‘Cohesion’ in the Context of Welfare and Citizenship: Discourse, Policy and Common Sense

Matthew Donoghue, BA (Hons.), MA

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Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University
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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy between 2001 and 2010. It argues that there was a disjuncture between the linguistic presentation and the actual aims of cohesion and welfare policy. This was symptomatic of deeper processes of coercion and consent, designed to create citizens amenable to socio-economic adjustment and increasing responsibility onto the citizen. Discourses in policy are contrasted with everyday narratives of people living in Bradford and Birmingham to draw out this disjuncture, but also to show elements of dissent from dominant discourses, as well as the multiple ways in which the everyday narratives conform to a series of discursive logics, potentially lessening the impact of this disjuncture.

The thesis uses a critical analytical framework, adopting Gramscian concepts of ‘common sense’ and hegemony, within which the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis and focus groups are used. Critical Discourse Analysis is used to analyse cohesion and welfare documents from between 2001 and 2010, whilst focus group research investigates the plausibility of the disjuncture between language and aims, as well as the underlying construction of a common sense understanding of ‘cohesion’ based on hegemonic discourses. However, these hegemonic discourses can still be challenged through what Laclau calls ‘contamination’, providing the everyday narratives with the capacity to question discursive logics and subtly alter the discourses themselves.

The thesis’ contribution to knowledge comes from the combined use of critical discourse analysis and focus groups within the Gramscian analytical frame, as well as its findings that a disjuncture between the language and aims of policy, and how citizens in selected areas have reacted to this, points to wider questions about community, empowerment and responsibility in the New Labour years. This is placed in the context of New Labour’s approach to, and ambitions of, creating British citizens that followed an appropriate ideology (Bieling, 2003: 66) based on community as a new plane from which to administer micro-moral relations (Rose, 1996: 331).
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6
INTRODUCTION – DEVELOPING 'COHESION' IN THE CONTEXT OF WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP

This thesis engages with New Labour’s development of cohesion through Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy since 2001. The thesis argues that the empowering language of New Labour’s policy did not match up with its actual aims, which points to wider underlying processes of coercion and consent designed to create a polity more amenable to socio-economic adjustments and the shifting of responsibility from the state to the citizen. The thesis engages with this argument through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of New Labour policy documents on Community Cohesion and welfare reform, alongside a series of focus groups that examine how, if at all, the discourses are used and reproduced in everyday narratives. This provides further insight into the disjuncture between language and aims, what this disjuncture signifies, and the processes of stabilisation that take place.

The specific area of analysis therefore is the language within New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare policy, related as it is to social, economic and ethnic integration through the lens of community. This was a key area for New Labour, as Driver and Martell illustrate:

New Labour sell community as the hangover cure to the excesses of Conservative individualism. Community will create social cohesion out of the market culture of self-interest. And in Labour's dynamic market economy, community will also be good for business, underpinning economic efficiency and individual opportunity (Driver and Martell, 1997: 27).

Generally speaking, issues of cohesion, integration, race relations and
inequalities have been staples of political debate for decades. These concepts have been popular with academics from various disciplines. However, since 2001 and the multiple ‘race’ riots centred on Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, the issue of cohesion has become particularly important for UK policy making, especially in the New Labour years. In terms of social policy, a break down in cohesion became a catch-all explanation for a raft of social problems ‘as diverse as Islamic terrorism, educational underachievement, gang violence, teenage pregnancy, worklessness, drug crime and anti-social behaviour’, which were all ‘explained through reference to the erosion of the informal ties and reciprocal arrangements that bind communities together’ (Flint and Robinson, 2008: 1). The problem (and solution) of social/Community Cohesion has import across multiple policy areas, encroaching on fairly self-contained territory such as welfare\(^1\). Ironically, the solution to a multifaceted problem became increasingly targeted, to the extent that one could argue that a political project of cohesion was developed to address a number of New Labour’s ideological aims.

This project presented a specific notion of cohesion that was promoted and enacted through Community Cohesion and welfare policy, and legitimised and solidified through a range of discourses, as will be argued in the thesis. The Cantle and Denham Reports’, for example, asserted that ethnic 'communities' had begun living 'parallel lives', which had led to mistrust of

\[^1\] As will be discussed later, particularly chapter four, there are numerous ways in which welfare and cohesion interact, though they are still largely seen as separate entities with regards to policy.
one another (e.g. Home Office, 2001a). Considering the unrest was largely contained within economically deprived neighbourhoods, some have questioned the preoccupation with ethnic difference found within Community Cohesion policy (e.g. Ratcliffe, 2012; Cheong et al. 2007).

New Labour’s approach to developing and promoting policy was characterised ostensibly by a break with the past on both the left and the right (Driver, 2000). However, this does not mean New Labour successfully broke with the past (e.g. Heffernan, 2000). This can be seen in policy: the impetus to focus on race within the Community Cohesion literature is likely a direct result of the UK’s history of race relations legislation (Pilkington, 2008; Meer and Modood, 2009). As such, it may be useful to undertake a broader examination of UK race relations, in relation to cohesion. Yet although Community Cohesion was undoubtedly influenced by past developments in race relations in the UK (e.g. Worley, 2005; Robinson, 2005), this thesis is interested in the specificities of New Labour’s approach to social, cultural and economic integration, particularly the *implicit* focus on race and ethnicity in much of the Community Cohesion literature to the detriment of the socio-economic concerns related to social cohesion. As such, it seems prudent to focus on policy developed by New Labour, specifically New Labour’s community cohesion policy and welfare (reform) policy. The specificities of New Labour’s approach to integration suggest that the relationship between Community Cohesion policy and the party’s extensive work on welfare reform deserve in-depth examination and analysis. Focusing too strongly on the potentially disparate antecedents of Community Cohesion policy found in race relations legislation could risk
playing down further the role of socio-economic issues in favour of more
traditional debates surrounding race, ethnicity, integration and assimilation
(e.g. Robinson, 2005). This would emphasise what this thesis sees as a
largely arbitrary separation of the two policy areas. This is discussed later in
the thesis.

Related to this, the thesis focuses on the social cohesion and community
cohesion literatures more so than literature on race relations. This is because,
as mentioned above, the thesis treats Community Cohesion as a relatively
new policy area, albeit one that has ties to the past. Considering the use of
the concept of cohesion, and the long history of social cohesion (e.g. Forrest
and Kearns, 2001: 2125), it is important to explore why New Labour
decided to employ a different term when an existing one may have sufficed,
and the consequences of adopting such an approach, such as with the
deracialisation of language found in Community Cohesion policy (Worley,
2005). Considering welfare reform was also a major objective for New
Labour in the 90s and 00s, the thesis explores the cohesive effects of
welfare, and how these two policy areas help produce such a specific, yet
contingent\(^2\), understanding of cohesion. To that end, this thesis investigates
the specificity of New Labour’s response to unrest after the northern riots of
2001. It does this by examining Community Cohesion policy and welfare
reform policy between 2001 and 2010, taking into account antecedents
found in traditions of citizenship and regimes of welfare (as seen in chapter

\(^2\) As will be shown throughout, there are a number of significant connections and breaks
between cohesion and welfare as concepts that can be seen in New Labour’s policy, which
affect how they are presented.
four). The major claim of the thesis is that there existed a disconnect between the language of policy and the aims of policy that promised, but did not deliver, individual and group empowerment, particularly for ethnic groups. This is shown mainly through chapter five, in which the critical discourse analysis demonstrates that policy documents from the time contain contradictory language, nevertheless shored up through a strong discursive framework that produces a ‘common sense’ conception of cohesion and integration. This language constructs imagery of empowerment and autonomy, whilst engendering a situation in which more responsibility is shouldered by those who do not have the wherewithal to fulfil it. The legacy of this can still be felt in certain communities after Labour left office in 2010. It is important to note that the policy documents do not create discourses, per se. As Fairclough (2003) argues, such documents are only one link in a larger genre chain in which discourses are developed, legitimised, reproduced and disseminated. The policy documents are more likely to reflect wider discursive patterns and trends, rather than create discourses or even being the major force behind the prominence of particular discourses. However, considering the role of policy documents (white papers in particular) in the process of legislation creation, and in the process of the promotion and legitimisation of ideas central to New Labour policy thanks to the party’s focus on public relations (Fairclough, 2000: vii), the documents analysed in this thesis have a central role to play regarding the legitimisation and suppression of particular discourses.

Furthermore, considering the effort New Labour put into presenting and disseminating policy and the ideas within (Fairclough, 2002: 177), one
would expect discourses key to this presentation to rise to the surface, which would act to at least partially influence the public to support the policy itself. A prominent example of this would be the idea of ‘making work pay’ in relation to welfare reform (e.g. Gray, 2001; Bennett and Millar, 2005). This makes engaging with the discourses and discursive logics contained within all the more important. Such a highly controlled environment would likely facilitate the legitimisation and emphasis of key discourses, whilst suppressing (or attempting to supress) less favourable discourses. As such, an attempt to control or influence the development of particular discourses could more easily transform desirable discourses into hegemonic discourses, which are so strong they become seen as natural and are therefore much more difficult to challenge.

Hegemonic discourses, along with strong discursive logics, helped construct a political project of cohesion that presented one notion of cohesion as the only practical approach, which included both socio-cultural and economic elements whilst also artificially separating them. However, notwithstanding their strength these hegemonic discourses are susceptible to contamination. This is demonstrated predominantly through the focus groups in chapters six and seven, which find that discourses and logics identified in the policy literature can be seen in everyday narratives on community, cohesion and welfare; these discourses are either defended and reproduced, or subverted, contaminated and challenged by the participants. Welfare reform, of course, is nothing new; however, Community Cohesion as a specific policy response that invokes various forms of socio-cultural and economic integration is more recent. Varying amounts of attention have been accorded
to both these areas separately. The politics of welfare and welfare reform have been comprehensively examined: Pierson argues that although there have been fluctuations in the influence and size of the welfare state, it has not been, and will not be, entirely dismantled (Pierson, 1994; 1996; 2001). However, though the welfare state may not be dismantled entirely, its focus and therefore provision can change (e.g. Bonoli, 2007) – this is arguably what took place under New Labour (e.g. Levitas, 1998; 2005; Powell, 1999; 2000; Lund, 1999; Prideaux, 2001; Grover, 2003), through a logic of 'no alternative' that suggested previous welfare expenditure and welfare politics pursued by the left were not sustainable (Hay, 1998).

There has also been a fair amount of research concerning the nature of Community Cohesion in the UK, much of which has been critical, arguing that the heavy focus on the cultural and ethnic aspects of cohesion to the detriment of other aspects can be problematic (e.g. McGhee, 2003; 2005; Worley, 2005; Flint and Robinson, 2008). Others suggest that for cohesion to be successful, it must embrace a commitment to reduce economic inequalities (e.g. Cheong et al, 2007; Letki, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2012; Novy, 2011). The thesis largely agrees with this literature based on discussions with focus group participants in designated areas of the UK, providing a further rationale for examining the welfare state in conjunction with cohesion policy.

A number of scholars assert that welfare provision may be used to increase social solidarity through reducing inequality (Baldwin, 1990; Bay and Flora and Alber for example suggest that the welfare state can be used to increase
Pedersen, 2006; Pfau-Effinger, 2005). Considering that a key element of cohesion (be it 'community' or 'social') is in essence solidarity (regardless of the character of this solidarity), one could begin to see a joint role for both cohesion and welfare policy in promoting this – particularly if welfare retrenchment necessitates alternative sources of social support. However, although there is some work that begins to examine the connections between welfare and cohesion – for example, through the use of social capital and political trust (e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Letki, 2008), and through the more traditional routes of examining (social) cohesion and inequality (e.g. Korpi and Palme, 1998) - this has not been undertaken in such a way that understands their development and implementation in UK society as intrinsically connected. This thesis, through analysing discursive developments concerning Community Cohesion and welfare reform in the UK in the 00s, contributes to the literature on social and Community Cohesion by providing a systematic analysis: it provides a critical exploration of the discursive connections between New Labour's welfare and Community Cohesion policy, paying particular attention to how 'dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). This is social (and, by extrapolation, cultural) solidarity that is threatened by the breaking down of traditional forms of social organisation, which can exacerbate problems of integration (Flora and Albers, 2009; 40). This links it to T.H. Marshall's conception of citizenship – particularly social citizenship – that enables citizens to participate in society with a modicum of economic autonomy and civic-social equality (Marshall, 1950).

4 The (sometimes only perceived) difference between social and Community Cohesion will be explained in more detail later. As a vulgar definition, however, social cohesion can be seen to have more concern for economic inequalities, whereas Community Cohesion affords more focus on to cultural inequalities.
achieved through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of twelve policy documents from between 2001-2010, combined with a number of focus groups in Bradford and Birmingham designed to explore common sense understandings of cohesion and welfare, influenced by discourses and discursive logics. The examination of power abuse, dominance and inequality is important because of the implications that power relations between citizens, groups and the state can have on cohesion in the UK: the power relations between groups, or between citizen and state, effectively determine their position in society, and indeed the public goods they can access (Bourdieu, 1986; Bauder, 2008). In other words, it is possible that the more asymmetrical the power relations, the less equal particular groups or individuals will feel with others, which could affect how they participate in society.

The thesis provides an original contribution through the combination of its substantive focus and methodological position. The thesis' use of CDA emphasises the more obvious interactions and reactions between welfare and cohesion (e.g. through social exclusion, social capital, and social citizenship) whilst drawing out less self-evident but equally important links that can be found through the analysis of social and political logics. Social and political logics are understood in this thesis as the building blocks of discourse (see Howarth, 2005; Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Social logics denote the boundaries of discourse, whilst political logics constitute and contest these boundaries.

Cohesion and welfare can themselves be seen as social logics, as they are
systems of practice that contain sets of rules on how one should understand and act upon phenomena (e.g. Howarth, 2005, 323). More important to the thesis are political logics, which contain the elements of these rules; the linguistic building blocks that contribute to and influence one’s overall understanding and therefore approach to subjects such as community, cohesion and welfare. The three political logics examined in the thesis are conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration – three components that can have an impact on both cohesion and welfare as concepts and institutions. The way these logics interact and strengthen discourses contribute to the notion that such discourses can be seen as hegemonic and develop ‘common sense’ (e.g. Gramsci, 1985) understandings, which result in only being able to conceive of a particular understanding, rather than engaging with alternatives. However these discourses are susceptible to what, discussed in detail in chapter three, Laclau (2001) calls contamination, as evidenced by some of the discussions on and responses to key subjects in focus groups, where the discursive logics are invoked and reproduced as well as subverted and challenged. This contributes to the notion that if cohesion can be seen as a project, it is syncretic and contingent on a number of ideological and discursive anchors (as examined in chapters five, six and seven).

CDA provides an interesting approach to understanding cohesion and welfare because of its focus on the accumulation and transfer of power as seen through talk and text. This is important considering the need to (at least nominally) redistribute forms power in order to combat social exclusion and therefore increase cohesion (Werbner, 2005; Kearns, 2003; Shaw, 2006).
Crucially, employing CDA of welfare and cohesion policy literature examines how the shared aims and means of the policies are represented in language and presentation, and how this presentation provides the discursive and ideological boundaries of a political project. Utilising Gramscian perspectives within a wider tradition of critical theory, the thesis adopts an analytical framework concerned with understanding elements of socio-political domination and negotiation. It is therefore an appropriate framework within which to nest CDA. It also links them to the analysis of policy documents through using the Gramscian concept of 'common sense' to engage with popular understandings of welfare, cohesion and community.

The CDA provides the critical analysis of the language of New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy, which is essential to understanding the significance of a disjuncture between state and citizen as understood through linguistic and political presentation. The focus groups build upon the CDA by examining the same issues from the position of everyday narratives – i.e. positions that are not necessarily explicitly political, or aimed at achieving political ends. Without both the CDA and the focus groups, it would also not be possible to entertain the notions of hegemony and common sense, and therefore the notion that New Labour’s approach to issues of unrest and disadvantage contained contradictions, the

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5 'Common sense' is akin to a 'normal understanding'. However this normal understanding is mediated by discourse (as will be discussed in chapter three), which can potentially imbue it with ideological preoccupations – particularly as 'common sense' is 'organised' and presented by intellectuals (Ives, 2005: 74-75). Gramsci himself sees the term as a 'collective noun', standing as a product of historical processes (Gramsci, 1971: 324-5). Furthermore, this common sense is usually treated as unproblematic, regardless of its inherently syncretic nature: 'Common sense is a chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions, and one can find there anything that one likes' (Gramsci, 1971: 422).
effects of which the party needed to address\textsuperscript{6}.

In summary, this thesis engages with New Labour's specific policy response to unrest in 2001, and how this response linked up to wider policy prescription regarding tackling social exclusion through welfare. It provides analysis of narratives from both government and members of particular communities in Bradford and Birmingham regarding cohesion from a critical perspective, through the use of CDA and focus groups. The linking of cohesion and welfare policy narratives via CDA provides an appropriate perspective on New Labour's policy development in this area, whilst the use of focus groups allows for the gathering of indicative evidence regarding the appropriation of discourses in popular narratives. The thesis contributes to knowledge through this perspective on the nature of cohesion in the UK and the potential influence of discourses in popular narratives on welfare, cohesion and community.

**Main Arguments**

The major aim of this thesis is to critically engage with the UK’s Community Cohesion policy framework by problematising discourses and logics in New Labour's cohesion and welfare policy. It aims to highlight the difficult nature of developing such a targeted and prescriptive response to unrest: namely the divergence between the language and aims of the policies, a possible over-emphasis by government on ethnic and cultural inequalities over economic inequalities, combined with the perpetuation of asymmetrical

\textsuperscript{6} At points in the thesis, I discuss whether or not the creation of a hegemonic project by New Labour could be seen as a conscious and intentioned decision. I do not discuss it here for continuity’s sake.
power relations between particular social groups\(^7\). This is undertaken via a critical analytical frame, allowing for a systematic observation of power abuse and control via discourse.

The points of disjuncture and contact between the language and presentation of policy and focus group participants’ everyday narratives does not just represent a simple disagreement between two groups. The schism between highlights a disconnect between state and citizen when one considers that the language of the policies under scrutiny are inherently geared to represent (or at least present a representation) of the supposed wishes of the polity. Furthermore, the disconnect could point to wider issues in terms of the legitimacy of New Labour’s projects whilst in government (beyond electoral legitimacy). It is here that Gramsci’s thinking on hegemony becomes useful, in terms of providing the wherewithal to smooth over inconsistencies and contradictions, and present a reality in which there is little disagreement\(^8\).

To further this end the thesis makes a number of key arguments, the majority of which derive directly from the findings of the CDA of cohesion and welfare policy documents. The primary argument, supported by the findings of the CDA, is that the language of policy diverges from the aims of policy, as set out in the documents analysed in chapter five. The language of the policy is predominantly of a promotional nature, which shuts down debate through presenting one side as a \textit{fait accompli}. This is as opposed to the language of policy being dialogical, therefore inducing some form of debate (e.g. Fairclough, 2000: 12). For example, both policy on cohesion

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\(^7\) These groups include ethnic ‘communities', as well as socio-economic groups.  
\(^8\) Chapter two deals with this in detail.
and welfare is preoccupied with presenting the image of empowered citizens, and of a government providing citizens with tools to realise that empowerment (e.g. DCLG, 2007b: 6). However, as chapter five will demonstrate, CDA reveals that the policy can in fact be seen as rather top-down and controlling in nature; instead of empowering citizens, it can provide them with more responsibility without necessarily increasing citizens’ rights and entitlements. Of course, all policy is top-down to an extent, which would not be a problem if it did not purport to be more bottom-up and grassroots orientated. As Ledwith argues:

The New Right hijacking of a language of liberation (“empowerment”, “participation”, “active citizenship”) not only cleverly diluted this radical tradition, but it transformed rights into responsibilities by transferring the collective responsibility of the welfare state to the individual, the family and the community as a moral responsibility. Thus, notions of “community” became interpreted in the interests of the state (Ledwith, 2001: 171)

Furthermore, the discursive logics mentioned earlier contribute to the construction of common sense understandings of community, cohesion and welfare, which influences how the roles of Community Cohesion and welfare policy are understood and generally accepted. The common sense understanding of various elements of cohesion and welfare contribute to related and interlinked objectives, which draw out the notion of a project of cohesion – a set of ideological and practical devices to encourage citizens to interact with, and act within, the state in a particular way. The political logics work in unison in order to legitimise and strengthen one another and the discourses to which they contribute. Combined with the use of language that shuts down debate, this results in discourses that are presented as the
way of doing things, as opposed to *one way* of doing things. As chapters five and seven discuss, these discourses have the potential to become hegemonic, which in turn presents the possibility of reinforcing hegemonic power structures as opposed to empowering individuals.

This draws out the links between New Labour’s welfare reform and Community Cohesion policy⁹, illustrating their shared objectives: the (potential) cohesive and integrative effects of welfare provision alongside the potential for Community Cohesion to promote social behaviours such as appropriate work ethics. Perhaps one of the most obvious links between the two, discussed at various points throughout the thesis, is the idea that employment promotes integration – therefore encouraging people away from welfare, as well as encouraging people to become more integrated into the life of their communities.

Finally, engagement with focus groups in certain areas of the UK that have particular experience with Community Cohesion allow for an indication as to the use and influence in popular narratives of the discourses and logics discussed in chapter five. The arguments derived from the focus group discussion revolve around the concepts of common sense and the contamination of discourse. Firstly, chapter seven argues that there is indeed a common sense understanding of cohesion and welfare, which is influenced by the discourses and logics found within cohesion and welfare policy. This can be seen in the language used by focus group participants when...

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⁹ As will be discussed throughout the thesis, for New Labour these two policy areas were ostensibly separate, save some shared objectives concerning social exclusion. The thesis discusses briefly the long history between welfare and social cohesion as concepts/phenomena having shared objectives.
discussing issues concerned with the preoccupations of these policies. However, the chapter also finds that these discourses can in fact be contaminated: this is where discourses are appropriated and their meaning and implications are subtly changed, in line with Gramsci's thinking on 'spontaneous grammar'\textsuperscript{10}. Furthermore, a contaminated discourse has its 'chain of equivalences' (Laclau, 2001: 11) – the links a discourse has to various meanings and conceptual anchors – stretched to the point that it can become an 'empty signifier' (Laclau, 2001: 11); in other words, a term with diminished meaning that is easier to populate with alternative preoccupations, without necessarily tainting its outward presentation. So, for example, discourse in cohesion policy may link more strongly with assimilation, whilst a discourse contaminated in the popular narrative may instead link more strongly with integration without losing the outward presentation of being 'cohesion'.

These arguments – that there is a difference between the linguistic presentation and actual aims of policy, that one can see the construction of a project of cohesion, that there is a 'common sense' conception of cohesion that presents itself as the 	extit{only} option, and that the aforementioned logics help discourses become hegemonic, though these discourses can be contaminated in the popular narrative – combine with one another, relating back to the central argument of the thesis: that New Labour's specific response to unrest, although presented as empowering and enabling, resulted

\textsuperscript{10} 'Spontaneous grammar' is the idea that grammatical conformity is related to the material and social situation of the speaker. Gramsci uses the example of a peasant who will intentionally attempt to change the way they speak when moving in to an urban centre, in order to be accepted (Gramsci, 1984: 180-81)
in a top-down and controlling policy framework. This juxtaposition developed particular contradictions and paradoxes, rendering the framework problematic. However, the development of hegemonic discourses increased the project’s resistance to critique. These arguments can be linked thanks to the use of a critical analytical frame, drawing on Gramscian analysis and the hermeneutic circle, which refers to the notion that the whole of an object under study (such as a text) cannot be understood without making reference to the component parts and vice versa (Kinsella, 2006), and the (re)production, shifting and consolidation of elements of power and influence (in this case, via language and discourse).

**Contribution to Literature**
This thesis primarily contributes to the literatures on social and Community Cohesion, whilst speaking to elements of the literatures on welfare and citizenship – such as social inclusion/exclusion, and citizenship rights and responsibilities. This is achieved partly via substantive content and partly from the methodological and analytical position held in the thesis.

The discursive approach to understanding cohesion in the UK, as well as the relationship between welfare and cohesion policy as component parts of a political project of cohesion provides an alternative perspective to other studies on social/Community Cohesion and the cohesive effects of welfare policy. There have been studies employing CDA that study the language of socio-cultural policies that impact on cohesion (e.g. Blackledge, 2003) such as the ‘racialisation' of language (Blackledge, 2006), an investigation into 'slippages of language' concerning Community Cohesion (Worley, 2005),
the problems surrounding de-emphasising material deprivation when formulating cohesion policy (McGhee, 2003), as well as studies that explore the role of social capital in cohesion relative to cultural and economic inequalities (e.g. Cheong et al., 2007; Letki, 2007). However, the role of Community Cohesion policy in direct relation to welfare provision has generally been under researched. Likewise, there is little work that examines cohesion and welfare policy in the context of a wider programme of cohesion, though there is cognate work such as the role of the welfare state in developing social capital (e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005), as well as its wider effects in urban society (e.g. Forrest and Kearns, 2001). A special mention here needs to be made for the work of Norman Fairclough: Fairclough has written extensively on CDA and has applied it, to an extent, to the welfare reform of New Labour (e.g. Fairclough, 2002). However, his focus is different to that of this thesis; Fairclough focuses on the language of welfare reform and its implications for welfare, whereas this thesis utilises CDA to draw links between the policy areas of welfare and cohesion (through the use of logics), in order to understand how they contribute to one another's reproduction and development, within the wider context of British cohesion.

A combined CDA of cohesion and welfare reform therefore provides a new and different perspective from which to engage with the policy responses to unrest and exclusion. Furthermore, whilst it acknowledges the centrality of arguments in favour of recognising the importance of both cultural and economic inequalities, it provides a fresh perspective through examining the assumed power relations of the policies and programmes inherent within
discourse and language. This can be seen in both the CDA and the analysis of focus groups.

The major findings – that the language of cohesion and welfare policy does not necessarily correlate with the aims of the policy, that there is a political project of cohesion as evidenced by the discursive links between cohesion and welfare, and that these discourses are potentially hegemonic (notwithstanding their susceptibility to contamination) – make a contribution to literature in a number of ways. Chapter five will show there is still a role for economic inclusion in cohesion in the UK. This is drawn out not only through highlighting economic aspects within Community Cohesion policy that have been played down by the discourse, but by highlighting the same or similar strands of argument found in welfare reform policy. Secondly, although valuable work has been undertaken on the economic, social and cultural elements of both cohesion and welfare (as discussed in section 1), they have been undertaken separately. The analysis in this thesis, seen both in the CDA and analysis of focus groups, aims to combine examinations in order to observe social policy frameworks in conjunction with one another. A particular example of this is seen in chapter five when discussing the importance of employment as a route out of exclusion (therefore developing cohesion), identified in both welfare reform and Community Cohesion policy documents. This helps highlight the idea of cohesion as a political project.

The final two arguments provide contributions that were not entirely expected from the outset. The use of a Gramscian frame to understand
power in language combined with CDA allows for the exploration of the possibility of hegemonic discourses, and the potential effect such hegemony may have on the aforementioned cohesion project. Chapter five finds that the interrelation of discourses and logics, strengthening and reinforcing one another to present a 'common sense' conception of cohesion, could be seen as creating a hegemonic culture of cohesion that is top-down and relatively controlling. This culture is economic and socio-cultural in nature (though not always evidenced by the language of the policies), and focuses overly on cultural mores and individual dysfunction. This has the effect of shutting out alternatives to this project, as evidenced indicatively through discussions with focus group participants in Bradford and Birmingham.

The finding from the focus groups that discourses and logics identified in the CDA do have some purchase with the groups interviewed, whilst also being subject to contamination, further highlights the potential for the existence of hegemonic discourses. This is because the process of hegemony is not solely about unproblematic domination. Chapter two discusses the role of coercion and consent in hegemony, whereby individuals and groups must feel invested in the project in order to provide spontaneous consent. In respect to discourse, contamination can be seen as the interaction needed to achieve such consent: individuals accept the discourses on their own terms and are able to slightly alter the import of these discourses, even if they cannot be changed wholesale. The discourses are therefore legitimised and reproduced so as to become embedded in common sense understandings of phenomena.
The exploration of hegemony through CDA and focus group analysis provides an alternative method of examining the discursive and practical links between welfare and cohesion policy, understanding and problematising their interrelation. It also provides a vehicle with which to discuss the relative strength and influence of various discourses and logics, which contributes to the argument that a 'common sense' understanding of 'cohesion' contributes to an acceptance of a specific approach to cohesion in the UK.

These findings combine to bolster the major argument of the thesis: that New Labour's specific policy response to unrest in northern England, the uptake and mainstreaming of the concerns of Community Cohesion within other policy areas, and the resultant construction of a project in which a set of ideological and practical devices are deployed to encourage prescribed forms of interaction, action and integration, is problematic due to issues of discursive and practical focus, alongside its top-down and controlling nature. The thesis contributes to an existing body of literature on this subject, whilst adding more specific explorations of the deployment of linguistic and discursive tools. This can be seen in the context of its methodological and analytical frameworks, which provide a critical and hermeneutic analysis of the interrelation between cohesion and welfare policy in developing cohesion in the UK. Indeed, the notion of a project of cohesion could be understood as a hermeneutic device in itself. This critical and hermeneutic outlook enables the thesis to explore the role power abuse, dominance and inequality play in the discourse of cohesion, as found in cohesion and welfare policy, along with indicative evidence gained from focus group
Chapter Outline

Chapter one provides a critical introduction to the genesis of Community Cohesion policy in the UK, as well as the major themes concerning the role of welfare provision for New Labour. The chapter argues that Community Cohesion policy was to an extent an empty vessel that New Labour populated with its own preoccupations, some of which stemmed from the party's welfare reform agenda, as argued by Robinson (2008). It highlights the overly ethnicised nature of Community Cohesion policy, whilst drawing attention to the theme of individual responsibility and empowerment inherent in welfare reform. It provides a rationale for examining cohesion and welfare in conjunction with one another, through presenting the historical context for the policies under scrutiny.

Chapter two discusses employing a critical analytical frame, based primarily on the thinking of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci's work on linguistics and culture, as well as his most famous work concerning hegemony (incorporating common sense and coercion and consent), provides a framework that is sensitive to the subtleties of power relations and power transfer, insofar as it is designed to observe and critique the pooling of power through ideological and material means\(^\text{11}\) (e.g. Ives, 2005: 63-101). This makes it an appropriate frame within which to undertake a CDA of

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\(^\text{11}\) For this thesis, ideological means mainly revolve around the influence and development of particular discourses, whilst material means can be seen firstly as the influence of discourse on agency, and secondly as the real-world effects policy implementation can have on discourses – for example using sanctions to reinforce behaviour specified by particular discourses, as discussed in chapter four.
policy on the subject, particularly as this frame would allow the problematisation of policy from a contextual (i.e. historical) position as well as a purely policy-orientated position.

Chapter three builds upon the analytical frame and discusses and justifies the use of critical discourse analysis as the main form of analysis in the thesis. It argues that CDA is well placed to study power abuse and inequality inherent within cohesion and welfare policy manifested through discourse. The implicit power inequalities masked by promotional language can be made explicit through the critical and Gramscian analytical frame. The focus groups primarily provide a value-added to the CDA, in that indications as to the prominence and influence of particular discourses identified in policy can be explored through discussion with people in areas key to both welfare reform and Community Cohesion policy: in this case, Aston in Birmingham and Manningham in Bradford. Employing such a methodology allows the research to address the thesis' key arguments: that the language and aims of cohesion and welfare policy diverge, that there is a relatively self-contained project of cohesion as evidenced by the discursive links between cohesion and welfare, and that these discourses are potentially hegemonic (notwithstanding their susceptibility to contamination).

Chapter four places the thesis in scholarly context. It engages with academic thinking on the nature of welfare and welfare provision, but also with thinking on citizenship – particularly social citizenship – due to the centrality of participation and rights and responsibilities in cohesive

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12 These areas are in the top 10% and top 1% of deprived areas in the UK respectively (Birmingham City Council, 2011; Bradford City Council, 2011; DCLG, 2011)
societies. It also examines the idea that Community Cohesion (as opposed to social cohesion) as a distinct policy area is recent, but the idea of cohesion is not, and nor is the idea that a particular kind of welfare state can promote cohesion (e.g. Morel et al., 2012; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003; Lewis and Surrender, 2004; Bonoli, 2007; Powell, 2000; Beauvais and Jenson, 2002; Jessop, 1995; Levitas, 1996; Hartman, 2005; Jessop, 1999). This facilitates the CDA for a number of reasons. Firstly, exploring how cohesion is understood (be it social or Community Cohesion) makes possible a deeper level of analysis; one can identify for example possible aims of the policy in relation to thinking on how to develop cohesion. Furthermore, understanding how welfare can contribute to cohesion via an engagement with academic and theoretical debates allows for these connections to be drawn out more explicitly in the CDA. Finally, this allows for an explicitly critical approach to analysing the policy, as an understanding of how particular debates may have contributed to policy development allows for a more incisive problematisation of the elements of policy.

Chapter five draws upon the analytical frame set out in chapter two, the methodology of chapter three, and the scholarly context and debates contained in chapter four. This chapter contains the major arguments and findings of the thesis, and argues that the policy response developed by New Labour is problematic partially because of a divergence between empowering language and controlling policy, which creates contradictions and paradoxes regarding citizens’ aims and outcomes, distorting expectations. However, the discussion of discourses and logics shows that a syncretic and potentially problematic project can be presented as
unproblematic, through influencing a 'common sense' conception of cohesion based on top-down and controlling policy, presented as a means of empowerment. This in turn develops the notion of hegemonic discourses: a hegemonic project is characterised by uniting disparate demands from various groups, which can be seen firstly in the policy itself (for example with the mixing of various elements of thought on citizenship) and then in the appropriation and partial contamination of the same discourses when observed in discussion with focus group participants. It is in this respect that a common sense understanding is reached, based predominantly on the powerful discourses and logics, but also via a partial contamination of these discourses. Alongside the argument that the language and aims of the policy diverge (as discussed above), the CDA utilises the identification of shared political logics to designate cohesion and welfare as social logics as well as policy areas. This allows the analysis to highlight how the two areas work in conjunction across various social, political, economic and cultural concerns to act as a project of cohesion aimed at influencing the behaviour of individuals. It also highlights how the empowering language of the policies does not necessarily match with the top-down nature of what is proposed in the policies. The idea of hegemonic discourses becomes central to the creation of this project of cohesion due to its ability to garner popular (spontaneous) consent at the necessary cost of having the full effect of the project lessened: this takes place through the contamination of discourses and therefore the reducing of its discursive impact. These findings and arguments are then exposed to a plausibility probe in the form of a number of focus groups.
Chapter six introduces the focus groups in more detail, and provides a descriptive analysis of the groups and some of the narrative data collected. It discusses the contextual elements of the focus groups: the relative difficulty of recruiting participants in both areas, the general feeling of the participants and atmosphere within the groups, and the influence of the moderator in various groups. It also provides an introduction to some of the data: elements of convergence and divergence across groups and sites, key areas of concern for participants, as well as some key definitions of terms used by the groups. The chapter frames the in-depth analysis of chapter seven, and helps address the thesis' main arguments and contribution by exploring the feelings of participants regarding cohesion and welfare in key sites in the UK, in order to provide an indication of the influence of the policies and the overall framework.

Chapter seven builds upon the discussion in chapter six by introducing elements of the CDA into an analysis of the focus groups. This is in order to incorporate the main methodological concern of paying attention to how language may reproduce or challenge inequalities and power structures, thereby either increasing the influence and/or longevity of the cohesion project, or increasing (even if incrementally) the influence of individuals, as potentially indicated from participants' contamination of discourses. It aims to provide indications as to whether the discourses and logics identified in chapter five can be seen to be included in individuals' discussions concerning cohesion and, if so, the extent to which they shape individuals' opinions and arguments on the matter. Using CDA also allows for an exploration of the contamination of discourse, which can be a particularly
subtle endeavour.

The arguments contained within chapter five, supported by theoretical context and further exploration in surrounding chapters, contribute to the major aim of the thesis: to examine and problematise New Labour's policy response to unrest from 2001 onwards. These arguments are contextualised through a critical analytical frame, supported by critical discourse analysis and focus group research. The thesis contributes to literature through its approach to examining cohesion in the UK (methodologically and substantively). It provides a contribution to a gap in the literature via a systematic analysis of two policy areas that have been developed to be complementary to one another, but have not necessarily been examined as such. It also provides insight into how individuals in areas key for cohesion and welfare policy understand cohesion and cognate concepts in relation to (possibly hegemonic) discourses identified in the policy literature.
CHAPTER ONE – A BACKGROUND TO COHESION AND WELFARE UNDER NEW LABOUR

By 2001 New Labour was four years in to its first term in office. It had already implemented a number of important programmes such as the New Deal(s) and the National Minimum Wage. Events in 2001, namely riots that took place in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, opened up political space for the development of Community Cohesion (Robinson, 2008: 17), which dovetailed with the party’s approach to social exclusion (Worley, 2005: 486; McGhee, 2003: 382). The period 2001-2010 also saw the continuing development of New Labour's welfare reform programme, building upon the New Deals. Combined, these areas contributed to a wider social policy agenda, encapsulating New Labour’s response to unrest.

Developing a critical overview of the development of Community Cohesion policy and welfare reform between 2001-2010 will facilitate debates concerning key concepts and debates to cohesion and welfare. This chapter provides this overview through a descriptive analysis of New Labour’s major policy developments in the time period, as well as discussing some elements that are central to the policies, such as social exclusion and social capital for example. This helps inform the engagement with key academic and theoretical concepts related to cohesion and welfare in chapter three, as well as providing essential background information about the policies under scrutiny in chapter five.

