Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister

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Stakeholder Security:
The New Western Way of Counter-terrorism?

Lee Jarvis (Swansea University) & Michael Lister (Oxford Brookes University)
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Abstract

This article explores the ways in which Western states have adapted their counter-terrorism strategies to meet the demands of a post-9/11 era. Focusing on the US and UK as illustrative case studies, we chart the emergence of a new, complex topography of security measures aimed at confronting the threat of unconventional violence from above and below. Of particular interest is the construction of a raft of initiatives heavily reliant on the continued participation of citizens for their functioning; a reliance persistently justified by claims to uncertainty, even ignorance, amongst political elites. To better understand these initiatives and their implications this article introduces the concept of Stakeholder Security to refer to the conscription of ordinary individuals into the state’s security apparatuses; a conscription that positions citizens precariously as simultaneously technologies, subjects and objects of security. The article concludes with a first attempt to trace some of the political and normative issues raised by this new policy framework.

Key words: Terrorism; Counter-terrorism; Security; Stakeholders; Citizenship; Risk.

Introduction

On 24 March 2009 the British Home Office released a second, revised, edition of their CONTEST Strategy for countering international terrorism. Structured around the four alliterative workstreams of its predecessor – Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare – the document was quickly positioned as an integral part of the state’s efforts to, ‘…reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism,’ (HM Government 2009, p.12); a threat that both ‘…remains and is evolving’ (Smith 2009) according to the Home Secretary in her accompanying remarks. The publication of this document offers a timely opportunity for reflecting on the ongoing, struggle against unconventional violence which this article efforts to meet by taking the United States and United Kingdom as critical case studies in this protracted conflict. Although important differences between the two have been identified (Rees and Aldrich 2005, see also Guild 1

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al 2007), we argue that a concurrent exploration of key measures undertaken by these states sheds light on the emergence of a consistent and relatively coherent approach to combating terrorism. This approach, we suggest, has become increasingly dominated by a ‘stakeholder security’ counter-terrorism model that poses profound implications for citizens and non-citizens resident within Western democracies. To outline the contours of this model, and to explore the questions it raises, our discussion proceeds in two stages.

The article begins by mapping recent Anglo-American counter-terrorism initiatives. Focusing, specifically, on the post-9/11 period, we identify a concerted effort to construct a new, complex, topography of mechanisms for combating terrorist violence. On one level, this has been marked by the relevant state representatives fashioning new weapons for resisting and managing the terrorist threat ‘from above’: new weapons that strengthened, in the process, core executive powers. At the same time, and perhaps less predictably, there surfaced a willingness – perhaps even a need – to formulate measures for combating terrorism ‘from below’: measures such as the US-based Ready Campaign, for example, which were heavily reliant on the active engagement of these two states’ polities.

The article’s second section contains our effort to understand this new topography. Contributing, here, to existing efforts at conceptualising these dynamics, we advance the notion of ‘stakeholder security’ to refer to governmental efforts at conscripting ‘ordinary’ citizens into the state’s security apparatuses. This conscription, we argue, has been predicated on an appeal, first, to elite-level ignorance of emergent threats. And, second, to a communal responsibility for providing the public good of security. The increasing reliance on citizens for counter-terrorism, we suggest, has led to the ever more precarious positioning of individuals within Western states as simultaneously suppliers of,
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beneficiaries from, and challengers to the successful provision of security: as simultaneously technologies, subjects and objects of security policy. The emergence of this stakeholder security paradigm, we argue, raises profound political and normative questions, not least concerning the character and limits of citizenship.

A New Topography of Security

The CONTEST 2 document establishes the rationale for revisiting British counter-terrorism mechanisms by pointing to the emergence of a complex, networked global enemy headed by the al-Qaeda leadership (HM Government 2009, p.11). This enemy, readers are informed, has benefited at once from the development of modern technologies posing new opportunities for proselytisation; the growing popularity of extremist ideologies; and unresolved regional conflicts across the globe (HM Government 2009, p.11). Tracing, here, academic discussions of the ‘new terrorism’ that gained considerable currency following 9/11 (compare Burnett & Whyte 2005; Neumann 2009), CONTEST 2 explicitly argues that, ‘the current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past,’ (HM Government 2009, p.11).

The grammar of unprecedented insecurity that both frames and legitimises this latest counter-terrorist strategy is an instantly familiar one. From 9/11’s immediate aftermath onwards, Western polities have been persistently subject to claims to those events marking a radical transformation in their own prospects of present/future security (Jackson 2005, Jarvis 2009). From Dick Cheney’s (2001a) suggestion that, ‘the world shifted in some respects’, through George Bush’s (2001a) claim that ‘…night fell on a different world’, to Tony Blair’s (2001) identifying 9/11 as a ‘…turning point in history’ such that ‘the kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux’, a powerful trans-Atlantic narrative of
systemic change in our security environment has been consolidated. In Condoleezza Rice’s terms:

September 11th was one of those rare dates that forever divides history into distinct categories of before and after. Everyone will remember what he or she was doing on September 11th. It was a day when the dark and impossible became a horrific reality for our country and for the world. We commonly hear the refrain that everything changed on September 11th. In many ways that is true. (Rice 2001).

