ideal” (Rest, 1984, p. 27) and taking responsibility for any moral outcomes (Myyry, 2003).

Ever since Blasi (1980) identified a gap between moral judgement and action, arguing in his meta-analysis that moral action does not seem to correspond with the high scores of moral judgement on Kohlbergian tests, moral motivation has received a large amount of academic attention from both psychological (Hardy, 2006; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Lotze, Ravindran, & Myers, 2010; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013; Power, Roney, & Power, 2008) and philosophical perspectives (Blasi, 1980; Kretz, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2006; 2009; 2010a; 2010b). Philosophers and psychologists have argued that moral emotions (Blasi, 1999; Best, 1988; Coplan, 2010; Garcia & Ostrosky-Solis, 2006; Hernandez, 2009; Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011) on the one hand, and moral identity (Bergman, 2005a; Krettenauer, 2011; Kristjánsson, 2009; 2013; Monin & Jordan, 2009) on the other can best bridge this gap. The motivating quality of moral emotions and moral identity, their relation to each other, and the development of moral motivation in terms of moral emotions and moral identity are explored in greater depth below.

2.1.4. Moral Implementation

Moral implementation is sometimes interchangeably referred to as moral character or moral action, but in order to avoid confusion with the other two terms that are frequently used in this thesis in different contexts, in this study this component is referred to only as moral implementation. Moral implementation has been studied less than the other components. Bebeau, Rest, and Narvaez (1999) describe moral character in the following words:

“A person may have the first three components (be sensitive to moral issues, have good judgment, prioritize moral values), but if he or she is lacking in Component 4, the person will wilt under pressure or fatigue, won't follow through, will be distracted
or discouraged, and moral behaviour will fail. Component 4 presupposes that one has set goals, has self-discipline and controls impulse, and has the strength and skill to act in accord with one's goals.” (p. 22)

The development of moral character in this sense entails fostering moral determination and bravery to some extent for resisting distractions and pressure respectively, and the emotional drive and energy to follow through despite fatigue. As Narvaez (2010a) puts it, “experts in ethical action know how to keep their eye on the prize” (p. 171).

Although a search of “Four Components Model” and “moral character” or “component 4 development” yields relatively few results, literature related to the development of moral character can be found in moral identity development (Krettenauer, 2011; Moshman, 2009; Power, Power, & Clark, 2008) and in moral agency development (Lapsley, 2010; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010; Tappan, 2010) which relate to this through personality trait development (such as bravery) and development of moral autonomy.

2.2. Moral Judgement

Moral judgement was introduced in section 2.1.2 above; in this section, it is explored in greater depth. Two main processes lead to moral judgement: moral reasoning and moral intuitions. While the two processes were thought to be incompatible and studied in isolation, recent research indicates that the two processes are complementary. Initially, moral reasoning literature is presented below, followed by moral intuitions. Finally, how the two processes work together is presented.

The field of moral psychology grew mostly in response to Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory, which proposed a developmental structure to moral reasoning. However, its underlying assumptions have been heavily criticised; as a result, Kohlberg’s original theory has lost most of its credibility. Currently, the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (hereafter NKA) to the Cognitive Developmental Theory, advanced by Rest and colleagues, is more widely accepted as it addresses most of the criticisms directed at Kohlberg’s theory, albeit focusing solely on moral reasoning. On the other hand, Kohlberg’s original theory is more widely known.
2.2.1. Development of Moral Reasoning

The NKA proposes that moral development can be described through three schemas of reasoning. Rest et al. (1999; 2000) revised the stages of CDT (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984) to construct the schemas of the NKA. These three schemas are the Personal Interest Schema, the Maintaining Norms Schema, and the Post-Conventional schema (see Table 1).

In the Personal Interest Schema, the individual has an egocentric orientation to morality (as opposed to a socio-centric orientation), judging the rightness and wrongness of an action based only on its immediate consequences. Questions of morality remain at person to person/face-to-face basis, and individuals using this schema justify a moral decision by analysing what each stakeholder in a moral dilemma has to gain or lose in the consequences of an action, driven mainly by the notion of ‘if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours’. It is hypothesised that moral behaviour in this schema is motivated by external forces, and is heavily based on the approval of adults, mainly parents and teachers. Individuals operating at this level of reasoning are primarily concerned with themselves and people with whom they have an affectionate relationship (Rest et al. 2000, p. 387). It is regarded as a somewhat simpler and morally uncritical form of reasoning. It is also suggested that this style of reasoning develops early in childhood. In the latter stage of the personal interest schema, societal roles are more important. Moral evaluation of actions is in terms of relationships, and the concept of ‘treat others as you would like them to treat you’ becomes important. External approval is still an important factor in motivation, and moral behaviour is still based more on personal interests than societal interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cognitive Development Theory</th>
<th>Neo-Kohlbergian Approach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-conventional Level</td>
<td>Stage 1: Avoidance of Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 2: Self-interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional Level</td>
<td>Stage 3: Interpersonal Accord and Conformity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stage 4: Maintaining Authority and Social Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-conventional Level</td>
<td>Stage 5: Social Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: CDT Stages vs. NKA Schemas
The main characteristic of the second schema of the NKA (Maintaining Norms Schema, see Table 1) is conformity with society’s rules, and obeying them without much questioning or critical thinking, even if obedience or disobedience will not have a significant consequence. Rest et al. (1999; 2000) regard it as more complex than the Personal Interest Schema since it includes a socio-centric perspective. Individuals using this schema see no need to question authority and rules, almost having complete faith in them. Law is connected to order in a moral sense; thus, the law is morality. Also, this schema provides a sense of moral certainty; the individual is likely to think that s/he knows that s/he is right for the sake of the entire society.

This schema is typical of adolescents and adults. Rest and colleagues argue that the main reason for the advance to this level during adolescence is the “discovery of society” (Rest et al., 2000, p. 386). This refers to the understanding that people are connected to each other through institutions and ‘the system,’ (Rest et al., 2000), and not only on a face-to-face basis. This awareness raises questions about the morality of society and issues of moral authority. This is due to greater abstract thinking capacities of adolescents compared to younger children, developing around age 10 (Rest et al., 2000), and the related advent of moral imagination. As children are more and more capable of understanding distant institutions functioning on abstract principles – aided by their newly developing imaginative capabilities – their (understanding of the) world expands. This leads to the “discovery of society.”

However, the matter may not be about the entire society, but about the peer-group. Adolescence is also the time when alliances and friendships are forged (Haidt, 2001), so this schema may be related more to solidifying such alliances by uncritically subscribing to the dominant norms of the peer group and maintaining those values, rather than the entire society. It may also have a connection with our evolved tribal nature; perhaps the issue is related more to the development of a sense of belonging to a tribe or group during adolescence, rather than our cognitive capacities affording moral reasoning at only this level of complexity.

The Post-Conventional schema (see Table 1) is characterised by a more independent moral orientation. At this level, rules are regarded more as guidelines rather than definite moral dictations. As a result, an individual may disobey certain rules which do not reflect his or her principles. The most fundamental tenet of the Post-Conventional schema is that moral
obligations are to be based on shared ideals, are fully reciprocal, and are open to scrutiny (Rest et al., 2000; p.388). This kind of moral reasoning is typical of adults; however, relatively fewer active members of society reach this level according to Rest et al. (1999; 2000). Kohlberg (1984) had also found that fewer members of society reach the stages of the Post-Conventional level. (See Table 1 for how the Post-Conventional level in the CDT and the Post-Conventional schema in the NKA are related.)

Eckersberger & Zimba (1997) propose that the advance from one stage/schema to the next can be understood in terms of a heteronomous vs. autonomous orientation to the style of reasoning defined by the schemas. The authors indicate that each Kohlbergian stage (see Table 1 for CDT and NKA stage comparison) has a further set of sub-stages, A and B (heteronomous and autonomous orientations, respectively). It is envisioned that when an individual advances from, for example, stage 3 to stage 4, they advance from an autonomous orientation of stage 3 reasoning (Stage 3B) to a heteronomous orientation of stage 4 reasoning (Stage 4A). According to Kohlberg (1984), this could be partly due to how progress takes place. Progress from one stage to the next is usually prompted by a more complex observation of the moral domain of life; in other words, it is partly motivated externally (e.g. observing peers functioning/making decisions at a higher stage of moral reasoning). It would logically follow that in most cases an externally motivated advance to the next stage would lead to a heteronomous orientation until the reasoning style of the stage is properly internalised, and an autonomous orientation can be taken. Once this autonomous orientation is established, it is possible that the moral horizon of the individual is broadened, and the individual becomes ready to engage with the observation required for the advance to the next stage.

2.2.2. Moral Intuitions

The core assumption of the above-presented rationalist approach to moral judgement is that moral reasoning is responsible for moral judgements. This assumption was challenged by Haidt in 2001 with the Social Intuitionist Model (SIM). Haidt argued that reasoning does not reflect the whole picture of moral judgement, and instead asserted that moral judgements are not the result of conscious reasoning, but of unconscious, intuitive judgements. The SIM relies less on decision-making mechanisms available to our conscious observation, and more on unconscious mechanisms that operate outside the awareness of our consciousness and demand less cognitive effort. The core assumption of the SIM is that moral judgements are
caused by automatic moral intuitions. Moral reasoning is activated only when it is called upon for purposes of justifying a moral judgement. Haidt (2001) defines *moral judgement* as “evaluations (good versus bad) of the actions or character of a person that are made with respect to a set of virtues held by a culture or subculture to be obligatory” (p. 817). *Moral reasoning* is defined as conscious (intentional, effortful, within the individual’s awareness) mental activity of analysing information about people and the situation in order to reach a moral judgement. And finally, *moral intuition* is defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of research, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).

Haidt (2001) offers four main lines of criticism of the rationalist approach. First of all, that there are not just one, but two cognitive processes involved in decision-making, namely reasoning *and* intuitions. Reasoning, a slow and effortful process, is largely accessible to our consciousness, but intuitions, effortless and automatic, are unconscious operations, and cause the larger part of moral judgements. Secondly, although the reasoning process may seem to be objective, it is most often driven by relatedness motives (Chen & Chaiken, 1999; Chen, Shechter & Chaiken, 1996) and coherence motives (Kesebir & Pyszczynski, 2011; Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999). Thirdly, such motivated reasoning does not objectively reflect the decision-making process but merely produces posthoc justifications. And finally, moral action is based more on emotions than on reasoning.

In return, Haidt (2001) proposes four main “links” in SIM concerning the occurrence of moral judgements (see Figure 1). Initially, a situation elicits a moral intuition. This leads to the sudden appearance of a judgement in the individual’s consciousness (link 1: *intuitive judgement link*). This judgement occurs automatically and effortlessly. Next, a justification for the already made judgement is created (link 2: *posthoc reasoning link*). This is done in order to convey the judgement to another person. Haidt (2001) argues that reasoned discussions and arguments do not usually cause another person to change their position unless the argument taps into the other person’s moral intuitions (link 3: *reasoned persuasion link*). On the other hand, the simple fact that one believes in a moral position is likely to affect another person’s moral intuitions if the two individuals have a positive relationship (e.g. friends, allies; link 4: *social persuasion link*). According to Haidt, this comes as a result of our sensitivity to the emergence of group norms.
Besides the four main links SIM proposes, there are two more links: reasoned judgement link (link 5), and private reflection link (link 6). Link 5 suggests that in rare cases where the initial intuition is weak, and processing capacity is high, people could reason their way to a judgement by “sheer force of logic” (Haidt, 2001; p. 819), overriding the intuition. Haidt argues that link 6 can spontaneously activate an intuition that contradicts the initial intuitive judgement. Role taking is the most common way of doing this as when one imagines oneself in the shoes of another, empathy is activated, and one can understand the pain, affection, or other vicarious emotional responses. Haidt (2001) also adds that while rationalist models focus on the last two links, the SIM concentrates on the first four links. However, Haidt maintains that there are no links between one person’s reasoning and another’s judgement.

Concerning the development of moral intuitions in the SIM, it is proposed that they are partly innate, but they are also shaped by culture. In Moral Foundations Theory, Haidt and colleagues define innate as “organised in advance of experience” (Graham et al. 2013, p. 7). These innate moral intuitions are then either built upon or discarded through experiences largely influenced by the culture in which an individual grows up. Haidt argues that just as children are born with the capability to learn all the sounds of any language, but lose this ability after passing a certain sensitive period and fail to properly pronounce new sounds of a language they learn after the sensitive period, children are born with the capacity to
internalize any moral value, but after a certain age, they are less able to do so, and do not internalize the values of foreign cultures. Haidt (2001) calls this the selective loss of intuitions. On the other hand, through being immersed in a culture, other moral intuitions that are valued by the culture become more pronounced as children grow. This is called immersion in custom complexes. Haidt proposes that the sensitive period when children internalise values seems to be between the ages of 9 and 15. If children younger than 9 years old migrate to another culture, the values of the previous culture do not seem to have a lasting effect. On the other hand, people older than 15 years of age experience culture shock when they travel to a foreign culture. Haidt posits that the rules and norms of the host culture may be learnt, but they will not be internalised. This sensitive period overlaps with adolescence; a period when children learn how to make alliances. Haidt (2001) hypothesises that children acquire moral norms from their peers. He names this process as peer socialisation, and explains it in the following terms:

“children’s task in late childhood and adolescence is not to become like their parents but to fit into their peer group, for it is among peers that alliances must be formed and prestige garnered... Children acquire their culture – including moral values – from their peers, just as they acquire their phonology (i.e. children of immigrants copy the accent of their peers, not their parents)” (p. 828)

The question of universality which has been posed to rationalist approaches to moral judgement also applies to intuitionist approaches. The development of moral reasoning is highly likely to be heavily based on culture since it is through our culture that we get our habits and styles of rationalising the world (Haidt, 2001). However, the development of intuitions may be more universal, as this is based on human psychology – a rather more consistent structure across cultures than habits of reasoning. This is not to deny that social intuitions could differ so much from culture to culture that foreign people may sometimes feel like complete aliens to a particular culture, however, the development of social/moral intuitions could follow a similar process across cultures. In Moral Foundations Theory, Graham, Haidt and colleagues (2013) argue that moral capacities are innate and universal. They point out, however, innate and universal does not mean unmalleable. Instead, moral intuitions are revised through cultural experiences.
2.2.3. **Rational Control over Intuitions**

Research on moral intuitions explains how moral judgements occur, and research on moral reasoning explains how moral judgement develops. However, unlike Haidt (2001) claims, moral reasoning does not simply create confabulatory justifications for past actions and does lead to moral judgement. Several mechanisms of cognitive control over initial intuitive judgements exist, and these have a direct influence on judgement. Indirectly, styles of moral reasoning can become habituated, and eventually act like moral intuitions.

Cognitive control over moral intuitions has been demonstrated through cognitive override (Fine, 2006) and emotion reappraisal (Feinberg et al., 2012). Cognitive override depends on being motivated to withhold an initial judgement. Motivation to pass an accurate judgement has been shown to withhold the original intuition (Thompson et al. 1994). Dependency on the person being judged was also shown to lead to rational judgements over intuitive ones (Pendry & Macrae, 1994). Also, concerns about stereotyping were shown to cause people to withhold their initial judgement in order to arrive at a more accurate or socially desirable judgement through reasoning (Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Devine, 1989). While these motivations cannot be considered to be the entire list of possible motivations for a cognitive override of initial intuitive judgement, they nonetheless provide evidence that, given the motivation, reasoning can override intuitive moral judgements.

Emotional reappraisal is a kind of emotion regulation strategy, though not the only one (Hu et al., 2014). It allows a person to step out of a situation emotionally in order to evaluate the situation rationally, including his or her own emotional situation (Feinberg et al. 2012). Feinberg et al. (2012) indicate that this “involves construing an emotion-eliciting situation or event in a way that diminishes the intensity of the emotional experience… When exposed to a potentially immoral act that elicits emotionally driven moral intuitions, some people … reappraise their emotion by focusing on why they are experiencing it and whether there is good reason to experience it, and… this reappraisal … limit[s] the emotional impact” (p.789). Feinberg and colleagues (2012) found that individuals who had the habit of reappraising their emotions arrived at fewer moral judgements based on their initial intuitions overall, supporting the position that our initial moral intuitions, based on our emotions, are malleable control and manipulation by conscious effort. This suggests that a disposition to rein in impulsive/intuitive judgements by thinking twice can help one keep one’s moral intuitions in check.
Rational intuitions refer to paths of reasoning that have become habitualised and cause judgements to appear as if intuitions. After having gone through steps of learning and practising, our conscious and reasoned efforts become internalised and habitual. Narvaez (2010a) calls this process the development of expertise while Sauer (2012) calls it the education of intuitions. When next time this internalised, habitual rational process is invoked, it behaves like an intuition; a judgement suddenly appears in our consciousness, and we do not go through the steps of weighing evidence, careful thinking, etc., once again. This is not the same intuition as the one we had before learning and internalising the reasoning process.

Sauer (2012) argues that rational judgements could be passed automatically if they have been habitualised. He argues that if we repeat the same action frequently enough over a long enough period of time, the action becomes habitual. What we once devoted conscious effort to (keep your foot on the brake when you start the car) becomes habitual and does not require conscious effort after a period. This is habitualisation. Sauer further maintains that acts which are habitualised are not random. Habitual actions serve a purpose (e.g. getting back home), and such habitualising practices and purposes can be provided by education.

“In the course of an agent’s education, her practical reasons become embodied in her automatic judgemental and behavioural responses. These reasons are thus both internal to a subject’s psychology and external to her conscious awareness and initiation control at a given point in time. Making explicit the reasons that brought me to adopt my after work routine – namely that I want to go home – is an enterprise that comes entirely post hoc. But it need not be confabulatory; indeed, it would be ludicrous to suppose so.” (Sauer, 2012; p. 264)

Narvaez also supports the position that some automatic judgements are not merely intuitive, but are based on (previous) reasoning. She names this the development of “expertise” (Narvaez & Lapsley; 2008; Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c) instead of habits. Narvaez makes a distinction between the expert intuitions experts have regarding a domain and the naïve intuitions that novices have. Narvaez (2010a) makes use of three concepts, arguing for the integration of moral reasoning and moral intuitions. She argues that deliberation allows “one to assess the signals of intuition and the construction of reasons and to scrutinise their validity” (Narvaez, 2010a; p. 169). This makes it possible for perceptions to shift, altering one's intuitions in the course of deliberation. Next, she argues for moral deliberation in terms of moral imagination. In essence, moral imagination is a sophisticated kind of moral deliberation. Moral imagination allows the individual to consider things
beyond the immediate in terms of time, alternative, and place. This helps the individual to move beyond the immediate, allowing one to have different intuitions, monitored by reason. Finally, Narvaez supports expert-to-novice teaching and thus developing moral expertise in which a dialogue between intuitions and reasoning deepen understanding of a given moral situation (see section 1.5 above). Intuitions and reasoning constantly feed each other, and with the guidance of an expert, moral expertise develops. Intuitive reactions are subjected to scrutiny through reasoning, and the reasoning process then becomes intuitive. As a result, expert intuitions develop.

In summary, while moral reasoning is a conscious and effortful process, moral intuitions are unconscious and automatic processes. Moral judgement is primarily rooted in moral intuitions. However, moral intuitions are not formed randomly; they are based on cultural experiences and habitualised reasoning styles. Moreover, effortful cognitive processes can control the unconscious intuitive processes. This indicates that fostering certain styles of moral reasoning during education may equip students with the right moral intuitions, and the cognitive abilities to maintain and control moral intuitions.

2.3. Moral Motivation

Moral motivation is defined as an individual’s value priorities (Rest, 1986). It is concerned with how (and whether) an individual prefers moral values over non-moral values (Myyry, 2003; Rest, 1986). While moral judgement allows a person to understand what is the best thing to do in a given situation, moral motivation is necessary to drive the person to act on the judgement.

In his meta-analysis, Blasi (1980) concludes that moral reasoning does not correlate with moral action; this situation has since been termed the ‘gappiness problem’ and finds support from recent studies as well (Hardy, 2006). Hardy (2006) compares the motivational force that moral identity, moral reasoning and moral emotions provide. His research shows that moral identity and moral emotions play a significant role in motivating the individual to moral action, but not moral reasoning. He suggests that a larger, personality oriented perspective is necessary to understand morality, as pure reasoning is shown to contribute rarely to moral action. Educators and philosophers have called for the resolution of this gap (Kretz 2012; Kristjánsson, 2010a). In order to bridge this gap, philosophers and psychologists have focused on the motivational power of moral emotions and the moral self (Blasi, 1980; Hardy, 2006; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Kretz, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2006; 2009; 2010a;
Haidt (2003) indicates that moral emotions can be defined as the emotions that are concerned with the well-being and interests of others. This definition does not categorise specific emotions as moral or not, rather the context in which an emotion is felt makes it moral. Huebner, Dwyer, and Hauser (2008) suggest that “the source of moral judgments lies in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a primary role in motivating morally relevant action” (p. 1).

An exhaustive list of morally relevant emotions and their effect on behaviour is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, many studies have focused on specific emotions and their influence on moral behaviour. Empathy has been shown to cause people to act more compassionately to those with whom one shares a close positive bond (Hoffman, 2000; Myyry, 2003); anger at perpetrators has been demonstrated to motivate attacking behaviour (Graham et al., 2013; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998; Hutchinson & Gross, 2011; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994); guilt has been shown to motivate pro-social behaviour in order to make reparations and right the wrongdoing one has committed (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011; Sanders, Pattison, & Hurwitz, 2011); the expectancy of being proud of good action was shown to motivate action (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011); shame has been demonstrated to be negatively linked with morality by “freezing the global self” (Sanders, Pattison, & Hurwitz, 2011, p. 86) from taking action (Hoffman, 2000; Myyry, 2003; Sanders, Pattison, & Hurwitz, 2011; Tangney & Dearing 2002); and disgust has been shown to cause avoidance of perceived immorality (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, and Imada 1997; Hutchinson & Gross, 2011).

On the other hand, many psychologists and philosophers think that moral emotions alone do not present the entire picture of moral motivation. Blasi (1999) indicates that emotions cannot be the motivational force for “moral” actions. He considers intentionality to be a fundamental element of moral action and argues that the automatic and unintentional nature of behaviour that is driven by emotions do not meet this criterion. He instead suggests that moral identity provides a better picture. This position finds support from many philosophers (Dewey, 1932; Kristjánsson, 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010).

According to Pasupathi and Wainryb (2010), moral identity is usually measured as how much value people place on moral values as opposed to other values. While moral
emotions and motivations can sometimes account for morally right behaviour or the lack of it, over time certain people tend to make “right” decisions more often. This is because of a developed moral identity (Pasupathi & Wainryb, 2010).

However, this begs the question of what is a moral value, and further to this, what is value. In very broad terms, what makes anything worthy of value is the efficiency any given thing provides in achieving a certain aim. Based on this, one could discuss different types of values, e.g. the economic value of an object or a behaviour based on how well it achieves its economic aims; the intellectual value of, say, an academic paper or a critical disposition based on how well the paper or the critical disposition achieves the intellectual aim, etc. This definition makes an exhaustive list of values and aims beyond the scope of this thesis, as it would indeed be very long.

In line with the naturalistic underpinnings of this thesis, I would say that moral value is defined by how well an act achieves the aims of survival, reproduction and thriving (SRT) (Narvaez, 2010a; de Waal, 2014) of an immediate entity (such as an individual, or a community), or the quantity, quality and diversity of life in the broadest sense. Acts that achieve these ends would thus be morally valuable, and the abstraction of the common elements of these acts would be called a ‘moral value.’ For example, if the act of imparting accurate information with the intent of telling the truth, as opposed to imparting inaccurate information with the intent of deceiving, contributes to the aims of SRT of a community, the abstraction of the common element of such acts – honesty – would be deemed a moral value (and associated with a positive normative evaluation, such as ‘honesty’ has – assuming that community values its aims of SRT).

Once a value has been identified, and specifically identified as a moral value, the definition of this value can be employed as a general guideline and/or aim for behaviour. The definition of moral identity as the prioritization of moral values over other kinds and types of values is in reference to this: which types of values are considered before other kinds of values in terms of acting as a guideline for behaviour? However, this also requires addressing the concept of identity.

Identity can be discussed at length as it acquires different qualities in different contexts; one might talk about one’s tribal identity, as in their nationality, ethnicity, or any other similar kind of group, religious identity, or gender identity. This thesis is not concerned with such accounts of identity, but with the aspects of individuals’ identity relevant to moral
psychology – morality is not the preserve of any group, no matter how the group is defined, and whether it is or not is not relevant to the focus of this thesis.

Instead, what is of interest here is how the morally relevant aspects of one’s identity leads or does not lead to moral behaviour. The concept of identity has a narrative quality to it (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2010), as it is informed by one’s past, and future aspirations – i.e. temporally connected backwards and forwards thematically: “narratives both reflect existing conceptions of self, and may also exert prospective influences on future self-views” (Wainryb & Pasupathi, 2010; p. 64).

Furthermore, the construct of identity is of interest for what might be called its function. One’s identity tends to be a thread of intertwined themes and narratives that influence one’s interaction with the world. Based on one’s (moral) identity a person is likely to be more (morally) sensitive to certain things than others, and likely to pass judgements in a certain fashion as opposed to possible alternatives. By extension, identities also influence how one reacts to the happenings around them – essentially influencing both our experiences (how we process things happening inside ourselves psychologically and outside ourselves – how we are affected by the world) and our choices (how we affect the world).

One final element of identities is that they are what one takes one’s self to be. This leads to a circular argument about identity being the self and the self being the identity. However, the difference between a self and an identity is that selves are what they are concretely (in the sense that “I am what I am” – insofar as such an abstract thing as a ‘self’ can be thought of as concrete), but identities are perceptions of this self.

The term ‘value’ appears throughout this thesis, although it is slightly more relevant in the philosophy section (Section 4) of Chapter I, and throughout Chapter II. The term is used in the sense defined here. The term ‘identity’ is most relevant in this section, and it used in other parts of the thesis specifically in terms of ‘moral identity’, as discussed in more depth below.

Different scholars have discussed the concept of moral identity in different times. However, sometimes the discussions of moral identity overlap with conceptions of the moral self. Concerning the philosophy of moral identity, or the moral self as Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) and Kristjánsson (2010a) refer to it, an important distinction needs to be made regarding cognition and affect. While it may appear as if cognition and affect are two
different things, they are a single whole (Best 1988; Kristjánsson, 2010a). We do not feel emotions unless we cognate something – this can be other-related like feeling anger at the perception of the moral law being broken, or self-related like feeling shame for having acted too selfishly. Conversely, our cognition has its roots in our emotions. When emotions are dispositional (as opposed to episodic emotions, Kristjánsson, 2009) they direct what we will be sensitive to, the decisions we are likely to make, the values we are likely to prioritise... As Dewey (1909) puts it, an individual “is an organic whole, intellectually, socially, morally, as well as physically” (p. 5).

Kristjánsson (2009) indicates that there is a difference between emotions that are felt episodically and settled emotional dispositions. Episodic emotions are felt in response to a situation, but emotional dispositions are settled states of emotions. While feeling excited about a certain event is an episodic feeling, a general trait of being frequently excited – or excitableness – is a settled emotional disposition. These emotional dispositions form our character traits, and our interactions with the world are guided by these emotions. Kristjánsson indicates that the educationally relevant aspect of this is that the right kind of emotional dispositions should be fostered during education.

Comparable lines of arguments can be found in John Dewey’s writings as well. According to Dewey, the self is the interaction of habits and interests (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998). While Dewey does not explore the relationship of emotions and character traits in depth, he indicates that affect guides our interests, and frequent practice or pursuit of interests becomes habitual. He maintains that “the self is constituted, on the one hand, by its acts and habits, and on the other, by its social membership” (cited from Bergman, 2005b, p. 51). Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) explains that the most characteristic activity of the self is deliberate choice, and that “as Aristotle said, the goodness of a good man shines through his deeds” (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 342). Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) emphasises that once the self has made a certain choice, it is disposed to make similar ones in similar situations in the future, ultimately becoming habits. Furthermore, Bergman (2005b) states that for Dewey “character is the interaction of habits” (p. 48). Since, for Dewey, habits are such a fundamental part of a person’s character, and habits are formed by deliberate choice, choice is the means by which selves are created and maintained.
The focus on habits is also shared by Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. According to Kristjánsson (2010a) who indicates that morally relevant habits are based on emotional dispositions, the ultimate aim of the Aristotelian focus on habits is to “help the young gradually actualise their own [practical wisdom], in order to re-evaluate and possibly revise the emotional dispositions with which they were originally inculcated, and to infuse those dispositions with moral value” (pp. 235-236). A parallel to this kind of practical wisdom can be found in The Moral Self (Dewey, 1932, from Hickman & Alexander, 1998), where Dewey states that the “union of benevolent impulse [emotions] and intelligent reflection is ... most likely to result in conduct that is good. But in this union the role of thoughtful inquiry is quite as important as that of sympathetic affection” (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 348).

Dewey (in Hickman & Alexander, 1998) agrees with Aristotle (and Spinoza) that “happiness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself” (p. 351), and states that “it is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself” (emphasis original, p. 353). Bergman (2005b) states that according to Dewey “the only moral “end” or “law” is growth of the self; the essential moral criterion is what sort of self is being furthered and formed” (p. 51).

What kind of self is being advanced and formed is guided by what Frankfurt (1971) calls second order volitions/desires. If a person desires, for example, to be honest, this is a first-order volition. If a person “wants to want to” (p. 9) be honest, this is a second-order volition. Second order volitions form the base of what Dewey (1932) calls interests. Kristjánsson argues that the “real integration between moral cognition and moral action is achieved only when one’s moral understandings and concerns have become part of one’s sense of selfhood: a selfhood thereby constructed under the influence of moral reasons. Acting against such a self-identity would represent unacceptable self-betrayal or even self-loss” (Kristjánsson, 2010a; p. 90). Blasi (1999) further indicates that without second order volitions one cannot be a person in the fullest sense of the word. He maintains that people can have different reasons for wanting to want something and that “[f]rom this perspective (and from the perspective of moral personhood), it matters less to know what kind of emotions people spontaneously experience than to know the reflexive desires they have about these emotions and the core concerns from which both the reflexive desires and the attempts to regulate the emotions derive” (p. 11). He argues that a truly moral identity is constructed when the second order volitions a person holds are also based on moral concerns, rather than pragmatic or simply identity-consistency or other concerns.
With regards to the development of moral motivation, Malti and Buchmann (2010) found that close friendships are a moral motivator for young adults, but interestingly not for mid-adolescents. Malti and Buchmann (2010) compared the sources of moral motivation of 1258 15-year-olds and 584 21-year-olds by evaluating their responses to hypothetical dilemmas. The authors indicate that for mid-adolescents, the relationship with the caregiver is more important for moral motivation than friendship. For young adults, the relation with caregivers is not as important for moral motivation as it is for adolescents. Malti and Buchmann (2010) suggest that this may be the result of having solved autonomy and interdependence problems by young adulthood, and thus a lesser dependence on parents. The researchers found no relation between education level and moral motivation. They suggest that education may be more important for cognitive moral tasks/skills (e.g. moral judgement). They found that valuing social justice predicts moral motivation, and state that several studies “provide empirical support for the argument that the strength of motivation to act upon rules is associated with the extent to which one values justice, incorporates this value into one’s identity, and draws on it as a basis for moral behaviour” (p. 146).

2.4. Moral Foundations Theory

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) is based on evolutionary thinking on morality and cross-cultural research on virtues (Graham et al., 2013). The authors state they developed the theory in order to shed light on “why morality varies so much across cultures yet still shows so many similarities and recurrent themes” (MoralFoundations.org, 2012, n.p.). Their argument is that several innate and universally available psychological systems are the foundations of “intuitive ethics;” and then cultures around the world build their own virtues, narratives, and institutions on top of these foundations, leading to the immense cultural variety in morality. However, it should be noted that the variation is not limited to cultural differences as it is posited that there are even greater differences within cultures than between cultures.

MFT is based on four assumptions: nativism, cultural learning, intuitionism, and pluralism. Nativism posits that there are psychological systems that develop in the brain even before birth. However, the authors point out that these innate structures are far from being unmalleable. Rather, they are “organised in advance of experience” (p. 7). During childhood, and stretching into adulthood, cultural learning (i.e. experience) revises the innate structures and reconfigures the individual’s morality into its cultural norms. Graham et al. (2013)
indicate that “MFT is a theory about the universal first draft of the moral mind, and about how that draft gets revised in variable ways across cultures” (p. 10). Intuitionism completes the circle of nativism and cultural learning by adding that moral behaviour and evaluations are not the results of conscious reasoning, but rather that they occur rapidly and automatically, “relatively effortless, associative, heuristic processing” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 11). The authors also argue that “evolutionary thinking encourages pluralism” (p. 12) on the grounds that solutions to evolutionary adaptive problems are fashioned by whatever material is available. This suggests that our ancestors used whatever cognitive materials were available to them to solve recurring adaptive problems they faced, rather than inventing novel psychological resources.

Based on the above claims, MFT identifies five foundations: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. Kesebir and Pyszczynski (2011) explain that “these foundations, notwithstanding individual and cultural differences, are posited to be recurrent themes of intuitive ethics across time and space” (p. 880).

**Care/harm Foundation:** This foundation relates to our evolutionary history as mammals, considering social/emotional attachments and empathy – our ability to feel and dislike the pain of others. It underlies virtues (and vices) of kindness and nurturance such as compassion or cruelty.

**Fairness/cheating Foundation:** This foundation relates to our evolutionary history as social animals, who face opportunities of “non-zero-sum exchanges and relationships” (p. 13). It is based on the evolutionary process of reciprocal altruism. It is related to ideas such as justice, proportionality, rights, and autonomy.

**Loyalty/betrayal Foundation:** This foundation is related to our tribal nature and ability to form shifting coalitions. This foundation strengthens the bonds within a group. It underlies virtues and vices such as patriotism, self-sacrifice for the group, loyalty and betrayal to the group as the name suggests.

**Authority/subversion Foundation:** This foundation relates to our social nature forming hierarchies. It underlies virtues of leadership and followership, including obedience and deference to legitimate authorities and traditions.
Sanctity/degradation Foundation: This foundation relates to physical and spiritual cleanliness. It is based on the feeling of disgust, an evolutionary adaptation to avoid sickness and other forms of contamination. Treating the body as a temple, and virtues and vices related to this notion, result from this foundation.

Although MFT was not developed to shed light on different political moralities, Haidt and Graham (2007) found that the theory mapped on differences in political ideology easily and closely. The theory is also best known for the empirical results it yielded on this topic. Graham et al. (2013) point out that western liberal political culture, which focuses on protecting individuals from harm and exploitation, is relatively narrow compared to other parts of the world. They maintain that “in most traditional societies the moral domain is broader, including concerns about protecting groups, institutions, traditions, and the moral order in general” (p. 16). The authors also show that there is a difference between social classes: richer people tend to have a narrower moral domain, and that they value this narrower moral domain slightly more intensely (Graham & Haidt, 2007; Graham et al., 2013).

According to Haidt and Graham (2007), the fundamental difference between liberals and conservatives lies in how much individuals embrace different moral foundations, and which ones they do. The authors report that “liberal morality rests primarily on … two foundations (… fairness/[cheating] and harm/care), whereas conservative morality rests on five foundations, including [loyalty/betrayal], authority/[subversion], and sanctity/degradation] concerns as well” (pp. 112-113).

Concerned with the care and fairness foundations more than loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations, it could be argued that liberals are much more concerned with matters of autonomy and liberty. Graham et al. (2013) explain that liberal morality is characterised by greater openness to experience, lower need for structure, and “a dampened disgust sensitivity,” (p. 18) which would in turn make liberals less anxious in challenging traditional authority structures.

Conservative morality, on the other hand, while valuing all foundations, does not place as much value on care and fairness foundations as liberals do, but emphasizes loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations much more than liberals, placing higher respect on values such as “family and country” (McAdams et al, 2008). The authors report that conservatives have a higher need for order, structure and closure, and lower openness to new experiences.
compared to liberals. Conservatives have a higher disgust sensibility as well, leading to a higher emphasis on the sanctity foundation. These findings, the authors argue, provide the psychological framework for politically conservative morality.

The MFT also sheds light on cultural differences in morality to a certain extent. The authors also argue that, while there are significant differences between eastern and western cultures, MTF provides a relatively good explanation concerning the differences in morality. Graham et al. (2013) found that even after controlling for various demographic variables, individuals from Eastern cultures (South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia) valued loyalty and sanctity related virtues slightly more than their Western counterparts. Furthermore, this is “consistent with established cultural differences in collectivism ... and the role of purity concerns in daily life and religious practices” (Graham et al., 2013; p. 26). Moreover, the authors found that “compared to the liberal vs. conservative differences in the U.S., these cross-cultural differences were small – consistent with the theory that variation within cultures exceeds variation between cultures ...” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 26).

The fact that variation within cultures exceeds the variation between cultures indicates that the findings of Graham and colleagues are also applicable in the Turkish context. However, given the unique position of the Turkish culture nestled in between individualistic Western cultures and collectivist Eastern cultures, morality in Turkey may be much more diverse, and the moral concerns of the smaller communities that make up the Turkish people, including all ethnic and religious minorities, maybe even more diverse. This further adds to the importance of fostering a pluralistic understanding and approach to morality in moral education in Turkey.

In a different line, the fact that variation within cultures exceeds the variation between cultures could suggest that typical clashes between progressive and conservative groups around the world is bound not by geographical similarities (or differences), but by a much deeper (possibly evolutionary) psychological split within our species. However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.

2.5. Triune Ethics Theory

Triune Ethics Theory (TET) was developed by Narvaez (2008; 2010b; 2011; Narvaez and Vaydich, 2008) in response to the complexities of moral psychology, for which both the rationalist and the intuitionist models have failed to account on their own. TET takes into
perspective evolutionary psychology and neurobiology, as well as developmental psychology. Narvaez (2010b) explains the TET in her own words:

“Triune ethics theory ... integrates neuro-scientific, evolutionary, and developmental findings to explain differences in moral functioning (capacities that involve noticing, feeling for, imagining, solving, and acting on the needs of others). TET proposes that three basic types of affectively rooted moral orientations emerged from human evolution and are influenced by early care and social environments: the ethics of security, engagement, and imagination. Each orientation has neurobiological roots that are suggested by the structures and circuitry of human brain evolution ... and each prioritizes a different set of emotions. When the propensities for action in a particular orientation trump other values, they become an ethic. That is, as a type of motivated cognition, an activated ethic influences what affordances (action possibilities) are salient, and what goals and actions are preferred. Thus, moral action emerges from the affective stance underlying the ethic that imbues ongoing experience with a particular moral value ... Each ethic makes normative claims, making particular actions seem “right” based on the interaction between the particular context and the habits of mind brought to the situation by the person (character).” (p. 81)

TET has been developed to meet three goals: (a) It aims to integrate findings in neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive science into moral psychology in order to shed light on moral research that focuses on the moral life of people. It is a bottom-up theory that takes into account the “motivational orientations that are rooted in evolved unconscious emotional systems shaped by experience that predispose one to react to and act on events in particular ways” (Narvaez, 2008, p. 96). (b) TET aims to understand human morality from the perspective of person’s interactions with the context. Narvaez argues that people differ in their early emotional experiences which prime them to behave in certain ways in a given context, while situations evoke particular reactions. (c) TET also suggests the initial conditions for optimal moral development. It takes into account the “environment of evolutionary adaptedness,” (the psychological environment in which we have evolved; p. 96) which supports optimal brain development for moral maturity.

The theory outlines three different ethics that are grounded in various parts of the brain. The Security Ethic is rooted in parts of the brain that evolved the earliest. Narvaez implies that this ethic is built on the most basic survival needs, and correspondingly in the same areas of the brain that regulates these drives. The Engagement Ethic is grounded on
relatively more recently evolved parts of the brain, and that it is characteristically mammalian. Social bonding and affection are rooted in similar regions of the brain; hence values of cooperation receive higher emphasis in the Ethic of Engagement. Imagination Ethic is grounded in the most recently evolved parts of the brain, and it is characteristically human. It makes use of all the capacities of the human brain and can move beyond the immediate. Imagination Ethic can bind both with the Security Ethic (in which the individual takes a more anti-social position against imagined strangers) and with the Engagement Ethic (in which the individual takes a more cooperative position with imagined strangers) (Narvaez, 2008).

**Security Ethics (Bunker Morality):** Evolutionarily older brain structures related to morality are activated when the individual feels threatened, such as the anger-rage emotion system, and the fear-distress emotion circuit in the brain. These networks are useful for self-preservation. The author notes that the security ethics are associated with threats like death, leading the individual to feel less compassion towards companions. The “fight or flight” mode as well as seeking one's basic needs is embedded in this system. Narvaez also adds that priming an individual with a market orientation also makes the security ethic more accessible, making the individual less compassionate.

**Engagement Ethic (Harmony Morality):** Harmony morality relies more on compassion as opposed to self-preservation. It involves the use of emotion systems that allow intimacy and “limbic resonance,” implying the use of empathy. The ethic of engagement is oriented to face-to-face emotional affiliation with others, especially with those whom the individual shares an affectionate, caring relationship, as well as social bonds. It underlies self-sacrifice and compassionate response. Narvaez notes that when moral exemplars engage in committed or risky actions for others, they are typically driven by affiliation and compassion.

**Imagination Ethic (Mindful or Heartless Morality):** The imagination ethic makes use of more complex brain structures which have evolved relatively recently, taking full advantage of humans’ cognitive reasoning capacities, fundamental for social and moral functioning in complex societies. The key trait of the ethics of imagination that distinguishes it from the ethic of security and engagement is that it allows for the individual to address concerns beyond the immediate and envision alternatives to what exists, and plan and guide action for change. However, the ethic of imagination can be harnessed by both the security ethic and the engagement ethic. When it is harnessed by the security ethic, the ethics of imagination allows the individual to become more protective of the group against (imagined)
outsiders, making the individual less compassionate for out-group people, creating a “heartless morality.” On the other hand, when it is harnessed by the ethic of engagement, the individual becomes more interested in cooperation with (imagined) others, or possibly future generations, thus creating a “mindful morality.” Narvaez adds that the Imagination Ethic is the one that has been studied most extensively, namely by Piaget, Kohlberg, and the rationalist tradition in general.

2.6. Summary

The main aim of this section has been to find an answer to the second research question and shed light on how moral behaviour occurs and develops. The reviewed literature is posited to contribute to teachers’ psychological beliefs regarding morality, and the understanding gained from it is expected to help teachers better foster students’ moral development. In this summary, a concise picture of how moral behaviour occurs and develops is presented based on the literature reviewed above; the chapter summary in the next section discusses the educational implications of the psychological literature in conjunction with the educational literature reviewed in the first section of this chapter.

How does moral behaviour occur? The FCM indicates that moral behaviour comes as a result of the complex interactions of four different morally relevant broad skill sets. These are moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral implementation. While each component may be comprised of independent skill sets, the complex feed-forward and feed-backward interactions between the components draws attention to the fact that moral development happens globally, as opposed to each set of skills developing independently from each other. Skills related to moral sensitivity, including empathy and role taking, allow a person to understand the moral salience of a situation and react appropriately. Skills related to moral judgement direct which course of action a person is likely to follow, and skills related to moral motivation provide the drive to act on the moral judgement. Finally, skills related to moral implementation allow a person to follow through the course of action to its end, making sure the action is fully executed.

The moral judgement literature reveals that while one may feel like s/he is in control of his/her moral judgements, this is not entirely the case. Judgements are more often intuitive, and out of one's conscious control to a certain extent. Moreover, given the motivated reasoning and posthoc justification problems, one may not even be able to recognise that s/he is indeed likely to arrive at morally biased judgements. However, it is possible to take
conscious control over moral intuitions. Several methods of withholding initial intuitions to arrive at more accurate moral judgements exist. These include, but are not limited to, emotional reappraisal (Feinberg et al., 2012) and cognitive override (Fine, 2006). Furthermore, it is possible to consciously design one’s moral intuitions, by practising certain styles of moral reasoning to the point where they become habitualised and intuitive. Developing expertise in morally relevant skills also helps conscious maintenance of moral intuitions. This is not to imply anything negative regarding initial moral intuitions; however, it is certainly possible to improve or change moral intuitions in a more conscious manner.

On the other hand, moral reasoning and judgement mechanisms alone do not lead to moral behaviour, moral motivational mechanisms do. The main drive to act morally is provided by moral emotions. However, one’s moral self determines which moral emotions one is likely to feel. Two kinds of moral emotions exist: episodic emotions which are felt in specific situations, and emotional dispositions which determine one’s tendency to feel certain emotions in general. Emotional dispositions lie at the heart of character traits, and alongside one’s habits, constitute the moral self. Furthermore, the choices we make deliberately affect the development of our moral selves. Each choice made, and each action carried out fosters the disposition to act similarly in similar situations in the future. These decisions are further influenced by what Dewey (1932) calls “interests”, and Frankfurt (1971) calls “second-order volitions.” Both second-order volitions and interests can be selected rationally and pursued consciously, granting an individual conscious control over the development of his/her moral self, at least to a certain extent.

How does moral development take place? This review does not exhaustively detail each stage of moral development in depth, as this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the reviewed literature does lend some understanding regarding the age-related development of morality. Moral reasoning development progresses from an ego-centric and uncritical schema during childhood to a socio-centric and uncritical schema during adolescence, to a socio-centric and critical schema during adulthood. This has major educational implications, which are explored in the next section. Furthermore, progress from one stage to the next follows the heteronomous/autonomous orientation cycle, where an individual initially takes a heteronomous orientation to a higher level of moral reasoning, before fully internalising the reasoning style and achieving an autonomous orientation to that level of moral reasoning.
The early phases of moral intuition development are not clear as of yet. It is suggested that true internalisation of moral intuitions happens between the ages 9 to 15. It is also suggested that the values internalised are not necessarily or primarily those of the child’s parents or the school, but his/her peer group. However, concerning moral motivation, it appears that caregivers are more important for adolescents, whereas peers are more important only for young adults.