Two major points to be made in this chapter have import on how New Labour’s treatment of cohesion and welfare should be understood. Firstly,
'cohesion' can be seen as a relatively malleable concept; 'Community Cohesion' becomes an empty vessel that New Labour can effectively populate with its own policy concerns (Robinson, 2008: 17). Secondly, the concepts of social exclusion and social capital are central to the working of both these policy areas, and shape their development in multiple ways, such as integrating members of society under one set of core values. This provides some context to the contention later in the thesis that the two areas contribute to a political project of ‘cohesion’, partially based on development of cultural norms and values (Bieling, 2003; Rose, 1998; Finlayson, 2009).

In order to achieve its aims, the chapter is divided into a number of sections. The first section provides an overview of the precursors leading to the development of Community Cohesion policy, namely the 2001 riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley. The second section deals with the development of Community Cohesion policy as a response to this unrest, followed by the parallel reform and development of welfare policy, which affected the same groups of people considering the context of deprivation in which the riots took place (Amin, 2003: 461). Finally, before concluding the chapter will provide an overview of two concepts threaded throughout both Community Cohesion and welfare policy: social capital and social exclusion.

1.1 The Development of Community Cohesion Policy
Although cohesion itself is not new, Community Cohesion as a policy area was developed as a reaction to the unrest experienced in northern towns in northern towns in

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13 See chapter three for a fuller discussion of cohesion as a concept.
Community Cohesion in the UK treads a balance between legislation and policy initiatives. Rather than developing explicit cohesion legislation, the framework was instead rolled out through local and national initiatives, in order to promote local solution building. Community Cohesion was mainstreamed through government, to become a consideration within the development of social policy. It can therefore be seen in legislation such as the Education and Inspections Act 2006, which made promoting Community Cohesion a duty for educational institutions. Community Cohesion can also be seen in the Equality Act 2006, which deals with inequalities based on gender, race and disability. As will be discussed in chapters five and seven, this mainstreaming has the potential to produce tensions and contradictions between the local approaches to developing cohesion in communities, and the ability (or desire) for government to retain central control over major cohesion initiatives. The department in overall control of the Community Cohesion framework was the Department of Communities and Local Government. It was founded originally in 2001 (in the same year as the riots and the response) as a sub-group of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). It became its own department in 2006, subsuming the responsibilities of the ODPM at that time.

To understand the development of Community Cohesion policy, it is useful to understand the context in which the riots occurred. The disturbances in 2001 were characterised by the media as ‘race riots’, and as some of the worst in the UK’s history (BBC, 2001: Harris, 2001). Kundnani described
the unrest as ‘the violence of communities fragmented by colour lines, class lines, and police lines. It was the violence of hopelessness. It was the violence of the violated’ (Kundnani, 2001: 105). The government’s official line was that groups were polarised along the lines of education, employment, worship and language, which did not allow for ‘any meaningful interchanges’ between various groups (Home Office, 2001: 9). Yet this in itself does not provide the whole story, as ‘[t]here can be no doubt that ethnic resentment has been fuelled by deprivation and desperation’ (Amin, 2003: 461). Alongside problems of deprivation was anger and frustration aimed at the police (Kalra, 2003), which coincided with media reports of racially motivated crime against whites by south Asians (Kalra, 2002). This enabled the British National Party to mobilise in the area, particularly regarding local elections (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003; Kundnani, 2001).

The riots were therefore multifaceted. The trigger may have been agitation by the BNP and related groups, but it must be seen in the wider context of historical deprivation (Amin, 2003: 461), particularly after the closure of the mills:

Notably, these were towns that had endured sustained economic decline from the 1980s onwards following the demise of much of the manufacturing base (including the textile industry that had once dominated local landscapes). The jobs to which South Asian migrants had once been drawn had disappeared and there were few alternative opportunities either for them or for working class whites (Ratcliffe, 2012: 264).

The government resolved to develop a policy framework that would contribute to easing tensions in this area. However, its focus became
increasingly specific, focusing more on the ‘mores of minorities’ (Cheong et al., 2007: 26), perhaps to the detriment of more structural concerns (e.g. Mcghee, 2003; Blackledge, 2006; Letki, 2008: 121; Ratcliffe, 2012: 263).

1.1.1. A timeline of cohesion

Between 2001 and 2010, many documents mentioned Community Cohesion or had Community Cohesion at their centre. However, a number of documents can be identified as key, in that they developed, codified or normalised various policy developments and approaches in the wider process of creating Community Cohesion. The major documents within the period focused on in this thesis span from 2001 to 2008. The documents can be found in table 1 on the following page.

The localised inquiries into the riots (e.g. Richie, 2001; Clarke, 2001), as well as the Cantle and Denham Reports, did not pay much attention to the precursors or triggers of the riots, instead choosing to focus on ethnic divisions that led to mistrust and ‘self-segregation’. The Denham report highlighted what it saw to be the main problem, arguing that ‘[w]e cannot claim to be a truly multi-cultural society if the various communities within it live, as Cantle puts it, a series of parallel lives which do not touch at any point’ (Home Office, 2001b: 13). The Cantle report was ‘particularly struck by the depth of polarisation in our towns and cities’ (Home Office, 2001a: 9).

*Table 1. Major Strategic and Policy Documents/Developments in Community Cohesion*
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building cohesive Communities: Report of the Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion (The Denham Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality and Inter-Faith Network Joint Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guidance on Community Cohesion (Local Government Association)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What Works in Community Cohesion: Research Study for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion(^\text{14})</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds</td>
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The Cantle Report centred solidly on the idea of separation between ethnic groups, arguing that there is ‘little wonder that the ignorance about each other’s’ communities can easily grow into fear’ (Home Office, 2001a: 9). This was further characterised by a lack of ‘open and honest dialogue’ and a ‘reluctance to confront the issues and to find solutions’ (Home Office, 2001a: 9). The report highlighted the notion that there was no sense of common values linking ethnic groups to Britain, with some groups looking backwards to a mono-cultural society, and others looking to their countries of origin in order to foster a sense of identity. The report did however recognise that ‘some communities felt particularly disadvantaged’ (Home

\(^{14}\) Authored by the Department for Communities and Local Government.
The problems of policing raised by Kundnani and others were framed by the idea that there did not exist a code of best practice, ‘where there was not only inconsistency in their approach but also in the extent to which they felt supported and a part of a positive vision for the area’ (Home Office, 2001a: 10).

The Cantle report set out to develop shared principles of citizenship, within the context of the development of a solid and permanent infrastructure. This new citizenship was to be used to develop ‘a more coherent approach to education, housing, regeneration, employment and other programmes’ (Home Office, 2001a: 11). This was to be based upon cross cultural contact, designed to foster understanding and respect. Community leadership was to be promoted, as well as integration over segregation.

The second national inquiry in the aftermath of the riots – the Denham Report – continued the theme of the Cantle Report. Headed by the then Home Secretary, John Denham, its focus was on practical steps that could be taken to minimise future disorder, such as appointing ‘facilitators to foster dialogue within and between fractured communities’ (Home Office, 2001b: ii). Of particular interest for the discourse analysis of chapter five, the Denham report lauds the importance of localised problem solving:

Many of the recommendations Cantle, Clarke, Richie and Ouseley make are aimed at local Government, and at other local agencies and organisations. While central Government clearly has a crucial role to play in empowering and enabling local communities, many of the solutions to the problems identified must be found and implemented at a local level. The action we have already taken… is intended to support local community solutions, rather than impose them from the outside (Home Office, 2001b: iii).
Any development of Community Cohesion was therefore expected to include local people, as well as acknowledging and understanding the multifaceted context of the riots, which included ‘a series of economic, cultural and social issues’ (Home Office, 2001b: 10). This suggests that at least on the surface, attempts were being made to incorporate multiple elements of unrest. This is examined further in chapters five and seven. Yet issues of segregation were still seen mainly as a conscious choice on the part of residents (Home Office, 2001b: 11). The major theme that developments were to be based on was that of ‘a civic identity which serves to unite people and which expresses common goals and aspirations’ (Home Office, 2001b: 12).

The report of the inaugural meeting of the interfaith network for the UK regarding Community Cohesion was published in 2002. The general message of the meeting was encapsulated by Alan Smith, the team leader for the Home Office’s Community Cohesion Unit15, who highlighted that ‘Community Cohesion is inextricably linked to issues of social inclusion/exclusion and race equality, but extends beyond these to encompass all the factors that can lead to our living “separate lives” in what have been called “fractured communities”’ (Inter Faith Network, 2002: 3). This echoes the thrust of both the Cantle and Denham reports. Emphasised was the need for local communities to take the lead in developing Community Cohesion. Faith communities were touted as being ideally placed to lead such developments (Inter Faith Network, 2002: 3),

15 Smith was one of 20 staff charged with mainstreaming Community Cohesion within government, on the recommendation of the Denham Report.
highlighting the priority that ethnic and faith groups were given in issues of cohesion. The need to develop shared values was again highlighted, along with the importance of building social capital, in order to combat the problem of parallel lives (Inter Faith Network, 2002: 4).

Councillor Laura Willoughby, the deputy chair of the Equalities Executive of the Local Government Association, emphasised the need to ask the ‘awkward questions’ regarding Community Cohesion. The development of a ‘toolkit’ for cohesion was highlighted, designed to foster cross-community communication and development in education, the voluntary sector, housing and so on (Inter Faith Network, 2002: 11-12) – again echoing the areas of interest illustrated in the Cantle and Denham Reports.

The scope of Community Cohesion from the outset, therefore, is that of reported local control with national oversight. Community Cohesion was to be mainstreamed – so that it became a concern in the development of policy and legislation, without necessarily becoming standalone legislation itself. In this respect, Community Cohesion became simultaneously national and local. There was certainly rhetoric concerned with bottom-up solutions, though much control remained with local and national government, as will be discussed further in later chapters.

2004 brought the report of the Community Cohesion Panel, forwarded by Fiona McTaggart MP – the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Race Equality, Community Policy and Civil Renewal. It demonstrated a commitment to ‘developing a successful multi-cultural society. There is no choice in our view – multiculturalism is a fact of life’ (Community
Cohesion Panel, 2004: 7). A particular focus was put on the role of managing migration to develop cohesion, which ‘must not just be seen as an economic issue’ (Community Cohesion Panel, 2004: 7). The panel, set up in 2002, continued the narrative of the importance of promoting shared values, which involved developing citizenship at a national level, supported by the actions of local authorities. The overwhelming priority was making sure that any member of a BME group, regardless of faith, felt British, ‘whether or not they add their cultural identity to the term’ (Community Cohesion Panel, 2004: 8). Furthermore, ‘[t]he heritage of all communities – including the host community – should be celebrated’ (Community Cohesion Panel, 2004: 8). In fact, the report emphasised the fact that Community Cohesion affected white communities as well as BME communities (Community Cohesion Panel, 2004: 12). Regarding ethnic groups, the report recommended monitoring segregated areas, whilst applying the report’s recommendations ‘with greater vigour’ (Community Cohesion Panel, 2004: 17). Although the Denham report in 2001 acknowledged the issue of economic deprivation (Home Office, 2001b: 8), it has seemingly been dropped by 2004.

The next major development is in 2007, with the Commission on Integration and (community) Cohesion’s\textsuperscript{16} final report. It marked an attempt to move away from ‘what they describe as the unhelpful over-emphasis on residential segregation found in the Cantle Report and in Trevor Phillips’\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{16} The CIC was established in 2005. It produced an interim report in 2006/7, but the thesis focuses on the 2007 final report precisely because of its finality.
\textsuperscript{17} Trevor Phillips was the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, before becoming head of the Commission for Racial Equality in 2003. His interaction with cohesion policy was in this capacity. He is well known for discussing the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism, and the need to foster a strong sense of Britishness (e.g. Phillips, 2004).
speeches when he was head of the [Commission for Racial Equality]’ (McGhee, 2008: 49; for an example see CIC, 2007: 58). The report emphasised four key principles to be used in developing a new understanding of cohesion: a sense of shared futures, articulating what binds communities together; a new model of rights and responsibilities that make obvious the obligations that go along with membership of a community; a new emphasis on mutual respect and civility, and; a commitment to equality alongside a need to deliver visible social justice (CIC, 2007: 7). This report was more about developing a new definition of cohesion (based upon the four key principles), rather than developing recommendations for implementation at various governmental levels.

Complementing the CIC’s final report, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) published a key document regarding implementing cohesion initiatives at the local level, entitled *What Works in Community Cohesion*. Again, the focus was on encouraging positive relationships between ethnic ‘communities’ and developing policies to promote meaningful interaction in some areas, ‘building a sense of commonality around real life issues’ (DCLG, 2007: 6), although in other areas there was a stronger focus on ‘socio-economic well-being and empowerment’ (DCLG, 2007: 5). The major focus of the paper was centred around illustrating and highlighting ‘what works’ using evidence from a number of local authorities. Again, fostering commonalities between people from different ethnic backgrounds was key, regardless of if socio-economic well-being was a contextual factor for some local authorities.
Alongside the further acknowledgement of some socio-economic concerns, 2007 saw the development of tackling violent extremism in partial conjunction with the development of Community Cohesion. This was first seen in the DCLG paper *Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds*. The document contributed to a securitisation of Community Cohesion, equating a lack of cohesion with violent extremism, as shown in the document’s ‘immediate priority’:

> We have made it clear that it is not acceptable for leadership organisation to merely pay lip service to tackling violent extremism. Government is giving priority, in its support and funding decisions, to those leadership organisations actively working to tackle violent extremism, supporting Community Cohesion and speaking out for the vast majority who reject violence (DCLG, 2007: 9)

The response to the already well-established challenges to cohesion highlighted in preceding documents did not deviate from that of previous documents either. Government (both national and local) was to support local solutions, build civic capacity and leadership, and strengthen the role of faith institutions and leaders (DCLG, 2007). The focus remains strongly on ethnic division, mistrust and fear, and building a response based on communication and building mutual trust. Implicitly, then, the break that the Commission on Integration and Cohesion claimed to make may not have been as radical as the commission first imagined.

The equation of security, cohesion and extremism was solidified in stronger terms through the PREVENT strategy, developed in 2008. A major aim of PREVENT was to develop Community Cohesion, in the belief that cohesive communities are less likely to be wooed by the ideology and actions of
violent extremists (Home Office, 2008: 6). The notion of securitisation is heightened in the PREVENT strategy through being combined with CONTEST, the government’s counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2008: 5). It again lauded a local approach:

Central government will take forward the national and international aspects of this work, but local communities need to play an integral part… It is essential that local work on preventing violent extremism embraces the experience, energy and ideas of the whole community. The community should be actively engaged in multi-agency partnerships and should shape the development and implementation of a jointly agreed programme of action which meets the objectives of the strategy (Home Office, 2008: 7).

Community Cohesion can be seen to be born from a security threat, moving through elements of communication and conciliation, firmly based on relations between ethnic groups, before moving through a period of securitisation, reintroducing more strongly the notion of the security threat.\(^{18}\)

This section has outlined the major developments in Community Cohesion under New Labour since the riots of 2001. It has highlighted the rhetorical importance of localism, whilst also retaining national control over initiatives seen especially via the PREVENT strategy. Alongside Community Cohesion New Labour considered welfare to hold some tools that could be used to develop strong, empowered communities that were to be of great social benefit. The next section discusses New Labour’s welfare reform, and

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\(^{18}\) One must be aware that during the development of the various Community Cohesion strategies, the UK experienced a large-scale terrorist attack that may have altered the overall thrust and strategy of the framework. However, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter five, this should not be seen as the only influence acting upon the cohesion framework.

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how its development can be seen to dovetail with the development of Community Cohesion policy.

1.2. New Labour’s Welfare Reform as a companion to Community Cohesion
Section one highlighted Community Cohesion’s tendency to focus on ethnic and cultural concerns over economic concerns, even though multiple reports and policy documents acknowledged the contributing role socio-economic deprivation had on cohesion in urban areas. Welfare reform in the New Labour era focused strongly on social exclusion (Lister, 1998; 2003; Powell, 2000). This may help to explain the predominantly cultural focus of the Community Cohesion framework, whilst also necessitating an understanding of the role welfare may have played in combatting social exclusion and developing a form of cohesion. This section examines New Labour’s welfare reform, predominantly between 2001-2010 (whilst acknowledging the New Deals of the late 90s), constructing a narrative of welfare and linking this to the narrative of cohesion outlined above.

1.2.1. A timeline of welfare reform
New Labour’s welfare reform programme revolved around six key elements: coordination and integration of services; prevention as opposed to reactive welfare; choice and empowerment; regulation, quality and inspection; eligibility and prioritisation, and; social justice (Baldwin, 2008: 83). Unlike the Community Cohesion framework, welfare reform was not being implemented as a new enterprise; it was being built upon decades of previous developments and incarnations. To present a narrative that encompasses New Labour’s major developments in welfare reform in the
era, it is therefore more useful to present a mix of initiatives and policy documents (found in table 2).

The key elements as highlighted by Baldwin play into a larger integrated notion of empowerment, both on an individual and community level. Though New Labour’s welfare reforms generally deal with the individual in the first instance, there are elements that speak to more community-orientated approaches.

**Table 2. Major developments in welfare reform.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reform/Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Introduction of the New Deals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Pledge to eradicate child poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of tax credits</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction of the minimum wage</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Introduction of Jobcentre Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td><em>A New Deal for Welfare: Empowering People to Work</em> (DWP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td><em>In work, Better off: Next steps to full employment</em> (DWP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future of welfare to work</em> (DWP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td><em>Raising expectations and increasing support: reforming welfare for the future</em> (DWP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
New Labour’s welfare reforms began with, and were contextualised by, the various New Deals: the New Deal for Young People (NDYP), the New Deal for the Long-Term Unemployed, the New Deal for Lone Parents, and the New Deal for the Disabled. Of these four strands, the New Deal for Young People received the most funding (Beaudry, 2002: 9). The allocation of funding highlighted a desire to invest in development in young people’s skills, just as the Community Cohesion framework would invest in the development of individuals and communities socially and culturally. The NDYP aimed to empower individuals to be resilient to a changing economic landscape and the developing knowledge economy (e.g. Finlayson, 2009; 2012: 75), akin to the Community Cohesion framework’s aim to develop resilience in communities, both in terms of fighting extremism as well as surviving fast-paced economic changes in deprived areas (e.g. Home Office, 2001b: 8).

The New Deals were contextualised by a pledge in 1998/9 to eradicate child poverty. This became a central tenet of combatting social exclusion (Lister, 2006: 316). Around the same time, the government introduced a minimum wage in the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, which helped reduce 49
poverty (Coats, 2007: 40), integrating them more effectively into public economic life. 2002 saw the publication of the *The Child and Working Tax Credits: The Modernisation of Britain’s Tax and Benefit System* (HM Treasury, 2002). The document was aimed at outlining the task of ‘making work pay’, increasing financial support for those with small children (HM Treasury, 2002: 1), so that they can afford to go back to work earlier (Inland Revenue, 2001). Combined, the minimum wage and the tax credits aimed to provide support to those transitioning into regular employment. This would become a key theme, as demonstrated in later documents that covered the idea of welfare to work in much more detail.

Continuing the trend of increasing support into work, 2002 also saw the introduction of Jobcentre Plus. The aim of Jobcentre Plus was to provide a joined up approach to tackling unemployment and social exclusion. ‘Providing a single gateway for the delivery of benefit and work placement/job-seeking activities Jobcentre Plus aims to strengthen the link between welfare and work for a wide range of working-age benefit claimants, including the unemployed, lone parents, disabled people and carers’ (Karagiannaki, 2007: 178). It allowed the government to administer centrally the process of tackling social exclusion, and integrating people back into work.

2006 saw the publication of *A New Deal for Welfare*, focused on ‘empowering people back into work’. It provided an integrated summary of New Labour’s reforms and developments from 1997 onwards. However, its major aim was to highlight what the government saw to be the remaining
challenges and proposed efforts to tackle them:

But there is still more to be done to break down the barriers that prevent many from fulfilling their potential, barriers that impede social mobility and, through worklessness and economic inactivity, consign people to poverty and disadvantage. We need to accelerate the move away from a welfare state fixed to the old model of dispensing benefits and move further in the direction of enabling people to achieve a better life (DWP, 2006: 2)

Presented as an element of the government’s ‘case for reform’, this New Deal represented a shift, in that now basic infrastructure was in place – minimum wage, tax credits, Jobcentre Plus (Finlayson, 2009: 405; Lister, 2003) – the government could focus on the development of a new culture of welfare, which empowered individuals and began to prevent social exclusion rather than reacting to social exclusion. The official aims of this period were to ‘reduce by 1 million the number on incapacity benefits; help 300,000 lone parents into work; and increase by 1 million the number of older workers’ (DWP. 2006: 3). Demonstrating its connections with previous reforms, the government aimed to tackle social exclusion through promoting a more inclusive notion of work.  

The acceleration of reforms was continued in 2007 with *In Work Better Off*, the major aim of which was to work towards ‘full employment’. It identified the barriers to this goal, which dovetailed with issues regarding the relationship between deprivation and cohesion:

> Despite the fact that the biggest improvements have been amongst the groups that started off in the worst position, the legacy we inherited has meant that there are still gaps that are far too wide

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19 Though not the focus of this chapter, this idea does connect strongly to the idea that paid work is the best route to a cohesive society (Hulse and Stone, 2007: 114)
between the employment rates of different groups. People from ethnic minorities, disabled people, lone parents and people with low or no skills are much less likely to be in work than the working age population as a whole (DWP, 2007: 5)

Based on these challenges, the government aimed to achieve an employment rate of 80%, whilst continuing to reduce the amount of people ‘who are dependent on benefit’ in general (DWP, 2007a: 5). This continued the theme of reducing people who are at risk of exclusion from not participating in the world of work, potentially similar to those in particular groups who have no to little contact with those outside their immediate social or ethnic group.

Another 2007 document Reducing Dependency, Increasing Opportunity, provided recommendations on how to achieve the above aims, through the increased use of welfare conditionality, using resources ‘further towards helping and encouraging the least advantaged into work… in a more individualised way’ (DWP, 2007b: 1).

2008’s Realising Potential: A Vision for Personalised Conditionality and Support built upon the moves towards individualised support within welfare. It continued the narrative of social exclusion, and the responsibility of government to tackle this through employment:

It is essential that we do not repeat the mistakes of the last two recessions, by letting a large proportion of the workforce become disconnected from the labour market. In fact we should go further and start to build a system for the future that is even more resilient to the ebbs and flows of the economy; a system where truly no one is left behind (DWP, 2008: 7).

The aim was to provide a truly personalised path back into work, or a ‘single personalised conditionality regime’ in which everyone on benefits
and not in work should plan their own route back to work with personalised advice (DWP, 2008: 7). The report recommended splitting benefit claimants into groups: a work ready group who needed least support, a progression to work group requiring more support, and a no conditionality group who included lone parents of young children and certain carers (DWP, 2008: 8). By 2008, then, New Labour’s welfare reforms had moved from developing the required infrastructure to increase benefits that would smooth a transition to work, to developing a more stringent benefits system that expected more of those claiming benefits. The emphasis had changed from getting people back into work to helping people help themselves back to work. The government in 2009 published their response to *Realising Potential*, which was very positive of the recommendations, in fact stating the government’s intention to implement the proposals in a shorter timeframe than first proposed (DWP, 2009).

Two major concepts can be identified that contribute to the mutual development of cohesion and welfare, as well as highlighting the potential to begin to link cohesion and welfare conceptually and discursively: social capital and social exclusion. They help contextualise the scope and aims of both welfare and cohesion policy in the New Labour era, and provide a foundational conceptual background from which to interrogate key concepts further.

### 1.3. Social Capital, Social Exclusion and their place within cohesion and welfare

Social capital and social exclusion are essential to understanding the nature and scope of both Community Cohesion and welfare (reform) in the New
Labour era. They act as guides and as motivators for reform and development of policies. This section provides a brief overview of how the two concepts were used by New Labour, and their import for understanding both Community Cohesion and welfare policy.

1.3.1. Social capital, cohesion and welfare
‘Britain has long had some of the densest networks of civic engagement in the world’ (Hall, 1999: 419). The notion of social capital most popular in the UK is based on a liberal understanding of state and society. It is based on the work of Robert Putnam, the preferred social capital theorist for New Labour (e.g. Kisby, 2007: 85), who sees social capital as the ‘associations among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam, 2000: 19). In his analysis, ‘state influence is largely extraneous to generating trust; the major source of generalised trust is intermediate associations. Democratic institutions must be built up in the everyday traditions of trust and civic engagement, and are not (or not easily) built from the top down’ (Lehning, 1998: 239). This can be seen at least in the language of policy above; both welfare and cohesion the idea of local community-based solutions is prominent.

These social networks are built through voluntary associations (Cheong et al., 2007: 29; Putnam, 2000), which highlights the importance of developing inclusive communities and, to an extent, joined-up welfare provision due to the ability to include voluntary associations in getting people back to work (Fyfe, 2005). Particularly important to the use of social capital in Community Cohesion is the designation of bridging capital and bonding
Within the contemporary discourse of Community Cohesion, bridging capital is seen as the “good stuff” to be facilitated and the core of the new community development work. However, the erstwhile virtues of bonding capital are routinely seen as lamentable characteristics of the dispossessed working classes and the minority communities still mired in “identity politics”. This of course takes place within a wider policy context where resilient ethnic and cultural diversity is framed by a consensual assertion of the failure of multiculturalism (Husband and Alam, 2011: 42).

Therefore bridging capital is to be nurtured, whilst bonding capital is to be dissuaded. Yet to encourage this whilst also giving local communities as much autonomy as possible may be difficult, particularly if their wish is to increase levels of bonding capital. Another issue is that of delineating the limits of bonding capital: is it ok, for example, to encourage bonding capital within a neighbourhood consisting of multiple communities, even if this may be to the detriment of relations between neighbourhoods or postcode areas? The use and potential tensions between these forms of social capital accentuates the role ‘community’ can play in Community Cohesion. The ideas of developing ‘community spirit’ or a ‘sense of community’ (and therefore developing some form of social capital) ‘present themselves simultaneously as a description of certain social and economic ills, a diagnosis of the cures of these ills and a solution to them’ (Rose, 1999: 173; Donzelot, 1991: 169). In this case, bonding capital is the problem and bridging capital is the cure. Yet in developing ‘community’ via social capital it may be difficult to nurture one form of capital over the other, particularly without retaining some form of top-down control over the process.
A further problem with using social capital as the conceptual backbone for Community Cohesion is that communities ‘are far more complex than the concept of social capital can capture’ (Campbell, 2001: 4). Understanding how individuals and groups can improve their levels of social capital and how this contributes to Community Cohesion, for example, is very important. However, it does not really take into account the struggles people undertake in the process of increasing their social capital (Kearns and Forrest, 2000; Zetter et al., 2006: 10). Furthermore, on its own it does not necessarily capture how more established institutions such as the welfare state may contribute towards someone’s social capital, even if work is seen as a core element of increasing cohesion. In fact, some suggest that social capital as a core concept could justify a reduction in the prominence of welfare provision as traditionally understood:

Ascendency of the concept [of social capital] hinges on the international popularity of the neo-liberal agenda, which prioritises tight fiscal management, reduction in public welfare expenditure and the consequent erosion of welfare entitlements. If social capital can be used to mobilise popular resources, then the rationale for state-administered welfare is further undermined (Zetter et al., 2006: 10; see also Harris, 2002; Zetter, 2004).

The bonds formed by increased social capital, leading to increased (community) cohesion could therefore be seen as an alternative to strong state-centred provision. This tallies somewhat with the generally decentralised approach to welfare in the New Labour era, that aimed to empower individuals directly rather than constructing a controlling system. The extent to which this is the case is addressed in chapters five and seven. However, this does not mean that welfare in the UK does not have a role in
developing cohesion, or that welfare provision does not have consequences regarding cohesion. This can be seen particularly effectively within New Labour’s use and development of social exclusion.

1.3.2. Social exclusion, welfare and cohesion
Social exclusion predates Community Cohesion, particularly in New Labour policy development. The prominence of social exclusion as a concept in New Labour discourse and policy can be linked to the rebranding of the Labour Party in the 90s (Levitas, 2005: 1). It was part of a larger project used to redefine the priorities of Labour:

When the planned Social Exclusion Unit was publicised in August 1997, and billed, together with welfare to work, as the policy defining the aims and character of the Blair government, the meaning of exclusion was a little clearer. Since social exclusion was a term often used in conjunction with poverty, perhaps addressing poverty would, in fact, be a priority. On the other hand, Labour was pressing ahead with benefit cuts announced in the last Conservative budget in November 1996, which would increase poverty for some people (Levitas, 2005: 2)

Social exclusion was therefore understood as ‘a shorthand label for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health, and family breakdown’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998: 1). The development of social exclusion in policy was characterised by a mix of integrationist and moral underclass discourses (Levitas, 2005: x), highlighting the relationship between social exclusion and cohesion (in that social integration can be seen as a response to groups living parallel lives). The moral underclass discourse works within both cohesion and welfare through defining acceptable moral boundaries, and identifying the need to
bring into the fold those who exist outside these boundaries (e.g. Prideaux, 2001).

The preference towards the term ‘Community Cohesion’ demonstrates a move away from using social exclusion, which went hand in hand with social cohesion (Fairclough, 2000: 51; Worley, 2005)\(^{20}\). This move was legitimised through the process of securitisation post 2005, after terrorist attacks in London prompted a stronger focus on security. Considering at this time there was a heightened fear of groups such as Al-Quaedea, the securitisation dovetailed with existing priorities in the Community Cohesion agenda, designed to make Muslim ‘communities’ more British (e.g. Worley, 2005). This dovetailed with an attack on multiculturalism, suggesting that it had failed as a policy (Husband and Alam, 2011: 42; Phillips et al., 2007: 218; see also Mitchell, 2004), even though Britain was still described as ‘multicultural’ (Phillips et al., 2007: 218). The decentralised approach to welfare retains the philosophy (and language) of social exclusion however. The local and personalised approach, combined with the integrationist discourse found in New Labour’s approach to social exclusion emphasised personal responsibility, without necessarily diminishing the role of the state (Powell, 2000: 50; Field, 1996; Giddens, 1998). Issues of social exclusion become a part of a network encompassing multiple issues, including Community Cohesion, through the ethos of localism:

\(^{20}\) It should be noted for emphasis that social cohesion and Community Cohesion are technically different; the former focuses more on socio-economic issues, whilst the latter focuses on socio-cultural issues. However, the terms have, to an extent, become somewhat interchangeable when dealing with New Labour policy. Worley (2005) for example discusses slippages in language in this respect, which could be a result of New Labour’s move away from social exclusion and social cohesion on to Community Cohesion.
[T]his ethos is also visible in a new spatial sensibility that has grown across other government departments with a national remit, as in the Home Office’s emphasis on Community Cohesion and civic responsibility, the Department of Work and Pensions’ targeted labour market and social welfare schemes for the most deprived areas, and the Department of Education and Skills’ special schools for inner-urban areas (Amin, 2005: 615).

The ethos of localism and personalisation can therefore be seen across social policy areas, potentially contributing to the development of a larger project of social, cultural and economic integration that actively targets those outside defined norms to modify their behaviour into a more acceptable form (Larkin, 2007). Social exclusion is seen as a local problem that requires national input, particularly as these norms must be defined, communicated to and upheld within a multitude of socio-economic, ethnic and cultural communities.

The gradual de-emphasis of social exclusion as a priority concern in New Labour’s policy literature, or at least its subsumation into existing policy (such as welfare and Community Cohesion) as a specific concern within a wider project, illustrates a strategic change since 2001. Introducing the new and seductive\(^{21}\) concept of ‘Community Cohesion’ allowed debates on social exclusion, poverty and so on to be ‘steered away from more intractable problems, such as the high levels of deprivation and social marginalisation in the effected locations, and directed towards virgin political territory that the government could colonise with its own priorities.

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\(^{21}\) I use the term ‘seductive’ here because superficially the idea and language of community can be seen as having almost entirely positive connotations, combined with a strong normative element. Community is something people aspire to, but may not always be attainable (Bauman, 2001: i); it can be seen as the ends that justify the means. This does not mean however that community is always seen in a positive light. This is investigated through the Critical Discourse Analysis.
and preoccupations' (Robinson, 2008: 17).

The development of a joined-up system of governance through welfare policy that was put in place before and around the time of the inception of Community Cohesion allowed the new policy framework to take advantage of these developing networks. Through using concepts such as social exclusion it could tap in to an already existing conceptual framework and embed itself more easily into existing policy traditions, whereas Community Cohesion’s adoption of social capital enabled welfare strategies to tap-in more readily to a framework of individual capacity building (e.g. Jessop, 2003: 146) that allowed the agendas of localism and personalisation to develop further.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a foundational understanding of the character and trajectory of New Labour’s approach to cohesion and welfare via an engagement with some of its key policies. It has examined briefly the concepts of social capital and social exclusion, which can be seen as key to understanding some of the nuances of Community Cohesion and welfare policy in the New Labour era. Examining the ways in which these concepts interrelate helps develop a deeper understanding of the interaction of these two policy areas, which helps identify key issues to be considered later in the thesis. Providing this understanding of the development of the two policy areas provides a basis from which to explore deeper some of the components of, and issues that arise from, the development of Community Cohesion and welfare.
The development of Community Cohesion policy between 2001 and 2010 was predicated along largely socio-cultural lines, although socio-economic issues associated with social exclusion were not entirely ignored. The major focus was on ethnic groups living parallel lives, and although focus on the parallel lives thesis may have lessened after the introduction of the CIC, it still remained a prominent issue within Community Cohesion. This was heightened with the developing securitisation of cohesion as evidenced with the PREVENT strategy. The development of welfare reform, although separate, can be seen to contribute to multiple overlapping areas, particularly regarding New Labour’s concern with social exclusion. The party’s welfare reform programme developed a joined-up but locally focused framework, allowing top-down policies to retain an element of decentralisation. The increase of personalisation as the decade progressed also contributed to the move away from a ‘one size fits all’ approach in the challenge of attaining full employment.

These policies can be seen to contribute to New Labour’s overall goal of creating a population resilient to the challenges of a developing knowledge economy (Finlayson, 2009), as well as the insecurities that are symptomatic of the increasing social exclusion felt by those groups in deprived areas of the UK. There is potential therefore to identify a larger project of ‘cohesion’, based upon integrating citizens both culturally and economically into particular common norms; developing the appropriate ideologies that will ‘make people more willing to accept and support the socio-economic adjustment efforts in the name of global competitiveness’ (Bieling, 2003: 66). Not only this, but one can see these policy areas contributing to this
wider project through the language of community, where ‘community’ is a new plane of governance based on micro-management of human relations (Rose, 1996: 331). This helps explain the commitment to community and locally orientated solutions whilst retaining fairly strong governmental control (be it local or central government). As McGhee argues, it encourages ‘local people to alter their ways of thinking about, doing and being communities’ (McGhee, 2003: 391).

Although the general focus and development of these two policy areas have been laid out, along with two concepts key to this development, they must be interrogated further in order to fully engage with New Labour’s response to unrest in the UK, the potential divergence between the language and aims of the policies, and how these policies have affected how specific groups make sense of the ideas of welfare and cohesion in their everyday lives. Before this can take place, the nature of the engagement must be explored. Chapter two contributes to this by setting out the analytical frame of the thesis, which provides the lens through which Community Cohesion and welfare reform will be interrogated.

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22 Of course, New Labour’s welfare reform programme pre-dates the development of Community Cohesion, but as the latter was developed further, one can argue that welfare began to play a larger role, albeit implicitly.
CHAPTER TWO – EXPLORING ‘COHESION’ CRITICALLY

Chapter one outlined a brief history of New Labour’s policy development regarding cohesion and welfare. This chapter provides a framework with which to explore, interrogate and analyse the conceptual and practical specifics of cohesion in the context of citizenship and welfare in the UK. It provides the analytical foundations for engaging with people’s everyday understandings of cohesion and welfare, which when contrasted with an analysis of policy documents, can facilitate an engagement with the notion of a wider political project of ‘cohesion’ comprised of Community Cohesion and welfare concerns.

The framework provides the analytical backbone for the discourse analysis used in the thesis and justifies the use of critical discourse analysis over other forms. Broadly, it employs critical theory; a mode of inquiry designed to critique and problematise orthodox understandings of the social and political world. Specifically, it draws upon key elements of the work of Antonio Gramsci; namely his work on hegemony, language and ‘common sense’. Gramsci’s work can be classed as critical theory as it contributes to a wider tradition of struggle, emancipation and empowerment of those with little social or political power (Bieler and Morton, 2004; Chambers, 2002: 90). Indeed, some feel that Gramsci’s work, particularly his work on hegemony, is central to critical research (e.g. Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002: 93).

23 The methods employed in this thesis (CDA and focus groups) are discussed in detail in chapter four.
The chapter highlights the centrality and complementarity of a critical analytical frame employing Gramsci with the use of critical discourse analysis. The particular focus on power and power relations in material relations, as well as language formation and use found in Gramsci, is particularly useful to a discursive study of policy and its potential effect on creating a hegemonic project. Through exploring the role of power and power relations, one can develop a dialectical approach through the use of the hermeneutic circle, whereby the whole is seen with reference to its component parts, and these component parts can only be understood with reference to the whole (Kinsella, 2006; Ryner, 2002; Taylor, 1971). This juxtaposes discourse from the ‘top’ (government) with that of the ‘bottom’ (citizens and ‘communities’), when seen as elements of a wider discursive whole. This helps conceptualise the locus – or loci – of power when regarding cohesion as a developing project.

The thesis employs a critical theoretical position concerned with how ‘social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk’ (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). Specifically, this critical frame invokes a Gramscian focus on power, language, negotiation and manoeuvre, incorporating the relationship between the ideational and the material (e.g. between ideology and its concrete socio-political effects). This allows it to highlight how social power is enacted, reproduced and possibly resisted – particularly through the employment of the concepts of hegemony, grammar and ‘common sense’ as applied to language and discourse.