This repeated construction of 9/11 as a temporal ‘interval’ (Fortier 1999, p.47) separating discrete historical periods has relied on and sustained two related arguments. First, it has positioned those attacks as a tragic harbinger of a ‘new and frightening’ (Blair 2001) terrorist threat. Viewed thus, a new, incorrigible, type of terrorist enemy determined for maximum casualties now confronts us all as an existential, imminent, danger. Second, this spectre of unprecedented, exceptional, threat serves as a potent justification for radically rethinking security policy at home and abroad; with 9/11 figuring here as, ‘a window into our future…where the old methods of deterrence are no longer sufficient – and new strategies and capabilities are needed to ensure peace and security’ (Wolfowitz 2001). Gone now forever, it seems, is the Cold War era of rational, deterrable, foes. Our once familiar adversaries replaced by a ‘new normalcy’ (Cheney 2001b) of nihilistic enemies necessitating appropriately exceptional counter-terrorist measures. In the remainder of this section, we turn now to specific examples of these as subsequently enacted on both sides of the Atlantic.

Counter-terrorism from above
The post-9/11 period witnessed the introduction of a veritable panoply of new Anglo-American counter-terrorism measures. This section introduces some of the most prominent ‘top-down’ initiatives enacted in each state in order to highlight trans-Atlantic convergence in this policy arena, and to add context to the citizen-led measures turned to below. Specifically, we turn now to the construction of new definitions and categories of threat; the increasing attention to regulating individual movement; and the enhanced powers of surveillance introduced by each state.

Amongst the most sustained Anglo-American responses to the 9/11-induced sense of uncertainty has been a concerted effort to identify and proscribe new forms of terrorist behaviour. Both states moved here to supplement and update existing official definitions of terrorism, with the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act and the UK’s 2006 Terrorism Act both significantly broadening prior accounts of this threat, adding, at the same time, specific new offences to be now considered under the rubric of terrorism. The latter, for example, controversially dealt with the glorification of terrorism. As critics have noted, the ambiguity and reach of these new constructions of terrorism rendered their powers not only applicable to groups engaged in hitherto legitimate forms of dissent. It rendered them also applicable to all manner of criminal activities not typically understood as terrorism-related (e.g., Haque 2002, p.174, Eland 2003, p.163). With anti-war protesters, marijuana smugglers, dog owners and litterers but four of the demographics subsequently targeted, a whole swathe of social activities have now been opened to counter-terrorism policing (compare Dworkin 2003, Lichtblau 2003, O’Hagan 2004, US Department of Justice 2004, BBC News 2008). This effort to re-establish control upon a background of uncertainty was enhanced by a parallel, multifaceted, attempt to more tightly manage the movements of individuals. In the first instance, entrance into these two states became increasingly difficult with the Bush
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administration’s reinvigorated effort to keep out those ‘evil folks lurking out there’ (Bush 2001b) symbolised and embedded in measures such as Section IV of the USA PATRIOT Act; a new $11 billion ‘Smart Borders’ Initiative to ‘provide a strong defense for the American people against all external threats, most importantly international terrorists’ (Department of Homeland Security 2002); and the 2006 Secure Fence Act. The British state, similarly, worked equally hard to maintain the boundary separating domestic order from international anarchy, interpreting 9/11 as evidence of a tangible link between border control and national security. Part 4 of the 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA), for example, dealt explicitly with questions of immigration and asylum, outlining the Home Secretary’s power to certify suspected international terrorists. For, as the House of Commons Explanatory Note made clear, it was now vital that: ‘in the light of the new situation arising from the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington [the Government] have the necessary powers to counter the increased threat to the UK’ (House of Commons 2005, p.32).

Although certainly not limited to the Anglo-American context (see Bigo 2006, Vaughan-Williams 2008), this attempt to further control the movement of suspect bodies was likewise apparent in the increased powers sought for forcible transportations of non-citizens away from the domestic. The restructuring of the US Immigration and Nationality Act, for example, significantly broadened the range of individuals at risk of removal, with the (newly expanded) definition of ‘terrorist activity’ now representing a deportable offence. Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act, indeed, expanded these powers of removal even to those providing lawful assistance to organisations not designated as terrorist groups, requiring the demonstration of ignorance that an individual’s support may have assisted ‘terrorist activity’. In the UK, similarly, the now repealed Part 4 powers of the 2001
ATCSA dealt explicitly with this matter, significantly increasing the grounds for the forcible removal of individuals ‘whose presence in the UK is not conducive to the public good’ (Office of Public Sector Information 2001). And, in August 2005, these grounds were expanded still further with the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke releasing a list of ‘unacceptable behaviours’ warranting deportation or exclusion. This impressively ambiguous list of offences extended to individuals expressing views which:

- foment, justify or glorify terrorist violence in furtherance of particular beliefs; seek to provoke others to terrorist acts; foment other serious criminal activity or seek to provoke others to serious criminal acts; or foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK (Home Office Press Office 2005).