Taken together, the age-related development of morally relevant skills seems to be influenced most by socialisation. During childhood and earlier phases, socialisation happens most prominently within the family. Thus it is expected that families influence children’s moral development the most during this phase. However, understanding of morality remains ego-centric essentially. Once a child reaches late childhood and early adolescence, socialisation expands considerably. Children’s expanding cognitive capacities lead to the discovery of society – that people are connected to each other through institutions. Furthermore, establishing and solidifying alliances with peers becomes more important during adolescence. It appears that this leads to the internalisation of values held by peers. This is also in parallel with a growing concern for social desirability during adolescence, and uncritically maintaining the norms of the social group of which the child is a part, whether this group is the peer group, the family, school, or any other relation (e.g. nationality, religion, ethnicity, football team…). Finally, once issues related to autonomy and interdependence are resolved in adulthood, parents seem to lose their importance related to moral development, and peers and the general society appear to take precedence. While this is not true in all cases, individuals may advance to the Post-Conventional schema in adulthood, finally achieving a critical and socio-centric approach to moral judgements.

The MFT and the TET are psychological theories that contribute to one’s philosophical beliefs regarding morality, as well as psychological beliefs. The MFT indicates that while different cultures may have different morals, they are rooted in the same features of human evolutionary psychology. Furthermore, it also points out that that liberals and conservatives have different moral concerns, and that it may be hard for people on one side of the spectrum to understand the moral concerns of the people at the other end of the spectrum, as what is thought to be morally relevant differs between the two sides. Such an understanding can have wide-ranging consequences regarding tolerance and democracy; the educational implications of this are explored in more depth in the next section.
The TET draws attention to two main dispositions one may have with regards to moral behaviour: one based on fear and self-preservation (Security Ethics), the other based on compassion and cooperation (Engagement Ethics). Furthermore, it also sheds light on how human cognitive capacities can amplify the effects of either disposition (Imagination Ethics). This points to the importance of understanding the consequences of each disposition, and perhaps attempting to foster them in accordance, as well as creating the school environment in which these dispositions can be fostered or controlled.
3. Chapter Summary

The main aim of this chapter has been to answer the first two research questions:

1. How does moral education take place?
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour?

The answers to these two questions create the theoretical foundations on which the empirical component of this study stands. These two questions were answered individually in the summaries provided in sections 1.6 and 2.6 above. The chapter summary in this section brings together the conclusions from the previous summaries to discuss some of the possible educational implications of how an understanding of implicit moral education and an understanding of moral psychology can help teachers better foster students’ moral development.

Given that the focus of this thesis is on implicit moral education, the purpose of this literature review is not to detail aspects of moral psychology as content matter for moral educators, but rather to identify the areas of moral behaviour and its development which are most pertinent to teachers; and knowledge of which could direct their conduct and teaching in a way that fosters students’ moral development. In other words, so that teachers can take conscious control over the implicit moral education they conduct in an unplanned and unconscious manner. Prescription of specific pedagogical methods is not the aim of this study, as specific pedagogical practices can change from culture to culture, depending on the moral intuitions, identified by the MFT, on which a culture has built its morality. The argument here is that understanding and knowing the issues explored in this review could help teachers behave and engage in implicit moral education accordingly, which could have a positive influence on students’ overall moral development. It should also be noted that teachers themselves can benefit from such an understanding of morality beyond the potential contribution to their students’ moral development; as one of the interview participants of the empirical component of this study stated.

In the first section of this literature review it was concluded that while teachers are interested and willing to engage in moral education, their initial training does not equip them optimally to do so. Furthermore, the training they receive does not seem to equip them with a moral perspective, or “moral language” (Sockett & LePage, 2002), for them to make sense of
their experiences in school through a moral lens. The Moral Work of Teaching (MWT) framework developed by Sanger and Osguthorpe (2005; 2011) offers an approach that may be taken in ITE programmes to remedy this issue. By focusing on teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education in their initial training, including their moral, psychological, and educational beliefs, teachers can be intellectually better equipped to carry out moral education. In this review, greater attention was paid to aspects, theories, and models of moral education and moral psychology that may inform teachers’ psychological and educational beliefs. Although some reviewed theories may also be relevant to teachers’ moral beliefs, this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.

In the review of educational literature of the first section of this chapter, it was identified that the majority of moral education takes place implicitly. Two key concepts to understand in this respect are the hidden curriculum and moral ecology. The hidden curriculum refers to the secondary and implicit messages educational activities, structures, and systems (e.g. school rules) may convey to students. Moral ecology is a broader term that refers to all morally relevant aspects of the school life, including the explicit moral education provided in schools, aspects of moral education that would be categorised as part of the hidden curriculum, as well as the interaction between the people in the school.

In the psychological review of the second section of this chapter, two theories of moral psychology were identified that may lend a deeper understanding in terms of positively manipulating the school moral ecology and hidden curriculum to foster moral development: Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013) and Triune Ethics Theory (TET; Narvaez, 2008). An understanding of the MFT, especially the liberal/conservative divide with respect to how people of different political orientations find different sets of concerns morally relevant, may help teachers create a pluralistic and tolerant moral ecology in their schools. TET, on the other hand, sheds light on how people may prioritise values of self-preservation or cooperation. Such an understanding could further help teachers create a moral ecology that fosters a disposition towards self-preservation or cooperation. While these suggestions are somewhat vague, they cannot be made any more specific here, as how teachers’ employ their understanding of TET and MFT in the context of their own schools’ moral ecology is down to each teachers’ creativity, for the moral ecology of each school would be unique, and the more specific a suggestion is, the less generalizable it’s application would be.
An understanding of the other models and theories reviewed in this chapter could help teachers direct their attention and behaviour in more specific ways. Sanderse (2014) concludes that teachers’ understanding of how role modelling works and the training they receive in ITE regarding role modelling as a method is lacking. Including Albert Bandura’s Theory of Learning by Observation (1986; 1997) in ITE can address this issue. A clear understanding of how role modelling and learning by observation work could be an invaluable tool for teachers in terms of teaching moral values through demonstration.

The most basic value in understanding the Four Components Model (Rest, 1986) is that the model provides an overview of the skills and some processes involved in the production of moral behaviour. Such an understanding could help teachers diagnose how and why a student fails to act morally, whether this is due to moral insensitivity, a lack of good judgement, prioritising non-moral values, or simply because their students do not bother to act morally or are deterred for various reasons. Such recognition could allow teachers to individually help students develop their moral skills. In educational interventions of ethical development, role-playing morally charged situations has been shown to increase moral sensitivity and motivation (Bebeau, 1994), while discussing moral dilemmas has been shown to foster moral judgement (Morton et al. 2006). Furthermore, and more crucially, the feed-forward and feed-backward loops between the four components suggest that attending to students’ moral development globally, rather than focusing on individual skills, is more likely to be more effective.

In conjunction with an understanding of the FCM, an understanding of how expertise of morally relevant skills develops could greatly increase teachers’ effectiveness in terms of providing moral education. Understanding how each skill develops, what kind of activities foster expertise in which skills, and which activities would be more appropriate for which age groups can help teachers design their classroom activities and select content material for their lessons with greater precision to foster these skills at appropriate levels.

Understanding the developmental progress of moral reasoning from the Personal Interest Schema to the Maintaining Norms Schema to the Post-Conventional Schema is especially important in this respect. These schemas broadly define the perspective students are likely to take with regards to moral behaviour at specific ages. Furthermore, understanding the heteronomous/autonomous cycle involved in the progress from one schema to the next can further help teachers select content material for their lessons, design their
classroom activities, and inform their interactions with students with greater precision to foster moral reasoning development.

Understanding and fostering moral reasoning development is particularly important, for it is the door through which teachers may influence students’ moral intuitions and moral selves – constructs that are less accessible to teachers’ direct influence. Understanding how moral intuitions function could help teachers identify how and why students act morally or not. It sheds light on the complications and limitations of moral reasoning. Furthermore, Haidt’s (2001) suggestion that teachers’ reasoned arguments are unlikely to influence students’ moral intuitions as much as the positive bond between the teacher and the student draws attention to the importance of the quality of teachers’ relationship with their students, which Narvaez (2010b) also highlights. When this understanding is coupled with an understanding of how one may rationally control one’s ‘naïve’ moral intuitions through cognitive override, emotional reappraisal, or other methods, teachers’ attempts to foster desirable moral intuitions in students can be much more robust and effective. In addition to this, understanding how habitualisation of certain styles of moral reasoning can lead to expert moral intuitions can help teachers define goals for the moral education they intend to provide.

A deep understanding of moral reasoning development could further help teachers influence the development of students’ moral motivational constructs. While motivation for moral behaviour is mainly driven by moral emotions, which are most likely beyond the direct influence of teachers, the tendency to feel certain moral emotions is defined by students’ moral selves. Moral selves are primarily formed by emotional dispositions (which also form the base for character traits) and habits. In return, habits and emotional dispositions are largely influenced by an individual’s deliberate choices, interests, and second-order volitions. And given that deliberate choice, interests, and second order volitions can be consciously and rationally selected by an individual (at least to a certain extent), fostering and influencing students’ moral reasoning development is critical.

However, this should not be taken to mean that reasoning is the primary skill that teachers should aim to develop. Following from the above analogy, such a claim would be similar to saying that the door of a house is the most important part. What takes primacy in moral education should be students’ global moral development, including their moral reasoning, moral identity and self, and all other morally relevant skills.
In order to achieve this, an environment conducive to moral development needs to be created, for which an understanding of moral ecology, MFT and TET is argued to be useful here. Furthermore, as Narvaez (2010a) and Haidt (2001) indicate, in the lack of a positive emotional bond between a teacher and a student, the teacher is unlikely to be able to influence the development of a student’s moral self, which is one of the most fundamental elements of moral psychology. Once the necessary minimum environmental and social conditions required (which have not been identified in this thesis for concerns of space) are present, the teacher may then equip the students with the reasoning tools necessary for students to lead their own moral development in a desirable trajectory. In order to achieve this, it is argued here that an understanding of moral reasoning development is crucial for teachers.

In section 2 of this chapter, and in this section, a cyclical relationship between moral reasoning, morally relevant habits, moral self and identity, moral emotions, moral intuitions, and ultimately moral behaviour has been described. The main reason for emphasising moral reasoning in this complex system of feed-forward and feed-backward relationships is not because moral reasoning has greater importance in terms of moral development, but because it is the most practical skill teachers may target in terms of moral education, in order to help the students direct the development of aspects of their moral psychology that teachers do not have direct access to – such as students’ emotional dispositions.

This may raise a question of what to do in cases where students’ reasoning capacities are harder to empathise with, as might be the situation in cases of special educational needs and disabilities (SEND), where students’ psychological and mental SEND’s are different from non-SEND students. The fact that some students have psychological and mental SEND’s does not mean that they wholly lack the capacity for any of the psychological skills discussed in this thesis. However, depending on the kind of special need, a more specialized approach may be necessary for teachers to foster such students’ moral development. For example, teachers may need to follow different educational approaches with students afflicted by psychopathy, due to psychopaths’ emotional disabilities (Fallon, 2006). However, moral education in the SEND context is far beyond the scope of this thesis.

This concludes the literature review of this thesis. There may be many other potential contributions an understanding of how implicit moral education takes place and how moral psychology works may have with regards to teachers’ engagement in moral education,
however, mentioning the entire range of possibilities is beyond the scope of this thesis. This summary gives an indication of the possibilities understanding these issues offers with respect to conducting moral education. The next chapter explains the methodology employed in the empirical component of this study.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, the overarching methodology of the research is presented. This study is designed as a mixed methods case study that investigates a cross-sectional sample of participants. Initially, the purpose of the empirical component of the study is explained. This is followed by the philosophical approach employed in conducting the research. Next, the research design is presented, alongside the rationale for the design of the data gathering tools and experience gained from the pilot study. Finally, ethical considerations pertinent to this study are addressed before the chapter is concluded with an account of how participant recruitment and data gathering was conducted.

1. Purpose and Setting

The purpose of this empirical investigation was to examine, in the light of understandings developed from the literature review, how Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, moral development, and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching experience. In order to achieve this, qualitative and quantitative methods were employed in the research. A case study approach focusing on one Turkish university and a cross-sectional sample of trainee teachers and alumni teachers of the same university was chosen for this purpose. In order to establish triangulation, the research methods included a questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews, and observation of intern teachers and teachers with several years of teaching experience.

The setting of this study was chosen to be Turkey. There is very little attention paid to moral education by academics in Turkey apart from religious education. Education is a morally loaded enterprise, and moral education takes place in schools inevitably (Purpel & Ryan, 1983) and implicitly (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). However, in Turkey, neither moral development and psychology nor an understanding of implicit learning and teaching are taught to trainee teachers. As a result, Turkish teachers may engage in implicit moral education without being fully aware, or in control, of the education they provide. While this does not automatically warrant the assumption that teachers’ knowledge and beliefs about moral education, development and psychology are wrong, and that they “miseducate” students; an empirical investigation will help to understand the nature of teachers’ beliefs and attitudes, and how these beliefs and attitudes are reflected in classroom practice.
2. **Research Questions and Aims**

The main aim of the research was to understand Turkish teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral psychology and moral education that may influence students’ moral development through implicit moral education. Five research questions were identified in order to meet this aim:

1. How does moral education take place?
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour?
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and development of moral behaviour?
4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education in Turkey?
5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching experience?

The first two questions were addressed in Chapter II by an investigation of the literature on moral psychology and moral education. The empirical component of the study is designed to answer the third, fourth and fifth questions. In order to investigate the third and fourth questions, the empirical component of the research attempts to shed light on the beliefs of teachers and trainee teachers regarding moral psychology and moral development and how these develop through teacher training and teaching experience. Addressing the 5th question entails a comparison of the beliefs of the three different groups of participants recruited to take part in this study.

The answers to the remaining three questions were sought through a questionnaire survey designed to probe participants’ beliefs regarding the above-stated topics. However, while a questionnaire survey would allow a broad understanding regarding the beliefs and attitudes of the population under study (teachers and trainee teachers), it would only afford a surface appreciation of the beliefs under investigation, allowing only a superficial understanding of them. Thus interviews, which provide a deeper understanding, were also necessary to complement the broad, but superficial understanding provided by a survey. Furthermore, in order to establish triangulation and cover the weaknesses of the survey and interview methods, an observation of interns’ and teachers’ classroom practice was also
conducted. This entailed cross-checking their practice with their stated beliefs in the interviews.
3. Research Design

This research can be considered to be social research. Johnson (1994) indicates that educational research is usually social research as it is based on people: “…where people and their behaviour, their forms of organisation and their associations are the subject of enquiry, we are into the field of social research” (p. 4). While the content of the research involves strong psychological elements, the context of the research revolves around beliefs about psychological constructs and how these beliefs are reflected in the context of education, rather than the psychological constructs themselves.

The empirical component of this study has been designed as a case study, with a cross-sectional sample of participants, employing mixed methods. In the following section, an argument is made for employing mixed methods in a case study and studying a cross-sectional sample of participants in order to yield the most reliable and valid results, compared with other possible methodologies.

3.1. The Pragmatic Paradigm and Mixed Methods

This study can be conceived as a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The main reason for this lies in the philosophical paradigm underpinning this research, which is influenced mainly by methodological pragmatism.

Morgan (2007) argues that social research has been undergoing a paradigm shift since the turn of the century. Previously most research was guided by either a positivist paradigm, which predominantly employs quantitative methods, or an interpretivist paradigm, which focuses on qualitative methods (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Mertens, 2010). The results produced by research with different paradigms were thought to be “incommensurable” (Morgan, 2007, p. 58). However, this view has started to lose its popularity, as can be seen in Morrison’s (2002) argument that in educational research it is common that the two paradigms often overlap and that methods based on these two different approaches may be similar to each other.

The use of a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods have increased in frequency recently (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Mertens, 2010; Morgan, 2007; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003), and this mixed method approach “is driven by pragmatism” as an epistemological paradigm (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 26). Morgan (2007) indicates that other philosophical paradigms dictate a priori a certain pattern of investigation.
to the research. While this makes methodological justifications somewhat easier, by referring to a fixed set of assumptions, such a priori assumptions also limit the research. Pragmatism, on the other hand, pays “equal attention to both the epistemological and technical “warrants” that influence how we conduct our research” (Morgan, 2007, p. 68). As a result, pragmatic studies tend to justify the use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods with reference to both epistemological arguments and the comparative reliability and validity of specific research tools/methods used in research.

Furthermore, methodological pragmatism also draws from multiple philosophical approaches in order to complement the strengths and weaknesses of each approach:

“Pragmatism adopts a methodologically eclectic, pluralist approach to research, drawing on positivism and interpretive epistemologies based on the criteria of fitness for purpose and applicability, and regarding ‘reality’ as both objective and socially constructed.” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 23)

Given the nature of the purpose of the research and the kind of data necessary to be analysed in order to investigate the issue, it was felt that strict adherence to either an interpretivist or positivist paradigm would not have been sufficient. With a view to achieving a well-established understanding, considering both the breadth and depth of the current state of relevant beliefs of the participants of this study, a mixed methods approach was necessary. A quantitative method (questionnaires) could provide the necessary broad understanding of what is generally believed among the participants with regards to the research questions, but this would fall short of providing the necessary depth. In order to achieve greater depth, a qualitative method (semi-structured interviews) was also needed. The interview schedule required to be informed by the (early/tentative) results of the questionnaires in order to ask accurate questions which would yield a more nuanced picture of what participants’ beliefs were, and to give a better indication of the development of participants’ beliefs with regards to progress through teacher training and experience.

While these methods would provide the necessary understanding of how these beliefs came into being and how they develop, they cannot yield any data on how these beliefs actually influence practice. Statements can be biased for a variety of reasons (see below), and they may not reflect the reality of the classroom behaviour of teachers. Therefore, observations are also necessary for achieving an accurate and triangulated understanding of the nature of teachers’ beliefs, and how they reflect in classroom practice (see below).
Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003, p. 353) indicate that triangulation is only one of the five purposes served by using mixed methods, the others being complementarity, development, initiation, and expansion. The use of mixed methods in this study mainly serves the purposes of triangulation, complementarity, and development. Employing mixed methods allows the researcher to elaborate, clarify, and ultimately complement the results obtained by one method with results gained from another. In this study, interviews allowed me to clarify some results obtained from the questionnaires and elaborate on several interesting points raised in the survey results. Identifying these points in the survey results allowed me to “develop” the interview schedule in more depth. More specific justifications and descriptions of the methods used are made in the next section.

When using the pragmatic mixed methods paradigm, the researcher also needs to make a decision about how much particular quantitative or qualitative methods will dominate the research (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). This is a matter of prioritisation, and it is also dependent on the purpose of the research. Given that the overarching aim of this study is to understand Turkish teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral development, and how these beliefs may influence implicit moral education in Turkey, the subjectivity and objectivity of the psychology of moral development and beliefs pertaining to this topic must be considered. While the psychology of moral development is regarded as an objective phenomenon (albeit variable from individual to individual) (see Graham et al. 2013; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005; Rest et al. 2000), beliefs about these topics are subjective, and since this study does not assess the moral psychological constructs of teachers, but teachers’ beliefs regarding the psychology of moral development, and how their beliefs impact their practice, qualitative methods (interviews and observations) are more dominant in this study.

3.2. Case Study Approach and the Case

The design of the empirical component of this study can be categorised as a case study which focuses on a cross-sectional sample of participants. Bassey (1999, 2002) defines case studies as conducted within a localised boundary of space and time, into aspects of an educational activity, or programme, or institution, or system. Case studies are carried out mainly in the natural context of the investigated phenomena and within an ethic of respect for persons, in order to inform the judgements and decisions of practitioners or policy-makers or of theoreticians who are working towards these ends. Johnson (1994) indicates that case
studies are concerned with “the interaction of factors and events over a period of time. Usually, the study is of a phenomenon still in evidence at the present day, though not necessarily new or recent” (p. 20). Furthermore, “case studies can penetrate situations in ways that are not always susceptible to numerical analysis” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000; p. 181); facilitating greater depth in understanding complex social phenomena. This is the main reason case study design has been chosen as the research approach for this study.

Bassey (1999) lists what the data provided by a case study should allow the researcher to do:

a. “to explore significant features of the case,
b. to create plausible interpretations of what is found,
c. to construct a worthwhile argument or story,
d. to relate the argument or story to any relevant research in the literature,
e. to convey convincingly to an audience this argument or story,
f. and to provide an audit trail by which other researchers may validate or challenge the findings, or construct alternative arguments” (p. 58)

The data collected in this research was expected to meet the above-listed items and to shed light on teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes relevant to fostering students’ moral development (identified in Chapter II). It was also expected that data analysis would allow the creation of a taxonomy detailing these beliefs and attitudes, which can be validated or challenged by other researchers by providing a detailed explanation of the methodology employed in arriving at the interpretations of the data. The interpretation of the data, or the created narrative or taxonomy of beliefs, was expected to shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of teacher training in Turkey with regards to its capacity for equipping teachers with the beliefs and attitudes conducive to better fostering students’ moral development.

The case study approach has several strengths compared to other approaches. While coping with complex phenomena, results of case studies are easier to understand as they tend to rely on intelligible and non-technical findings, they capture a unique feature and are “strong on reality” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000, p. 184), providing insights into similar cases. Furthermore, they can be undertaken by a single researcher, which makes the study relatively easier to conduct (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Coolican, 2004).
But this approach also has some weaknesses. It is possible for such studies to be subjective or biased as they are not open to cross-checking. As a result, this approach may lack a degree of scientific rigour. This is further problematized as access to all aspects of the studied phenomenon could possibly be uneven. The findings may be unique to the case, and may not be generalizable (Coolican, 2004). This approach also relies on time, ready access to settings and familiarity with a range of research skills. Furthermore, case studies “are prone to problems of observer bias, despite attempts made to address reflexivity” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000, p. 184; Johnson, 1994).

When conducting a case study, it is important to carefully define the case, considering the scope and features of the case (Yin, 2014). Yin presents a twofold definition of a case study. The first part is concerned with the scope of the study:

“A case study is an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident.” (Yin, 2014; p. 16)

The second part of the definition involves the features of the case:

“A case study enquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis.” (Yin, 2014, p. 17)

The definition that Yin offers highlights the reason why the boundaries of cases under investigation can be fuzzy; in certain cases, as with this study, the phenomena of interest to the study can be deeply connected to things beyond the scope of the study. Moreover, results obtained can be based on multiple sources of evidence, and each piece of evidence can point to multiple results. One of the greatest challenges related to conducting and obtaining results from case studies in the context of social science is that these studies attempt to investigate certain phenomena that have what might be described as an organic interconnectivity with their context. Thus, a clear understanding of the boundaries of the case, concerning the scope, features and limits is necessary.

Yin’s (2014) emphasis on having a clear understanding concerning the fuzzy boundaries of a case is especially pertinent to the case under study here; the case might
appear simply to include data collected from a multitude of schools, a sample of students and alumni from a teacher training programme, and an enquiry into the training programme itself. However, the focus is specifically on a Turkish teacher training programme and the attitudes and beliefs of the programme’s students and alumni related to the aspects of moral psychology and education regarding fostering students’ moral development.

This definition of the case implies several characteristics regarding the scope, features and limits of the case under study. The scope of the case can be defined in two ways. Firstly, it covers the population of interest, which are Turkish teachers and trainee teachers. Secondly, the study also includes a certain set of beliefs and attitudes related to aspects of moral psychology and moral education. These aspects of moral psychology and moral education have been identified through the literature review (see Chapter II). The study features a sample of the population of interest (see below for more information on the participants) and, more importantly, how these beliefs and attitudes develop through teacher training and experience. The study was limited to the students and alumni of a teacher training programme conducted at the education faculty of a university in Turkey. The limits of the study regarding the beliefs and attitudes under investigation can also be found in the literature review chapter; the study is not related to aspects of psychology and education beyond those that have been identified in the literature review. The scope, features and limits of the study have been defined generally here, but given the interconnectivity of the case with its context, they cannot be exhaustively specified.

Case studies can vary, either to include single case studies or multiple case studies. Single case studies focus on a single location, event, or phenomenon, while multiple case studies focus on more than one (Yin, 2014). Considering these characteristics, this study qualifies as a single case study: the beliefs of teachers and trainee teachers who are studying or have studied, at one institution’s teacher training programme. While this study gathers data from a number of schools, the unifying theme is that all participants are from the same teacher training institution; practising alumni teachers work in different schools; however, they have all received the teacher training provided by the same university.

3.3. Cross-Sectional Sampling of Participants

A cross-sectional sampling of participants was selected for this study. Cross-sectional studies focus on different samples of subjects who are related to each other in some way,
depending on the study. Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) state that cross-sectional studies provide:

“a snapshot of a population at a particular point in time… in education, cross-sectional studies involve indirect measures of the nature and the rate of changes in the physical and intellectual development of samples of [people] drawn from representative age levels” (p. 175).

Cross-sectional studies usually feature large-scale and representative sampling and macro-level analysis which enables different groups to be compared. In this study, trainee teachers, intern teachers, and experienced teachers who are receiving, or have received, training from the same university were selected to track the development of beliefs over time spent receiving training and gaining teaching experience.

The alternative to a cross-sectional study is a longitudinal study, which examines the same group of participants over a longer period of time. Longitudinal studies feature micro-levels of analysis and enable the same individuals to be compared over time. The strengths of longitudinal studies are that they show more reliable causal relationships for interpretation, document how change and development occur over time, provide in-depth and accurate coverage of individuals, are less prone to sampling errors as the same population is studied over time, and enable clear recommendations for interventions to be made. However, longitudinal studies take a long time to conduct, taking years in some cases. A longitudinal design for this study would have required at least 9 years for data gathering – including 4 years of university training and 5 years of teaching experience (assuming participants graduate without delay and work as teachers for 5 years immediately following their graduation). Longitudinal studies are also vulnerable to control effects. Cohen, Manion and Morrison, (2000) indicate that “repeated interviewing of the same sample influences their behaviour” (p. 178). Furthermore, longitudinal studies create the problem of securing participants who will make a long-term investment in participating (Mertens, 2010).

In comparison, cross-sectional studies are relatively quick and cheap to conduct, do not suffer from control effects (as participation is necessary only once, which also increases the likelihood of participation), and are more generalizable as a variety of participants are involved (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Mertens, 2010; Yin 2014). However, it is harder to infer causality in cross-sectional studies, and they are not as effective in tracking developmental patterns as longitudinal studies. Considering these practical problems related
to longitudinal studies, a cross-sectional approach was preferred, as cross-sectional studies are relatively easier to conduct in terms of time commitments and finding voluntary participants.

The cross-sectional selection of participants entailed three sections: first-year students who have little training and no teaching experience, fourth-year students who have full training but little teaching experience, and practising alumni teachers who have both full training and several years’ experience. This selection of participants was expected to reveal how trainee teachers’ beliefs investigated in this study may have developed through teacher training and experience. It should be noted that university training in Turkey takes four years, and in the final year, the university arranges students’ placements where they can undertake their internships. For the sake of brevity and ease of reference, hereafter 1st-year students who took part in the study are referred to as ‘students,’ fourth-year students are referred to as ‘interns,’ and practising teachers are referred to as ‘teachers.’
4. Research Tools

The primary research tools employed in this study were questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, and semi-structured observations. These tools were used in order to establish triangulation, complementarity and development (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). The implication of triangulation is that through the application of different methods to examine a question, the accuracy of the answer is improved. Triangulation, therefore, helps to reduce potential subjectivity and increase consistency. According to Bush (2002) “triangulation means comparing many sources of evidence in order to determine the accuracy of information or phenomena. It is essentially a means of cross-checking data to establish its validity” (p. 68). The use of a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches also allows the research tools to complement each other in terms of breadth and depth, considering the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative research methods (see above). The order of data collection also allows for development, in that questionnaire results inform the development of the interview schedule, and results obtained from interview data analysis inform the observation schedule development.

4.1. Questionnaire Survey

The questionnaire survey, as a research tool, has several benefits. First of all, it is less time consuming and relatively cheaper than other methods, and it can be administered to a larger sample of participants to obtain quick results (Denscombe, 2003). It is empowering to the respondents in that they can complete the questionnaire when it suits them (Gillham, 2007). Greater respondent accuracy is possible, as respondents are anonymous and free of interviewer bias (Johnson, 1994). They are also relatively easy to analyse since the questions are standard, and answers to closed questions make analysis straightforward (Gillham, 2007). Questionnaire surveys, therefore, provide large scale and general data regarding the topic under investigation (Denscombe, 2003; Gillham, 2007; Johnson, 1994).

However, questionnaires by themselves are not sufficient to provide reliable data. The number of responses to questionnaires is usually low, unless the sample is ‘captive’ (e.g. students in a lecture hall), as it is often hard to motivate participants to respond (Gillham, 2007). Gillham (2007) indicates that a 30% response to questionnaires is usual, and above 50% returns “has to be accounted quite a good response” (p. 9). Questionnaires are also vulnerable to errors in wording and design, as these can drastically affect the responses gathered. This is further complicated by the need to write brief and relatively simple
questions, as well as an inability to correct misunderstandings (Johnson, 1994). Finally, the genuineness of responses to questions cannot be ascertained (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Gillham, 2007); it is hard to identify cases in which a participant’s responses are random rather than accurate or truthful. Indeed, two questionnaires were discarded in this study as the participants had explicitly noted at the end of the questionnaire that they had answered the questions randomly. In anticipation of these potential problems, semi-structured interviews and observations were also employed in this study to increase reliability and validity.

4.1.1. Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire was designed to assess participants’ beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral education. The questionnaire is divided into four parts. The first part, which focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, is formed of twenty-four questions assessed against a Likert scale. Likert scales ask participants to give a rating to an item on a questionnaire, indicating their agreement or disagreement to the statements on the questionnaires in this study. The second part focuses on beliefs regarding moral education, and it is formed of seventeen questions also assessed against a Likert scale. The third part also focuses on beliefs regarding moral education and is formed of four ranking questions with a total of nineteen items between the four questions. Ranking questions ask participants to rank several items in a question on the questionnaire. It uncovers participants’ views regarding the priority they ascribe to each item, compared to each other item. Part 4 sought background information to cross check whether any unexpected patterns were emerging from participants’ responses, and to classify which questionnaire was answered by a member of which group under investigation (student, intern, or teacher). Questionnaires were administered in Turkish; responses were later translated into English for presentation in the thesis (see Appendices A3 and A4).

The first part of the questionnaire consisted of 24 statements focusing on participants’ beliefs regarding moral psychology. The questions were designed as statements to which participants could agree on a scale of 1 to 5. These statements were written as one-sentence summaries of relevant literature reviewed in section 2, Chapter II. Participants’ responses to the statements revealed what they believe regarding the topics under investigation. The topics include a) the Four Components Model – moral sensitivity, moral judgement, moral motivation, and moral implementation, b) moral intuitions and moral reasoning; c) Moral
Participants’ responses were analysed both as responses to individual questions, and as their sum total scores for the part, sum total scores being the sum of response scores participants gave on the Likert scales (1 to 5) to each question of each part of the questionnaire.

The second part of the questionnaire consists of 17 statements focusing on participants’ beliefs regarding moral education in the hidden curriculum. The questions were designed as statements to which participants could agree or disagree on a scale of 1 to 4. It was anticipated that participants might not be able to decide whether they agree or disagree with statements regarding moral psychology in the first part of the questionnaire due to not being familiar with certain topics under investigation. For this reason, a neutral response was provided in the first part. This was not the case in the second part of the questionnaire in order to understand whether participants had negative or positive attitudes to the topics under investigation. It was anticipated that participants would be familiar with these topics depending on how much teacher training and experience they had.

Statements were designed to reflect participants’ perception of a) their role in moral education, b) how moral education takes place in the hidden curriculum, c) broadly how moral education should be carried out in the official curriculum, d) the current state of moral education in Turkey, and e) their experience of engaging with moral education. The statements were drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter II, Section 1. Six statements which focus on participants’ experience of engaging in moral education were omitted from the questionnaire distributed to first-year students, as these students were assumed to have no experience of teaching (questions 36 to 41). Participants’ responses were analysed both as responses to individual questions and as their sum total scores for the part.

The third part of the questionnaire also focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral education in the hidden curriculum. However, these questions were designed as ranking questions. Participants were prompted to rank the items on the 4 questions in this part from the most effective to the least effective. The first question in this part asks participants to rank 5 definitions of hidden curriculum drawn from Carr and Landon (1999) from the most accurate definition to the least accurate. The other three questions ask participants to rank which elements they think influence students’ moral development, and how they think moral learning takes place. The questions were drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter II.
Participants’ responses were analysed both as responses to individual questions and as their sum total scores for the part.

Alternatively, a more qualitative approach could have been followed in the design of the questionnaires, including a fewer number of open ended questions instead of the current number of Likert scale and ranking questions. Such a qualitative approach was not employed for several practical reasons.

The first reason is related to the expected familiarity of participants with the explored moral psychology topics. Given that elements of moral psychology do not feature in teacher training programmes; it was expected that participants would be unfamiliar with the explored topics. It was thought that, this being the case, greater structure in question design would provide more information regarding participants’ relevant beliefs than loosely structured/unstructured, open-ended questions. Furthermore, a high number of beliefs related to narrow and specific aspects of moral psychology were of interest for this phase of the study. Due to these reasons more structured questions were preferred in the exploration of beliefs relevant to moral psychology.

Questions designed to tease out participants’ beliefs relevant to moral education were relatively more straightforward. This is mainly due to this phase of the study being designed to achieve a broad and somewhat more surface understanding of participants’ beliefs relevant to moral education. It was expected that with the relatively higher number of participants and questions at this point, analysis would have required more time and energy than the depth of obtained data would warrant.

Furthermore, more qualitative and unstructured questions could have been more appropriate if the main area of interest was participants’ experience of moral education. This was not the priority interest – beliefs regarding moral psychology and education took priority over participants’ experience, given the fundamental value of how beliefs influence experiences, as established in Chapter II. Also, considering that over 40% of participants – first year students – were expected to lack any experience of teaching, focusing predominantly on participants’ experiences risked making the data obtained from the quantitatively most significant portion of participants qualitatively insignificant, creating a bias in obtained data.
These points also raise the question of why the research focused on narrow and specific beliefs rather than aiming to achieve a broader and more holistic understanding of participants’ beliefs through more qualitative questions. The main reason for this is that the purpose of this phase of the study was to achieve a broad and surface understanding of a higher number of teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs on specific aspects of moral psychology, which could later be explored in greater depth in the interviews and observations, and yield more generalizable results through triangulation.

Apart from exploring how beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral development are influenced by ITE programmes in Turkey, the empirical component of this study is also partly characterised by the attempt to analyse Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ relevant beliefs. This entails gaining an understanding of these beliefs in some depth, leading to the qualitative element, but it requires breadth in understanding as well, to see how generalizable findings are, which is better obtained through quantitative methods. Due to this reason, a solely quantitative or ethnographic line of enquiry was not chosen, considering their respective weaknesses discussed above.

Other research approaches that were not chosen include experimental designs and grounded theory. The diagnostic aim of the empirical component is better met through analysis of more naturalistic data, as opposed to data obtained through experimental designs or pre-test/post-test designs characteristic of intervention studies, in avoidance of deliberate control of obtained data. Contrarily, theory generation through grounded theory was not chosen as beliefs of interest to this study were drawn from and analysed with reference to the relevant literature reviewed in Chapter II, alleviating the need for an emergent theory.

4.2. Interview Schedule

In addition to a questionnaire survey, semi-structured interviews were conducted with voluntary participants. With the exception of very large scale studies, questionnaires are rarely the sole research tool used in most studies (Denscombe, 2003). The interview method has several strengths that help ameliorate some of the weaknesses of using questionnaires. Most importantly, interviews allow the researcher to probe matters in more depth than questionnaires. Motivation to respond to an interviewer is much greater than to a questionnaire, and it is generally easier to answer questions verbally than in written form. In addition, any misunderstandings can be corrected on the spot and points of interest pursued further (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2011).
While strictly structured interviews resemble verbal questionnaires, semi-structured interviews have strengths that neither formal interviews nor questionnaires can offer. Semi-structured interviews give the researcher opportunities to investigate the beliefs of teachers and trainee teachers in more detail and to find out how their experiences and education affects their beliefs and understanding. Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to pursue certain ideas and follow these to a suitable conclusion, while also allowing some degree of direction by the participant:

“The prime aim of a structured interview is to get equivalent information from a number of interviewees, information which is uncontaminated by subtle differences in the way in which it is asked for. The semi-structured interview has a similar aim of collecting equivalent information from a number of people, but places less emphasis on a standardised approach. A more flexible style is used, adapted to the personality and circumstances of the person being interviewed” (Johnson, 1994, p.45).

The limitation of using semi-structured interviews is that the analysis may become too dominated by the opinions of the person being interviewed, depending on his/her natural inclination towards subjectivity or objectivity.

“Research interviews, although apparently a perfect natural means of communication and enquiry, are in practice riddled with numerous pitfalls for the unwary. For example, the questions asked may turn out to be loaded ones, if the interviewer merely seeks to confirm a prejudice. Respondents may not tell the truth, particularly if they believe their answers may show them in a bad light or reach the ears of their superiors.” (Coleman and Briggs, 2002, p. 143)

With this consideration in mind, every effort was made during the interviews to maintain the required objectivity. On the other hand, unstructured interviews are completely led by the participant; thus, they are prone for the interview to digress too far from the main topic of investigation.

For this study, semi-structured interviews were preferred. Adopting a non-judgemental approach and an openly neutral stance are of key importance, both for ethical reasons and for clarity and reliability of obtained data from the interviewees. Semi-structured interviews allow more space for this kind of an approach compared to structured interviews as they are less standardised and open to re-articulation for clearer communication of questions spontaneously during the interview. Semi-structured interviews are also preferred
as a means of following up on certain ideas that the interviewees may introduce during the interview. An unstructured interviewing style was not chosen, for there were specific concepts that needed to be addressed during the interview, and it could not be guaranteed that the interviewees would introduce these concepts without the researcher’s guidance. In fact, it was expected that it would be unlikely that the participants would introduce these topics.

4.2.1. Interview Schedule Design

Questions included in the interview schedule were also based on the literature review and driven by the research questions. The main aim of the interview was to gain a deeper understanding of the topics investigated by the questionnaire. To this end, the interview schedule was semi-structured, allowing the interviewer both to ask pre-determined questions and follow up points of interest as the interview developed. The interview questions were similar to those of the questionnaire and were also broadly divided into four parts excluding the initial background questions.

Initially, some background questions were asked, in order to begin the interview conversation. These early background questions cover participants’ demographic information (see Chapter V). This was followed by the first section of the interview questions that introduced the main topic and probed participants’ beliefs regarding morality including three questions related to participants’ background knowledge on moral psychology and their understanding of morality. The second part included eight questions related to moral psychology. These were drawn from the literature review and were designed to elicit interviewees’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, rather than to evaluate their knowledge of the issues since no formal education related to moral psychology is provided in teacher training programmes in Turkey. The third part of the interview included 5 questions related to moral education and implicit moral education, with which participants are more or less familiar depending on their group. Finally, with the fourth part, the interview was concluded by asking participants three questions about their own experiences relevant to learning and teaching morality, explicitly or implicitly (see Appendices A7 and A8).

As the interview schedule was long, it was not expected that all questions would be explored in great depth, given that each question on the schedule could lead to a detailed conversation on a relatively narrow field. However, following the pilot study, it was noticed that participants tended to answer several questions at once while explicitly focusing on one, as separate questions in the schedule focus on related topics. The questions were
asked/presented to the interviewee in a fashion that followed the flow of the interview. The questions were also visible to both the interviewer and the interviewee on the computer screen and handed out in hard copies to the interviewees. This was partly done in order to keep the interview from digressing and allowing the interviewee to look at the questions themselves if they felt this to be necessary. The interviewer also kept a separate sheet of questions at hand to take notes on. It was expected that the interviews would last at least 20 minutes and no longer than 40 minutes; the shortest interview was 15 minutes long, and the longest was 36 minutes long – averaging around 26 minutes per interview. The interviews were also audio-recorded. Audio recordings were later transcribed and shared with the interviewee to check accuracy before analysis, and participants were once again asked verbally whether they could be quoted in addition to the request stated in the Participant Information sheets. The interviews were conducted in Turkish and later translated into English to be presented in the thesis.

4.2.2. Analysis Procedure

Verbatim transcriptions of the interviews and translations were made by the researcher. Interviews were not translated wholly into English, as this would have been extremely time-consuming. Only the parts of the interviews relevant to analysis and presentation have been translated into English. Being a native speaker of both English and Turkish, having conducted the interviews in person, and having an in-depth understanding of the topics investigated in the interviews, I judged that I would be the most suitable translator of the interview data into English and translated the relevant parts of the interviews myself. It should be noted that while I aimed to make the most accurate translations possible, differences in nuance between English and Turkish make it almost impossible for translated material to reflect the original material with perfect accuracy, and word-for-word translations do not always make sense in the translated language. Thus cultural and social knowledge and intuitions concerning the use of language both in English and in Turkish was necessary to employ at times in order to achieve greater accuracy in translation. As a result, while all translated quotes have been marked with quotation marks and reflect the original material to a very high degree, each quote should be considered a paraphrase of the original material. Problems arising from translations have been noted where they are relevant.

The main aim of this part of the study was to understand and describe Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding certain aspects of moral psychology and
moral education, so that a deeper analysis could be conducted in the discussion of the results concerning how these beliefs reflect in classroom practice in conjunction with the questionnaire and observation data. To meet the descriptive aim of this part of the study, the main method of analysis employed was thematic categorization. The analysis procedure was conducted independently for data obtained from each question of the interview schedule. Each question focused on different aspects of moral psychology or moral education, and so the nature of participants’ responses changed from question to question. In order to address the variety of obtained data, they were not analysed using a single methodology strictly corresponding to a certain well-defined method of analysis. Instead, a variety of analytical methods were employed depending on the nature of the data. Methods of thematic content analysis and framework analysis were used most often, as the data could be analysed and presented best through the practices of these methods. Most importantly, what these two methodologies have in common is that they are both focused on the thematic categorization of data in order to make sense of it, although this is not the sole concern of either method.

The first method of analysis used in this part of the study, involving thematic categorization, is thematic content analysis. Neuendorf (2002) indicates that “content analysis may be briefly defined as the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (p. 1, italics original). Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) define content analysis:

“[Content analysis] simply defines the process of summarizing and reporting written data – the main contents of data and their messages. More strictly speaking, it defines a strict and systematic set of procedures for the rigorous analysis, examination and verification of the contents of written data” (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007; p. 475).

Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2007) further explain that while content analysis is sometimes thought of as the quantitative analysis of qualitative data, it is not strictly so. Anderson and Arsenault (1998) indicate that content analysis can shed light on how frequently certain topics appear in a data set. Moreover, Weber (1990) maintains that the aims of content analysis include uncovering the focus of individual, group, institutional and societal matters, description of trends and patterns in the content of communication, and the coding of responses to open-ended questions in questionnaires.
The steps used in content analysis involved defining the units of analysis, identifying and selecting codes to be analysed, identification of categories based on the definition of units of analysis and identified codes, categorising codes, and interpretation of categories (Cohen, Mannion & Morrison, 2007; pp. 477-483). Krippendorf (2004) indicates that there are five ways of defining units based on their physical, syntactical, categorical, propositional, and thematic distinctions. Physical distinctions refer to the physical aspects of data such as the space a building occupies, or the length of a speech. Syntactical distinctions are concerned with linguistic units of data, such as words or sentences. Categorical distinctions “define units by their membership in a class or category – by their having something in common” (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 105). For example, references to “the first African-American president of the United States” and “Barrack Obama” and any other reference to the same person would be the unit of analysis concerned with Obama. Propositional distinctions are also concerned with the linguistic aspects of data and they “delineate units according to particular constructions, such as those that have a particular propositional form or exhibit certain semantic relations between conceptual components” (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 106). Thematic distinctions of units can be described much more freely; they are defined based on “story like verbal material, and the use of relatively comprehensive units of analysis such as *themas*, *themes*,... combinations of categories, motifs, imagery, and thoughts” (Krippendorf, 2004; p. 108, italics original). The description of units most appropriate to the aims of this study is based on thematic distinctions, and units of analysis – codes – have been thematically defined and analysed in this part of the study. The description of themes has changed from question to question based on a priori concerns and considering novel recurrent concepts emerging from the data.

The second method of analysis involving thematic categorization is framework analysis, which was developed by Jane Ritchie and Liz Spencer in the 1990s for the field of applied policy research at the Social and Community Planning Research Institute (SCPRI) in London (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). While this study is not related to the field of applied policy research where it is employed most often, it can be, and has been, used in research in educational settings as well (e.g. Archer et al., 2005).

Framework analysis consists of five steps. The first is the familiarisation process where the analyst immerses him/herself in the data and starts writing down possible themes and key issues emerging from the data. The second step involves identifying a thematic framework, where the analyst starts to conceptualise the thematic framework through which
the data can be categorised, analysed and presented based on predetermined and/or emergent issues recurring in the data set. This step is more concerned with identifying the emerging themes, based on novel or a priori concerns, rather than categorising. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) indicate that:

“Devising and refining a thematic framework is not an automatic or mechanical process, but involves both logical and intuitive thinking. It involves making judgements about meaning, about the relevance and importance of issues, and about implicit connections between ideas.” (p. 180)

The third step is indexing, where the analyst categorises the bits of data according to the theme they fit. These bits of data can be called ‘codes’ in comparison with content analysis literature. Codes can be applicable to more than one theme/category, and in such cases, they are thus categorised. The fourth step is charting, where the analyst removes the codes out of their context and rearranges the whole data set based on themes or cases. In this study, charting is based on themes. While a cut and paste method can be applied, charting in framework analysis also includes paraphrasing and summarising the relevant data:

“Whereas some methods of qualitative analysis rely on a ‘cut and paste’ approach, whereby ‘chunks’ of verbatim text are regrouped according to their index reference, charting involves abstraction and synthesis.” (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; p. 184)

The final step in framework analysis is the mapping and interpretation step, where “the analyst begins to pull together the key characteristics of the data, and to map and interpret the data set as a whole” (p. 186). At this stage, the analyst analyses the data taking the research aims into consideration. Ritchie and Spencer (1994) indicate that the purposes of framework analysis in the context of applied policy research involve “defining concepts, mapping range and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing explanations, developing strategies etc.” (p. 176). The aim of this part of the study was to describe participants’ beliefs regarding moral education and moral psychology. Among the main goals of the research was to understand how participants’ beliefs were reflected in classroom practice. However, this objective was met in the final discussion of the whole data set, following the description and analysis of observation data, and taking into account data obtained from the questionnaires and interviews as well as the observations.