Furthermore a Gramscian approach situated within a wider tradition of
critical theory allows for the examination of ideology in policy through a critical engagement with language and discourse. This is important to understand the argument that New Labour developed a wider political project of cohesion aimed at promoting citizens more amenable to a new knowledge economy (Finlayson, 2012; 75), in which community became the primary political space to develop appropriate ideologies, developing a larger commitment to communitarian principles.

The use of a Gramscian analytical frame as applied to critical discourse analysis allows for the exploration of the idea of a political project of ‘cohesion’ by examining the linguistic and ideological relationships between Community Cohesion and welfare reform as policy areas, as well as how ‘power resides in the production of ideas… although the production of ideas is put into the service of the production of things (Chambers, 2002: 90). The analytical framework provides a method of interpreting the discourses and logics discussed in chapter five, highlighting elements of inequality, control and dominance. It highlights the analytical significance of an exploration of Gramsci’s concept of ‘common sense’, particularly when applied to issues of cohesion and welfare. That this exploration takes place firstly in the realm of ideas and language makes it appropriate to structure an interpretation of discourse. The framework therefore complements CDA for two reasons: first, both occupy a position critical of more orthodox approaches to analysis. Secondly, as CDA can be seen as more of an approach than a strict method, it can be imbued with a particular analytical and theoretical outlook that makes Gramsci’s work highly relevant.
The chapter makes an overall contribution to the thesis in a number of ways. Firstly, the analytical frame helps explicitly develop the combined analysis of welfare and cohesion as a wider political project, allowing the CDA to draw out the discursive links between them. The focus on power relations provides a perspective on why the language and aims of policy may diverge, whilst also providing a rationale as to the retention of (some) economic concerns, such as employment. Finally, without a Gramscian analytical frame it would not be possible to explore the idea of hegemonic discourses and their effect on the actions and attitudes of citizens. The idea of hegemonic discourses is directly related to the configuration of power relations between social groups and between citizen and state, and therefore is essential to the overall theoretical outlook of the thesis.

To achieve its aims, the chapter is divided in to a number of sections. Section one deals with the general role of critical theory in the thesis, discussing general political and epistemological positions in order to contextualise the use of Gramscian concepts. Section two deals specifically with Gramsci by discussing language, ‘common sense’ and hegemony. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the overall benefits and implications of using this analytical frame for a study of New Labour’s overall project of cohesion. This highlights the utility of employing a Gramscian position in a critical analysis of discourse.

2.1. The use of Critical Theory to critique Cohesion

Taking a critical approach in the thesis allows for a deep engagement with Community Cohesion and welfare reform as separate entities. Under
scrutiny is a historically specific form of cohesion, as contextualised by New Labour’s response to unrest from 2001 onwards. The use of critical theory (and more specifically Gramsci, as discussed in section 2) allows for the exploration of the notion of ‘cohesion’ as a political project, which incorporates Community Cohesion and welfare reform as policy processes.

It is unlikely that ordinary citizens will play a significant role in developing policy, although it is possible for them to be involved. Whilst it is obviously important that policy is developed by experts, the voices and positions of ordinary citizens can provide insight, particularly considering that a major aim of New Labour’s cohesion and welfare policies was to improve social togetherness and quality of life, whilst combatting social exclusion (Lister, 1998; 2003; Robinson, 2005; McGhee, 2003), as well as dealing with the more functionalist issues of maintaining decent levels of employment (Powell, 2000; Hulse and Stone, 2007). This requires the use of an appropriate theoretical frame, which can be found in critical theory:

The work of the Critical Theorists provides criticism and alternatives to traditional, or mainstream, social theory, philosophy and science, together with a critique of a full range of ideologies from mass culture to religion. At least some versions of Critical Theory are motivated by an interest in relating theory to politics and an interest in the emancipation of those who are oppressed and dominated. Critical Theory is thus informed by a critique of domination and a theory of liberation (Kellner, 1989: 1)

This fundamental position combines well with critical discourse analysis, discussed in chapter four, that seeks to investigate how ‘social power abuse,

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24 This is perhaps more so considering New Labour’s extensive use of focus groups (Barbour and Schostack, 2004: 41), and the ability for citizens to become more involved in the public sphere if they so with (as discussed in section 1 of chapter three).
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk’ (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). Critical theory can therefore critique power relations inherent within language and discourse formation, providing an interpretive understanding of what is being said from the ‘top’, and which can be contrasted to what is being said from the ‘bottom’. The dialectical nature of critical theory is particularly important if one hopes to explore cohesion as a complex and multifaceted political project that is reliant on multiple complementary and contesting components. To that end, the thesis employs the hermeneutic circle, based on the premise that ‘[t]he totality of a structure can only be understood with reference to the whole’ (Ryner, 2002: 199).

The process of relating the parts to the whole in order to understand the totality of a structure can be seen as a dialectical method. Horkheimer, a leading figure in the Frankfurt School, described the 'whole' as 'not something other than the parts in their determinate structure... the whole process of thought which contains in itself all limited representations in the consciousness of their limitedness' (Horkheimer, cited in Held, 1990: 177). In other words, the 'whole' is unlikely to be truly whole; it is presented as such to aid comprehension of the social world, but because the whole is not complete, it can only be understood through an engagement with its component parts. Using this method therefore necessitates an acknowledgement that one is not dealing with closed or perfected systems. In fact:

'What distinguishes the dialectical method is its recognition of the insufficiencies and imperfections of “finished systems of thought”.'
The dialectical method is a critical method for it reveals incompleteness where completeness is claimed' (Held, 1990: 177).

Held's assertion demonstrates why using a dialectical method is advantageous for this thesis. It allows one to problematise entities that claim to be complete and whole by extracting and critiquing components that do not necessarily complement one another, or by finding gaps within the whole. By examining the component parts of a totality, one can identify the limits to the various components and how this would impact upon the totality of a structure. In contrast to other understandings of the social world, the dialectics of critical theory ‘describes the complex set of mediations that interconnect consciousness and society, culture and economy, state and citizens’ (Kellner, 1990: 15). Understanding cohesion as a political project requires an engagement with its component parts, which can vary in location and prominence.

This can be seen in the limits found in both agency and structure. On one hand, human activity creates the institutions and structures around them. On the other, this creation is constrained and influenced by the historical-structural legacy of these institutions and structures (Ryner, 2002: 196). The historical context of actions is central to the complex set of mediations Kellner describes. This is illustrated by Horkheimer, who suggests that one asks:

Which interconnections exist in a definite social group, in a definite period of time and in a definite country, between the role of this group in the economic process, the transformation of the psychic structures of its individual members, and the totality of the system that affects and produces its thoughts and mechanism (Horkheimer, 1989: 44; see also Kellner, 1990: 15).
The dialectic therefore engages with contradictory yet coexisting elements of phenomena that are historically contingent on one another (Isaac, 1987: 59; Paolucci, 2003: 78). Contradictory elements can only coexist because their tensions are lessened by other complementary elements, or if through interaction the contradictory elements can resolve one another. Their development is contingent on the historical conditions of the time, and history develops thanks to the interactions between these complementary and contradicting elements (e.g. Althusser, 1969: 15-35). In other words, structures appear whole and unproblematic, but they are constituted by potentially destabilising contradictions as well as binding complementarities. It is this development that highlights the importance of understanding historical specificity. In this case, the specific response of New Labour to social unrest in 2001, and the historically specific construction of cohesion in the UK as manifested through Community Cohesion (and to an extent welfare policy) can be seen as the result of a limited range of options, as well as the result of human, social and political agency.

Regarding discourse, historical structures and historical specificity are significant because what is seen as a ‘natural’ development could be more historically contingent than one may suppose. For example, ‘[o]bjective always means “humanly objective” which can be held to correspond exactly to “historically subjective”’ (Gramsci, 1971: 445). It is therefore useful to understand discourses as historically specific, akin to the historical structures that contain and contextualise them. What an individual understands as existing unproblematically can be understood as the outcome
of historical deliberation and mediation. The language used in policy for example reflects a specific historical moment, and the communication of specific ideas in particular ways can affect the attitudes and actions of citizens, resulting in the (re)production of historical structures:

‘When configurations of ideas and material capabilities converge into a coherent whole that tends to crystallise into institutional practices that stabilise, perpetuate and reproduce a particular order. Once established, institutions take on a life of their own and affect the development of ideas and material capabilities’ (Ryner, 2002: 196; see also Cox, 1981: 207-20).

The creation and dissemination of discourse can be seen as a part of the crystallisation of institutional practices. Discourse is therefore a component of the stabilisation, perpetuation and reproduction of particular orders. This accords it high influence in the creation of normative and cultural orientations designed to influence the behaviour of citizens (Bieling, 2003: 66). This can be seen in the development of political projects such as the political project of cohesion, which may be understood in terms of a hegemonic project linked to the perpetuation of a particular set of cultural and political norms. The use of discourse to produce the appropriate ideology in a wider process of stabilising and (re)producing a particular order can be examined through a Gramscian analytical frame, particularly when employing Gramscian understandings and concepts of language, ‘common sense’ and hegemony.

2.2. Gramsci: language, ‘common sense’ and hegemony

A Gramscian analytical frame focuses on conflict and power relations as manifested in social, political and linguistic interaction. This makes it
appropriate for examining discourses and logics in welfare and cohesion policy, as well as the everyday speech and discussion of ordinary citizens, considering the contention held by critical discourse analysis that it is power and influence in discourse that should be examined (Burnham et al., 2008: 252; Fairclough, 1999; 2000; Van Dijk, 2004; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997). Considering also that cohesion is a process in which individuals and groups are brought closer together, there is space for conflict as well as integration as groups negotiate their social position in a reconfiguring socio-cultural order. The competing interests of citizens and groups will eventually crystallise into a more stable ‘general will’ (Courtinho, 2000). It is the competition of interests, as well as the crystallisation that can be explored through a Gramscian analytical frame.

The use of a Gramscian analytical frame implies a particular understanding of state-citizen relations along the lines of class. Engaging with discourse in and around government policy entails engaging with the state, which Gramsci understood as ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules’ (Gramsci, 1971: 244). In combining this position with CDA, which is concerned with dominance and inequality as manifested in language, the thesis makes the judgement that this dominance and inequality is ultimately class-based. In other words, the discourses and discursive logics are directly involved in the development and maintenance of class hegemony, as understood by Gramsci. A hegemonic project requires social unity in favour of the dominant class, which is built at least partially through the
organisation of common sense (Ives, 2005: 74-75), that allows for the
development of an hegemonic bloc that exerts moral, intellectual and
political leadership (Jessop, 1997).

As discussed in this and later chapters, this does not mean unproblematic
dominance of one class over another. There is still room for manoeuvre in
terms of dissent, and in terms of challenging the prevailing common sense.
Yet as was discussed in Chapter One, and will be discussed in Chapter Five,
the developments in welfare and cohesion policy under New Labour
targeted perceived ‘problem’ groups who neither conformed to particular
understandings of cohesion, nor understandings of ‘deserving’ welfare
recipients, whilst justifying this targeting through appeals to empowerment
of the same groups. A Gramscian use of CDA would understand this as an
example of (class) dominance through language, contributing to the wider
aim of developing, maintaining and legitimising a hegemonic project.
Blommaert and Bulcaen illustrate this point via reference to Thatcher,
whose speech style crossed social class lines so as to colonise ‘everyday
speech genres in order to achieve hegemony and increased legitimation for
the voice of authority’ (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 453). Integrating
CDA with Gramsci’s Marxist position therefore privileges the role of class
in the struggle for the dominance of ideas. This is referenced throughout the
thesis through the use of his concepts of hegemony, war of position and
manoeuvre, and common sense.

In line with a dialectical understanding of social relations, it is important to
engage with cohesion as a project from various angles. This thesis engages
with top-down (government policy) and bottom-up (citizens’ positioning) perspectives. The approach juxtaposes these positions in order to explore the extent to which identified discourses become hegemonic, or are contaminated. Essential to this is an understanding of how Gramsci uses language, partially because Gramsci’s approach to language and political development removes an opposition between language and more material elements such as the economy for example (Ives, 2005: 458).

A Gramscian approach allows language to be seen as inherently political, as well as a key component of developing and (re)producing historical structures. For example, the idea of language as a ‘continual process of metaphor’, which develops upon previous incarnations of itself:

‘Etymologically, dis-astro [disaster] referred to a misalignment of the stars. But if [Gramsci] described an earthquake as a disaster, no one would accuse him of believing in astrology. The misalignment of the stars then becomes a metaphor for a calamity or devastating event. The term disaster sheds its literal reference but retains a sense of its meaning. But to use the word disastro and have it understood neither the speaker nor the listener requires any knowledge of this history. Rather “disaster” becomes almost synonymous with “catastrophe” or “calamity”. The nuanced difference in these terms bears no reference to any root in astrology’ (Ives, 2005: 463; see also Gramsci, 1971: 450).

Language is therefore a reflection or interpretation of an historical moment, which is in turn influenced by the configurations of ideas and material capabilities. Language is used to designate ideas and concepts used to understand the (social) world. For example, the four compass points were designated as north, south, east and west, which now take on a very particular meaning. They ‘correspond to real facts, they allow one to travel by land and by sea, to arrive where one has decided to arrive’ (Gramsci,
The language of cohesion corresponds to real facts, but to an extent New Labour policy makers arrived where they had decided to arrive by populating the relatively empty term ‘Community Cohesion’ with their own policy preoccupations. In this respect, then, examining the language of policy relating to a wider project of cohesion will lead to a greater critical understanding of New Labour’s response to unrest in northern England in 2001.

Doing this requires the employment of concepts that contain and contextualise the linguistic elements of analysis. Gramsci provides two such concepts in the form of hegemony and common sense. One must remember that ‘Gramsci always insisted that hegemony is not exclusively an ideological phenomenon. There can be no hegemony without the decisive nucleus of the economic. On the other hand, do not fall in to the trap of the old mechanical economism and believe that, if you can only get hold of the economy, you can move the rest of life’ (Hall, 1987: 6). Hegemony – socio-political domination of one class over others – is a multifaceted concept that is not simply about physical domination. It requires not only the ability to retain a physical presence, but also a social and cultural presence. Gramsci’s ‘notion of hegemony includes the creation of a “collective will” – not merely an economic class coming into its own or becoming aware of itself – but the construction of a social-cultural unity’ (Ives, 2005: 458). For cohesion requires socio-cultural unity of some sort; a state of dialogue and at least partial consensus between most, if not all, groups. This must be done to allow subjugated or marginalised groups to feel included, regardless of their actual influence in social and political processes. Although a policy of
cohesion cannot create society-wide hegemony, in attempting to form a collective will (in this case a set of cultural, social and political orientations designed to guide all citizens regarding their behaviour towards one another) it is possible to understand Community Cohesion as a nascent hegemonic project\textsuperscript{25}. 

For hegemony to take hold there needs to be more than just an integrated policy effort and discursive structure; the discourses need to be taken up by enough of the populace to legitimise policy decisions, and therefore wider socio-political projects and historical structures. In this respect accepting the language of cohesion and welfare, and the implications this has on social relations in general, contributes to the construction of cohesion as a political project – even if this project is not entirely accepted by the populace.

Hegemony can therefore be seen as the promotion (and perhaps dominance) of a particular set of ideas, through the construction of a social-cultural unity developed in the popular consciousness. This requires both material (e.g. forces and relations of production) and ideational (e.g. intellectual struggle) processes. If these two combine in a way that is complementary, Bieling’s ‘appropriate ideology’ can be developed more easily. An example of this is the ‘logic of no alternative’, which asserts that further globalisation is

\textsuperscript{25} A hegemonic project can be thought of as a component of a wider process of hegemony. It is related to the war of position, which is the intellectual struggle for primacy that groups/classes find themselves in. The war of position is the preparation of the ideal intellectual groundwork needed for a group to maintain hegemony or become hegemonic. Using WW1 as a metaphor, Gramsci argues that ‘[a] war of position is not, in reality, constituted simply by the trenches, but by the whole organisational and industrial system of the territory which lies to the rear of the army in the field’ (Gramsci, 1971: 229). The development of a specific approach to cohesion, which requires citizens to modify social and cultural orientations to fit a particular constructed norm, can therefore be seen as a particular project in the development or maintenance of hegemony.
inevitable because economic and political orthodoxy is inoculated from questioning and calls for alternatives via ‘an inexorable and fatalistic unfolding economic’ language (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 155). This allows originally contingent and contested elements to take on a more steadfast existence, thanks to the development of a popular common sense.

Common sense can be seen in two ways. On one hand, it is simply the popular(ist) understanding of a socio-political concept. For example, that welfare claimants should work for their benefit is ‘common sense’. However, for an idea to become common sense it must develop to a point whereby it is increasingly difficult to be seen in any other light; an idea is the ‘correct’ idea because it is increasingly difficult to conceive of a competing idea. However, common sense can be seen in a dialectical fashion:

‘Popular common sense could become a ground of struggle because it is an amalgam of historically effective ideologies, scientific doctrines and social mythologies. Gramsci understood popular common sense not to be monolithic or univocal, nor was hegemony an unproblematically dominant ideology which simply shut out all alternative visions or political projects. Rather, common sense was understood to be a syncretic historical residue, fragmentary and contradictory, open to multiple interpretations and potentially supportive of very different kinds of social visions and political projects’ (Rupert, 2003: 185)

A political project of cohesion that encompasses historical policy ideas and traditions (such as race relations, support from cradle to the grave) is likely to contain a syncretic historical residue, retaining and developing past attitudes, norms and values. What is developed can be seen as the way, rather than one way of doing things. Yet, because popular common sense is
an amalgam of ideologies, doctrines and mythologies that then presents itself as whole and unproblematic, it can be problematised through the use of critical discourse analysis. For example, how is discourse developed and presented? How is discourse treated, internalised or changed by citizens? Does it conform to or supplement a wider ideological or political project? Such questions are central to understanding the specificity of New Labour’s response to social unrest and perceived cultural suspicion. The analytical framework used in this thesis helps to break down these specificities through examining their component parts within the context of the whole.

Common sense understandings of phenomena take a project with a potentially problematic internal structure and present it as unified, whole and unproblematic. Linguistically and discursively this could mean taking a syncretic project and presenting it in such a way as to render it relatively unproblematic. Chapter five deals with such issues, drawing upon the contradictions and paradoxes discussed in chapter one. One could argue for example that New Labour constructed a common sense approach to rights and responsibilities in the mantra ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens, 1998: 65; Dwyer, 2004). This allows the increase of conditions on citizens’ access to rights that are, in general, not questioned. This allowed New Labour to begin modifying the behaviour of ‘dysfunctional’ citizens (Prideaux, 2001) and ‘problem groups’ (McGhee, 2003; Worley, 2005; 26...
Ratcliffe, 2012). A key role of critical theory in this respect is to deconstruct the ‘common sense’ and highlight the contradictions in a syncretic project. However, in line with both the hermeneutic circle and historical structuralism, ‘common sense’ does not spontaneously appear; it is the result of the interaction between structural and agential forces, both materially (e.g. through policy) and ideationally (e.g. through language and discourse). This is where Gramsci’s theory of hegemony becomes particularly useful.

‘Hegemony’ has been interpreted and invoked in a number of ways since Gramsci’s development of the idea. Thomas (2013: 21) identifies three interpretations that have been particularly influential. Firstly, hegemony can be seen as securing the consent of other social strata as opposed to passing decrees, utilising cultural and ideological mechanisms. Secondly, hegemony can be seen as the unification of diverse interests in a composite political body; multiple actors and groups with varying levels of control understood as ‘the people’ for example. Another interpretation utilises coercion and consent. Coercion becomes the preserve of the state – e.g. ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens, 1998: 65) – whilst consent is built through civil society. In the context of Community Cohesion and welfare reform, this could be through involvement with various community groups, or through internships, apprenticeships and other forms of voluntary and/or community work.

Thomas in fact identifies four interpretations of hegemony. However, the final interpretation is most concerned with the realist school of international relations. This makes it almost solely preoccupied with state and military relations, leaving little import for this thesis.
Although Thomas presents these interpretations separately, they can in fact be combined to form a more encompassing theorisation of hegemony. For hegemony to be understood in a sufficiently nuanced fashion these three interpretations need to be seen as components in a wider project of hegemony. The thesis treats the development of these interpretations as dialectical. For example, a group cannot present themselves as a unified political force unless some form of collective will has been established. Likewise, for this collective will to be established, there needs to be some element of political, ideological or cultural ‘control’. This is similar to Morton’s understanding, in that a critical theory approach to hegemony should direct attention to ‘relations between social interests in the struggle for consensual leadership rather than concentrating solely on state dominance’ (Morton, 2007: 134-5). This struggle links in with the notion that New Labour perpetuated a number of philosophical tendencies from the 1980s concerning the best way to organise society, based partially on a common sense of Thatcherism (Hall, 1998). Therefore, hegemony should be understood within the context of a multifaceted struggle for overall social control, both philosophically and practically.

Within this, one can identify cohesion as a political and hegemonic project based on New Labour’s Third Way position, and its associated ‘sociological claims about the fundamental social shifts of late modernity’ (Leggett, 2009: 140; Finlayson, 2003). New Labour’s specific approach to dealing with social unrest such as the disturbances of 2001 centres around particular assumptions about different groups, which can also be seen in some of the welfare reform of the era (discussed in chapter five). This attempt to
universalise cultural and social assumptions ‘indicates an attempt to get to grips with social forces that go beyond the merely conjunctural, and to grasp and develop a narrative around the changing nature of modernity itself, as befits a hegemonic project’ (Leggett, 2009: 140).

In order to apply the theory of hegemony (via common sense and language) to a study of cohesion as a political project, one must understand the key institution(s) involved in hegemony. The foremost institution is the state, which Gramsci sees as ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules’ (Gramsci, 1971: 244). The state must retain its political and social control, but it must also influence people to provide their spontaneous consent – in other words, consent that is considered freely given, rather than coerced in any way. Gramsci sees an exemplar of this in western democracy: people are given the choice who to vote for, or whether to vote at all. But if subaltern classes internalise western liberal democracy as the only viable system, then those who represent and rule will always retain some control (Townshend, 2009: 157; Gramsci, 1971: 243; 253). This does not mean however citizens have not been coerced at all into giving their consent, they are just not always fully aware of the ways in which they are being coerced. As will be discussed in chapter five, both welfare and cohesion policy contain discernible elements of coercion. These elements could reflect the wider elements of coercion within the state, designed to enable the retention of power. Through the use of CDA one can explore and problematise these asymmetrical power relations.
Furthermore, a combined analysis of welfare and cohesion policy as contributing to a wider project of cohesion allows for the scope of ‘cohesion’ to be redefined within the context of a Gramscian analytical frame. For example, one particular interpretation of rule by consent can be found in the welfare state. Some scholars see the welfare state as a concession to the working classes for better conditions. This is seen as an acceptable outlay by the ruling classes because capitulating to some demands from below quells disquiet that may ultimately endanger the position of the ruling classes (e.g. Mann, 1987; Offe, 1987). Cohesion, as a project designed to unite disparate groups and elements as a unified whole (albeit with a fairly immutable set of non-negotiable values) could be seen as a project that provides the needed levels of coercion and consent to produce a relatively happy populace whilst maintaining the position of the ruling classes. This helps justify one of the main arguments of the thesis – that the aims and language of cohesion and welfare policy diverge – whilst providing a possible reason for this happening. As discussed in chapter five, the language of policy provides imagery of empowered citizens, whilst engineering a system that coerces through imparting extra responsibility on to the shoulders of citizens. An example of this is the punishment of citizens who allegedly ‘wilfully’ exclude themselves from the labour market (e.g. Prideaux, 2001: 97).

Another way the concept of hegemony allows for a deeper investigation of cohesion as a project is by grasping 'the connection between the ways in which social consciousness are formed and the exercise of political (or class) rule under conditions of high levels of popular consent’ (Hunt, 1990: 310-11). New Labour had these high levels for the majority of its time in office
(Showstack Sassoon, 2000: 93-105; Hall, 2003; Rose, 2000; Finlayson, 2008). The language of policy allows one to see the construction of such a consciousness through the development of particular social, cultural and economic values to which groups must conform in order to be seen as ‘inclusive’, ‘cohesive’ or ‘British’.\footnote{This is a central contention of chapter five.}

This section has introduced and outlined key Gramscian concepts such as hegemony and common sense. These concepts have been explored within discursive, linguistic and political contexts, in order to highlight their utility for exploring New labour’s specific response to unrest in the form of Community Cohesion policy. It has suggested that cohesion can be understood as a hegemonic project designed to universalise specific assumptions about ‘problem’ groups. Now a basic understanding of the key analytical concepts has been provided, section 3 will discuss in more detail how these concepts can be combined with critical discourse analysis through a Gramscian treatment of grammar.

\section*{2.3. Gramsci, Grammar and Discourse Analysis}

Though Gramsci does not use the term 'discourse' himself, his work on language is highly compatible with an analysis of discourse. Applying Gramsci’s thinking on language, and 'grammar' more specifically, one can combine his thinking on common sense and hegemony with a critical discourse analysis.

Gramsci discusses two forms of 'grammar': spontaneous and normative. 'By “spontaneous grammar”, Gramsci means those patterns we follow while...
speaking that are unconscious and seem natural' (Ives, 2004: 90-91); One employs grammar without knowing it (Gramsci, 1985: 180). Gramsci derives normative grammar from the work of Ferdinand de Saussure in two ways: to incorporate grammatical correctness, or a 'proper' way of speaking appropriate to one's social position (therefore (re)producing inherent power relations) and; the relation of grammar to historical specificity. In other words, acknowledging that particular grammar rules are a product of particular historical eras. The inclusion of history and power in grammar is important for Gramsci, and provides import into its use in discourse analysis:

'Besides the “immanent grammar” in every language, there is also in reality (i.e. even if not written) a “normative” grammar (or more than one). This is made up of the reciprocal monitoring, reciprocal teaching, reciprocal “censorship” expressed in such questions as “What did you mean to say?”, “What do you mean?”, “Make yourself clearer”, etc., and in mimicry and teasing. This whole complex of actions and reactions come together to create a grammatical conformism, to establish “norms” or judgements of correctness and incorrectness' (Gramsci, 1985: 180).

Inherent within socially constructed language rules are power relations, certain people are expected to speak in particular ways to conform to their social position. Those who do not employ the proper grammar are not welcome in higher social strata. For example someone from a higher social class may speak with greater linguistic proficiency, whilst expecting a member of a lower class to speak with less grammatical accuracy. Yet this is not a conscious decision on the part of either speaker; rules and conventions develop historically, but 'speakers can use language without

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29 Gramsci uses the terms 'immanent' and 'spontaneous' interchangeably. The thesis will stick with the term 'spontaneous', in line with the work of Ives (2004), because of its important relation to 'spontaneous consent'.

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knowing its history' (Ives, 2004: 95). The meaning imparted through language and the rules of language is intertwined with various relations of power. This can make the construction of language (and indeed discourse) an inherently political act. As Ives points out:

'Normative grammar, according to Gramsci, does not come from some natural or logical process outside society and its tensions. Rather, normative grammars are produced through the organisation, codification and legitimisation of certain spontaneous grammars. Of course, this is a competitive process whereby many (if not most) spontaneous grammars are often delegitimised and suppressed' (Ives, 2004: 96).

The production of normative grammars can be directly related to the production and reproduction of discourses. As with grammars, some discourses become dominant over others through a process of contestation and development. It is in this contestation that one can gain a keener understanding of New Labour's specific policy response to unrest, particularly in the way that elements of Community Cohesion and welfare (reform) combine to develop a larger project of cohesion. A Gramscian analytical frame, in this sense, provides a framework that enables the CDA to highlight and problematise some of the specificities as manifested through discourse and logic.

The development of the dominant normative grammar shapes the 'common sense' world view. Relating to New Labour's development of Community Cohesion, the common sense position would be that 'communities' self-segregate and as a result live 'parallel lives'. This encourages 'social exclusion', which leads to suspicion and eventually conflict. A normative grammar has been constructed around key concepts. 'Communities'
translates to ethnic, cultural or religious groups such as the 'Muslim community', the 'Asian community' or the 'host (i.e. white British) community' (e.g. Ratcliffe, 2012; Worley, 2005; McGhee, 2003).

The normative grammar of parallel lives is infused with negative connotations; groups living parallel lives becomes similar to groups self-segregating. Social exclusion moves from being understood as 'a shorthand label for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health, and family breakdown’ (SEU, 1998: 1), to a situation that is encountered by individuals and groups who make the wrong choices, or who are dysfunctional. These definitions are developed through policy (as well as through other methods), and their altered meanings begin to have more purchase within the common sense position. Thus, an understanding of the contested development of normative grammars helps develop an understanding of inequality and unequal power relations manifested in talk and text, through the use of critical discourse analysis.

The plausibility of these 'common sense' positions can be examined through an engagement with those outside spheres of influence. Therefore, the thesis engages with local 'communities' to explore the idea that discourses and logics can affect normative grammars, people's every day speech on particular issues, and therefore their attitudes and actions towards the issues. This is discussed in more detail in the methodology (chapter four).

The utility of exploring normative grammars as a partner of discourse comes
from being able to examine the rules that construct the discourses, which ultimately condition and shape an appropriate ideology. The 'rules' that construct the discourses combine with the building blocks of discourse – logics – to create discursive formations that can withstand superficial questioning and critique. This can reinforce the common sense position, possibly leading to a position of hegemony for the discourses and the wider socio-political project(s) associated with the discourses in question. Such developments assist in using 'community' as an anchor for managing micro relations between people, whilst a critical engagement with these developments allows for an exploration of the specificities of New Labour's response to social unrest perceived as racially motivated.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that a frame broadly based on critical theory, using specifically the work of Antonio Gramsci, is appropriate for a number of reasons. The critical nature of Gramsci’s work complements the theoretical-methodological position of critical discourse analysis (discussed in detail in chapter four), whilst Gramsci’s work on language and grammar provides solid concepts with which to integrate into CDA. Second, the use of a critical Gramscian frame allows for the development of a perspective somewhat different to orthodox interpretations and analyses of policy. The broadly dialectical approach allows for multiple components of discourse formation and use to be explored, whilst also providing an alternative perspective on cohesion and welfare policy themselves. This allows an engagement with the notion that New Labour's specific response to unrest in
2001 included the development of a wider project of cohesion, which reached beyond specific policies.

Critical theory provides a useful starting point for developing an appropriate analytical frame for the thesis. This is because it is interested in the political nature of theory and action, making it useful to combine with a form of discourse analysis that has similar aims (e.g. Van Dijk, 2004: 352; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271-80). Its dialectical epistemology allows for the investigation of contingent phenomena that present themselves as complete and unproblematic, invoking use of the hermeneutic circle so that the whole can be seen in relation to its parts. This allows one to explore the syncretic and disjointed internal nature of discourse. The theoretical starting point can then be combined with a Gramscian analysis of language, 'common sense' understandings of phenomena, and the possible development of hegemonic discourses and structures. This links the Gramscian position with an engagement with the idea of a project of cohesion, incorporating disparate socio-political elements; some of which have uneasy relationships, others less so.

The use of the concepts of common sense and hegemony not only facilitate an engagement with ideas of larger socio-political projects, but they also highlight the loci of power in various social relations. Furthermore an engagement with common sense and hegemony enables an analysis of the reach of discourses in everyday life, as well as their influence on the attitudes and actions of citizens. This is brought out through the use of a Gramscian frame that accords importance to the role and influence of
language, and grammar(s) more specifically, alongside reciprocal effects on ideology and material relations.

In order to provide solid ground with which to situate the thesis' analytical framework, the arguments and discussions from chapter one must be further contextualised. This requires a critical engagement with concepts key to an understanding of cohesion and welfare as separate policy areas, as well as cohesion as a political project. So far, the thesis has only engaged with concerns directly related to New Labour and its response to social unrest. In order to employ a dialectical and hermeneutic analysis based on critical theory and Gramsci, it is important to engage critically with concepts key to cohesion and welfare beyond New Labour's conception of them. This is so that the divergence of the aims and language of New Labour's policy can be examined via an engagement with wider definitions of and developments within cohesion and welfare as policies and processes.
CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY

The aim of this chapter is to provide the thesis with a robust methodological framework. It is developed along the analytical backbone of the thesis set out in chapter two. The analytical framework highlights the utility of a dialectical and critical approach to engaging with policies of, and discourses surrounding, cohesion within the context of welfare and citizenship. The Gramscian approach to language provides the analytical foundations within which the critical discourse analysis can be situated. This allows the specificities of New Labour's response to unrest to be examined and problematised. Furthermore, it facilitates an exploration of whether a 'common sense' conception of cohesion can be seen to be developed in the policy literature, and the extent to which this 'common sense' is taken up in every day discussion in two particular neighbourhoods.

The methodology adds to the analytical framework by discussing the ways in which discourse analysis relates to the analytical frame, and can be conceived and applied within that context. This provides specific detail into the nature and workings of critical discourse analysis and the ontological and epistemological consequences of its use. It also addresses in detail the contribution that focus groups will make to the thesis, drawing upon the analytical framework and situating the method within the wider context of the thesis as a whole. The analytical framework is sympathetic to a qualitative methodological approach, particularly as critical social research rejects the idea of research being entirely objective and value-free (Henn et al., 2009: 18; Humphries, 1997), partly because of inherent and implicit
influence of material conditions on individuals and social groups (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 9). At most, one could advocate an idea of ontological stratification, in which an 'objective reality' is mediated by and interpreted through multiple social structures (Burnham et al., 2008: 35; Benton, 1977; Archer, 1995: 159). Discourse can be seen to be one of these structures, as will be discussed later. The discourses affect perceptions of key concepts to cohesion and welfare, drawing from discussions on citizenship, welfare and cohesion. The critical frame also necessitates at least some commitment to giving a voice to oppressed social groups (Schostak and Schostak, 2008; Henn et al., 2009: 29).

Critical discourse analysis plays a role in the first steps toward providing this voice. It aims to 'expose the way in which language and discourses are used by the powerful to confuse and exploit the mass of the population' (Burnham et al., 2008: 252; Fairclough, 2000). CDA is employed in this thesis to engage with the language of cohesion and welfare policy. It draws out manifestations of unequal power relations and inequality, constructed and reproduced by discourses, which may at first appear obfuscated or inconsequential. This can be emphasised through the use of the Gramscian analytical frame that engages with the notion of a 'common sense' conception of cohesion produced through discourse. The focus groups can be seen as a value-added element to the CDA, in that they provide indications as to the possibility of, and extent to which, any 'common sense' discourses can be contaminated and therefore resisted through their everyday appropriation and use. It also provides an opportunity to explore the prominence and influence of different discourses and logics in the
communities at which cohesion policy is primarily aimed, such as Aston in Birmingham and Manningham in Bradford.

In order to discuss the thesis' methodology effectively, this chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section discusses discourse analysis in general, and critical discourse analysis more specifically. It explains its suitability in combining with the thesis' analytical frame, justifying its use in the research. It also explains and discusses the component elements of discourse and discourse analysis, such as social and political logics, and the potential for discourses to be contaminated. The second section deals with the nature and composition of focus groups, explaining how this method fits with the thesis as whole, and how using focus groups helps to accentuate and explore deeper some of the arguments and findings of the CDA in chapter five. It therefore provides indications as to the reach and efficacy of New Labour's specific response to unrest as manifested in a project of cohesion that reached beyond Community Cohesion policy.

3.1. Engaging with Discourses to engage with Cohesion

Engaging with discourse entails engaging with the practices of talking and writing. At its core, a discourse analytic view considers social reality to be constructed through social interaction (Phillips and Hardy, 2002), which is represented through discourse – 'the interrelated texts, conversations and practices associated with a particular object' (Burnham et al., 2008: 250). Discourse theory argues that discourses are socially constructed, which in turn helps people give meaning to objects in the material world. From a
critical perspective, this can be related to Gramsci's pronouncement that meaning may appear objective, but this objectivity is historically subjective – a reflection of the material conditions and social relations of the time (Gramsci, 1971: 445). Discourses also communicate a 'who' and a 'what': a socially situated identity and a socially situated activity (Wieder and Pratt, 1990; Gee, 1999: 13). Depending on the power one has relative to someone else, this could result in occupying a position of power or vulnerability. In this sense discourses can contribute to a 'common sense' understanding of phenomena because they reproduce everyday assumptions of society, therefore reproducing certain power relations, as they influence and even construct collective conceptions of phenomena. These can be reinforced by 'experts' who are able to claim authority over the construction of particular objects, discussions or material relations (Fairclough, 1999: 74).

Therefore, '[d]iscourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules' (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 2). This historic specificity is useful not only because it allows discourse to be seen within a critical Gramscian frame, but also because one can explore the subtle differences in meaning various words can have, depending on their historical context. Words such as refugee, illegals etc. have specific implied meanings that can shape one's interpretation of a text (Vromen, 2010: 264).

These fundamental aspects of discourse theory and analysis can be applied

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For detailed examples, please see chapter two, section 2.

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in various ways. Howarth identifies five major approaches (Howarth, 2000: 2-5): Positivist, which understands discourses as strategic efforts to fashion shared understandings of the world (McAdam et al., 1996: 6); realistic, which sees discourses as objects existing independently of one another that interact to influence phenomena in the social world; Marxist, which understands discourse as ideological systems of meaning 'which legitimate capitalist exploitation' (Burnham et al., 2008: 252); critical, which is similar to the Marxist approach, except it privileges the construction of human meaning and the justification of human action, and; post-structuralist/post-Marxist, which see discourses as symbolic social systems. Critical discourse analysis has already been identified elsewhere as the method of choice in the thesis. The nature and composition of the CDA used in this thesis is the concern of the next section.