A third dimension of this effort to manage individual mobility concerned Anglo-American efforts to regulate freedoms of movement within their geographical borders (see also Guild 2005). Following 9/11, both states enacted vastly increased powers of detention and incarceration, with the USA PATRIOT Act permitting the indefinite detention of immigrants and non-citizens. (Public Law 101-156, 2001, Section 412), and the Part 4 powers of the British 2001 ATCSA providing for the same without charge or trial for foreigners suspected of engagement in international terrorism. Although the British powers were ultimately ruled incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, critics were quick to identify their alienating impact upon particular domestic communities (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2003, Liberty 2004). Their replacement with the ‘Control Orders’ of the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act did little to assuage civil rights advocates, with citizens and foreign nationals alike now subject to curtailments of their liberties for suspected involvement in terrorist activities.
A final, equally important, constituent of this new topography was the emergence of vastly increased powers of surveillance within the two states. In the US, these powers emerged again with the USA PATRIOT Act, with Title II – ‘Enhanced Surveillance Powers’ – dedicated to extending the state’s authority to survey ‘terrorists’, ‘agents of foreign powers’ and computer hackers. These new provisions streamlined the procedures by which court orders for information and surveillance warrants could be granted and legalised ‘roving wiretaps’ providing for the tapping of telephones with potential to be used by suspects under investigation. Although not without precedent (Lyon 2003), these expanded powers of surveillance and the markedly reduced role for judicial scrutiny therein, posed considerable implications for citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. If less pronounced than the American case, recent British legislation has also introduced widespread changes in the state’s powers of surveillance. Chapter 11 of the 2001 ATCSA, for example, outlined a number of provisions whereby the Secretary of State could require communications providers to retain data for the purposes of national security (Office of Public Sector Information 2001). Although challenged by the Internet Service Providers Association, these powers provided for the revealing of an individual’s name, address and internet usage history without the need for any judicial or executive warrant. As the Information Commissioner argued, this effectively meant:

that data may be retained for longer than they otherwise would be, on the ground that their retention is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national security, but that the data may then be accessed for a variety of collateral public purposes which have no connection (direct or indirect) with national security (cited in Privacy International 2002)
Counter-terrorism from below

As we have seen, the construction of a new global environment of increased unpredictability, disorder and risk was responded to by the US and UK executives through a multifaceted attempt to further manage the flows of information and bodies into, out of, and within their borders. In themselves, these developments were perhaps unsurprising: invocations of exceptionality have long been linked both to the forging of exceptional security policies, and to the centralisation of political power within executive agencies. Perhaps less predictable, however, were the contemporaneous efforts of each state to construct new security mechanisms for countering terrorism ‘from below’: at the level of the polity. The remainder of this section introduces key examples of these measures, charting the enhancement of citizen obligations to collect information, prepare themselves and their dependents, and otherwise contribute to the security of others in this ‘new’ era of terrorism.

Amongst the many controversial initiatives to follow 9/11, the ill-fated Operation TIPS seems to stand out as particularly prescient for subsequent occurrences. This Terrorism Information and Prevention Service, which emerged under the US Freedom Corps and Citizen Corps programmes, encouraged Americans with access to the houses and lives of fellow citizens to report suspicious activities directly to the FBI. Utility workers, postal workers and the like were here encouraged to fulfil their civic duty through the gathering of potentially pertinent intelligence on their fellow nationals; their collected activities aggregating into what was officially described as:
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a national system for reporting suspicious, and potentially terrorist-related activity. The program will involve millions of American workers who, in the daily course of their work, are in a unique position to see potentially unusual or suspicious activity in public places (cited in Biesecker 2007, p.162).

Although withdrawn under the 2002 Homeland Security and Defense Act, Operation TIPS’ production of citizens as information foragers and siphons was to live on in both the US and UK. The American Highway Watch scheme, for example, witnessed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enter into agreement with 300,000 members of the American Trucking Association (including school bus drivers and toll collectors), calling on these individuals similarly to ‘recognise and report suspicious activity’ encountered in their everyday lives (Department for Homeland Security, cited in Amoore 2007, p. 216). Surveillance roles such as these have also been extended beyond particular sectors of the citizenry defined by employment. The New Jersey Office of Homeland Security, for example, have run public awareness campaigns with slogans including: ‘Our most effective weapon against terrorism is you. If you suspect it report it’, and ‘Watch Out Help Out’ (State of New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, undated; see also Hay & Andrejevic, 2005, p. 340). Technologically literate suspicious Americans, moreover, are now even able to submit their intelligence ‘tips’ directly to the FBI through completing a simple online form (FBI undated).