Drawing from the above-reviewed literature on thematic content analysis and framework analysis, analysis of data was conducted in six or seven steps depending on the
nature of the data. The first step of analysis involved immersion in the collected data through reading, rereading, transcribing and (where necessary) translating the data. This allowed me to get ‘a feel’ for the data at hand. The second step involved reading the transcribed data once again and jotting down notes regarding possible themes based on a priori concerns, or novel themes, recurring in the data set. After this, all potential themes were turned into titles and/or subtitles on a separate sheet of paper into which codes could be categorised. The third step followed was to identify codes relevant to identified themes, as well as identifying other codes that merit analytical attention. Then each identified code was categorised under their relevant titles. In case certain identified codes were relevant to more than one title or subtitle, they were categorised multiple times. Following this, the titles and categories were refined either through changing the title of the category to better reflect its contents, consolidating categories if they turned out to be more closely related than originally thought, or by breaking apart certain categories into more categories if certain elements of their contents were not as closely related to each other as originally thought.

While this categorization and thematization process was used with every question, in some questions categorization turned out to be either not possible or unnecessary. Thematic analysis was still employed in these cases without categorization. The sixth step was not used in the analysis of all questions, as in this step quantitative analysis of identified codes and categories was conducted. The need for methodological pluralism in the narrow area of thematic categorization arose at this point, due to the nature of obtained data. Data obtained through some questions were at times so varied (or so uniform) that a quantitative analysis of the qualitative data was not warranted; thus, the use of content analysis would not have been appropriate. However, in other questions the quantitative analysis of the qualitative data reflected much more depth regarding the aims of those questions; thus, the quantitative aspect of content analysis was employed. This step largely involved the comparison of frequencies of codes or categories. The final step in the analysis was the interpretation of identified codes, categories, themes, and where relevant, the quantitative aspects of data.

This procedure was conducted independently in the analysis of each question in the interview schedule, a total of 19 times. It was necessary to code and categorise the data separately for each question as each one is focused on a different topic, and they have relatively little bearing on each other. Following the regrouping of interview questions after the pilot interviews, in order to avoid asking questions that yield the same data repeatedly, questions no longer tended to draw answers that were highly relevant to other questions in the
interview schedule. As a result, categories identified in the analysis of one question could not be applied uniformly in all other questions, although certain themes were recurring in some questions. Interpretation of findings was also conducted independently for each question due to different categories and themes emerging from question analyses. General interpretation of the whole set of findings from the qualitative data analysis (including both interview and observation data analysis) is made at the end of Chapter V. Still, larger interpretation of results with consideration for the broad aims of the research is made in Chapter VI in conjunction with the results obtained from questionnaire data analysis. A final note that needs to be made is that codes were analysed with respect to their corresponding themes unless the context in which the code occurs needed to be considered as well.

One more alternative analysis method considered was discourse analysis. Rogers et al. (2005) define discourse analysis as focusing on “how language as a cultural tool mediates relationships of power and privilege in social interactions, institutions, and bodies of knowledge” (p. 367). Discourse analysis could have been warranted in this part of the study, especially in relation to participants’ beliefs regarding morality in Turkey, and how moral justifications are employed for ostracism and other forms of social pressure on people. However, participants’ beliefs regarding this aspect of morality are not part of the aims of the study; their beliefs regarding moral psychology and development, and how these beliefs reflect in classroom practice concerning the fostering of students’ moral development is the priority interest of this study.

There are further practical problems regarding the use of discourse analysis in this study, which are related to language. The data set is in Turkish, yet the presentation needs to be made in English. And discourse analysis relies heavily on the use of language (Rogers, 2011; Rogers et al., 2005), as opposed to the conceptual and thematic focus of the methods reviewed above. In order to conduct discourse analysis in Turkish and present the findings in English, a comparative review of the method in both languages would have been necessary so that the underlying justifications and analysis procedure could have been made explicit. Considering that there are relatively few points that discourse analysis could have shed light on (at least with regards to the priorities of this study), this path was not taken. It was judged that the time and energy spent on conducting discourse analysis in two languages that have nothing in common grammatically, and very little culturally, would not be justified by the relatively small amount of results the method would have yielded, which would be
tangentially related to the research aims in any case. The issues regarding translation become more apparent in Chapter V, Section 1; especially in section 1.8.

4.3. Observations

The interview and questionnaire methods are not always sufficient to provide reliable data. Bush (2002) indicates that the greatest vulnerability of the interview method is bias. Interviewees may give inaccurate answers because they may want to reflect themselves in a certain light, for social desirability bias (giving answers they think are more likely to be better accepted by society), or because they are led by the interviewer into giving certain answers. Similarly, the interviewer may ask loaded questions (e.g. confirming a prejudice). For this reason, observations were also planned in order to establish reliability through triangulation.

The main aim of the observations was to understand whether participants’ beliefs, as stated in the interviews, were reflected in their teaching practice. Moyles (2002) explains that observations are independent of participants’ stated views and that they are sometimes necessary to establish triangulation:

“Observation as a tool for the researcher can be powerful, flexible and real. It is not dependent, like questionnaires or interview methods, on respondents’ personal views, but seeks explicit evidence through the eyes of the observer either directly or through a camera lens.” (Moyles, 2002, p. 172)

Observations are important research tools as they can give direct access and insight into complex social interactions and settings, provide permanent and systematic records of such interactions and settings and enrich and supplement data gathered by other techniques like questionnaires and interviews. They are also context sensitive and ecologically valid (Denscombe, 2003). Furthermore, observations use very varied techniques, yielding different types of data and with the potential to be widely applied in different contexts; and be used to address a variety of types of research questions (Denscombe, 2003; Moyles, 2002). Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2000) indicate that observations can yield data on the physical, human, interactional, and programme setting of observed phenomena. However, observations alone cannot generate completely reliable data:

“Observation methods are powerful tools for gaining insights into situations. As with other data collection techniques, they are beset by issues of validity and reliability. Even low inference observation, perhaps the safest form of observation, is itself
highly selective, just as perception is selective. In this respect it has been suggested that additional methods of gathering data might be employed, to provide corroboration and triangulation, in short, to ensure that reliable inferences are derived from reliable data.” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000, p. 315)

For this reason, findings from observations were cross-checked with questionnaire results and interview findings. It was expected that in this way triangulation is established and reliability increased.

The observations were semi-structured and conducted in a non-participant manner. The main reason for engaging in non-participant observation is that the researcher was not part of the group that he was researching (the school where observed teachers work). Observing in this manner has several benefits, as well as costs. The most important drawback of non-participant observation is the ‘observer effect’ (Gillham, 2008; Simpson & Tuson, 1995). In the presence of a stranger (the non-participant observer in this case), people do not act the same as they would if this person were absent. This creates a problem as the non-participant observer cannot have clear access to the natural behaviour of those that are being observed. On the other hand, when the researcher is an insider of the group – a participant observer – s/he is more likely to have clearer access to more natural behaviour, as the researcher is not a stranger to those being observed. However, becoming an insider to the observed group (conducting participant observation) either requires an investment of time, such that one becomes a part of the observed group, or that the researcher has already established themselves as a part of the group. Since the researcher was not part of any of the schools in which the observations were conducted, becoming an insider by investing time and assuming other roles in the schools was the only possible way of conducting participant observation. Since it would not be feasible to become an insider to 10 different schools, and considering the time limitations of a PhD programme, participant observation was not feasible for this study.

Non-participant observation has several benefits, the most important of which is detachment. Yin (2014) indicates that participant observation is prone to biases such as “[having] to assume positions or advocacy roles contrary to the interests of good social science practice” (p. 117). Furthermore, being a part of the observed group, the researcher may have other roles and responsibilities to the group which may create practical problems such as insufficient time to take research-related notes in an event, or inability to position
oneself effectively in order to conduct the observations. The detachment of non-participant observations allows the researcher to circumvent problems of bias and practicality to a certain extent and given the potential sensitivity of the research topic (morality), detachment in terms of avoiding bias was crucial for this study.

Observations are guided by the observation schedule which can range in its degree of structure from strictly defined item checklists to a complete lack of observation schedule – usually described as unstructured observations (Gillham, 2008; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007; Simpson & Tuson, 1995). Unstructured observations are often used by ethnographers who immerse themselves with the group they are researching as participants of the group (Angrosino, 2007). While unstructured observations yield rich qualitative data, they are expensive in terms of time, analysis, and presentation, making it harder to manage for the researcher (Gillham, 2008). When researching implicit moral interactions and education, an unstructured ethnographic observation – immersing oneself in the context – could be preferable, as Woods (2013) has done. However, in this study, the heavily participatory nature of unstructured observations could have created practical problems such as devoting a lot of time to becoming a participant in one place of observation. Furthermore, explicit and implicit interactions regarding ‘good and bad’ can be so common and so subtle in the school context (Purpel & Ryan, 1983) that in the lack of at least semi-structured guidelines to narrow the perspective and focus the researcher’s attention, the researcher cannot accurately perceive and reflect interactions about morality in its entirety – especially in a single day of observation. Thus, in this study, structure was required for the observations.

Structured observations are sometimes equated with non-participant observations (Gillham, 2008); the observer enters the classroom with a previously prepared checklist and proceeds to mark the items on the observation schedule. Heavily structured observations tend to yield quantitative data and are much more manageable in terms of time, preparation and analysis compared to unstructured observations; however, the results they yield can be superficial (Gillham, 2008; Simpson & Tuson, 1995). Interactions about morality in the school context take a variety of forms, from subtle gestures to lesson-long lectures about good and bad behaviour, to school rules (Purpel & Ryan, 1983). Constructing a strictly defined set of items to be marked on a checklist that covers this wide range of potential moral interactions is not only very difficult but also unnecessary. The present study does not focus on specific behaviour or events that convey moral messages to students (such as, for example, a disapproving frown of the teacher to a student speaking out of turn in class), but rather how
(and whether) these interactions occur in general. Since the specific behaviour or event that may convey a moral message can take such a wide variety of forms, highly structured items are unlikely to cover the whole range of possible interactions about morality and reflect an accurate picture of the events that take place in the classroom.

It is possible to create a structured checklist for controlling whether certain activities which have been shown to foster moral development, such as role-playing activities or dilemma discussion (Bebeau, 1994), have been undertaken for specific pedagogical purposes at specific dates. However, not only would it be unrealistic to expect to be able to observe these activities on the specific day of the observation (unless the observation date was set specifically when these activities would be carried out), but even if such activities were observed, it would be unrealistic to assume that one day’s activities are representative of the general moral education practice of the school (including both implicit and explicit moral education). The activities teachers use to foster students’ moral development could be learnt from follow-up questions instead. For this reason, more subtle interactions concerning moral education were the topic of the observations.

Given the above grounds for the unsuitableness of highly structured, or completely unstructured observation schedules, for this study, semi-structured observation schedules were prepared. Semi-structured observations are not as highly structured as a checklist but do provide some guidelines for observation. Gillham (2008) indicates that in semi-structured observations the researcher has some structured items or questions, but that these are “open” so that the researcher “cannot predict what [s/he] will find” (p. 19). Given the difficulty of predicting the wide range of possible behaviour that may have moral implications which the students can pick up on, semi-structured observations were the most suitable kind of observation to address the research questions of this study.

Two different observations were conducted. The main observation was focused on teachers’ classroom interaction with students; while supporting observations of the school grounds were also conducted.

4.3.1. Classroom Observations

The main observation schedule was designed to be semi-structured. Cohen, Manion, and Morrison (2008) indicate that observations allow data to be gathered on the physical environment and its organization (the physical setting), the people present in the
environment, their characteristics and how they organize themselves (the human setting), the interactions taking place in the environment and the manner of these interactions (the interactional setting), and the programme setting which covers curricula, pedagogic styles, resources and their organization. While the observation schedule was designed predominantly as an aid to record the interactional setting in the classroom, it also includes tools to record the physical, human, and programme settings as well. The main focus of the observations was teachers’ behaviour relevant to implicit moral education based on their beliefs stated in the interviews. However, while engagement in implicit moral education can be observed mostly in the interactional setting, the human (e.g. population of the class), physical (e.g. classroom size and seating plan), and programme (e.g. use of posters) can also play a part in the interactions of interest (see Appendix A11).

The observation schedule was further adapted for each observation based on participants’ statements in the interviews. This further structure was added following the interview data analysis, and the added structure was unique to each observation, being based on individual participants’ statements.

4.3.2. Observation of School Grounds

While volunteer teachers were observed in their classroom practice, a supporting structured non-participant observation of the school in which the teachers were teaching was also conducted. This observation was expected to yield some data on the school rules and how they were practised, and the general climate and implicit messages that may have been conveyed to students through the physical environment of the school. These qualify as an observation of the physical setting (physical environment) and programme setting (pedagogic styles, rules, etc.) of the school. The observation schedule for the school included specific items, although other instances of interest were also noted during observations.

The observation of the school grounds was divided into two sections: description of physical objects and facilities, and any behaviour or event of interest that took place outside the classroom. The schedule was once again semi-structured, albeit including more structure in the noting of physical facilities.

The second section of the school grounds observation schedule included event descriptions. It was expected that certain events/behaviour of interest could be observed in
the school grounds. These events were noted down the same way as in the main classroom observation, only with the addition of where the event took place (see Appendix A12).

4.4. Pilot Study and the Revision of Research Tools

A pilot study was conducted which included 18 questionnaire responses from participants, including 5 students, 7 interns, and 6 teachers. Pilot interviews were also conducted with two participants from each group.

The questionnaire initially consisted of 5 parts, with background questions included in the first part. Following the pilot study, background questions were moved to the end of the questionnaire and one section which consisted of open-ended questions was omitted. The open-ended questions focused on the respondents’ own experiences in learning and, if applicable, teaching moral values. However, in the pilot study these questions were rarely answered, and when they were, they did not yield usable data – as it was evident that participants answered these questions just for the sake of answering them and without being concerned about accuracy. Some further problems regarding the wording of questions were identified and corrected in the final form. Also, the answers to questions in the second part included a five-point Likert scale range, including a neutral answer. In the pilot study, these neutral answers were regularly chosen by respondents. Later feedback from participants revealed that neutral options were not chosen for concerns of accuracy. For this reason, the neutral option was omitted to force the participant to give a more accurate answer.

Only minor changes were made to the interview format after the pilot study. Most importantly it was found that in order to explore each question of the interview schedule in depth at least 60 to 90 minutes of interviewing was necessary. For this reason, the interview schedule was shortened. It was also noted that participants tended to give answers to several related questions on the interview schedule while they focused on one question. Clusters of questions that tended to elicit related answers were grouped in order to conduct the interview in manageable time scales while exploring the topics under investigation in depth. However, while most participants’ answers to a question would be relevant to other questions on the schedule, the other questions to which their responses were relevant changed from participant to participant. For this reason, the number of questions on the schedule could not be greatly reduced, for if the interviewees did not talk about a certain topic, the researcher could introduce it. Some problems based on the translations of questions from English to Turkish were encountered. These were corrected following the pilot study. Most importantly the
experience of interviewing was helpful for the researcher. This experience has allowed me to
be more mindful of the ethical concerns of interviewing participants on a sensitive topic
related to morality. And finally, background questions were moved to the beginning of the
interview in order to serve as an easy start to the discussion.

The observations were not piloted, for entering the classroom for a pilot observation
would have been intrusive of pilot participants’ educational practice and privacy. However,
having worked as a teacher and conducted observations during my university teacher training
in Turkey as an undergraduate, I had some experience of conducting observations in
educational settings prior to this research. Furthermore, I was also working at a school at the
time of designing the observation schedule, where I practised conducting observations as part
of my normal duties, which helped me design the observation schedule. This pilot resulted in
the creation of the semi-structured observation schedule, whereas in the first place
unstructured observations were planned to be conducted. During the practice observation, I
noticed that without some guidelines to narrow my focus while observing, it would be too
difficult to take unified notes that could lead to manageable amounts of data ordered in a way
conducive to easier analysis. As a result, the semi-structured observation schedule was
created.
5. Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were central to this research as morality, and education regarding morality, are sensitive topics. The anonymity of participants, respect for their privacy, and confidentiality were of utmost importance. Due diligence was paid to the design of the questionnaire and interview schedule as “ethical problems in educational research can often result from thoughtlessness, oversight or taking matters for granted” (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2000). Every effort was made to avoid articulating questions in a way that could be perceived as obtrusive, prejudiced, accusatory, or degrading. Participants’ informed consent was sought through a participant information sheet provided to the participants prior to the interviews, seeking permission to use quotations as relevant to the research analysis and presentation (see appendices A1 and A2, and A5 and A6). The practice of informed consent through participant information sheets and signed consent forms was also employed with the observations (see Appendices A9 and A10). The school names where participating teachers work and the names of the interviewees are not and will not be disclosed in this study or anywhere else. The individuals who took part in the questionnaire survey have also not been asked to disclose their names.

A Participant Information Sheet was provided to reassure the participants that the study would not invade their privacy and that their identity would be kept confidential (see Appendices A1 and A2). The Participant Information Sheet included the details of the purpose of the study, why the person had been invited to participate in the study, ethical guarantees pertaining to confidentiality, anonymity, and the right to withdraw from the study giving reason, the benefits of taking part in the study, and communication details. Busher (2002) explicitly states the importance of informed consent:

“Respect for the dignity and privacy of participants is often translated into the common practice, urged by various codes of conduct for researchers in Education and Social Sciences (e.g. British Educational Research Association, 1992; British Sociological Association, 1992) of researchers always trying to gain the informed consent of participants to be involved in any research they are proposing to undertake and always trying to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of their participants, whatever information they give.” (p. 74)

Nonetheless, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) indicate that “the questionnaire will always be an intrusion into the life of the respondent, be it in terms of time taken to
complete the questionnaire, the level of threat or sensitivity of the questions, or the possible invasion of privacy” (p. 245). With this consideration in mind, the questionnaire was designed to minimise the level of intrusion on the participants’ behalf. The wording of the questions was especially important in this case, as their content – morality – is a sensitive issue. Data provided by the participants were also handled with appropriate diligence. The data has been locked in a cabinet, and as I translated the material myself, the data has not been seen by anyone else.

Ethical considerations are of even greater importance in observations. The privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality of all observed parties – be it the teacher that is the centre of focus, the school where the teacher works, or other parties present during the observations, such as the students or other staff – must be strictly protected. Video recording of observations was not chosen for this reason. Meticulous note taking was employed instead. Every measure was taken to protect the participants’ and other observed parties’ privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality. Participants and schools were given a guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality through the letter of informed consent and permission requests.

With the above considerations in mind, an application to the Oxford Brookes University Research Ethics Committee was made in March 2014 to gain approval of the ethical soundness of the research approach and data gathering tools. Approval was granted in April 2014.
6. Recruitment and Data Gathering

This section provides an explanation of how the cross-sectional sample of participants was recruited for this study, and how data were gathered. All participants were recruited from the teacher training programme of the same university in Izmir, Turkey. The university was chosen based on the reputation of its teacher training programme and practical concerns such as accessibility. Participants consisted of first-year students (students), fourth-year students (interns), and practising alumni teachers of the programme (teachers). This selection of participants was intended to reveal how teacher training and teaching practice influenced the development of the beliefs under investigation. Responses of students who had little training and no experience, interns who had complete training and little experience (fourth year education faculty students in Turkey have their internship in this year), and practising teachers who have both full training and several years of teaching experience were compared to reveal the influence of teacher training and experience on the beliefs under investigation.

It must be reported at this point that, following data analysis, it was noticed that the sample of teachers and trainee teachers investigated in this study is biased. The bias resides in participants’ political orientations in general. Izmir is the most liberal city in Turkey considering social matters, which narrowed down the population under investigation. University students tend to be slightly more liberal as well, and the specific Faculty of Education where data was gathered is also reputed to have a liberal tradition, further liberalising the sample under investigation. As a result, the findings of this study, with regards to participants’ moral and educational beliefs, are more representative of beliefs influenced by liberal political orientations than of conservative orientations.

6.1. Questionnaire Survey

Two strategies were used to recruit participants. First and fourth-year students completed the survey on paper, and teachers completed the survey online. Permission was obtained from the faculty Dean to gather data from students and alumni of the programme and to conduct data gathering both on university grounds and online. After permission was granted, the recruitment of first and fourth-year students took place at the university. Questionnaires were distributed to students and interns in class, before or after a lecture they were attending in order to increase response rates. While data were gathered from this captive sample, the voluntary nature of participation was verbally emphasised in addition to the clear statement in the participant information sheets. A link to the online survey on the
SurveyMonkey website was communicated to the alumni of the programme through a variety of methods, including social media (such as Facebook) and emails sent to alumni of the programme by the university. Due to this indirect method of communicating, response rates were lower for teachers than they were for students or interns.

6.2. Interviews

The research was designed such that the number of interview participants was around one tenth of questionnaire participants, in order to collect manageable amounts of data. The contact details of the researcher were on the questionnaires and participants were invited to volunteer for interviews. Contact information of participants was taken once they volunteered to be interviewed, and a location for conducting the interviews was selected. Wragg (2002) indicates that the site where the interview is conducted is important as participants feel differently in different places, and this influences the answers they give. He suggests that conducting the interview in a location where the participant feels more relaxed is more likely to produce better results. For this reason, interviews were conducted in a place of the interviewee’s choice, as long as this was conducive to an uninterrupted interview.

Twenty participants volunteered to be interviewed. First and fourth-year participants (students and interns) were asked whether they would volunteer to be interviewed on topics similar to those covered in the survey, immediately after the survey was conducted. Volunteers’ contact information was taken to facilitate possible arrangements to carry out further interviews. Five students and five interns volunteered to be interviewed. All interviews were audio recorded and took place at the university, in a place of participants’ choosing sufficiently convenient for conducting the interviews. The total time of recorded interviews was four hours and twenty-seven minutes, averaging 26.7 minutes per interview. The shortest interview was 15 minutes long, while the longest was 36 minutes.

A survey of teachers was conducted online, and an invitation for interviews was communicated online as well. Contrary to expectations, more teachers volunteered to be interviewed than students or interns. Invitations for interviews were communicated to teachers through the online questionnaire. Ten teachers volunteered to be interviewed. Their contact information was taken, and a meeting was arranged for conducting the interviews at a place and time of the participants’ choosing. However, due to technical difficulties with the recorder, these interviews were conducted online in written form. More detailed information about the interviewees can be found in Chapter V.
6.3. Observations

Intern and teacher participants were invited to volunteer for observations at the end of the interviews. The invitation was not extended to students since first-year students do not do teaching or teaching practice. The voluntary nature of participation was emphasised, and participants were briefed about how the observations would take place, and what the focus would be. (See Appendices A1 and A2 for PI sheets, and A9 and A10 for Observation Informed Consent forms.) It was planned that 5 interns and 5 teachers would be observed in class. While the aim of recruiting five teachers was initially met, only one intern volunteered to take part in the observations. More detailed information about the observation participants can be found in Chapter V.

Information regarding the schools where teachers worked and where the intern had her placement was gathered. The schools were then contacted, and information regarding the research was given. Following this, permission to conduct observations on the school grounds and the classrooms was sought. Written assurance was provided that permissions could be withdrawn without giving cause and that schools’ and all observed parties’ anonymity and confidentiality would be protected. The heads of four schools gave permission, while two schools, one of which was where the intern had her placement, refused permission. Once permission was denied, the issue was not further pursued with either school. As there were no other volunteers, other opportunities for conducting observations could not be pursued either. With the schools that gave permission to conduct observations, a date for conducting the observations was set jointly with the school administration and the teachers who volunteered to be observed. Data were gathered on these selected days.

Depending on the teachers’ availability on the day of the observations, non-participant observations for one or two lessons (40 minutes per lesson) were conducted with each participant, and observation of school grounds was allocated as much time as necessary. The time devoted to the observation of school grounds differed from school to school as each school was of a different size; for example, the observation of the urban school took the least amount of time as this was the smallest school.

Field notes were taken on hard copies of the observation schedules, the hard copy of transcripts, and a notebook. Each observation was adapted based on the observed teachers’ statements in the interviews. Before the observations, I familiarised myself with the interview transcripts in order to be able to direct my attention to specific instances and interactions.
when taking field notes and analysing observed data from the perspective of the stated beliefs, rather than trying to observe anything and everything at once. A hard copy of the transcripts was used during the observations in order to take a look at the statements again if necessary and to take field notes next to certain statements. Field notes were later digitalized by copying them to a word processor on computer.

In order to minimise my impact on the lessons being observed, I chose the remotest place in the classrooms to conduct the observations. This was the back of the classroom in each case, and this further allowed me to observe the entire class as the lesson was taking place. Most importantly, this allowed me to see how and whether teachers responded to certain behaviours of students during class. Interactions (or lack thereof) between students and the teacher pertinent to the study were, later on, followed up by questions to the teacher after the observations. Follow-up questions were formed during the observations; they were based on how observed behaviour was related to teachers stated beliefs.

However, it needs to be noted at this junction that the observations did not achieve their original aim. In retrospect, I believe that I have underestimated the depth and complexity of the issue. While achieving the initial objective of conducting observations in ten schools could have provided a wide variety, two to four hours of observations have not been enough to gather sufficient amounts of data. The gathered data have been analysed, and are discussed below to the extent that data analysis affords discussion. However, for this reason, references to the observations are somewhat scarce in the presentation of qualitative data analysis in Chapter V.
CHAPTER IV
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

In this chapter, the results of the quantitative data analysis are presented. Two kinds of analysis have been conducted. Firstly, analysis of descriptive data focusing on the frequencies of responses to individual questions is presented. This is followed by the presentation of the analysis of results obtained from regression tests. Finally, in Section 5, the findings are summarised.

The analysis of descriptive frequencies can be said to indicate that participants’ overall responses, to moral psychology issues investigated here, loosely reflect the moral psychology literature reviewed in chapter two of this thesis; however, some participants’ attitudes towards certain issues conflict with the attitudes of other participants. As a result, it cannot be clearly concluded that participants have a positive or negative attitude towards these matters. On issues related to implicit moral education, participants indicate that children learn morality firstly at home from their parents, and secondly at school from their peers and teachers. Participants seem to recognise their role in the moral development of students, and a large majority indicated that as teachers they are and should be responsible for students’ moral development. Furthermore, most indicated that they are not satisfied with the current system of moral education.

Regression tests were conducted on four different topics: a) whether teacher training and experience influences attitudes, b) whether planning to continue in education or not influences attitudes, c) whether gender differences influence attitudes, and d) whether disciplinary focus influences attitudes. Overall, none of these tests has yielded significant results. Chi-square tests were conducted considering each of the four topics above, and these tests have yielded significant results on relatively few issues.
1. Reliability and Normality

Cronbach’s alpha was chosen as the reliability indicator of the questionnaire. Cronbach’s alpha is the most commonly used reliability score for assessing the internal consistency of quantitative measures (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). As a general rule of thumb, a score of 0.7 or above is thought to reflect an acceptable amount of internal consistency (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the first three parts of the questionnaire as the fourth part contains only demographic and background questions. Cronbach’s alpha score for the first three parts was $\alpha = .72$. (See Appendices A3 and A4, for the questionnaires given to participants.)

Data were tested for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for each part of the questionnaire. Alternatively, the Shapiro-Wilk test can be used to assess normality. However, the Shapiro-Wilk test is more accurate with sample sizes smaller than 50 (Field, 2009), while the sample size in this study is 171. The KS test showed that Part 1 responses were normally distributed, $D(171) = 0.06, p < .05$. However, the test revealed that part 2 responses, $D(171) = 0.07, p > .05$, and part 3 responses, $D(171) = 0.49, p > .001$, were significantly non-normal. For this reason, non-parametric tests were run on the data. Skewness and Kurtosis are disregarded here as it is recommended that they are not considered in large samples (Field, 2009).
2. Participants

2.1. Demographics

71 first year students (41.5%), 63 interns (36.8%), and 37 teachers (21.6%) volunteered to take part in the study, totalling 171 participants in the survey. The sample included 17 interns studying Teaching Computer and Information Technologies (9.9%), 30 mathematics teachers and students studying Teaching Mathematics, 27 English teachers (15.7%), 90 students and interns studying Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG) (52.6%), and 1 physics, 1 history, and 1 science teacher (0.5% each), while 3 teachers (1.7%) did not report their subject (see Chart 1). The mean age of participants was 22.07 (SD = 4.16). 41 participants were male (23.9%), and 126 were female (73.6%). 4 participants (2.3%) did not report their gender.

The high number of PCG students is due to the greater number of PCG students volunteering to take part in the study, and also to practical issues such as availability during the time when data gathering was permitted on university grounds.

2.2. Experience and Education

Twenty teachers indicated that their education level was graduate (11.6%) while 15 teachers were post-graduates (8.7%). All other participants, with the exception of 5 who did not indicate their education level, were undergraduates (131 participants 76.6%): these are the first year or fourth year undergraduate students (students and interns). While 58 participants had not done their internship yet (33.9%), 50 were in the process of doing their internships (29.2%), and 59 participants indicated that they had completed their internship (34.5%). Four participants did not provide information on whether they had done their internship or not. In response to the question of how much teaching experience participants had, 57 participants (33.3%) stated that they had no teaching experience, 50 participants (29.2%) had the experience of an internship they had not yet completed, 27 participants (15.8%) had only
their internship experience (each of which was an intern), 16 teachers (9.4%) had from less than a year to two years of teaching experience, 11 participants (6.4%) had three to five years of teaching experience, and finally 6 participants (3.5%) had more than six years of teaching experience. Once again, 4 participants did not respond to this question (see Chart 2).

In response to an open-ended question about whether participants had any training regarding moral psychology, development, or education, more than 80% of participants indicated that they had not, while some participants thought some education they previously received might be relevant to moral psychology. These include high school RE, citizenship and philosophy courses, and undergraduate professional ethics, philosophy, and developmental psychology courses. Only four participants mentioned Kohlberg’s theory in response to this question. No other author or moral psychology theory was mentioned.
3. Frequencies

The presentation of results in this section focuses solely on their frequencies. Initially, how participants responded to the questions of the first part of the questionnaire is presented, focusing on what the results indicate regarding participants’ beliefs related to aspects of the Four Components Model, Moral Foundations Theory, Social Intuitionist Model, Triune Ethics Theory, Cognitive Development Theory and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach. (Please see section 2.2 in the literature review for an overview of each of these theories.) The results of the second part of the questionnaire, which focuses on participants’ beliefs regarding moral education and their experience of engaging in implicit moral education with 17 statements, also assessed against a Likert scale, are presented in section 3.2 below. Finally, the results of the third part of the questionnaire, which involves 4 ranking questions regarding participants’ beliefs about moral development and implicit moral education, are presented in section 3.3, before the results of the regression tests based on participant groups are presented in section 4 below.

3.1. Moral Psychology Beliefs

This section of the questionnaire was formed of 24 statements assessed against a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). As Likert scale assessments provide categorical data rather than numerical data, the results and central tendencies for each question can be best presented through the mode, which is the statistic that describes the most frequent response to an item on the questionnaire (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). In this part, questions 1 to 11 are related to the Four Components Model, 12 to 15 are drawn from the Moral Foundations Theory and the Social Intuitionist Model, questions 16, 17, 22 and 24 are based on Triune Ethics Theory, 18 to 21 are from the Cognitive Development Theory and the Neo-Kohlbergian approach, and question 23 is unrelated to these topics. (See Section 2, Chapter II for these models and theories.)

3.1.1. Four Components Model

There are two questions specifically related to moral sensitivity – questions 1 and 6. Question 1 asked participants whether they thought people always understood the moral salience of a situation and question 6 asked participants whether they thought people always understood the moral salience of the decisions they made. The mode for question 1 was “not sure” with 66 (38.6%) responses. In addition to this, negative responses (disagree/strongly
disagree) to the item also add up to 66 (38.6%), meaning that participants were either unsure whether people understood the moral salience of any given situation, or were inclined to believe that people did not recognize the moral salience of situations in general. This is supported by responses to question 6 where the mode is “disagree” with 68 (39.8%), followed by 54 “not sure” responses (31.6%) (see Chart 3). The results of the questions related to moral sensitivity indicate that there is a slight tendency among participants to believe that people, in general, do not recognise the moral significance of situations or their decisions.

Four questions directly related to moral judgement were asked – questions 2 to 5. (Questions 7 and 18 are also indirectly related to moral judgement; however, they are more related to moral motivation and moral reasoning development respectively and have been analysed in the relevant section below.) Question 2 asked participants whether they thought people had good moral judgement, to which 70 participants (40.9%) disagreed. Following this, question 3 asked participants whether they thought people were influenced more by moral reasoning, or, in question 4, by moral intuitions when making moral judgements. These questions were followed by question 5 which asked participants whether they thought rational and intuitive processes equally affected moral judgement. The mode for moral reasoning (question 3) was “disagree” with 63 (36.8%), and for moral intuitions (question 4) it was “agree” with 87 (50.9%). Furthermore, responses were equally distributed between “disagree”, “not sure”, and “agree” regarding the balanced effect of rational and intuitive process on moral judgement (question 5),
with 49 (28.7%), 49 (28.7%), and 50 (29.2%) responses respectively (see Chart 4). This indicates that most participants believe that moral intuitions, in the form of emotions, influence moral judgement; however, they are divided on the matter of whether the two processes have a balanced influence on moral judgement.

Six questions related to moral motivation were asked – questions 7 to 12. Question 7 asked participants whether they thought people would still act immorally even if they knew what they were doing was bad. This question seeks to understand whether participants believe that moral reasoning provides moral motivation. 93 participants (54.4%) agreed with this statement, and 52 participants (30.4%) strongly agreed (total 145 participants, 84.8%), indicating that moral reasoning did not provide moral motivation, in line with the gappiness problem (see Section 2, Chapter II). Question 8 asked participants whether the moral self provided moral motivation. Participants agreed that people found the motivation to act morally within themselves with 81 (49.9%) participants agreeing (see Chart 5). Question 9 asked whether participants thought that moral emotions provided moral motivation, to which 77 participants (45.0%) agreed. Question 10 was also related to the moral self, however, this time focusing on second-order volitions (see Section 2, Chapter II). 65 participants (38.0%) agreed that people acted morally because they wanted to be good people.

Questions 11 and 12 were designed to offer a contrasting point to the previous questions in suggesting that moral motivation was provided externally through laws and social pressure, with question 11 indicating that in the absence of laws and social pressure people would do what suits them best, while question 12 stated that laws and social pressure were more effective in ensuring moral behaviour than the moral self and character. Following the previous responses, especially to question 8, it might have been expected that participants would disagree with the notion that moral motivation was provided externally; however, 74 participants (43.4%) agreed that without external motivation (such as punishments), people
would not act morally, and 41 (24.0%) participants strongly agreed to this as well, totalling 115 (67.3%) participants stating a positive response. Furthermore, in response to question 12, 81 participants (47.4%) agreed, and 30 participants (17.5%) strongly agreed, totalling 111 (64.9%) positive responses. The total positive (agree and strongly agree) responses to the previous three questions are 101 (59.1%) for question 8, 94 (54.9%) for question 9, and 76 (44.4%) for question 10, evidencing a stronger belief in external sources of moral motivation than internal sources.

These results indicate that a majority of participants believe that while moral reasoning does not provide moral motivation, the moral self and moral emotions are more likely to provide moral motivation. However, without laws and social pressure to enforce moral behaviour, people would not act morally, indicating that while moral motivation is based on the moral self and moral emotions, these are not enough by themselves.


Questions 13 to 15 were related to the Moral Foundations Theory and the Social Intuitionist Model (see Section 2, Chapter II). These questions were designed to elicit participants’ beliefs regarding the relationship between morality and culture. Questions 13 and 14 were intended to contrast each other, with question 13 indicating that there are no universal moral foundations, only cultural moralities, while question 14 states that there are universal moral foundations across the world, however, their interpretation and application differ from culture to culture. Interestingly participants tended to agree to both questions. 70 participants (40.9%) strongly agreed, and 63 participants (36.8%) agreed to question 13, totalling to 133 positive responses (77.7%) to a particularist perspective; and 75 participants (43.9%) agreed and 55 participants (32.2%) strongly agreed to question 14, totalling 130 positive responses (76.1%) to a foundationalist perspective. About the same number of participants have indicated that they hold beliefs that were presented to be contrasting. Question 15 asked participants whether they thought culture influenced people’s emotions in morally salient situations, to which 101 participants (59.1%) agreed.

These results indicate that while participants believe that culture has a very important role in people’s understanding of morality, their view on whether morality is entirely culturally relativistic or not is unclear.
3.1.3. Triune Ethics Theory

Questions 16, 17, 22, and 24 were drawn from the literature regarding Triune Ethics Theory. Question 16 asked participants whether they believed that morality was innate, that people were born knowing at least some moral rules. Responses to this question were spread fairly equally, with 49 participants (28.7%) disagreeing, 38 participants (22.2%) indicating they were not sure, and 43 participants (25.1%) agreeing. This result points to a divide among participants’ beliefs, albeit there is a greater tendency to think that morality is not innate. Question 17 asked participants whether they believed that growing up in a loving and secure environment was more conducive for greater moral development for children. Participants overwhelmingly responded positively to this question with 142 participants (89.3%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement. Question 24 asked participants whether they thought moral behaviour could be conceived as a skill that could be developed. 121 participants (72.1%) responses positively this statement, while only 16 participants (9.5%) responded negatively (see Chart 6). These results indicate that participants believe that children may or may not be born with any kind of moral knowledge, but if they are brought up in a conducive environment, their moral skills can be developed.

Question 22 asked participants whether they thought research on neurology could shed light on the process of moral judgement, to which 76 participants (44.4%) agreed. This result indicates that teachers are more likely to believe that neurological research can be useful in understanding moral psychology than to think that neurology is not related to moral psychology.
3.1.4. Development of Moral Reasoning (CDT & NKA)

Questions 18 to 21 were based on moral reasoning development, drawing from Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory, and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (see Section 2, Chapter II). Question 18 asked participants whether they thought that people’s understanding of morality changed as they grow and mature. 93 participants (54.4%) agreed, and 53 participants (31.0%) strongly agreed with this statement, totalling 146 positive responses (85.4%). Question 19 asked participants whether they thought it was possible for children to think beyond their immediate surroundings on moral matters. While 55 participants (32.2%) disagreed with this statement, 52 participants (30.4%) indicated that they were not sure. Question 20 asked participants whether they thought that the moral reasoning of most adolescents and some adults were driven by a desire to maintain the social order. 82 participants (48.0%) agreed with this statement. Finally, question 21 asked participants whether they thought that it was possible for people to think of morality in terms of principles and ideals before adulthood, to which 61 participants (35.7%) disagreed and 57 participants (33.3%) were not sure.

These results indicate that participants think that moral reasoning develops over time, and their understanding of this development seems to reflect the theories which these questions were drawn from. However, participants also have doubts as well, since nearly as many participants indicated that they were not sure as those that gave a non-neutral response in questions related to the pre- and post-conventional levels of moral reasoning.

One final question in Part 1 that does not fit under any of the above titles was question 23, which asked whether participants thought that philosophical contemplation was the only way of understanding moral rules. 72 participants (42.1%) indicated that this was not the case. This suggests that some participants believe that philosophy is not the only method of understanding and possibly teaching morality (see Chart 7).
3.2. Moral Education Beliefs – Responses to Likert Scale Questions

Part 2 of the questionnaire is divided into two sections. The first eleven questions (questions 25 to 35) were answered by all participants and focus on participants’ views on moral education and the hidden curriculum, while the latter six questions (questions 36 to 41) were answered only by interns and teachers, since these questions focus on participants’ experience in teaching and it was assumed that first year students had not yet had any teaching experience. Once again, the questions are statements to which participants could agree or disagree on a Likert scale range of 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), and, once again, as these responses are not ranking or rating items, the discussion below of central tendencies are presented in terms of the mode.

Question 25 asked participants whether they thought that it was important to teach morality in school, to which 158 participants (92.4%) responded positively (38.6% agree and 53.8% strongly agree). Questions 26 to 28 were related to the place of the teacher in moral education. Question 26 asked participants whether they thought that it was their responsibility to teach moral values to their students. 165 participants (96.5%) responded to this question positively as well (42.7% agree, and 53.8% strongly agree). Questions 27 and 28 asked participants whether they thought that teachers are models of moral behaviour and whether they should be, respectively. 157 participants (91.8%) responded positively to question 27 (39.2% agree and 52.6% strongly agree); this figure rises to 163 positive responses (95.3%) in question 28 (38.0% agree and 57.3% strongly agree). These results indicate that participants strongly believe that it is important to teach morality in school and that teachers have and should have a central role in fostering students’ moral development.

Questions 29 to 33 are concerned with moral education. Question 29 asked participants whether they thought that there should be a specific subject focusing on moral education, to which 71 participants (41.5%) agreed, and 48 participants (28.1%) strongly agreed. Question 30 asked participants whether they thought that moral education should be taught across the curriculum, while question 31 asked participants...
whether they thought that there should be more weekly lessons focusing on morality. 76 participants (44.4%) agreed to question 30 (while 57 participants, 33.3% strongly agreed) and 77 participants (45.0%) agreed to question 31 (see Chart 8). Question 32 asked participants whether they thought that teachers should be educated regarding how to foster students’ moral development. 84 participants (49.1%) agreed, and 72 participants (42.1%) strongly agreed with this question. Question 33 asked participants whether they thought that our current education system teaches morality effectively, to which 92 participants (53.8%) disagreed and 54 participants (31.6%) strongly disagreed. These results indicate that participants believe that neither moral education nor teacher training regarding moral education is sufficient and that moral education should be improved in terms of quality and time devoted to morality across the curriculum.

Questions 34 and 35 were related to the hidden curriculum. Question 34 asked participants whether they thought that the school’s physical and temporal (e.g. recess times) features influenced students’ moral development, to which 91 participants (53.2%) agreed and 33 participants (19.3%) strongly agreed. Question 35 asked participants whether they thought that school rules and culture had an influence on students’ moral development, to which 97 participants (56.7%) agreed, and 62 participants (36.3%) strongly agreed. These results indicate that participants think that the school rules and the physical environment of the school might have an implicit influence on students’ moral development.

The second section of part 2 includes six questions (questions 36 to 41) that were answered only by fourth-year students (interns) and teachers as these questions are related to participants’ teaching experience. A total of 100 participants answered these questions. Question 36 asked participants whether they came across moral dilemmas frequently with students. 42 participants (42.0%) agreed, and 40 participants (40.0%) disagreed with this. Question 37 asked participants whether they frequently felt the need to teach morality to their students, to which 47 participants (47.0%) agreed, and 16 participants strongly agreed (63 participants responded positively, 63.0%). Question 38 asked participants whether they taught morality whenever there was an opportunity. 50 participants (50.0%) agreed, and 27 participants (27.0%) strongly agreed with this statement as well (77 participants responded positively, 77.0%). Question 39 asked participants whether they frequently felt the need to teach morality to their students, to which 47 participants (47.0%) agreed, and 16 participants strongly agreed (63 participants responded positively, 63.0%). Question 38 asked participants whether they taught morality whenever there was an opportunity. 50 participants (50.0%) agreed, and 27 participants (27.0%) strongly agreed with this statement as well (77 participants responded positively, 77.0%). Question 39 asked participants whether they thought it was not their place to teach morality, and 52 participants (52.0%) disagreed with this statement, and 29 participants
(29.0%) strongly disagreed (81 participants responded negatively, 81.0%), indicating that they thought it is their place to engage in moral education. And finally, question 41 asked participants whether they thought that moral values could not be taught. To this question, 41 participants (41.0%) disagreed, and 37 participants (37.0%) strongly disagreed; 78 participants (78.0%) thought that moral values could be taught.

These results indicate that while only some participants come across moral dilemmas, nearly two-thirds felt the need to engage in moral education, and while more often than not, participants do not regularly spend time teaching morality, more than three quarters tend to take the opportunity to do so when it arises. On the other hand, nearly four out of five participants thought that moral values could be taught and that it was their place as the teacher to teach moral values.

### 3.3 Moral Education Beliefs – Responses to Ranking Questions

Part 3 of the questionnaire included 4 ranking questions. These questions were designed to elicit participants’ beliefs regarding the hidden curriculum, and how implicit moral education takes place. As these questions are ranking questions, central tendencies are better presented by the mean and the standard deviation (Field, 2009; Hinton, 2004). Each question asked participants to rank several items in order of accuracy depending on the questions and items, with 1 being most accurate and the highest number being the least accurate. Thus, the lower the mean value of the items in the tables shown below, the more accurate participants have ranked those items to be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 42: Hidden curriculum can be defined as,</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c) the implicit messages conveyed to students by teachers, staff and administration</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) school culture and psychological climate</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) the unintended and/or accidental learning outcomes and side effects of schooling</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) the physical structure of the school, including announcement posters and the decoration of rooms and buildings, and time frames such as class and recess times and holidays</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) a system within education that benefits the ruling elite by maintaining present class structures in the society</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Question 42 – Definitions of hidden curriculum
Question 42 asked participants to rank 5 definitions of the hidden curriculum presented to them in order of accuracy with 1 being most accurate and 5 least accurate. The items are presented in the above table (Table 2). These results show that participants clearly believe that item (c) is the most accurate definition of the hidden curriculum, while item (e) was more often deemed to be the second most accurate definition of the hidden curriculum. Items (a), (b), and (d) were ranked to be less accurate. Item (c) is the textbook definition of hidden curriculum; as a result, it is not surprising that it was deemed to be the most accurate definition. The fact that item (e) was rated to be slightly more accurate than the other three items indicates that participants were more likely to be sensitive to the psychological aspects of implicit education, as opposed to the social, physical, or political aspects of it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 43: Children learn moral values:</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) at home</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) at school</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) while playing with friends</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) in the street</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Question 43 – Where children learn moral values

Question 43 asked participants to rank four items based on where participants thought children learnt moral values from 1 (most influential) to 4 (least influential). Responses clearly indicate that participants believe that home is the first and foremost place where children learn moral values (see Table 3). This is followed by school, and then while playing with their peers. Finally, participants think that other factors more peripherally influence children’s moral development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 44: Children learn moral values,</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) from their parents</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) by interacting with their peers</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) from their teachers</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) by observing their social environment</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) from the media</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) by thinking on their own</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Question 44 – From whom children learn moral values

Question 44 asked participants to rank 6 items based on how influential they thought certain people were in children’s moral development (See Table 4). Results clearly show that participants believe that the most influential people with regards to children’s moral
development are their parents. Teachers and peers were identified as the next most influential people. Observing the social environment, the media, and self-reflection were ranked as 4th, 5th and 6th in the moral development of children, respectively. The fact that self-reflection has been selected as the least influential, and teachers’ and peers’ influence were second only to parents’ influence indicates that participants believe that children learn morality from other people rather than by themselves. The nearly equal ranking for teachers and peers could be due to different conceptions of ‘children’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 45: Children learn moral values,</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) implicitly; values are caught, not taught</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) by listening to lectures on morality/right and wrong</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) through conflicts with their equals (peers) – with experience</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) through punishments and rewards</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Question 45 – How children learn moral values

Finally, question 45 asked participants to rank 4 items based on how they thought children learnt morality, with 1 being the most influential, and 4 being the least influential (see Table 5). The results indicate that participants believe that children learn moral values mostly implicitly, and not through punishments and rewards. Being lectured on morality and through experience with equals were ranked to have medium influence on children’s moral development. The equal ranking of lecturing and experience with peers seem to mirror the equal ranking given to teachers and peers in question 44. A tentative conclusion that could follow from this finding is that participants give about the same amount of importance to both top-down teaching of morality from superiors (e.g. teachers and parents), and a bottom-up discovery of morality by children interacting with their equals.
4. Analysis According to Participants’ Groups: Results of Regression Tests

In this section, the results obtained through regression tests run on the data are presented. After the analysis based on frequencies was conducted, regression tests were run on the data considering the various groupings that emerged from participants’ background information. Analysis was carried out to see, firstly, how teacher training and experience influenced belief development. The data obtained from the three different participant groups (students, interns, and teachers) were compared to this end. Secondly, whether participants’ investment in teaching as a career influenced their beliefs was analysed. This analysis was based on participants’ response to the question “Do you plan on staying as a teacher?” (See appendices A3 and A4). Thirdly, gender differences were also analysed. And fourthly, while it was not among the initial aims of the research to study students in the Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG) programme, the fact that over half of participants were on this course gave the opportunity to compare participants who were studying educational psychology and those studying other disciplines.