3.1.1. Using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
The thesis uses CDA to analyse government documents published between 2001 and 2010. As mentioned throughout the thesis thus far, the research is at least partially interested in exploring power relations. CDA has been chosen for this because it is a ‘type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). It is also through this that a connection can be made to a Marxist interpretation of discourse and discourse analysis, in that the analytical frame proposes some form of dialectical relationship between language and the economy, or between discourse and the material conditions in which that discourse arises and is (re)produced (e.g. Ives,
In other words, material conditions affect the development of discourses, and the prominence of particular discourses has real-world effects. Discourses on benefit cheats for example could develop a discourse of deserving and undeserving, which can serve to legitimise real-world sanctions for misbehaviour. Therefore analysing the use of language in the way it deals with key concepts related to cohesion and welfare (as discussed in chapter three) becomes essential.

It is important to highlight that the structure of CDA can be fairly malleable. 'CDA does not provide a ready-made, how-to-do approach to social analysis, but emphasizes that for each study a thorough theoretical analysis of a social issue must be made, so as to be able to select which discourse and social structures to analyse and to relate' (Van Dijk, 2002: 98). Due somewhat to its conceptual debt to the Frankfurt School (Van Dijk, 2004: 352; Agger, 1992; Rasmussen, 1996), as well as 'critical turns' in sociolinguistics, psychology and other social sciences (e.g. Birnbaum, 1971; Calhoun, 1995; Fay, 1987; Fox and Prilleltensky, 1997; Wodak, 1996), CDA is 'not so much a direction, school, or specialisation next to the many other “approaches” in discourse studies. Rather, it aims to offer a different “mode” or “perspective” of theorising, analysis, and application throughout the whole field' (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). Putting this in more emphatic terms, 'without being eclectic, good scholarship, and especially good CDA, should integrate the best work of many people, famous or not, from different disciplines, countries, cultures and directions of research' (Van Dijk, 2002: 95). CDA can be combined with any approach in the social sciences (Van Dijk, 2002: 96). In this thesis, the broad approach of CDA is combined with
a Gramscian analytical outlook that focuses on language and power relations and, more specifically to discourse analysis and theory, an understanding of the construction of discourses through logics.\footnote{Though the form of discourse analysis in this thesis is, I argue, CDA, it does appropriate an understanding of the 'cogs' of discourses from David Howarth, as discussed in section 1.2. of this chapter (Howarth, 2005; Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Norman Fairclough argues that Howarth's version of discourse analysis (poststructuralist discourse theory) and Fairclough's CDA shares common ground in that the two draw from one another, although Fairclough argues that CDA inclines more toward critical realism (Fairclough, 2013: 177). In the interests of using CDA as a broad and somewhat interdisciplinary approach, as called for by Van Dijk (2002: 96; 2003: 352), I do not follow entirely either Fairclough's CDA or Howarth's discourse analysis. Instead I draw from both, whilst also drawing from Van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak, who argues that theories and methods that are helpful in explaining the object under investigation can be combined with CDA (Wodak, 2002: 69).}

Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 271-80) set out eight main tenets of CDA: 1) it addresses social problems; 2) power relations are discursive; 3) discourse constitutes society and culture; 4) discourse does ideological work; 5) discourse is historical; 5) the link between text and society is mediated; 7) discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory, and; 8) discourse is a form of social action (for more information see Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough, 1992; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Fowler et al., 1979; Van Dijk, 1993).

The research aims to incorporate these tenets in the following ways. Firstly the perceived separation of cohesion and welfare policy is seen as a problem in itself as it legitimises the de-materialisation of the language of cohesion (Blackledge, 2006; McGhee, 2003; 2008; Worley, 2005), which makes it harder to address issues of economic inequality that have been shown to negatively affect cohesion (Letki, 2006; 2008: 121; Johnson and Soroka, 1999; Ulsaner, 2003). It also acts as a barrier to exploring further the idea of

\footnote{Though the form of discourse analysis in this thesis is, I argue, CDA, it does appropriate an understanding of the 'cogs' of discourses from David Howarth, as discussed in section 1.2. of this chapter (Howarth, 2005; Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Norman Fairclough argues that Howarth's version of discourse analysis (poststructuralist discourse theory) and Fairclough's CDA shares common ground in that the two draw from one another, although Fairclough argues that CDA inclines more toward critical realism (Fairclough, 2013: 177). In the interests of using CDA as a broad and somewhat interdisciplinary approach, as called for by Van Dijk (2002: 96; 2003: 352), I do not follow entirely either Fairclough's CDA or Howarth's discourse analysis. Instead I draw from both, whilst also drawing from Van Dijk, and Ruth Wodak, who argues that theories and methods that are helpful in explaining the object under investigation can be combined with CDA (Wodak, 2002: 69).}
cohesion as a political project. Secondly, chapters five and seven explore the notion that the specificity of New Labour's response to unrest was not simply a pragmatic reaction to a social problem, but went beyond this as an attempt to create a new ideological framework (e.g. Bieling, 2003: 66; Ryner, 2002; Hall, 1998). Thirdly, to be effective, discourses need to take hold in wider society. They need to have cultural anchors, which can be seen in the language of community (e.g. Rose, 1996: 331) and in New Labour's appropriation of some communitarian concerns (e.g. Etzioni, 1995: 4; Deacon, 2000: 12; Powell, 2000: 47; Heron and Dwyer, 2002: 92; Freeden, 2002: 4).

Fourthly and fifthly, discourses that take hold are capable of developing the conditions needed for a hegemonic project (such as a project of cohesion that reaches beyond cohesion policy). Considering that some discourses will take hold more easily, and some discourses are more likely to be promoted by government (such as a discourse of empowerment), one can argue that discourse is doing ideological work. For example, current incarnations of policy and discourse are built upon and developed from previous incarnations. Discourses do not simply appear; rather they highlight, suppress or modify what has come before. Sixthly and seventhly, the fact that the link between text and society is mediated emphasises the idea of the construction of a specific political project because there is some agency present in the mediation between text and society (e.g. choosing what goes

32 This is highlighted particularly well by Van Dijk: 'language users as social actors have both personal and social cognition: personal memories, knowledge and opinions, as well as those shared with members of the group or culture as a whole' (Van Dijk, 2004: 354). Discourses firstly arise from interactions and the assumptions held within those interactions, and can subsequently influence those interactions once embedded.
in a press release). This legitimises the use of CDA to explore such constructions. Finally, discourse as social action implies that the effects of discourses found within the policy literature have real world effects. CDA can therefore help explore the practical effects of discourse on everyday communication and concept formation.

This analytical understanding of discourse, taken from a CDA and a Gramscian perspective illustrates the potential stabilising role discourses can play within society. Yet this is characterised by a possible contradiction. Discourses themselves are not necessarily stable, and like a project that becomes hegemonic, a discourse could be seen as syncretic. However, if a discourse remained openly contradictory, it is unlikely that it would gain enough purchase in the social world. Therefore, by necessity a discourse must appear whole and unproblematic, similar to Gramsci's 'common sense'. Discourses can also be contingent on one another, enabling for a fairly strong discursive mesh. For example, a discourse of deserving is inherently connected to a discourse of undeserving; a discourse of participation for welfare (e.g. active citizenship) is inherently connected to discourses of participation in citizenship. Therefore to identify and problematise the construction, makeup and network(s) of discourses it is helpful to conceive of them as made of component parts. This can be seen as a heuristic device. To this end, the thesis invokes David Howarth's conception of logics as the building blocks of discourse, which point to these structures.
3.1.2. Logics in Discourse

‘Logics’, according to Howarth, are the basic units of explanation in discourse theory. They refer to ‘the rules governing a practice, institution or system of relations between objects and, secondly, to the kinds of entities (and their relations) presupposed by the operation of such rules’ (Howarth, 2005: 323). The concept of logics is not unique to Howarth, although this particular use of ‘logics’ is specific to a particular idea of discourse. The use of logics aim to explore the possibilities of phenomena (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 135). In other words, logics help define the boundaries of possibility for (the representation of) actions. The role of logics is highlighted when referring once again to grammars, within ‘language games’:

I understand by “grammar” the set of rules governing a particular “language game”… By logic, on the contrary, I understand the type of relations between entities that makes possible the actual operation of that system of rules. While the grammar merely enounces what the rules of a particular language game are, the logic answers to a different kind of question: how entities have to be to make those rules possible (Laclau, in Butler et al., 2000: 284)

Laclau’s understanding of grammar can be linked to Gramsci’s understanding of grammar, in that it denotes a set of rules that are followed to increase comprehension and allow communication. Logics in this sense will help construct the grammar. Relating this to the Gramscian analytical frame, investigating logics will therefore help one understand the specific historical and material situation of particular discourses, through an
engagement with these rules. Therefore, logics define the limits of the possible in relation to discourse. This is important to note when exploring the relationship between material and ideational capabilities, such as the real-world effects a discourse of deserving and undeserving can have on community spirit and people’s attitudes towards welfare assistance for example. To understand how (and perhaps why) the discourses have a specific effect on phenomena, it is essential to try to understand how these logics come about and what contextualises them. Following the analytical frame, the development of particular logics can be seen as a consequence of material conditions and relations. Yet Laclau suggests that rules are bent when they are implemented. In other words there is the possibility for human agency. Discourse not only contains grammars and logics (the rules and the elements that construct the rules), but also ‘those actions which implement/distort/subvert them’ (Laclau, in Butler et al., 2000: 284).

This reiterates that discourses are not complete or perfect systems of understanding and/or communication. It also highlights that they are a product (at least partially) of human and group agency, which is likely to render them syncretic. The ideas of distortion and subversion therefore become important. Though logics can be used to presuppose ‘common sense’ rules, how discourse is taken on board, interpreted, used and subverted provides a form of agency to those whom the rules impact upon. Connecting the ideational and the material, and in the context of this thesis, cohesion can therefore be seen as a space of discursive and concrete

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34 See chapter two, section 3.
struggle. Treating it as such provides an opportunity to explore whether or not 'cohesion' (incorporating elements such as Community Cohesion and welfare policy) can be seen in any way as a hegemonic project.

Howarth provides a more specific way of understanding logics by breaking them down into two distinct categories: social logics and political logics. Social logics contain the rules of a practice or regime, which enables one to understand their purpose and content (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 106). They are ‘conditional and historically specific systems of sedimented practice, such as “the logic of the market” (Howarth, 2005: 323). Political logics, on the other hand, ‘refer to the special kinds of practice that constitute and contest these social logics’ (Howarth, 2005: 323). These different logics provide the basis for the CDA, and so deserve a little more attention.

3.1.2.1. Social Logics

Social logics provide a way to explore the relationship between rules and practices. They aim to characterise a regime as a whole. Howarth and Glynos use Thatcherism to highlight the workings of social logics:

Take, for instance, the Thatcher regime in the UK, which can be characterised in terms of a network of social logics, including the logics of marketisation and centralisation, both of which were rooted in the philosophy of the New Right. Once sedimented, the Thatcherite discourse signified the practices and aspiration of liberating the capitalist economy, with its attendant entrepreneurial practices, from the stranglehold of an overloaded and bureaucratic state, as well as from over-powerful trade unions which were smothering enterprise and innovation. On the other hand, Thatcherism came to represent a demand for a more restrictive, though more powerful, state that would regulate less, but more intensively (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 137).
A regime, in this reading, is comprised of social logics that when combined characterise a wider project. In the above example, the social logics of marketisation and centralisation instituted rules as to how the state should organise and treat capital. The operation of these rules also allowed for the creation of a 'common sense' position concerning the nature and role of the state not just in economic life, but also in social and political life. Understanding the operation and character of social logics therefore allows for a more detailed understanding of a regime as a whole.

In this thesis two social logics are identified: the social logic of 'cohesion' and the social logic of 'welfare'. They are identified as such because they can be seen as historically specific systems of sedimented practice, which contain rules that help characterise a wider regime or practice. In this case, cohesion and welfare as social logics help characterise the wider practice contained within New Labour's response to unrest. The social logic of cohesion contains rules on how different groups should interact and behave in society, drawing upon concepts found in multiple debates on citizenship. The social logic of welfare contains rules on how individuals should behave in society, whilst also transmitting the more concrete rules of citizenship, in terms of the rights and responsibilities of the citizen. Social logics are not necessarily the most important element of discourse however. They provide a set of rules with which to characterise a regime or practice, but those rules themselves must be developed and reproduced. This is the role of political logics, which condition, whilst also being conditioned by, the social logics.
3.1.2.2. Political Logics

Arguably for the analytical position taken in this thesis, political logics are the more important in the partnership. This is because '[p]olitical logics aim to capture those processes of collective mobilisation precipitated by the emergence of the political dimension of social relations, such as the construction, defence, and naturalisation of new frontiers. But they also include processes which seek to interrupt or break up this process of drawing frontiers' (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 141). This can be seen as cognate to the construction of common sense, outlined in chapter two. For research that is concerned with understanding power relations, inequality and dominance as manifested through the development of 'cohesion', capturing the construction, defence and naturalisation of various political and social positions is important. This is more so when considering indications that the building of a particular form of cohesion, in response to wider issues of social unrest, could be instrumental in developing a wider hegemonic project partially based upon social logics.

Glynos and Howarth demonstrate how political logics work by using Apartheid South Africa as an example. They argue that political logics can be seen in the formation of Apartheid, as well as their naturalisation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 141). The political logics highlight a particular appropriation and deployment of concepts in order to further a political process and position:

More precisely, their construction was engineered, first, by dividing the “white” ruling bloc between the proponents of Afrikaner nationalism, with their policy of Apartheid, and those supporting the existing “segregation” policies, who in the discourse of Afrikaner nationalism were presented as the lackeys of British imperialism.
But it also involved a sharpening of the frontier between the emergent forces of Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism, in which the proponents of Apartheid presented the latter as seeking to bring about a communist takeover of the country. The spectre of communism was thus used to demonise those who were opposed to Apartheid as enemies of the Afrikaner volk, and indeed of any authentic nationalist sentiment (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 141).

The political logics aimed to intensify the divisions between whites and blacks, presenting blacks as dangerous. This 'other' would not have an authentic claim to nationalism and would instead overwhelm the interests of more legitimate nationalists (in this case, presented as the white Afrikaners). Before the victory of the white National Party, these logics were easier to contest. After the party’s victory, however, ‘the new ruling party, and the reconfigured South African state, struggled to sediment these new divisions by domesticating otherness in the name of legitimate, though subordinated, ethnic and national particularities’ which prevented the creation of overlapping links or combinations between identities and their associated demands (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 141).

Political logics can be identified in the construction of ‘cohesion’ as a project that encompasses Community Cohesion policy and welfare policy. For example, the social logics of cohesion and welfare contain rules on how individuals and groups should interact and behave in public life (such as what is required of benefit claimants, or 'problem' communities). One can identify political logics that articulate concerns central to the behaviour and interaction of individuals and groups, such as the distribution of rights and responsibilities. How a ruling group presents the idea of rights and responsibilities and their distribution will affect how those in different
power positions view their role in society and their personal or group levels of agency in different situations. This is elaborated on further in chapters five and seven. To that end, the CDA focuses on three political logics: conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration. The decision to designate and focus on these three areas as political logics is discussed in detail in chapter five, so that this explanation can provide context for the analysis in the chapter.

Briefly, a key reason is that all three can be seen to contribute to and contest cohesion and welfare as social logics. This provides an opportunity to use these building blocks to explore the notion of a political project of 'cohesion' as encapsulated in New Labour's response to unrest. Obviously, many other political logics could be identified and focused upon. However, because of the vast amount of elements one could focus upon, there is no such thing as a complete discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2002: 99). 'Hence, also in CDA, we must make choices, and select those structures for closer analysis that are relevant for the study of a social issue' (Van Dijk, 2002: 99). It is in that spirit that these three political logics have been chosen to study, so that a deep enough level of focus can be achieved, both within the CDA and in terms of the utility of these logics in exploring New Labour's development of cohesion as a political project.

CDA is used to analyse a collection of twelve Green Papers, White Papers, consultation and guidance documents covering welfare reform and Community Cohesion, published by the Labour government between 2001 (when Community Cohesion first appeared on the agenda) and 2010
(Labour's last year in office). It examines common themes in both sets of policy literature, exploring how the language construction and imagery produced by the language represents different groups, issues and concepts. The result is a categorisation of certain elements into logics, which allows the analysis to investigate how discourse and logics help construct a political project of cohesion. This utilises cohesion and welfare as separate policy areas that are conjoined as social logics. In line with the appreciation of historical context found both within CDA (e.g. Wodak, 2002: 70) and the thesis' Gramscian analytical frame, it builds upon the historical understanding of the welfare and cohesion policy narratives, as set out in chapter one. This is particularly useful when investigating the existence and strength of these narratives in everyday conversation.

The papers were chosen for the CDA for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are a mix of six papers on welfare reform and six papers on Community Cohesion. This ensures that analysis of one area (e.g. cohesion) was not privileged over another (e.g. welfare), which provides a more equitable basis for identifying and analysing the discursive and practical connections between the policies and processes of cohesion and welfare. Secondly, they are spread across the period 2001-2010, enabling for an analysis that views the development of cohesion, as a specific response to social unrest set out by New Labour, throughout their time in office\(^{35}\). Finally, the individual documents deal with either watershed moments or watershed concepts in the development of cohesion and welfare under New Labour. Concepts such as

\(^{35}\) The selection of welfare documents begin in 2006, but can be seen to build directly upon Labour's New Deal from 1998 onwards, as discussed in chapter one.
separate lives, welfare conditionality, moral obligation and rights and responsibilities are prominent in the policies. Some of the documents also discuss best practice or intended methods of operation. This is important in order to explore the extent to which logics and discourses may affect the implementation, development or popular uptake of the policies.

Although the CDA provides the main research and analysis for the thesis, the analysis of policy documents alone cannot provide much insight as to whether a 'common sense' conception of cohesion has been constructed because it focuses on the top-down element of a project of cohesion. Therefore it cannot explore whether or not one can talk of there being a political project of cohesion. To provide some insight into this, the thesis also makes use of focus groups to provide indicative evidence from the bottom-up position as to whether or not discourses and logics can be seen in the discussion of individuals in specific areas of the UK. This may indicate the construction of 'common sense' on issues of cohesion. How the thesis goes about this is the focus of the following section.

3.2. Exploring 'common sense' conceptions of cohesion
Alongside exploring and analysing discourses and logics found within government policy, and how they impact on the development of cohesion as a specific project, it is useful to explore how 'ordinary' citizens respond to the imagery and discourse construction surrounding issues of cohesion and welfare. If individuals were to talk using the same imagery or reasoning found in policy when discussing the responsibility of particular citizens to integrate, for example, one may be able to say something (however modest)
about the relative strength or influence of particular discourses and their associated logics. In order to achieve this, the thesis employs focus groups, conducted to investigate the plausibility of conceptualising New Labour's specific response to unrest as in any way hegemonic, particularly through the use of 'common sense' to render a syncretic and potentially problematic policy project as complete and unproblematic. This section discusses the rationale behind using focus groups for this task, as well as providing a discussion regarding the character and nature of focus groups, and their suitability over other methods.

3.2.1. The nature and use of focus groups
Focus groups are used in this thesis to complement the work of the CDA, in the form of providing further context to, and exploration of, particular logics and discourse in general discussion of certain issues. They are a type of group interview based upon group interaction (Kitzinger, 1994: 103-21). This makes them well placed to explore discourse in general conversation, considering the socially constructed nature of discourses (e.g. Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 2). They comprise of 'carefully selected individuals brought together to discuss a specific topic' (Burnham et al., 2008: 128). Another reason they are useful to use alongside discourse analysis is that they 'throw light on the normative understandings that groups draw upon to reach their collective judgements' (Bloor et al., 2001: 4). It is in such interaction that one may see the influence of discourses, and even the construction or reproduction of a 'common sense' view of particular issues.
The researcher is expected to not become actively involved in discussions; rather it is their job to ensure the overall discussion is relevant to the research being conducted (Bloor et al., 2001). However, some prefer to actively question participants to gauge the strength of their views (Burnham et al., 2008: 130). Although this may be useful when conducting a critical approach, it may be less straightforward when the researcher is hoping to explore the role of discourses; moderator interaction in this respect could contaminate the discussion.

Focus groups generally comprise of around six to eight people. This is so that there are enough voices to provide a wide enough range of opinions, but not so many that effective discussion becomes difficult (Morgan, 1992; 2004: 278). Having a smaller number of participants also allows for the moderator to retain general control over the discussion(s) taking place within the group. The composition of the group is important as group deliberation and discussion allows for an exploration of interaction between participants, and whether or not such deliberation is influenced by any of the social or political logics discussed in chapter five. It is also important as individuals do not spontaneously develop opinions on matters; they are developed through interaction with the world around them:

Participants present their own views and experience, but they also hear from other people. They listen, reflect on what is said, and in the light of this consider their own standpoint further. Additional material is thus triggered in response to what they hear. Participants ask questions of each other, seek clarification, comment on what they have heard and prompt other to reveal more (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 171)

Not only is additional material triggered in response to what people hear, but
so is the kind of material produced. In other words, the discussions of one
group of participants could lead to the invocation of particular discourses
and logics, in the pursuit of agreement and group understanding. Exploring
such interaction would not be practical in other data collection methods. For
example, structured or semi-structured interviews would provide highly
detailed responses to set questions. Yet, they would not necessarily be
informed and contextualised through the responses of others\textsuperscript{36}, therefore
lessening the community and collaborative context, and lessening the extent
to which the use of discourses and logics could be identified considering the
socially constructed nature of discourse. Alternatively, using participant
observation for example would certainly allow for the observation of the
community and collaborative context, but it would provide little control
over discussions. As discourse is intimately linked with talk and text, being
able to engender relevant discussions is of paramount importance.

Focus groups therefore present themselves as an appropriate tool with which
to engage with the creation, modification and reproduction of ideas in talk
and text. They are not an exhaustive tool, however. 'A 90-minute focus
group discussion among 8 to 10 participants will, of necessity, generate
roughly a tenth of the information that each participant would provide in an
equivalently long individual interview' (Morgan, 1997: 11). This is not
necessarily an issue for the research in this thesis however, because what is
focused on, rather than how much, is more important. The issues that

\textsuperscript{36} It may be the case that they are informed and contextualised by others' responses
outside of the interview, but there would be no reliable way of exploring that using one-on-one
interviews.
participants gravitate towards, and the way in which they are discussed, explained and internalised provide a greater opportunity for engaging with discourse; the interaction and the building of a conversation (Kitzinger, 1994; Burnham et al., 2008: 128) can provide as much information as the conversation itself.

Group context also provides another benefit to the study. Although focus groups are obviously not natural environments, and are in some sense artificial (Esterberg, 2002: 12; Morgan, 1997), participants and their responses are still likely to be attuned to the context and dynamic of their immediate group. Focus groups cannot escape from this forced nature, but alternatively the purposeful construction of a group could lead to a more productive discussion: 'there has to be sufficient diversity to encourage discussion. However, groups that are too heterogeneous may result in conflict and the repression of views of certain individuals' (Bloor et al., 2001: 20). The mix of backgrounds and positions in the focus group must therefore be managed, and this management is likely to affect the nature of the conversation (e.g. if one ethnic group is heavily represented, there may be an over representation of that group's perceptions of commonly held problems). The role of the researcher switches from recruiter to moderator in the actual focus group. They must be aware of their impact on the conversation, particularly if the aim is for research to engage with discourses:

The facilitator of a focus group does not need, and should not seek, to control the group: sometimes the facilitator may emerge from a most successful group feeling that she has been holding a tiger by the tail for the last hour and a half. A facilitator should facilitate the
Facilitation requires steering of discussion but not controlling the discussion. This is even more important with respect to discourse and logics as the way participants discuss or answer a question, and the deliberation they take part in to reach their answer(s), may involve the invocation of particular logics. As such, 'Formal direction is limited to control of the agenda of the speaker and to fixing the beginning, course and end of the discussion. Topical steering additionally comprises the introduction of new questions and steering the discussion towards deepening and extension of specific topics and parts' (Flick, 2009: 199). This helps provide focus within the group, and makes it more likely that data gathered will be of use to the researcher (Morgan, 1997: 13). However, a potential drawback is that moderator involvement (and indeed the constructed nature of the group) creates an unnatural social setting (Morgan, 1997: 8), in which discussions will be somewhat artificial – precisely because the researcher needs discussions to revolve around particular topics (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 180). This may make some participants uncomfortable and reluctant to communicate their real feelings (Janis, 1982). However, this could also lead to reliance on particular tropes, themes and of course discourses and logics to explain and discuss issues so that participants feel on safer ground in terms of framing their opinions and ideas. This is useful for the research because it helps highlight the influence and import of various logics and discourses. The potential for these discourses and logics to be used in such a
way also opens them up to contamination – a way for individuals to contest, question, reconfigure and even perhaps destabilise discourses. This highlights the utility of focus groups as adding extra context and detail to the CDA, and allows for a critical engagement with the idea of 'common sense' conceptions of cohesion.

3.2.2. Focus groups and the contamination of discourse
As mentioned before, discourses in general present themselves as complete and unproblematic. However, this does not mean that they are in fact unproblematic. The discourse transmitted in text and talk from government (through policy documents, local government, community groups, local media and so on) is unlikely to remain entirely unmodified when used by individuals. Discourses, in this respect, become appropriated and modified to suit the context in which they are being used. In relation to the work of Gramsci, this can be likened to using grammar appropriate to one's social situation, which is employed without knowing it (Gramsci, 1985: 180). Therefore, people appropriate and subtly change discourses (likely invoking political logics in order to contest the boundaries of the discourse) without being fully aware that they are exerting such agency.

One way of conceptualising this is to talk of contaminating discourses. Discursively, it links to the use of logics, and relates to the work of Laclau. Because discourses are syncretic, they are likely to contain elements – or logics – that are not entirely compatible. In the work of Howarth, this could be the contesting element of political logics. Laclau asks whether or not this contamination could be politically productive:
Would it not be possible to engage, starting from that incompatibility of different practices, to tropologically contaminate, for instance, one incompatible trend with the other and to explore the political productivity which derives from this contamination? Perhaps the universal and the particular, the substantive and the procedural, are less impenetrable to each other once ambiguity (or undecidability) is accepted as the terrain from which any strategico-political move has to start (Laclau, 2001: 5)?

Once ambiguity has been accepted, there is more space for deliberation and discussion, and therefore more space for contestation, problematisation and destabilisation. Such appropriation and use of discourse through discussion and interaction could be seen as the actions which can subvert, distort and/or reproduce particular discourses and logics (Laclau, cited in Butler et al., 2000: 284). Extrapolating upon this, if someone contests a particular logic or discourse, they also contest the (legitimisation of) any policy which utilises the discourses and logics in question to sustain its position. It may even lead to a direct contestation of the policy (e.g. through protest). The interaction within focus groups could therefore help explore the relationships between the universal and particular, breaking down discourses into their component parts, or the substantive and procedural, exploring how discourses and logics found in policy documents fare when appropriated and employed as part of a 'common sense' understanding of ideas such as cohesion.

37 For example, contesting a logic of 'no alternative' regarding globalisation is likely to go hand in hand with contesting particular policies that are based upon this idea, such as flexibilisation of employment regulations.
38 Another way of looking at the universal and particular is to take the discourses found in policy as universal (i.e. presented as personal, but applying to large swathes of people), and the reproduction of these discourses in general conversation, or to make sense of concepts, as particular (i.e. in that an individual may use the term 'welfare' or 'cohesion' to describe specific phenomena that may differ to generally accepted definitions or uses).
Using the idea of contamination, therefore, provides a means of utilising the focus groups in the wider engagement with discourses that begins with the CDA of chapter five. It is the connected, inter-related and deliberative nature of focus groups that allow for this engagement, as one can explore the extent to which particular discourses may shape, or be shaped by, discussions on various topics. It relates to the idea of the universal and particular in that focus groups allow for the construction and validation of multiple positions around a common anchor. It is how these positions slot together that can shed light on the use, contamination or reproduction of particular logics and discourses. However, to be able to engage with such interactions, there has to be an awareness of the group dynamics inherent within focus groups.

3.2.3. (Focus) group dynamics
How individuals interpret, appropriate and develop ideas, logics and discourses within groups are influenced by the dynamics of the group of which they are a part (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 171; Kitzinger, 1994; Burnham et al., 2008: 128). As 'social animals' (Aristotle, 1962), humans are drawn to groups. Yet these groups are not entirely open; there can be elements of territoriality and exclusivity that shut out groups (e.g. Joppke, 2008). Understanding the context of focus group conversations, and engaging with the ideas produced from them, necessitates an appreciation of these group dynamics.

Focus groups 'provide direct evidence about similarities and differences in the participants' opinions and experiences as opposed to reaching such
conclusions from post hoc analyses of separate statements from each interviewee' (Morgan, 1997: 10). One participant's reaction to another in a group setting is more likely to be more 'raw' than in an individual interview, where the participant has time to consider their response to a direct question. It is the responses that are less vetted that the research is interested in; it wants to tap into how participants immediately make sense of concepts, so that their construction can be compared to the CDA.

The responses participants give can also be mediated or influenced by whether or not the participants are known to one another, or if they are able to create a rapport. Having participants who know each other is a double-edged sword. It can be useful in that they already know one another and are therefore more likely to be comfortable in each other's presence. It can even make the conversation more natural, as '[t]hese are, after all, the network in which people might normally discuss (or evade) the sorts of issues likely to be raised in the research session and the “naturally occurring” group is one of the most important contexts in which ideas are formed and decisions made' (Kitzinger and Barbour, 1999: 8-9). However, debate could become stifled if each participant knows the others' positions; people may be less inclined to debate or disagree over well-trodden ground. The group dynamic could swing in favour of cliques, if some are known to one another, which would shut out other participants. In some cases, this could even shut out the researcher (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 190-192).

Nurturing favourable group dynamics is an essential part of this research, as it aims to gain representations of communities as a whole (however far this
is actually possible in reality). Therefore participants should be from the local area in some capacity, so that common experiences can be brought to life, discussed and put in a social, political, and academic context. It is beneficial for this research if a communal conception of the communities under scrutiny can be constructed, particularly as this will allow for an exploration of the prominence of various discourses and logics (if any). To ensure the focus group research allows for an indicative engagement with the use and prominence of discourses and logics in general conversation, the groups must be set up rigorously. This is the subject of the next section.

3.2.4. Arranging and conducting the focus groups

There are a number of issues to take into account when arranging and conducting focus groups. One such issue is that of bias on the part of the researcher. Participants should be selected in a methodical fashion to ensure that the researcher receives useful responses to the questions posed, and to ensure that the conversations within the group help address the subject of research – in this case the role of discourses and logics. It is not helpful either for the researcher or the research if participants are selected because they may fit a certain mould and may therefore take particular, anticipated, positions on key subjects. The fieldwork employs snowball sampling (Burnham et al., 2008: 107-108), whereby individuals are recommended by their peers, forming a network of participants, and spreading the word around relevant communities about the focus groups. This is a useful method for when incentives for participants are not possible. It is also particularly useful when the commonality that all participants need is to live and/or work in the same local area. It would not be particularly useful for 117
the research if the participants in the Aston focus groups could not contribute to a discussion on the lived experiences of people in Aston from a first-hand position, for example. Of course, there is a possibility of bias, in that participants are likely to recommend people they know, who may therefore hold a similar position. However, it could also be the case that interested parties would be recommended, regardless of their outlook. This method allows the researcher to negate their own personal bias somewhat, through allowing participants, who have locally specific knowledge and experiences to recommend people. Furthermore, 'snowball sampling is more suited to in-depth interview research than to survey research, as conventionally understood' (Burnham et al., 2008: 108). As the research does not rely on quantitative measures, participants only need to have a willingness to contribute, though it may be useful if the groups are representative demographically. However, the openness of the group to a wider range of people provides numerous challenges, such as confidentiality:

In the case of group interviews, all the other group participants need to maintain confidentiality as well. Participants won't speak freely if they believe that what they say will not be held in confidence. This is especially important in focus groups that deal with sensitive issues (Esterberg, 2002: 111).

Issues of cohesion and welfare can bring up particularly sensitive issues surrounding ethnicity, socio-economic situations (regarding welfare stigma, for example) and potentially gender issues (e.g. traditional views of a woman's role in society). The researcher must be sensitive to this, and should perhaps be particularly aware of potential gender issues, considering the various perspectives of the role of women in the Muslim faith (Mernissi,
All the focus groups undertaken therefore begin with a set of ground rules covering confidentiality, freedom to speak, freedom to leave at any time, and so on.

There can also be potential issues concerning homogeneity and heterogeneity. A group must not be too heterogeneous to cause discomfort, or too disparate to foster debate (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 190). One can plan for such eventualities, but one will not know as to the success of the group until after the focus group has run. Some may feel that race and ethnicity could cause problems in the groups. Due to the nature of the subjects being discussed, there is the potential for emotions to flare along these lines. Heterogeneity will hopefully provide diverse and fruitful discussion, but one must be mindful of the potential problems associated with this diversity, particularly when discussing subjects that people are likely to have strong feelings on, such as cohesion and welfare. These potential issues are deemed a risk worth taking however, as the payoff is that people are more likely to be challenged on their views, forcing them to evaluate them and hopefully providing the researcher with an insight into the construction of various positions. At the very least, it should provide more detail in the participants' answers (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 190-191).

Another concern is geographical location. It is a useful criterion for segmentation as different groups' experiences of cohesion and welfare will be, at least in part, influenced by the areas in which they live and work. The actions of a council in one ward as compared to another, and how the actions are represented and reported by participants, may provide insights
into how much influence participants feel they have on particular issues, for example. Segmentation could also happen along the lines of group or institutional membership, in that people who share common membership of different groups are likely to have similar opinions on particular matters (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 190-192). Of course, this does not mean that members of the same group will see eye to eye on everything. Along similar lines to the criterion of membership, groups could be separated along the lines of shared experiences. A particular problem with this approach is that shared experiences could become shared assumptions, where participants assume that each has the same understanding of a phenomenon or concept. This means that potentially important issues are skipped over or discussed only briefly (Finch and Lewis, 2003: 192). How people define experiences could also be problematic when deciding who belongs in which group. Finally, socio-economic background could form the basis for segmentation. This may be useful for relating issues of inequality to cohesion. However, this category is partially covered by the locales in which the focus groups take place: Aston in Birmingham, and Manningham in Bradford

3.2.4.1. Choosing the location for focus groups
The focus groups need to be able to capture a snapshot of the dynamics of communities in which Community Cohesion is a salient topic. It does not necessarily have to be a prominent talking point in the communities, but neighbourhoods and so on should ideally have been locations of interest for cohesion policy. For that reason, the focus groups take place in two urban areas in the UK: Aston in Birmingham and Manningham in Bradford. Aston is in the top 10% of deprived neighbourhoods in the UK (Birmingham City
Council, 2011; DCLG, 2011), whilst Manningham is in the top 1% (Bradford Council, 2011; DCLG, 2011). Furthermore, Manningham was one of the flashpoints for the 2001 riots (Home Office, 2001a), providing extra specific context for undertaking focus groups in that area. Many residents in the Manningham area are dependent on benefits, with lower employment levels than the regional average, and with twice the national average of pupils on free school meals (Bradford MDC, n.d., 18). Bradford also has the third highest proportion of Black and Minority Ethnic people outside of London, behind Birmingham and Manchester (Bradford Council, 2010: 20).

Aston sits within the constituency of Ladywood in Birmingham, which is the most deprived in the city (Birmingham City Council, 2011: 3). Birmingham in general is very diverse, with around one third of the population coming from an ethnic minority background (Cangiano, 2008: 9). Aston itself has a very diverse ethnic background with no one group largely prevailing (Cagniano, 2008: 10). The ethnic and economic backgrounds of Manningham and Aston can be seen in the ethnic and socio-economic makeup of the groups. This is discussed in detail in chapter six. Taking into account the background of the two areas in which the focus groups are conducted, a cogent set of questions can now be developed.

### 3.2.5. Choosing the questions to be asked

The questions for the focus groups should be designed with the major questions of aims of the research in mind (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990). As the main aims of this thesis are to investigate New Labour’s specific
response to unrest as manifested through Community Cohesion and welfare policy, alongside exploring the role and influence of particular discourses, the questions devised for the focus groups should speak to issues of cohesion, community and togetherness, as well as looking at how people make sense of related concepts and phenomena. The question schedule itself follows the funnel approach (Morgan, 1997: 41), whereby the group begins with the discussion of general questions, which become more specific as the discussion progresses. By constructing groups that are drawn from the local area and are as heterogeneous as possible, discussion of the questions should help construct a picture of ‘cohesion’ as seen by that population. Ideally, the focus groups should contain around six questions. There is room for more if desired, but there should certainly be no more than twelve (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990; Kreuger, 1988). The focus groups will take place in surroundings in which the participants feel comfortable so as to encourage full and honest responses to the questions asked.

For this thesis, the focus group questions not only relate to the main thrust of the research, but also to the discussions generated by the discourse analysis. This is to facilitate an exploration of the potential use, appropriation and contamination of discourse through discussion of pertinent issues. The questions need to be general enough to incite debate within the group and to avoid simple yes/no answers. If they are too specific or technical, it could stifle debate or lead to excessive interruption by the participants.

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39 Of course, with qualitative research of this nature, it is not possible to claim representation or an ability to generalise for that community as a whole. However, it can claim a form of legitimacy instead, in that the insights gained do represent a faithful picture of what a range of people think about the same area.

40 This research makes use of ten questions to ensure a wide enough discussion.

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moderator in order to explain concepts, terms, etc. The questions have been
organised into broad indicative themes, in an attempt to develop an idea of
what question(s) will produce particular kinds of information. These themes
are: community, inequality, perceptions and practical concerns. Of course,
there is crossover between the themes. The questions are as follows.