If these generalised and targeted calls for public vigilance sought to mobilise an army of willing citizen-siphons, other DHS initiatives seemed predicated on a model of citizen-scouts characterised by a preparedness for participation in the provision of national and local security where required. At times, professional bodies from the public and private
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sectors were called on to input into evolving plans for relief and response. As the outgoing Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge stated:

Homeland Security is truly a national calling. All of us have a role and a responsibility in the protection of our country and we must be both ready and willing to make security a priority… With guidance and serious input from multiple stakeholders, Homeland Security recently unveiled our National Response Plan. We worked with experts and practitioners from across the country, across disciplines, and across traditional barriers to fuse and pull together, for the first time in the nation's history, a comprehensive, single, all hazards approach to managing domestic incidents. (Ridge, 2005 emphasis added)

At others, a still wider invocation to citizen participation was encouraged; the DHS-instituted Ready Campaign, for example, continues to encourage Americans to prepare emergency kits and plans whilst keeping abreast of the latest information on terrorism and other security threats. Indeed, concerned individuals – as individuals or as participants in workplaces, schools and communities – may now even assess their preparedness for terrorist attacks and other emergencies by testing their Readiness Quotient (RQ) online.² Initiatives such as these here reflecting the DHS philosophy that:

citizens are a necessary and absolutely irreplaceable asset in this fight. Since that day [9/11], we have come a long way to motivating our citizens to do their part to prepare and ready their families and friends for any potential disaster, whether natural or man made. And in doing so, we have depended on our partners in the

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² The Council for Excellence in Government’s Readiness Quotient (RQ) tests are available at the following URL: http://www.whatsyourrq.org/ (accessed 2 March 2010).
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private sector, the academic community, and all levels of government. They have all helped us to engage and empower citizens to embrace a direct role to accept the responsibility to secure your family, your freedom, and your community. (Ridge 2005, emphasis added).

Although we return to this emphasis on social or communal responsibility below, the full extent of these obligations become apparent as Ridge continues:

we're all in this together, ladies and gentlemen. Each of us bears the title of citizen and so, we must all also shoulder the responsibilities that accompany that wonderful and magnificent trust. And in doing so, we will ensure that future generations of citizens inherit more than just the title, but also the blessings of liberty that, in this great nation, the title of citizen actually represents. (Ridge 2005, emphasis added)

As Ridge suggests, the obligation to participate in security governance practices is not only a personal one, or even a responsibility one owes to one’s immediate community, but also perhaps something owed to generations to come.

In the UK context, suspicious citizens were provided with similar access to the national intelligence architecture via the introduction of a confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline. Here, those witnessing activities such as the renting of commercial vehicles, the photographing of ‘security arrangements’, the visiting of ‘terrorist-related websites’ (Police National Legal Database & Staniforth 2009, p.241), or, as Vaughan Williams (2008, p.74) notes, even the inhabiting of residential accommodation, were encouraged to articulate their concerns directly and anonymously to those charged with providing national security. In similar vein
to the New Jersey campaign, the Metropolitan Police’s anti terrorism adverts arrived with
the strapline: ‘If you suspect, it report it’ (Metropolitan Police, undated). In July 2004,
 Furthermore, British households were leafleted about preparation for terrorist attacks and
other emergencies (HM Government, 2004); the advice therein almost identical to the US-
based Ready Campaign. Here, the section ‘Helping to prevent a terrorist attack’ contained
various invocations to action, encouraging the reporting of suspicious activity – ‘Do not
hesitate to tell the police’ – with a citation from the MI5 head making the public’s role clear
in anti-terrorism: ‘Working closely with our law enforcement and intelligence partners, we
strive to keep the UK safe and make it difficult for terrorists to operate here. But public
vigilance, good sense and co-operation are just as important and essential components of
the UK’s response as a whole’ (HM Government 2004, p. 17, emphasis added). Other
broad appeals to participation in security provision have included widespread appeals for
Universities to contribute to preventing radicalisation and extremism, despite the well-
known limits of this terminology (see Spalek & Intoual 2007); and, finally, initiatives more
specifically targeted at younger demographics such as the conduct of anti-terrorism
exercises in schools. As Greater Manchester Police (Undated) reported one such exercise:
‘School pupils become counter terrorism officers for the day’.