4.1. Belief Development

The cross-sectional selection of participants was intended to reveal how teacher training and teaching experience influenced belief development. As indicated above, the questionnaires given to each group were slightly different, considering participants’ level of education and experience of teaching. Analysis concerning belief development was conducted using two different strategies. Firstly, the ANOVA model was used to analyse the difference between each groups’ total score for all the questions of each part of the questionnaire. This analysis showed a significant relationship \( p = .001 \), \( df = 2 \) for part 2 total scores between groups. However, this was likely due to a miscoding of results into SPSS. Six questions in this part were not answered by students as these questions were related to teaching experiences and students were assumed to have no experience. Thus these questions were omitted from their questionnaire in order not to make the questionnaire no longer than it was necessary. Participants could respond to these questions on a scale of 1 to 4, and they were thus coded; however, for students, who did not respond to these six questions, responses were coded as 0 where they should have been left as missing data. One way ANOVA model was used again in Excel after this mistake was fixed. The test yielded a significant result between the three groups for questions that all participants responded to in part 2 (i.e. excluding the six questions not answered by students), \( p = .01 \), \( df = 2 \). The test was...
repeated three times, taking into account only two groups at a time. The test yielded a significant difference between students and interns ($p = .02$, $df = 1$), and between students and teachers ($p = .01$, $df = 1$), but no significant relationship between interns and teachers ($p = .43$, $df = 1$). The test was also repeated including the six missing questions, but disregarding data from students as the missing data from students caused the results to be unreliable. No significant difference was found between interns and teachers concerning only the questions related to experience, nor when taking into account all questions of part two.

These results seem to indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education between students and the other two groups, but no difference between interns and teachers. This indicates that teacher training has a significant influence on participants’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education, but the same cannot be said of teaching experience as no significant difference was found between interns and teachers. This result, however, does not necessarily signify that the majority of participants gave the same or similar responses to questions. Indeed, the second strategy used to analyse the results, applying the chi-square test to each question (as opposed to part total scores) in order to understand whether there is any relationship between beliefs on specific topics and concepts and teacher training and experience, shows this. Applying the chi-square test to each individual question allows for more detailed exploration of responses, and whether there are differences between participant groups on specific issues (such as responses to question 24 which asks participants whether they believe morality is a skill that can be developed).

There are only 4 questions that reveal any statistically significant relationship between training and experience and belief development: questions 8, 16, 42a$^{10}$, and 42b (see appendices A3 and A4). Question 8 was designed to understand whether participants believe that the motivation to act morally was embedded in a person’s character, or was influenced by external factors (see Section 2, Chapter II for moral

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
\text{Students} & \text{Interns} & \text{Teachers} \\
SD & D & NS & A & SA \\
\end{array} \]

Chart 11: Question 8 Frequencies – People find the motivation to do the right thing within themselves.

$^{10}$ 42a is item (a) of question 42.
motivation). The score for this question was $p = .001$ (df = 8). The responses to this question seem to suggest that while interns are more likely to disagree, students are more likely to agree, and teachers are more likely to strongly agree with this statement (see Table 6, and Chart 9 for a visual description).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 8</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>23 (32.4%)</td>
<td>40 (56.2%)</td>
<td>3 (4.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interns</td>
<td>2 (3.3%)</td>
<td>11 (18%)</td>
<td>17 (27.9%)</td>
<td>26 (42.6%)</td>
<td>5 (8.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>1 (3.7%)</td>
<td>1 (2.7%)</td>
<td>8 (21.6%)</td>
<td>15 (40.5%)</td>
<td>12 (32.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (1.8%)</td>
<td>17 (10.1%)</td>
<td>48 (28.4%)</td>
<td>81 (47.9%)</td>
<td>20 (11.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Question 8 - People find the motivation to do the right thing within themselves.

Question 16 was designed to understand whether participants believe that people are born with at least some moral skills and capacities embedded in our psychology – whether morality is innate. The question was based on Triune Ethics Theory (see Section 2, Chapter II). The score for this question was $p = .039$ (df = 8). While there is a general tendency to disagree with this statement, more students tended to agree, and the most striking difference between groups is that students stated they were not sure much more than interns and teachers (see Table 7, Chart 10). This indicates that with greater education and experience in teaching, participants were more confident in stating a positive or negative disposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 16</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>7 (9.9%)</td>
<td>14 (19.7%)</td>
<td>22 (31.0%)</td>
<td>20 (28.2%)</td>
<td>8 (11.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interns</td>
<td>13 (20.6%)</td>
<td>24 (38.1%)</td>
<td>9 (14.3%)</td>
<td>15 (23.8%)</td>
<td>2 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>5 (13.5%)</td>
<td>11 (29.7%)</td>
<td>7 (18.9%)</td>
<td>8 (21.6%)</td>
<td>6 (16.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25 (14.6%)</td>
<td>49 (28.7%)</td>
<td>38 (22.2%)</td>
<td>43 (25.1%)</td>
<td>16 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Question 16 - Morality is innate – we are born knowing at least some moral rules.

Question 42 asked participants to rank five definitions of hidden curriculum drawn from Carr and Landon (1999), based on their accuracy (see Section 1, Chapter II). For item (a) the $p$-value was (.026), and for item (b) it was (.036). The implications of these results are
relatively clear. Not having studied what the hidden curriculum is, first-year students scored slightly differently for these two items. This is based on their lack of knowledge of hidden curriculum, as hidden curriculum is not discussed in the first year of the teacher training programme (see Tables 8 and 9, Charts 11 and 12). Once participants have had training regarding the hidden curriculum, their responses start to become more similar; indicating that teacher training has an impact on beliefs regarding the hidden curriculum.

**Question 42, item a**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most accurate</th>
<th>2nd most accurate</th>
<th>3rd most accurate</th>
<th>4th most accurate</th>
<th>Least accurate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>8 (11.6%)</td>
<td>9 (13.0%)</td>
<td>13 (18.8%)</td>
<td>17 (24.6%)</td>
<td>22 (31.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interns</td>
<td>8 (12.9%)</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
<td>15 (24.2%)</td>
<td>19 (30.6%)</td>
<td>10 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>12 (33.3%)</td>
<td>7 (19.4%)</td>
<td>7 (19.4%)</td>
<td>3 (8.3%)</td>
<td>7 (19.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28 (16.8%)</td>
<td>26 (15.6%)</td>
<td>35 (21.0%)</td>
<td>39 (23.4%)</td>
<td>39 (23.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Question 42a - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the unintended and/or accidental learning outcomes and side effects of schooling.

**Chart 14: Question 42a Frequencies**

**Question 42, item b**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Most accurate</th>
<th>2nd most accurate</th>
<th>3rd most accurate</th>
<th>4th most accurate</th>
<th>Least accurate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>9 (12.9%)</td>
<td>15 (21.4%)</td>
<td>16 (22.9%)</td>
<td>13 (18.6%)</td>
<td>17 (24.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interns</td>
<td>5 (8.1%)</td>
<td>5 (8.1%)</td>
<td>16 (25.8%)</td>
<td>21 (33.9%)</td>
<td>15 (24.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>10 (27.8%)</td>
<td>4 (11.1%)</td>
<td>12 (33.3%)</td>
<td>10 (27.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (8.3%)</td>
<td>30 (17.9%)</td>
<td>36 (21.4%)</td>
<td>46 (27.4%)</td>
<td>42 (25.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Question 42b - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the physical structure of the school, including announcement posters and the decoration of rooms and buildings, and time frames such as class and recess times and holidays.

4.2. Investment Differences

Whether participants thought they would continue in teaching or not was also analysed to see if this kind of investment in the career had any impact on beliefs. Investment was measured from the responses given to the question “do you plan on continuing as a teacher?”
Participants could choose from one of three items: (a) “Yes, I will continue as a teacher,” (b) “No, I will change my career,” and (c) “I am not sure yet.” 117 (68.4%) participants indicated that they intended to continue in teaching, 11 (6.4%) planned on changing their career, and 39 (22.8%) were unsure. Four (2.3%) participants did not respond to the question. Chart 13 is provided as a visual description; participants who plan on continuing in education are coloured in shades of blue, participants who plan on changing their careers are coloured in shades of orange, and participants who have not yet decided are coloured the shades of green. The student population for each group is the darkest shade, while the lightest shades represent teachers and medium shades represent interns.

Analysis concerning investment differences was conducted using two different strategies. Firstly, the ANOVA model was used to analyse the difference between each groups’ total score for all the questions of each part of the questionnaire. This analysis showed no significant relationships between any of the groups, indicating that, considering the overall measure, whether a participant planned to continue in education, change their career, or had not yet made a decision about continuing in education made no significant difference in their beliefs and attitudes investigated by this questionnaire.

The second strategy used in analysis was applying the chi-square test to each question individually. There are only five questions that show any significant relationship between career plans and beliefs: questions 14, 22, 24, 27, and 42 (item a). Question 14 was designed to understand whether participants believed that there are common moral foundations across the world on which different cultural moralities are built (see Section 2, Chapter II for MFT). The score for this question was $p = .008$ (df = 8).
The two most striking results emerging from this test are the high percentage of neutral responses from participants who plan on changing their career, and the relatively low percentage of positive responses from the same group (see Table 10, Chart 14). 77% of participants who planned on continuing in education responded positively to this question (40.2% agreed, and 36.8% strongly agreed) while 82% of participants who were undecided about their future responded positively (56.4% agreed, and 25.6% strongly agreed). In contrast, only 54.6% of participants who planned on changing their career responded positively to this question. While nearly 4 out of every 5 participant who plans on continuing or is undecided responded positively to this question, only slightly more than half of the participants who will change their career have responded positively. Furthermore, participants who plan on changing their career responded neutrally to this question nearly twice as much as the other two groups combined (27.3% for ‘no’s while 12% and 2.6% for ‘yes’ s and ‘unsure’s, respectively). Together these results seem to suggest that participants who have decided to change their careers are less likely to think that there are core foundations of moral behaviour that manifest differently in different cultures and more likely to refrain from taking either a positive or negative side with regard to this issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 14</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, will stay in education</td>
<td>2 (1.7%)</td>
<td>11 (9.4%)</td>
<td>14 (12.0%)</td>
<td>47 (40.2%)</td>
<td>43 (36.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, will change career</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>1 (2.6%)</td>
<td>5 (12.8%)</td>
<td>1 (2.6%)</td>
<td>22 (56.4%)</td>
<td>10 (25.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 (3.0%)</td>
<td>16 (9.6%)</td>
<td>18 (10.8%)</td>
<td>74 (44.3%)</td>
<td>54 (32.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Question 14 - I think that the core foundations of morality are the same throughout the world but rules and applications differ from country to country.

Question 22 was designed to understand whether participants thought research on neurology could be used to understand moral judgement processes (see Section 2, Chapter II for TET). The score for this question was $p = .009$ (df = 8). The results suggest that participants who plan on changing their career tend to think less that neurology can be
effective in understanding moral judgement (see Table 11, Chart 15). This result seems to suggest that where a participant plans on continuing in teaching, they are more likely to think that morality can be studied in neurology.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 22</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, will stay in education</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>15 (12.8%)</td>
<td>41 (35.0%)</td>
<td>52 (44.4%)</td>
<td>8 (6.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, will change career</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>1 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (7.7%)</td>
<td>13 (33.3%)</td>
<td>19 (48.7%)</td>
<td>4 (10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (1.8%)</td>
<td>20 (12.0%)</td>
<td>56 (33.5%)</td>
<td>75 (44.9%)</td>
<td>13 (7.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Question 22 - Research on brain functions and neurology can shed light on the moral decision making process.

Question 24 was designed to understand whether participants thought moral behaviour could be conceived as a skill that could be improved. The score for this question was $p = .014$ (df = 8). The results suggest that participants who were more invested in teaching were more likely to think of morality as a skill that could be developed while participants who plan on changing their career are less likely to think in the same way (see Table 12, Chart 16). Participants who were planning to continue as teachers were more likely to think of moral behaviour as something that could be improved through education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 24</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, will stay in education</td>
<td>1 (0.9%)</td>
<td>5 (4.3%)</td>
<td>18 (15.7%)</td>
<td>64 (55.7%)</td>
<td>27 (23.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, will change career</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>2 (5.1%)</td>
<td>4 (10.3%)</td>
<td>8 (20.5%)</td>
<td>21 (53.8%)</td>
<td>4 (10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (1.8%)</td>
<td>12 (7.3%)</td>
<td>30 (18.2%)</td>
<td>89 (53.9%)</td>
<td>31 (18.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Question 24 - Moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill, and this skill can be further developed.
Question 27 was designed to understand whether participants thought teachers were moral role models for students. The score for this question was \( p = .001 \) (df = 8). While most participants indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, participants who planned on continuing as teachers notably strongly agreed more than other participants (see Table 13, Chart 17). This suggests that the more invested participants were in the teaching career, the more strongly they thought teachers were moral models for their students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 27</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, will stay in education</td>
<td>3 (2.6%)</td>
<td>3 (2.6%)</td>
<td>37 (31.6%)</td>
<td>74 (63.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, will change career</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>5 (45.5%)</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (12.8%)</td>
<td>23 (59.0%)</td>
<td>11 (28.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 (1.8%)</td>
<td>10 (6.0%)</td>
<td>65 (38.9%)</td>
<td>89 (53.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Question 27 - Teachers are models of moral behaviour for students.

Question 42 was explained above. Once again responses to item (a) turned out to be statistically significant at \( p = .037 \) (df = 8). The main difference between groups in this question seems to be in their overall responses (see Table 14, Chart 18). Participants who plan on continuing in education were more likely to think that this item is not very accurate; however, a close number of participants have indicated other amounts of accuracy as well (between 17.5% and 26.3%). Participants who plan on changing their careers thought this item was either more accurate or less accurate than other items as no participant from this group thought it was the 3rd most accurate description of the hidden curriculum while...
36.4% and 27.3% of participants from this group indicated that it was either the most accurate or least accurate description, respectively. Participants undecided about continuing in education tended to give less accuracy to this item with 3rd and least accurate being the choice of more than 30% of participants from this group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question item a</th>
<th>Most accurate</th>
<th>2nd most accurate</th>
<th>3rd most accurate</th>
<th>4th most accurate</th>
<th>Least accurate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, will stay in education</td>
<td>20 (17.5%)</td>
<td>20 (17.5%)</td>
<td>22 (19.3%)</td>
<td>30 (26.3%)</td>
<td>22 (19.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, will change career</td>
<td>4 (36.4%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (18.2%)</td>
<td>3 (27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>2 (5.3%)</td>
<td>4 (10.5%)</td>
<td>12 (31.6%)</td>
<td>6 (15.8%)</td>
<td>14 (36.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26 (16.0%)</td>
<td>26 (16.0%)</td>
<td>34 (20.9%)</td>
<td>38 (23.3%)</td>
<td>39 (23.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Question 42a - Hidden curriculum can be defined as the unintended and/or accidental learning outcomes and side effects of schooling.

4.3. Gender Differences

While differences in gender are not among the foremost priorities of this study, it was nonetheless controlled for. Previous studies have found that gender differences in moral psychology are either due to other variables like education or socialisation, or non-existent (see You, Maeda, & Bebeau, 2011 for a meta-analysis). However, some authors have pointed out that while women tend to be more care-oriented, men are more justice oriented, agentic, and impersonal (Myyry, 2003; Walker et al., 1987).

Gender differences were controlled for in this study to see whether any interesting patterns emerged.

The sample included 41 male participants (23.9%), and 126 female participants (73.6%). Four participants (2.3%) did not report their gender. Chart 19 is provided as a visual description; females are coloured in shades of blue, and males are orange; students are the darker shade, while interns are the medium shade and teachers are the lighter shade of each.

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11 The discrepancy between Tables 8 and 14 are the result of participants’ not specifying their investment in teaching.
colour. Once again, two strategies were used to analyse the data. Firstly, male and female participants’ part total scores were compared using independent t-test and Mann-Whitney U test, as responses were non-normally distributed. And secondly, the chi-square test was employed to analyse responses to each question. Levene’s test for equality of variances showed a weak correlation at $p = .049$ for part 3 responses (df = 165), while Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant relationship between male and female participants’ scores, indicating that, considering the overall measure, gender makes no difference in beliefs and attitudes in this questionnaire.

Chi-square analyses revealed statistically significant results for 5 questions: questions 1, 25, 30, 31, and 43b. The first interesting finding to emerge from these results is that only one of the 5 questions is related to moral psychology; the other five questions with significant results are all on moral education. This result suggests that any difference between male and female participants’ beliefs and attitudes is more likely to be on educational issues rather than beliefs regarding certain concepts related to moral psychology.

Question 1 was designed to understand whether participants believed that people, in general, could recognise the moral salience of a situation (see Section 2, Chapter II for moral sensitivity). The score for this question was $p = .022$ (df = 4). The results suggest that, while most participants indicated that they were not sure, males tended to disagree more often (48.7%) while females agreed and disagreed a similar amount (23.8% and 27.0% respectively) (see Table 15, Chart 20). This implies that males tend to think more that people may not understand the moral salience of a given situation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 1</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 (5.1%)</td>
<td>19 (48.7%)</td>
<td>16 (41.0%)</td>
<td>2 (5.1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8 (6.3%)</td>
<td>34 (27.0%)</td>
<td>49 (38.9%)</td>
<td>30 (23.8%)</td>
<td>5 (4.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10 (6.1%)</td>
<td>53 (32.1%)</td>
<td>65 (39.4%)</td>
<td>32 (19.4%)</td>
<td>5 (3.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Question 1 - People always understand the moral significance of a situation.
Question 25 was designed to understand whether participants thought moral education should be given in school. The score for this question was $p = .035$ (df = 3). The results show that, while the majority of participants think that it is important to teach morality in school, males tended to disagree slightly more than females (see Table 16, Chart 21).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 25</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3 (7.3%)</td>
<td>4 (9.8%)</td>
<td>12 (29.3%)</td>
<td>22 (53.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 (1.6%)</td>
<td>3 (2.4%)</td>
<td>52 (41.3%)</td>
<td>69 (54.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 (3.0%)</td>
<td>7 (4.2%)</td>
<td>64 (38.3%)</td>
<td>91 (54.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Question 25 - It is important to teach morality in school.

Question 30 was designed to understand whether participants thought moral education should be distributed across the curriculum in an implicit way or not. The score for this question was $p = .021$ (df = 3). The results suggest that males strongly disagree with this statement significantly more than females, while once again, most participants either agreed or strongly agreed (see Table 17, Chart 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 30</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5 (12.2%)</td>
<td>5 (12.2%)</td>
<td>16 (39.0%)</td>
<td>15 (36.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 (1.6%)</td>
<td>25 (19.8%)</td>
<td>57 (45.2%)</td>
<td>42 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 (4.2%)</td>
<td>30 (18.0%)</td>
<td>73 (43.7%)</td>
<td>57 (34.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18: Question 30 - Moral education should be taught across the curriculum.

Question 31 was designed to understand whether participants thought it would be beneficial to have more weekly lessons focusing on morality or not. The score for this question was $p = .030$ (df = 3). The results once again show significant strong
disagreement among males to this statement. Otherwise, participants gave similar responses (see Table 18, Chart 23).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 31</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5 (12.5%)</td>
<td>13 (32.5%)</td>
<td>16 (40.0%)</td>
<td>6 (15.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2 (1.6%)</td>
<td>44 (35.2%)</td>
<td>60 (48.0%)</td>
<td>19 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 (4.2%)</td>
<td>57 (34.5%)</td>
<td>76 (46.1%)</td>
<td>25 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Question 31 - There should be more weekly lessons in school focusing on morality.

Question 43 was designed to understand where participants thought children learned moral values. Participants were asked to rank four items in terms of the statements’ accuracy. The items were a) at home, b) at school, c) in the street, and d) while playing with friends. Results for this question showed a significant relationship between gender and responses to item (b). The score for this question was \( p = .017 \) (df = 3). Most participants agreed that children learnt values firstly at home, but while the majority of females (64.0%) thought the school was the second most important place where students learnt morality, males tended to think the school was the third or least important place where children learn morality (see Table 19, Chart 24). This implies that female participants place a greater importance on school for moral education than males do.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 43, item b</th>
<th>Most accurate</th>
<th>2(^{nd}) most accurate</th>
<th>3(^{rd}) most accurate</th>
<th>Least accurate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2 (4.9%)</td>
<td>16 (39.0%)</td>
<td>13 (31.7%)</td>
<td>10 (24.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4 (3.2%)</td>
<td>80 (64.0%)</td>
<td>30 (24.0%)</td>
<td>11 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 (3.6%)</td>
<td>96 (57.8%)</td>
<td>43 (25.9%)</td>
<td>21 (12.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Question 43b - Children learn moral values at school.

4.4. Disciplinary Differences

The last set of initial analyses focused on whether participants’ discipline made a difference in their beliefs. This was not among the initial intentions of participant selection and study design, but since more than half of all recruited participants (52.6%) were studying Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG), this gave an interesting opportunity to
compare participants studying educational psychology with other participants who taught different disciplines. One important point to note is that all PCG participants were either first or fourth-year students. The sample does not include PCG practitioners. 44 participants were first year PCG students (25.7% of total participants and 61.9% of the student group), and 46 participants were fourth year PCG students (26.9% of total participants and 73.0% of interns).

One way ANOVA was used to see whether there was any difference between PCG and other disciplines. No significant result emerged from the tests. This indicates that participants’ discipline, whether studying educational psychology or another discipline, made no difference concerning the beliefs and attitudes investigated by this questionnaire.

Chi-square analysis revealed that PCG students and participants focusing on other disciplines differed statistically significantly in their beliefs in only one question: question 35. Question 35 was designed to understand whether participants thought that school rules and traditions (e.g. classroom seating arrangements, getting in line at the canteen, etc.) affected students’ moral development (see Section 1, Chapter II for implicit moral education). The score for this question was $p = .036$ (df = 4). The results suggest that the only difference between PCG students and interns and participants focusing on other disciplines is in their strength of disagreement to the question (see Table 20, Chart 25). 94.6% of participants either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, while 5.4% disagreed. PCG students disagreed, participants of other branches strongly disagreed with the statement. However, the difference in the only statistically significant result is still very small.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 35</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Branch</td>
<td>2 (2.6%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>47 (61.0%)</td>
<td>28 (36.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCG</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (7.8%)</td>
<td>50 (55.6%)</td>
<td>33 (36.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2 (1.2%)</td>
<td>7 (4.2%)</td>
<td>97 (58.1%)</td>
<td>61 (36.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Question 35 - School rules such as classroom seating arrangements and getting in line at the canteen affect students’ moral development.
5. Summary of Findings

The analysis of descriptive frequencies can be said to indicate that participants’ overall responses to moral psychology issues investigated here, loosely reflect the moral psychology literature reviewed in chapter two of this thesis; however, some participants’ attitudes towards certain matters conflict with the attitudes of other participants. As a result, it cannot clearly be concluded that participants have a positive or negative attitude towards these issues. On matters related to implicit moral education, participants indicate that children learn morality firstly at home from their parents, and secondly at school from their peers and teachers. Participants seem to recognise their role as teachers in the moral development of students, and a large majority indicated that teachers are and should be responsible for students’ moral development. Furthermore, most stated that they are not satisfied with the current system of moral education in Turkey.

Initial analyses have revealed that there is hardly any statistically significant relationship between beliefs and demographic factors considered in this study. The only statistically significant relationship found was that students’ beliefs and attitudes related to moral education, investigated in part two of the questionnaire, are different from the other two groups’ (interns’ and teachers’). This finding implies that teacher training has an influence on beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education. However, the lack of a statistically significant relationship between teachers and interns indicates that teaching experience does not influence beliefs regarding moral education. Furthermore, the lack of any significant relationship concerning part 1 indicates that neither teacher training nor experience influences beliefs regarding moral psychology.

In-depth investigation of each question with regards to group differences, employing chi-square tests, revealed some minor differences between groups on specific issues. Four questions showed a statistically significant relationship between teacher training and experience. The results indicate that, first of all, first-year students who have not studied the hidden curriculum gave different answers to the question related to how moral education took place in the hidden curriculum. This finding in itself is not surprising as hidden curriculum is part of the last year curriculum of teacher training programmes in Turkey; first year students are not yet acquainted with the concept, only interns and teachers know what “hidden curriculum” refers to. On the other hand, this finding implies that training on certain topics does have a significant influence on belief development. And secondly, the other two
questions that showed significant relationships are both on moral psychology – on moral motivation and on the innateness of morality. In both cases, the significant relationship points to a greater confidence for those with more training and experience when stating one’s disposition regarding the topics under investigation, rather than a substantial progress towards certain beliefs. It should be noted that out of the sixty questions in the questionnaire (disregarding background questions and treating each item in the ranking questions as individual questions), only four questions show any statistically significant relationship.

Five questions showed significant relationships between beliefs and investment in the teaching career. Three of these questions were related to concepts in moral psychology, and two to moral education. The other questions analysed seem to suggest that participants who plan on staying in the teaching career are more likely to conceive morality in psychological terms – trusting more in neurology and believing that it is a skill that can be developed (through education) – and that teachers are in practice moral role models. This might point to some kind of investment in moral education beyond their own subject matter. Again, it should be noted that only five questions out of sixty show statistical significance.

Gender differences also revealed five questions with significant results. Except for one, all questions that showed significant relationships were related to moral education. Overall, the results can be summarised as males giving less importance to moral education and learning morality in school compared to females. However, what the results do not show is that males do not give any importance to moral education. The results merely imply that a small but statistically significant population of males give slightly less importance to moral education. Again, it should be noted that only five questions out of sixty show statistical significance.

Perhaps the most striking finding is that, compared to analyses based on other demographic qualities, there is even less difference in beliefs between participants who focus on educational psychology and those that focus on other disciplines. Only one question, on moral education rather than moral psychology, showed a statistically significant relationship. This lack of difference, coupled with other observations reported above, implies that not only does teacher training and experience not have an important effect on students’ and teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology but that even training in educational psychology makes no difference in investigated beliefs. This means that current teacher training and experience
equips teachers and psychological counsellors the same way. Furthermore, this equipping seems to be limited in teacher training programmes.
6. **Summary and Conclusion**

This chapter has reported the results of quantitative data analysis. Statistical frequencies and results of regression tests were described. In summary, quantitative data seem to indicate that teacher training and experience have very limited influence on belief and attitude development regarding the topics investigated with this questionnaire. This finding will be studied in more depth in the next chapter where it will be confirmed or disconfirmed through analysis of the data gathered from interviews.
CHAPTER V

QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the findings emerging from the qualitative data analysis. Initially, participants’ beliefs regarding certain aspects of moral psychology are presented. Next, their beliefs regarding moral education and implicit education are explored. This is followed by an analysis of how these beliefs differ based on participants’ groups. Finally, several other themes that recurred throughout the interviews are presented.

The presentation of findings is predominantly based on interview data analysis; findings from the observations are presented where they are relevant. Each question in the interview schedule had a specific focus – participants’ beliefs regarding different aspects of moral psychology or moral education were sought. However, due to participants’ lack of knowledge on the topics of interest, discussion during the interviews tended to focus on the first thing that came to participants’ minds in response to the questions put to them. Responses to follow-up questions often yielded information concerning participants’ beliefs regarding issues that were initially planned to be explored in other questions of the interview schedule. Indeed, one rather eager participant had already answered nearly half my questions by the time I was able to steer the conversation to my first main moral psychology question that she had not already answered by herself. Sometimes participants focused on the same issue, but there was almost always a variety of foci. Furthermore, virtually no participant, as far as the questions on moral psychology are concerned, was able to focus on everything the question sought to elicit. Collectively participants covered almost all the aspects of investigated topics, but hardly any individual was able to recognise all aspects of any topic.

The interview schedule was formed of four parts. The first part included three introductory questions which sought to understand participants’ background knowledge and understanding of the issues which were to be explored in later questions. The second part was formed of eight moral psychology questions. This was followed in the third part with five questions on moral and implicit education. Finally, four conclusion questions were asked, seeking to understand their personal experiences with moral education and teacher training.

The analyses of participants’ responses have been presented in tables. These tables were later moved to Appendix B for concerns of space. Two tables were retained in the main text of this chapter as examples (see Tables 21 and 22).
1. Beliefs Regarding Moral Psychology

In this section, participants’ beliefs and attitudes regarding aspects of moral psychology are presented.

1.1. Participants’ Existing Knowledge

Participants were asked whether they had received any training on moral psychology and whether they were familiar with any of the authors frequently referenced and quoted in this thesis. None of the participants had been given any education regarding moral psychology; one participant referenced the Religious Culture and Ethics course mandatory in primary and secondary schools, and one participant said she had done her own reading on moral psychology. In total, eleven participants stated that they had read Kohlberg. Of those who specified where they had read Kohlberg one participant indicated she had read his work studying for a national exam unrelated to her university studies, two participants had read his work for their university studies, and two teachers had read Kohlberg during their master’s degree studies. Although these participants did not specify which of Kohlberg’s works they had read, one participant indicated she had read Kohlberg’s stage theory, and one participant was familiar with Piaget’s cognitive development theory, though she initially thought it was Kohlberg’s. The rest of the participants could not remember any of Kohlberg’s work. The other authors that participants recognised or referenced included Gilligan (1 participant), Piaget (2 participants) and Wolfgang Klafki (1 participant).

Throughout the interviews, Maslow’s hierarchy of needs was the most often and explicitly cited and referenced academic literature. This hierarchy was either expressly or implicitly referred to concerning when participants thought morality would apply. Interestingly most participants implied that moral concerns would become relevant when all baser needs are met, and the individual can start to realise his/her full potential.

When asked to describe what morality is briefly, participants’ responses yielded a wide variety of perspectives regarding the nature of morality. Analysis revealed 12 distinct themes emerging from responses:

a) Social harmony and consideration for others, collectivist
b) Personal, individualist
c) Both individualist and collectivist
d) Rules
e) Virtues and character traits
f) Values
g) Developmental
h) Universality
i) Particularity
j) Behaviour
k) Intentions
l) Sexuality

Most participants emphasised different aspects of morality; some of these aspects are in opposition to each other, such as the emphasis on the universality or particularity of morality, or reflect incomparable aspects of morality, such as the focus on morality as a set of rules versus the emphasis on moral development.

This richness of perspectives is also somewhat reflected in the academic fields participants thought were relevant to achieving a better understanding of morality. Participants were asked which academic fields should be studied to understand the nature of morality better. Nine areas of study were included in the question to provide a range of examples for the interviewees (see the interview schedules at Appendices A7 and A8, Part 1, Question 3). Most participants elected to choose from the listed examples, while several participants added disciplines not listed. Participants responded to this question most frequently with philosophy and psychology (11 participants – 55% each), closely followed by sociology (10 participants – 50%). Five participants (25%) indicated that religion was a relevant field, while three participants (15%) said that culture should also be studied. Two participants (10%) stated that understanding human evolution was pertinent to a better understanding of morality, and one participant (5%) added that neurology should be studied. Finally, five participants (25%), all of them teachers (i.e. 50% of teachers), indicated that all academic fields should be studied to gain an in-depth understanding of morality (see Chart 26). Apart from these, Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, anthropology, history, and language were also mentioned.
Finally, two participants specifically stated that some fields should not be studied. One participant indicated that religion must be avoided for it is a private matter and that politics should be avoided because it does not shed light on human behaviour as much as philosophy and psychology. The other participant indicated that studying culture would limit one’s understanding of morality to that specific culture.

These results imply that on the one hand, individuals’ perception of the nature of morality differs from person to person, and on the other, collectively the perceptions of morality that may influence implicit moral education in Turkey draw from a wide range of perspectives.

1.2. Four Components Model

In the questions that were based on the Four Components Model none of the participants was able to recognise all four components; in fact, no participant was able to identify moral sensitivity during the interviews. This is not surprising considering that participants had never received any training regarding the FCM.

The first question of the second part of the interview sought to elicit participants’ beliefs regarding the Four Components Model (see Appendix B2). No participant was able to identify all of the components; only two participants were able to identify one of the components directly (moral judgement and moral motivation), and one participant was able to identify one of the major elements of a component (moral emotions in relation to moral motivation). All the other participants generally focused on how psychological components necessary for moral behaviour are learned during moral development. This is not a surprising finding considering that none of the participants had prior knowledge of the FCM.

Over sixteen percent of all the participants’ statements relevant to the FCM in this question were categorised under the category of Components of the FCM, including 4.1% of statements categorised under the theme of Judgement, 8.3% under Motivation, and 4.1% under Emotions. 66.6% of all statements were categorised under the category of Moral Development, including 16.6% of statements categorised under the theme of Reactions, 4.1% under Learning, 25.0% under Developmental, and 20.8% under Environmental. And finally, 16.6% of statements were not categorised under these themes (see Appendix B2). Chart 27 shows the frequency of statements categorised under specific themes. Themes under
Components of the FCM have been coloured shades of green, themes under Moral Development have been coloured in shades of grey, and Other has been coloured blue.

However, participants did refer to different elements of the components in various questions. Participants’ views regarding moral judgement were elicited in the second question of the moral psychology part of the interviews, participants focused on moral motivation in the third and fourth questions of the same part of the interview, and their views regarding moral implementation were also elicited in the third question.

1.3. Moral Judgement

In response to the question related to the FCM, only one participant recognised that moral judgement, or decision making, was necessary for moral behaviour to emerge. This finding implies that participants are not likely to recognise consciously that moral judgement is a necessary component of moral behaviour if they do not receive relevant training. However, when asked directly about their thoughts regarding intuitive and rational moral judgements, participants were able to discuss the issue in some depth.

Participants’ views regarding moral judgement and their attitudes towards intuitive and rational judgements were elicited in the second moral psychology question, which asked participants whether people made moral judgements more often intuitively or rationally. Participants’ responses to this question can be presented at three different levels. Firstly, the majority of participants’ statements can be categorised into two main themes: a) Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive, and b) Balanced Influence. Only one female participant indicated that she believed that reasoning was more influential in moral judgement than moral intuitions and that this applied only to males. Secondly, some participants gave responses that do not neatly fall into these two categories. These include a focus on a) the role of experiences, b) gender differences, c) overriding intuitions, and d) an implied negative conception of emotional and intuitive moral judgement (see Appendix B3).
Forty-five percent of all coded responses were categorised under *Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive*, and 22.5% of all coded responses were categorised under *Balanced Influence*. Considering only the statements categorised under these two categories, 66.6% were categorised under *Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive*, and 33.3% were categorised under *Balanced Influence*. Participants were twice as likely to indicate that they believed people made moral judgements based on their intuitions than they were to think that the effect of moral reasoning and moral intuitions were balanced. Except for one female participant, who stated that only males make moral judgements more often based on moral reasoning, no participant thought that the influence of moral reasoning was greater than the role of moral emotions and intuitions in moral judgement.

However, more importantly, some participants gave more nuanced answers. The most important of these are the responses related to the role of experiences. One student, one intern, and two teachers focused on the role of experiences. One teacher stated that “by establishing a balance between our reasoning and emotions, and then deciding based on previous experiences.” One student indicated that initially moral judgements are more often based on moral intuitions, but that a balance developed over time by learning from experiences, and stated that the morally important thing is to take lessons out of it in retrospect and make an effort to be a better person in the future.

Two participants also referred to whether one could override one’s intuitions and/or emotions with reasoning. Previous research indicates that this is possible (see Section 2, Chapter II). While one of the participants thought that she could not override her emotions or intuitive judgements, the other indicated that she did not act on her feelings:

“If I’m worried [about something], how can I override it? I can’t.”

“I don’t do bad things to people because of my emotions. If I’m angry, I hold myself in.”

Two further answers implied that the participants had a negative conception of intuitive reactions. One participant indicated that moral judgements were mostly intuitive, but “through education, moral behaviour finds the correct direction” (emphasis added). Another participant initially stated that moral judgements were purely intuitive, but when she was asked whether there could be a balance between reasoning and intuitions, she stated “of course there is. I’ve looked at people badly,” indicating a negative attitude towards intuitive
judgements. While there is no consensus concerning whether moral judgements not based on reasoning is normatively good or bad, participants seemed to have greater respect for judgements based on reasoning.

There are several interesting aspects of the participants’ thoughts regarding moral reasoning and intuitions. First of all, two participants, in relation to moral judgement, implied negative attitudes towards judgement based purely on moral intuitions. This is notable because, at least regarding moral judgement, no other positive or negative attitude can be gleaned concerning moral judgements based on moral reasoning or moral intuitions. It seems to be the case that participants value thought-out behaviour and judgements rather than uncritically going with their gut feeling. On the other hand, participants appeared to indicate a negative attitude towards technical/tactical moral reasoning (see Section 2, Chapter II for technical/tactical moral reasoning). However, this kind of reasoning did not occur to participants during the interviews unless they were directed by the researcher to think about it. This implies that while participants have positive attitudes towards moral motivation and judgement based on moral reasoning, technical/tactical moral reasoning does not occur to them as having moral relevance; they do not recognise its moral relevance unless they are directed to think about the issue.

1.4. Moral Motivation

The first, third and fourth questions of the moral psychology part of the interview yielded interesting findings regarding participants’ beliefs about moral motivation. The first question was based on the Four Components Model and was aimed at eliciting participants’ conceptions of psychological components necessary for moral behaviour to occur (see Appendix B2). The third question was related to participants’ views regarding the gappiness problem (see Appendix B4). The fourth question was related to moral motivation (see Appendix B5). In the question related to the FCM, less than 17% of identified statements were related to the FCM, but three-quarters of these were related to moral motivation and the motivational power of emotions. This finding implies that participants are most likely to identify moral motivation as a necessary component of moral action, if they identify any of the components, given that they have no prior knowledge of the FCM.

The third question asked participants whether people always do the right thing in a situation when they know what it is, or whether people cannot or will not act on their knowledge for any given reason. Eliciting participants’ beliefs about a lack of moral
motivation as the cause of failing to act morally was one of the main goals of this question. Furthermore, the articulation of this question also allowed participants to reflect on other causes of failure as well, which yielded another substantial focus related to the fourth component of the FCM (see section 1.5 below). Moral motivation, on the other hand, is mainly the focus of the third component of the FCM.

Analysis of participants’ statements relevant to moral motivation yielded three main themes: a) Religion, b) Personal Interest, and c) Indifference (see Appendix B4). Participants indicated that religion could both motivate people to act on their knowledge and that it could inhibit people from acting on their knowledge. This finding implies that participants’ understanding of morality, while having some connection to religion, does not entirely overlap with religious morality. Participants also indicated that other interests competing with moral interests – most often personal gain in this case – may cause people not to act on what they know to be the right course of action. Finally, one participant indicated that not acting morally in a situation where one knows what the right thing to do is might be caused by indifference, responding to this question with a proverb which roughly translates as “the snake that does not touch me can live for a thousand years for all I care.” This Turkish proverb is used in contexts where a person is indifferent to some wrongdoing as long as the person is not directly affected by the wrongdoing.

The fourth moral psychology question asked participants whether they thought the motivational source for moral behaviour was internal (moral reasoning, emotions, character) or external (laws, social pressure). The question also sought to elicit participants’ views regarding technical/tactical reasons for moral behaviour (behaving morally to maintain a reputation or avoid punishments, rather than for moral reasons).

Participants’ responses to this question were categorised into three categories: a) External Motivation, b) Internal Motivation, and c) Mixed Influence. Over 80% of identified statements were categorised under the first two categories, which include three themes each. Statements placed in the External Motivation category all refer to aspects of motivation for behaviour that are based on external factors such as other people’s reactions and punishments, while statements placed under Internal Motivation refer to moral motivation stemming from internal factors such as character or moral reasoning. Themes that constitute the External Motivation category include a) technical/tactical reasons, b) consequences (which has two further subthemes “legal consequences” and “social consequences,”) and c)
the necessity of external moral motivation. Themes that constitute *Internal Motivation* include a) development and character, b) reasoning vs. emotions, and c) the value of internal motivation. *Mixed Influence* includes statements that point to the variety and ambiguity related to moral motivation (see Appendix B5).

Concerning the motivation for moral action provided by external factors, avoiding negative consequences such as ostracism and punishments and seeking positive consequences such as being accepted and achieving “the good in the afterlife” are considered to be the most important factors. Furthermore, external motivation is also deemed to be necessary, at least until a developmental stage is reached where character can start to provide internal motivation. Internal motivation is also more highly respected, compared to technical/tactical reasons or other external factors, albeit a few conflicting views to this emerged as well, which can be found in Appendix B5.

1.5. *Moral Implementation*

Participants’ views regarding the fourth component of the FCM (moral implementation) were elicited most clearly in the third moral psychology question – related to the gappiness problem. In the first question – directly related to participants understanding of the FCM – the ability to carry out a moral action was not mentioned at all, indicating that participants do not recognise that this ability is a necessary component of moral behaviour.

In the question related to the gappiness problem, some participants’ statements referred to the barriers preventing people from carrying out the moral behaviour they are motivated to do. These statements were categorised into two themes: a) *Social Pressure* and b) *Emotional Barriers* (see Appendix B4). Chart 28 is provided for the visualisation of the frequencies of statements’ relevance to themes emerging from the question related to the gappiness problem.
Themes under the *Related to the FCM – Component 3* category have been coloured in shades of blue, themes of *Related to the FCM – Component 4* have been coloured in shades of green, and other themes and subcategories have been coloured in shades of grey.

Nearly a quarter of all statements given in response to the gappiness problem question attributed the cause of failing to act morally to social pressure, and 5% of statements were focused on other emotional barriers. Responses related to social pressure focus most often on the fear or anxiety of suffering negative social repercussions or ostracism. Participants indicated that people might not do what they know to be the right course of action to avoid exclusion or condemnation. Other responses were focused only on emotions such as fear and anxiety without an emphasis on the context of the emotions:

“People do bad things because their emotions override their will to do good.”

However, some of these responses are somewhat cryptic, making their analysis harder. Taking this into consideration, it seems to be the case that participants attribute the failures to act morally mostly to pressures from the social environment, and other unspecified psychological failings.

1.6. *Moral Behaviour as a Skill*

The final moral psychology question was related to moral behaviour as a skill and whether this skill could be fostered in education:

“Do you think moral behaviour can be thought of as a skill? How can morality be fostered?”

This question is based on the literature regarding morality as a skill, drawing mostly from the work of Darcia Narvaez (see Chapter II.). Where it was felt necessary to explain further what is meant by skill, an analogy to playing team sports was made with the FCM. It was summarized, with varying degrees of detail depending on participants’ indication of when they had sufficiently understood the analogy, that when a player receives the ball (senses the moral salience of a situation; component 1) s/he needs to make a judgement about whether to pass the ball, dribble, or take a shot (making a moral judgement; component 2). While rookie players might need to take a moment to think what to do and how to do it, 12

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12 Some of these cryptic responses were not further pursued with follow up questions as I felt that these may be sensitive topics for the participant, and I judged it best not to pursue for ethical reasons and to avoid discouraging the participant from further engaging with the other interview questions.
professional players can make an intuitive judgement in a split second (moral reasoning vs.
moral intuitions). Once a judgement has been made, for example, to pass the ball, the
motivation to carry out the judgement is necessary (moral motivation; component 3), even if,
for instance, the player with the ball does not like the person s/he is about to pass the ball to,
and would rather not pass it. When the necessary motivation to carry out the judgement is
mustered (e.g. for the greater good of the team, to win the match), the player should have the
necessary motor skills to be able to pass the ball accurately to its destination (moral
implementation; component 4); although it should be noted that component 4 of the FCM
involves not motor skills but more often character traits and personal qualities such as
endurance, determination and courage depending on the situation. More or less detail was
given with this analogy as it was felt necessary or demanded by the participant.

The first part of the question was framed as a simple yes or no question, but
participants were invited to elaborate on their answers. Five participants indicated that moral
behaviour is not a skill, eleven participants stated that it could be thought of as a skill, and
four participants’ responses did not clarify whether they believed that morality is a skill or
not. The unclear responses focused more on how morality can be fostered rather than whether
it is a skill or not. Twelve responses in total had an explicit focus on development or moral
education. Also, in eight responses, different perceptions of skill emerged.

Two participants distinguished between morality as a skill and morality as a
behaviour. Another participant said that moral behaviour “is a way of living, character;”
implying that morality is not something that is done, but that someone is moral (or not).
These three participants were teachers. One student made a distinction between moral
behaviour based on emotions and based on reasoning, and stated that moral behaviour based
on emotions could not be thought of as a skill, while behaviour based on reasoning could be a
skill. The last participant to indicate that morality is not a skill was also a student, who
seemed to conceive ‘skill’ as something that is socially learnt. She implied that even if
someone grows up isolated from any community, a sense of morality would still develop
based on what is experienced as good or bad:

“No... I think [an understanding of morality] would form even if someone […] isn’t in
a community. […] How you behave in relationships would be learnt in society. But I
don’t think if there is [no] one […] around with moral rules... People would create
[morality] based on their experiences anyway. […] In the end, […] even if the child
This participant seems to focus on skills as socially learnt, which seems not to align with her understanding of morality, as she states that morality is not entirely socially learnt. This implies instead that someone would inevitably develop an attraction to things associated with positive experiences and aversion to things associated with negative experiences, from which an understanding of morality would emerge.