3.2.5.1. Question Schedule

- Tell me about where you live – what’s it like?
  - Safe? Nice people? Wealthy/poor?

- Is there anything you’d like to change about where you live?

*If participants reply with specific issues, probe them on it: why these issues?
Does the community feel the same way? Etc.*

- How do you think people from elsewhere view where you live?
  - Problems? Good things?

- What does ‘community’ mean to you?
  - How would you describe a strong community? Do you have examples?

- Some people say there are problems between different ethnic groups. Do you agree? Why/why not?
  - (If yes) what do you think causes tensions between groups?

- Look at these headlines – what kind of images do they portray?

- Think about (the idea of) welfare. What comes to mind?
  - What role does welfare play in your community?
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- Why do you think we have welfare?
- Some people think inequality isn’t a problem. What do you think?
- Some people say that if you are unwilling to work, you shouldn’t get any benefits. What is your opinion on this?
- Would you do anything differently, if you could?
- Is unemployment a problem (in your area)?
- Do you think it causes other problems?
- Is there anything you would do to change it, if you could?

Prompts (Legard et al., 2003: 149), in this case newspaper articles from The Sun, The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Telegraph and The Guardian, are used to give participants imaged and information that they can relate to directly, rather than invoking a potentially abstract discussion. This helps to further personalise discussion and to engender a more explicit positioning and use of particular concepts etc. The articles are related to the questions to provide context. The explicit aim of using such prompts is to gauge participants’ reactions to emotive or specific headlines regarding cohesion and welfare, which are likely to also employ some of the discourses and logics discussed via the discourse analysis. Thus, a further analytical link is provided between the CDA and the focus groups.

Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach taken in this thesis, within the context of the analytical frame as set out in chapter two. It provides discussion regarding the choice of methods used in the thesis, such
as why they are suitable for the research undertaken and how they contribute to an exploration of New Labour’s response to unrest in the UK. The use of two qualitative methods, discourse analysis and focus groups, is particularly compatible with the critical analytical framework due to maintain similar positions regarding the role of the researcher and the contestation of the possibility of a value-free or non-biased exploration of the subject matter (Henn et al., 2009: 18; Humphries, 1997; Snape and Spencer, 2003: 9; Burnham et al., 2008: 35; Benton, 1977; Archer, 1995: 159). The use of focus groups to supplement the work of the critical discourse analysis is also compatible with the analytical approach because of its ability to provide a platform for actors whose voice can be diminished when discussing issues of policy (Schostack and Schostak: 2008; Henn et al., 2009: 29).

The interdisciplinary and relatively open nature of CDA (Van Dijk, 2002: 98; 2004: 352; Wodak, 2002: 69) allows it to incorporate various theoretical and conceptual elements. Therefore, the CDA in this thesis employs Howarth’s understanding of social and political logics as the building blocks of discourse (Howarth, 2005: 323; Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 133-164), whilst retaining a critical approach to the analysis itself (Fairclough, 2013: 177; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271-80). This critical approach is inspired by the Gramscian framework in chapter two, particularly regarding language and grammar, alongside issues of common sense and hegemony. It treats cohesion and welfare as separate social logics that nevertheless integrate and interact in the construction of a wider political project of ‘cohesion’. Constituting both these social logics, the analysis focuses on
three political logics: conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration. These political logics have been chosen because they can be seen in the development of both social logics, and therefore provide the best chance of exploring the influence and composition of key discourses. It is important to remember that as CDA can be very in-depth, it is practically impossible to conduct a ‘full’ discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2002: 99). Likewise, it would be impossible to explore and analyse all the potential logics existent in the policy documents being studies.

Designed to support the CDA, the focus groups aim to provide indicative evidence as to the influence, strength, use and possible contamination of discourse, partially through the subversion of logics. For this to be possible, they must be devised, arranged and conducted methodically and systematically, with a set of questions that will allow the group discussion to address directly (if not explicitly) key concepts and how participants make sense of, and relate to, them. The group and deliberative nature of focus group allows for the exploration of collective and individual perceptions of phenomena (Kitzinger, 1994). As discourses and logics are at least partially based on collective understandings of issues, focus groups present themselves as a useful forum to explore the role of discourses and logics further (Burnham et al., 2008: 128). Although focus groups are in some sense an unnatural social setting (Morgan, 1997: 8; Finch and Lewis, 2003: 180), the way people react to this and alter their discussion accordingly also provides some insight into prevailing assumptions and discourses, along similar lines to individuals using grammar appropriate to their social context.
(Gramsci, 1985: 180)

The combination of critical discourse analysis and focus groups therefore provides a methodological framework adept at exploring New Labour’s response to unrest through the construction of a political project of cohesion, and how the difference between the language and aims of policy may affect people, as explored through the focus groups. It is suitable for combining with the thesis’ critical analytical frame, allowing for the problematisation of a top-down construction of cohesion to be compared with a bottom-up exploration of everyday narratives of community, cohesion and welfare, using discourses and logics as the connector.

Thus far, the thesis has presented its analytical and methodological position, contextualised by discussions on the background and history of New Labour’s development of cohesion as a political project, as well as discussions regarding key academic and theoretical concepts related to Community Cohesion and welfare. The thesis now moves to utilise these discussions in combined fashion, embarking on a critical discourse analysis of New Labour policy literature on Community Cohesion and welfare reform.
CHAPTER FOUR – INTERROGATING KEY CONCEPTS
WITH COHESION AND WELFARE

The major aim of this chapter is to review literature central to an understanding of the socio-political and academic context in which New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy is situated. It analyses two well-established bodies of literature focused on citizenship and welfare, and so focuses on what these literatures can say about integration, participation, belonging and social support in the UK, and regarding New Labour more specifically. The chapter also reviews pertinent elements of the less extensive literature on social/Community Cohesion, in order to relate it to the wider debates regarding the rights and responsibilities of both citizen and state. In doing so it speaks to specific elements of the literatures on citizenship, welfare and cohesion: particularly debates surrounding asset-based and social investment welfare in the UK, the significance of economic and socio-cultural integration, and the aims and consequences (both intended and unintended) of New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare reform on British society. New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare policy relied upon the promotion of a form of citizenship that prioritised participation and adherence to a set of shared values. In doing so, it drew on republican and communitarian traditions in order to augment the already existing British liberal tradition. However, through an attempt to appeal to all sections of society, New Labour risked incorporating fundamental contradictions in how the relationship between citizen and state, as well as
their rights and responsibilities, was to be understood and acted upon. Embodied in the Labour Party’s adoption of Giddens’ Third Way, the tensions become clear:

One wonders where one might find Giddens’ heroic competitive, flexible and mobile individual who at the same time is a nurturing parent, rooted in a community, in which he/she has time and energy to invest in civic involvement… It would be a repressed super-ego indeed that in this context would refrain from engaging in power-charged strategic language games driven on by economic interests imposed by necessities as defined by the terms of market participation. When the individual then fails to live up to these demands, it is presumably the role of ‘etho-politics’ to discipline (and punish?) the individual (Ryner, 2002: 20).

This was not seen as a problem to a party that attempted to construct a politics that drew consensus from all sides by ignoring the tensions and divisions within society (Mouffe, 1998; Hall 1998). Society was to be modernised without disturbing existing embedded interests; in other words, the project was more focused on stabilising (neo) liberal practice through justifying ‘on a philosophical and theoretical level a broad alliance of interests that otherwise would not be reconcilable’ (Ryner, 2002: 18).

This line of argument chimes with a number of concerns of the thesis, particularly the argument that the empowering language of New Labour’s policy was coupled with a controlling and top-down framework that did more to responsibilise than empower. To evaluate this further it is useful to explore the academic debates surrounding key assumptions of New Labour’s approach to Community Cohesion and welfare, and the overarching concern with active citizenship as a key component of mobilising citizen assent to combat the ‘weak’ citizenship characteristic of
neoliberalism (Davies, 2012; Retort, 2004: 9-10). This involves engaging with academic debates on traditions and the nature of citizenship (particularly in the UK case), and debates concerned with the (potential) cohesive effects of welfare policies and infrastructure.

Through these debates one can chart continuities and differences between the theoretical expectations of these concepts and their implementation in the UK case. This helps provide the foundation from which one can embark on a critical discourse analysis of New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform policies. The debates in this chapter act as a conceptual reference point in order to highlight the tensions and contradictions in some of New Labour’s thinking, thereby advancing the problematisation of the discourses and logics found within the policy literature, as set out in chapter five.

The debates in this chapter draw upon literatures concerned with citizenship and welfare. It speaks particularly to broader debates on the social investment welfare state, which is concerned with the reorganisation of welfare in order to promote inclusion and provide a welfare state that is able to deal with the challenges of the knowledge economy (e.g. Morel et al., 2012; Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003; Lundvall and Lorenz, 2012). Specifically to the UK, this involves creating financially literate citizens who are incorporated into the mainstream financial system through the development of asset-based welfare (Finlayson, 2009: 408). Regarding community/social cohesion, the debates speak to the literature on the nature of participation, belonging and integration. In particular, debates regarding
the role of the citizen in (British) society and the impact of forms of
citizenship on the character of cohesion (and in the case of the UK, the
development of Community Cohesion policy).

To provide such a foundation, the chapter is divided into a number of
sections. Section one explores how various traditions of citizenship may
influence the nature and depth of cohesion. Section two relates these debates
to the development and implementation of social citizenship (partially)
through the welfare state, particularly in the UK case. The final section then
debates the extent to which one can see specific ‘regimes’ of cohesion as a
result of particular developments in citizenship and welfare policy.

4.1. Citizenship as a foundation for cohesion in New Labour’s
Britain

Central to New Labour’s social policy was the notion of ‘active citizenship’,
designed to encourage citizens to interact more in their communities and
within society as a whole (Home Office, 2004; Davies, 2012). This active
citizenship can be seen to have republican and communitarian inflections
(e.g. Annette, 2009). Considering that the liberal tradition of citizenship has
been a core feature of the British polity for hundreds of years (e.g. Bevir and
Rhodes, 2001), it is important to understand the contradictions and
complementarities between these three traditions – not least because the
nature and depth of cohesion in a state is linked to the dominant tradition of
citizenship, and the rights and responsibilities laid out for state and citizen.
Thus, an engagement with the notion of citizenship, and the traditions that
may have influenced New Labour’s overall approach to cohesion and
welfare, helps provide a firm basis from which to embark on a CDA of New
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Labour policy.

Citizenship is inherently linked to the state, and provides mechanisms that develop participation and belonging in that state (Turner, 1993; Isin and Turner, 2002; Yuval-Davis, 2007). One's official membership of a particular nation-state is crucial due to the benefits one can receive (Kofman, 2002; Orloff, 1993; Marshall, 1950) such as protection (from other states, for example), order (in the form of a legal system) and possibly assistance (such as with the welfare state). Beyond these official elements, being a member of a nation-state can provide a powerful sense of belonging (Cesarini and Fulbrook, 1996), increasing the likelihood of citizens acting in the state's interests particularly if the state’s interests are felt to be the interests of the populace. This has obvious effects for a system of cohesion; a cohesive nation should have an anchor point to which most, if not all, citizens can relate. This was something that New Labour focused on heavily, particularly through the development of active citizenship and shared values.

Although it cannot be argued that it was a purposeful and calculated move on the part of New Labour, one can argue that elements of three different traditions of citizenship influenced New Labour’s development of social policy: liberal, republican and communitarian. Republican influences were relatively small; the biggest influences came from the UK’s deeply ingrained liberal tradition (e.g. Joppke, 2005; Smith, 1998), and the enthusiastic adoption of communitarian principles. The way these traditions are ordered and deployed affects the horizontal relationships within the nation-state (i.e. relationships between citizens) as well as the vertical
relationship (i.e. between citizens and state). It is important to highlight that these three traditions are not entirely separate; rather they overlap, both in theory and in practice.

In developing a more ‘active’ citizenship, New Labour aimed to influence the social contract\footnote{Many have discussed at length the nature of the social contract, such as Rousseau (1997), Hobbes (1991), Locke (1988) and Rawls (1999). It is not discussed in great detail in this thesis, rather it is used as a signpost to a wider tradition of contractarianism associated with citizenship.}, 'the set of mutual rights and obligations binding citizens with their polity' (Flanagan \textit{et al.}, 1999: 135). The party whilst in government put significant effort into heightening people's awareness of a social contract, exemplified by the mantra of 'no rights without responsibilities' (Giddens, 1998: 65). The notion of a contract implies a relationship between citizen and state (e.g. Mouffe, 1992; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Somers, 1993), and the composition of this relationship is crucial to the character of citizenship. Where power lies, how it is transmitted, and how much is transmitted influences the actions and attitudes of citizens.

This relationship can have a profound effect on cohesion. Indeed, after 2001 developing cohesion through an appeal to a common citizenship became a major aim for New Labour. The idea of citizenship, as well as the rules various traditions of citizenship presuppose, suggests an ideal goal to be attained regardless of the likelihood of its attainment\footnote{It may even be highly unlikely, if not impossible, that an ideal state could be reached (e.g. Young, 1989).}. It can encourage specific forms of engagement and integration within the polity, which is why it is essential as a foundation for developing (community or social)
cohesion. Understanding New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion therefore necessitates an understanding of how the elements of various traditions of citizenship may interact, and the possible outcomes of this.

Moving away from the more authoritarian contractualism of Hobbes (1991) and Machiavelli (1988), modern citizenship can be seen to strive for a more equitable political settlement. The starting point of modern citizenship is therefore a commitment to recognition and equality in the eyes of the state; all citizens should be treated in the same manner (Young, 1989: 250). Though oppressed groups did not disappear with the development of citizenship, this development did provide some channels through which these groups could struggle for greater inclusion\(^{43}\). However, there is not one uniform process for gaining recognition, and the extent to which individuals' and groups' belonging increases (along with their level of participation) is at least partially dependent on the parameters constructed through the prevalent interpretation of citizenship. The way in which a state interprets and approaches its relationship with its citizens will influence the nature of support available, expectations placed upon citizens and ultimately how citizens act towards one another, within and towards various social groups, and as groups and individuals in relation to the state. In other words, the state has influence in how citizens (are expected to) interact and integrate within its borders. This is of importance to understanding cohesion as a policy and as a wider socio-political project. The foundational

\(^{43}\) Marshall's (1950) charting of the development of citizenship rights, discussed later in the chapter, attests to this.
interpretation of citizenship in the UK stems from the liberal tradition. It is therefore important to understand New Labour’s position in relation to this tradition.

4.1.1. New Labour’s approach to Citizenship and participation: Liberal foundations

New Labour’s relationship with the liberal tradition (beyond the relationship all British political parties have through the British political tradition) could be seen most prominently in its adopted Third Way approach. The aim of the approach was to ‘fuse neo-liberal economics with more “social” and communitarian sentiments’ (Ryner, 2002: 7). This has been characterised in multiple ways ranging from renewing social democracy (Giddens, 1998) to humanising and/or softening neoliberalism (Jessop, 2002). The fusing of the neoliberal with the ‘social’ necessitated the incorporation of elements of communitarian and, to an extent, republican traditions of citizenship, placed within this wider liberal tradition. This was not straightforward, considering the different ontological positions from which the traditions operate.

The liberal tradition of citizenship is not monolithic; within it one can identify multiple strands. One of the original premises of liberal citizenship that informs these strands is that all citizens have equal status; inalienable rights to life, liberty and property (Locke, 1988). Within the tradition there are strands that adhere to both a positive and negative conception of liberty (see Berlin, 1958). This means that some (generally classical) forms of liberal citizenship advocate as little state intervention as possible, so that citizens may be left to pursue their own interests. However this is not always the case: T.H. Marshall’s liberalism for example can be seen to
adhere to a positive conception of liberty (e.g. McLaughlin and Baker, 2007). This advocates state intervention to ensure that all citizens have the wherewithal to pursue their individual goals. Aside from the debatable necessity for socio-economic intervention\textsuperscript{44}, the state's role in this pursuit is to provide protection – from those outside the state (by employing an army for defence) and from those inside the state (by maintaining law and order through a police force, for example).

Taylor describes liberal citizenship as having 'an ethic of the right, rather than the good. That is, its basic principle concerns how society should respond to and arbitrate the competing demands of individuals' (Taylor, 2003: 197). Therefore in liberal citizenship individuals have primacy; it is the individual that creates state and society, not the other way around. In order for individuals to pursue their own interests, they must agree not to encroach on the liberty of others. The way society responds and arbitrates individuals' competing demands is through a sovereign government, to which individuals loan some of their liberty (Lister and Pia, 2008: 10). The idea of collective governance therefore presents difficulties, because it would potentially subsume individual interests and therefore restrict individual liberty in the name of the greater good (Faulks, 2002: 67; Lister and Pia, 2008: 10). Based on this the development of neoliberal economics requires limits on any collective governance. The interaction of neoliberal economics and social politics therefore internalises some contradictions regarding the role and capacity of the citizen. To what extent could New

\textsuperscript{44} See section 2 for a more detailed discussion.
Labour, for example, work in the interests of a collective good when its financial concerns prioritised individual good?

Because individuals only loan sovereignty to the state, their rights retain primacy. Government power is to be limited to combat the threat of absolutism, and to ensure any restriction of individual liberty is legitimate (Hobhouse, 1999: 11-12; Lister and Pia, 2008: 11). Furthermore, because the individual retains primacy, and individuals are encouraged to pursue their own private interests, the division between public and private is important. The private sphere is where individuals are free to pursue their own interests and goals, and so it is this sphere that takes primacy. Individuals are not expected to participate in public life; it is solely their choice whether or not they shall. Ultimately liberalism, regardless of whether it is interventionist or not, aims to maximise individuals’ liberty and restrict group power. The private sphere is lauded, whilst the public sphere is seen as something that serves the private. Again, this places restrictions on the scope of the ‘social’. The Third Way, in this tradition, waters down ‘socialism’ and social democracy to ‘very general claims about taking responsibility for ourselves and each other: social-ism’ (Finlayson, 1999: 271). The collectivist underpinning of the economic element of social democracy is removed and replaced with an economic doctrine that actively prioritises individualism.

The primacy of the private sphere, of the individual, and of property, links liberal citizenship with capitalism. C.B. Macpherson highlights this historical connection:
Its life began in capitalist market societies, and from the beginning it accepted their basic unconscious assumption, which might be paraphrased ‘Market maketh man’. Yet quite early on, as early as John Stuart Mill in the mid-nineteenth century, it pressed the claim of equal individual rights to self-development, and justified itself largely by that claim (Macpherson, 1977: 1)

Liberalism's meshing with capitalism influences its development; it is unlikely a coincidence that the key tenets of liberalism, in terms of enshrining individual freedom and rights such as the right to own property have been central to capitalist development. A system of cohesion within a liberal tradition is perhaps more likely to be designed to support such development, employing mechanisms that support individual endeavour as opposed to social solidarity, if it would be more favourable to the capitalist ethos.

Therefore, one may question the ability of a liberal citizenship structure to develop cohesion if the main tenet of liberal citizenship is to allow individuals to lead separate lives within the private sphere. It is not absolutely necessary for one to be active in the public sphere (where the state has more influence) unless one chooses to participate. With this in mind, the ability for a Third Way political party to achieve greater social cohesion would depend entirely on the nature of that cohesion. This may also help to explain, as discussed in chapter one, why in the UK Putnam's conceptual development of social capital has been popular, conforming as it does to a generally individualist and private conception of integration and participation (e.g. Dolfisma and Dannreuther, 2003).

The distribution of rights and responsibilities is central to social or
Community Cohesion, as various distributions influence how, and the extent to which, individuals participate in society. Liberal citizenship in general accords most importance to rights, the development of which was theorised by T.H. Marshall. Lister and Pia state that Marshall's work on citizenship rights 'has become a touchstone piece for a number of debates around citizenship' (2008: 3). Marshall argued that historically, citizenship has developed in a threefold manner, giving rise to three forms of rights: civic rights, political rights and social rights (Marshall, 1950). Civic rights are the basic liberal rights – life, liberty, property. The entrenchment of these rights allowed for the development of political rights, such as freedom of association, which allow individuals to participate more fully in the life of the nation-state. The entrenching of political rights embeds the needed environment for the development of social rights (such as the right to a minimum income, perhaps). It is these final rights to which the welfare state is heavily indebted (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21). 'Thus, citizenship, for Marshall, provides membership of the community through the establishment of equal rights which give each individual an equal chance to pursue their own, private, goals' (Lister and Pia, 2008: 14). A higher membership of the community could reduce issues of atomism and exclusion by fostering a shared sense of belonging. However, the emphasis on private property still privileges those who can afford to amass property. It is not usually these people who are in need of initiatives to increase cohesion and decrease exclusion, as they are more likely to have stability:

For those who emphasise self-interest, (the narrow conception), property is understood primarily to entail the right to exclude others
from the use and benefit of what one owns. This privileges the possessive individual who presumably stands solely in market relations to other “traders” in a *laissez faire* society. It allows each person to erect high and enforceable legal boundaries of exclusion around her property, boundaries which operate as *in rem* rights – rights “against the world” (Shachar and Hirschl, 2007: 263).

Competition is essential in a liberal society, yet cohesion must at least partially be based on some form of solidarity (e.g. Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Kawachi and Berkman, 2000; Letki, 2008; Cheong *et al*, 2007; Chan *et al.*, 2006) – either solidarity between different ethnic groups, or across various other social strata. Reconciling competition with solidarity, at least in general terms, could produce contradictory messages; not to say that the two are diametrically opposed, but one generally pushes in the direction of co-operation and compromise, whilst the other does not. It also leaves those in privileged economic positions with the choice to volunteer their time, whereas those in more vulnerable positions are more likely to be obliged to contribute part of their responsibilities to their communities. Bringing individuals' private interests into the public sphere could increase competition rather than solidarity, which could have a knock-on effect on cohesion. This can be seen in communities' suspicion of one another regarding competing for local government funding (DCLG, 2007b: 6), which is discussed in greater depth in chapter five. Of course, this possible incompatibility between competition and solidarity may not be so strong when dealing with social liberalism, which values certain interventions in order to allow individuals to pursue their private interests (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2004; Zipp, 1986). Social liberals advocate ensuring citizens have
the ‘basic level of material well-being’ that is required to pursue these interests (Lister and Pia, 2008: 12). This is discussed in more detail in section 2.

Within a liberal structure, cohesion may be the result of private deliberation manifesting itself in the public sphere. For example, ‘people are capable of reaching agreement on principles of justice which will then govern their political arrangements’ (Miller, 1995: 436). In other words, people's private actions and interactions influence their public activities. This means that New Labour’s focus on the individual, or ‘communities’, still has the potential to develop cohesion. Yet since cohesion was developed through Community Cohesion policy, any private deliberation has been influenced by the state. The state therefore develops a sense of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizenship practices (perhaps as seen in the concept of ‘active citizenship’ discussed in chapter five) in order to engender a particular form of public activity. This may help to explain why although couched in language generally appropriate to the liberal tradition the UK's Community Cohesion framework is top-down, giving little real autonomy to citizens. If it is the case that '[a] citizen is just someone who subscribes to a certain set of principles' (Miller, 1995: 437), these principles would need to penetrate citizens' activities in the private as well as public sphere. This can be seen in New Labour's response to unrest, which emphasised universal uptake of

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45 Much of the language of Community Cohesion and welfare is compatible with the British liberal tradition. However, there is also much language that invokes republican and communitarian ideals. This is discussed in general terms later in this chapter, and in more detail in chapter five.
'core' values\textsuperscript{46} (e.g. Home Office, 2004: 6).

The focus on private endeavour and even the pursuit of property found in the liberal conception of citizenship may hinder the development of cohesion because of the potential contradictions between individual freedom and solidarity\textsuperscript{47}. An alternative to liberalism that accords less focus to the individual is republican citizenship, which may provide more fertile ground from which to develop cohesion. Some republican ideals can be seen as influencing New Labour’s Third Way thinking (Williams, 2004), particularly regarding how to encourage and increase participation within a wider political that privileges the private individual.

\textbf{4.1.2. Participation and state/society relationships: The utility of Republican tenets of citizenship for New Labour}

Elements of the republican tradition of citizenship can be seen as compatible with New Labour’s overall approach to integration and participation in community and society (Lister \textit{et al.}, 2003; Powell, 2002). Indeed, New Labour’s model of rights and responsibilities (in which responsibilities were accented over rights) utilised the republican ideal of civic participation as a responsibility of the citizen in a functioning society (Lister \textit{et al.}, 2003), even if this society was based upon broader liberal traditions.

A potential issue with this incorporation is that the republican tradition of citizenship stands in contrast to liberal citizenship. Republicans accuse liberals of focusing too heavily on individual rights in the private sphere, to

\textsuperscript{46} Again, this is discussed in further depth in chapter five.
\textsuperscript{47} Although individual freedom and solidarity are of course not mutually exclusive, promoting the two simultaneously could lead to mixed messages.
the detriment of developing civic virtue (e.g. Sullivan, 1986; Pettit, 1997). In the republican tradition, citizens are expected to be active in the public sphere. It is through this participation that freedom (both for the state and the citizen) is developed. ‘Republicans, according to Skinner, are above all committed to the ideal of a “free state”. A free state, like a free individual, is one which is not subject to constraints, but which is able to act according to its own will, that is, according to the general will of all the members of the community’ (Patten, 1996: 28; see also Skinner, 1990). Individual freedom can only be obtained through the development of a free state, which requires citizens to play their part. The freer the state, the freer the citizens (Skinner, 1990: 301-2). From this, a form of cohesion between citizens could develop: a freer state is more able to guarantee rights, leading to freer citizens, but only if enough citizens participate. This creates a community that draws people out of the private sphere and into public life, beyond ‘the circle of family and friends’ (Tocqueville, 1969: 506). France was one of the first modern republican states, and provided many other countries with a blueprint based on freedom, secularism, and civic participation (Jennings, 2000). Each citizen therefore has a vested interest in the other's participation. However, this means that although a free state can be thought of in a similar way as a free individual, the individuals within the state must accept that their personal freedom is somewhat subsumed by the priority of the freedom of the state. This provides the state with a lot of centralised power (Jennings, 2000). Participation and cohesion can therefore be seen as reliant on one another. Pattern uses the example of the citizen's responsibility to the state:

Free states, republicans assume, break down easily into unfree ones
because of the negligence and indifference of their citizens. When this happens, the negative liberties cherished by liberals and republicans are in danger of being lost. This sets up the central republican problem, which is to identify the conditions under which a society can maintain the institutions of its freedom, despite this tendency to corruption (Patten, 1996: 28).

Cohesion in a republican system of citizenship would therefore be based on the active participation of its citizens. This is an obvious influence on New Labour's development of the concept of 'active citizenship' (Home Office, 2004: 6), designed to increase participation and adherence to shared values so as to develop Community Cohesion. Drawing people out of their circle of family and friends is analogous with encouraging self-segregated ethnic communities to stop living parallel lives. If New Labour did adopt some republican ideals whilst developing its approach to citizenship, their incorporation would need to demonstrate sensitivity to the wider British tradition. Perhaps this could be achieved by speaking to the interventionist tradition within liberal citizenship.

In this system, state intervention is easier to justify. The state involves itself in private endeavours to encourage public participation, needed to reinforce the strength of the state and therefore the freedom of the individual citizen. Furthermore, a republican system is based on the close connection between citizens and state. In this respect, the state would intervene in a similar manner to that of the liberal system: to arbitrate competing demands, in order that all citizens have the ability to participate in the public sphere.

48 This is highlighted by Rousseau's belief that the citizen should put aside their personal interests to follow the general will (Rousseau, 1997), which is arrived at through citizen deliberation via the state (see also Dagger, 2002: 150).
State intervention can therefore be seen to help develop cohesion, considering the integrative effects of civic participation (e.g. Dagger, 2002: 15). This would seem ideal to achieve New Labour’s plans; the state may become involved in the lives of private individuals, but these individuals would still retain some autonomy. However, there is an issue in that with a mixture of liberal and republican traditions, how the individual understands their freedom as a citizen, along with their precise role, will become confused. It is not tenable, for example, to feel that it is one’s duty to become involved civically, but one’s right to remain entirely outside the public sphere.

Although a greater level of participation in the public sphere could lead to a greater sense of cohesion, extending this participation too far could lead to citizen fatigue (e.g. Young, 1989; 1995). This would have a negative effect on cohesion, as it would likely instigate the breakdown of the state due to negligence on the part of the citizen (Patten, 1996: 28). This is an argument in favour for adopting a more liberal approach in which citizens are left to pursue their own private goals, whilst the state arbitrates their competing demands. However, neither of these options seem to adequately account for the development and maintenance of cohesion. It would seem that one needs to strike a balance between having too much participation (leading to burn-out) and too little participation (leading to negligence).

The key to this balance may be found in the distribution of rights, which constitutes an important difference between the liberal and republican traditions. For republicans, liberty comes from participation; ‘[l]aw which
ensures the freedom of the citizenry is dependent upon the participation of the citizenry’ (Lister and Pia, 2008: 24). By this logic, citizens must take an active role in public life (however small) in order to access and defend their rights. Such citizens are furnished with a civic and social education, and are thus more integrated into the life of the nation (Dagger, 2002: 15). This will increase cohesion via developing a sense of civic duty. This is central for thinkers such as Putnam, who suggests that it is precisely a lack of civic participation that causes problems for cohesion in developed states, as society atomises and individuals retreat into the private sphere (Putnam, 2000; 2002: 60). Barber sees this as a problem with liberalism and 'thin' democracy (Barber, 1984). A loose collection of individuals has no hope of overcoming either the potential tyranny of government, nor the anomie and alienation that will pervade social life. For Barber there is an obvious route to cohesion:

Strong democratic theory posits the social nature of human beings in the world and the dialectical interdependence of man and his government. As a consequence, it places human self-realisation through mutual transformation at the centre of the democratic process. Like the social reality it infracts, human nature is compound; it is potentially both benign and malevolent, both cooperative and antagonistic (Barber, 1984: 215).

For republicans, a successful project of cohesion would likely emphasise the public over the private, in order to engender integration and cooperation. This could, to an extent, protect individual citizens’ private endeavours through the granting of particular rights. The state regulates citizens whilst also being comprised of citizens. This could lead to a situation where citizens begin to govern themselves (e.g. Bohman, 2001). The use of
community as the basis of governance could be the mechanism required to emphasise the role and importance of the public sphere without possibly encroaching too much on individual freedom. The ‘community’ becomes the public sphere of interaction and deliberation, whilst extra-community life resembles one’s private liberty. However, both the republican and liberal traditions of citizenship would necessarily conceive of the ‘community’ differently; either as a loose collection of individuals within wider society, or as a cohesive unit that offers its positions within wider society.

The idea of the self-governing citizen is fairly central to republicanism, and shares some commonalities with liberalism. Dagger illustrates this in reference to the rule of law:

If citizens are to be self-governing, they cannot be subject to absolute or arbitrary rule. If the citizen is to be self-governing, then he or she must be free from the absolute or arbitrary rule of others. To avoid this arbitrariness, citizens must be subject to the rule of law – the government of laws, not men, in what was the standard formula (Dagger, 2002: 147)

The rule of law could be another mechanism for cohesion, particularly in the republican tradition (e.g. Cohen, 1999). If citizens are encouraged to participate in the public sphere, and this participation has integrative effects as well as protecting liberties, this should be reflected in a state’s laws. The rule of law in this respect would therefore set out the rights and responsibilities of citizens (alongside a constitution if a state has one). In the example of the UK however, there is a possible tension.

Considering that one can identify both liberal and republican traits within
New Labour's response to unrest in the UK, this could result in contradictions that impact negatively on citizens. For example, can one retain the freedom to pursue one's private interests if they are required to participate in specific public activities, the outcome of which could be to place constraints on their private activity? This tension is likely to be stronger considering the UK's deeply ingrained liberal traditions (Joppke, 2005).

As analysis later in the thesis will show, there are contradictions resultant of this uneasy relationship between liberalism and republicanism. As suggested by Ryner's analysis near the beginning of the chapter, such a structure may simply place too many expectations upon the shoulders of citizens. It is this problem that highlights the central importance of communitarian citizenship to New Labour’s social policy ambitions, drawn out further through the partial construction of a political project of cohesion that contributes to a wider hegemonic strategy.

The adoption of elements of the communitarian tradition of citizenship within New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare reform programmes provide a clear unit of primacy. Instead of focusing on the tension between similar but ultimately different conceptions of freedom contained within the liberal and republican traditions of citizenship, focus can be shifted to the community as the primary source of authority and duty. This allows for the construction of an ostensibly contradiction-less framework for cohesion, although it does not resolve the tension between competing conceptions of freedom and duty.
4.1.3. Communitarian citizenship: New Labour’s understanding of rights and obligations for the citizen

The notion of communitarianism was the anchor from which New Labour aimed to reinvent the party. ‘Fairclough notes how communitarian discourse was used to distinguish New Labour both from Thatcherite Conservatism and old socialist Labour (Marinetto, 2003: 114; see also Fairclough, 2000: 37-8). Yet New Labour was, to an extent, constrained by the policies and programmes of the Thatcherite legacy (Heffernan, 2001). In conjunction with the Third Way, which spoke ‘as if there are no longer any conflicting interests which cannot be reconciled’ (Hall, 1998: 10), communitarianism was used to populate a middle ground between an admittance of the ‘primacy of the private realm’ (Waltzer, 1989: 218), and the need for an active, civically-minded, population (Marinetto, 2003: 107) – to which the British liberal state was not entirely set-up to nurture.

To understand the significance of communitarianism (and how it interacts with liberal and republican elements of citizenship) to New Labour’s ‘vision’, it is important to understand communitarian citizenship in theory. Communitarians have traditionally asserted the primacy of community in regards to citizenship. Delanty highlights the extent to which communitarianism initially separates itself from liberalism and republicanism:

The idea of community has been counterposed to society, as in Tönnies's famous treatise on Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or the state, as in the thought of modern communitarianism... In this latter conception, community is rooted in something prior to the political order of the state and, in the former, it is based on something more substantive than the associational order of modern society' (Delanty, 2002: 159; see also Tönnies, 1959).
Communitarians posit that the 'community' is already-existing, and therefore comes before any form of social or political development (e.g. Lister and Pia, 2008). In fact, any social or political development is influenced by the pre-existing community, to fit a certain set of moral and cultural values. The community therefore becomes the central mechanism in the development of citizenship. By extrapolation, this means for communitarians the community also becomes the central mechanism for developing civic-mindedness, a sense of belonging and an active citizenry. It is therefore central to New Labour’s conception of Community Cohesion (e.g. Robinson, 2005; 2008). This position also allows the state more influence in the private realm than may originally be tolerated in a liberal state. Rather than an imposition on people’s private lives, state intervention could be legitimised as the realisation and shoring up of the moral and cultural position of the pre-existing community, without which a private life in the liberal sense could not be sustained.49 'Even when the emphasis is not on an underlying cultural community, there is the assumption that politics and citizenship must rest on an underlying moral order that is prior to the political' (Delanty, 2002: 160). Therefore, by buying into communitarianism as a framework, New Labour (and by extension, the public) adhere to a number of social rules that are technically immutable.

However, communitarianism can be mixed with other traditions, depending on the character of the prior 'community'. Delanty (2002: 162-168) for

49 As an example, the deeply ingrained liberal rights in the UK stem from the pre-existing (moral) community, communitarians could argue. Therefore this prior community must be prioritised to sustain liberal rights.
example identifies three forms of communitarianism: liberal communitarianism, associated most strongly with Waltzer (1983), Sandel (1982), MacIntyre (1981) and Taylor (1989; 1994); civic communitarianism (akin to republican communitarianism), associated strongly with Putnam and his theory of social capital (1993; 1999), and; governmental communitarianism, associated most strongly with Etzioni (1995). Delanty suggests that governmental communitarianism has 'become popular in Britain and North America, frequently becoming interchangeable with a civic kind of nationalism. It was central to the political rhetoric of the British Labour Party in the historic election campaign in 1997 when the terms “nation” and “society” became interchangeable' (Delanty, 2002: 166). This makes it key to this thesis.

However, the relationship between communitarianism and liberalism deserves further attention because of the UK's historical association with liberalism. Waltzer says of communitarianism:

> It is a consistently intermittent feature of liberal politics and social organisation. No liberal success will make it permanently unattractive. At the same time, no communitarian critique, however penetrating, will ever be anything more than an inconstant feature of liberalism (Waltzer, 1990: 6).

In the first instance, communitarianism would look to be diametrically opposed to liberalism. ‘This is because where liberalism seeks to emphasise rights, communitarianism stresses the obligations that the individual owes to the community’ (Lister and Pia, 2008: 15). Furthermore, the importance of the prior community is at odds with the individualist and generally atomistic nature of liberal citizenship. Whereas liberals take the individual to be prior
to society (e.g. Rawls, 1971: 560), communitarians see the individual as constituted by the community within which they are situated (e.g. MacIntyre, 1984: 220). Fundamentally, liberalism can be seen perhaps as ahistorical and too universalistic (e.g. Smith, 1986: 13), whereas communitarianism’s invocation of an already-existing community immediately places it within a concrete historical context. This produces an obvious contradiction that manifested in New Labour’s social (and economic) policies; an uneasy mixture of social-liberal and social-conservative social policies, that simultaneously attempted to build an open community whilst implicitly excluding many groups (e.g. Worley, 2005; McGhee, 2003; Robinson, 2008; Ratcliffe, 2012).

This makes New Labour’s development of rights and responsibilities inherently political. The liberal claim to universal rights based on rationality is not feasible if there is a separate social and political context for different communities; the claim to rights (and responsibilities) is based on the practice of various communities (Kukathas and Pettit, 1990: 95). Furthermore, community is not simply a loose aggregation of individuals, as for individuals to associate there must be some common bond all in that community can relate to (Lister and Pia, 2008: 17; Sandel, 1984: 90). Part of New Labour’s project, as evidenced in their adoption (and adaptation) of the Third Way, therefore, was to try to smooth out such inherent contradictions.