A related movement towards enhanced citizen participation in this policy area can be found
in the upsurge of US and UK community-based counter-terrorism initiatives (see Spalek &
Intoual 2007, Spalek, & Lambert 2008, Klausen 2009, p.416). These have overwhelmingly
targeted those populations deemed host to specific, internal, ‘suspect’ communities (see
Hillyard 1993), and have included the ‘outreach and engagement initiatives’ of the DHS’s
Engagement with Key Communities Team, such as the 2007-8 ‘Roundtables on Security
and Liberty’ with representatives from Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, and Middle
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Eastern American communities (DHS Undated; see also Amoore 2008). The ‘Prevent’ strand of CONTEST in the UK signalled a similar interest in ‘risky’ minority demographics. These efforts to incorporate representatives of such communities into the national security project raise considerable concerns surrounding their efficacy (Spalek & Imtoual 2007). They also, more worryingly, tapped into a post-9/11 tendency to ‘wage war through citizenship’ (Rygiel 2006). With pre-selected populations here increasingly expected to contribute to the national security project as part of the performance of citizenship, these programmes not only serve to divert responsibility for security away from more formalised spheres of political activity. They also further imply that culpability for the very existence of these threats resides within those minority communities disproportionately targeted by these (and the ‘top-down’) counterterrorism measures. As Community and Local Government Secretary Hazel Blears (cited in House of Commons, Home Affairs Select Committee, 2005, p.46) made explicit:

Dealing with the terrorist threat and the fact that at the moment the threat is most likely to come from those people associated with an extreme form of Islam, or falsely hiding behind Islam, if you like, in terms of justifying their activities, inevitably means that some of our counter terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community. That is the reality of the situation, we should acknowledge that reality and then try to have as open, as honest and as transparent a debate with the community as we can.

As Spalek & Imtoual (2007, p.193) emphasise, surveillance practices of this form are increasingly being cast as a responsibility of citizenship:
it might be argued that Muslims’ responsibilities as active citizens have increasingly been framed by anti-terror measures which encourage internal community surveillance so that the responsible Muslim citizen is expected to inform the authorities about the activities, suspicious or perceived to be suspicious, of their fellow community members, and to actively help deal with any potential extremism.

Turning, finally, to the British CONTEST 2 strategy with which we began, still further evidence for the continued appeal of this ‘bottom-up’ approach to counter-terrorism emerges. This strategy called for further anti-terrorism training for ‘ordinary’ citizens to supplement that hitherto received by sixty thousand people throughout the UK. Under this programme, the citizenry’s counter-terrorism responsibilities were extended still further: stretching now even beyond recognising, preparing for, and reporting on potential, emergent, threats. Now, (certain) citizens were expected to participate in responding to future terrorist attacks: an obligation that blurred any distinction between the providers and recipients of security still further. As the Prime Minister noted on the strategy’s release:

Today, not only the police and security and intelligence officers and our armed forces, but also the emergency services, local councils, businesses and community groups are involved in state-of-the-art contingency planning. Tens of thousands of men and women throughout Britain – from security guards to store managers – have now been trained and equipped to deal with an incident and know what to watch for as people go about their daily business in crowded places such as stations, airports, shopping centres and sports grounds (Brown 2009).
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Within the existing literatures on contemporary counter-terrorism, discussions around risk management offer a potentially useful inroad into understanding the ‘bottom up’ developments traced above. Interest in this risk management framework emerges, in part, from the prominent role of discourses of unpredictability in the counter-terrorism field. Claims to the unknowable, unpredictable, character of our new terrorist foes have, of course, been central to justifying post-9/11 policy responses, with figures such as Paul Wolfowitz (2001) regularly asserting our need to ‘prepare ourselves for the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again’. Donald Rumsfeld (2002), more famously, invoked the existence of:

known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.

Claims, such as these, to the omnipresence of uncertainty in the counter-terrorism field immediately call forth Ulrich Beck’s (1992, 1999, 2002) notion of the global risk society. While the appeal of this appears obvious in light of the above comments, Beck’s emphasis on the objectivity of risk has been appropriately critiqued (Aradau & van Munster 2007, p. 96). For Aradau and Munster (2007), these mechanisms are therefore better understood as an exercise in precautionary risk management: a framing that points to the precariousness of particular designations of risk, and elite justifications for action in the face of (constructed) unknowable dangers. Viewed thus, claims to the existence, scale, and appropriate responses to, particular risks emerge as part of a broader contest over representation.
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The ‘top-down’, executive, efforts to manage threat definitions, bodies and information against an insecure backdrop certainly appear to fit this conceptualisation of policy formulation as an exercise in precautionary risk management (see also Burke 2002, Kessler & Daase 2008, Kittelsen 2009). In terms of the ‘bottom up’ initiatives of the new topography, however, this approach appears rather less complete. Discussions of risk management, and its connotations of calculative decision-making (see Amoore and de Goede 2008), suggest an approach to counter-terrorism that is both quantitatively organised, and undertaken by experts. These discussions imply, put otherwise, that terrorism is fought by those with sufficient access to relevant intelligence; an ability to interpret this information appropriately; and a designated authority from which to act. Yet, as we have seen, the contemporary Western way of counter-terrorism extends far beyond the immediate decisions of executive agencies and their subordinates. Governance, in this arena, has been diffused right throughout the social: to the homes, lives and work of ‘ordinary’ individuals and communities. To further understand the involvement of these actors, then, we introduce now our notion of stakeholder security.