Eleven participants indicated that moral behaviour could be conceived as a skill. While some participants focused more on the development or teaching of this skill, in seven responses different understandings of ‘skill’ seem to be present. When one participants’ view, who said moral behaviour was not a skill, is included among the differing understandings of skill, a total of eight participants talked about their understanding of what skill is. Two participants, a student, and an intern, indicated that moral behaviour could be conceived as a skill when it includes a conscious effort; the intern stated that moral behaviour is a “cognitive skill,” while the student indicated that moral behaviour is a skill when it is based on reasoning as opposed to emotions. Three participants (two students and one intern) stated that moral behaviour could be conceived of as a skill because it is not always easy to act morally or on one’s moral beliefs. Following the explanation of the FCM, one student stated that “this is a skill because it is hard to do,” while the other two participants emphasised that being able to act morally consistently was something hard to do, and thus moral behaviour could be conceived of as a skill. One other participant, an intern, stated that moral behaviour could be conceived of as a skill because some people employ moral behaviour as a strategy to be loved by others.

These responses, focusing either on moral behaviour as a skill because it is something hard to do (at least consistently), or that it involves conscious, cognitive effort, or it is used as a strategy, imply that participants’ conception of ‘skill’ is that it is an intricate and complex ability that requires conscious and continuous cognitive effort. This view seems not to align with the conception of skill as the capacity to carry out habituated and/or automated (“expert” in Narvaez’s terms) behaviour (see Chapter II). One intern’s response was somewhat related to this conception but does not align neatly with the other responses. This intern, to whom the

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13 In Turkish the verb tends to be the last word of a sentence, and the participant did not complete this sentence, leaving the verb unsaid.
sports analogy was made, indicated that moral behaviour could not be compared to sports in terms of skills. She said that sporting skills are settled, repetitive and continuous while moral behaviour can change from situation to situation. However, she did not expressly indicate that moral behaviour cannot be thought of as a skill. Thus, her response was categorised among the responses that do not make it clear whether the participant believes that morality can be conceived of as a skill or not. While this intern’s understanding of skill seems to align with the other participants’ conception explained above, her understanding of morality as a skill is ambiguous, as she might think that moral behaviour might be conceived of as a skill in different terms (which was the case for another participant). However, this was not stated. Finally, one student, whose response has been analysed above in terms of developing morality as an attraction and aversion to certain things based on experiences, implied that skills are socially learnt, while morality would develop even in the absence of society. The interesting implication of this statement regarding the participant’s understanding of skill, as opposed to morality, is that she thinks that skills are “socially learnt.” This seems to imply that skills can be developed only when someone teaches the skill (thus the necessity of social interaction with other people) and appears to disregard abilities developed by oneself in isolation.

The second focus participants addressed in their responses was the development of moral behaviour, whether as a skill or not. Twelve responses concentrate on this topic, three of which are ambiguous with regards to the conception of moral behaviour as a skill, two of which do not conceive of moral behaviour as a skill, and seven responses that indicate that moral behaviour is a skill. Seven participants (two students, one intern and four teachers) stated that moral behaviour could be fostered through education; one student elaborated on her view by indicating that this education should start at a young age, and the intern stated that this education could be either formal or implicit. Four participants (one student and three teachers) indicated that family has a major role to play in the development of moral behaviour. Two teachers also included the social environment alongside the family; one teacher elaborating on her view by including the “school environment [...] and relatives.” Two teachers further emphasised that life experiences play a role in the development of moral behaviour. One participant simply stated that “this skill can be fostered.” Two teachers emphasized that moral development took time; one teacher indicated that the development continues from infancy to seniority, the other teacher stated that each stage of development is a different area of skill, and by taking the correct steps during development these skills
should be applied in daily life and not just remain at the level of knowledge. One teacher and one student also indicated that a person could develop their own moral behaviour skills. The student who indicated this also stated that “moral behaviour is a skill for which everyone is born possessing the raw materials ... [and the] foundations for certain moral norms,” and that it was up to the individual to adapt their moral foundations to the conditions of the situation. This is perhaps one of the most interesting views as it is very much in line with Hursthouse’s (2012) description that “virtues arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them” (p. 169).

A cautionary note should also be made here. The translation for both ‘develop’ and ‘foster’ are the same in Turkish (geliştirmek), as a result, the nuance between fostering and developing inevitably gets lost in translation in some instances. Participants’ statements have been translated into English as ‘foster’ or ‘develop’ based on what the context of where the word ‘geliştirmek’ is used implies.

Two further interesting points emerge from participants’ responses to this question. Firstly, the conception of moral behaviour as a skill seems to have a negative connotation for three participants (one student, intern, and teacher each). The student and the teacher who have indicated this stated that “morality should not be a skill.” The intern who said that moral behaviour could be thought of as a skill when it is used as a strategy to be loved by others implied that this was a Machiavellian use of morality, and implied a negative attitude towards it. While no participant expressed a clear positive attitude towards the conception of moral behaviour as a skill, no other participant implied a negative attitude towards it either.

1.7. Moral Emotions

Participants’ views regarding moral emotions were elicited from their responses to the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth questions of the moral psychology part of the interview. This is particularly the case in the fifth question which focuses on moral emotions exclusively, and the sixth question where the focus is the moral self in more general terms. In relation to FCM, only one participant indicated that emotions (empathy in particular) were relevant to moral behaviour (see Appendix B2). This suggests that moral emotions are not among the first thing that came to participants’ minds about psychological components necessary for moral behaviour to emerge.
In relation to the gappiness problem (see Appendix B4), participants did not name moral emotions as an important source of moral motivation but indicated that other emotions such as fear and anxiety, felt for various reasons, might inhibit people from acting morally. Regarding moral motivation, participants clearly recognised that moral emotions are an internal source of moral motivation. However, mention of moral emotions in this question was either in relation to moral character or opposition to moral reasoning.

Participants’ understanding of moral emotions was elicited most clearly in the fifth question of the second part of the interview, which was related to moral emotions and their effect on moral behaviour:

“What do you think might be moral emotions (e.g. guilt)? How do these moral emotions affect moral behaviour?”

The main aim of the question was to understand what participants thought were moral emotions by eliciting example emotions, and how they thought these emotions influenced morally relevant behaviour. Some participants responded to this question by naming several other emotions, which was the core aim of this question, while others named character traits or habits alongside emotions. Some participants referred only to character traits as emotions, instead of emotions themselves. Many participants agreed that guilt was a moral emotion and four participants included guilt in their responses to this question, while several others seemed to indicate their agreement implicitly. Other moral emotions participants named included shame, anger (at cruelty), sadness and happiness (for others’ misfortune and good fortune respectively), and empathy. Other emotions respondents referred to, that are not as directly related to morality as shame, guilt, empathy or anger, but could have moral salience depending on the situation, included anxiety, fear, and peace of mind.

Some participants also included character traits and other responses in their answers. Morally relevant character traits participants referred to include responsibility, virtue, a tendency to comply with social rules, industrious/working habits (çalışma alışkanlığı), humbleness/modesty (açakgönüllülük), to be able to apologise, mercifulness, and helpfulness (yardımseverlik¹⁴). Other traits with varying degrees of moral relevance were also named. These include freedom (or a desire to be free), conscience, inner balance, and sympathy.

¹⁴ Yardımseverlik can be alternatively translated as benevolence, charity, or cooperativeness.
With regards to the effect of moral emotions on behaviour, participants indicated that moral emotions influence all behaviour in social situations, but the nature of this influence would depend on the situation and the character of the individual. While this summary reflects the views of all participants who responded to the second part of the question, one participant went into more detail and indicated that guilt limits what people think and want to do.

Further investigation of data yields several more points worth mentioning. Firstly, one participant stated that morality is deeply related with emotions, that an emotion would reflect in morally relevant behaviour, and that morally relevant behaviour would have an emotional effect on the individual. The same participant also indicated that “[w]hat makes us contradict ourselves is sometimes our emotion of self-interest/selfishness” and that “[s]elfishness can sometimes be useful, but these are times when people should control themselves.”

A note regarding participants’ use of the word ‘emotion’ in Turkish (duygu) also needs to be made here. While phrases such as ‘the/an emotion of guilt’ or ‘the/an emotion of freedom’ do not sound entirely grammatical in English, the same phrases in Turkish (‘suçluluk duyusu’ and ‘özgürlük duyusu’ respectively) are more commonly used linguistic elements and are not ungrammatical. ‘Duygu’ (emotion) is often treated as the noun, and ‘hissetmek’ (to feel) is often treated as the verb for the same concept. However, the two are distinct concepts. While all emotions might be felt, not all feelings are emotions (this applies in Turkish as well). The word ‘feeling’ (‘his’ in Turkish) would be a more accurate description of the phenomena: ‘suçlu hissetmek’ (to feel guilty) or ‘suçluluk hissi’ (the feeling of guilt); ‘özgürlük hissi’ (the feeling of freedom) or ‘özgür hissetmek’ (to feel free). The fact that all participants used the word ‘emotion’ (duygu) instead of ‘feeling’ (his) when describing emotions or other felt phenomena indicates an ambiguity regarding the meanings of ‘emotion (duygu)’ and ‘feeling (his).’ However, since participants’ use of these words is also common in Turkish in general, it is difficult to conclude whether the ambiguity resides in participants’ understanding of these words or the use of these words in Turkish in general.

Furthermore, all participants who referred to character traits in response to this question, either explicitly or implicitly, indicated that they considered them emotions. While character traits can elicit certain emotions, which provide the motivation to act in certain ways (e.g. moral action), character traits themselves, such as helpfulness (yardımseverlik), are not emotions. A tentative conclusion that should be taken with caution is that participants,
and even perhaps most Turkish speakers, conflate the instantaneous visceral element of emotions with the long-term effect of settled emotional dispositions which have a very close relationship with character traits.

In addition to the ambiguity regarding participants’ conception of moral emotions, an ambiguity regarding the distinction between episodic emotions and settled emotional dispositions was also found in the analysis of the sixth moral psychology question (which was related to the moral self – see Appendices B6, B7, and B8). When discussing the influence of emotions on moral behaviour, participants focused either on episodic emotions, or emotional dispositions; no participant talked about both kinds of emotions, neither did any participant give an indication that they were aware of the distinction or the other kind of emotion. Participants’ understanding of moral emotions in this respect is more relevant to their understanding of the moral self, and thus is presented in the next section.

1.8. Moral Self

In the second introductory question (asking participants to describe briefly what they think morality is), only the responses of one participant who included virtues and character traits in her description of morality, and two participants who emphasised moral development, were related to the moral self. However, in other parts of the interview – especially in relation to moral behaviour as a skill – some participants implied or stated that they thought moral action was not something that was simply done, but that it was a way of life, a way of being. A more nuanced picture of participants’ views regarding the moral self was elicited mostly in the sixth moral psychology question, which focused on the relationship between emotions, character traits, and second order volitions:

“What do you think might be the relationship between character traits and emotions?
How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral behaviour?”

Participants’ responses to this question can be categorised into five different foci: a) the relationship between emotions and character traits, b) second-order volitions, c) what influences moral behaviour, d) the role of the social environment, and e) the effect of life experiences. Participants’ responses regarding the relationship between emotions and character traits were more in line with the academic literature than was expected. Three themes have emerged in this category: firstly, that there is a cyclical or parallel relationship
between emotions and character traits, secondly the influence of reasoning and emotions on character traits, and thirdly the influence of episodic emotions and emotional dispositions on character traits (see Table 21).

Table 22: The Relationship between Emotions and Character Traits

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
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| There is a cyclical or parallel relationship between emotions and character traits | Some participants emphasised or indicated that there is a deep two-way relationship between emotions and character traits. Most such statements indicated that the distinction between emotions and character traits are very hard to discern if not impossible. | • “There must be a parallel relationship [between character traits and emotions].”  
• “...I can’t make a distinction between emotions and personality. Emotions must direct personality.”  
• “I think moral behaviour would have an emotional feedback. Or an emotional behaviour would have a moral feedback. I don’t think it is possible to make a distinction between the two.” |

| The influence of emotions vs. the influence of reasoning on character traits | The statements that have been categorised in this theme referred to the influence of reasoning on character traits, either in opposition to emotions or combined with them. | • “Instinctively our emotions direct our thoughts. Through reasoning, emotions are managed.”  
• “Personality traits are the combination of emotional and cognitive traits; however it is life experiences that determine whether emotional or cognitive traits will be more dominant.”  
• “Morality is closer to reasoning [than emotions], and reasoning/logic must accept [moral principles].”  
• “Emotions must direct personality. Reasoning is a bit further away.” |

| The influence of episodic emotions vs. the influence of emotional dispositions on character traits | The statements from which this theme emerged were concerned with participants’ understanding of episodic emotions and emotional dispositions, and how these influence character traits. | • “I think emotional reactions would change when [an individual’s] character changes.”  
• “We are constantly experiencing emotions, aren’t we? We have a constant emotion, sadness, jealousy, happiness maybe... It might be that our emotions create our character traits.”  
• “I think character traits are socially learned. For example children of introverted parents are usually introverted as well. This is the child’s character... I think children learn these emotions from their parents.” |

Participants seemed not to have a clear understanding of the distinctions between emotional dispositions and episodic emotions. All participants focused on either the former or the latter when discussing issues where this distinction becomes relevant, but no participant referred to both kinds of emotions. More often, participants would respond to questions as if the other kind of emotions did not exist – emotions seemed to be conceived of as either episodic or dispositional. On the other hand, despite the ambiguity regarding their
understanding of emotions and feelings, and of situational emotions and emotional dispositions, participants’ understanding of the relationship between emotions and character traits was remarkably in line with the psychological and philosophical literature on the matter. Participants seem to think that, as far as a distinction between episodic emotions and emotional dispositions is perceived, emotional dispositions either have a profound and mutual influence on each other with character traits, or the two are the same and indiscernible, on the one hand. And, on the other hand, participants who focused on situational emotions indicated that these emotions are influenced by character traits.

Participants’ responses that focus on the aspects of second order volitions (SOVs) have also yielded three themes, including a focus on the roots of second order volitions, a concern for second order volitions as goal orientation, and an emphasis regarding failures related to second order volitions (see Appendix B6). Participants’ responses that focus on second order volitions seem to indicate that they are rooted in an individual’s reasoning about what is desirable for a person and that they function as goals, which can take time to achieve. Finally, these aims are partly formed according to the social environment, and when they contradict the individual’s character or when they cannot be met problematic behaviour can arise.

The third category revolves around the effect second order volitions and character traits have on moral behaviour. Participants’ responses tend to focus either on second order volitions or character traits (see Appendix B7). Participants who concentrated on the effects second order volitions and character traits have on moral behaviour, no matter which one they focused on, indicated that both have a direct and positive effect on moral behaviour. Participants seemed to have a positive attitude towards second-order volitions.

The fourth focus to emerge from the responses to this question revolves around the influence the social environment has on the development of the moral self; this topic is explored in more depth in section 4.2 below. Similarly, the fifth focus emerging from this question revolved around the theme of life experiences, and this issue is explored in more depth in section 4.1 below.

1.9. Moral Development

Participants views regarding moral development and how it takes place were elicited mostly in the second introductory question (description of morality), and first and seventh
moral psychology questions (related to the FCM and moral development respectively). Some participants included concepts relevant to moral development in their description of morality:

“A well-raised person is moral.”

“[Morality is] something inside people but could be developed.”

These two responses imply that some participants’ understanding of morality is at least partially dependent on the phenomenon of moral development.

The heavy focus on moral development in the first moral psychology question was unexpected, as the question focuses on the FCM. Two-thirds of all responses to that question focused on moral development. These responses were further categorised into four themes including Reactions, Learning, Developmental, and Environmental. The first theme, Reactions, focused on caregivers’ and teachers’ reactions to children’s behaviour, fostering or discouraging certain behaviour. The second theme, Learning, emphasised that moral behaviour was something learnt. The third theme, Developmental, which, in terms of frequency, was the most common kind of response to the question, focused on aspects of moral development and related aspects of cognitive development. Finally, the fourth theme, Environmental, which was the second most common kind of response, focused on the social and cultural environment in which a child’s moral development takes place.

The fact that developmental and educational aspects of morality were more frequently mentioned in response to this question than psychological components necessary for moral behaviour to emerge indicates that participants were more sensitive to the developmental and educational aspects of morality than its psychological aspects.

A more detailed understanding of participants’ beliefs regarding moral development emerged in response to the seventh moral psychology question, which was more directly related to moral development and the role models that influence moral development:

“How do you think moral development takes place from infancy to adulthood considering emotions, reasoning and behaviour? What do you think is the influence of the family, teacher (hierarchical relationships), peers (equals), and the general society (3rd persons and the media) on moral development?”

Participants’ responses to this question were divided into two categories, based on which of the aspect included in the question they focused on: a) moral development, and b)
role models. Regarding the first focus, moral development, only three participants (one student, one intern, and one teacher) gave responses that clearly detail a progression of moral development. The teacher who focused on this part of the question gave a brief summary of whom she thought influenced morality over the course of development:

“It initially starts with the family, followed by the influence of friends starting at preschool education and later on in school. The general society becomes more important in adulthood.”

The responses of the student and the intern who also focused on this aspect overlap with the general direction of moral development indicated in the above quote. The student agreed that family and friends would be the only ones who influence moral development until the child is 12 years old, which, she indicated, is when character forms and relevant emotions are learnt and ‘sink in’ to one’s character. She further elaborated that during adulthood reasoning would become a more significant influence on moral development. The intern also indicated that the influence of peers becomes more important during adolescence, but she also focused on how rules of games influence a child’s understanding of normative morality. She emphasised that if a child does not play by the rules or does not conform to the norms of his/her peer group in adolescence, the child/adolescent could be ostracised.

Three participants also indicated that other aspects of development are related to moral development. While one participant stated that “moral development influences emotions, thoughts and behaviour,” another indicated that emotional development was an important factor in moral development. Finally, one participant indicated that cognitive development and maturity are also important factors in moral development.

All other participants focused more on who influences moral development than how moral development progresses over time, so did not identify whose influence is greater at specific stages. Half of all statements in this category name parents as the most influential models in moral development. Half of the participants who referred to the influence of society indicated that when compared with family, peers, and teachers, society was less influential, while the other half indicated that society was the most significant influence on moral development. The influence of society was the second most frequently cited answer. This is followed by the influence of peers regarding frequency and judged most commonly to be the second most influential actors, and finally, teachers were usually cited as the third most influential while being cited the least frequently. On the other hand, one participant
indicated that teachers would not have much influence; she stated that she never cared about her teachers herself and paid more attention to her peers, while another participant indicated that the teacher’s influence would lessen as the child grew older into adolescence. Also, one participant stated that, especially in early years, the teacher is closer to a parental figure than anything else, so would have an influence nearly as much as parents did. Some participants simply indicated that all of the above actors would have a direct impact on moral development, while two participants specifically stated that whoever one spent the most time with would have the greatest influence on one’s moral development. Finally, two participants focused on the influence of the media, and both indicated that it had a very negative influence on moral development. One of the participants focusing on the media elaborated that the influence of the media is very hard for parents to control, and she criticised parents who direct their children to spend time consuming media to either “get rid of the kid” or “so that the kid learns something.”

1.10. Moral Foundations Theory & Triune Ethics Theory

Discussions relating to the Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and the Triune Ethics Theory (TET) did not feature prominently in the interviews. Statements most relevant to the MFT occurred in response to the second introductory question (see Appendix B1). While some participants indicated that there could be moral universals, participants were more likely to imply a relativist position by stating that morality changes from person to person or from community to community. Furthermore, some participants indicated that particular moral rules are not derived from universals, but that moral universals could be extrapolated by investigating morality cross-culturally. These results suggest that participants were more likely to convey relativistic views than universalist views.

Evidence for participants’ beliefs regarding the aspects of the MFT was found more often in observations of their practice. Instances of fostering values related to each moral foundation were observed, but these instances are not reported here due to concerns of space and their tangential relevance to the research aims. However, teachers were asked whether they were specifically aiming to foster any value, which values they were aiming to foster, and why, in the follow-up questions to the observations. Three of the four observed teachers indicated that their actions were not consciously based on the aim of fostering a specific value or virtue. They instead implied that, in summary, they observed the students doing something wrong (the observed wrongdoing is unique to each instance), and that they felt
compelled to direct students towards the correct course of action. The remaining one teacher stated that she was aiming to foster specific values (helpfulness and responsibility), but the values she indicated she was fostering do not seem to have a robust connection with her actions. In the instance regarding fostering helpfulness she had emphasised concepts related to equality which is related more strongly to the fairness/cheating foundation, and the instance related to responsibility seemed to have a more direct relationship with the loyalty/betrayal foundation as the responsibility the teacher was aiming to foster in the student was related to taking care of the poster with the lyrics of the national anthem. These results suggest that, from the perspective of the MFT, teachers are aware that their actions foster certain values, but they do not comprehensively understand how their actions foster which values.
2. Beliefs Regarding Education

In this section participants’ beliefs regarding how moral education is conducted today in Turkey is presented initially. This is followed by how moral education should be implemented according to participants. Next, participants’ views regarding teachers are presented. And finally, participants’ thoughts regarding how teacher training should be carried out with regards to engaging in moral education is explored. The findings detailed below are predominantly based on interview data analysis, particularly on the data obtained in response to the five questions in the third part of the interview schedule, which focused on participants’ beliefs regarding aspects of moral education and implicit education. Some of the findings presented below draw also from the three concluding questions of the interview schedule (see Appendices A7 and A8).

2.1. Current Moral Education in Turkey

Currently, in Turkey, explicit moral education is conducted in conjunction with religious education (RE) in the Religious Culture and Ethics course (RCE), and there is greater emphasis on religious practices than on morality (see Chapter II). The course takes a predominantly Sunni Muslim approach to both religious education and morality. In addition to this, philosophy of morality is taught in the final year of secondary education as part of the philosophy course, and individual schools may have their own focus on ethics or character education.

Participants’ thoughts regarding the current status of moral education were sought in the third question of the third part of the interview; however, some participants also touched upon this issue in the first question of the third part as well (see Appendices B10 and B12).

No participant stated a positive attitude to the current moral education system. Three participants, one teacher and two students, did not indicate an attitude towards the system, and the remaining 17 participants all stated negative attitudes such as:

“There is no moral education ... We used to take the religion course in middle school but the moral education given there is made up of whatever the individual teacher teaches and it changes from teacher to teacher and school to school.”

Twenty-three statements given in response to this question have yielded six themes (see Appendix B10). Considering that the main context where explicit moral education is
practised is the religious education course, perhaps the most interesting finding is the lack of references to the course. Only five participants explicitly referred to RCE, while some participants referred to it implicitly (e.g. “It requires more support. A separate course and education programme should be planned.”). However, it seems to be the case that at least in seven interviews, participants did not recognise RCE as moral education. These seven participants either focused on the way implicit moral education is conducted in schools or described where moral education takes place without referring to RCE. Given that all participants have received RCE in their secondary education (the course has been mandatory since 1980), the fact that 35% of participants did not consider RCE as (at least partly) moral education is striking. The remaining 8 participants either make an implicit reference to RCE, or it is unclear whether they recognise RCE as moral education or not.

One further point regarding participants’ attitudes towards RE in Turkey also needs to be made. When several participants’ responses to this question are taken in conjunction with their responses to some of the other questions on the interview schedule, it seems that while they are not entirely happy with RE and ME as they are currently conducted, they do not necessarily advocate the removal of RE from the official curriculum. These participants seem to think that religion holds great importance and that RE is necessary; but concerning ME, these participants either believe that RE and ME should be separated, or the moral education RE provides should be improved. Most frequently this improvement is indicated to be related to a more pluralistic understanding and teaching of morality and religion.

2.2. Conducting Moral Education

The first question of the education part of the interview (part 3) focused on participants’ thoughts regarding the value of moral education and how it should be conducted.

“Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral education program be conducted?”

This question is focused more on participants’ thoughts about how moral education (ME) should be conducted. All participants indicated that moral education is important. However, while most participants focused on how they think moral education should be carried out in school, some participants stated that ME is not entirely possible or that school is not the most important factor in moral education. Statements were categorized into three
main themes within this larger category, including a) that the influence of the school is limited compared to that of the family, b) that morality is not something that can be taught (at least explicitly), and c) that moral education is not and cannot be confined to the school (see Appendix B8).

Participants who focused on why the school is not the most important place for moral education tended to focus on how learning morality is broader than what can be taught in the school. Some participants indicated that the school’s influence can never be more than the family’s and that it could only have a supporting role to the teachings of the parents; while other participants indicated that school is not the only place moral education happens. Several participants also stated that they did not think morality can be taught in school or by teachers. However, these views represent only a minority of statements.

Most participants focused on how moral education should be conducted. Participants who focused on how moral education should be conducted or how it can be improved focused on a variety of aspects related to ME. These include seven main foci that have been thematically categorised (see Appendix B9, several other statements of interest have been presented in the ‘Unspecified’ or ‘Other Statements’ categories as well):

a. Moral education based on lessons,
b. Moral education versus religious education,
c. Moral education based on application and experience,
d. Implicit moral education,
e. Pedagogical methods relevant to moral education,
f. The role of teachers, and
g. Moral education as imposing values

These results indicate several interesting points. While some participants support explicit moral education, others support implicit education. It seems to be the case that the more teacher training and experience participants have the more they favour explicit education. Secondly, only students explicitly focused on the role of teachers in moral education in response to this question; interns and teachers did not. Another interesting point is that, while there were six participants whose discipline is PCG, only one intern explicitly focused on the psychological aspects of moral education in this question by emphasising fostering students’ self-esteem. Taken in conjunction with what this participant had said in
response to other questions, she seems to imply that fostering students’ autonomy would result in achieving the aims of moral education.

Finally, perhaps the most interesting finding is that three interns indicated that a certain kind of morality should not be imposed on students through moral education. They stated that moral education should be based more on what could be described as discovering morality for oneself; participants tended to emphasise classroom discussions to achieve this. When this is taken in conjunction with what several participants indicated during the interviews, there seems to be an underlying sense that some participants perceive morality in Turkey as an oppressive force impeding their self-expression.

2.3. Implicit Moral Education

The fourth question of the third part of the interview was related to the hidden curriculum and how moral education takes place in it:

“What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How does moral education take place in the hidden curriculum?”

The main aim of this question was to understand participants’ beliefs regarding how implicit moral education took place. The hidden curriculum is taught during the teacher training programme in Turkey. In most universities, it is covered in the last (4\textsuperscript{th}) year of the programme. As a result, it was expected that interns and teachers would be familiar with the concept, while students would not be. None of the first-year students were familiar with the concept, so the hidden curriculum was briefly explained to them.

Two themes emerged from participants’ responses including a) the importance of the implicit influence of teachers’ actions on students’ moral development, and b) the actors in the school environment whose actions have an influence on students’ moral development (see Appendix B11). These two themes cover a minority of statements (44.4%). The rest of the statements (55.5%) are not related to these two themes, or to each other, as they each have a different focus or description.

The results point to the two most fundamental elements of the hidden curriculum: the actors involved in implicit moral education, and the salience of these actors’ behaviour. Not surprisingly, teachers are viewed as the most important actors with regards to ME in the hidden curriculum. Furthermore, participants are also aware that other people in the school
also have a significant influence. Participants also think that teachers’ behaviour is more important than what they say in class, and being a good role model is important.

The majority of statements, however, do not fit into these two themes. These include the responses of 5 teachers, two interns, and three students. Each statement has a different focus except for two teachers who indicated that “morality should be at the foundation of education” using the exact same words. One primary teacher concentrated on the implicit moral education that takes place in the official curriculum:

“The topics of the ‘Knowledge of Life’ course at primary level have been designed according to this. A situation is taken, and a connection to morality is made.”

This is the only participant to emphasise moral education in the official curriculum. Two teachers focused on the applied and experiential nature of ME in the hidden curriculum. One teacher indicated that ME took place in the hidden curriculum “through living and social experiences” while the other teacher stated that moral education “is given some space in the hidden curriculum, but it is very weak in terms of application.” The interesting thing about the latter quote is that, while it is generally assumed that the hidden curriculum is not entirely intentionally, explicitly, or officially designed, the teacher states that ‘space [for moral education] is given in the hidden curriculum,’ (emphasis added) implying that the teacher thinks that the content of the hidden curriculum is intentionally or officially structured.

While one of the interns stated that moral education takes place exclusively in implicit education, the other intern indicated that moral education does not take place in Turkey at all, because “moral values are [not] reflected or taught very well.” This participant’s view seems to indicate not that there is no implicit education, but that implicit education is not entirely moral.

The three students each focused on different things. None of them had any knowledge regarding what hidden curriculum is, so a brief explanation of hidden curriculum was provided. The first student indicated that since RCE focuses more on RE, moral education would largely take place in the hidden curriculum. The second student focused on individual teachers’ understanding of morality and indicated that since each teacher’s understanding of morality would be unique, the values and virtues they emphasise would be different. As a result, a unified moral education could not be provided through the hidden curriculum. Finally, the last student focused on the physical environment:
“Of course it’s very important! For example, putting railings on little students’ classroom’s windows if the classroom is high. This is being concerned for the students, right? It’s for their benefit. You shouldn’t be pushed to do this, but do it yourself and be aware of it. It wouldn’t have any meaning if you put the railings after a student fell, right? But if you do it before anyone hurts themselves this is a truly moral thing to do.”

This participant was the only one to focus on the implicit moral education the physical environment provides. Perhaps what is more interesting is that none of the other participants with greater training and experience referred to the physical environment in response to this question. While it changes from lecturer to lecturer, most commonly the physical environment is not part of the courses on the hidden curriculum. As a result, it is suspected that older participants who have received training regarding the hidden curriculum, but perhaps did not discuss the relevance of the physical environment in their lectures, do not associate the physical environment of the school with implicit moral education.

Finally, one intern, who emphasised the development of autonomy in her interview, also elaborated on how some practices in the school environment might have a negative effect regarding moral education in response to the question regarding the current state of ME in Turkey:

“Sometimes it is expected of the child to follow rules blindly ... Parents and teachers decide in the child’s stead – you will go to this school, we will learn this in class today – all without the child’s participation in decision making. As a result, the child ends up unable to advocate his/her own thoughts. So, the child just keeps on taking what is being provided rather than being creative or resourceful.”

While this participant focuses explicitly on how certain practices have an implicit influence on moral development and education, other participants also refer to such issues, albeit more implicitly. Taken together, these results indicate that participants are aware of the influence certain practices might have in terms of implicit moral education.

2.4. Learning Morality

The second question of the education part of the interview focused on participants’ beliefs regarding learning morality, as opposed to the teaching morality focus in the above question:
“How do you think children learn moral values and good behaviour?”

Two main categories emerged from participants’ responses: a) **Observation**, and b) **Experience**. Twenty-one of the 30 relevant statements, including statements placed in multiple themes, fall into the first category, which is further formed of 5 themes based on the emphasis on who is being observed. These include observation of a) family, b) teachers, c) social environment, d) peers, and e) other options such as the media. The remaining nine statements all focus on learning through experience (see Table 22).

Participants seem to think that children learn morality first and foremost through observation. The most important factors here are the parents. Participants also focused on the role of the teacher; however, some participants do not think that the teacher can be very influential. Participants also place importance on peers as well, but more often they believe that the general society has a greater influence. Some participants also think that children learn morality from the media. On the other hand, many participants also believe that children learn moral values especially from practising moral behaviour, through experience. It should be noted that participants did not refer to any other alternatives such as learning morality through lessons or self-reflection.

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
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| Observation       | Observing Family       | Statements placed in this theme indicated that children learn morality by observing their parents. Parents and family were the most frequently cited actors whom the children learn morality from by observing. | • “Children learn the first models by observing and copying the parents. If good behaviour is observed and demonstrated to children, they will learn.”  
• “By taking examples and experiencing, and this starts in the family and continues with the social environment [the child] is in.” |
|                   | Observing Teachers     | Statements placed in this theme stated that children learn morality by observing their teachers. This theme holds the second highest frequency of codes. | • “Teachers can be good models but I don’t think morality can be completely taught.”  
• “They learn from their parents, peers and teachers.” |
|                   | Observing the Social Environment | Statements placed in this category emphasised that children learn morality by observing the social environment. | • “Everyone in the school is part of moral education, the guy at the canteen, the cleaners, friends, administrators... They have more influence.” |
2.5. Regarding Teachers

While this was not among the main aims of the interviews, some participants also mentioned their views regarding teachers who engage in moral education. Surprisingly, all participants who touched upon this subject indicated negative attitudes towards teaching staff. This view was emphasised most in response to the first and third questions of the education part of the interview (see Appendices B10 and B12).

In response to the first education question, only four participants, each of them students, focused on teachers. Three of the students indicated that the teacher plays a crucial
role in moral education, but one participant stated that “if the teachers had the necessary and relevant knowledge they could do better moral education.”

In response to the question regarding the current state of moral education, some participants focused on teachers’ behaviour or quality regarding their ability to engage in moral education. Several participants have indicated negative attitudes towards teachers who conduct moral education, for example:

“It is taught only in religious education, perhaps by the wrong people.”

“As far as I can see unskilled teachers are being trained... I don’t think I’ll be a very good model so I don’t want morality to be taught... If the system was a bit better more skilled teachers could be trained. [...] If I were a parent I wouldn’t want teachers to teach anything about morality to my children.”

This indicates that some participants believe that current teachers who are engaging with moral education either are not equipped with the necessary tools to engage in moral education or approach the issue from a perspective towards which participants do not have a positive attitude. Participants seem to think that teacher training does not equip teachers, including themselves, with the best tools for engaging in moral education.

This is further complicated by another factor. In response to the third education question, some participants also emphasised that engaging in moral education is up to the initiative of individual teachers.

“[The current state of moral education is] awful... It is up to individual teachers to conduct moral education, and idealist teachers who will do quality moral education are very rare.”

The emerging picture is that, according to participants, the practice of moral education in Turkey is weak, and teachers who engage in moral education are not adequately equipped to do so. In response to this, participants have also talked about how teacher training should be conducted concerning moral education.

2.6. Teacher Training

Participants conveyed their views regarding how teacher education should be undertaken with regard to moral education in the last (fifth) education question, and the final
question of the interview schedule (the third question of the concluding section of the interview, see Appendices A7 and A8).

The last question of the third part of the interview was related to the effect teacher training had on implicit moral education:

“How do you think higher education teacher training affects primary and secondary education hidden curriculum? What do you think can be done in teacher training to improve moral education in primary and secondary education?”

This question aimed to elicit participants’ beliefs based on their experience and expectations as much as their knowledge of implicit moral education. Participants’ responses yielded two themes including a) improving teacher training, and b) the benefit and influence of teacher training (see Appendix B12). The majority of statements were categorised in these two themes; only three statements were not categorised there.

All participants, either implicitly or explicitly, indicated that they think that teacher training regarding moral education would be very beneficial and that the current system needs to be improved in one way or another. While most participants focused on how to improve pre-service teacher education, some of the teachers emphasised that in-service training would be beneficial. Some teachers also stressed that teacher educators should be well equipped to conduct this training, although they did not elaborate on this. The fields of moral psychology, student psychology, and developmental psychology were indicated to be important to learn in this training. One intern implied that trainee teachers should have the opportunity to practise the training they receive:

“The development of a person must be thoroughly known. Developmental psychology must be learnt; student psychology must be learnt; teaching techniques and methodologies must also be learnt. The training we get supposedly teaches us this, but it is shallow, and we don’t have the means to practise any of this kind of training we get. I’m not sure if every graduate of an education faculty is moral either. I don’t think the assessment of this training can be tests; the idea is ludicrous.”

Another interesting point is that two participants stated doubts about the characters and abilities of teachers regarding providing moral education. And finally, all participants, except one, indicated that they would have liked to receive this kind of training and would have benefited from it.
The final question of the interview asked participants whether they would like to receive training regarding the topics explored in the interview – mainly moral psychology and implicit moral education. Participants’ responses were analysed from the perspective of 5 main foci. All teachers except one indicated that they would have liked to receive training on moral psychology and development. Participants talked about a) the reasons for receiving training on moral education, b) how the format of this training should be, c) the content of the training, d) who should be given this training, or e) that they would have liked to receive this training (see Appendix B14). Twenty-three statements in total have been analysed; including some long monologues parts of which have been categorised in different themes.

The first point to emerge was that all participants except one teacher stated positive attitudes towards such training. Some participants have explicitly said that they want to receive such training:

“The course I would like to have a course like this. I think the training I received is not enough. I would have liked to learn more.”

None of the students, with one exception, could elaborate on the aspects of the training they would like to receive, and nearly half of teachers elected not to elaborate. The reasoning participants provided for taking this training varied, but the unifying theme of all the reasons given is the perception that the training received is not sufficient and should be deeper. One student emphasised that people should be given this training, to put it briefly, to understand the nature of morality and how the world works in relation to this.

Concerning the format of this training, participants seem to have a negative attitude towards being told top-down what is right and wrong and would prefer a kind of training that would allow them to develop their own understanding of morality:

“A course means directing people. I would like to discuss what people think morality is rather than how to be moral. Not like ‘universal morality is this or that.’”

This has two implications. First of all, it seems that participants do not want to recreate the established understanding of morality uncritically, and prefer to receive training that would allow them to think about morality critically. And secondly, this implies that participants value autonomy in terms of reflecting on morality, and would prefer to foster the same kind of autonomy with their own students. However, it should be noted that only students and interns focused on this, not teachers.
Regarding content, moral philosophy was mentioned most frequently as potential content for the training. Moral psychology, moral development and a sociological understanding of morality were also considered to be relevant to this kind of training.

“... we should first understand how morality progressed historically... [...] We should understand the human brain’s cognitive process [...] After this, philosophy and sociology should enter the scene. This time we should investigate the philosophical perspectives on morality. Like pragmatism. [...] It should be in the frame of historical development once again, so we can have a sense of the historical pattern, a foundation. And we should understand what shapes societies’ understanding of morality.”

This student went into great depth about what the content of training should cover, and emphasised that gaining a historical understanding of how and why morality came to be considered what it is currently is crucial in terms of understanding the nature of morality.

Regarding the length of the training considered, participants’ thoughts ranged from ‘a few seminars’ to being ‘distributed across secondary and tertiary education.’ Most participants implied that this training should be given during university training (although some teachers also considered the possibility of in-service training in other questions), and most, but not all participants, think that this training should take more than a few lectures or seminars. This implies that most participants would prefer in-depth training.

And finally, although only a few participants focused on this, those who did all indicated that at least everyone involved in the education process, including non-teaching staff, should receive this training. This implies that at least some participants think that everyone who may have an influence on the student should receive training regarding moral development.

2.7. Participants’ Experience of Teaching and Receiving Moral Education

The first question of the conclusion section of the interview was related to participants’ experience of teaching moral values:

“How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the classroom? Do you use a specific system or method when you teach morality?”
The students who had no teaching experience did not respond to this question. The remaining participants, including one student who had the experience of a few private lessons, responded to this question. Participants either focused on how much time they spend on teaching values or the methods they use. Some of the responses, however, did not focus on either the time dedicated to teaching values nor on the methods employed. Perhaps not surprisingly, teachers gave clearer answers to this question than interns (see Appendix B13).

The time teachers indicated that they devote to teaching values ranges from “only when the opportunity arises” to “all the time.” Two teachers stated that they teach morality as part of their lessons every day. These two teachers were primary teachers. In Turkey, primary teachers tend to teach a single primary level class most courses every day, having a more intimate relationship with the students of their class than other subject matter teachers. All other teachers have specific disciplines they teach, and specific discipline teachers, such as physics or history, tend to teach a range of grades, so they interact with more students, but with less frequency than primary teachers, who specialize on a single class until the class is 5th grade, when the majority of their courses become taught by subject matter teachers. As a result, primary teachers tend to have more opportunities to engage in moral education. Other disciplinary teachers indicated that they either conduct moral education in general throughout the whole education process or that they spent time on it only when the opportunity arises.

Concerning methods, teachers were able to give more general answers, whereas interns focused on the methods they employed in specific instances during their internships, particularly mentoring and guiding the students towards moral behaviour and conflict resolution. Teachers, on the other hand, gave more specific methods they employed in general. One teacher stated two specific methods (‘I Solve Problems’ and drama) while other teachers focused on either providing experiences or making connections between concepts of morality discussed in class to current events in or out of the school. One teacher indicated that she tried to make use of Kohlberg’s theory while engaging in moral education. The remaining three interns stated that they either had not had the chance to engage in moral education, or if they did it they were unaware of it, or that they did not conduct moral education at all.

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15 ‘I Solve Problems’ is a series of activities designed to foster primary students’ problem-solving skills.
3. Belief Differences Based on Participants’ Groups

This section discusses the differences emerging between participants’ beliefs based on which group they are a part of (student, intern, teacher), and based on their disciplines. Belief differences based on gender are not discussed here, unlike the discussion of the questionnaire data results. Only one of the 20 interview participants was male, and all observation participants were female. Thus, a comparison of beliefs based on gender is not possible in the qualitative data analysis.

Three groups of participants took part in the interviews: students, interns, and teachers. Results of the regression tests run on the data gathered from the questionnaires indicated that there is little statistically significant difference between these three groups’ beliefs, and these differences were on minor points. This was investigated in more depth in the interviews. Similar to the quantitative data analysis, the interview data also point to only a few differences between the beliefs and attitudes of participants from these three different groups.

The first notable difference is in the third introductory question of the interview; while most participants indicated that they thought that several academic fields were relevant to understanding morality (most often philosophy, psychology, and sociology), half of the teachers stated that all areas were related to morality. Secondly, in questions related to moral psychology, teachers were more often focused on the developmental aspects of morality in terms of how it took place and who influenced moral development. Thirdly, with regard to participants’ thoughts about moral education, it seems like the more training and experience participants had, the more they appeared to have a positive attitude towards explicit moral education. Fourth, with regard to how teacher education could be improved in relation to moral education (in the fifth question on education), teachers were the only ones who emphasised that in-service training could also be considered, while students and interns focused exclusively on pre-service university training. The interesting point here is not that interns and students failed to mention in-service training – as the question directed participants to think about university training – but that teachers were interested in in-service training despite the question’s direction. The final point is that, in line with the quantitative analysis, and not surprisingly, the student group did not know what to talk about with regard to the hidden curriculum – as they had had no training regarding the hidden curriculum and implicit education while interns and teachers had undertaken this training.
Participants’ beliefs and attitudes according to their discipline were also analysed. However, once again in line with the quantitative analysis, only in a few instances did participants’ disciplines seem to influence their thoughts explicitly. One PCG intern focused on fostering students’ autonomy in order to foster their moral development, and one Computer and Technology Education intern indicated that technology should be a part of moral education:

“Philosophy [should be part of teacher training for moral education], but also other relevant things too. These include religion, technological developments, psychological theories... Giving the largest share to philosophy, all these should be studied.”

More interestingly, the two primary teachers indicated that moral education was part of their daily practice. While explicit moral education is not part of the curriculum in early and primary years, the format of the primary education programme seems to allow teachers to engage in moral education much more often than other subject matter courses. Apart from this, participants’ disciplinary influence did not appear to have an explicit influence regarding their beliefs and attitudes about moral psychology and moral education.

These results imply that participants’ understanding of morality is not related to either the teacher training and experience they have or their disciplines. Where differences based on participants’ groups can be detected, these are related to issues about moral education rather than moral psychology. It might be the case that their understanding of morality is more closely related to their worldviews than with their views regarding education and teaching. This conclusion also seems to align with participants’ thoughts that moral education is up to the initiative of individual teachers who place more importance on what they conceive to be moral education and strive to engage with it. Some participants also indicated that while not all teachers conduct moral education, some teachers that do should perhaps not, implying that participants’ think that their understanding of morality does not overlap with some other teachers’ understanding of morality. Finally, this conclusion also seems to be supported by participants’ emphasis that moral education should not be conducted in a top-down way, but based more on discovery of values through discussions and critical thinking, and practising moral behaviour.
4. Other Recurring Themes

In this section, other themes recurring throughout the interviews are presented. Participants indicated that these concepts and phenomena are highly relevant to the field of moral psychology and moral education.

4.1. Role of Experiences

While this was not among the main aims of the interview, participants’ beliefs regarding the role of experiences in moral development, and character development, in particular, are worth mentioning. Especially in two questions (the second and sixth moral psychology questions), some participants indicated that reflecting on past experiences allows people to make better moral judgements in the future, and also implied that taking certain decisions predisposes us to make similar decisions in the future by either fostering or weakening an orientation. This is somewhat in line with Dewey’s (1932) philosophy of the moral self, that past choices influence present choices, which in turn dispose us to make similar choices in the future. And this pattern of making choices and judgements is a crucial part of forming and maintaining our moral self.

4.2. Social Pressure and the Social Environment

The social environment and social pressure were recurring themes throughout the interviews. The role of the social environment in relation to moral development was referenced several times. Participants seem to think that the social environment in which a child grows has a critical influence on their moral development. However, participants stated negative attitudes towards this influence under certain circumstances. The effect of media on moral development was referenced few times, each time along with an indicated negative attitude. However, more importantly, the influence of social pressure was referenced in different ways.

First of all, participants indicated that many people act morally, or at least in line with social expectations relevant to morality, out of a fear of experiencing ostracism and other kinds of social pressure. Contrary to this, participants also indicated that people might sometimes fail to act morally due to the same fear. This shows that participants think that social pressure can force people to act both morally or immorally. Furthermore, this seems to suggest that participants’ understanding of morality does not overlap with their perception of the expectations of society, or what the general society thinks morality to be. They seem to
think that people’s greater concern is to be approved by general society and by friends and family, whether this would require acting in line with morality or not. Participants seem to think that, when the influence of the social environment is considered in terms of moral development and behaviour, retaining the positive attitudes of others is more important than acting morally. The aim of retaining this positive attitude might entail moral behaviour, but it might also entail the opposite.