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50 One could have a side-debate concerning the concreteness of the historical context of the prior community, particularly considering Gramsci’s proclamation that ‘humanly objective is historically subjective’ (Gramsci, 1971: 445), discussed in chapter two.
51 Of course rights and responsibilities, when connected with citizenship, are always political. However, I mean ‘inherently political’ in this sense as an effort to build a concerted political project.
even if they could not be resolved fully.

Communitarianism sustains three major oppositions to liberalism: obligations should take primacy over rights, membership of a community is more important than individual liberty in a liberal sense, and there should be some common notion of the ‘good’ life (Lister and Pia, 2008: 18), because the prior community will have specific needs that members of that community are obligated to satisfy (MacIntyre, 1984: 220). These are, by and large, the virtues that New Labour tried to cultivate in British communities, as discussed in chapters one and five.

For all communitarianism’s fundamental differences to liberalism, it is possible to see the traditions and moral positions of communitarianism punctuating liberal practice. As Waltzer suggests, the communitarian critique of liberalism can perhaps develop it (Waltzer, 1990: 6). The prior community that holds moral priority in communitarianism could be used to provide some form of moral compass to liberal practice, particularly for countries in which liberalism is historically significant.

The freedom associated with liberalism comes at a price; the choices one makes as a free individual are based on one's individual experiences and nothing more. Communitarianism provides the common experience that can help individuals make informed social decisions. 'Liberal society... is fragmentation in practice; and community is the exact opposite, the home of coherence, connection, and narrative capacity' (Waltzer, 1990: 9). This highlights the inherent and perhaps unsolvable contradiction in New Labour’s social vision. Even with a sensitivity to the differing ontological
positions of communitarian and liberal citizenship, it simply may not be possible to reconcile them to the point that the tensions do not pose significant difficulties in providing a coherent set of rules and privileges for citizens.

To an extent, this suggests that a liberal cohesion may not be possible, echoing some of the arguments made in section 4.1. However, a liberal/communitarian cohesion may be possible if the incorporation prioritises one tradition over the other. The development of a political project of cohesion, expanding beyond strict (community) cohesion policy, may be able to use communitarianism to either limit or possibly transform some liberal foundations, which could lead to atomised individuals developing an awareness of some common bonds. These common bonds can be found in the everyday patterns of relationships and networks of power in society, exhibited through one's relation to their parents, co-workers, friends, neighbours and so on, from whom one learns patterns of socially acceptable behaviour (Waltzer, 1990: 10). Perhaps, then, successfully building (community) cohesion in a liberal society is dependent on communitarian punctuations. Waltzer highlights this through observing liberal ideology:

The liberal ideology of separatism cannot take personhood and bondedness away from us. What it does take away is the sense of our personhood and bondedness, and this deprivation is then reflected in liberal politics. It explains our inability to form cohesive solidarities, stable movements and parties, that might make our deep convictions visible and effective in the world (Waltzer, 1990: 10)

This suggests that the problem with liberalism is not that there is no prior
community, but that the prior community is obscured from social reality. Communitarianism in this respect lays the groundwork for cohesion by making visible individuals' connections to one another, be they moral, cultural or social, and using these connections to foster a sense of common belonging. However, this sense of common belonging, developed via a criticism of the atomism of individuals espoused by liberalism (e.g. Waltzer, 1990; Taylor, 1992: 39) is arguably conservative in nature, which can be an issue particularly when an element of cohesion is incorporating groups with different cultural anchors into one society. Gutmann highlights this by comparing the 'new' critics of liberalism (the liberal communitarians mentioned earlier) with the 'old' critics (e.g. Marx):

Whereas the good society of the old critics was one of collective property ownership and equal political power, the good society of the new critics is one of settled traditions and established identities. For many of the old critics, the role of women within the family was symptomatic of their social and economic oppression; for Sandel, the family serves as the model of community and evidence of a good greater than justice. For the old critics, patriotism was an irrational sentiment that stood in the way of world peace; for MacIntyre, the particularistic demands of patriotism are no less rational than the universalistic demands of justice (Gutmann, 2003: 182; see also Sandel, 1982: 30-34; MacIntyre, 1999: 15-18).

Based on this assessment, the value of cohesion modelled on the communitarian tradition of citizenship may be the preservation of the status quo, which, according to Waltzer's position, would include the retention and development of liberalism as the prior community. In this respect, cohesion as apolitical project could be seen as an attempt to rectify a subversion or denigration of this community; as an attempt to restore equilibrium. This also provides scope for understanding New Labour's response to unrest in
the UK after the 2001 northern riots, if one believes the unrest to be a threat to wider social order, which was the case considering the subsequent accelerated securitisation of cohesion after 2005. Likewise, one can see the appeal to the restoration of a particular British community in welfare reform policies that aim to drive the behaviour of claimants in order to make them ‘better’ citizens. If communitarianism is the key to developing cohesion (whether it is through an appropriation of liberal values, an appeal to the development of civic mindedness, or by harking to more conservative values), it needs a vehicle through which it can be implemented.

Considering its influence in New Labour policy circles, one can think of governmental communitarianism to be this vehicle. The foremost proponent of governmental communitarianism is Etzioni, and one does not need look far to appreciate his influence on New Labour, and by extension on debates around the nature of British citizenship at the time (for a fuller discussion of Etzioni’s influence in New Labour’s approach to social issues, see Bevir and O’Brien, 2001; Lister, 2003; Fremeaux, 2005; Prideaux, 2001; 2005). In the introduction of *The Spirit Of Community*, Etzioni draws his line in the sand:

> Correcting the current imbalance between rights and responsibilities requires a four-point agenda: a moratorium on the minting of most, if not all, new rights; reestablishing the link between rights and responsibilities; recognising that some responsibilities do not entail rights; and, most carefully, adjusting some rights to the changed circumstances (Etzioni, 1995: 4).

It is clear that this position influenced New Labour's social policy (e.g. Deacon, 2000: 12; Powell, 2000: 47; Heron and Dwyer, 2002: 92; Freeden,
The invocation of governmental communitarianism enables a focus on the reconfiguration of the relationship between rights and responsibilities. The focus on responsibilities enables government to encourage increased civic participation (therefore invoking some elements of republican citizenship), and the acknowledgement of a prior community (either the liberal community as suggested by Waltzer, or perhaps a more conservatively minded community of traditional values). This does not necessarily provide a complete solution to the problem of fragmented communities, but it does enable the development of a political project. Etzioni can be seen to appeal to both a liberal and conservative community, whilst also possibly incorporating some elements of republicanism. This is highlighted through his emphasis on the family, schooling and policing; he encourages fairly traditional family structures (e.g. Etzioni, 1995: 12), the transmission of 'core values' via formal education (Etzioni, 1995: 12), and reducing the need for policing by strengthening the community's moral voice (Etzioni, 1995: 44). However, although Etzioni does not advocate a wholesale return to past formations of community and society, 'it is significant that he constantly uses the term a “return” to community or a “recovery” of community, thus making the assumption that community was a thing of the past and the present is all the poorer for letting it pass' (Delanty, 2002: 167). Furthermore, the adoption of Etzioni's communitarianism into New Labour's political discourse may be problematic considering that it does not accord much prominence to the state (Delanty, 2002: 167), when New Labour made extensive use of the tools of state (e.g. Korris, 2011: 568). Yet governmental communitarianism
may still hold the key to incorporating liberalism and communitarianism within the same citizenship framework, as it is clearly communitarian principles that take priority.

The relatively low priority of the role of the state in Etzioni's communitarianism is compounded somewhat through an invocation of Putnam's position on citizenship and social capital, which relies on social networks and norms of trust (Putnam, 2007: 137), which at points act as a check on the power of the state. The norms that derive from these social networks can tap directly into the prior community that communitarians wish to revive (in the language of Etzioni) or emphasise (in the language of Waltzer). This requires the cultivation of civil society, which is only possible 'if civil society already speaks with one voice' (Delanty, 2002: 166). This 'one voice' can be found in cultural traditions (Putnam, 1993) – in other words, the prior community that communitarians promote. It aims to create a more representative state (one of the aims of republicanism - e.g. Delanty, 2002: 165) though using checks and balances:

Externally, voluntary associations, from churches to professional societies to Elks clubs and reading groups, allow individuals to express their interested demands on government and to protect themselves from abuses of power by their political leaders (Putnam 2000: 338).

Essentially, social capital makes 'democracy and the economy work better' (Putnam, 2007: 138; see also Putnam, 2000). However, considering the influence of Putnameque social capital on New Labour's response to unrest (Cheong et al., 2007; Lowndes and Wilson, 2001), there is a tension between civil society as a check against the state, and civil society as a
conduit between state and community. This makes the implementation of a purely communitarian tradition of citizenship potentially problematic. It has the potential to create paradoxes and contradictions, which can only serve to increase the tensions between communitarianism and liberalism within the British state.

Communitarianism for New Labour, alongside the Third Way, performed a number of actions. Firstly, it provided the moral-normative anchor for the party in the form of the prior community. The return to which was something that could be set as the ambition for British society, guided by New Labour principles (e.g. Levitas, 2000). However, New Labour’s vision of citizenship retained a liberal citizenry as its foundation, which produced tensions when citizens entitled to retreat to the private sphere were more or less compelled (either through an appeal to republican civic mindedness or communitarian loyalty to the community) to participate in the public sphere (e.g. Ryner, 2002: 20). Yet privileging the priorities of (governmental) communitarianism allowed New Labour to present the image of a complete and internally unproblematic tradition of citizenship to the British public. However, such a syncretic project cannot escape from its contradictions. This heightens the importance of the disciplinary and re-educational elements of social policy, such as those found in Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy, explored in more detail in chapter five.

These tensions shape the development and efficacy of the institutions tasked with implementing New Labour’s project. Just as various traditions of citizenship were combined by New Labour, so were various elements of
different welfare philosophies. This, as the following sections will demonstrate, has an effect on the development and nature of cohesion in the British state. Section 2 deals with key debates surrounding welfare regimes, particularly those elements that found a place in the British welfare architecture whilst New Labour were in power.

4.2. Social citizenship and the welfare state

New Labour's welfare reform was a key pillar of its modernisation programme (Powell, 2000), and although it conformed to many global trends of the time (Deacon, 2000) – such as workfarism (Grover, 2003) – it reshaped the political context around which welfare in the UK had operated (Lister, 1998; Lund, 1999; Prideaux, 2001). In this sense, New Labour’s programme of welfare reform was central to achieving its wider social aims. The importance of the welfare architecture is highlighted when one considers its role in developing and defending social citizenship rights.

Social citizenship, the third in Marshall's account of citizenship's development, is perhaps best placed to explore the deeper relationship between state and citizen, contextualising further the characteristics of New Labour's development of cohesion and welfare. As Esping-Andersen attests, '[f]ew can disagree with T.H. Marshall's proposition that social citizenship constitutes the core idea of a welfare state' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21). The social dimension of citizenship is concerned with enabling citizens to participate fully in public life. Marshall asserts that it 'is of a different order from the others, because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on
terms of equality with others and by due process of law' (Marshall, 1950: 10-11). In other words, social citizenship rights entrench civic and political rights by giving citizens the wherewithal to act upon them and defend them. For example, it is one thing to give citizens the right to assembly, but what use is this right if one does not have the resources to act upon it? Using another example, ‘the right to freedom of speech has little real substance if, from lack of education, you have nothing to say that is worth saying, and no means of making yourself heard if you say it’ (Marshall, 1950: 35).

Viewing it as an institutional manifestation of social citizenship, the potential for the welfare state to improve cohesion is worth exploring. This is particularly true considering the debates in the previous section suggested that for a successful programme of cohesion, citizens need to be active in public life, or the life of their various 'communities'. The welfare state can be seen as a tool that directly assists citizens in this endeavour, through providing the basic resources one needs to participate. However, as there are different traditions of citizenship, so there are different distributions of citizenship rights. The character of the welfare state, along with the mechanisms put in place for citizens to enjoy their rights, could produce various forms of cohesion, just as it is with the underlying traditions of citizenship involved.

The general position of the Third Way – neither old socialism nor neo-liberalism – necessitated it forge its own path. However, this process still took from both neo-liberal economic practice and more traditional social democracy (e.g. White, 2004). This can be seen, to an extent, in the
development of the welfare state in the UK since 1997. The contradictions and tensions discussed in the previous section can therefore also be seen. For example, the key mantra of the Third Way, no rights without responsibilities (Giddens, 1998: 65), has some commonalities with the philosophy of the social democratic welfare state. This welfare state delivers solidarity, but expects participation in return (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). To claim benefits, one must contribute accordingly – usually beyond simply paying tax. This echoes a philosophy of rights and responsibilities being tightly intertwined. However, New Labour’s interpretation of this was developed in the context of a largely liberal and individualist welfare state, in which solidarity was not a key component. Banting points out a central problem to this configuration: ‘In countries that established expansive welfare states, whether of social democratic or corporatist inspiration, the balance tilts towards social incorporation. In countries that established more liberal welfare states, welfare chauvinism seems to be leaving a heavier imprint’ (Banting, 2000: 22). This highlights the inherent tension of combining differing citizenship traditions, in that their manifestation via key institutions is likely to cause potentially unsolvable problems. One cannot be simultaneously chauvinist and inclusionary in this context. So what is to be done? Perhaps the framework can be presented as one, but operate largely as the other?

To understand the potential tensions within New Labour’s welfare reform programme (contributing to its overall vision for British society) it is useful to explore various welfare regimes, elements of which have contributed to
the UK’s largely liberal but somewhat hybrid\textsuperscript{52} welfare system. However, more important than Esping-Andersen’s ideal types themselves are the characteristics of the ideal types that influence the UK’s welfare system – particularly decommodification and social stratification.

\subsection*{4.2.1. Classifying the UK’s Welfare Regime}
The most well-known classification of welfare regimes is Esping-Andersen’s (1990) \textit{Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism}. In this he proposes three ideal types – the liberal, corporatist and social democratic welfare state. As discussed briefly above, the UK is largely liberal, whilst borrowing some elements from other welfare states. Key to understanding New Labour’s reform of the welfare state is the level of decommodification and stratification in the regime. Decommodification can be understood as the ability to ‘uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of market participation’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). Stratification is the extent to which a welfare regime produces or upholds various inequalities; as an example, such stratification could be based on class or gender lines (e.g. O’Connor, 1993).

Esping-Andersen was not the first to compare the welfare states of different nations. Originally, much comparative analysis was based on the premise that a higher level of spending meant a stronger commitment to the welfare state (e.g. Cutright, 1965; Wilensky, 1975; Hewitt, 1977; Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983). However, focusing on spending will not shed much light on

\textsuperscript{52} As part of a thematic review, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser (2011: 591) characterise the UK as a ‘medium-high internal consistency country’, ‘classified between 61\% and 80\% of the time in the same regime type’.
welfare's effect on cohesion, not least because 'the linear scoring approach (more or less power, democracy, or spending) contradicts the sociological notion that power, democracy, or welfare are relational and structured phenomena' (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 19). The thesis treats cohesion as a relational phenomenon, considering its relationship to policy responses, traditions of citizenship and so on. Therefore any categorisation of welfare states relating to cohesion needs to take this into account. Esping-Andersen, following Titmuss (1958), employs an analysis based upon the content of welfare states (such as employment rights and benefits), sensitive to prioritising the demands of citizens.

A central aim of the welfare state is to ensure that workers, whose survival is contingent upon the sale of their labour power, receive assistance when they are not able to sell their labour power sufficiently (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21). This introduces the idea of decommodification into welfare:

> Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction outside the labour contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. Decommodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 21-22).

The level of decommodification will influence how citizens sell their labour, and how dependent they are on their labour to survive; welfare states with high de-commodification provide more benefits as a right, lessening citizens' reliance on the market. This could enable citizens to participate more fully in public life, contributing to a sense of cohesion. However, one could also argue that encouraging citizens to enter the labour market fully
by providing more meagre benefits that carry social stigma, as with the liberal welfare state, can also increase levels of cohesion via interaction through paid work (e.g. DWP, 2006: 2). It is therefore necessary to explore the characteristics of Esping-Andersen's three ideal types, and their potential influence on cohesion.

The UK is, by and large, a liberal welfare state. This means that instead of providing wide and universal benefits, it structures the system to discourage claimant uptake. Benefits are targeted to low-income state dependents, and utilises stigma as a method of encouraging work over welfare (Goodin, 2001: 13). Private provision may also be encouraged (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-27). This has a particular impact on stratification:

The consequence is that this type of regime minimizes de-commodification effects, effectively contains the realm of social rights, and erects an order of stratification that is a blend of relative equality of poverty among welfare state recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 27; for UK examples see Mabbett, 2013; regarding stigma, see Taylor-Gooby, 2013).

The stratification encountered within this system could make it more difficult to build cohesion, particularly across strata because of the associated stigma of occupying a lower rank in the social order. This system of stratification may even lend itself to the idea of segregation (if not 'self-segregation') and groups living parallel lives, as each socio economic grouping sticks to their own. This becomes an important issue of contention considering that the social unrest in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley in 2001 took place in economically deprived areas (e.g. Home Office, 2001b: 8). In other words, there is a potential for the development of in-built antagonism
based upon class lines. ‘Even the impact of race and ethnicity in a country such as the United States tends to recede as class differentiation within ethnic groups increases over time’ (Svallfors, 1997: 285).

Heron and Dwyer (1999) argue that two notions were central in New Labour’s welfare reform: communitarianism and stakeholding. According to the authors, both these concepts ‘whilst acknowledging a social dimension, nevertheless are still centrally concerned with regulating the behaviour of individual welfare recipients’ (Heron and Dwyer, 1999: 92). The ideal of universalism is therefore not a guiding principle in New Labour’s welfare. ‘No rights without responsibilities’ may apply to all citizens, but it is emphasised for those who are seen to transgress. Stakeholder welfare contributes well to an overall communitarian programme. Field (1996) and Hutton (1996; 1997a; 1997b) contributed heavily to the idea of the stakeholder in New Labour’s welfare reform, which emphasised the need for individuals to take control of their own welfare (Heron and Dwyer, 1999: 98).

As with New Labour’s position on citizenship, the welfare state literature suggests that there may be a tension between the liberal foundation and communitarian articulation found within the UK regime. Such tension can be seen in New Labour’s use of the third sector, for example, in which rights are earned through accepting responsibility (via volunteering, for example) (Johnstone and Whitehead, 2004: 10), and that increasing civic participation increases social capital, which according to Brown would lower crime and increase social cohesion (Fyfe, 2005: 542). Yet Fyfe
highlights a key tension with New Labour’s straddling of state and civil society: third sector organisations, for example, are expected ‘to provide “professional” and cost-effective welfare services’ whilst also ‘expecting such organisations to contribute to the reinvigoration of civil society by fostering the development of social capital and citizenship’ (Fyfe, 2005: 552). In other words, on the one hand civil society organisations are expected to act as rational utility-maximising actors, whilst going beyond their primary duties in order to foster a sense of society and community on the other. This epitomises New Labour’s approach to social policy that aims to develop ‘trust, social participation, voluntary associations, and friendship, at least as much as from markets and competition’ (Bevir, 2003). However, Jayasuria argues that ‘this new governance privileges certain forms of social association and community primarily by marginalising the conflicts of class and social relations and serves to reinforce the anti-pluralism of economic constitutionalism’ (Jayasuria, 2006: 246).

Again, as with traditions of citizenship, the role of communitarianism may be to ostensibly smooth these tensions. White, for example, argues that communitarianism fits neatly with the notion of reciprocity in the UK welfare system (White, 2004: 39). Furthermore, this reciprocity has been built into the UK system for a long time (e.g. Tawney, 1948; 1964; Crosland, 1956; Hobhouse, 1994). Yet the contractualism of British social democracy was concerned more with the ‘idle rich’ (White, 2004: 41) than those who lived off society without working (Levitas, 1998: 27; Powell, 2000: 46; Lister, 2004: 168). The modern conception of no rights without responsibilities, then, produces a slight tension within the British political
tradition in this sense, in that it pulls the sentiment both ways.

The literature therefore suggests that the relatively low level of decommodification found within the British welfare state, combined with higher levels of stratification across more than just class lines, would perhaps not develop New Labour’s vision of Community Cohesion on its own. It may in fact present a barrier, particularly considering the contradictions implicit within the messages that citizens receive. However, just as elements of communitarianism were used to ostensibly lessen the tensions of participation and belonging found in New Labour’s and the Third Way’s treatment of citizenship, one can argue that the notion of social investment welfare was used to lessen the tensions produced by a system that simultaneously produced elements of inclusivity and welfare chauvinism.

The idea of the social investment welfare state is that social justice could be combined with economic efficiency (Morel et al., 2012). The notion of social investment prioritises helping citizens help themselves (E.g Finlayson, 2009: 406; Lewis and Surrender, 2004), and to do this policymakers are engaged with redesigning citizenship regimes, and that the ‘aspect of the citizenship regime with which policy communities are most concerned is the welfare architecture’ (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003: 79). With regards to the UK, ‘no rights without responsibilities’ is again key to regulate behaviour (Deacon, 2000), through using the benefits system to promote ‘the paid work ethic in the name of social inclusion’ (Lister, 2003: 428).

This position utilises communitarian appeals (for example to a moral
conformity) whilst reducing the role (and perhaps size) of the state (Lister, 2003: 428; Blair, 2002) and ‘enabling’ individual citizens to look after themselves (Miliband, 1999). The position combines communitarian language with liberal processes of reducing the presence of the state in the life of the individual. It is useful to break down the term ‘social investment’ to make this point further: if one invests in something, in general one expects a return. Therefore, if the state invests in its citizens, it expects its citizens to repay this investment (E.g. DWP, 2007a: 6) – no rights without responsibilities. The state, according to Giddens, must invest in the human capital of individuals, rather than simply providing economic maintenance (1998: 117). This in turn leads to an investment in social capital, which contributes to ‘the moral and social reconstruction of our society’ (Commission on Social Justice, 1994: 306; see also Lister, 2003: 430). Welfare and cohesion therefore become necessary components of one another, tied together by an ambition to reconfigure the dominant tradition of citizenship with the injection of elements from other traditions.

The Third Way’s adaptation of the social investment state involved asset-based welfare (Sherraden, 2002), and became increasingly important to New Labour’s welfare aspirations (Prabhakar, 2008). According to Finlayson, asset-based welfare was framed as a ‘radical new way of achieving egalitarian goals’, whilst implementing the major aim of connecting individuals to markets: ‘Asset-based welfare policies, as implemented by New Labour, do not have as their primary goal the redistribution of wealth but rather the incorporation of individuals within the mainstream financial system’ (Finlayson, 2009: 408; see also Regan and Paxton, 2003).
In some ways, then, one could argue that New Labour attempted to mimic some elements of the social democratic welfare state, within the predominantly liberal prior community. The social democratic welfare state aims for universal welfare provision via the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). Of course, this was not an aim for New Labour (nor for liberal welfare in general), yet through elements of social investment and asset-based welfare, New Labour did indeed attempt to universalise its brand of welfare provision and at least try to lessen disparity within the market, if not inequality elsewhere (e.g. Powell, 2000; Lister, 2003). Due to the heavy influence of the market, New Labour’s welfare state was never particularly heavily de-commodified. The tension inherent within this is that lessening stratification in some sectors of society was offset by higher stratification elsewhere – between ethnic groups, for example, or between those who found themselves in need of welfare and those who did not (Prideaux, 2001).

In the traditional social democratic welfare state ‘all are dependent and all will presumably feel obliged to pay’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). This is obviously not the case in New Labour’s predominantly liberal welfare state; rather all are encouraged to feel an obligation to integrate themselves into the market, which in turn will provide forms of welfare if needed.

The literature highlights that the welfare state under New Labour, much like its citizenship framework, seems to straddle and incorporate multiple positions and philosophies. Elements of social democracy, at least superficially, interact with the heavily embedded liberal tradition, tied
together (not entirely unproblematically) with a commitment to asset-based welfare and the social investment state. This illuminates further the utility of understanding New Labour’s construction of socio-cultural and socio-economic forms of cohesion as a syncretic project that attempts to reconcile that which may be impossible to reconcile entirely (E.g. Hall, 1998; Ryner, 2002).

4.3. Cohesion under New Labour: a product of citizenship and welfare traditions?

Sections one and two explored the literature on citizenship and welfare in order to better understand the nature of New Labour’s approach to these issues, particularly regarding tensions and contradictions and the impact these tensions could have on citizens. However, looking at these issues themselves does not necessarily shed light on the deeper role the idea of cohesion played in New Labour’s attempt to influence the behaviour and outlook of the British citizenry. This section therefore draws upon the discussions in the previous sections, whilst exploring literature directly related to social and Community Cohesion. This provides a fuller picture of the specific elements of (community) cohesion in the UK, how they are influenced by the tradition of citizenship and the welfare architecture, and how these areas integrate with one another to develop a specific notion of cohesion that incorporates socio-cultural and socio-economic elements.

Considering that each tradition of citizenship and welfare regime bring with them (or necessitate) a specific political culture (e.g. Somers and Block, 2005), one could expect different regimes of cohesion as a product of
different regimes of welfare (and by extension traditions of citizenship). This is the general argument taken up by Green and Janmaat. (2011). Therefore, understanding how the literature depicts different regimes of cohesion within the context of welfare and citizenship facilitates a greater understanding of New Labour’s project of cohesion. In particular, if the literature suggests that cohesion (either social or community) is more or less a product of particular citizenship traditions and welfare regimes, New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion as standalone policy can be problematized and its specific nature examined.

A particularly strong connection between citizenship, welfare and cohesion in the British state is found in the social investment literature. In fact, the notion of social investment has influenced the notion that paid work is the best route to cohesion (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003: 88; Hulse and Stone, 2007: 114). Linking the issues of cohesion and welfare systematically allows for the development of a more integrated social policy, and one that is more adept at redesigning citizenship regimes (e.g. Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003: 79) and therefore the political culture and outlook of citizens. Furthermore, the importance of (social) cohesion increases as ‘the safety-net of the Keynesian welfare state is progressively eroded, [and] more of the burdens of social reproduction are thrown back onto the family’ (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2127).

Jenson (1998) highlights that cohesion as a subject is most popular at times of social change. In the case of the UK, this was the riots of 2001 and the reported feeling of tension between ethnic groups (Home Office, 2001a;
Green and Jamaat. (2011: 1) highlight a number of potential threats to cohesion: income inequality (e.g. OECD, 1997), unemployment and crime (e.g. Jenson, 1998; OECD, 1997), the decline of the traditional family (e.g. Fukuyama, 1999), immigration and segregation (e.g. Council of Europe, 2004; Home Office, 2001a; 2001b), and a rise of individualism (e.g. Reich, 2001). All of these threats are addressed in part by the welfare architecture and tradition of citizenship in place in a state, highlighting their centrality to the effective development of cohesion. A specific conditioning factor of cohesion in the UK however is the individualism that has, according to Marquand (1988: 7), been codified into the British social fabric. This brings into focus the ‘liberal communitarianism’ developed by the likes of Waltzer, in that the British regime of cohesion is likely to need to reconcile individualism with forms of solidarity. This runs the risk of turning into a situation in which one must attempt to reconcile that which may be irreconcilable, as argued by Ryner and by Hall earlier in this chapter.

Prefacing their categorisation and exploration of regimes of cohesion, Green and Janmaat assert that ‘regimes of social cohesion can be seen as relatively durable (but not immutable) configurations of social attitudes and behaviours contributing to society-wide social bonding that are underpinned by particular institutional arrangements’ (2011: 64). As these social attitudes and behaviours are generally imparted upon citizens through the tradition of citizenship, and realised partially through the welfare architecture, there is

\[53\] This is not to say, however, that all forms of solidarity are incompatible with all forms of individualism.
an obvious relationship between the three areas.

Green and Janmaat (2011: 7) argue that one can understand cohesion as a formalised ‘regime’ in a number of ways. One approach conforms to the liberal tradition of citizenship, in that it is based on ‘a mutually supportive community of free individuals pursuing common goals by democratic means’ (Council of Europe, 2004: 3). This is the most important approach in understanding the UK context, and conforms to what one would expect to find from consulting the literature on liberal interpretations of citizenship and welfare. As will be discussed in later chapters, a key contention with this regime is what qualifies as ‘mutual support’, and to what extent can a community of free individuals form a cohesive unit? Again, this renders New Labour’s adoption of communitarianism, its interaction with, and its embedding within, the dominant tradition of liberalism discussed earlier as crucial. Another is more republican in nature, arguing that ‘social cohesion is a set of social processes that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community’ (Commissariat Général du Plan, cited in Jenson, 1988: 4). One can identify elements of the republican tradition in the UK’s Community Cohesion framework and as a wider project of cohesion, as it attempts to foster individual responsibility and agency (particularly through welfare), whilst emphasising the need for bonds to a wider community. However, it remains subordinate to the dominant liberal tradition.

The prioritisation and subordination of key traditions and regimes, alongside
the potential need to reconcile difficult components of these, renders acute
the notion that for this to be successful, the construction of a (albeit syncretic) political project is essential. Therefore, to understand the nuanced interactions between citizenship and welfare, and the production of a ‘regime’ of cohesion as a result, the idea that New Labour constructed a political project of cohesion becomes a useful analytical tool. This is borne out through the explication of the component elements of regimes of cohesion that outline the central roles of citizenship and welfare:

The national institutional structures most relevant to social cohesion include the laws and regulations governing property and ownership, including company law; the organisation of the labour market; the arrangements for wage setting and income re-distribution and the welfare system (Green and Janmaat, 2011: 65).

Laws surrounding property and ownership relate to Marshall's civic citizenship rights, as well as the wider tradition of liberalism. Alongside an obvious connection to welfare, the organisation of the labour market also relates to citizenship and cohesion, particularly considering whether or not labour market participation is seen as a route to cohesion. Finally, wage setting could be seen as linked to citizenship, depending on the distribution and character of a particular tradition's rights and responsibilities (e.g. a minimum or living wage in return for regular labour).

The liberal cohesion regime is characterised strongly by characteristics of both the liberal citizenship tradition and the liberal welfare regime:

The liberal regime of social cohesion relies for its legitimacy on a widespread belief in the benefits of opportunity, individual freedom and choice, and rewards based on merit. In addition to these core beliefs, it regards high levels of civic association as an important
social cement and generally believes itself to be tolerant of diversity. In the liberal regime, social cohesion is not seen to depend on economic inequality, and the state and its public institutions are not taken to be the guarantors of social cohesion... Put simply, the individual comes before the state, and freedom is more prized than equality' (Green and Janmaat, 2011: 68).

The liberal state lauds flexible labour markets over the development of solidarity because of the benefits to business (Layard, 2005), which diminishes the state's ability to foster solidarity. This would throw into question the UK's response to unrest when one considers the evidence to suggest that ethnic difference may not be the primary threat to 'community' cohesion in the UK. Indeed, Letki (2006) argues there is no correlation between diversity and cohesion when other factors such as socio-economic status are accounted for. Johnson and Soroka (1999) argue that ethnic diversity has little impact on social cohesion (in Canada). Ulsaner (2003) finds no discernible link between diversity and levels of interpersonal trust (see also Green and Janmaat, 2011; Green, 2006).

The lack of discussion on equality in the UK's cohesion discourse (discussed in detail in chapter five) suggests liberal antecedents because equality requires state intervention, which goes against the liberal ideal of freedom and minimal state intervention. In fact, rising levels of inequality in the UK has led to declining levels of trust in people and institutions (Hall, 1999) – a key threat to cohesion according to Putnam (2000). Yet, as discussed in chapter one, an increasing focus on 'community' as the anchor concept for understanding cohesion allows focus to be drawn away from problems of solidarity and into other areas of cohesion (e.g. Robinson, 2005). It also
elides some of the tensions between the components, again because of the overarching focus on ephemeral and amorphous ‘communities’.

Whereas the liberal regime places individual freedom at the centre of its plan for cohesion, the social market puts more emphasis on shared values and active participation in public life. This ‘regime’ of cohesion provides insights into the UK context, mainly through a link with the social investment state. Though in the UK there is a commitment to individual liberty, the core of Community Cohesion (and, to an extent, welfare reform) was active citizenship, designed precisely to foster greater public activity, and through which people were to invest in themselves and their nation (e.g. Giddens, 1998: 117). The social market model also has a more immediate role for the notion of rights and responsibilities, as 'ownership [of property, private or public] is invariably thought to entail obligations as well as rights' (Green and Janmaat, 2011: 75).

Finally, exploring the social democratic regime of cohesion provides a point of comparison for the UK case, particularly considering the Labour Party’s (liberalism-influenced) social democratic heritage. Unlike the social market regime the social democratic regime prioritises equality. Green and Janmaat not only highlight this system's commitment to state assistance (such as healthcare, social benefits and childcare), but also (in the case of the 'Nordic model') the quality of public transport (2011: 79). This may seem a subtle difference, but the ability for citizens of all social strata to move around extensively contributes to the opportunities for mixing and developing bonds (and therefore social capital in Putnam's model) between social,
economic, cultural and ethnic groups. Considering that the Cantle and Denham reports highlighted the separation and segregation of ethnic ‘communities’ as a central precursor to the 2001 riots, such concerns become important. The ability to easily travel to a place of work, or a social hub, should not be overlooked. The authors also point to an increasingly solidaristic form of education, whereby students stay with the same cohort and teachers for much of their compulsory schooling (Green and Janmaat, 2011: 80; see also Wilborg, 2009). However, this could also lead to a form of unwitting self-segregation, in that a sense of solidarity will be built within one particular group but not beyond it, strengthening bonding social capital over bridging social capital and potentially leading to a form of group fragmentation as opposed to widespread cohesion. Though this may be a risk, there is a positive correlation between skills equality and levels of trust (Green and Janmaat, 2011). The import this has for understanding cohesion in the UK is that the literature suggests that cohesion needs to be built in a multiplicity of locations simultaneously. It is of limited use to build social capital and cohesion in communities, if this process is not replicated in schools, workplaces, public spaces and so on. As later chapters will demonstrate and discuss (and as discussed in chapter one), this is indeed what New Labour attempted to do, although the overriding focus was on the ‘parallel lives’ of ethnic groups. Yet the attempts to build forms of solidarity elsewhere should not be understated, and provide more reason to understand New Labour’s construction and development of cohesion as a political


54 Nevertheless, Nordic schooling systems ‘are among the most egalitarian in the developed world’ (Green and Janmaat, 2011: 80; See also OECD, 2007).
project that extends beyond simply Community Cohesion policy and related initiatives. Although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the characteristics of cohesion in a nation-state are influenced by the pre-existing welfare regimes and citizenship traditions, it does not necessarily elucidate the reasons why the UK's response to unrest – enshrined in Community Cohesion – placed such a heavy focus on the ethnic and cultural elements of difference. It does however help demonstrate how New Labour's welfare reform contributes to Community Cohesion specifically, and particularly how the construction and reproduction of a particular welfare paradigm and architecture could contribute to a political project of cohesion. If ethnic diversity and difference is but one threat to cohesion amongst a host of others, it seems odd that so much emphasis would be placed upon ethnic dimensions in the UK's Community Cohesion framework (e.g. Home Office, 2001: 9; Ratcliffe, 2012; Worley, 2005; McGhee, 2003; Home Office, 2004; Kundnani, 2007; Husband and Alam, 2011: 42; Cheong et al., 2007). This is perhaps due to the UK's response to unrest incorporating elements from the different traditions of citizenship (e.g. individual primacy from liberalism, active participation from republicanism, and a commitment to a prior community from communitarianism), which manifest themselves in the architecture of the welfare state, and ultimately in the state's construction of cohesion. This cohesion is likely to contain contradictions and paradoxes that may impede its development, regarding the position of individuals and groups, and the importance of different socio-economic groups over ethnic groups or vice versa. This potentially problematic construction is not necessarily
straightforward to identify, though employing critical discourse analysis of key policy documents will allow for a greater understanding and therefore problematisation of New Labour's response to unrest.

**Conclusion**

New Labour, like all major British political parties, operated from within a strong context of liberalism (e.g. Marquand, 1988). Yet the party’s social and political ambitions required them to go beyond these foundations, hence the use of communitarian principles of citizenship in its social policy. This, suggests an analysis of the literature, has a tendency to produce fairly fundamental tensions concerned with how citizens should act, their rights and responsibilities and so on. It is not possible for all of these tensions to be reconciled, although New Labour certainly tried to square the circle (e.g. Ryner, 2002; Hall, 1998). The welfare architecture, as an expression of the dominant tradition of citizenship in that state, can bear out some of these tensions in its operation. These tensions become solidified in the regimes of cohesion, as suggested by this chapter’s treatment of the literature on the subject. As these tensions could possibly destrabilise in such a situation, it may be wise to construct a political project of cohesion that acts to stabilise some of the syncretic elements.

The literature shows that one should be able to find a fairly strong conceptual link running through the three frameworks of citizenship, welfare and cohesion. The literature also highlights the relatively immutable nature of traditions of citizenship, in that it is certainly possible to combine elements of these traditions, but one tradition will remain dominant over the
other – particularly in a country that has such a strongly embedded tradition, such as the UK.