By way of introduction, let us first note that the contemporary appeal to citizen vigilance and participation in security provision is, in one sense, not at all new. James Hay (2005), for example, points out that American exhortations for families to prepare communication plans in the event of terrorist attacks or other emergencies, hark back to a longer tradition of government. Louise Amoore (2007, p.216), while pointing to the distinctiveness of the precautionary principle noted above, has similarly argued:
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There is nothing substantively new about engaging the eyes of people in their everyday routines and journeys in order to identify suspicious behaviour or the apparently “out of the ordinary”. In many ways, this is a rearticulation of the “behind the blinds” surveillance of the 1950s suburban neighbourhood watch.

Getting to grips with this gradual progression towards governance from a distance has long been a concern of the governmentality literature. Authors inspired by this tradition have here noted, for example, the connections between developments in anti-terrorism and other areas of government (Hay & Andrejevic 2005); and the concomitant emergence of ‘government through community’ (Rose 2008, p.90). One aspect of this effort to rethink ‘the territory of government’ (Rose 2008, p.88), indeed, is precisely this appeal for individuals to take responsibility for their own security and welfare, where individuals are “…being urged by politicians and others to take upon themselves the responsibility for their own security and that of their families… to take an active role in securing themselves against all that could possibly threaten the security of their chosen style of life’ (Rose 2008, p.100).

Rose’s discussion points us towards a related literature that explores this theme of growing responsibilisation for individual wellbeing. Here, spheres as diverse as health, welfare, pensions and crime, have all been subject to contemporary efforts at encouraging individual provision for personal gain (see Andersen 2010, Belfrage 2008, Watson 2010). As Garland (1996, p. 452) argues, responsibilisation here ‘involves a number of new techniques and methods whereby the state seeks to bring about action on the part of “private” agencies and individuals – either by “stimulating new forms of behaviour” or “stopping established habits”’. While the use of these strategies, as Garland (1996, p.454) reminds us, bring into
question traditional public/private distinctions, the stimulation of private activity they engender cannot be seen as a straightforward hollowing out of the state:

The state does not diminish or become merely a nightwatchman. On the contrary, it retains all its traditional functions—the state agencies have actually increased their size and output during the same period—and, in addition, takes on a new set of coordinating and activating roles, which, in time, develop into new structures of support, funding, information exchange or co-operation. Where it works... the responsibilization strategy leaves the centralized state machine more powerful than before, with an extended capacity for action and influence. At the same time, however, this strategy serves to erode the notion of the state as the public's representative and primary protector. It marks what may be the beginning of an important reconfiguration of the 'criminal justice state' and its relation to the citizen.

As with the governmentality literature, these discussions of individual responsibilisation seem to capture the shifting emphasis towards individual provision of one’s own welfare. Yet, as we have suggested, contemporary ‘bottom-up’ efforts at countering terrorism from below appear to rely on a still broader appeal to obligation even than this. Individual citizens have increasingly been called on to take responsibility not only for the security of themselves and of their families: by preparing emergency kits, plans and so forth. But also, importantly, to take responsibility for the security of one’s community understood in a far broader sense. In Tom Ridge’s framing, indeed, citizens are now responsible even for the security and wellbeing of future generations.
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As the range of subjects to whom ordinary individuals are responsible for helping to secure has broadened, so the pressure for responding to this call has intensified. With participation in counter-terrorism mechanisms viewed increasingly as a social commitment, citizens are obligated – not merely expected – to contribute to the national security project in specific ways. One recent UK government report on community interventions, for example, expressed its frustration that, ‘they are unable to get some partners to engage, particularly in achieving interventions’ (Daily Telegraph 2009). A British woman was also recently brought to trial for failing to inform the authorities of her husband’s preparations to engage in terrorist activities (BBC News 2010). Although the individual was acquitted, the bringing of this charge indicates the importance of these assumptions regarding social responsibility: the costs of failing to participate in countering terrorism are here deemed fully social, not merely individual.