4.3. *Religion and Religious Education with Regard to Morality*

Religion was another theme that recurred several times during the interviews. Religion was thought to be relevant especially to a person’s motivation to act morally. It should be noted that none of the participants used religious terms when describing morality in the second introductory question. However, both positive and negative attitudes towards religion were stated during the interviews.

Religious beliefs are indicated both to motivate and inhibit people from acting on their moral knowledge. This implies that participants’ understanding of religion does not entirely overlap with their understanding of morality. However, it was also said that religion “elevates morality to a higher level,” indicating a level of trust in the moral teachings of religion. Upon analysis, this struck me as contradictory, but it was not followed up in the interviews, as I had not recognised the contradictory nature of the statements until analysing them. It seems to be the case that participants observed a difference in the practice of religion in relation to morality. A contrast emerges between the perception of a deep and genuine belief in religion which leads to moral behaviour and a shallow technical/tactical belief in religion where moral behaviour is conceived of as a tool to secure God’s favour. Participants indicated positive attitudes to genuine religious beliefs and negative attitudes towards (what could be described as) tactical religious behaviour.

While attitudes towards religion are either positive or negative depending on the context, attitudes towards religious education are negative, at least the way it is currently conducted in Turkey. There seem to be two main causes of this negative attitude: firstly, that religious education, as it is conducted currently, is perceived to be not pluralistic enough, failing to address students of different religious backgrounds and beliefs, thus not appealing to all students:
“There should be no religious education because the way it is practised now excludes people of different religious backgrounds.”

In relation to this, a narrow understanding of morality is thought to be conveyed alongside RE, which fails to address the concerns of a portion of students. Furthermore, participants not only implied that their understanding of morality does not overlap with the morality taught in RE, but they also implied resentment at such a narrow perspective of morality being imposed upon them. One final point of interest is that about a third of the participants did not seem even to consider current RE as moral education.
5. **Conclusion and Summary**

This chapter covered the findings obtained from qualitative data analysis. The results indicate that while no participant has a broad and comprehensive understanding of moral psychology, collectively their beliefs complement each other. While participants think that it is important to teach morality in school, they believe that the influence of moral education is limited compared to the influence of the family and the general society. Furthermore, they do not think that teachers are equipped well enough to conduct moral education, and most feel they are not adequately prepared to engage in moral education themselves. They have all indicated a positive attitude towards receiving more training concerning moral education.
CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

This chapter initially revisits the purpose, setting and aims of the study, the research questions, and the methodology employed in seeking answers to the research questions. Following this, how teacher training and experience influence the development of teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs is discussed in the second section. This is followed by a discussion of participants’ general dispositions regarding moral education, including their thoughts about the current system of moral education and how it should be changed, and their attitudes towards their colleagues who engage in moral education in the third section. The fourth section goes into greater depth regarding the implications of teachers’ beliefs for their potential engagement in face-to-face interactions with students and classroom activities in terms of fostering students’ moral development. The fifth section follows this by focusing on the implications of the findings in terms of teachers’ beliefs and dispositions relevant to creating a school environment conducive to fostering moral development. Finally, the sixth section discusses the training ITE programmes seem to provide trainees and possible recommendations for revising ITE programmes to better prepare teachers for engaging with moral education. Limitations of the study, generalizability and transferability of findings, and avenues of potential future research can be found in Chapter VII.

1. The Purpose of the Research

This research was born out of my perception as a student and a trainee teacher in Turkey that teacher training programmes lacked a sufficient focus on moral education. In addition to this, the rising levels of political turbulence, hostility, indifference to others’ suffering, and corruption in the last decades in Turkey, made me feel that a greater focus on moral education was desirable. As a result, this study aimed to shed light on ways in which moral education could be improved in Turkey.

Drawing from philosophical naturalism, pragmatism, and virtue ethics, it was identified that teachers’ beliefs regarding moral psychology, development, and education are crucial in terms of their efforts and ability to foster pupils’ moral development. This is mainly due to the implicit nature of most moral education taking place in schools, where teachers’ beliefs and attitudes – which inform their engagement with implicit moral education – have the most significant effect on pupils’ moral development in the school context. This
highlights the importance of understanding how ITE programmes in Turkey equip pre-service teachers with the beliefs, attitudes, and content matter knowledge relevant to their engagement with moral education. However, there is a significant lack of knowledge on this issue. Following this understanding, five core research questions were identified:

1. How does moral education take place?
2. What are the psychological processes involved in the production and development of moral behaviour?
3. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs regarding the occurrence and development of moral behaviour?
4. What are Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral education in Turkey?
5. How do Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral psychology and moral education develop through teacher training and teaching experience?

In order to answer these research questions, initially, a deep investigation of relevant literature was carried out. The educational literature reviewed to answer the first question indicates that, most importantly, while teachers are willing and interested in conducting moral education, they are not adequately equipped in their pre-service training to do so. This is most clearly exemplified in the lack of ‘moral language’ through which teachers can make sense of their moral experiences in school, and their faith in the impact of role modelling, despite lacking an understanding of how role modelling works and its limitations. Furthermore, due to the nature of morality and the nature of school life, moral education takes place largely implicitly through the hidden curriculum, and more broadly, pupils’ interaction with the moral ecology of the school. One of the most critical elements of this kind of moral education that students receive is their interaction with teachers. These indicate that teachers’ beliefs regarding the psychological and educational aspects of morality, which inform their behaviour relevant to implicit moral education, are one of the key elements that define the moral education pupils receive in school.

The review of moral psychology literature aimed to provide a clear and comprehensive picture of how moral behaviour occurs and develops, to answer the second research question. The FCM sheds light on the overall psychological processes that moral behaviour entails. It also indicates that these processes can be conceived and fostered as
morally relevant skills in education. Moral reasoning was identified as a crucial skill to develop as it a) leads to moral judgement, b) is capable of refining and maintaining moral intuitions, which drive moral judgement to a larger extent than moral reasoning, c) helps to consciously and rationally create and maintain one’s moral self, and d) is more accessible to teachers’ influence than other aspects of pupils’ moral psychology. The implications of moral reasoning regarding the moral self is especially important, as the moral self is the prime motivator for moral behaviour. The motivation to act in moral ways itself resides in one’s episodic moral emotions; however, the tendency to feel these emotions are rooted in one’s emotional dispositions (which also deeply influence character traits). Furthermore, habits also define the moral self, and morally relevant emotional dispositions and habits can be consciously and rationally directed through the use of deliberate choice, interests, and second-order volitions, highlighting how fostering moral reasoning is central to moral self development. Moreover, an understanding of the MFT and TET can help teachers create a moral ecology within their schools that fosters pluralism, tolerance, and an orientation towards self-preservation or cooperation. The TET also highlights how humans’ cognitive capacities amplify the effects of an ethics of self-preservation or cooperation.

The remaining three research questions were answered through the empirical component of this study. The empirical component entailed a pragmatic mixed method approach to identifying Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to the aspects of moral psychology and education described in the literature review through a cross-sectional sampling of the population. The cross-sectional sampling was intended to reveal the influence of teacher training and experience on Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs, through a selection of participants that either had little training and no experience (first-year students), full training and little experience (interns), or full training and several years of experience (practising teachers). The mixed methods approach was intended to provide a deep and broad understanding of participants’ beliefs and belief development by a) achieving a broad (though possibly superficial) understanding of participants’ beliefs through a questionnaire, b) gaining a deeper understanding of identified beliefs through semi-structured interviews, and c) understanding how these beliefs reflect in teachers’ conduct in and outside of the classroom through observations. However, the observations did not meet their aim due to an insufficient amount of data collected (see Chapter III for observations and Chapter VII for limitations and future directions).
The remaining body of this chapter synthesises the understandings gained from the literature reviewed in Chapter II with the results of the empirical component of the study described in Chapters IV and V.
2. Development of Beliefs

No general patterns regarding belief differences, or development, can be found among the participants of this study. This is perhaps one of the most significant findings. Teacher training or experience does not have a statistically recognisable impact on the development of Turkish teachers’ beliefs. Neither does gender, commitment to the teaching career, nor, perhaps more surprisingly, disciplinary focus. Participants differ from each other based on the groups mentioned above, in only several minor matters that are largely unrelated. These minor differences are discussed in more detail where they become relevant in the following sections.

The most significant of these differences is in educational beliefs; there is hardly any difference in moral psychology beliefs that fits any pattern regarding participants’ groups. The most that can be said about the development of psychological beliefs is that with greater training and experience participants are more likely to indicate a positive or negative attitude regarding aspects of moral psychology. In the questionnaires, the student group was more likely to respond to questions with ‘not sure’ than interns or teachers were. This suggests that students have relatively less confidence in their thoughts or beliefs. However, whether the development of confidence regarding this issue is related to teacher training and experience, or just age and general life experience, is not clear. The lack of a similar difference in educational beliefs suggests that age and experience are more likely to be the root cause of the development of confidence.

One of the most surprising findings was that disciplinary differences are nearly non-existent. This is surprising because the comparison between participant groups was based on whether the participants were students of Psychological Counselling and Guidance (PCG) or other disciplines. The PCG department is part of the education faculty; however, courses in this department predominantly focus on psychology. While moral psychology is not part of the PCG curriculum, it was expected that students who are better acquainted with human psychology would differ in their beliefs from students and teachers who are not as knowledgeable on psychology as PCG students are. The lack of difference between PCG students and students and teachers of other disciplines suggests that the PCG programme is no more or no less effective in preparing its students to foster pupils’ moral development.

One of the main differences between participants lies in their approach to moral education. In the interviews, it emerged that younger participants – mainly students and
interns – are more interested in discussing the nature of morality and moral education, whereas teachers are more focused on the practical aspects. Teachers more often focused on how moral development takes place and who influences development in what way, implying that teachers are more interested in learning how to conduct moral education, as opposed to learning what morality is. In a similar vein, students also seem to talk and think about moral education the way they would like to receive it, while teachers think and talk about moral education the way they would teach it. This suggests that a course on moral development that focuses on the nature of morality and moral psychology would be of greater interest to younger trainees, while practical aspects of engaging in moral education would be of greater interest to older students and practising teachers (for example, through in-service training). It should be noted at this point that in the interviews, many teachers indicated that they would be willing to take in-service training concerning how to engage in moral education.

Furthermore, there seems to be a correlation between greater training and experience with more positive attitudes towards explicit moral education. This could be due to several reasons, one of which is the ease of conducting explicit education. Explicit education requires a set of knowledge and skills; most often this can be obtained from training that equips teachers with a set of professional knowledge and expertise. Implicit education, however, requires a more subtle approach. I would argue that implicit moral education – constant role modelling, reacting appropriately to spontaneous events, etc. – requires the teacher to be a certain kind of person, as opposed to possessing a set of skills and knowledge. My view is that the teachers who were interviewed had a similar but tacit understanding of the issue – that implicit moral education is more demanding of the teacher. And whether episodic sessions of in-service training can adequately equip teachers to meet the demands of implicit moral education is yet to be seen.

Finally, while participants’ moral philosophies were not extensively explored in this study, there seems to be a wide variety of philosophical understandings of morality that inform Turkish teachers’ thinking about morality, moral psychology, and moral education. Elements of philosophical naturalism, rationalism and pragmatism were detected; however, I should admit that I may be somewhat constrained in my observation, by virtue of being more familiar with these schools of thought than most others, and it is possible that I was unable to identify many other approaches. Nonetheless, this still implies that a course on moral philosophy is likely to be of interest and benefit to Turkish teachers.
Given the lack of belief differences among the groups investigated in this study, the next section focuses on participants’ general dispositions regarding moral education.
3. General Dispositions Regarding Moral Education

In the questionnaires participants overwhelmingly agreed that it is important to teach morality in school, and that teachers are and should be role models. This is an indication that participants of this study are willing to engage in moral education and believe they have a moral responsibility as teachers to do so, providing further support to many authors (Brookhart & Freeman, 1992; Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno, 2000; Goodlad et al, 1990; Joseph & Efron, 1993; LePage, et al, 2011; Sanger & Osghuthorpe, 2011; 2013; Temli, Şen, & Akar, 2011; Wang & Fwu, 2002).

Furthermore, in the interviews, whenever participants lacked the knowledge to talk about an issue related to moral psychology in depth, they frequently referred to the developmental aspects of moral education. This is especially exemplified in the responses to the interview questions focusing on the components of the FCM, morality as a skill, and moral development. Having received no training regarding any of these issues, participants were largely unable to talk about the psychological components of moral behaviour, how and whether morality can be conceived as a skill, or what it is that actually develops in moral development, respectively. Instead, a large majority focused on how psychological components of moral behaviour may develop, who or what might influence moral development or the development of moral skills. Given that fostering growth is at the heart of the teaching profession (even if this growth is most usually of specific intellectual skills), this common focus on development further seems to indicate that participants may have the growth mindset of a teacher, bringing to the discussion what they can (the perspective of, and interest in, fostering development as a teacher) where their content knowledge is insufficient. This further provides support to the notion that teachers are interested and willing to engage in moral education. Because, otherwise, one would expect participants to disengage (or at least give such an indication), or talk in ways that are not so teacher-like during the interviews. They spoke of all issues with some enthusiasm, although since they had volunteered to participate in the study, this might indicate an existing interest in the subject.

Contrary to this, during the interviews, some participants also indicated that the school’s influence on pupils’ moral development is limited. It was thought that, given the definitive impact of the family on students’ moral development, the influence of the school could go only so far, and while the school may provide pupils with the experiences and observations to foster their moral development, similar experiences and observations also
take place outside of the school, and the these would compete with the influence of the school. This points to two conclusions: a) that there is a tacit realistic understanding among the participants about the limitations of the moral influence of the school, and by extension, the teachers’, and b) that participants are aware of how ubiquitous moral interactions are – that they pervade all aspects of not only school life, but life in general.

While attitudes towards moral education among participants are very positive, attitudes towards the current system of moral education are not. In the questionnaires, participants overwhelmingly indicated negative attitudes towards the current system, and this was repeated in the interviews as well – only a quarter of interview participants referred to the RCE course as moral education, and more than a third did not seem to consider it as moral education at all. The most often cited reason for this negative attitude was the lack of pluralism in the course, and that education related to morality did not feature in the course as much as it should. While these criticisms reflect some important gaps in the design of the course, and have been voiced by other authors (Okçu, 2009; Şaşmaz et al., 2011; Yıldız, 2009; Yılmaz, 2009), there also seems to be another implicit, political, reason as well.

As noted in Chapter III, the population sample included in this study was biased towards a liberal sample. In Turkey, the place of religion in the public sphere, and by extension in education, is a hotly debated political and social issue. In this regard, liberals tend to favour greater distance between religion and education, while conservatives tend to favour closer ties between the two. Furthermore, the MFT indicates that liberals tend to be slightly more individualistic than conservatives, valuing autonomy more highly (Graham et al., 2013), and this may also apply in Turkey as well. Several participants indicated that moral education should not impose certain values and virtues on pupils – or trainee teachers – instead favouring a kind of moral education that would foster critical thinking and moral autonomy. Moreover, some participants also indicated that religious motives could motivate both moral and immoral behaviour (or refraining from either behaviour). This implies that participants’ understanding of morality and religion does not overlap perfectly. And finally, several participants also indicated negative attitudes towards their colleagues who conduct moral education. Given the current state of the system in Turkey, the only teachers who can explicitly conduct moral education are the RE teachers, which in all likelihood participants of this study criticised based on the assumption that RE teachers emphasise non-secular values.

\[16\] Here I am referring only to liberal or conservative views on social matters.
Taking these points together, it is possible that the greatest concern of the participants of this study regarding moral education is that, as it stands, moral education is provided in a non-pluralist and dogmatic manner, undermining secular values, and that it is not entirely geared towards fostering morality. This implies that teachers with liberal tendencies may be more interested in engaging in moral education from a secular perspective for political reasons or prefer to avoid the issue entirely due to the sensitive political situation in Turkey.

The above indicates what participants think moral education should not be. Given that their anxieties about current moral education are more related to the fact that it is bundled together with religious education, with less emphasis on its moral aspects, it might be expected that they could prefer RE and ME to be separate courses. This preference is reflected in the data. There is variety among participants’ beliefs regarding how implicit or explicit moral education should be taught, preference for and focus on explicit education increasing with age and experience, but in general greater focus on both implicit and explicit education was called for. In terms of how explicit education should be designed, most participants indicated that ME should not be susceptible to shallow learning based on passing tests through rote memorization, but an in-depth, experience and practice-based curriculum, fostering moral autonomy and avoiding imposing a set of values and virtues.

However, there is also one point that seems to contradict participants’ emphasis on not imposing values. In the frequency analysis of the quantitative data, the responses to Question 45 appear to indicate that participants, while believing that morality is learnt first and foremost implicitly, gave about the same amount of importance to both top-down teaching through lectures on right and wrong and bottom-up discoveries through interactions with their peers. At first sight, the value given to top-down teaching may seem to be inconsistent with the emphasis that moral values should not be imposed; however, it is more likely that participants value top-down teaching in terms of providing a scaffold for pupils’ moral development. This theme is explored in more depth in the next section.
4. Implications of Findings for Face-to-Face Practice

Despite all the evident interest and willingness, and convictions about how moral education should take place, it is quite apparent that the participants of this study were not adequately equipped with the necessary understanding regarding moral psychology to optimally carry out ME, in line with the findings of Temli et al. (2011) and Carr and Landon (1998; 1999). Given the lack of evidence for belief development based on teacher training and experience, this conclusion applies to both experienced teachers as well as students who have recently enrolled in an ITE programme. However, the students and teachers who took part in this study seem to approach moral education with an interest in fostering development, as opposed to outright teaching what is moral and what is not. In fact, many participants have expressed resentment towards the latter approach. Based on this, the remainder of the section will explore the notion, given participants’ current beliefs, of how they may foster moral development by providing a scaffold for pupils’ development.

Participants were more likely to think that moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill – more than 70% of questionnaire participants and 55% of interview participants indicated this. More interestingly, during the interviews, it was noticed that most participants seemed to have never thought whether morality is a skill or not. The fact that there is a tendency to agree with this could either be due to social desirability bias by a high number of participants, or that thinking of moral behaviour as a skill fits in with their worldview.

Whether the following description of skill applies to morality or not in teachers’ view, skill is thought to be an intricate ability that requires constant cognitive effort. This belief does not entirely reflect the literature regarding moral skills (Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). With regards to the purposes of this thesis, the degree of the intricacy of an ability may reflect the expertise one has regarding the skill. This implies that skills on which expertise has not been cultivated would not be as intricate as expert skills. Furthermore, the notion that skill requires constant cognitive effort is also problematic. Development of skills entails automation at higher levels (Narvaez, 2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008). While constant cognitive effort would be required when a new skill is being cultivated, as greater expertise is gained the need for cognitive effort would become less frequent; indeed, automation is a sign of developed expertise and cognitive effort is a sign of developing expertise. These imply that teachers’ perception of skill only reflects newly developing skills, and the unawareness regarding the subtle, automated nature of expert skills may cause
teachers to misjudge the level of pupils’ moral skills, and by extension, misjudge the best course of action regarding how to further foster the development of any given skill.

Another potentially problematic aspect of teachers’ perception of moral behaviour as a skill is the negative attitudes indicated towards it. While only a minority conveyed their attitudes, all stated attitudes were negative. It seems to be the case that, given that skills are thought to require constant cognitive effort, conceiving of morality as a skill leads some to believe that moral behaviour is more likely to be employed in a calculating, Machiavellian manner, akin to technical/tactical moral reasoning. This puts moral skills in conflict with a truly moral self. It seems to be the case that participants believe that moral behaviour will naturally follow from a truly moral self, which in itself may not be an inaccurate conception. However, the development of the moral self need not be abandoned to nature, and nurturing its development entails the development of skills related to moral motivation. Given the case, it may seem that teachers would prefer to refrain from influencing (i.e. fostering) pupils’ moral motivation and moral self development, but this conclusion is not supported by other results from the data analysis.

This is especially exemplified in participants’ attitudes towards external moral motivation. While they value internal motivation more highly than external motivation, they also think that external motivation is necessary. On the one hand, this perceived necessity seems based on the value of deterring immoral behaviour through social and/or legal punishments, but more importantly, external motivation is thought to be necessary at early phases of moral motivation development. Taking these understandings together, it seems that participants are interested in providing a scaffold for pupils through external motivation and teaching in order to help nature take its course (with regards to the development of a moral self, at least), without designing a course for said nature to take. They seem to be in favour of providing the resources for pupils to make their own selves (hence the emphasis on providing learning opportunities through experiences and observations), without making students’ selves for them (i.e. imposing a certain set of values and virtues).

This implies that the seemingly contradictory nature of participants’ beliefs is in essence rooted in an understanding of moral psychology that lacks sufficient nuance. Furthermore, they seem to be unaware of this. This gap in teachers’ knowledge and the resulting conflicting beliefs can be problematic when it comes to engaging in moral education/fostering moral development. At best, these seemingly contradictory beliefs can
preclude teachers from optimally fostering moral development, at worst, negatively influencing moral development by engaging in activities or interactions with pupils that are not appropriate to the students’ level – either underestimating or overestimating students’ capabilities and/or needs, or entirely disregarding their capabilities and needs and failing to take action where necessary.

The scaffolding teachers seem interested in providing seems to draw from two pedagogical methods: experience and observations. Participants have repeatedly emphasised that pupils learn morality best through, and that moral education should be designed to provide, experiences and observations. Observations can be thought of as a passive kind of experience. On the other hand, in the interviews, participants who mentioned experience as a learning method also mentioned application (actively carrying out what was learnt in the classroom) as a way of learning. This implies that teachers tend towards providing both active and passive learning experiences to pupils.

With regards to experience, participants’ beliefs about how experience works to influence the moral self seem in line with Dewey’s (1932) philosophy, although not so nuanced. It is thought that experiences, especially active experiences where pupils carry out deliberate choices and have the opportunity to observe the consequences of their decisions, foster or discourage an orientation to make similar choices in the future. In this regard, Narvaez’s (2010a; 2010b; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2008) proposed four-stage structure for fostering expertise in moral skills is likely to aid teachers in their endeavours. The structure proposed by Narvaez addresses teachers’ concerns in that the structure does not require a certain set of values to be taught; rather it allows a student to act more effectively with regards to their values by equipping them with the relevant subset of abilities and skills.

In terms of observations, while participants place faith in the impact of role modelling, it seems that they are not entirely aware of how it works, or its limitations, echoing the findings of Sanderse (2014). Participants did not talk about how pupils may learn from observations or role modelling but instead talked about how influential various actors’ modelling can be. This indicates an awareness of the limits of teachers’ influence. However, the fact that a teachers’ influence is limited does not necessarily imply that the role modelling they do is pointless, or that there is no point in improving teachers’ skills regarding role modelling. In this regard, it is expected that teachers would be able to put Albert Bandura’s Theory of Learning by Observation (1986; 1997) to particularly good use. This would allow
teachers to understand how exactly learning through observation works, and thus enable them to tailor their role modelling to pupils’ level of learning.

However, providing developmentally appropriate learning experiences, whether passive or active, entails an understanding of morally relevant psychological skills, and the developmental pattern of these skills. Yet participants seem to lack an understanding of these skills. The majority of participants failed to identify the psychological components of moral behaviour (in relation to the FCM), instead talking about how moral development could take place. No participant was able to identify moral sensitivity as a component of moral behaviour – despite in the questionnaires indicating a perception that there is a general lack of moral sensitivity in people. Awareness of moral implementation is also not evident unless they were discussing why people fail to act morally. When participants did identify any component of moral behaviour, they recognised either moral judgement or moral motivation, the latter being more frequently recognised than the former.

With regards to moral judgement, there is a perceived lack of judgements based on reasoning. Participants seem to be aware that moral intuitions are the main drivers of moral judgements; however, they respect reasoning more highly. This appears to indicate a dislike of uncritically going with one’s gut feeling. There is a risk here, regarding the intuition-like behaviour of habitualised moral reasoning. In cases where teachers mistake behaviour based on highly developed moral reasoning as uncritical intuitive behaviour, they may inadvertently encourage the pupil to take a developmentally regressive path. This highlights the necessity of understanding the relationship between naïve intuitive judgements with expert rational judgements. Given that moral reasoning can influence intuitions, this suggests that participants may be interested in fostering moral reasoning development. However, they are not clear regarding the developmental phases of moral reasoning either, suggesting that while teachers may be interested in fostering moral reasoning, they lack the necessary knowledge and skills to provide a scaffold for pupils’ development. Taking this into account, it is likely that teachers would be interested in, and could make use of training regarding moral reasoning development.

Moral motivation is most likely to be recognised as a component of moral behaviour, implying that teachers are likely to be most sensitive to pupils’ moral motivation. There is general agreement among participants that moral reasoning does not provide moral motivation, evidencing a recognition of the gappiness problem (Blasi, 1980; Kristjánsson,
2010a). Participants’ emphasis that values and virtues should not be imposed on the pupils via moral education implies that they are disinclined to influence the development of students' moral selves directly. Instead, they seem in favour of providing a scaffold for development. Their attempts to achieve this would be defined at least partly by their understanding of the moral self and its elements.

While some participants’ beliefs regarding moral emotions reflect the academic literature on episodic emotions, other participants’ beliefs reflect the literature on emotional dispositions. No participant seemed to be aware that there are two kinds of moral emotions. Given that teachers are likely to be disinclined to attempt to influence pupils' moral emotions directly, their understanding regarding this topic may serve more diagnostic purposes with regards to providing learning opportunities through experiences and observations. However, the fact that they understand only one side of the moral emotions coin may create problems regarding their analysis of pupils’ behaviour and/or needs relevant to furthering moral development.

Participants’ understanding of second order volitions (see Chapter II, Section 2.3 for a description of SOVs; in particular, the review of Frankfurt, 1971) seems to be that they are rationally set personality goals. They also indicated a positive attitude alongside this conception, suggesting that they like the notion of a rationally defined ideal state of personhood that an individual desires to achieve and that this rational maintenance of one’s character is, in general, a good thing. The emphasis on, and positive attitudes towards, the rational aspect of SOVs in teachers’ conceptions, once again suggests that teachers are likely to focus on pupils’ moral reasoning development, in this case, to aid students in defining and achieving these personality goals.

It also seems that some participants, especially PCG students, are acquainted with the concept of selfhood. One interviewee brought into the discussion terms such as “ideal selfhood” from her own studies, and also highlighted several pitfalls regarding SOVs such as setting unrealistic goals leading to problematic behaviour. This suggests that, at least in relation to SOVs, certain aspects of the PCG programme may also be included in the ITE of other disciplines. However, identifying exactly which aspects are likely to be beneficial to all teachers requires deeper investigation, which is out of the scope of this study.

One final issue relevant to participants’ personal practice of moral education that needs to be addressed is moral language. Echoing the observations of Sockett and LePage
(2002) and Willemse et al. (2008), participants seemed to lack the language necessary to engage in in-depth discussions regarding moral development and moral education. This is most clearly exemplified in the confusion regarding the difference between emotions and feelings; and the related confusion regarding moral emotions, character traits, and values and virtues (see Chapter II, section 2.3 for the explanation of these terms, and Chapter V, Section 1.7 for an analysis of participants’ confusion relevant to these terms). This may also have some bearing on the confusion regarding participants’ understanding of the difference between episodic moral emotions, and moral emotional dispositions. Furthermore, during the interviews, many participants had trouble presenting their thoughts in an organised manner. Participants frequently stopped talking mid-sentence, or stated their ideas in a fragmented manner, as can be seen in some of the translated quotations in Chapter V and Appendix B.

With regards to fostering pupils’ moral development, command of moral language is crucial, for this language is the tool with which teachers may realise their efforts (Sockett & LePage, 2002; Tappan 1991; Willemse et al., 2008). Considering Carr and Landon’s (1999) observation that the Catholic ethos of one of the schools they visited had equipped the teachers and pupils with moral language to some degree, engaging with the philosophical, psychological, educational, or theological aspects of morality during ITE may serve to equip trainee teachers with moral language. This, yet again, highlights the potential of including training regarding morality and moral development in ITE.

Given the understandings obtained from the literature review and results, this section focused on how teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs may lend themselves to conducting moral education, and how the gaps in these beliefs could be addressed in ITE. The next section focuses on teachers’ beliefs relevant to creating a moral ecology conducive to fostering moral development in schools.
5. Implications Regarding Moral Ecology

This section discusses how teachers’ beliefs may influence the moral ecology of the school and the hidden curriculum. The discussion initially focuses on teachers’ beliefs regarding moral ecology and the hidden curriculum and moral education in relation to these two concepts. This is followed by a discussion of how culture and the social environment influence pupils’ moral development in teachers’ views, and finally, how the variety of identified beliefs may affect school moral ecology.

Teachers’ conceptions of the moral ecology of the school and the hidden curriculum, and the influence of these two concepts on pupils’ moral development is particularly important as the majority of moral education takes place through the subtle interactions that are a part of these two concepts, due to the nature of morality and the nature of school life (Frey, 2010; Giroux & Purpel, 1983; Hertzke, 1998; Yüksel, 2005). Participants seem to be aware of this issue as they repeatedly emphasised that pupils learn morality primarily through observing their environment, and that the influence of these observations is critical regarding the development of moral skills and the moral self. Furthermore, while not a unanimous position, a considerable number of participants indicated that a consideration for moral education should feature more clearly in the hidden curriculum. This suggests that teachers are likely to be sensitive to the physical and psychological environment of the school, and could attempt to alter them in order to create a climate more conducive to fostering pupils’ moral development.

Taking this together with the nearly unanimous agreement that teachers and their behaviour are the central elements of the hidden curriculum in schools, it appears that participants recognise a responsibility regarding the examples they set to pupils. This is further supported by the quantitative results that indicate that participants believe that teachers are and should be role models. Moreover, this was also emphasised during the interviews as well. These suggest that participants are likely to be sensitive to how their behaviour indirectly affects pupils’ moral development, and that other teachers’ behaviour also has an important effect.

One important element of the hidden curriculum that participants seem unaware of is the influence of the physical environment (e.g. the existence of green space or an art studio on school grounds) and the temporal structure of the school (e.g. recess and lesson times, holiday dates), by way of implying the priorities of the school (Giroux & Purpel, 1983).
While in the questionnaires participants generally indicated agreement that these aspects of the school may influence moral development, during the interviews only one student, who had not been acquainted with the concept of hidden curriculum until I introduced it to her, referred to the potential influence of these aspects of the hidden curriculum. Given that the physical aspects of the school do not feature prominently in discussions regarding the hidden curriculum in ITE programmes in Turkey, it seems to be the case that while the training pre-service teachers receive influences their educational beliefs, it also educates them out of recognising the impact of the school’s physical aspects on the school moral ecology, due to a lack of discussion regarding the matter. This may hinder teachers’ attempts to create a school environment more conducive to moral development as they may not be aware of all aspects of the ecology.

On the other hand, just as the interactions of life at school have a subtle yet profound effect on moral development, participants emphasised that life outside of school also has a similar effect. Participants especially emphasised the influence of the family in this respect. This implies that teachers understand that multiple moral ecologies in a pupil's life exert competing influences on his/her moral development and that teachers’ influence, while most decidedly not in vain and certainly valuable, is limited in comparison to the influence of the family.

On the broader scale of culture, participants have indicated that the culture in which an individual grows up influences moral emotional dispositions. Given that participants also agreed that school psychological climate influences moral development, there seems to be a tacit understanding that school culture and psychological climate may affect pupils’ moral development on the scale of school, although this influence would be smaller compared to the scale of culture in general.

To this end, participants stated overwhelming agreement with the notion that a loving and secure environment is conducive for moral development. Similar views were also voiced during the interviews. Based on this, it can be argued that, considering TET (Narvaez, 2008), teachers would tend towards creating a psychological climate in school that fosters an Engagement Ethics orientation in pupils, emphasising compassion and cooperation. While the details of how this might be achieved in the participants’ views are not clear, the means of achieving such an aim would be partly dependent on the situation where a teacher works, or the trainee may work in the future, i.e. the existing moral ecology of a school.
At this point, participants’ politically relevant concerns regarding the role of religion in the moral ecology need to be addressed. Given participants’ emphasis on pluralism and resentment of imposing values, it seems as if they would be interested in creating a pluralist environment where both religious and secular values can be fostered. However, they may be reluctant to engage with the religious aspects of the school moral ecology themselves. This implies that, while they are highly unlikely to attempt to repress religious perspectives or sensitivities in the school, they may not be very likely to engage with them either.

Just as participants’ concerns regarding religion are partly based on the perception that the central aspect of religion is not morality, so they have indicated that the centre of the social environment and social pressure is not morality. Yet, the social environment was repeatedly stated to have a deep influence on pupils’ moral development and behaviour. It seems to be the case that, participants’ understanding is that social alliances – being in others’ good favour, whether teachers or peers – are a priority over socially impartial moral principles. While being biased towards one’s social alliances over being impartial and caring equally for all people may not sound morally commendable, literature on evolutionary moral psychology (beyond the scope of this thesis) supports this position – it is the moral nature of Homo Sapiens to prioritise friends and family over strangers and rivals. The educational relevance of this position draws attention to the socialisation of pupils, and the impact of students’ socialisation on their moral development.

It appears that in teachers’ understanding, pupils’ socialisation with peers and teachers would be key to understanding the impact of school moral ecology on students’ moral development. Understanding regarding the influence and progress of socialisation is somewhat evident in the analysis of participants’ responses in Section 1.9 of Chapter V. Participants believe that during the early years, parents are the most important figures, followed by teachers in primary years. During adolescence peers gain greater importance and teachers lose some of their influence, and during adulthood the general society and peers are thought to be the main influences. This belief places particular importance on primary teachers, and to a lesser degree on other teachers as well. Considering that the primary teacher system in Turkey affords teachers greater opportunities to influence pupils’ moral development, it is likely that primary teachers would be especially interested in the affective quality of their relationships with the students.
Considering other teachers’ roles in students’ socialisation, middle-school (student age 10 to 13) and high school (student age 14 to 17) teachers may be more interested in monitoring pupils’ relationships with each other, and how the quality of these relationships reflects on the school/classroom psychological climate and moral ecology. In terms of the influence of external moral motivation, participants implied that social consequences such as ostracism and exclusion from play or peer groups, or the threat of it, would influence pupils’ moral behaviour. Such social consequences are likely to impact the psychological climate of the classroom or the school as well, in return influencing pupils’ moral development. In this respect, middle and high school teachers may be more interested in helping pupils manage their social relationships. In this process, teachers would also achieve their aim in providing a scaffold for students’ moral development, rather than enforcing on them certain behaviours or values (which, by enough repetition, can be habitualised and become part of pupils’ moral selves). Helping pupils manage their social relationships need not entail imposing a certain set of values on them. Indeed, this approach would be more in line with fostering practical wisdom (Hursthouse, 2006) in pupils.

As a result, such an approach could also accommodate the variety of beliefs that teachers hold, with regards to the nature of morality, without forcing conflicting or complementary values and virtues on pupils. Participants conveyed a wide array of descriptions of what morality is, and a similar variety was found regarding their thoughts on which academic fields are relevant to understanding morality. This variety indicates that each teacher is likely to contribute uniquely to the moral ecology of the school through their relevant beliefs and that in turn, the school moral ecology would have a rich diversity of beliefs from which pupils can learn.

However, some participants also problematised this. Several participants indicated that each teacher in the school would hold a unique set of values and virtues, or prioritise values and virtues in a unique way, and that this would result in a collectively relativistic, dis-unified approach to moral education in the school context. It was thought that this dis-unified multiplicity would make it harder for pupils to learn morality by observing their different teachers. This seems somewhat contradictory with participants’ emphasis on pluralism in moral education. However, this could also be due to an underlying conception of a learning threshold that needs to be passed, in terms of providing sufficient experiences and observations to pupils for them to learn. It could be the case that participants think that in a relativistic environment where there is a lack of a unified approach to moral education, pupils
will not receive sufficient input to truly learn from the range of observations and experiences that prioritise different sets of values and virtues.

Furthermore, there is some evidence from the interviews that participants tend towards a particularist or relativist perspective, as opposed to a foundationalist perspective comparable to the argument of the MFT (Graham et al., 2013). Especially from a particularist perspective, the lack of unity might be problematic. If the assumption is that there is no unifying foundation or consequence/end result, the unique approach each teacher takes would be problematic as different teachers’ perspectives would share no common ground.

This disunity in what is emphasised and how the issue of morality is approached could be due to a lack of focus on morality and moral education in ITE programmes in Turkey. Given that ITE programmes clearly influence pre-service teachers’ educational beliefs in a unifying manner, but no such pattern can be found in the data regarding beliefs about morality, it is likely that participants’ understanding of morality is not related to any professional training, but to world views in general or some other variable. This suggests that providing training regarding moral education and moral development could address this problem.

On the other hand, participants’ particularist views may not be as constraining as they think. The Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2013) indicates that there are foundations of morality in our evolved moral psychology. The issue regarding differing sets of values is more related to differing prioritisations of a larger set of values that each person holds to a greater or lesser degree, by virtue of being human. This indicates that even in cases where priorities differ wildly, they still share a common foundation, and this would be either explicitly or implicitly conveyed to the pupils. Furthermore, this applies not only to teachers but the entire society and cultural practices at large, alleviating participants’ concerns about competing influences on students’ moral psychology to some extent.

This concludes the discussion of teachers’ beliefs that are relevant to school moral ecology and their potential practices in this context. The next section discusses the training Turkish teachers receive and participants’ thoughts regarding training and presents recommendations regarding improving ITE programmes in Turkey with regards to equipping pre-service teachers with the knowledge and skills to foster pupils’ moral development.
6. Training Provided in ITE and Recommendations

According to the quantitative results, participants of this study had received no training at all regarding moral psychology – all psychological beliefs reported and discussed in this thesis have developed in the absence of relevant training, whether a PCG student or other disciplines. During the interviews, it turned out that some participants had been acquainted with some concepts relevant to moral psychology, albeit this acquaintance was most often not related to their university training, and overall it was superficial.

By way of reference, however, participants seem to think that the model most relevant to moral psychology that they are familiar with is Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, as this was mentioned by several participants. In each case where Maslow’s hierarchy was mentioned, participants indicated that moral behaviour would become a concern only when one reaches the highest level of the hierarchy – actualizing oneself. Of all the misconceptions regarding moral psychology identified in this thesis, I think this belief is the most alarming. This interpretation implies that morality is not applicable unless one has a considerably fulfilling life. However, morality is relevant at all levels of the hierarchy, especially with regards to how the needs of respective levels are met. The belief that morality is not relevant unless one has a fulfilling life could easily translate into absolving wrongdoers (e.g. bullies) from moral responsibility if they are themselves victims of some kind, or are suffering in some other manner. This could lead to harmful practices regarding fostering pupils’ moral development. It also implies that participants do not recognise how pervasive the relevance of morality is in all aspects of life.

On the other hand, this seems to conflict with participants’ recognition of the ubiquity of morality, evident from their views regarding the influence of multiple moral ecologies on pupils’ moral development. The issue may be more closely related to the lack of moral language. As Tappan (1991) indicates, moral language helps one to make sense of moral experiences; in the absence of a sufficiently developed moral language, participants may be unable to both make moral sense of their experiences and mentally process and convey their related observations in a clear and well-articulated manner. The problematic lack of moral language among the participants of this study was discussed earlier. Further evidence of a lack of moral language can be found in Appendix B (although many quotations included there were translated in a clearer way than they were originally articulated) and in the transcripts of the interviews. Indeed, one participant was especially nervous about her
capability to talk about the issues explored in the interview as she explicitly stated that she did not know how to talk about them.

While teachers’ disciplines do not seem to influence the development of psychological or educational beliefs regarding morality, their experiences of engaging with moral education points to some important differences with regards to the opportunities teachers have regarding conducting moral education. While most teachers indicated that they engaged in moral education only when they found the chance to do so, primary teachers stated that they conducted moral education “all the time.” This is due to the primary teacher system in Turkey. As explained in Chapter V, primary teachers tend to engage much more often with a single class whereas specific subject teachers (e.g. history, English) tend to engage with a greater number of pupils for much shorter times per week. Primary teachers also have form tutor responsibilities for their own class. This gives primary teachers greater chance to impact students’ moral development much more deeply. However, the number of pupils they can influence is limited. Specific subject teachers, on the other hand, can influence a larger number of students but to a lesser degree.

Most importantly, this shows how teachers’ disciplines influence their socialisation with pupils, and by extension, their potential influence on pupils’ moral development. The training regarding ME provided in ITE would need to take this into account, and be tailored according to how teachers’ disciplines provide the context for their socialisation with pupils.

Practising teachers were able to explain in some detail how they engage with moral education (if they do at all). Activities designed to foster students’ problem-solving capabilities and drama were given as examples. While problem-solving capabilities could potentially foster moral reasoning and moral judgement development, role-playing (drama) has been demonstrated to foster moral sensitivity and moral motivation through empathy (Bebeau, 1994). ITE programmes or in-service training can capitalise on teachers’ familiarity with these methods in terms of equipping them with pedagogical methods designed to foster moral development.

In opposition to this, interns were unable to reflect the same depth. While this is not surprising considering that interns have had much fewer opportunities to engage in moral education, many interns complained that they had never had the chance to practise moral education, and many of them seemed ambivalent about the prospect of doing it. Some participants clearly felt they were not up to delivering moral education; interns especially
seemed anxious at the prospect of teaching morality. This, once again, points to how the lack of a focus on morality in ITE can work against teachers’ interest and willingness to engage in moral education.

Participants’ thoughts regarding how ITE should be designed in order to equip teachers with the abilities and knowledge to foster pupils’ moral development also need to be discussed, as this has implications regarding their openness to the kinds of potential training they can receive, and by extension, the potential impact of training.

Participants have indicated the training they have received, or are receiving, is lacking in terms of preparing them to engage with moral education, and stated that they would have benefitted from such training both as a teacher and as an individual. They have also said that all trainee teachers should receive training on moral development regardless of their disciplines on the basis that morality is ubiquitous in the school context. In fact, some also suggested that non-teaching staff of the school should also receive some training, as they are also part of the moral influence pupils are exposed to. While the suggested length of training varies from ‘a few seminars’ to ‘distributed throughout secondary and tertiary education,’ more often they tended towards long-term and in-depth training, although this may have been partly due to – once interviewed – participants understanding that their grasp of the philosophical, psychological, and sociological aspects of morality is limited. It was suggested that this in-depth training should cover these three aspects of morality. However, very few participants were able to elaborate in greater detail about what training on each field should entail, presumably due to their lack of knowledge on what is morally relevant. It was re-emphasised that values should not be imposed on trainee teachers, but that training should foster autonomy and critical thinking, in line with their approach to moral education discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. In a similar vein, they indicated that the assessment of this training should not be based on tests that encourage rote memorization.

The remainder of the section discusses how ITE programmes may provide training to pre-service teachers based on identified misconceptions of morality, dispositions of teachers as existing strengths and weaknesses regarding their ability to engage with moral education, and participants’ stated preferences regarding the kinds of training they can receive in terms of their openness to potential kinds of training.

Based on the discussed conclusions so far, the initial consideration that needs to be taken into account is what kind of training are Turkish pre-service teachers are likely to
benefit from, given their concerns and interests. It seems to be the case that, in light of the findings of this study, and to the extent that they can be generalised (see Chapter VII for the generalisability of findings and the related limitations of the study), Turkish teachers are interested in fostering pupils’ moral development by providing them with a scaffold. Considering the reviewed literature, several specific suggestions can be made for ITE curriculum designers to meet this concern and interest of teachers.17

Considering participants’ responses, it can be said that Turkish teachers would prefer in-depth and long-term training that covers a wide range of morally relevant fields over several years. Participants have generally indicated a preference for philosophical, sociological, psychological, and other perspectives that would ultimately provide a fundamental understanding of the nature of morality, and a deep understanding of how to implement a kind of moral education that fosters pupils’ moral autonomy.

For teachers to be able to meet this aim, the training they receive would need to address several seemingly widespread misconceptions regarding moral psychology. Collectively, participants’ beliefs tended to be overall in line with academic literature; however, at the individual level no participant was especially knowledgeable on moral psychology, so it is likely that any and all relevant training they receive will be of value. It is envisioned that clarifying teachers’ understanding of skills, and by extension moral skills, and the development of moral skills into higher levels of expertise would be particularly beneficial.

In this regard, considering the literature analysed in Chapter II, it could be suggested that training on the FCM would be beneficial, as the model provides an overview of the psychological skills relevant to moral behaviour. In support of this, literature regarding the concept of moral skills, and the developmental pattern in terms of expertise would be useful. I would suggest that the four-stage structure proposed by Narvaez (2010b) would provide a complementary understanding. Furthermore, this four-stage model would also provide teachers with a better understanding regarding how and what kinds of experiences they could provide to pupils in order to foster their moral skills.

17 In the suggestions of this section, I have endeavoured to keep to the literature I have reviewed in this thesis, and all proposed training and literature is proposed as a starting point – none of the suggestions here should be considered an exhaustive list of possibilities.
These elements of training could clarify teachers’ misconceptions regarding moral skills, and perhaps alter their current negative attitudes towards it as well. Furthermore, if teachers receive training regarding how moral skill expertise develops, their incomplete conception of skill, which seems to be limited to only the newly developing phase of skills, can be addressed. This would also support their efforts in fostering pupils’ moral reasoning development.

With regards to participants’ understanding of moral reasoning development, while their understanding does not seem to contradict the psychological literature on the matter, it lacks depth. Based on the theory analysis in Chapter II, training on the levels and/or schemas of moral reasoning (e.g. Rest et al., 1999; 2000) could address this deficiency. This could be achieved through providing training on Kohlberg’s Cognitive Development Theory (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984), and the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to the theory (Rest et al., 1999; 2000). Furthermore, the heteronomous/autonomous orientation cycle proposed by Eckersberger & Zimba (1997) could provide further nuance to teachers’ understanding, which could help them design their classroom activities and their interactions with pupils according to the students’ level.

However, considering the theories reviewed in Chapter II, disregarding teachers’ beliefs and attitudes regarding moral intuitions can be problematic. Providing training on moral intuitions, through the SIM (Haidt, 2001) and MFT (Graham et al., 2013), could help teachers gain a broader and deeper understanding of moral judgement processes, as well as alerting them to how highly developed moral reasoning skills may behave like moral intuitions. Furthermore, the proposed links of the SIM (see Figure 1 in Chapter II, or Haidt, 2001) can highlight to trainee teachers the value of their positive bond with their pupils – that their reasoned arguments are not likely to influence pupils’ moral reasoning if they lack a positive bond with the pupil, since reasoned arguments do not lead to moral judgements in another person unless the argument taps into their moral intuitions, and the likelihood of tapping into another’s intuitions is increased when there is a positive bond between the parties having the discussion (Haidt, 2001).