Yet this literature does have some limitations. For example, the social investment state literature is strong on outlining a solid connection between welfare and citizenship, in that the attempt to change the culture of welfare and social support necessitates a redesign in a framework of citizenship (Jenson and Saint-Martin, 2003). It also begins to demonstrate the significance of welfare cultures and regimes in contributing to a sense of cohesion. However, this could be drawn out further and more systematically for the UK context. For example, social investment may develop a commitment to cohesion, but how does this play out within the context of a cohesion framework that focuses heavily on ethnic difference (Worley, 2005; McGhee, 2003; Blackledge, 2012; Ratcliffe, 2012), and which retains an important place for the role of paid work without necessarily understanding the implications of these in relation to one another?55

The thesis consolidates three heavily interconnected areas that are largely treated as separate, or connected implicitly. It utilises this large body of literature to develop an understanding of (community) cohesion in the UK within the context of its traditions and regimes of citizenship and welfare. It takes into account the strategy of New Labour to integrate disparate and not

55 The issue here is not necessarily the reconciliation of these two areas; there is nothing to suggest that a focus on ethnic difference is incompatible with a focus on paid work producing cohesion. However, a pertinent issue is the focus and political connotations of having these two strong arguments side by side, in that it could produce mixed messages, confusion and therefore tensions. This is something that is explored in-depth through the Critical Discourse Analysis.
always compatible elements for the purpose of developing a particular political and social culture geared towards social and economic ‘Britishness’ (as discussed in chapter one and discussed further in chapters five, six and seven). It contributes to this understanding through a discourse analysis of New Labour’s policy that highlights and problematises some of the tensions emphasised in the analysis of the literature. Its treatment suggests there may be some legitimacy in arguing that New Labour constructed a political project that could be seen in fact as a hegemonic project, in the bringing together of disparate elements into a syncretic whole. The literature therefore provides the impetus to explore this further. The first stage of this – the Critical Discourse Analysis – is where the thesis now turns.
Chapter one provided a critical overview of New Labour’s developments in the policy areas of Community Cohesion and welfare reform, whilst chapter three explored the theoretical and academic antecedents that help form the policy and influence our understanding of cohesion and welfare as entities. The chapters also explored some of the ways in which the two policy areas could be seen to work towards common goals, thereby opening up the possibility for the construction of a political project of cohesion.

This chapter builds upon these overviews through an in-depth, substantive engagement with discourses in New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare policy literature. It draws upon the analytical framework set out in chapter two, exploring the power relations inherent within language and discursive construction. It employs critical discourse analysis, as set out and discussed in chapter four, to explore the ways in which power structures, inequalities and dominance are reproduced as well as resisted in talk and text (Van Dijk, 2004: 352). It explores the notion of a divergence between the stated aims of the policy and the language contained within (for example, ‘empowering’ language juxtaposed with a top down, highly controlled, policy framework), which produces contradictions. This divergence could point toward hegemonic discourses within the language of Community Cohesion and welfare that engender a particular ‘common sense’ understanding of cohesion, which helps render a syncretic project as ostensibly unproblematic. This is something that is explored in this and the
following chapters.

The chapter engages with discursive logics, as discussed in chapter four. A number of logics can be seen to operate within the language of both cohesion and welfare, and as such can be seen as the building blocks of cohesion as a political project. Furthermore, the logics enable an engagement with the specificity of New Labour’s response to unrest after the 2001 northern riots, taking into account the focus on, and sometimes uneasy relationship between, ethnic and socio-economic difference in the Community Cohesion policy literature. It also draws out key economic aspects that can be seen in both literatures, but which are legitimised mainly through welfare (reform).

This chapter addresses the thesis’ major claim, as set out in the introduction: that there existed a disconnect between the language of policy and the aims of policy that promised, but did not deliver, individual and group empowerment, particularly for ethnic groups, and; the discursive constructs identified in the policy literature contribute to the construction of hegemonic discourses that present a specific notion of cohesion as the only feasible option, without acknowledging the existence of alternatives.

The chapter delivers the necessary elements to do this in a number of ways. Firstly, it provides the material and analysis to suggest that the divergence of the aims and language of policy create a contradictory and problematic

56 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the extent to which New Labour actually delivered empowerment in a substantive sense. Rather, the thesis juxtaposes the promise (or ambition) to deliver such empowerment alongside language and discourse that essentially does the opposite.
policy framework that claims to empower whilst not actually delivering on these claims. Secondly, through the analysis of discursive logics, one can draw a picture of New Labour’s construction of a political project of cohesion incorporating both Community Cohesion and welfare reform. Critical discourse analysis can therefore draw out elements of a syncretic project that otherwise appears whole and unproblematic. Furthermore, this political project can be understood as a hegemonic project, because of the development of hegemonic discourses that contribute to a ‘common sense’ conception of cohesion. This softens the apparent contradictions within the project so as to present it as the way of doing things, as opposed to one way of doing things. It is through this construction that a political project of cohesion can be seen to be hegemonic. This also furthers an engagement with, and provides a potential explanation for, the specificity of New Labour’s response to unrest after the 2001 riots.

In order to draw out and engage with these arguments, the chapter is divided into a number of sections. Section one provides a brief overview of the documents selected for discourse analysis, as well as providing a short recap of the concept of logics. Sections two, three and four contain the major elements of the chapter, and deal with the three political logics (conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration). They explain the significance of the concepts when designated as political logics, and engage with the ways in which these logics influence and construct discourses that contribute to a hegemonic project of cohesion. Finally, the chapter contextualises the political logics within the context of
cohesion and welfare as social logics, which helps highlight the notion of cohesion as a political and/or hegemonic project.

5.1. Overview: Documents analysed and identifying logics
This section provides information on how, and to what, CDA is applied in order to analyse the specificity of New Labour’s approach to cohesion. It first discusses the documents analysed in brief, before illustrating the conceptualisation of cohesion and welfare as social logics. This allows the main discussion on the three political logics to be undertaken with a greater level of continuity.

The discussion in this chapter derives from a critical discourse analysis of twelve policy documents on Community Cohesion and welfare reform, spread across 2001 – when Community Cohesion first came into existence (Robinson, 2005) – and 2010, Labour’s last year in office. The selection consists of a number of white papers, green papers and consultation/guidance documents, aimed at multiple audiences such as ‘local stakeholders’ (e.g. local authorities, charities, community groups etc.) and national bodies. Although there were more than twelve documents published on these areas between the dates, it would be infeasible to analyse them all in sufficient detail (e.g. Van Dijk, 2002: 99; see also chapter four, section 1). Therefore, the documents were chosen to ensure a relatively equal spread across the decade, whilst also ensuring that cornerstone documents were included in the analysis. Table three shows the documents

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57 All the documents were freely available to the public. However, it should be noted that due to the nature of the documents, it is unlikely that a large proportion of the general public would take the time to read them.

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included in the analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document title</th>
<th>Description of document</th>
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| Building Cohesive Communities: A report of the ministerial group on public order and Community Cohesion (Home Office, 2001) | One of the original reports on Community Cohesion, written in response to the disturbances in Bradford in 2001. Its aim was to discuss how to reduce disorder and build ‘stronger, more cohesive communities’.
| Guidance on Community Cohesion (LGA, 2002) | Best practice guide on how to implement Community Cohesion policies. |
| Strength in Diversity: Towards a Community Cohesion and race equality strategy (Home Office, 2004) | Consultation document aimed at integrating cohesion with race equality. Shows that the government is focusing on cultural and ethnic inequalities rather than economic ones. |
| Our Shared Future (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007) | Final report and cornerstone document. Sets out the bulk of the justification and workings of the CCF. |
| Preventing Violent Extremism – Winning Hearts and Minds (DCLG, 2007) | Whilst not focused on Community Cohesion, this document directly references it multiple times and provides and insight into how the government views ‘problem’ groups. |
| What Works in Community Cohesion (DCLG, 2007) | Research/consultation document. Details best practice in implementing cohesion policy. Target audience is local government and related organisations (not the communities themselves) indicating the CCF’s top-down nature. |
| In work, Better off: Next steps to full employment (DWP, 2007) | Green Paper documenting changes in ‘support’ for welfare claimants. Further develops conditionality and begins the responsibilisation process of citizens. |
| Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future of welfare to work (DWP, 2007) | Also known as the Freud Report. A crucial independent report whose purpose was to help develop the welfare to work system further – i.e. to further develop systems of conditionality. |
| Raising expectations and increasing support: reforming welfare for the future (DWP, 2008) | White Paper documenting the government’s vision of a ‘personalised welfare state’. Develops the rights and responsibilities ethos by increasing the expectations placed upon welfare claimants. |
| Realising Potential: A Vision for Personalised Conditionality and Support (DWP, 2008) | An independent report, also known as the Gregg Review, further developing the system of conditionality in UK welfare. Promotes further |
The welfare reform documents begin here in 2006, after the Community Cohesion policy framework was beginning to be mainstreamed. The relatively late dates regarding welfare are primarily because the New Deals, which began in 1997, were still being implemented and remained the most prominent aspect of welfare reform policy. The New Deal’s legacy can be seen in the title of the 2006 DWP document, *A New Deal for Welfare.*

Within these documents, the three political logics were identified and analysed, helping to build a picture of cohesion as a political project through exploring the commonalities between the two policy areas. They were also used to highlight the divergence between the language and (stated) aims of the policies, as described in table three.

As discussed in chapter four, whilst the thesis acknowledges social logics (for example the social logics of cohesion and welfare), the primary focus is on the political logics that constitute and contest the social logics, and which therefore contribute to the construction of a political project of cohesion. The three political logics focused on in this chapter are conditionality, rights and...
and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration.\(^{58}\)

The political logics can be seen in both the Community Cohesion and the welfare literature, albeit to differing extents. The notion of rights and responsibilities can be seen to be central to both cohesion and welfare as social logics, dealing as it does with the obligations and freedoms of citizens. Conditionality is more evident in the welfare literature, but can be seen in varying, and generally less formal, ways in the cohesion literature as well. Assimilation and integration can be seen to operate as a result of the interrelation of conditionality and rights and responsibilities. Alone and collectively they influence the construction, reproduction and contestation of larger rules, as discussed in chapter four. As a logic, rights and responsibilities is effective because it is discursively and practically strengthened by the logic of conditionality and its material effects (e.g. sanctions when one does not discharge their responsibilities). The logic of assimilation and integration solidifies the logic of rights and responsibilities by promoting particular universal values. To do this, it relies on the logic of conditionality to an extent. This will be examined further throughout the chapter. The following subsections look at the logics in more detail.

It is useful to understand the nature of these logics as concepts in their own right, as well as political logics. The following sections therefore deal with how each logic can be designated as such, before presenting the analysis of these logics and how they help explore the divergence between the language

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\(^{58}\) See Chapter Four, section 1.2 for a fuller discussion of social and political logics, and the decision to focus on political logics over social logics.
and aims of policy, as well as the construction of a political/hegemonic project of cohesion.

5.2. Conditionality
This section deals with the in-depth discourse analysis of the political logic of conditionality, examining its role in the constitution of the social logics of cohesion and welfare, as well as exploring how its discursive constructs contribute to the specificity of New Labour’s political project of cohesion.

5.2.1. As a concept, and as a logic
Conditionality is based on the position that one must work to receive benefits. If conditions are not fulfilled a reprimand can be administered (Novak, 1997; Dwyer, 2004; Dunn, 2010). In the UK, unemployed people’s receipt of benefits is conditional on them undertaking work (HM Government, 2010: 23). This approach to welfare is aligned broadly with the liberal welfare regime, set out in chapter three, and Lawrence Mead’s position that ‘[u]nless the poor display better citizenship, especially by working, generous antipoverty policies could become indefensible’ (Mead, 1997: 207). Welfare assistance is not an unconditional right; rather it is a reward for discharging one’s responsibilities (in this case, to look for work). This position formed the backbone of New Labour’s welfare reform (Dwyer, 2004: 268).

To be considered as a logic, conditionality must provide, impart and (to an extent) uphold particular rules (see chapter four, section 1.2 for more information) that constitute and contest particular discourses and/or ways of thinking, as with the notion of normative grammars (see chapter four,
section 3). The political logic of conditionality normalises the position that benefits must be earned, rather than simply received as a right. The contractual element of conditionality means that the logic will impact on approaches to participation. For example, a republican tradition of citizenship may use conditionality to encourage people to participate in the public sphere more, in order to develop the freedom of the state.

As a logic, conditionality aims to ‘condition’ citizens to approach the notion of welfare and benefits in a particular way. It normalises the moral distinction, partly based on the notion of deserving (e.g. Williams, 1992; Garthwaite, 2011), between those who are in need of state assistance and those who are not. Conditionality as a logic will also operate to help legitimise particular approaches to welfare, discussed in this section. However, conditionality is not restricted to operating just within the realm of welfare, as the following analysis shows.

5.2.2. Analysing the logic of conditionality
Tony Blair epitomised New Labour’s approach to welfare reform when he remarked that ‘[w]e have changed the culture of the welfare state – it is now universally accepted that it is right to expect unemployed people to look for work and take jobs, that it is right for lone parents and others to come in for work-focused interviews’ (Blair, 2002). This came to be known in policy as the ‘something for something culture’ (DWP, 2007a: 10). It is now commonplace to find obligatory attendance for interviews, various assessments (e.g. to see whether one is fit to work) and training sessions (e.g. DWP, 2007a; 2008a; 2008b; 2009). Although one can argue that welfare
assistance such as unemployment benefit has always had some form of condition attached to it (e.g. National Insurance contributions), New Labour’s welfare reform represented a change in how citizens were encouraged to think about and approach welfare support. This shift in how citizens understand their roles, rights and responsibilities highlights a particular power relationship. Conditions placed on what can often be a lifeline suggest the ‘imposition of a dominant moral order that encompasses and frames the actions and voices of communities’ (Burnett, 2004: 2).

Increasing cohesion socially and economically is presented in the policy literature as state-led but citizen-centred. Conditionality plays a role in this, giving citizens choices as to how they contribute to this cohesion whilst influencing their decisions. Nominally, citizens should therefore feel a sense of empowerment, as their concerns should be listened to. Discussing What Works in Community Cohesion, ‘[a]ddressing the socio-economic well-being of individuals and communities is regarded as a pre-requisite for cohesion, and the most important part of cohesion policy in some areas’ (DCLG, 2007b: 6). The importance of socio-economic well-being for cohesion is highlighted. However, the focus of the Community Cohesion literature is overwhelmingly on ethnic and cultural difference (e.g. Home Office, 2001a; 2001b; Home Office, 2004; CIC, 2007), suggesting a split between the language and agenda of policy.

Economic well-being is important because it helps develop ‘social inclusion and empowerment,’ which ‘is seen as key to ensuring individuals have the resources to contribute meaningfully in communities and feel they have a
stake. It is also important in avoiding antisocial behaviour and tensions relating to concern over inequitable resource distribution’ (DCLG, 2007b: 6). Economic well-being, it is implied, enables citizens to participate in public life more effectively\(^5\). The use of the term empowerment is particularly important, as it promises more power to those who feel powerless. However, this economic well-being must be nurtured, which requires citizens to make the right choices. Therefore, government must empower citizens in a particular way, hence the use of conditionality.

The prominence of empowerment in the policy literature suggests an element of passivity on the part of the individuals in question. These passive individuals must be empowered so that they may feel included. Highlighting the local and targeted approach to this process, New Labour asserted that ‘[k]ey target groups should be the most disadvantaged and those groups where are most likely to tensions arise [sic]. This will vary by area and could be a particular demographic or ethnic group’ (DCLG, 2007b: 6). Overall, it is decided that certain individuals/groups need empowering, and they should be targeted by specific initiatives. This draws out a tension in the language being used: empowerment is something that happens to people, rather than something people do for themselves. The relative balance of power is drawn out when seen within the context of conditions placed on individuals and groups. Furthermore, ethnicity can be considered a demographic factor; the specific mention of ethnic groups may point to a particular focus on them. Nevertheless, an economic element to cohesion (in

\(^5\) This echoes T.H. Marshall’s (1950) sentiments, which are discussed in chapter three.

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some areas) has been acknowledged, at least regarding conditionality.

Understandably the notion of conditionality is used most explicitly in the welfare literature. This is evident from the following extract from the *Freud Review*, which deals directly with the issue of conditionality:

The review concludes that the Government has made strong progress in its Welfare to Work agenda, but that further evolution is necessary. Welfare to Work and the New Deals have been a success as has been the creation of the Government’s main delivery arm, Jobcentre Plus. The Government now needs to build on these successes, ensuring that resources are targeted in the most effective manner and on those who need them most, and that the expertise that exists across the public, private, voluntary and community sectors is fully utilised in tackling the challenge of extending employment opportunity to all (DWP, 2007b: 1).

The overall thrust of this extract is positive and promotional. Welfare to work has made strong progress and is a success. Situated at the beginning of the document, the extract frames the coming discussions. Conditionality is inevitable; it echoes the ‘inexorable and fatalistic unfolding economic’ language of Hay and Rosamond’s logic of no alternative (Hay and Rosamond, 2002: 155), highlighting a discourse that ‘tightly and unilaterally’ controls debate (Fairclough, 2002: 177). Conditionality is legitimised through a means of elimination – there is nothing else to choose from, and so conditionality becomes the ‘common sense’ option. The use of positive and empowering language, however, makes this more palatable. Furthermore, it reassures those not on welfare, as the logic equates welfare assistance with choice; if one is on welfare, it is their (poor) choices that led them there. This makes it a prime candidate in the construction of a hegemonic project because it is able to create a robust construct that
influences people’s attitudes on particular public and political issues.

One can drill further into the logic of conditionality using the notion of employment. Note above that there is no discussion of extending employment, but rather employment opportunity (DWP, 2007b: 1). In other words, there is no guarantee of a job in which greater integration lies. Of course, it may not be the role of the state to ensure that everyone finds employment, but symbolically it places responsibility on the shoulders of individuals who are likely already vulnerable to exclusion. Their options are diminished, and they are unlikely to have the levels of capital required (financial, social or human) to take full advantage of these employment and related opportunities.

The juxtaposition of conditions and opportunities is evident elsewhere in the literature. Discussed regarding both Community Cohesion and welfare reform, the (perceived) unfair allocation of resources to one group or area over another was presented as producing particularly strong tensions. In A New Deal for Welfare, the government aimed to ‘[allow] greater flexibility over the way resources can be deployed to meet negotiated outcome targets that reflect the needs of each local community; for example through a process of alignment or pooling of budgets’ (DWP, 2006: 36). ‘Local community’ has some say in how it is used, empowering individuals and communities. Yet surely successful budget allocation would mean a lack of tension? Tension between groups makes this issue relevant to cohesion, as demonstrated by a passage from What Works in Community Cohesion:

Recognising the tension between the need for targeting, and the need
for universalism. Building the capacity of and/or a sense of commonality within a specific group in the community (e.g. a specific ethnic group, or young people) can function to emphasise differences to those outside the targeted group, and become a source of tension over the allocation of resources. Policy makers must be constantly vigilant to the complexity of how different dimensions of community structure interact and compete (DCLG, 2007b: 7)

Implicit within this extract is the issue of trust and suspicion. One group receiving funds over another creates tension between groups, as each group presumably feels they are deserving. This may suggest a feeling of entitlement, which the logic of conditionality could counteract on the account of changing the culture so that people feel it is right to earn assistance. If people earn resources, there is less recourse to unfair allocation. Issues of cohesion and inclusion can therefore legitimise conditionality, through the notion that cohesion can only be developed when individuals make the right choices. Again, the issue of ethnic groups is highlighted as a particular example, suggesting a specific focus that may make any pursuit for universalism difficult.60

Specificity and targeting were accorded a higher priority than universalism in New Labour’s social policy, although universalism played an important discursive role. Conditionality is presented in the policy literature as a method to universalise employment opportunity. This can be seen most clearly in the Jobseekers’ regime, which ‘is a largely rules-based system that requires claimants to focus quickly on job search’ (DWP, 2008b: 29). The conditionality regime is legitimised discursively through an ethical

60 The issue of targeting ethnic groups can be seen in McGhee, 2003, Worley, 2005 and Robinson, 2012. It is also discussed in the findings of the focus groups in chapter seven.
argument, based on the personalised support each welfare claimant will receive:

Personalised support boosts well-being and improves outcome for some of the hardest to help groups on [Jobseekers’ Allowance]. Qualitative evidence shows that more personalised support for jobseekers at the New Deal stage has improved the frequency and quality of job search activity and jobseekers’ confidence and motivation. It has encouraged jobseekers to open up and overcome barriers such as problems with alcohol, drugs, basic skills, mental and physical health issues that they face (DWP, 2008b: 33).

The argument for conditionality here, in the form of personalising conditions and requirements on the receipt of assistance, is that it helps people live better lives. It follows the position of New Labour that paid work is the best route to integration and cohesion (Hulse and Stone, 2007: 114). However, the focus is not necessarily on improving the lives of individuals with such problems; it is focused on getting people back into work. The justification for this – that work improves people’s lives – is secondary. Personalisation is presented as a tool of empowerment, giving individuals more control over their futures – to produce an ‘enabling welfare state’ (Blair, 2002). The normative grammar of personalisation within conditionality constructs a situation whereby conditions are placed upon individuals for their own good:

Evidence also suggests that the system of sanctions encouraged claimants to actively seek work. Over half of JSA claimants say that they are more likely to look for work because of the threat of sanctions and only around one in seven of those who enter the programme are sanctioned […] The system has also been shown to provide value for money. There is clear evidence that fortnightly signing and face-to-face contact with Personal Advisors improve off-flow rates (DWP, 2008b: 32).
Sanctions suggest that an individual made a conscious decision to transgress, therefore making the claimant responsible for their situation\(^{61}\). Furthermore, it implicitly places more blame on those who are sanctioned through emphasising the fact that ‘around one in seven’ are sanctioned, suggesting that the one in seven must be the worst offenders. This helps remove some responsibility from government, through the shift of responsibility to the individual.

The immediate and personal effects of conditionality tie-in to a wider programme of re-education or behaviour modification of individuals, in which conditionality as a political logic is of paramount importance. This can be seen in both cohesion and welfare, in which the citizen’s sense of duty (or, perhaps more appropriately, responsibility) needs to be fostered. This invokes notions of belonging and participation in that a more participatory society (be it through civic participation, or acknowledgement of and participation through a prior moral community) may increase social bonds and therefore develop cohesion\(^{62}\). New Labour employed active citizenship as a way to encourage participation. Conditionality plays an important discursive role in strengthening the contractualism inherent within (active) citizenship:

> To build a successful integrated society we need to promote an inclusive concept of citizenship, which goes further than the strictly legal definition of nationality and articulates the rights and responsibilities we share. Building this wider notion of active citizenship through participation, volunteering and civic action,

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\(^{61}\) Of course, it could be the case that the individual is indeed entirely responsible for their situation. It is not the aim of this chapter to engage in an agency/structure debate; rather it aims to highlight the role of conditionality as a political logic.

\(^{62}\) The full discussion on this matter can be found in chapter three, section 1.
underpinned by a sense of shared values, is one of the main ways in which we can strengthen the relationships and connections between communities. We need to ensure that all citizens feel a sense of pride in being British and a sense of belonging to this country and to each other (Home Office, 2004: 6).

Active citizenship exemplifies the political logic of conditionality. An individual’s informal citizenship status – ‘a dimension of membership in a national community related to practices of identity and belonging’ (Bauder, 2008: 323) – is tied up with certain prescribed behaviours and socio-cultural norms. If one does not conform to these behaviours and norms their citizenship may not be formally revoked, but their various levels of capital will suffer (Bauder, 2008). The inclusivity mentioned in the above extract would presumably originate from active participation. Therefore, the sanction for not participating is exclusion. This presents a paradox: an inclusive concept of citizenship still retains an aspect of exclusion. Furthermore, those who are excluded become the targets for various initiatives of welfare and cohesion policy, therefore entering a cycle. The only way out of this cycle is to accept these new cultural norms – the shared values and universalised sense of responsibility. In other words citizens, at least discursively, are coerced into accepting an appropriate ideology if they do not consent. The language presented however retains the imagery of empowerment; conditionality is the last resort, and is for the most part implied. Discursively the power is pooled squarely in favour of the state, not individuals and communities as the literature suggests.

The ways in which an inclusive, active and universalised citizenship could develop cohesion include focusing on both socio-cultural and socio-
economic dysfunction (e.g. Prideaux, 2001: 97). As mentioned earlier, New Labour tackled this prominently though increased employment (and) opportunity. From the LGA publication, *Guidance on Community Cohesion*:

> Poor employment opportunities have an adverse impact in many areas building cohesion. In particular, wide variation in the unemployment level within relatively small areas can breed significant resentment between communities (LGA, 2002: 41)

Echoing some parallels with the issue of resource allocation, varying levels of unemployment are understood to increase tensions. The most efficient way to deal with these tensions therefore is to increase employment. This leads into an explicit moral defence of conditionality. Reinforcing the idea that conditionality is imposed for the good of the claimants, compulsory training sessions, interviews and assessments are ‘empowering’, and the work that results (regardless of the specifics of the work) promotes good health (DWP, 2007b: 5; DWP, 2008b: 37). Therefore the government is compelled to act through employing conditionality: ‘Far from being reluctant to engage, the Government could on this evidence be accused of dereliction if it were to fail to do so’ (DWP, 2007b: 5). The Government set out its chosen responsibilities clearly – its main responsibility here was to ensure the well-being of its citizens63. However, as the government has the power to specify when it would be committing a dereliction, so it has the power to specify the same for welfare claimants: ‘Because we are giving individuals much greater support, we should, in return, expect them to take up the opportunities provided by the employers’ (DWP, 2007a: 6). This may

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63 It is interesting to note that in this situation the government is able to choose its responsibilities, whereas citizens are not.
be framed as opportunity, but if it is compulsory, to what extent is it actually ‘opportunity’ at all? Central to conditionality is an illusion of choice that helps justify and legitimise its use, contained within a promotional language of empowerment. It utilises strong normative grammars that influence citizens’ behaviour. When this is not enough, they are faced with informal sanctions (e.g. exclusion, diminished social capital) and, within welfare, formal sanctions.

The language of sanctions is also framed carefully. For example, the *Gregg Review* suggests sanctions should be used to ‘drive behaviour’ (DWP, 2008a: 72). In reality, this is a swift punishment for perceived bad behaviour. A ‘sanction is imposed quickly after the behaviour that triggered the sanction’ (DWP, 2008a: 79). This is a clear tactic to instil particular behaviour patterns into those who are seen as deviating from the desired path. If you choose not be empowered, there are consequences you must accept. There seems to be a paradox here in that one is given as many opportunities as possible to empower themselves and increase their participation in public life, but only if it matches an approved template of activity. Therefore, again, the onus is on the individual.

Developing a hegemonic project requires elements of coercion and consent. One can find consent through the promotional language and the normative grammars found within the logic of conditionality. The coercion is found within the implied threat of exclusion and relative deprivation, as well as explicitly through sanctions. The strength and the discursive presentation of the logic helps legitimise it, as critiques are met with the belief that
problems can be corrected through better communication (e.g. DWP, 2008a: 79). The logic of conditionality shuts down alternative ways of thinking about this problem, which has a knock-on effect on how other problems are approached.

This section has explored the composition and deployment of the political logic of conditionality, highlighting how it helps legitimise particular discourses and practices. It identified particular normative grammars within and around the logic that strengthen its influence regarding the potential for behavioural change in citizens, particularly welfare claimants. It also discussed how although not as obvious, the political logic of conditionality could also be seen in the Community Cohesion literature. Finally, through this logic one can see a divergence between the language and presented aims of the policy, particularly regarding the socio-economic (and to an extent cultural) empowerment of individuals. Another political logic, rights and responsibilities, contributes to the relative strength of the logic of conditionality, employing similar methods and tools. This is the subject of the next section.

5.3. Rights and Responsibilities
This section engages with the notion of rights and responsibilities as a political logic. It can be designated as a logic because of its key position in New Labour’s social policy formulation, particularly regarding Community Cohesion and welfare reform. This section follows the same format as section 2. It will begin by outlining how the concept can be seen as a political logic, before moving on to the substantive analysis of rights and
responsibilities in the policy literature.

5.3.1. As a concept and as a logic
Notions of rights and responsibilities have always occupied a core position in the development of citizenship (Flanagan et al., 1999: 135; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Somers, 1993). As discussed in chapter three, citizenship traditions speak to the responsibilities of the state towards its citizens, and the rights and responsibilities of citizens to both the state and to one another. Rights and responsibilities define the rules of membership of a nation state (e.g. Lister and Pia, 2008: 14; MacIntyre, 1984: 220; Patten, 1996). The citizen’s duties and the state’s responsibilities also play into the nature of welfare provision, in that the extent to which citizens participate in public life (their responsibilities) can have an impact (positive or negative) on the welfare assistance they receive or need (their rights). The social democratic welfare state for example may provide generous benefits, but expects relatively active citizens in return, much more than in the corporatist welfare state for example. Chapter three discussed how particular configurations of citizenship and welfare impact on cohesion. These debates provide useful context for this logic considering that the citizenry’s relationship with the state could affect the level and character of welfare provision. This could, in turn, impact on the citizen’s ability to participate, and therefore the overall development of cohesion.

As a political logic, rights and responsibilities emphasises the notion of the (social) contract. The logic incorporates rights with responsibilities so that the two are inseparable. Considering the findings of section 2, in that
empowering language did not seem to be replicated with actual empowerment, one may see the logic of rights and responsibilities emphasising responsibility. Regardless, the logic operates so that the impact of increased responsibilities can be lessened with a discursive nod to rights, whilst any discussion of rights must include (even if only implicitly) a discussion of the corollary responsibilities.

Its strength as a discursive tool to increase and legitimise multiple responsibilities, and therefore contribute to the construction of a hegemonic project of cohesion, is worth examining.

5.3.2. Analysing the logic of rights and responsibilities
Much of the literature on cohesion and welfare refers to the idea of rights and responsibilities. Considering the prominence of the idea that there can be ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Giddens, 1998: 66) within New Labour thinking, the logic of rights and responsibilities can be seen to form the backbone of New Labour’s discursive construction of cohesion. This also makes it essential in the development of a hegemonic project, because the logic of rights and responsibilities provides the regulatory framework to which individuals and groups should conform. The logic works to discursively de-emphasise rights and prioritise responsibilities. For example, within welfare ‘[t]he ‘Two Strikes’ provisions enforce the principles of rights and responsibilities by ensuring that those who repeatedly defraud the benefits system can lose their right to financial support’ (DWP, 2008a: 115). Here the notion of rights can only be implied. Considering conditionality removes the notion of entitlement from welfare, more emphasis is placed on
the responsibilities of citizens. Yet in this extract a negative-sounding notion of rights is retained through the declaration that one can lose their right to support. Focus is therefore drawn to the negative connotations of responsibilities in this context. The notion of rights is given more of a platform within the Community Cohesion literature. However, treating rights and responsibilities as a political logic highlights its ability to frame rights and responsibilities in a specific manner:

But respect for diversity must take place within a framework of rights and responsibilities that are recognised by and apply to all – to abide by the law, to reject extremism and intolerance and make a positive contribution to UK society (Home Office, 2004: 7).

A liberal conception of rights is evident in the above extract, which suggests that individuals have a right to live their private lives generally free of interference as evidenced by the need for respect for diversity. The imagery of rejecting extremism and promoting tolerance speaks to this, although the use of these terms rests on a common sense conception of them; the lack of a definition suggests an implicit and assumed specific understanding, commonly held by the majority. However, it is the discourses and logics in the literature that specify their connotations. Rights and responsibilities are mentioned in the extract, but only responsibilities are listed. The notion of responsibilities is therefore clearly prior to rights. Although implicit in the extract, the prioritisation of responsibilities over rights suggests a power relationship in favour of the state. This is made more explicit in the

64 I do not intend to make an argument that the idea of responsibilities is negative. However, in this context it is strongly tied in with the issue of welfare fraud, emphasising the deserving/undeserving dichotomy.
following extract, dealing with welfare contractualism:

The Government has made a commitment to rights and responsibilities a central feature of policy. In return for more support in obtaining employment, it would seem appropriate for the state to expect more work-related activity from those on benefit (DWP, 2007b: 8).

This extract ties rights explicitly to responsibilities. The request itself is reasonable and on first reading innocuous. Yet it is difficult to pinpoint an exact conception of rights in this passage. As with the previous extract, rights and responsibilities are mentioned but only responsibilities are talked about in any detail. One is left to assume that the nod to rights is covered by the government’s commitment to providing more support in obtaining employment. In other words, welfare claimants have a right to be supported into work. However, as discussed in section 2, if claimants do not accept such support their benefits are reduced or terminated. Therefore it may not be entirely appropriate to frame such a discussion in the language of rights and responsibilities; it is more accurate to talk of just responsibilities. The language of rights legitimises the practice of increasing individual and group (e.g. ethnic group) responsibility, without increasing the counterpart rights. As discussed in section 2, this is an issue of the language of policy not matching the aims of policy.

This system of controlled empowerment is also seen in Community Cohesion policy, which in places draws directly from experiences and linguistic tools found in the welfare policy literature:

The second key principle to emerge from our work is a new emphasis on rights and responsibilities in the context of integration
and cohesion – recognising that government has in the past set out this type of approach to welfare reform, for example, but that it is time to apply it as a response to local and dynamic demographic change [...] The concept of citizenship is therefore developed into something that can stand as a wider contract of rights and responsibilities for all citizens. And to get to that, we need to openly debate forms of citizenship that prioritise integration and cohesion (CIC, 2007: 62).

This echoes the tension between universalism and targeting mentioned earlier. The same linguistic devices are found in both sets of policy literature, demonstrating how the political logics interact to construct a wider project of cohesion. Applying the ‘emphasis on rights and responsibilities’ to ‘local and dynamic demographic change’ suggests the universalisation of a specific response to unrest.

Regarding the language of the extract, a normative grammar is constructed around the issue of integration and cohesion. There is positive language of an open debate, but the subject of that debate is very much closed, which helps legitimise a specific form of integration. The normative grammar suggests that citizenship is not about rights and responsibilities per se, but the responsibility to integrate. Considering the responsibility-driven society is prominent in the cohesion and welfare policy literature (e.g. CIC, 2007; DWP, 2007a; 2007b; DWP, 2008a), one would expect integration and cohesion to conform to a power relationship that favours state structures over individual or collective agency. This is discussed further in section 4.

Such a construction of normative grammar makes the logic of rights and

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65 Of course, some may argue that this is a positive thing. It is not the aim of this chapter to debate exactly where power should lie in the contract between state and citizen. Rather, it aims to highlight the divergence between the language of policy and the aims and likely effects of the policy.
responsibilities useful for constructing and/or reproducing a hegemonic project, particularly considering that in Gramscian terms, constructing a normative grammar is a political act that involves making choices about which terms to adopt and how to define them (e.g. Ives, 2004: 95-96).

This normative grammar is reinforced (and reinforces) the notion of responsibilities over rights as common sense. Again, the use of promotional and positive language is an important tool in understanding the specificity of New Labour’s response to unrest, and in the construction of a political project of cohesion:

We recognise the importance of open and constructive debate about citizenship, civic identity, shared values, rights and responsibilities. It is only through having such a debate that we will have the basis for bringing together people of different races, cultures and religions in a cohesive society and within cohesive communities. We intend that national Government should take the lead in promoting such a debate, and we hope that local government will also recognise the need for this dialogue to take place at a local level (Home Office, 2001a: 20).

As highlighted in chapter one, the focus of Community Cohesion for New Labour was on ethnic and cultural difference, rather than more traditional understandings of social cohesion that included more socio-economic considerations. This is highlighted in the above extract. The positive, potentially empowering, language in the extract helps construct a normative grammar that encourages and legitimises a specific form of integration. The positivity can be seen in the recognition of the need for open and constructive debate about citizenship, shared values and rights and responsibilities. However, national government will take the lead on this debate, effectively controlling who can contribute. Controlling debate
allows for some control over the dissemination and contamination of discourses. It also points to a certain level of specificity, in that only particular debates and positions are given time.

The specificity of New Labour’s programme of cohesion, drawing from both Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy, lends itself towards the construction of a common sense conception of cohesion, playing a role in its construction as a political and/or hegemonic project. This has been present since the inception of Community Cohesion\textsuperscript{66}, as this extract from the Cantle Report demonstrates:

In an open liberal democracy, citizenship is founded on fundamental human rights and duties. The laws, rules and practices that govern our democracy, uphold our commitment to the equal worth and dignity of all our citizens. We must tackle head on racism and Islamophobia. It will sometimes be necessary to confront cultural practices that conflict with these basic values, such as those which deny women the right to participate as equal citizens. Similarly, it means ensuring that every individual has the wherewithal, such as the ability to speak English, to enable them to engage as active citizens in economic, social and political life (Home Office, 2001a: 20)

In a similar vein to conditionality’s appeal to moral virtue, rights and responsibilities are tied closely to ‘equal worth and dignity’. The extract highlights unequivocally that an inclusive citizenship is defined on the state’s terms, and defended through lauding particular norms over those that are seen as less desirable or civilised. Community Cohesion retains a link to issues beyond cultural relations through highlighting the need to enable all individuals to engage as active citizens economically, socially and

\textsuperscript{66}As discussed in chapter one, New Labour latched on to the idea and use of Community Cohesion as a way to deflect from more intractable social problems (Robinson, 2005).
politically. However, the choice of being able to speak English as the example to demonstrate this suggests an element of targeting. These devices render this conception of an inclusive citizenship problematic. Again, it can easily be seen as common sense to tackle racism, protect women’s rights and to deal with Islamophobia. Yet within what could be considered as empowering language, there is an implicit construction of a value system that may not be transgressed. This is easiest to justify using potentially emotive examples that appeal to a fundamental sense of right and wrong. In this respect, one can see the construction of a normative grammar based around having the ‘right’ values, regardless of one’s background.

Directly following the extract are two statements that potentially contradict its message. These are that “[c]ommon citizenship does not mean cultural uniformity’ (Home Office, 2001a: 20) and “[c]itizenship means finding a common place for diverse cultures and beliefs, consistent with our core values’ (Home Office, 2001a: 20 - emphasis added). The message seems to be that cultural heterogeneity should be promoted, but only if it fits within a particular – in this case, British – template. The implicit message echoes those that can be seen in both the logic of assimilation and integration (discussed in the next section) and the logic of conditionality – that such processes and relations should be prescribed, largely from a central source such as government. So problem groups (e.g. McGhee, 2003; Worley, 2005) are ‘expected to show “which side they are on”, through an allegiance to a “phoney” construction of Britishness’ (Worley, 2005: 491).