In order to better understand these developments, and to shift analytical emphasis from the risky individuals and behaviours explored in the risk management and responsibilisation literatures, we propose that contemporary citizen-led counter-terrorism strategies be understood as an effort in establishing a model of stakeholder security. This term, we suggest, more precisely captures the construction of social responsibilities that underpins the recent developments detailed above, and the importance of these constructions for their public legitimisation. Although the term stakeholder is characterised by connotative contestability – it ‘means many different things to many different people’ (Phillips et al 2003, p.479) – its widening in general usage has proved productive in extending its applicability far beyond Freeman’s (1984) path-breaking discussion of a particular style of corporate management. If Kelly et al (1997, p.238) are correct in arguing that, ‘Almost everything, it seems, has a stakeholder dimension: stakeholder capitalism, stakeholder
government, stakeholder Europe, stakeholder society, stakeholder economy’, we here seek to highlight a similar dimension in security policy. In so doing, we follow Will Hutton’s (1997, p.3) attachment of stakeholding to inclusion, such that: ‘…a stakeholder society and a stakeholder economy exist where there is a mutuality of rights and obligations constructed around the notion of economic, social and political inclusion’ (Hutton 1997, p. 3).

Hutton’s attachment of stakeholding to inclusion appears immediately pertinent to the new counter-terrorism topography sketched at this article’s outset. As we have seen, the increased willingness of political elites to claim ignorance of potential, emerging, or imminent dangers has worked to legitimise non-elite involvement in counter-terrorism programmes. With these programmes justified not by a limited availability of reliable intelligence, but rather by the very absence of reliable knowledge, new practices and behaviours are increasingly expected of citizens to supplement, or somehow ‘fill’, these ‘gaps’. Responsibility for the combating of terrorism and the associated provision of security now stretches across the social: infiltrating, and linking, national, community and individual levels of social interaction.

The stakeholder approach to countering terrorism is predicated, then, on an appeal for inclusion across distinct, if linked, spheres of social activity. It should be noted that the inclusion sought (expected, even), however, is of a very particular kind. Participation in these counter-terrorism projects is demanded from citizens in order to correct the limits or failures of the national security architecture. Our participation is called forth, put otherwise, to deliver what the state is, simply, unable to provide. Citizens are therefore included in the delivery or provision of security as a shared public good, where the desirability and
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contents of this good are presumed to be already established. As Alistair Darling (1997, p.11-12) suggested in an earlier context:

We look to the government to do those things that we cannot do ourselves, but the government itself does not always have to provide the services, or the delivery mechanisms. Public provision is effective in some cases, in others it is less so…It is not a conflict between public and private; both government and private sector have different roles to play; indeed, they are dependent on each other; there is a partnership between them. (Darling 1997, p. 11-12, emphasis added)

If we return to Tom Ridge’s comments above, the form of citizen-involvement envisaged in the contemporary counter-terrorism arena clearly accords with Darling’s emphasis on the delivery of established ideals. What these programmes appear not to foster is a rather different form of inclusion based on deliberation and agential participation. In this sense, the contemporary stakeholder security paradigm eschews republican approaches to stakeholding rooted in notions of authorship and participation. Instead, it promotes a communitarian-inspired approach to the citizen-stakeholder as a participant in only the delivery, not the authorship, of public goods. Seen in this way, evolving approaches to counter-terrorism may be viewed as an extension of broader socio-political developments, where, ‘The more powerful and radical stakeholder idea…has faded away fast while the communitarianism of personal responsibility has continued to be pursued’ (Driver & Martell 1997, p.42). As such, the movement towards a new topography of security measures we have sketched may perhaps be most profitably understood as the latest moment in a trajectory towards a new mode of governance that cuts across old distinctions
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between high and low politics; a new mode of governance reliant on the conscription of ordinary individuals into the state’s traditional apparatuses and projects.

At the individual level, this shift towards a stakeholder model of counter-terrorism positions or interpellates ‘ordinary’ citizens into the role of stakeholders in the contemporary struggle with terrorism. In calling for our direct participation in the national security enterprise – through the reporting of suspicious behaviour, participation in inter-community dialogue mechanisms, the undertaking of emergency training, and so forth – the new security topography seems radically to have transformed what it means to be a citizen within the US or UK. Today, publics are not merely interest groups to be fought over by competing political projects, nor are they simply consumers of public resources. They are not quite, either, passive voters merely represented by elites seeking political power (see Bingham, Nabatchi & O’Leary 2005, p.549). Instead, they are required to be active: to engage directly and immediately in traditional issues of high politics through the collection and transmission of intelligence information and so forth. This widespread demand for citizen participation has been couched not simply in terms of an individualised act of utility-maximisation such that the participant will themselves receive tangible benefits. Rather, it is couched in terms of ‘our’ need to contribute to the enhancement of security as a truly public good. Participation in these new mechanisms, put otherwise, is not requested because we, as individuals, will be safer for their existence. Rather, (or as well), it is requested, because in so doing we will also increase the security of those around us. As a recent Metropolitan Police advertisement for the new Anti-Terrorist Hotline summarised against an image of a bustling suburban street: ‘A bomb won’t go off here because weeks before a shopper reported someone studying the CCTV cameras’ (Metropolitan Police Undated).
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This call for public participation in the provision of security places considerable responsibilities on the citizen. In the first instance, to participate appropriately citizens are expected to possess a literacy of this new climate of (in)security. Here, ordinary individuals are to be capable of recognising those behaviours that potentially endanger themselves and others; to know whom to contact under such circumstances; and to be able to access the pertinent central sites of governance appropriately through the dialling of telephone hotlines or the completion of anonymous Internet forms. In addition, citizens are further expected to be active in responding to attacks should they occur. It has become a civic obligation to contribute to, and participate in, the monitoring of others such that oneself and one’s others will benefit from enhanced security. And, the import of this obligation trumps, it would seem, any possible uncertainty we may experience in the fulfilment of these new roles. Again, to reiterate, as an earlier Metropolitan Police (2008) radio advertisement stated: ‘You don’t have to be sure. If you suspect it, report it’.