Data analysis revealed that teachers aim to foster pupils’ moral motivational constructs – most importantly pupils’ moral selves. Analysis of reviewed literature would suggest that understanding moral judgement, and the moral reasoning process in particular, would also help teachers achieve this aim. This is based on data analysis regarding teachers’
dispositions and attitudes towards providing a scaffold for development, and the power of second-order volitions (Frankfurt, 1971; Kristjánsson, 2010a) and interests (Dewey, 1932) as consciously devised and maintained methods of forming a moral self. In this regard, considering both data analysis and reviewed literature, providing training on the philosophical literature on the moral self, interests and second-order volitions can help teachers acquire the necessary depth in understanding. Considering the literature reviewed in this thesis, the literature by Kristjánsson (2010a) and Blasi (1980; 1999) could further teachers’ understanding of the moral self, Frankfurt’s (1971) discussion of SOVs, and Dewey’s philosophy of the moral self regarding interests and habits (from Hickman & Alexander, 1998) could provide at least a starting point for training.

Training on the moral self can also clarify several other misconceptions identified in the data analysis. Most importantly, teachers’ confusion regarding the difference between episodic emotions and emotional dispositions, and by extension their confusion regarding emotional dispositions, character traits, and values and virtues could be addressed. Furthermore, although tangentially relevant, the confusion between moral emotions and morally relevant feelings could be clarified. The psychological and philosophical literature reviewed in Section 2.3 of Chapter II could provide a starting point for discussions/training regarding this matter.

Most importantly, however, providing such training could equip teachers with the moral language they are currently lacking, following from Tappan (1991), and Sockeet and LePage (2002). I do not think that ITE programmes would need to address the issue of moral language separately if the above training were provided – this training itself would, as a side effect, equip teachers with the philosophically and psychologically relevant moral language. The more training is provided, the more robust teachers’ moral language would become. This would apply not only to the training suggested here, but any and all training trainees receive.

One final problem that could be addressed is the perceived problem of relativism. While the psychological and philosophical points suggested above as training would be explicitly or implicitly based on virtue ethics, alleviating their concerns of relativism to a certain extent, theoretical analysis in Chapter II would indicate that the MFT could be especially useful in dispelling this concern. The MFT provides a pluralist, but not a relativist, understanding of moral psychology. The philosophical approach inherent in the MFT
addresses the limitlessness problem of relativism, while at the same time providing space for pluralism.

On the other hand, there are several dispositions and attitudes that ITE programmes may capitalise on and foster. It was argued in Chapter I that pluralism is a sound philosophical aim to pursue in moral education. The findings of this study indicate that Turkish teachers also value pluralism, and are disposed to foster it. Considering only the literature reviewed in Chapter II, the MFT is, I think, particularly conducive to helping teachers achieve this aim – both considering their face-to-face interactions with pupils and their influence on the school’s moral ecology. The theory sheds light on how teachers, students and parents may hold differing values, and understanding this may allow teachers to negotiate potentially sensitive situations (whether moral or political) that may occur in school, by way of emphasising shared values and concerns. Furthermore, this would also be beneficial not only for the liberal teachers represented in this study, but the conservative population underrepresented in this study as well – MFT sheds light on conservative morality for liberals, and also on liberal morality for conservatives.

In Section 3 of Chapter II, it was concluded that moral reasoning is the door through which teachers can influence pupils’ moral development. This study has discovered that Turkish teachers are especially interested in students’ moral reasoning development, and not disposed to attempt to influence pupils’ moral selves directly. Although an understanding of moral reasoning alone would not be sufficient and would need to be supported with other aspects of moral psychology, this general disposition could be supported through relevant training.

Another ecologically relevant disposition teachers seem to hold, that is worth fostering in my opinion, is their awareness of the ubiquity of morality. Teachers understand that there are a number of moral ecologies, inside and outside of the school, that exert competing influences on pupils’ moral development. They are aware that their own influence is limited but do not seem to be daunted by this aspect. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that they would endeavour to create a moral ecology in their school that would foster an Engagement Ethics orientation, as described by the TET (Narvaez, 2008). In this regard, the value of pursuing this tendency, and the methods and end result of achieving it could be fostered by including the TET in the training provided.
Related to this, Turkish teachers seem to have a tacit understanding that pupils’ socialisation with their peers and teachers has a key role in their moral development in school. I believe this is a key understanding that needs to be fostered, however, not having dealt with the relevant literature in this thesis in depth (as it was beyond its scope), I will not suggest anything in particular. The only piece of literature explored in this thesis that is relevant to this conception is Haidt’s (2001) musings on immersion in cultural complexes during adolescence. Apart from this, I would suggest literature on the evolutionary psychology of morality, or, as participants have suggested, morally relevant aspects of sociology.

Data analysis indicates that teachers are drawn towards the idea of teaching morality by providing observations through role modelling, and experiences where pupils can practise their moral skills. I would argue that this also is a disposition worth fostering in ITE. The literature most relevant to this disposition includes Dewey’s philosophy of experiences, habits, and the moral self in relation to these (Dewey, 1932), and Narvaez’s (2010b) four-stage structure for fostering moral skill expertise with regards to providing experiences; and Albert Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Theory of Learning by Observation.

Finally, with regards to teachers’ and trainee teachers’ dispositions, analysis of data suggests that younger trainees are more interested in the nature of morality, while older students and practising teachers are more interested in the practicalities of engaging in moral education. Taking this into consideration, a broad, year-by-year structure could be suggested for ITE institutions, based on theories analysed here, as a potential starting point for discussions regarding the revision of ITE curriculum.

I would suggest that at the earlier phases of training, greater emphasis is placed on normative and meta-ethical understandings of morality. This would entail most prominently a range of philosophical approaches to morality, including, but not limited to, pragmatism, virtue ethics, and rationalism. Pragmatism, especially Dewey’s (1909; 1932; Hickman & Alexander, 1998) philosophy of education in general and his philosophy of moral education in particular, is expected to be of great interest, given the emphasis participants made regarding learning morality from experience. In relation to this, virtue ethics is also expected to be of interest, especially concepts such as techne, eudaimonia, natural virtue and full virtue, and practical wisdom (see Section 4.2, Chapter I for an overview).
It could also be suggested that sociological perspectives of morality are introduced in the early phases of training as well, given that most think that social concerns take priority over moral concerns. However, considering that the aim of the early phases of training is to provide a fundamental understanding of morality, it is suggested that sociological explorations at this stage revolve around the notion of the social nature of humans in relation to morality, rather than exploring cultural and societal habits relevant to morality, as an understanding of the latter is more relevant to practical application of relevant knowledge.

The early phases of training could also include theological approaches as well, given the prominence of religious concerns and their deep connection with morality, at least in the Turkish context. Indeed, many teachers in Turkey encounter pupils of differing religiosity, and whether liberal or conservative, Turkish teachers will need to attend to students’ (and perhaps even parents’) religious concerns as long as they engage with moral education. However, this suggestion may be contested based on political orientations. While disregarding religious concerns entirely would invariably lead to problems, at least in the current conjuncture of Turkey, trainee teachers and lecturers of differing political orientations may demand or contest the inclusion of theological aspects of morality as part of the provided fundamental understanding of morality. Liberal leaning teachers may consider theological considerations as more relevant to the practicalities of engaging with moral education, while conservatives may think theological aspects are fundamental to an understanding of morality. I suggest each university has its own internal discussion regarding the place of religion in this matter.

It can be suggested that, during the middle phases of training, greater attention is paid to psychological aspects relevant to morality. This would entail, most importantly, academic literature regarding moral psychology. Theories and models such as the Four Components Model for clarifying morally relevant skills and their development as well literature regarding moral skill expertise; the Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Cognitive Development Theory for equipping teachers with an understanding of moral reasoning and its development; the Social Intuitionist Model for the unconscious side of the moral judgement processes; and Moral Foundations Theory and Triune Ethics Theory for their moral ecological relevance are envisioned to be useful in this context. However, this phase of training need not be limited to moral psychology alone. Participants have stated interest in cognitive development and developmental psychology as well. Depending on how the religious and social aspects of morality are addressed in the training programme, these subjects could receive greater focus.
during mid-training. Furthermore, sociological aspects of morality, in terms of cultural and societal practices could also be part of mid-training, considering their relevance regarding the practicalities of the social nature of morality. I should note that the necessary clarification of misconceptions that I have suggested above, would take place during mid-training.

In later stages of training, it is suggested that greater attention is paid to the educational aspects of morality. Having built a foundational and practical understanding of morality based on philosophical, psychological, sociological, and theological approaches to morality and moral behaviour, trainees could approach moral education in a much more equipped and knowledgeable manner. Thus, in the final stages, pedagogical methods regarding how to teach morality, and other potential methods of how to influence the moral ecology of the school are likely to be of greater interest to trainees. In this regard, Narvaez’s (2010b) four-stage structure of fostering moral expertise could equip teachers with clear methods of providing experiences to pupils, while Bandura’s (1986; 1997) Theory of Learning by Observation could help teachers to develop an understanding of how to provide observations through role modelling. In addition to this, more direct methods of influencing the moral ecology of the school could be provided to teachers through a more practical application of the understandings gained from their studies of the MFT and TET. This approach would also coincide with the greater focus on implicit education commonly found in the final year of ITE programmes in Turkey. Furthermore, participants also called for more opportunities to practise what they learn. This could be achieved through the placements trainee teachers undertake in the final years of ITE programmes. So, the practical focus of the later stages of training would also coincide with the current focus of ITE programmes on practice.

The final issue to be considered in this section in broad terms, is the possible variations in the training provided. The first criterion in this regard that needs to be accounted for is trainees’ disciplines. Based on how teachers’ disciplines dictate their socialisation with pupils, and depending on the developmental level of the pupils with whom the teachers will be engaging, the training provided to pre-service teachers can be tailored to their specific needs. As an example, for primary teachers, an in-depth understanding of the early phases of moral reasoning development would be desirable; understanding how important their positive bond with pupils influences pupils’ moral development would also be crucial. Beliefs regarding innateness are more relevant to teachers who deal with very young pupils as well – one question primary teachers may seek an answer for is “what are the innate psychological

structures that are organized in advance of experience, and how can the experiences I provide for my pupils foster the development/organisation of these innate capacities?"

For subject matter teachers who engage with a greater number of older pupils for less time per week, understanding the social network of their students could be of greater importance. Middle phases of moral reasoning development such as the Maintaining Norms Schema would also be more relevant, and once again the importance of a positive bond with pupils is worth emphasising. For teachers who engage with adolescents more frequently, the moral self literature, especially with regards to SOV selection, and interest and habit cultivation, is likely to be more useful and beneficial.

While the above suggestions assume that training provided can be spread over several years, with attention devoted to elements of training every week, it excludes practising teachers who have expressed interest in in-service training, but may not have the opportunity to devote as much time to such training. Policymakers would need to consider such needs of practising teachers and make necessary adjustments in the training curriculum. However, this may also entail some sacrifices in terms of the depth of the training provided, as it is not clear whether episodic sessions of in-service training could adequately equip teachers to engage with the complexities and subtleties of implicit moral education. On the other hand, practising teachers’ (perhaps tacit) familiarity with the implicit aspects of education may alleviate some of the losses incurred by the time limitations imposed on in-service training. In this case, in-service training may only need to attend to teachers’ practical knowledge of moral psychology and development, and only the most crucial elements of the final stages of training suggested above.

In closure, it should be re-emphasised that training provided should not be geared towards solely expanding teachers’ knowledge of moral psychology and moral education. The delivery of the training, suggested here in the broadest outline, would focus on the practical application of new understandings gained from the training. Hence, the suggestions made here should not be taken to mean that the application of the literature reviewed in Chapter II should be imparted word for word. The technical language of moral psychology or moral philosophy does not need to be included to the maximum possible extent; technical vocabulary employed in training would depend on tutors’ style of teaching, and how relevant each tutor finds the technical language to the ultimate aim of equipping trainees with better intellectual tools and beliefs to carry out moral education.
In contrast to this, a concern regarding teachers’ and trainee teachers’ ‘moral language’ (Socket & LePage, 2002) also needs to be addressed. The fact that specialist philosophical and psychological vocabulary is not essential for teachers’ practice of moral education does not mean that a focus on moral language is not warranted. How teachers think and talk about morality, the lens through which they understand morality, needs to be considered in suggested training. Only, the development of a ‘moral language’ does not need to be based on the technical vocabulary of morality. While attending to teachers’ and trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to moral education (Sanger & Osguthorpe, 2011), it is expected that moral language would develop alongside more nuanced beliefs, as the use of a morally more nuanced language would be necessary in engaging with these relevant beliefs.
7. Summary

This chapter has discussed the implications of the findings of this study, and how the literature reviewed in Chapter II can be effectively employed in order to equip Turkish teachers and trainee teachers to foster pupils’ moral development. Most importantly, it was discovered that teachers and trainee teachers are dissatisfied with the current state of moral education, but that they lack the ability to take matters into their own hands – they are not equipped to carry out moral education. Furthermore, teacher training programmes in Turkey, as they are currently conducted, do not influence teachers’ moral beliefs and attitudes relevant to education. In order to address this issue, their current state of knowledge and dispositions were researched, and suggestions regarding how to dispel misconceptions and foster valuable dispositions through teacher training programmes were discussed.

The most critical findings in this regard include teachers’ and trainee teachers’ lack of moral language which could help teachers mediate and mentally process their morally relevant experiences, and further allow them to engage with moral education. It is clear that, overall, teachers and trainee teachers lack sufficient understanding of moral psychology; how this problem could be resolved through relevant training was discussed in depth; however, a detailed discussion of how to implement these ideas for ITE is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The most important dispositions that I would suggest ITE programmes foster include teachers’ interest in enabling moral development through providing a scaffold, rather than dictating a path to moral development. I would suggest that teachers’ interest in fostering pluralism is also capitalised on. Participants have expressed an interest and willingness to take in-depth training on moral philosophy, psychology, and sociology. In order to accommodate this inclination, ITE programmes may consider expanding the curriculum, introduce an elective course, or substitute another course with one on morality. However, ultimately this decision would be needed to be made by individual Turkish universities, as universities have some autonomy regarding their curriculum, and more specific circumstances and concerns may influence this decision.

The body of knowledge created in this study cannot be said to build squarely on previous knowledge. However, it adds much greater depth to a barely researched area – namely, Turkish teachers’ and trainee teachers’ moral beliefs and attitudes relevant to
education, and how teacher training and experience influence the development of these beliefs.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this final chapter of the thesis, the key findings are summarised. This summary is followed by a commentary on the limitations of this study and the generalizability of the conclusions. Finally, potential avenues of future research are explored, and the thesis is concluded with some final thoughts.

1. The Main Aim of the Research & Summary of Key Findings

There are growing rifts in the social fabric of Turkey, institutions no longer work as impartially as they could, and this situation has been abused by some people in Turkey – leading to corruption in many sectors, including education. While this may provide a bleak picture, education can help tackle this problem, and could indeed provide a long-term solution to such problems faced by not only Turkey but many countries around the world. Moral education, in particular, can help to address such problems. However, previous research in Turkey (Temli et al., 2011) and around the globe (Carr & Landon, 1998; 1999; LePage et al., 2011) has shown that teachers are not adequately equipped to carry out moral education, despite being willing and interested in conducting it. In order to address this problem, teacher training programmes need to equip teachers with the necessary intellectual tools. But where to start?

“The most important single factor influencing learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach him/her accordingly” (Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978, p. iv).

There is a significant gap in knowledge regarding Turkish teachers’ beliefs relevant to conducting moral education, and how teacher training and experience influence the development of these beliefs. In light of this understanding, this thesis has aimed to understand, first, what might constitute as relevant knowledge and skills for teachers, secondly, what Turkish teachers’ current beliefs and attitudes relevant to moral education are, and thirdly, what the role of current ITE programmes in Turkey are in influencing these beliefs and attitudes. This thesis specifically focused on the psychological nature of morality, and how teachers could positively affect this in schools.

Moral education takes place mostly implicitly, due to the nature of morality and school life. The most central element of this implicit education is teachers’ interactions with
pupils. In this respect, an in-depth understanding moral psychology can inform teachers’ interactions with pupils, foster the development of students’ moral skills, and help teachers create a school environment that is conducive to moral development. Thus, an understanding moral moral psychology and the moral ecology of the school is key for teachers regarding their engagement with moral education.

However, teachers or trainee teachers are insufficiently equipped with the relevant knowledge or beliefs to deliberately influence students’ moral development or the moral atmosphere of the school. Neither teacher training (as currently conducted) nor teaching experience seem to have an influence on teachers or trainee teachers’ beliefs relevant to their engagement with moral education. This appears to apply even to PCG students, who may have been expected to be better informed, or capable of making better guesses, regarding moral psychology, due to their greater familiarity with developmental psychology through their studies. This is evident from their lack of moral language. These findings echo that of Temli et al. (2011) in the Turkish context, and LePage et al. (2011), Carr and Landon (1998; 1999), and Sockett and LePage (2002) internationally. Yet this is still among the most significant findings of this study, as it clearly shows a lack of desirable focus on morality in teacher training.

On the other hand, teachers have expressed an interest and willingness for both engaging in moral education, also echoing the findings of Temli et al. (2011) in the Turkish context, and LePage et al. (2011), Carr and Landon (1998; 1999), and in receiving training relevant to conducting moral education. This finding implies that any attempt to help teachers better foster pupils’ moral development is going to be well received. Recommendations have been made to policymakers regarding this issue in Chapter VI.

It was suggested that, in terms of moral psychology, teachers need to understand that moral behaviour is a skill that can be developed through education. The aspect of moral psychology most relevant to teachers is moral reasoning: by fostering pupils’ moral reasoning capabilities, teachers can equip students with the ability to maintain their moral intuitions and selves consciously. Expert moral reasoning skills can help one to cultivate moral intuitions that would cohere with an understanding of practical wisdom and moral self. Furthermore, it can also help pupils cultivate practical wisdom as well. However, for teachers to be able to provide the right kind of education for moral reasoning, they also require a broader understanding of moral psychology. This includes a) other moral skills (moral sensitivity,
moral motivation, and moral implementation), and b) the moral self. In this way, teachers can not only foster moral reasoning development but equip pupils with the kinds of moral reasoning skills that would allow them to maintain conscious control over the moral aspects of their lives and selves. This focus on moral psychology, alongside a focus on moral philosophy and aspects of sociology, can also address the identified lack of moral language.

In terms of teachers’ dispositions regarding how to foster students’ moral development, there are three key findings that an understanding of moral psychology could support. Firstly, it was discovered that teachers are more interested in providing a scaffold for students moral development; teachers are disinclined to impose a set of values and virtues, and would rather prefer to help students natural moral development instead of dictating a course to said nature to take. Secondly, it also seems that teachers tend towards creating a pluralistic school environment that emphasises compassion and cooperation.

One unexpected and new finding that is highly relevant to any training that may be provided to teachers is how influential political orientations seem to be in terms of teachers’ dispositions towards moral education. Teachers have repeatedly indicated that they would be disinclined to teach morality in a top-down, dogmatic manner, imposing a certain set of values and virtues on their pupils. They have also voiced a similar disinclination regarding the training they would receive in this manner. This aspect of teachers’ dispositions should be considered in cases where training is to be provided to them, as this is the most central aspect of the provided training that determines trainees’ openness to receiving training.

Turkey is facing serious challenges and is going through historic shifts. How these challenges are met will define the future of the country both in political terms, and in social and moral terms. The steps suggested in this thesis to improve moral education in Turkey are envisioned to help the next generation better meet the ethical and social challenges the country faces.
2. Limitations and Generalizability of Findings

This study has several limitations. The most important limitation based on design is that this study has researched a cross-sectional sample of participants. Based on this sample, no pattern regarding the development of beliefs investigated in this study was found. However, cross-sectional studies are not as robust as longitudinal studies in determining such developmental patterns. While a longitudinal study could have been preferable for the aims of this study, it was not feasible for practical reasons detailed in Chapter III.

Another limitation of this study is related to the observations: observations were conducted in order to triangulate participants’ statements in the questionnaires and interviews, with a view to ascertain to what degree these statements were reflected in classroom practice. However, I now believe that I underestimated the depth and complexity of the issue. Had I achieved my original aim of 10 schools, it could have provided sufficient variety. My underestimation was in assuming that 2 to 4 hours of observations per school would have been enough. I had arrived at this conclusion based on my practice observations in the school where I worked. However, I now think that I took for granted my acquaintance with the pupils and teachers I had observed in my work place. I now think that in order to effectively employ observations in a study like this, the study would need to be driven primarily by the observations, and quantitative methods and interviews would only provide a supporting role to the observations.

In relation to this, a more qualitative research design could have been employed at the expense of generalizability. This could have been achieved by two central changes to methodology: Firstly, the ethnographic observations of teachers’ practice would be employed as the primary data gathering tool. The observations would be supported by pre-observation questionnaires that involve open ended questions designed to tease out participants’ beliefs relevant to moral education in response to a small number of vignettes/short stories depicting a moral dilemma, and post-observation interviews informed partly by participants’ observed behaviour and questionnaire responses, and partly by theory. However, such an approach would constitute a fundamentally different research project, and might be better suited for answering research questions of a fundamentally different nature.

The most significant limitation of this study, however, is the sampling bias inherent in the studied population. Data were collected from the students and alumni of a university in Izmir, which is the most liberal city in Turkey. The fact that the sample population was
selected from an education faculty of high reputation further narrows the population it represents. Overall, the findings of this study are representative of mainly liberal teachers and trainee teachers in Turkey; conservative views are underrepresented in this study.

However, the findings can be said to be independent of disciplinary focus. Given the lack of statistical difference between PCG students and teachers of other subjects, it can be concluded that the findings of this study are generalizable regardless of teachers’ discipline. Furthermore, considering that teacher training and experience does not contribute to the development of beliefs investigated in this research, the findings regarding moral and psychological beliefs could perhaps be generalised beyond teachers to other liberals in Turkey. However, in order to ascertain whether this claim is plausible, beliefs of professionals unrelated to education would need to be compared with the findings of this study.
3. Future Directions

The findings and conclusions of this study point to several new avenues of potential research. Most importantly, two comparative studies promise to clarify some of the points in this study. First, a comparative study between the beliefs of educators and other professionals can shed light on the place of liberalism with regard to the formation and development of moral, psychological, and educational beliefs investigated in this research. Secondly, and considering the Turkish context, more importantly, a comparative study that investigates the beliefs of conservative teachers as well would help to produce a more generalizable picture of beliefs and belief development. I think this is of paramount importance, given that the moral divide appears to be widening between liberals and conservatives – not just in Turkey but across the world, especially in the West – and the two sides have to communicate and work together to overcome the challenges in the future.

Based on the findings of this study, another line of research can focus on what is important in teachers’ experience regarding moral issues in schools and how they engage with moral education in relation to this. An ethnographic line of inquiry may be better suited to such an investigation.

Another line of potential research is how social and religious concerns overlap and/or compete with each other and moral concerns in the Turkish context. Participants repeatedly indicated that social and religious concerns can support and contradict moral concerns, but are likely to be prioritised over moral concerns. This shows that focusing solely on morality with regards to moral education would be insufficient. In a similar vein, researching morality in relation to the Turkish culture, which is generally more collectivist than its Western neighbours and more individualistic than its Eastern neighbours, is likely to shed light on how moral education can be best conducted in Turkey.

Finally, Carr & Landon (1998) indicate that in Catholic schools in Scotland, the religious focus on morality might have provided a moral linguistic platform for pupils and teachers to engage in moral education much more effectively. A similar study can be repeated in Turkey in order to find out whether and how a religious focus equips pupils with moral language in Imam Hatip schools in Turkey.
4. Final Word

As a researcher and a curious human being, I am interested in the moral nature of human beings. While at first sight, it may seem as if there are irreconcilable moral differences between people that inevitably lead to conflict, I think the conflicts are of a political nature, not moral. For this reason, I believe that people who have well-developed moral skills, a moral self that drives conduct and conviction, and practical wisdom can overcome the challenges they face, whether individually or as a community.

The Moral Foundations Theory indicates that all people share a common moral psychology; people differ in their priorities based on their psychological tendencies and their cultural practices. The Triune Ethics Theory shows that individuals who are primed towards a self-preservation orientation are likely to be less interested in cooperation and more interested in protecting themselves and their own, while people who are primarily inclined towards cooperation are more inclined to engage with others positively. In my view, these two theories alone point to the fact that conflicts are not necessary, although I think the evidence for this can be found all around in our daily lives.
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APPENDIX A

Data Gathering Tools
Katılımcı Bilgi Belgesi

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Birleşik Krallık

Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin Desteklenmesinde Türkiye Örneği


Bu araştırmının amacı nedir?
Araştırmanın temel amacı örtük ahlak eğitiminin uygulanışında öğretmenlerin ahlaki gelişime ve ahlak eğitimine dair düşüncelerinin ve öğretmenlik deneyimlerinin nasıl bir etkide bulunduğunun anlamaktır. Araştırmanın hedefi birinci ve dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencilerinin ve üç yıllık öğretmenlik deneyimi olan öğretmenlerin ahlaki gelişim ve ahlak psikolojisine dair görüşlerini anlamaktır.

Neden katılmaya davet ediliyorum?
Bu araştırmaya birinci sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi/dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi/ öğretmen olarak davet edilmektedir. 100 birinci sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi, 100 öğretmen stajyeri olan dördüncü sınıf öğretmenlik öğrencisi ve 100 3 yıllık deneyimi olan öğretmenin bu araştırmaya katılması beklenmektedir (toplam 300 katılımcı).

Katılmak zorunda mıym?

Katılarım bana neler olacak?
Aşağıdaki anketi doldurmanın 15 dakikadan daha fazla süreyecek bir sure ile tamamlanması istenir. Sorular ahlak psikolojisi ve ahlaki gelişime dair düşünceler ve görüşlerinizi ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Önemli olan şey düşüncede ve görüşlerinizin ortaya çıkarmaya amaçlamaktadır. Önemli olan şey düşüncede ve görüşlerinizin ortaya çıkarmaya için doğru veya yanlış cevap yoktur.


Araştırmaya katılmanın faydaları neler olabilir?
Bu araştırmaya katılmayanın sağlayabileceği faydalar arasında bu konu ile ilgili bilgimizi derinleştirmenin yanı sıra potansiyel olarak mesleki gelişimimize fayda sağlayabilecek konular hakkında daha yüksek bir farkındalık kazanmanız bulunmaktadır. Araştırmaya katılmanın her hangi bir zarara neden olması beklenmemektedir.

Verdiğim bilgiler gizli kalacak mı?

Katılmak istiyorsam ne yapmalıyım?
Ankete katılmak istiyorsanız yapmanız gereken tek şey doldurduktan sonra anketi size gösterilen güvenli kutuya iade etmenizdir.

Araştırmanın bulgularına neler olacak?

Araştırmayı kim organize ediyor ve kim finanse ediyor?

Araştırma kimin onayından geçti?
Bu araştırma Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi, Üniversite Araştırma Etik Kurulu tarafından onaylanmıştır.

Daha fazla bilgi için iletişim

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Bilgi belgesini okumaya zamanınızı ayırıldığı için teşekkür ederim.

Tarih
.../.../20...
Participant Information Sheet

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The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey

You are being invited to take part in a research study titled “The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey.” Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?

The main aim of the study is to understand whether there are any differences in the delivery of moral education, depending on beliefs about moral development and the education/teaching experience of teachers. The research is aimed at discovering the beliefs of 1st and 4th year university students studying teaching, and teachers with 3 years of experience regarding moral development and moral psychology.

Why have I been invited to participate?

You have been invited to participate in this study as a 1st year student studying education/4th year student studying education and intern/teacher. It is expected that 100 1st year students, 100 4th year students, and 100 teachers (a total of 300 participants) to take part in the survey.

Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep. If you decide to take part it should be noted that it will not be possible to withdraw participation and the data provided, as they will be anonymous. Choosing to take part or not to take part in the study will have no impact whatsoever on your marks, grades, assessment, or future studies or career.

What will happen to me if I take part?

The following is a questionnaire that is expected to take no more than 15 minutes. The questions are aimed at uncovering your beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral development. As it is your beliefs that are important, there are no right or wrong answers.

Following the survey, in depth interviews with 30 volunteers on the same topic will be conducted. If you are interested to participate in an interview please express your interest by contacting me through the details I have provided you. The interviews will be conducted at a place of your choice other than your work place. If there are more than 30 volunteers, participants will be randomly selected.

Following the interview, unstructured non-participant observations will be conducted with 5 teachers and 5 interns who volunteer to be observed (10 participants in total). If you are an interested teacher/intern and wish to be contacted for observation, please express your interest by contacting
me through the details I have provided you. If there are more than 10 volunteers, participants will be randomly selected.

**What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

Possible benefits of taking part in this study are becoming aware of a field of professional development, as well as helping us to further our understanding of this topic. There are no anticipated costs for taking part in this study.

**Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?**

**Your privacy and anonymity is of utmost importance.** All data gathered in this survey shall be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). In case any direct reference has to be made to the information you provide at any stage of the study, a pseudonym shall be used in order to conceal your identity. Data generated in the course of the research must be kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of a research project in accordance with the Academic Integrity policy of Oxford Brookes University.

**What should I do if I want to take part?**

If you want to take part in this survey, all you need to do is to simply return a filled questionnaire to the secure dropbox provided.

**What will happen to the results of the research study?**

Results of the present survey will be embedded with the information gathered from literature review, and the emerging findings will be published as a Ph.D. dissertation. The study is expected to run until 2015 September. If you wish to receive the results of the study, please express your interest by contacting me through the details I have provided you. I will write your contact details down and keep it in a safe location.

**Who is organising and funding the research?**

I am conducting this research as a Ph.D. student at the School of Education, Oxford Brookes University. The study is being organised by Oxford Brookes University.

**Who has reviewed the study?**

This research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC), Oxford Brookes University.

**Contact for Further Information**

You can contact me or my Director of Studies, Prof. Dr Graham Butt, for further information. If you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee.

Oliver Bridge: 12004054@brookes.ac.uk  
(+90) 5301743626  
(+44) 7909668239  
Prof. Dr. Graham Butt: gbult@brookes.ac.uk  
UREC: ethics@brookes.ac.uk.

**Thank you for taking time to read the information sheet.**

Date  
…/…/20…
APPENDIX A3 – Öğretmen Anketi (Teacher Questionnaire - Turkish)

Giriş

Aşağıdaki sorular ahlak psikolojisi ve ahlak eğitimine dair görüşlerinizi anlamayı hedefliyor. Anket dört bölümden oluşuyor: Birinci bölüm ahlak psikolojisi hakkındaki görüşlerinizi, ikinci ve üçüncü bölüm ise ahlak eğitimi hakkındaki düşüncelerinizi anlamayı hedefliyor. Son bölümde de özgeçmişinizi ile ilgili sorular var.

1. BÖLÜM

Lütfen aşağıdaki cümlelerin karşısındaki kutucukları işaretleyerek bu ifadelerne ne kadar katkıınızı belirtiniz. (1 = kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 2 = katılmıyorum, 3 = emin değilim, 4 = katılıyorum, 5 = kesinlikle katılıyorum)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cümleler</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. İnsanlar her zaman bir olayın ahlaki ağırlığını anlarlar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. İnsanlar bütün durumlarda ahlaki açıdan yapılışı en doğru olan şeyin ne olduğuna karar verebilirler.</td>
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<td>3. İnsanlar nasıl ahlaki bir davranış biçimi sergileyerek karar verirken doğru şeyi yaptıklarından emin olmaları için uzun uzun düşünürler.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. İnsanlar genellikle nasıl ahlaki bir davranış biçimi sergileyerek karar verirken, duygularına göre hareket ederler.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Ahlaki bir karar verirken duygularımız ve düşüncelerimiz kararımızı eşit ölçüde etkiler.</td>
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<td>6. İnsanlar ahlaki ağırlığı olan bir karar verdiklerinin her zaman farkında olurlar.</td>
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<td>7. İnsanlar bazı yapılabilecek en doğru şeyin ne olduğunu bilip bilse bile kötü davranışlarıda bulunuyorlar.</td>
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<td>8. İnsanlar doğru şeye yapma isteğini, motivasyonunu kendi içlerinde buluyorlar.</td>
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<td>9. Öfke ve sevgi gibi duygular insanları ahlaklı davranmaya iter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. İnsanlar gerçekten iyi insan olmak istedikleri için ahlaklı davranışlar.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. Bence yasa ve toplumsal baskı olmasa insanlar hep en çok işlerine yarayan şeyi yaparlardı, kötülük olsa bile.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Bence yasalar ve toplumsal kurallar insanları doğru davranmaya kendi duyguları ve kişilik özelliklerienden daha fazla itiyor.</td>
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<td>13. Ahlaki kurallar kültürden kültüre değişir, dünyanın her yerinde aynı değilidir.</td>
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<td>15. Kültür, insanların ahlaki durumlarında neler hissettikleri etkiler.</td>
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<td>16. Ahal doğudan gelen bir şeydir – en azından bazı temel ahlaki kuralları bilerek doğuysunuz.</td>
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<td>17. Güvendi bir aile ortamında bolsa evi ile yetişen çocukların ahlakı/iyi yetişkinler olmaya daha yol açar oluyorlar.</td>
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<td>18. Çocuklar büyüükçe ve insanlar olgunlaştıça ahlakı büyük açılarla değişir.</td>
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<td>19. Çocuklar neyin doğru neyin yanlış olduğuna karar verirken bulundukları ortamın ve anın ötesini düşünebilirler.</td>
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| 20. Çoğu ergenlik çağındaki insanların ve bazı yetişkinlerin neyin iyi neyin kötü
olduguna karar verirken toplumsal düzeni koruma isteği kararlarını yönlendirir.

21. İnsanların yetişkinlik çağına gelmeden önce ahlaki, ilke ve prensipler olarak anlayabilmeleri mümkündür.

22. Beynin işleyişine dair nörolojik araştırmalar ahlaki karar verme sürecini aydınlatabilir.

23. Ahlaki kuralları anlamamın tek yolu derin felsefi düşündürmedir.


2. BÖLÜM

Aşağıdaki sorular ahlak eğitimi ve ahlakla ilgili gizli müfredata dair görüşlerinizi almayı hedefliyor. Lütfen cümlelerin karşılıkındaki kutucukları işaretleyerek bu ifadelerle ne kadar katıldığızı belirtiniz. (1 = kesinlikle katılmıyorum, 2 = katılmıyorum, 3 = katılıyorum, 4 = kesinlikle katılıyorum)

| 25. Okulda ahlakin öğretmenlmesi önemlidir. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 26. Bir öğretmen olarak öğrencilerime ahlaki değerleri öğretmen sorumluluğumdur. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 27. Öğretmenler öğrencilere ahlaki davranış örneğidir. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 28. Öğretmenler öğrencilere ahlaki davranış örneği olması gerekli. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 29. Belirli bir dersin özellikle ahlak eğitmine yoğunlaşması gerekli. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 30. Ahlak eğitimi bütün müfredata yapılmalıdır. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 31. Ahlak eğitimi yoğunlaşan haftalık ders saati daha fazla olmalıdır. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 32. Öğretmenler öğrencilere ahlaki gelişimini nasıl destekleyebileceklerine dair eğitim almalıdır. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 33. Şu anki eğitim sistemimiz çocuklara ahlaki etkili bir biçimde öğretiyor. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 34. Bina düzeni, ders saatleri gibi zaman düzenleri, yanı okulun fiziki ortamı çocukların ahlaki gelişimini etkiler. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 35. Sınıf oturma düzeni ve kantinde sıraya girmek gibi okul kuralları ve gelenekleri çocukların ahlaki gelişimini etkiler. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

Ahlaki Değerleri Öğretmek

| 36. Öğrencilerimle sıkışık ahlaki ikilemlerle karşılaştırıyorum. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 37. Sıklıkla öğrencilerime ahlaki değerleri öğretme ihtiyacı hissediyorum. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 38. Fırsat doğduça ahlaki değerleri öğretmeye çalışırım. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 39. Öğrencilere ahlaki değerleri öğretmek için düzenli olarak zaman ayırırım. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 40. Ahlak eğitimi vermek benim yerim değil. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 41. Ahlaki değerlerin öğretilebileceğine inanıyorum. | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
3. BÖLÜM

Lütfen aşağıdaki sıralama sorularını kutucuklara numara vererek belirtilen şekilde cevaplayıniz.

42. Asağdakilerden hangilerinin ‘gizli müfredatı’ en iyi tanımladığını düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkilii) 5’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız.

Gizli müfredat şöyle tanımlanabilir:

a. Kasıtsız ve/veya tesadüfen öğrenilen şeyler ve okul ortamında olmanın yan etkileri
b. Çerçeveleyici duyarlar, sınıfların ve bina dekorasyonları, ders ve teneffüs zamanı ve
   tatiller gibi zaman düzenleri dahil olmak üzere, okulun fiziksel yapısı

c. Öğrencilerin öğretmenlerden, yöneticilerden ve diğer okul çalışanlarından aldığı
   örtük mesajlar

d. Eğitim içerisinde toplumsal sınıf düzenini koruyarak ayrıcalıklı sınıflara fayda sağlayan
   bir sistem

e. Okul yapısı ve psikolojik ortamı

43. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri nerede öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 4’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız.

Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri şurada öğrenir:

a. Evde
b. Okulda
c. Sokakta
d. Arkadaşlarıyla oynarken

44. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri kimden öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 6’ya (en etkisiz) sıralayınız.

Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri şu insanlardan öğrenir:

a. Anne-babalarından
b. Öğretmenlerinden
c. Arkadaşlarıyla etkileşerek (arkadaşlarından)
d. Toplumsal ortamı gözlemleyerek (toplumdan)
e. Medyadan
f. Kendi başlarına düşünerek

45. Çocukların ahlaki değerleri nasıl öğrendiğini düşünüyorsunuz? Lütfen şıkları 1’den (en etkili) 4’e (en etkisiz) sıralayınız.

a. Çocuklar ahlaki değerleri örtülü olarak öğrenirler, “değerler öğretilmem, öğrenilir”
b. Ceza ve ödüllerle
c. İyi ve kötü üzerine ders alarak
d. Arkadaşlarıylala anlaşımlarla – deneyim ile
4. BÖLÜM

Son olarak da sizinle ilgili bazı sorular: Lütfen aşağıdaki şıklı sorulardan bir şıkkı işaretleyiniz veya cevabınızı verilen alana yazınız.

46. Cinsiyetiniz:  
☐ E  ☐ K

47. Yaşınız:  
__________

48. Doğum yeriniz:  
__________

49. Eğitim seviyeniz:

☐ Üniversite öğrencisi  
☐ Üniversite mezunu  
☐ Yüksek lisans öğrencisi/mezunu

50. Branşınız nedir?

______________________________

51. Öğretmenlik staji yaptınız mı, yapıyor musunuz?

☐ Öğretmenlik staji yapmadım  
☐ Öğretmenlik staji yapıyorum  
☐ Öğretmenlik staji yaptım

52. Kaç yıllık öğretmenlik deneyiminiz var?

☐ 0-2  
☐ 3-5  
☐ 6’dan fazla

53. Öğretmen olarak kalmayı planlıyor musunuz?

☐ Evet, mesleğime devam etmeyi düşünüyorum  
☐ Hayır, mesleğimi değiştirmek istiyorum  
☐ Emin değilim

54. Ahlak psikolojisi, ahlaki gelişim, veya ahlak eğitimine dair hiç eğitim aldınız mı? Aldıysanız lütfen bu eğitimin hangi konuları kapsadığını ve ne kadar sürdüğünü kısaca açıklayınız.

Anketi doldurmaya zamanınızı ayırdiğiniz için teşekkür ederim. Bütün soruları cevapladıktan sonra dolu anketi lütfen belirtilen yere bırakınız.
APPENDIX A4 – Teacher Questionnaire

Introduction

The following questionnaire is aimed at understanding your thoughts and beliefs regarding moral psychology and moral education. There are four parts: The first part is aimed at understanding your beliefs about moral psychology and the second and third parts are aimed at understanding your thoughts about moral education. Finally the last part asks questions about your background. Please follow the provided guidelines when answering the questions.

PART 1

Please tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not sure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. People always understand the moral significance of a situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. People can decide on what the morally best thing to do is in all situations.</td>
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<td>3. Generally, when people are deciding on a moral course of action, they think about it at length to make sure they make the right decision.</td>
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<td>4. Generally, when people are deciding on a moral course of action, they act on their feelings.</td>
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<td>5. Our moral decisions are equally effected by our thoughts and emotions.</td>
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<td>6. People are always aware whether the decisions they make are have a moral salience.</td>
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<td>7. Sometimes, even when people know what the best thing to do is, they still do bad things.</td>
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<td>8. People find the motivation to do the right thing within themselves.</td>
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<td>9. Emotions such as love and anger drive people to act morally.</td>
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<td>10. People act morally because they really want to be good people.</td>
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<td>11. Without laws and societal pressure, people would always do what suits them best – even if it is bad.</td>
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<td>12. Laws and societal pressure drive people to act morally more than their own emotions and character.</td>
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<td>13. Moral rules change from culture to culture; they are not same around the world.</td>
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<td>14. I think that the core foundations of morality are the same throughout the world but rules and applications differ from country to country.</td>
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<td>15. Our culture affects what we feel in situations with moral weight</td>
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<td>16. Morality is innate – we are born knowing at least some basic moral rules.</td>
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<td>17. Children raised in a safe home with lots of love are more likely to grow up to be moral/ good people.</td>
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<td>18. As children grow and people mature their approach to morality changes.</td>
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<td>19. When children are deciding on what is right or wrong, they can think beyond their immediate surroundings.</td>
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<td>20. I think that a desire to maintain the order of society drives most adolescents’ and</td>
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some adults’ decisions regarding what is right or wrong.

21. It is not possible for people to conceive of morality in terms of ideals and principle before adulthood.

22. Research on brain functions and neurology can shed light on the moral decision making process.

23. The only way of understanding moral rules is through philosophical contemplation.

24. Moral behaviour can be conceived as a skill, and this skill can be further developed.

### PART 2

The questions below are aimed at understanding your thoughts about moral education and hidden curriculum. Please tick the relevant boxes to indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements. (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25. It is important to teach morality in school.</td>
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<tr>
<td>26. As a teacher it is my responsibility to teach moral values to my students.</td>
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<td>27. Teachers are models of moral behaviour for students.</td>
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<tr>
<td>28. Teachers should be models of moral behaviour for students.</td>
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<td>29. There should be a specific subject focusing on moral education.</td>
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<td>30. Moral education should be taught across the curriculum.</td>
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<td>31. There should be more weekly lessons in school focusing on morality.</td>
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<td>32. Teachers should be educated regarding how to foster their student’s moral development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>33. Our current education system teaches morality effectively.</td>
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<td>34. The physical environment of the school, including building structure and time frames such as class and recess times affect students’ moral development.</td>
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<tr>
<td>35. School rules such as classroom seating arrangements and getting in line at the canteen affect students’ moral development.</td>
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### Teaching Moral Values

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<tr>
<td>36. I frequently come across moral dilemmas with students.</td>
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<td>37. I frequently feel the need to teach morality to my students.</td>
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<td>38. I try to teach moral values when the opportunity rises.</td>
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<td>39. I regularly spend time on teaching values to students.</td>
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<td>40. It is not my place to teach morality.</td>
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<td>41. I do not think that moral values can be taught.</td>
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PART 3

Please answer the ranking questions below by giving relevant numbers to the boxes.

42. Which of the options below do you think defines ‘hidden curriculum’ the best? Please rank the following options from 1 (most influential) to 5 (least influential).

Hidden curriculum can be defined as,

- a. the unintended and/or accidental learning outcomes and side effects of schooling
- b. the physical structure of the school, including announcement posters and the decoration of rooms and buildings, and time frames such as class and recess times and holidays
- c. the implicit messages conveyed to students by teachers, staff and administration
- d. a system within education that benefits the ruling elite by maintaining present class structures in the society
- e. school culture and psychological climate

43. Where do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 (most influential) to 4 (least influential).

Children learn moral values

- a. At home
- b. At school
- c. In the street
- d. While playing with friends

44. From whom do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 (most influential) to 6 (least influential).

Children learn moral values;

- a. From their parents
- b. From their teachers
- c. By interacting with their peers
- d. By observing their social environment
- e. From the media
- f. By thinking about them, on their own

45. How do you think children learn moral values? Please rank the following options from 1 (most influential) to 4 (least influential).

- a. Children learn moral values implicitly, values are caught, not taught
- b. Punishments and rewards
- c. Lecturing on morality/ right and wrong
- d. Conflicts with their equals (peers) – with experience
PART 4

And finally some questions about you. Please select one answer or write down your answer for the following questions:

46. What is your gender?  
   M [ ]  F [ ]

47. How old are you?  
   __________

48. Where were you born?  
   __________

49. What is your education level?  
   [ ] Undergraduate  
   [ ] Graduate  
   [ ] Postgraduate

50. What do you teach?  
   ______________________________________

51. Have you done, or are you doing your teaching internship?  
   [ ] I have not done a teaching internship  
   [ ] I am in the process of doing my teaching internship  
   [ ] I have finished a teaching internship

52. How many years of teaching experience do you have?  
   [ ] 0-2  
   [ ] 3-5  
   [ ] 6 or more

53. Do you plan on staying as a teacher?  
   [ ] Yes, I intend to stay as a teacher  
   [ ] No, I want to change my career  
   [ ] I’m not sure

54. Have you ever received any formal education regarding moral psychology, moral development, and/or moral education? If yes, please briefly describe the course or topic, and for long it lasted.

Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. Once you have finished answering the question please return the filled questionnaire to the dropbox.
APPENDIX A5 – Mülakata Katılım Onay Formu (Interview Participation Informed Consent Form)

ONAY FORMU

Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin Desteklenmesinde Türkiye Örneği

Oliver B. Bridge, Doktora Öğrencisi, Eğitim Fakültesi,
Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com

Yukarıdaki katılımcı bilgi belgesini okuyup anladım ve sorular sormaya fırsatım oldu.
Katılımımın gönüllü olduğunu ve herhangi bir zamanda neden vermeden çekilebileceğini anlıyorum.
Yukarıda adı geçen araştırmaya katılmayı istiyorum.
Bu çalışmaya sağladığım veriler (kimliğim gizlendikten sonra) bir uzman veri merkezinde saklanabilir ve gelecekteki çalışmalar için kullanılabilir.