This reliance on ordinary citizens for counter-terrorism indicates, we suggest, a refashioning of both the agents and sites from which security emanates. At the level of the individual, it also introduces a considerable ambiguity. Now, the contemporary citizen has become at once a subject, a potential object, and a technology of security policy. In the first instance, as a stakeholder likely to benefit from enhanced national and local security, the citizen is positioned as a beneficiary of this new topography of security measures. As a shopper, or a temporary dweller of crowded spaces, for example, the contemporary citizen appears to enjoy the protection of these new mechanisms: she is the referent meriting securing both as an individual and as part of her broader social groupings. Second, paradoxically, the citizen has also increasingly become a potential object of these security measures: a possible threat from which others require protecting. Any individual partaking
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in the letting of temporary accommodation, the photographing of particular infrastructures, or even using public transport infrastructure, for example, may now be viewed as acting suspiciously by others around them. We are all, here, potential terrorists, or as Packer (2006, p.378) argues, ‘we are all becoming bombs’, surrounded by stakeholders in the security enterprise, even if the level of risk we appear to pose is likely to be read through intervening factors such as visible markers of ethnicity or religion. Finally, as we have seen, the contemporary citizen also must now participate actively in the provision of security for themselves and others through both reporting and responding to an ambiguous, ever-expanding, catalogue of suspicious behaviours. Here, ordinary individuals represent not only a threat, but also a cure in the confrontation with terrorism. They are simultaneously part of the problem and part of the solution.

The fact that this positioning of contemporary Western citizens as subjects, objects and technologies of security brings ordinary individuals into this regime of governance could be viewed as a desirable movement. Not only does it potentially engender a departure from the docility so frequently identified in discussions of the depoliticised nature of Western societies through offering polities new forms of political agency and engagement. It also, perhaps, enhances pluralism within the governance of states such as the US and UK: substituting a distribution of political power for otherwise frequently concentrated schemas in areas of high politics at least. A more sceptical reading of these developments, however, would point to the circumscription of these new forms of agency by more established political elites. All of the bottom-up measures reviewed in this article emerged initially from the Anglo-American core executives or their subordinates ultimately responsible for security and policing. And these agents, of course, have been central in setting the parameters of these engagements through requesting specific forms of information, for
example, or through undertaking the formal and informal education of citizens in threat prevention and response in the counter-terrorism context. Participation in this new topography is not then, we would argue, a new organic form of political activity springing from society’s grassroots. Using Isin’s terminology, citizens are encouraged to be active, not activist:

While activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not (Isin 2008, p.38)

It may be, therefore, that whilst citizens are called upon to participate and be active in security politics, that, as the scripts are already written the capacity for agency and engagement, and ultimately, the capacity for citizenship, is heavily circumscribed. In this vein, we might profitably distinguish between a more communitarian flavoured stakeholder approach to security being presently pursued on the one hand. And, on the other, a more radical, republican, form that would involve individuals in the writing of scripts beyond the simple performance of pre-given roles. Whether either form of stakeholder security can be successful in providing security for citizens remains to be seen.

Conclusion

In this article, we have identified the emergence of a relatively coherent approach to anti-terrorism policy in the US and UK: one oriented around the production of a new topography of security measures. At one level, this topography has been characterised by the two states’ executives fashioning new tools for countering this threat ‘from above’. At the same time, successive leaderships have also implemented a range of new mechanisms for combating
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terrorism ‘from below’, at the level of the polity. To conceptualise the increasing reliance on citizens in this area, we introduced the notion of stakeholder security. As we have seen, invocations to participation are frequently made through appeal not to elite expertise or knowledge, but rather the absence of such. As such, stakeholder security calls to mind the ‘responsibilisation’ of individuals identified in other domains, but goes further, as that which is sought is not an individual good, but a public one: the security of the wider community and society. Concomitantly, the obligation to participate in the provision of such security is cast in increasingly strident terms, becoming, in some instances, the key responsibility of citizenship. This diffusion of responsibility precariously positions the citizen simultaneously as a subject to be secured; a threat from which to be secured; and a technology of security.

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