Mülakatın sesli kaydının alınmasına onay veriyorum.
Kimliği gizlenmiş alıntıların yayımlarda kullanılmasına onay veriyorum
Araştırmmanın ileriki saflarlarına katılımın gönüllü olduğunu anıyorum ve araştırmının gözlem safhasına katılabilme ihtimali için benimle iletişime geçilmesine onay veriyorum.

__________________________  ____________________  __________________
Katılımcının Adı          Tarih                İmza

__________________________  ____________________  __________________
Araştırmacının Adı         Tarih                İmza
APPENDIX A6 – Interview Participation Informed Consent Form

CONSENT FORM

The Application of Moral Psychology in Teacher Training: A Case Study of the Fostering of Moral Development in Turkey

Oliver B. Bridge, Ph.D. Student, School of Education, Oxford Brookes University
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

Please initial box

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason.

Please initial box

I agree to take part in the above study.

Please initial box

I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research.

Please initial box

Please tick box

I agree to the interview being audio recorded

Yes
No

I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications

Yes
No

I understand that further participation in the study is optional, and I would like to be contacted to discuss the possibility of participating in observations.

Please tick box

Contact e-mail address for observations (optional)

Name of Participant    Date    Signature

Name of Researcher    Date    Signature
APPENDIX A7 – Mülakat Soruları (Interview Schedule – Turkish)

Soru lar

İlk bölümde özgeçmiş soruları bulunmaktadır, ardından 3 tane giriş sorusu bulunmaktadır. 3. bölümde ahlak psikolojisi ve ahlaki gelişime dair sorular bulunmaktadır. 4. bölümde ahlak eğitimi ve zihni mufredat/örtük program ile ilgili sorular bulunmaktadır. Son olarak da 5. bölümde sizin deneyimlerinizi ile ilgili sorular bulunmaktadır.

1. Özgeçmiş soruları:
1.1. Adınız:
1.2. Yaşınız:
1.3. Doğum yerininiz (nerelisiniz?):
1.4. Eğitim seviyeniz:
1.5. Bransınız:
1.6. Kaç yıllık öğretmenlik deneyiminiz var:
1.7. Öğretmenlik sizin için ne kadar önemli, bu işi seviyor musunuz, meslek değiştirmeyi düşünüyor musunuz?

2. Giriş soruları:
2.1. Daha önce ahlak psikolojisine dair hiç eğitim aldınız mı? Aldınsa, bu eğitimi nerede aldınız, ne kadar sürdü ve hangi konuları kapsadı? Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, James Rest, Jonathan Haidt, Elliot Turiel gibi yazarları daha önce hiç duydunuz mu?

2.2. Kısaca, sizce ahlak nedir, insanlar neden ahlaklı/iyi davranışlar?

2.3. Ahaîki ve iyi davranış anlama için sizce hangi akademik alanları incelemeliyiz? (Örn: Felsefe, psikoloji, din, kültür, politika, sosyoloji, nöroloji, evrim, diğer hayvanlar…)

3. Ahaîk Psikolojisi ve Ahaîki Gelişim
3.1. Sizce ahaîki/iyi davranış ortaya nasıl çıkar? Ahaîki davranışın ortaya çıkması için gereken psikolojik veya bilişsel öğeler neler olabilir?

3.2. Sizce insanlar belirli bir durumda yapılabilecek en iyi bir davranışın ne olduğuna karar verirken daha sıkılkla manıtrkları üzerinden mi (bilinçli bir şekilde düşünerek) hareket ederler, yoksa duyguları/sezgileri üzerinden mi (neredeyse hiç düşünmeden, otomatik, içgüdüsel olarak)?

3.3. Sizce insanlar belirli bir durumda yapılabilecek en iyi şeyler ne olduğunu bildikleri her zaman bunu yaparlar mı? Yapmıyorumlarla düşünceyi/bilgisi neden davranışa dökmezler veya dökemezler?
3.4. Sizce iyi davranışın motivasyonu nereden gelir? İç motivasyon olarak: mantık ve düşünce, duygular ve sezgiler, kişilik özellikleri ve karakter; veya dış motivasyon olarak yasalar ve toplumsal baskı. Bunların dışında, teknik taktik sebeplerle (ceza almamak için yasaya uymak, daha fazla ticaret yapabilmek için itibarınızı korumak, yükseltmek) ahlaklı davranmak sızce ne kadar yaygındır?

3.5. Sizce ahlaki duygular neler olabilir (örn: suçluluk duygusu)? Bu ahlaki duygular davranışlarınızı nasıl etkiler?

3.6. Sizce insanların kişilik özellikleri ve duyguları arasındaki bağ ne/nasıl olabilir? İnsanların “(öyle) bir insan olmak istiyorum” gibi özellikleri onların iyi davranışına ne ölçüde etkide bulunabilir?

3.7. Sizce bebeklikten yetişkinliğe kadar ahlaki gelişim duygu, düşünce, davranış bazında, nasıl gerçekleşir? Ahlaki gelişimde ailenin, öğretmenin (üst-ast ilişkisi), arkadaşlığın (esit ilişkileri) ve genel toplumun (3. kişiler ve medya) etkisi nedir, ne ölçüde olur?

3.8. Sizce ahlaki davranış bir beceri olarak düşünülebilir mi? Bu beceri sizce nasıl geliştirilebilir?

4. Ahlak Eğitimi ve Gizli Müfredat/Örtük Program

4.1. Ahlakın okulda öğretilmesi önemli midir sızce? Sizce ahlak eğitimi programı nasıl olmalıdır?

4.2. Sizce çocukların ahlaki değerleri ve iyi davranışları/iyilik yapmayı nasıl öğrenirler?

4.3. Bugünkü müfredattaki ahlak eğitimi hakkındaki görüşleriniz nelerdir?

4.4. Ahlak eğitiminin gizli müfredattaki yeri nedir, ahlak eğitimi gizli müfredatta nasıl gerçekleşir?

4.5. Yükseköğretimde gerçekleştirilen öğretmen eğitiminin, ilköğretim ve lise düzeyindeki gizli müfredata nasıl bir etkisi vardır sızce? İlköğretim ve lisede ahlak eğitiminin geliştirilmesi için sizce öğretmen eğitiminde neler yapılabilir?

5. Sizin deneyimleriniz

5.1. Ders içerisinde ahlaki değerleri öğretmeye genellikle ne kadar zaman ayırırsınız? Bunu yaparken belirli bir sistemden, metottan yararlanır misiniz?
5.2. Ahlak eğitimine dair paylaşmak isteyeceğiniz bir deneyiminiz var mı? Bu deneyim okul içerisinde veya dışarısında ve her hangi bir eğitim düzeyinde olabilir (anaokulundan bugüne kadar – öğrenirken veya öğretirken).

5.3. Bir öğretmen olarak, üniversite eğitiminiz sırasında ahlak eğitimi ve ahlaki gelişime dair bir ders almak ister miydiniz? Alsaydın bunun size nasıl bir faydası olacağıni düşünüyorsunuz? Böyle bir dersten öğrenmek isteyebileceğiniz belirli bir konu var mı?

Soruları cevaplama zamanınızı ayırdığınız için teşekkür ederim.
APPENDIX A8 – Interview Schedule

Introduction

The first part of the interview consists of background questions; this is followed by 3 introductory questions. The third part of the interview includes questions related to moral psychology and moral development. Questions related to moral education and implicit education can be found in the fourth part of the interview. Finally, in the fifth part, questions related to your own experiences are found.

1. Background Questions
   1.1. Name:
   1.2. Age:
   1.3. Birth place (Where are you from?):
   1.4. Education level:
   1.5. Discipline:
   1.6. Years of teaching experience:
   1.7. How important is teaching for you? Do you enjoy teaching? Do you plan on changing your career?

2. Introduction Questions:
   2.1. Have you ever received any education on moral psychology? If so, what did it cover and for how long did it last? Are you familiar with these authors: Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, James Rest, Jonathan Haidt, Elliot Turie!

   2.2. Briefly, what do you think morality is? Why do people behave morally?

   2.3. What academic fields do you think we should study in order to understand morality and moral behaviour? (E.g. philosophy, psychology, religion, culture, politics, sociology, neurology, evolution, other animals...)

3. Moral Psychology and Moral Development
   3.1. How do you think moral/good behaviour emerges? What might be the necessary psychological or cognitive components for moral behaviour to emerge?

   3.2. When deciding what they best thing to do might be in a certain situation, do you think people more often behave based on their reasoning (consciously thinking), or based on their emotions/intuitions (nearly without a thought, automatically, instinctively)?

   3.3. Do you think people always do the best possible thing when they know what it is? If not, why do you think they cannot or will not translate this thought/knowledge into action?
3.4. Where do you think the motivation for moral behaviour comes from? As internal motivation: logic and reasoning, emotions and intuitions, personality trait and character; or as external motivation laws and societal pressure. Apart from these, how prominent do you think moral behaviour for technical/tactical reasons (such as obeying the law to avoid punishment or protecting your reputation to be able to do better business)?

3.5. What do you think might be moral emotions (e.g. guilt)? How do these moral behaviours affect our behaviour?

3.6. What do you think might be the relationship between personality traits and emotions? How much can their desires to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral behaviour?

3.7. How do you think moral development takes place from infancy to adulthood considering emotions, reasoning and behaviour? What do you think is the influence of the family, teacher (hierarchical relationships), peers (equals), and the general society (3rd persons and the media) on moral development?

3.8. Can we think of moral behaviour as a skill? How do you think this skill can be fostered?

4. Moral Education and Implicit Education
4.1. Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral education program be?

4.2. How do you think children learn moral values and good behaviour?

4.3. What do you think about our current moral education system?

4.4. What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How does moral education take place in the hidden curriculum?

4.5. How do you think higher education teacher training affects primary and secondary education hidden curriculum? What do you think can be done in teacher training to improve moral education in primary and secondary education?
5. Your Experiences

5.1. How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the classroom? Do you use a specific system of method when you teach morality?

5.2. Do you have an experience that you would like to share regarding moral education? This can be in or out of the school, at any education level (from kindergarten to today – either teaching or learning).

5.3. As a teacher, would you have liked to take a course on moral development and moral psychology in teacher training? If you had, how do you think it would have been beneficial for you? Is there anything specific that you’d like to learn from such a course?

Thank you for answering my questions.
ONAY FORMU

Ahlak Psikolojisinin Öğretmen Eğitiminde Kullanılması: Ahlaki Gelişiminin Desteklemesinde Türkiye Örneği

Oliver B. Bridge, Doktora Öğrencisi, Eğitim Fakültesi,
Oxford Brookes Üniversitesi
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com

Kutucukları işaretleyiniz

Yukarıdaki katılımcı bilgi belgesini okuyup anladım ve sorular sormaya fırsatım oldu. □
Katılımımın gönüllü olduğunu ve her hangi bir zamanda neden vermeden çekilebileceğimi anlıyorum. □
Ders verirken gözlemlenilmeyi kabul ediyorum. □
Bu çalışmaya sağladığım veriler (kimliğim gizlendikten sonra) bir uzman veri merkezinde saklanabilir ve gelecekteki çalışmalar için kullanılabilir. □

Kimliği gizlenmiş alıntıların yayımlarda kullanmasına onay veriyorum □ □

_____________________________  __________________________  __________________________
Katılımcının Adı              Tarih                  İmza

_____________________________  __________________________  __________________________
Araştırmacının Adı             Tarih                  İmza
CONSENT FORM

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Oliver B. Bridge, Ph.D. Student, School of Education, Oxford Brookes University
b_oliver_b@hotmail.com

I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason.

I agree to be observed while teaching as a part of the above study.

I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research.

I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications

__________________________  _____________________  _______________________
Name of Participant       Date       Signature

__________________________  _____________________  _______________________
Name of Researcher       Date       Signature
## APPENDIX A11 – Classroom Observation Schedule:

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<tr>
<th>Description of Event: behaviour, feedback, pause, etc.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Care: Fairness: Loyalty: Authority: Sanctity:</td>
<td>Initiator/interaction:</td>
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<td>Sensitivity: Judgement: Motivation: Action:</td>
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<td>Care: Sensitivity</td>
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### APPENDIX A12 - School Grounds Observation Schedule

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<p>| 1. | Mode: |
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</table>

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Appendix B

Interview Data Analysis Tables
**APPENDIX B1: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 1, Question 2**

Part 1 – Question 2: Briefly, what do you think morality is? Why do people behave morally?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Social harmony and consideration of others, collectivist | Descriptions related to the social nature of morality have been included in this theme. | “People must behave morally for social order”  
“People behave morally to be in harmony with their society”  
“Avoiding ostracism, being accepted by others, social pressure...” |
| Personal, individualist | This theme is in direct opposition to the first, and includes descriptions related to the internally motivated and personal nature of morality. | “For personal peace of mind”  
“It has to be internal, I don’t think it can be done through external forces”  
“What a person thinks and wants to do is related more to morality than external factors” |
| Both individualist and collectivist | Responses included into this theme include descriptions that state that the nature of morality is both personal and social. | “Trying to be a good person is morality - that effort should be about being beneficial to oneself, to those around one, and the world.”  
“the balance has to be between living according to others and according to yourself.”  
“Morality is both individual and social” |
| Rules | This theme includes responses that define morality as a set of rules. | “A set of unwritten rules, from the beginning of humanity, that make human relationships better”  
“Rules that organize societies”  
“A set of unwritten laws for having healthy social relationships and communication.” |
| Virtues and character traits | Only one participant included virtues and character traits in her description of morality. | “Virtuous, honest respectful individuals” |
| Values | This theme includes descriptions of morality that focus on its relationship with values and valuations. | “People behave morally for things they deem right”  
“Morality covers values.”  
“...people value different things, and value derives from what is important to the individual, or because everyone in a society values that same thing.” |
| Developmental | This theme includes descriptions that focus on the developmental aspects of moral behaviour. | “A well raised person is moral”  
“Something inside people but could be developed” |
| Universality | This theme includes responses that indicate that at least some aspects of morality are universal. | “Goodness can change from person to person and locally, but there must be/are universal rules as well”  
“There are differences between cultures in morality, but there is also universal morality. Universal morality is the consequence of the common points of all different cultural moralities.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Particularity</strong></td>
<td>This theme is in direct opposition with the above, in that descriptions included in this theme define morality as something that is not universal.</td>
<td>“Behaviours [...] change from person to person and from community to community.”&lt;br&gt;“Morality can change from culture to culture.”&lt;br&gt;“Morality changes from person to person.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behaviour</strong></td>
<td>This theme includes definitions of morality focusing on the behavioural aspects of it.</td>
<td>“It is related to the good and bad things people do”&lt;br&gt;“Being good is about sharing, helping others, not talking behind people’s backs, not being selfish...”&lt;br&gt;“The ability to stop oneself, self-control”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intentions</strong></td>
<td>This theme includes the emphasis participants made regarding the intentionality of a behaviour in terms of whether the behaviour is moral or not.</td>
<td>“Intentions are important”&lt;br&gt;“... if a person does something good for others without intending it, it is not moral”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sexuality</strong></td>
<td>This theme includes responses emphasizing sexual morality.</td>
<td>“Morality is not only about sexuality or boy-girl relationships”&lt;br&gt;“Sometimes when a girl acts on her feelings it is deemed to be immoral by society.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>This theme includes responses that do not fit to any of the other categories.</td>
<td>“Morality is not what people think it is.”&lt;br&gt;“People create/make morality”&lt;br&gt;“[Morality] is related to our superego; the way we shape ourselves according to our superego [...].”&lt;br&gt;“The person in front of me might be used to being lied to or lying, but the fact that his/her perception of morality is shaped like this should not influence my understanding of morality.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B2: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 1

Part 2 – Question 1: How do you think moral behaviour emerges? What might be the necessary psychological or cognitive components for moral behaviour to emerge?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Components of the FCM</td>
<td>Judgement</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that focus on moral judgement. Only one response was categorized in this category.</td>
<td>• [Moral behaviour emerges] “When we need to make a choice between right and wrong”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that focus on the motivational aspects of moral behaviour. Only one response referred to the motivation to act morally.</td>
<td>• “Religion provides the motivation to act morally. But this motivation is a selfish one of seeking paradise after death and/or avoiding divine punishment.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emotion</td>
<td>This theme could be considered as a further subcategory of Motivation. However, while the motivational aspects of emotions are alluded to, the emphasis on specific emotions, rather than their motivational aspects, requires a separate category for emotions.</td>
<td>• “Empathy is behavioural morality, in my understanding.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral development</td>
<td>Reactions</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that emphasize the reactions role models give to children in response to events and situations during moral development.</td>
<td>• “Arrangements and reactions in response to events and situations are important.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Learning</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that focus on morality as something that is learnt.</td>
<td>• “Moral behaviour is learnt. During childhood it is learnt through observation, it sinks in during adolescence.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Developmental</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that focus on moral development. This was the most common kind of response that participants gave to this question. Some participants gave in depth explanations of moral development.</td>
<td>• “Morality emerges early in childhood with the family.”</td>
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<td>• “During ages 0-6 with the family, and with pre-school education”</td>
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<td>• “Morality appears after a certain phase of cognitive development is reached.”</td>
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<td>• “According to a study [children] think that their lies are true before they reach a certain level of cognitive development, so before they can understand”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theme</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Examples</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>This theme includes responses that focus on the environment in which a child’s moral development takes place. This was the second most common kind of response to this question.</td>
<td>“Personal history, experiences, and familial and environmental factors are important.”&lt;br&gt;“Social pressure and family are the most important things.”&lt;br&gt;“Pressure from society and family, related to where you grow up... People born on the Western and Eastern sides of Turkey tend to be different from each other given the differences in family structure and worldview.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>This category includes responses that could not be categorized in any of the other main themes or categories.</td>
<td>[It is] “Related to meeting the needs of oneself in balance with the needs of others”&lt;br&gt;“It is innate”&lt;br&gt;“It changes from person to person”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Part 2 – Question 2: “When deciding what the best thing to do might be in a certain situation, do you think people more often behave based on their reasoning (consciously thinking), or based on their emotions/intuitions (nearly without a thought, automatically, instinctively)?”

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Predominantly Emotional/Intuitive | This theme includes responses that emphasize the role of emotions and/or intuitions. While there is a clear difference between moral emotions and moral intuitions, in this question they were treated as if they were same in order to focus on the visceral and automatic nature of intuitive moral judgements. | • “People make decisions mostly emotionnally, instinctively”  
• “People initially reason, but eventually act on their intuitions”  
• “More than 80% of human behaviour is based on emotions.”  
• “I’d say 60% of the time emotions lead moral judgement. But this is for me, I can’t say for others.”  
• “…we make intuitive decisions because we usually cannot reason things out; because of either laziness, not being able to reason, or for lack of time”  
• “I think ... for women it would be 70-80% intuitive.” (female participant) |
| Balanced influence | This theme includes responses that indicate that the influence of moral reasoning and intuitions has a closer balance. | • “By establishing a balance between our reasoning and emotions...”  
• “The entirety of morality cannot be conceived in emotional terms, but it might cover both aspects.”  
• “…although it seems to me like it is reasoning, I think emotions play an important role; they are not independent.”  
• “This changes from person to person, but it should be equal. I try to make decisions based on my reasoning but if [one does not] emotionally accept [the reasoned judgement] one can’t be content.” |
APPENDIX B4: Themes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 3

Part 2 – Question 3: Do you think people always do the best possible thing when they know what it is? If not, why do you think they cannot or will not do what they think or know to be the right thing to do in a situation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Related to the FCM Component 3 | Religion | This theme includes statements that are related to the moral motivational power participants have attributed to religion. While some participants indicated that religion can motivate people to do what they think is right, others have indicated that religious beliefs can inhibit people from acting. This category includes 16.2% of all relevant statements. | • “Religion is used to elevate morality to a higher level”  
• “It could inhibit people from doing the right thing”  
• “...my friends with more religious emotions are morally better than others.”  
• “I think it is related to the love or fear of God” |
| Personal Interest | This theme includes statements that are related to competing interests; in this case all statements refer to personal interest. All statements included here indicated that personal interest prevents people from acting on what they think or know to be the right thing to do in a situation. This theme includes 24.3% of all statements. | • “People do bad things because they don’t care about others, they are concerned with their own interest”  
• “People can’t disregard their personal gains.”  
• “People are born with the ego to help their survival, but the society might force one to protect one’s interests more.” |
| Indifference | This theme includes statements that indicated that people fail to act on what they know to be the best thing to do in a situation due to indifference. This theme includes 2.7% of all statements. | • “... as in ‘the snake that doesn’t touch me can live a thousand years for all I care’” |
| Related to the FCM Component 4 | Social Pressure | This theme includes codes that indicated that people fail to do what they know to be the right thing due to fear or anxiety of suffering negative social repercussions or ostracism. This theme includes 24.3% of all statements. | • “For fear that getting involved might receive condemnation”  
• “They can’t, because in some situations environmental factors are also important”  
• “They don’t always do what they know, because sometimes what the majority wants can prevent our personal wishes”  
• “To be sure it is the right time and place”  
• “...for fear of losing people.”  
• “people would do whatever they want if nobody was watching –” |
| Emotional Barriers | This theme includes statements that identified only the preventive | • “No they cannot. Negative thoughts like fear, anxiety” |
motivation of emotions, leading to a failure in moral behaviour despite individuals’ knowledge of the best thing to do. This theme includes 5.4% of all statements.

**Other**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uncategorized</th>
<th>This category includes statements that pointed to a psychological failing, but could not be categorized in any other way. This category includes 10.8% of all statements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “People do bad things because their emotions override their will to do good”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “No they don’t. In some cases conscious values can be forgotten”</td>
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<tr>
<td>• “Individuals’ habits and character”</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “There are unseen obstacles in life.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>• “Some psychological obstacles might prevent [people from doing the right thing]”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unrelated to the FCM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This category includes statements that were not related to the Four Components Model. These include a focus on empathy, and gossip. This category includes 10.8% of all statements.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “To understand why people don’t do the right thing when they know it, we need to understand them, be like them, and understand how they got to be the way they are.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “People would not want to be treated the way they treat others if they were the receivers of that kind of treatment. To understand, one must put themselves in the shoes of others.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “No people don’t always do what they think is right. Instead they gossip about the wrong doing. Taking action against wrongdoing is a rare thing.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No Gappiness Problem**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This category includes codes that indicate that people always do what they know to be the best thing to do. Only two teachers indicated this in the written interviews, using the exact same words. 5.4% of codes are included in this subcategory.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “People always do the best they know”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “People always do the best they know”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Appendix B5: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 2, Question 4**

Part 2 – Question 4: “Where do you think the motivation for moral behaviour comes from? As internal motivation: logic and reasoning, emotions and intuitions, personality traits and character; or as external motivation laws and social pressure. Apart from these, how prominent do you think moral behaviour for technical/tactical reasons (such as obeying the law to avoid punishment or protecting your reputation to be able to do better business)?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Motivation</strong></td>
<td>Technical/tactical reasons</td>
<td>Statements related to this theme referred to motivation to act morally based on technical/tactical reasons.</td>
<td>• “technical/tactical reasons such as avoiding punishments are the main drivers of moral motivation”&lt;br&gt;• “[Technical/tactical reasons] should be more prominent, but they aren’t today”&lt;br&gt;• “It’s like fooling oneself and others to get to the good of afterlife – if it exists”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Statements related to this theme referred to the motivation consequences of certain behaviour provide for moral action.</td>
<td>• “In Turkey fear of punishments is a strong motivator.”&lt;br&gt;• “For laws to be effective motivators, punishments have to be deterrent enough.” (legal consequences)&lt;br&gt;• “People act morally because they are afraid of social pressure, if they don’t they are ostracized.” (social consequences)&lt;br&gt;• “Other people’s reactions are more important deterrents [than laws].” (social consequences)&lt;br&gt;• “The feeling of being accepted and approved of is an important motivator.” (social consequences)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>The necessity of external motivation</td>
<td>Statements placed in this theme were related to how participants perceived that external motivation is necessary for moral behaviour.</td>
<td>• “…if external motivation wasn’t so efficient, the notion of state would not have developed. This is the reason states exist. Because people violate each other. Everyone wants to see an authority above themselves. The necessity for an authority has led to the creation of states.”&lt;br&gt;• “Internal motivation plays a small role, external motivation such as rewards, like congratulating children, are necessary, at least before the character settles.”</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Motivation</strong></td>
<td>Development and character</td>
<td>Statements placed in this theme were related to the development of a kind of character that provides internal motivation.</td>
<td>• “Internal motivation is important. But of course, the external motivation during the development of internal motivation is very important.”&lt;br&gt;• “The person might be able to develop his/her own internal motivation once their character has settled.”&lt;br&gt;• “Character provides moral motivation, but only after a certain stage.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Reasoning vs. emotions | Statements related to this theme referred to the motivating power of moral reasoning or moral emotions. | • “…I can’t make a distinction between emotions and personality. Emotions must direct personality. Reasoning is a bit further away”  
• “Reasoning and logic are more important [motivators], followed by emotions.” |
|---|---|---|
| Value of internal motivation | Statements relevant to this theme emphasize the value of internal motivation. | • “Moral behaviour due to external reasons is more common, but internal motivation is more important.”  
• “People should act morally because they want to.” |
| **Mixed Influence** | Statements placed in this category pointed to the variety of potential causes of motivation to act morally and to the ambiguity related to the roots of moral motivation. | • “Internal and external motivation are equally important.”  
• “Changes from person to person. People can behave morally for all kinds of reasons.”  
• “Behaving morally can be instinctive as well as concerning personal interest.” |
| **Other** | Statements placed in this category either do not fit the other themes or categories, or they are ambiguous. | • “[Moral motivation] comes from the family.”  
• “Everybody acts morally for technical/tactical reasons... no, not everybody is that bad.” |
**Appendix B6: Second Order Volitions – Part 2, Question 6, Focus 2**

Part 2 – Question 6: “What do you think might be the relationship between character traits and emotions? How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral behaviour?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Roots of Second Order Volitions** | Statements categorized in this theme focused on how second order volitions are created, or alternatively what lies at the root of second order volitions. | • “I think if an individual is trying to be a good person s/he would be using only their reasoning. If someone is putting aside their emotions and is aiming to achieve that ideal personhood s/he is using his/her reasoning and that person should put their reasoning before their emotions.”  
• “I think it’s like indirect learning. If your mother praises the neighbour’s kid ‘look how hard he studies, look how smart he is’ you inevitably find yourself lacking and think ‘if I want to be loved by mum I need to work hard, I want to be hard-working.’” |
| **Second Order Volitions as Goal Orientation** | Several participants seemed to construe second order volitions, or “the kind of person one wants to be” as goals to be achieved. Statements categorized in this theme focused on participants’ beliefs relevant to this idea. | • “If someone is putting aside their emotions and is aiming to achieve that ideal personhood s/he is using his/her reasoning...”  
• “[The kind of person one want to be] must have an effect [on moral behaviour]. [A person who acts according to such desires] will have behaved towards a goal.” |
| **Failures Related to Second Order Volitions** | Several participants focused on how second order volitions fail, or what happens when they fail. The only unifying theme of this category is that each statement placed here emphasized one kind or another failure related to second order volitions. | • “People cannot change their personalities overnight even if they want to.”  
• “Usually when people can’t be what they want to be they become aggressive and blame others for their failure.”  
• “Well, the ideal self must not conflict with the real self.”  
• “Before a certain phase of cognitive development is reached where children can decide for themselves people learn morality by conforming to the environment and family. After this it is hard to detach from that influence. If this was not the case you might have been able to decide based on the kind of personality you wanted to be.” |
**Appendix B7: Effects on Moral Behaviour – Part 2, Question 6, Focus 3**

Part 2 – Question 6: “What do you think might be the relationship between character traits and emotions? How much can one’s desire to be “this kind of a person” affect their moral behaviour?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Second Order Volitions   | Statements placed in this theme focused on the effect second order volitions have on moral behaviour. Four out of the seven statements relevant to this focus are placed here. | • “[The kind of person one wants to be has] a direct effect [on moral behaviour].”  
• “The characteristics people want to be/have affect good behaviour to a large extent.”  
• “A person who succeeds in becoming the person they want to be is a moral and proper person.”  
• [The kind of person one wants to be has] quite a bit [of an effect on moral behaviour]. |
| Character Traits         | Statements placed in this theme focused on the effect character traits have on moral behaviour. Three out of the seven statements relevant to this focus were placed here. | • “The kind of person someone wants to be... would influence their behaviour, though not as much as their character traits.”  
• “Character traits can be effective. They affect moral behaviour.”  
• “Character traits have an effect.” |
**APPENDIX B8: School is not the most important place for moral education – Part 3, Question 1, Theme 1**

Part 3 – Question 1: Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral education program be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Family is more important</em></td>
<td>Statements placed in this theme focused on the importance of the family in</td>
<td>• “The school is a factor but the most important factor is the family.”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>terms of moral education, and the role the school plays in relation to the</td>
<td>• “I think the school can only have a supporting role to the family.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>family.</td>
<td>• “The school helps alongside the family.”</td>
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<td>• “Families should be given this kind of awareness [relevant to moral education].”</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>ME is not entirely possible</em></td>
<td>Statements placed in this theme indicated that moral education is either not</td>
<td>• “Teachers can be good models but I don’t think morality can be completely taught.”</td>
</tr>
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<td>entirely possible, or that ME in schools cannot do justice to what is</td>
<td>• “It could be in the homeroom hour, but something like morality is caught rather</td>
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<td>actually aims to achieve.</td>
<td>than taught, in and out of the school, and since life couldn’t be a lesson these</td>
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<td>things would be learnt implicitly.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• “I’m not sure how it can be taught.”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• “Concerns like earning bread would trump concerns about moral education.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>ME beyond the school</em></td>
<td>Statements placed in this theme indicated that moral education either should</td>
<td>• Moral learning is lifelong.</td>
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<td>not be confined to the school or that it continues beyond the school.</td>
<td>• Moral education should not be confined to school; those who don’t go to school</td>
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<td>should also get moral education.</td>
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</table>
**APPENDIX B9: How ME should be conducted – Part 3, Question 1, Theme 2**

Part 3 – Question 1: Do you think it is important to teach morality in school? How should the moral education program be?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Lesson Based ME**                             | Statements placed in this theme focused on the practice of ME in terms of lessons. All participants who indicated how moral education should be practiced as lessons were teachers. | • “It is definitely important. A yearly plan must be made regarding moral education. It should be conducted step by step like a lesson.”  
• “It is important. [It should be conducted when the teacher] finds the time during lessons.” |
| **ME vs. Religious Education (RE)**             | Statements refer to the ME provided in RE. Two students and one intern addressed this issue here. | • “Moral education should be separate from religious education, so that it can have an influence on people from different religious background or no religious interest.”  
• “There should be a moral education course separate from religious education, but that should not mean religious education should be removed.”  
• “What are you trying to achieve with religious education?” [Rhetorical question] |
| **Application/Experience Based ME**             | Two teachers explicitly emphasized that ME should be based on application and experience. However, they did not specify a certain format for how moral education should be conducted. | • “It should take place in education through application/exemplification.”  
• “It is important. Its application should be based on experiencing.” |
| **Implicit ME**                                 | Two interns emphasized that ME should be practised implicitly in schools.     | • “It should be implicit and it should penetrate the entire educational process.”  
• “Moral education should be implicit, and spread across the curriculum.” |
| **Pedagogical Practices**                       | One student and one intern focused on which pedagogical methods should be used in ME. | • “Morality as a skill develops through trial and error. But in school moral behaviour can be fostered with reinforcements: awards and punishments. But no, using only well placed rewards would be better.”  
• “Moral education should be given starting from primary school. But it should not be based on rote memorization, like the Religious Culture and Ethics course.” |
| **Regarding Teachers**                          | Four students focused on the role of the teacher in ME. While three students focused on the teacher in terms of being a role model, one student indicated that teachers are not well | • “Along with the moral education teacher other teachers should also know how to do moral education and be role models. But in the lack of a tight focus moral education cannot work very well.”  
• “Moral education should start with the teacher’s behaviour.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| equipped to conduct moral education. |                                                                                  | • “Morality is usually learnt from the behaviour of teachers, parents…”  
• “If the teachers had the necessary and relevant knowledge they could do better moral education.”  |
| ME as Imposition             | One interesting theme to emerge was this one, from the responses of three interns. They all indicated that moral education should not have an oppressive nature. | • “Moral education should be voluntary, not mandatory.”  
• “Moral education should be conducted not as handing down from an authority like the teacher or a cleric.”  
• “[ME] is important, but to a certain degree: it should not take away my freedom, I should be able to act like myself, not in some other direction – though there should be some direction in the education.”  |
| Unspecified                  | Some participants indicated that moral education was important, but they did not specify a certain method of conducting ME. Statements from one student and three teachers have been included here. | • “Yes, [it is important]. It should take place in the programme heavily.”  
• “It is important.”  
• “The school is already a moral programme [/institution].”  
• It should not be as a course.  |
| Other                        | Some statements could not be placed in any of the above categories. These include one intern’s focus on fostering students’ self-esteem, and one 1st year student’s thought regarding the nature of moral education. | • “If you build the child’s self-esteem and make them feel unique and valuable s/he would be more considerate, respectful, and overall more moral.”  
• “Morality should stop being seen as something religious or communal, and be taken for what it actually is.”  
• “If a kind of training that would improve people’s empathetic abilities was given and human psychology was well taught, there would no longer be any problems regarding morality.”  
• “Moral education should make people do the right thing beyond technical/tactical reasons.”    |
### APPENDIX B10: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 3, Question 3

Part 3 – Question 3: “What do you think about our current moral education system?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **ME Format**                 | Statements relevant to this theme focused on the format of moral education. 5 teachers and 1 intern focused on the format of ME, and this theme holds the highest frequency of statements in this question. | • “It requires more support. A separate course and education programme should be planned.”  
• “Awful. The general education system is bad on all levels.”  
• “It should be more intense; more importance should be given to experience and application.”  
• “I find it lacking in terms of application.”  
• “Moral education is not sufficient and it is not conducted in the right way.”  
• “Topics related to morality are taught in the religion and philosophy courses, but it is not enough.” |
| **Regarding RE and ME Content** | Statements placed in this theme focus on how ME is conducted in RE and other contexts, and the content of ME in different contexts. Three students and one intern explicitly focused on this matter. | • “There should be no religious education because the way it is practiced now excludes people of different religious backgrounds.”  
• “Sometimes it is expected of the child to blindly follow rules... Parents and teachers decide in the child’s stead – you will go to this school, we will learn this in class today – all without the child’s participation in decision making. As a result the child ends up unable to advocate his/her own thoughts. So, the child just keeps on taking what being provided rather than being creative or resourceful.”  
• “There is no moral education. There is no education that addresses Kohlberg’s theory. We used to take the religion course in middle school but the moral education given there is made up of whatever the individual teacher teaches and it changes from teacher to teacher and school to school.” |
| **Regarding Teachers**         | One teacher and two interns stated their beliefs regarding teachers engaged in moral education.                                                 | • “It is taught only in religious education, maybe by the wrong people.”  
• “As far as I can see unskilled teachers are being trained... I don’t think I’ll be a very good model so I don’t want morality to be taught... If the system was a bit better more skilled teachers could be trained. But very unskilled teachers are being trained. If I was a parent I wouldn’t want teachers to teach anything about morality to my children.”  
• “There is so much wrong with it I don’t know where to start... First of all teachers should receive moral education.” |
| **Teachers’ Initiative**      | Two students and one intern indicated that moral education is completely up to the efforts of individual teachers, implying that there is no consistent or unified practice of moral education. | • “Bad ... There is not enough emphasis on moral education; it is up to individual teachers.”  
• “There is no moral education ... We used to take the religion course in middle school but the moral education given there is made up of whatever the individual teacher teaches and it changes from teacher to teacher and school to school.”  
• “Awful ... It is up to individual teachers to conduct moral education, and idealist teachers who will do quality moral education are very rare.” |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Unspecified</strong></th>
<th>Two interns and two teachers stated negative attitudes towards the current system of moral education; however, they did not specify the cause of their negative attitudes.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                 | • “I find it lacking.”  
• “It’s insufficient.”  
• “Moral education exists only in name, it is not practiced. If it was we would have been able to see its effects, but there are none.”  
• “I don’t know much, but I don’t think it’s good.” |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Unclear</strong></th>
<th>The responses of two teachers and one student do not make it clear whether they have a negative or positive attitude towards the current moral education system. These participants described what they thought was the current moral education system.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                 | • “I know moral education to be conducted in the RCE and philosophy courses.”  
• “Programmes conducted in the homeroom/guidance course, as well as personal development courses.”  
• “I might have learnt something from high school philosophy...” |
Part 3 – Question 4: “What is the place of moral education in the hidden curriculum? How does moral education take place in the hidden curriculum?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Teachers’ Behaviour| The collection of statements that yield this theme focused on how teachers’ behaviour has an important implicit influence concerning students’ moral education. One teacher, two interns and a student focused on this.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | • [Moral education takes place in the hidden curriculum as teachers] “caution students at every area, during recess, during class.”  
• “It happens through taking role models. Or when the teacher warns a student who’s done something wrong or rewards when a student does something right. This provides a model... Not just in the classroom but in the yard as well, and teachers’ relationships with each other as well in some way... everyone in the school environment would contribute to moral education.”  
• “The teacher has to be a model. If there is petty competition between teachers, students pick up on it straight away, and they learn more from teachers’ behaviour than what they say in class.”  
• “Students pay attention to teachers all the time. If the teachers treat each other badly, the kids pick up on that.”                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Social Environment | Statements placed in this theme focused more on whose behaviour forms the hidden curriculum than what kind of behaviours form it. Three teachers and one intern focused on this aspect.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | • [It is] “The moral education taking place in the hidden curriculum between the teachers and the administrators.”  
• “It is between teachers and administrators”  
• “Hidden curriculum = school interaction”  
• “Students learn morality completely implicitly. I think morality is learnt better through what the teacher does outside the classroom than what s/he says in class. And not just the teachers, everyone in the school is part of moral education, the guy at the canteen, the cleaners, friends, administrators... They have more influence.”                                                                                                                                                  |
APPENDIX B12: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 3, Question 5

Part 3 – Question 5: “How do you think higher education teacher training affects primary and secondary education hidden curriculum? What do you think can be done in teacher training to improve moral education in primary and secondary education?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Improving Teacher Training   | The majority of participants focused on how teacher training could be improved considering implicit education at primary and secondary levels. 55.5% of statements have been placed in this theme. | • “There should be a greater focus on moral psychology in teacher training.”  
• “One would have greater knowledge. Seminars should be arranged.”  
• “It should be conducted throughout the teaching service by the right educationists.”  
• [It should be improved] “throughout teacher training by experienced teachers.”  
• “Formation programmes and in-service education can be considered.”  
• “The development of a person must be thoroughly known. Developmental psychology must be learnt, student psychology must be learnt; teaching techniques and methodologies must also be learnt. The training we get supposedly teaches us this, but it is shallow, and we don’t have the means to practice any of this kind of training we get. I’m not sure if every graduate of an education faculty is moral either. I don’t think the assessment of this training can be tests, the idea is ridiculous.” |
| The Benefit and Influence of Teacher Training | Most of the rest of the statements have been placed here (27.7%). Statements placed in this theme focused on how wide the effects of teacher training is, or can be, concerning moral education and the wider society. | • “During training it remains at the level of knowledge. It is useful in terms understanding the concept of ‘morality.’”  
• “It is very beneficial and effective. There should be greater focus on it.”  
• “Such an education should be definitely given. Now that I think about it, considering the four years of my education, I have never received this kind of training. Would it be useful if I had? Definitely. I would have been able to solve my own problems more easily had I had this kind of an education. I’ve had to grapple with some tough issues on my own without any help after moving to this city for university. This kind of training would have helped me to resolve my own issues with greater confidence, and in return, I could better help my students resolve their issues. They would learn confidence as well.”  
• “Despite being in an education faculty I don’t think very highly of teachers. Most of them don’t raise even their own children very well. And then what can a single teacher do in a class of forty students other than to be a role model anyway? ... But if teachers received this kind of an education every segment of the society would be better off. If a kind of training that would improve people’s empathetic abilities was given and human psychology was well taught, there would no longer be any problems regarding morality.” |
APPENDIX B13: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 4, Question 1

Part 4 – Question 1: “How much time do you devote to teaching moral values in the classroom? Do you use a specific system of method when you teach morality?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Time Focus** | The statements placed in this theme focused on how much time participants spend on teaching values. This theme includes 35% of all statements. | • “I devote a part of my lesson every day. I use ‘I Solve Problems’ and drama methods. I also use book sets.” (Teacher)  
• “When it is appropriate, when it is suitable, and in the homeroom hour.” (Teacher)  
• “Apart from conducting it as lessons, I focus on it at every social crisis in class.” (Teacher)  
• “I do it in the teaching and education process in general.” (Teacher)  
• “I don’t devote much time, only when I find the time.” (Teacher)  
• “Morality is a general concept; I implement it throughout the teaching and educating process.” (Teacher) |
| **Method Focus** | The statements placed in this theme elaborate on the methods employed in teaching values. This theme includes 35% of all statements. | • “I devote a part of my lesson every day. I use ‘I Solve Problems’ and drama methods. I also use book sets.” (Teacher)  
• “I prefer the teaching through experience method.” (Teacher)  
• “By relating it to topics covered in class or to current events, or through a situation happening in the class.” (Teacher)  
• “I prefer rewarding rather than punishing, but I try to use Kohlberg’s moral development stages and teaching methods” (Teacher)  
• “I worked with some 12-year-olds; they tend to be more self-centred. I try to get students to think for themselves by asking them questions instead of outright saying this is right and this is wrong. I focus on fostering the respect students have other individuals’ right, but I don’t interfere unless someone is in danger of being harmed.” (Intern)  
• “Usually in games. I worked for the Turkish Education Volunteers Charity for a while. The kids would fight when playing, ‘you took my spot’ ‘you pushed me’ sort of thing. I don’t know how, but spontaneously with something of the moment, using the right kind of language I would try to get the children to empathize with each other, ‘OK, now I want you two to change places’ or ‘how would you feel if you were in your friend’s place?’ ‘You’d be angry if your friend did the same to you, right?’ And the kids would understand then.” (Intern) |
| **Other** | Statements placed in this theme did not focus either on the time spent on teaching values, nor on the methods used. Interns’ and students’ responses were more related to this theme. 29% | • “Yes, I do.” (Teacher)  
• “I can’t really think of a concrete example right now, but unconsciously I would have tried to give something to the students with the way I talk and behave.” (Intern)  
• “I haven’t had much of an interaction with students. Actually there were a few times when I tried to take control of the class to challenge myself. But these... as I said, this information isn’t enough for teachers. Should I try to teach a lesson in my field or... I haven’t had much time for these.” (Intern)  
• “No I don’t use any specific methods.” (Intern) |
| of statements were placed in this category. | • “Respect is very important for me, like being listened to when I’m speaking. There is no meaning in what I do if the student isn’t listening to me. I should get a response, and I should not be interrupted.” (Student) |
APPENDIX B14: Codes and Categories Emerging from Part 4, Question 3

Part 4 – Question 3: “As a teacher, would you have liked to take a course on moral development and moral psychology in teacher training? If you had, how do you think it would have been beneficial for you? Is there anything specific that you’d like to learn from such a course?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Reasons for receiving training** | One teacher, two interns, and one student focused on why this training should be provided. | • “Yes I would like to. I would have better learnt the stages of how to explain and implement such a large and abstract topic” (teacher)  
• “Of course I would like to have a course like this. I think the training I received is not enough. I would have liked to learn more.” (intern)  
• “To understand what morality is. When you asked me what I thought morality is, I didn’t know what to say. I don’t know whether morality is my values or the society’s values.” (intern)  
• “If we understand ... historical development, philosophical development, and sociological development of foundations – if we understand these, we can understand that morality is something different than what the society, state or world order says it is.” (student) |
| **Format of the training** | Three interns and two students focused on how this training should be provided and assessed. | • “I would like it, but not as a course/lecture... It should not be evaluated like a test, but it should be more like sharing.” (intern)  
• “Yes, at least a few lectures. But this training should not be about rote memorization, it should be more about discussion.” (intern)  
• “It should not be about how I view morality, but about how I can teach and change morality.” (intern)  
• “A course means directing people. I would like to discuss what people think morality is rather than how to be moral. Not like ‘universal morality is this or that.’” (student)  
• “Yes, but it can’t be covered in a single lecture. It would be ridiculous to confine a topic that affects a person’s whole life to a single lecture. I think it should be distributed across secondary and tertiary education...” (student) |
| **Content of the training** | One teacher, two interns, and two students focused on what they would like to learn from this kind of training, and what the contents of this training should cover. | • “Yes I would like to. I’d have liked to learn about moral development theories.” (teacher)  
• “Yes, because even though I can’t make proper sentences about this topic, I like this stuff. I would like to learn the theories. I would like to read psychological, sociological, and philosophical papers.” (intern)  
• “Philosophy, like I said in the beginning, but also other relevant things as well. These include religion, technological developments, psychological theories... Giving the largest share to philosophy, all these should be studied.” (intern) |

18 The participant used the word “ders” which can mean either a single lecture, or a term long course. Due to the ambiguity, both translations have been included.
- “I’d like to learn something about the hidden curriculum...” (student)
- “... we should first understand how morality has progressed historically... How morality has progressed from the ancient era to the modern era. We should understand the human brain’s cognitive process ... After this philosophy and sociology should enter the scene. This time we should investigate the philosophical perspectives on morality. Like pragmatism. We should study philosophical schools of thought. It should be in the frame of historical development once again, so we can have a sense of the historical pattern, a foundation. And we should understand what shapes societies’ understanding of morality.” (student)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receivers of training</th>
<th>One teacher, intern and student emphasized that teachers should not be the only ones to receive this training, but that at least everyone involved in the education process should receive this training.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“I just want it.”</td>
<td>Five teachers and one student simply stated that they would have liked to receive this kind of training.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- “I would have liked to take this during university. I think it should be in all departments.” (teacher)
- “Every teacher and, indeed, everyone working in a school should get this training.” (intern)
- “Yes I would’ve liked it. It’s necessary in any case. Everybody needs it, from the construction engineer to the teacher.” (Student)