This section has analysed the political logic of rights and responsibilities. It
has demonstrated how its interaction with the logic of conditionality strengthens and constructs particular normative grammars, which contribute to common sense understandings of cohesion. The logic of rights and responsibilities legitimises a strong focus on the responsibility of the individual, whilst using empowering language and imagery of rights to soften the configuration. The combination of the logic of conditionality and the logic of rights and responsibilities begins to construct a particularly resilient discursive frame, within which particular behaviours are promoted, whilst others are punished. Their combination facilitates the exploration of the final political logic to be examined – assimilation and integration.

5.4. Assimilation and Integration
This section builds upon sections 2 and 3, demonstrating how the three political logics tie-in with one another, whilst exploring the logic of assimilation and integration in its own right. This logic also works to reinforce and legitimise the previous two logics, which results in the reproduction of specific discourses, as well as the social logics of cohesion and welfare. As with sections 2 and 3, section 4 begins with discussing the designation of assimilation and integration as a political logic, before embarking on the critical discourse analysis.

5.4.1. As a concept and as a logic
Similar to rights and responsibilities, assimilation and integration is the combination of two linked but separate ideas. Traditionally, debates on assimilation and integration are found in the realm of migration and nationality (e.g. Bloemraad et al., 2008; Worley, 2005; Cheong et al., 2007;
Kalra and Kapoor, 2009; Robinson, 2005). Implicitly the two suggest differing power relations: assimilation suggests preserving one group’s identity whilst incorporating others (Portes, 2007; Alba and Nee, 1997: 827). Integration suggests a slightly more equitable process of coming together (e.g. Favell, 1998). However, the language of integration can be used to promote assimilation as was the case with Community Cohesion, whereby ‘racist rhetoric [was] directed towards blaming the victim for negative other-representation (based on “their” failure to adapt)’ (Bowskill et al., 2007: 796; see also Van Dijk, 1997).

Furthermore, assimilation and integration do not necessarily have to be confined to the realm of migration. It is possible to see elements of each within socio-economic issues. Integration via paid work (Hulse and Stone, 2007) and through increasing social mobility (Constant and Zimmerman, 2010) are examples of this. There is an element of crossover here, considering these economic issues can tie in with debates on migration based on employment (Antecol et al., 2003; Bauder, 2008).

The logic of assimilation and integration utilises the potential similarity in definition and connotations, employing the potentially small yet significant differences in the terms to develop and reproduce particular normative grammars. As with the previous two logics, assimilation and integration is a useful logic with which to explore power relations within discourse, and how discourses and logics can be employed to legitimise a project of cohesion and develop its status as a hegemonic project. This is explored further in the following analysis.
5.4.2. Analysing the logic of assimilation and integration

The logic of assimilation and integration can be seen in tendencies towards universalisation in the literature. The logic moves towards totalising imagery. For example, New Labour’s vision of welfare assistance moved ‘decisively away from our current approach of engaging with, and having high expectations of, job seekers but leaving most other clients with infrequent contact and lower expectations’ (DWP, 2008a: 72). This seems to solve the tension between targeting and universalism discussed in the previous sections. There is no such tension here as the implication is that more will be expected of all. Interestingly, the overall thrust remains within the notion of empowerment, as those affected will have ‘a personal adviser with whom they would be able to agree a route back to work’ (DWP, 2008a: 72). In the first instance this would suggest a fairly integrative route back into work, and therefore back into public life. More may be expected of all affected, but these expectations will be managed on a case by case basis. However, the empowerment of these individuals only goes so far, as claimants would be ‘obliged to act on the steps they agree with their adviser’ (DWP, 2008a: 72). This language echoes that of the logic of rights and responsibilities, regarding the relationship between choice and expectation.

Of importance here is the locus of power. The claimant has some say in the construction of their plan back into work. However, the adviser retains power through their presumed expertise, as well as having the backing of the state. The claimant may decide not to agree on the steps suggested by the advisor, in which case two options present themselves: refuse these steps outright, or renegotiate. Renegotiation would likely result in a similar plan
(considering the adviser’s expert input), and constant refusal will result in benefit being cut off. The claimant is in a diminished position of influence, considering their potential excluded position, and the related lack of social, human and financial capital that accompanies it. The claimant’s material position effectively limits their empowerment, as their ultimate recourse – refusing the steps and ultimately refusing support – would eventually lead to the withdrawal of financial assistance.

Considering the implications on power relations, the implementation of the logic of assimilation and integration is not always clear cut. Its use can be subtle, particularly when addressing issues of empowerment and responsibility within Community Cohesion. One must explore the discursive location of power, as with the following extract:

Civil renewal is at the heart of the Government’s vision of life in our 21st century communities. It aims to reconnect citizens with the public realm by empowering them to influence the development of solutions to problems affecting them. It is vital that barriers to participation – from lack of confidence and capacity to express one’s views to prejudices which lead to exclusion – are tackled so that the aspiration for wider engagement can be translated into reality (Home Office, 2004: 19).

Power is located firmly with government. The language and imagery of empowerment is present, but it has been framed in a specific way. Government will empower citizens to influence solutions, not develop solutions themselves. This prevents bottom-up solutions from being developed. Considering the government’s commitment to local initiatives, this seems contradictory. Citizens are expected to become more active in their communities, but receive little overall control. Normative grammars
are constructed from participation and aspiration. All individuals are grouped within a specific notion of aspiration, encouraging a specific form of participation. Furthermore it assumes that the barriers to participation are the same across communities (be they ethnic, socio-economic or both). The logic of assimilation therefore creates a specific set of criteria that all citizens should follow, as was also discussed regarding the logic of rights and responsibilities. The logic of assimilation and integration, prioritising assimilation to an extent, can also be seen in a more obvious manner when discussing the position of ‘communities’:

In all these areas, we recognise the need to support not just existing communities, but also to bring diverse communities together to develop shared objectives and means of mutual support (Home Office, 2004: 19).

There is a division between ‘existing communities’ and ‘diverse communities’ in this extract. An artificial dichotomy, ‘diverse’ communities occupy a diminished position in relation to ‘existing’ communities; they are a mélange of outside groups until they become recognised through becoming part of the existing community. Existing communities are to be supported, whilst diverse communities are to be brought together. The language suggests a power advantage in favour of existing communities, with diverse communities being brought into line with the values of the existing ones. A normative grammar is constructed around the idea of mutual support, in that the elevated position of influence for existing communities suggests that although all support all, diverse communities will provide more assistance to existing communities, whilst the existing
communities assist the diverse ones into conforming to the right set of values. It is also through this grammar and language that one can see community as the new plane or surface on which micro-moral relationships are to be managed (Rose, 1996: 331). The logic of assimilation and integration can therefore be employed to promote, legitimise and reinforce a particular set of values and attitudes.

The logic of assimilation, similar to the other two logics in their use of positive empowering language, promotes a top-down organisational structure whilst suggesting more bottom-up control. Within the welfare reform literature, this is observable in the language of personalisation:

We recognise that the majority of claimants are best placed to decide their own path back to work as they know their own circumstances, needs and goals best. However, a minority may need more guidance. The activities they choose may prove to be ineffective over a sustained period of time. An even smaller number may refuse to co-operate with support from which they could benefit (DWP, 2008a: 38).

This extract is ultimately concerned with personalisation and empowerment. It discusses the central role of welfare claimants making their own choices to get back into work. However, there is still an assumption that some people do not know best. In this situation they are compelled to follow advice and pathways provided to them. Again, the discussion of the small number who do not know what is best for them, or who outright refuse help, implicitly places responsibility upon those people. In this situation, not knowing what is best for yourself is dependent on whether what is best is an objective or subjective category. Considering that humanly objective equates to historically subjective (Gramsci, 1971: 455), what is best not only
depends on the aims of social policy in general (full employment, increased integration, racial equality etc.) but also on the ideological (or for the purposes of this thesis, discursive\(^{67}\)) conditions at the time. Personalisation and increased support, combined with doing what is ‘best’ for claimants can therefore be used to instil the appropriate set of values and attitudes in dysfunctional citizens. A normative grammar is constructed in the idea of acting in one’s (or someone else’s) best interests. One has every right to refuse specific assistance, but if it is what is deemed ‘best’ for that individual case, the claimant is obliged to accept eventually. Those in a diminished position of influence are to be drawn into an ‘acceptable’ lifestyle.

The language and imagery of empowerment toward an acceptable lifestyle is somewhat contradicted by likely unintentional, yet disempowering, language. Such language heightens the feeling of a lack of agency on the part of welfare claimants, even if the rhetoric that it is for their own good remains. Lord Freud, in his report, suggested that ‘[a]s a one stop shop, Jobcentre Plus should therefore remain at the core of the service provided and retain ownership of claimants as they pass through the system’ (DWP, 2007b: 6). It is much easier to preside over a specific project when a centralised structure is in place. Jobcentre Plus played this role for New Labour. A centralised system also facilitates centralised power, which can be seen in the above extract. Jobcentre Plus will retain ownership of

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\(^{67}\) Although they can be seen as separate, discourse and ideology are inherently linked (e.g. Purvis and Hunt, 1993), particularly when adopting a critical approach (e.g. Van Dijk, 1995a; 1995b: 17-36; 1998: 191-312).
claimants. This is not empowering language and highlights the issue of power in assimilation.

Positive imagery and language is essential to the operation of assimilation and integration, which heightens the prominence of the integration element of the logic. It is the implications behind the linguistic and discursive constructs, particularly regarding power relations and the locus of power, which highlights the role and importance of assimilation in the logic. The following extract prioritises the development of a debate on shared values to promote inclusivity, whilst shutting out too much disengagement and disagreement:

Recognising that integration can mean changes for established communities does not mean abandoning the values that we share as citizens: respect for the law and democratic structures, fairness, tolerance and respect for difference. Part of the power of the concept of shared values lies in the debate itself. One of the main lessons from the disturbances in Northern English towns in 2001 was that a lack of shared vision and principles had contributed to the breakdown of cohesion and the Cantle report made recommendations in this area (Home Office, 2004: 8).

Within this extract, there is a mediated acknowledgement regarding the role of integration. In the first instance it is accepted that established communities (e.g. white British natives, or perhaps historically settled BME communities) will have to adapt to changes brought by integration. This conforms to the definition of integration set out in section 5.4.1. However, the statement that this ‘does not mean abandoning the values that we share as citizens’ implicitly regards the values of the established communities as a priority, echoing the communitarian concern with the prior community. The values that are specified are kept broad. Again, the imagery of debate is
used to engineer the feeling of an open conversation. The overall thrust of
the extract is that integration is positive when it allows all groups to
conform to a common set of values. Although this is an attractive prospect,
it does not consider the issue of who has the most influence in defining
these common values. Within the extract, a normative grammar is
constructed around the notion of shared values and/or vision. Within the
Community Cohesion literature, the logic creates the necessity to conform
to a particular set of cultural values, as it creates this necessity regarding
economic values within the welfare reform literature. If one does not
conform to these values there are consequences, as set out in the discussions
of the logic of conditionality and the logic of rights and responsibilities. In
that respect, the logic of assimilation and integration reinforces the previous
two logics, as well as being reinforced by them.

The need for people to adhere to a set of common values finds its parallel in
welfare reform through the desire to reduce social exclusion and improve
employability. The common values manifest in welfare reform through the
requirement that all claimants undertake certain kinds of work, for the good
of their communities and themselves:

Volunteering can help job seekers develop important work-related
skills and improve social cohesion. The current benefit rules balance
the expectation that claimants should be actively looking for paid
employment with recognition that volunteering can be part of the
path back to work (DWP, 2008a: 119).

This extract presents work not only as an opportunity, but as a responsibility
and a route to integration. If claimants agree to voluntary work, the
expectations upon them are lessened. For example, claimants who volunteer
are given 48 hours instead of 24 hours to attend a job interview, and a week to take up a job offer (DWP, 2008a: 119). This provides elements of coercion and consent: the consent derives from the rewards for undertaking extra work, reintegrating oneself into the local community and labour market, whilst improving skills. The coercion remains because of the threat of sanctions, discussed earlier. The carrot and stick approach therefore helps to condition individuals into developing and maintaining particular attitudes to employment and employability, centred on the notion of community involvement, and one’s responsibility to one’s neighbourhood and the state.

Similarly, the notion of employability can be framed in the context of a globally competitive labour market, as well as a tool to facilitate integration:

Migration to the UK has increased, not just because of globalisation and the expansion of the EU, but because of the attractiveness of our flexible labour market. Instead of higher unemployment, the outcome has been more jobs for migrants and locals alike. Nevertheless, the availability of skilled and flexible workers from abroad does not in any way reduce the need for us to improve the skills of our own population; to ensure they can compete in the labour market and have the opportunity to take up one of the 600,000 vacancies that come up each and every month. Migrants have shown that the job opportunities are there (DWP, 2007a: 8).

This extract, albeit in a more subtle way than in some previous extracts, highlights the importance of conforming to a particular common sense approach to employment and employability. The increase of migration to the UK’s flexible labour market is cited as the reason to improve individuals’

\[68\] Creating a workforce adaptable and resilient to changes in the labour market was a key issue for New Labour, as was the need to ensure the UK could compete with other states globally (e.g. Lister, 2003; Finlayson, 2009: 15-17).

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employability, rather than personal and community well-being as in some other extracts. In this context, a normative grammar is constructed around the idea of flexibility: if one wants to survive in a globally competitive labour market, one must be flexible. In order to be flexible, one must adopt particular approaches and attitudes towards work. Again, there are a raft of sanctions awaiting those who do not conform to those attitudes and working patterns that are supported. The language of inclusion in the extract (in that the flow of migrants does not mean the skills of established residents should be ignored) helps construct imagery of encouragement, whilst also highlighting implicitly that unemployment is not a systemic problem, as migrants ‘have shown that the job opportunities are there’. This, in essence, reinforces the notion that, discursively at least, New Labour’s aim was to create an enabling welfare state, which helps individuals help themselves.

This section has discussed the nuances of the logic of assimilation and integration, and demonstrated not only its reach within the policy literature, but its close implicit connection with the two other political logics examined in this chapter. Unlike the other two logics, assimilation and integration can operate much more subtly, particularly regarding welfare, where it is more pertinent to think of assimilation and integration in terms of configuring power relations. The logic relies to an extent on the operation of the other two logics to reinforce its rules, hence some observable cross-over – particularly with the logic of rights and responsibilities. These links are explicated in the final section, which summarises the ‘big picture’ regarding these logics’ operation within the social logics of cohesion and welfare.
5.5. Building a project of cohesion: the social logics of cohesion and welfare

This section draws on the analysis set out in sections 2, 3 and 4, in order to demonstrate how the three political logics analysed contribute to both cohesion and welfare as social logics, and therefore to a political project of cohesion. It also explicates the notion that this project can be seen as a hegemonic project, in its resilience to critique and in its construction of a specific approach to cohesion that has become ‘common sense’.

As discussed in chapter four, social logics contain rules on how institutions and individuals should approach particular issues. Specific to this thesis, the social logic of cohesion contains rules on how various social and ethnic groups should interact and participate in society, whilst the social logic of welfare contains rules and expectations on individuals to participate in society primarily through the labour market, but also to an extent in their local communities. They are historically sedimented, in that how the concepts are understood today is influenced by developing material and ideational conditions – for example, the notion that the welfare state in the UK has always expected people to work for their benefits (DWP, 2007b: 2) legitimises a debate on how these expectations should be met, rather than debating whether these expectations should exist at all.

The two social logics are constituted and contested\(^\text{69}\) by political logics, in this case conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and

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\(^\text{69}\) This chapter has focused mainly on the constitutive elements of the social logics. However, elements of contestation can be seen in the contradictions and paradoxes in imagery and language. Further contestations can be seen in the contamination of discourse, which is dealt with in chapters 6 and 7.
introduction. These political logics constitute the social logics through providing the character of the rules. Conditionality and rights and responsibilities provide nuanced rules on what is expected of groups and individuals, as well as the consequences for not living up to the expectations. The logic of assimilation and integration provides rules on how and to what extent these expectations should be realised. Combined, the social logics therefore provide a set of rules on how individuals and groups should participate and interact in modern British society, socially, culturally and economically.

As demonstrated in the above analysis, these political logics employ similar linguistic devices, imagery and normative grammars that present, promote and legitimise a particular approach to social organisation and a particular set of attitudes. Furthermore, the three logics reinforce and legitimise one another to strengthen the discursive mesh as a whole. The logic of rights and responsibilities lays out the expectations of the state and what citizens should expect from the state. The state’s expectations are made resilient from critique through the logic of conditionality, and the real-world sanctions associated with it. The logic of conditionality relies on the transmission of a specific configuration of expectations and entitlements, as set out in the logic of rights and responsibilities. Finally, the logic of assimilation and integration prioritises and legitimises assimilation over integration through the complex of conditions and expectations placed upon citizens. Without the logic of rights and responsibilities prioritising responsibilities over rights, for example, the logic of assimilation and
integration would not be as successful in prioritising forms of assimilation over integration.

The positive, empowering language discussed throughout this chapter is used to lessen the negative connotations that may otherwise be transmitted by these logics. Within this empowering language and positive imagery of resilient, influential and independent communities are normative grammars that help solidify the rules contained in the political logics. For example, the normative grammar of personalisation, found in conditionality, legitimises conditions placed on claimants as acting in their best interests. The normative grammar associated with shared values helps legitimise a form of ‘integration’ based on a specific set of shared values, likely set by the dominant prior (political and/or moral) community, which itself can be seen as a historically sedimented entity.

What develops is a mesh of linguistic devices and normative grammars that help constitute political logics, which in turn constitute and contest social logics. Within this mesh, the social logics of cohesion and welfare can be seen to contribute to the same, or similar, goals regarding integration and participation in British society. In this respect they are incorporated into a single political project of ‘cohesion’, which is social, cultural and economic in nature. This encapsulates New Labour’s response to unrest and ‘dysfunction’ (for a more in-depth discussion, see Prideaux, 2001), which began with the party’s welfare reform in the late 90s, but more specifically in the aftermath of the 2001 riots in northern England.

The political project can be seen as hegemonic through the Gramscian
concept of common sense. The ability for the political logics to legitimise and reinforce one another, whilst legitimising particular approaches to issues and restricting debate to particular categories facilitates the development of a common sense position, in that a specific approach to social unrest and to perceived individual and group dysfunction is successfully presented as the only viable approach. The various contradictions and paradoxes discussed in this chapter are lessened; the common sense approach to benefits for example is presented as empowering and integrative, using language and imagery to ‘smooth over’ the potential cracks in its presentation caused by these contradictions and paradoxes. In making potentially problematic constructions seem unproblematic, the common sense approach to cohesion as a project is able to universalise a specific approach through holding together an inevitably syncretic discursive project.

**Conclusion**

This chapter, by way of an in-depth critical discourse analysis, has engaged with the discursive construction of New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform literature, examining how the use of language, imagery, normative grammars and discursive logics contributed to the development of a political project of cohesion that in some circumstances can be seen to have developed as a hegemonic project.

The chapter found that, drawing parallels with a number of discussions from chapter three, New Labour developed a top-down policy framework that encouraged a specific approach to cohesion, both in terms of the race
relations of Community Cohesion, and the economic and labour market integration of welfare reform. This was promoted and legitimised by the use of positive imagery and language. The rules surrounding the development of a shared set of values and attitudes was reinforced through the operation of political logics, within which operated multiple normative grammars. These devices enabled the development of a common sense approach to both Community Cohesion and welfare reform, based largely on ideas such as empowerment and active citizenship, that effectively only allowed the development of one approach to problems of social unrest and economic segregation.

The interaction and interdependence of the political logics helped strengthen the social logics of cohesion and welfare, which ultimately allow for the construction of a political project of cohesion. The development of a common sense approach to cohesion, alongside the discursive reinforcement found with the political logics and normative grammars, enables this political project to transform into a hegemonic project, whereby discursively (and therefore, to an extent, practically\textsuperscript{70}) the longevity and influence of the project is increased through shutting down alternatives.

The chapter directly addressed a number of the main arguments of the thesis. It highlighted the divergence between the aims and language of policy, in that a top-down and relatively strict system designed to reproduce and preserve particular attitudes was presented as positive and empowering to

\textsuperscript{70} Discursively speaking, a hegemonic project can have material effects through restricting the number of legitimised avenues of conceiving of problems and solutions.
individuals and disadvantaged social and ethnic groups. Secondly, it demonstrated that the discursive constructs contribute to a political and hegemonic project of cohesion that consists of the social logics of cohesion and welfare, and the mesh of devices within. The development of common sense helps lessen the problems associated with a syncretic project, in order to facilitate citizens’ adherence to New Labour’s vision, regardless of any contradictory messages that may be apparent within.

Though this chapter has made a case for understanding the development of New Labour’s response to unrest and dysfunction as a hegemonic project, as evidenced by the use of language and linguistic devices that essentially do the opposite of what the policy claims to do, it warrants further examination from a different perspective. This is the role of chapters six and seven, employing a plausibility probe based on qualitative focus group data, which looks at participants’ responses to and uses of the discourses and logics discussed in this chapter. It also explores participants’ relationships with a common sense conception of cohesion, investigating the potential for it to be critiqued and stabilised through the contamination of discourse. This is where the thesis now turns.
CHAPTER SIX - NARRATIVES OF COHESION, WELFARE AND COMMUNITY

Chapter five provided the major arguments and analysis of the thesis: that there was a schism between the language and stated intention of policy, that the interaction of discursive logics helped construct a political project, and that this project could be understood as hegemonic through, amongst other things, the development of a common sense conception of cohesion. To explore these ideas further, a number of focus groups were conducted in two sites: Manningham in Bradford and Aston in Birmingham. The participants’ discussions and the analysis of them is the subject of this and the following chapter.

This chapter provides more detail regarding the context of the focus groups. It discusses the background of the groups, initial assumptions and feelings of the participants, and the major areas of interest for each group. It tells the ‘story’ of the participants, in order to lay the groundwork for the more substantive analysis of chapter seven that explores if, and to what extent, the logics discussed in chapter five are used in the everyday discussion of this small sample of focus group participants. It compares the narratives produced in Birmingham and Bradford, drawing out themes central to the participants’ understanding of issues such as cohesion, welfare and community.

The chapter makes a number of points in order to provide context to the groups. Firstly, it provides an overview of the general composition of the focus groups, along with the general atmosphere towards the subject and
research in each site. Secondly, It illustrates the areas of convergence and divergence regarding salient topics in both sites. It also provides discussions around some of the definitions (collective and individual) that participants gave for key terms, such as community, cohesion and welfare.

In order to highlight these issues and provide the necessary context, the chapter is divided into a number of sections. Section one provides background context to the groups, dealing with general reactions, atmosphere and group dynamics. Section two summarises the major points that can be taken away from both sites in the form of two case studies. Within these are discussions concerned with defining key terms, and the issues that participants in Bradford and Birmingham identified as important.

6.1. Background to the groups

This section discusses the general atmosphere felt in the Bradford and Birmingham focus groups. It discusses in general terms the background of the participants, the openness of discussion, and the topics that were most salient to participants in the two sites. As discussed in chapter three, it was decided that the focus groups should be conducted in deprived areas, where issues of (community) cohesion and welfare provision were either crucial or strongly connected to the day-to-day lives of the participants. People in these areas, therefore, were able to reflect on and discuss the questions in the focus groups, regardless of their technical knowledge of Community Cohesion or welfare as policy areas. Three focus groups were conducted in the Aston area of Birmingham, whilst two groups were conducted in the
Manningham area of Bradford. The following subsections deal with the specific background and issues encountered in Bradford and Birmingham respectively.

6.1.1. Bradford

The first group in Bradford consisted of two women and four men. All of the participants lived or worked in the area, either in community-orientated, public sector or council-related jobs. There was a modest difference in ages: the youngest participants were nearing middle age, one participant was around late middle age, whilst the rest could be considered middle aged. The second group comprised of three women and four men. The age range was similar to group one, in that the majority could be considered middle-aged. This group also had similar community-orientated professions. Across both groups, all but two participants came from a south Asian background (e.g. Pakistani etc.).

In general, members of the Manningham community were not particularly enthusiastic about participating in the study; some were interested in participating until they were informed there was no financial compensation, for example. One possible reason for this is that Manningham has had a lot of attention from researchers and government, as it was one of the sites of the riots in 2001. Over the last decade or so fatigue has set in, with participants feeling under scrutiny:

I found myself more and more saying to others ‘just leave us alone.

71 One of the focus groups in Aston only contained two people. It has therefore been omitted.

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We know we’re ok, and we don’t need you telling us otherwise.’ They don’t believe us (Amolika\textsuperscript{72}, Bradford).

We’re part of the goldfish bowl. People come in to Bradford and target things, you know, no disrespect to you [ref: moderator] you’re coming here to look at things (Paul, Bradford).

The reticence of the general public to participate in the Bradford focus groups was also seen in the backgrounds of those who participated. The majority of participants in both focus groups were either community workers or public sector workers (e.g. NHS and local council)\textsuperscript{73}. Discussion in the two groups was generally civilised; participants allowed each other to speak. There was a slight issue with a dominant speaker, Majid, in one of the Bradford groups. However, other participants would still speak up if they did not agree with the general thrust or tone of the conversation, as shown below:

\textbf{Majid:} But you know how people want to live their lives, and here we had this group of people who were going ‘oh it’s white flight, it’s racism’ and you know people latch on to it. But yet, all the people, ok there will be some that, you know…

\textbf{Jas:} But you can’t deny it, you can’t deny it happens

\textbf{Majid:} Of course racism exists

\textbf{Jas:} No no no, not racism, white flight. It does exist

\textbf{Majid:} No it doesn’t

\textbf{Jas:} Yes it does!

\textbf{Majid:} No.

\textbf{Jas:} You can look at stats in areas where south Asians have moved in to the area, you’ve got one or two families, three families, next thing you know there is a movement.

\textsuperscript{72} All names of participants are pseudonyms. The original data has been anonymised so that the participants’ real identities cannot be traced.

\textsuperscript{73} The backgrounds of the participants were not systematically collected. This information comes from the discussions themselves.
Majid: You need to understand…
Jas: I do understand
Khalida: I don’t think it’s fair to just say that it’s just white people
Jas: No, I’m not saying that. I’m saying there is an element of it.
Majid: Jas, listen to me. Listen. I’ll tell you why […]

The Bradford focus groups provided much fruitful conversation on topics related to what the participants saw as the key issues for the local area. These are outlined in more detail in section 2. The focus groups in Birmingham presented a number of similarities with the Bradford focus groups, but also a number of differences, as illustrated in the following subsection.

6.1.2. Birmingham
The participants in Birmingham were more diverse than those from the Bradford groups. Across the groups there was a mix of white British, Irish and Polish participants, participants from the West Indies and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as participants from a south Asian background. In general, participants were middle-aged, although there was some representation from people slightly younger and slightly older. Many participants had community-orientated professions, similar to those in Bradford. However, there was also representation from general members of the community. In one group, a recent refugee participated.

The participants in the Birmingham focus groups were less fatigued than those in Bradford regarding the prospect of being researched. Indeed, many of them felt energised and ready to discuss what they saw to be the biggest problems facing their community. Whereas anger could be felt in Bradford
that perhaps they were being made a spectacle of, in Birmingham anger could be felt towards the government.

The demographic background of the participants in Birmingham was more mixed. There were some community and public sector workers, as with Bradford, but the focus groups also contained members of the lay community, first generation migrants and in one case a refugee. This possibly allowed for a wider ranging conversation and the ability to bring in a number of topics, due to the wider background of the participants.

As with the Bradford focus groups, the participants were ready to speak on behalf of their community. However, it was those with community-orientated jobs who were more willing to do this. Other participants were more comfortable relaying their own experiences, although in some circumstances those willing to speak on behalf of their community replicated this within the dynamics of their own group:

**Bridget:** Um, I agree with what you said [Linda earlier discussed how those attempting to build bridges may actually be causing more divisions], because I’ve had some trouble, people come to do my house, and um, they came in they start the job, they said oh we get the go-ahead to do it, then they come back a few days after which they took out my bath and everything out of the bathroom, put it outside, came back ‘we haven’t got the go ahead, I’m ever so sorry’ put them back how they like, move my shower from one side, put it to the other side, I can’t get a bath now, and nobody’s come back to help me, and uh it’s been two years now, and they’re trying to help me here, so I’m waiting, and yet, people who don’t work in this country, are having their bath done the room [gone] and I can’t just get a bathroom done.

**Linda:** You see how easy it is to look that way, that people just come in and get everything? It’s not necessarily the case but it’s the way, it looks like it, and that’s what causes the tensions in the community.
Some of the groups in Birmingham also had some issues with dominant speakers. At times it felt as if some of the participants had a particular political position they were keen to put forward. In one group, there were two strong personalities with strong social and political positions, Richard and Omid, who at times dominated the discussion (nevertheless with useful information and insights). This dominance became more pronounced nearing the end of the group discussion, when other participants possibly felt that they had said what they wanted to say, and so were less inclined to disrupt those who still had a lot to say. It was also the case that in this group there was much more crosstalk.

These atmospheres impacted directly on the depth of discussion in some areas and the focus on particular topics. The various key topics, and their prominence, is the focus of section two, which presents in general terms the major discussions and subjects of the two sites.

6.2. Narratives of community, cohesion and welfare

Narratives of community and cohesion provide the context in which the more in-depth analysis of discourse and logic can be situated. As this section will show, there are multiple topics that found discursive purchase in both sites, although the importance the various groups placed on these topics varied. This section treats Bradford and Birmingham as case studies on the same overarching theme, whilst highlighting the site-specific differences. One major difference is how the groups approached issues of inequality and difference, framing it either in socio-economic terms or in more socio-cultural and ethnic terms. This can be seen in the way people in
the two sites approached and understood issues relating to cohesion, welfare and community.

6.2.1. Manningham’s story – frames of ethnicity, difference and frustration

Although not in every case, participants in the Bradford focus groups made use of ethnicity to make sense of many of the issues discussed. Alongside this frame, there was a feeling of powerlessness, or at least a sense of there being a diminished opportunity to influence. Furthermore, discussions of inequality were more likely to be linked to socio-cultural issues as opposed to socio-economic issues. Majid, for example, highlights the problem of tensions related to resource allocation and the position of south Asians in this distribution:

And this is someone going, you know, these Pakis and these Asians, they get everything, but yet, their own communities because they don’t read, well most of them read The Sun, and they don’t buy the Telegraph, these are the things where, you know, the government needs to be transparent in how it wants to serve its people. And unfortunately, you know, like spending £12m a day in Afghanistan, and yet we’re having to face cuts here. And these are the things that, you know, why are we fighting a war in Afghanistan? It’s nothing to do with us (Majid, Bradford).

Majid frames his understanding of tensions between groups using examples from the media and geopolitics. The tension between people who accuse Pakistanis and Asian people in general for getting ‘everything’ are portrayed as perhaps less educated, considering their choice of newspaper. Majid makes the point that without an expensive war overseas, there could be more money for local communities. The picture painted by Majid is concerned with the treatment of Asian people on one hand, and the idea that
if money was better allocated (through not fighting the war in Afghanistan, for example) there would be less tensions in the first place. This is an issue of inequality couched in ethnic imagery. It echoes somewhat discussions on resource allocation in chapter five, in that it is perhaps the perception of unfairness that is causing tensions, rather than there being an actual unfair distribution of resources. Ultimately however, the blame is placed at the feet of the government: ‘why are we fighting a war in Afghanistan? It’s nothing to do with us’.

The issue of ethnicity was also present in discussions on the relative amount of power and influence people have to develop their communities. The government alleged to give communities the power to influence solutions to problems in their area; this was not reflected in Manningham. One particularly salient issue for the participants in Bradford was how certain groups were treated by the local media:

If you were to just take away the word Afghanistan [in relation to perceptions of people in Afghanistan and south Asian culture], that is gang culture in LA, and it shows it 24/7 on the news everywhere else. And other parts of the world. Behaving like that is – and you mentioned the media – it stereotypes it, directs it towards very much about Islam, about Muslims, about those countries, but that behaviour is going on everywhere, in South America, and everything news, drug cartels, you know, criminal level that’s ridiculous, yet they’ll talk about the Opium fields in Afghanistan or somewhere – it’s a lot smaller scale – but that’s more in the news. So the media, you’re right [ref: Majid] plays a really bad role, but then we don’t do anything to challenge that either. I mean, we don’t have the power or whatever, but it frustrates me when it’s always directed… [he tails off] (Jas, Bradford).

Jas accuses the media of stereotyping south Asians as mired in gang violence and drugs. He suggests that this then becomes conflated with Islam,
so that Muslims become associated with negative social phenomena. He shows frustration that no-one seems to be doing anything to counter these stereotypes, which suggests a willingness to resist such images. However, this is soon negated by the throw away statement that ‘we don’t have the power or whatever’. Not only does this dampen Jas’ willingness to resist, but the use of the word ‘whatever’ suggests that this position has been normalised; it does not need specific qualification.

This feeling of powerlessness, as well as an awareness or perception of inequality, heightened feelings of difference and division in Bradford. However, this feeling of division was stoked by the media:

Mike: But, the answer, you know, the media, you know, they have, they play on lots of... A number of times you’ve mentioned Ravenscliffe, but Ravenscliffe...

Mo: that’s the example

Mike: Yeah, I know, but...

Mo: No, no, I work in Ravenscliffe, they’re cool! [laughter]

Mike: But, Ravenscliffe is very dear to me, it was the first place where I actually worked as a community development officer, and when I first got my job on there, speaking to my mates, “I’ve got a job” “Oh, where is it?” “Ravenscliffe”. These were educated people, you know, and they weren’t joking, they were genuinely concerned about me. “Have you heard about Ravenscliffe?” And you know these were guys who I thought had a brain between them, you know. And I thought, well let’s give it a go, and you’ll come visit me when I’m in hospital then, won’t you? [laughter]

This discussion between Mike and Mo provides an interesting line of thought. The media exacerbates difference between communities (in this example, neighbourhoods), conforming somewhat to the government’s original position on segregated communities (Home Office, 2001a; 2001b). Yet the participants are obviously aware that the differences may not be as
stark as first thought. However, individual dissent from the idea does not necessarily make the feeling of difference between larger groups go away. At certain points in the discussions in Bradford, one could draw the conclusion that although participants frame their debates around issues of ethnicity, difference and so on, this is not how they would ideally see the world. Mo illustrates this by providing an example of selective reporting:

The majority of the time when I read [the local newspaper, the Bradford Telegraph and Argus], it always highlights south Asian problems, they do. And I hate the T&A. They’re impossibly stupid, like. A cat dies in the Hussein family or something, they make a big issue about a cat dying, you know “Cat found dead in Manningham lane”, you know, they make a big issue of it. But if you look at the stories when you read through a few pages and you read the stories, committed by local, Bradford, white Bradford people, you know, like there was one last week or the week before about a guy who abused his own daughter, you know, that wasn’t highlighted as a white crime, it was just a normal crime reported (Mo, Bradford).

Mo’s anger is directed at the local newspaper’s decision to prominently report what he views as a minor crime that took place in a south Asian household, instead of giving more coverage to a more serious crime committed by white people. He takes particular issue with the idea of there being Asian crimes and white crimes, considering these to be terms used only when it suits the authors. This suggests that the divisions found in Bradford (be they socially constructed or material) have been created not by the communities themselves, but by those in positions of influence.

These central feelings – powerlessness, division and inequality – impact on how the participants understand welfare, cohesion and community and their relation to them. Amolika and Majid discuss the meaning of ‘community’ as they see it:
Majid: here though you find that when you hear this huge segregation and then it becomes us vs them. That’s what’s doing Bradford at the moment. That we don’t class ourselves as Bradfordians, and it is, you know, but that’s the States, that’s everywhere. But still, wherever you are, you have to be part of that community, as a person, as a human being.

Amolika: But is there a community?

Majid: Yes.

Amolika: And we have this conversation at work a lot, because I spent, basically from 8 till 6 or 7 or 8 sometimes, away from my home environment. When I go home, everyone else has gone home and I don’t really see many of us and I’ve been on that street for about ten years now. And I do know who belongs on the street, but that’s usually from doing a bit of gardening at the weekend, and I just see people around. Generally, I don’t have a lot of relationships, unless they’re people I know so I’ve got a reason to go across the street, so I don’t do a lot of to-ing and fro-ing on the street, so I don’t feel a sense of that’s my community in that I know everyone and, you know, I’m related to everyone

In this discussion, one can feel the idea of community as a normative term; it is something that is to be strived for, even if the ‘perfect’ community may not be fully attainable (e.g. Bauman, 2001: 3). At the same time, membership of a community is non-negotiable; ‘you have to be part of that community, as a person, as a human being’. Community takes on a holistic and heterogeneous character for Majid. One should not think in terms of separate communities, but a singular (possibly syncretic) community – in this case, Bradfordians. Majid’s call for separate groups to come together under a single Bradfordian community echoes, to an extent, the New Labour line that ‘communities’ were living parallel lives.

For Amolika community can also be seen as a normative ideal, but her notion of community is not necessarily tied up in groupings and divisions. She knows who belongs on her street, but does not necessarily know them
as individuals. She attributes her self-proclaimed lack of community spirit to working long hours and returning home when there is no-one around. This suggests that, at least for Amolika, community is not necessarily a feature of contemporary city life. Yet at the same time it is also not necessarily an issue of ethnic groupings either.

Another group decided to actively discuss how one could define and understand the notion of community:

**Ali:** You have got a broad definition

**Ibrahim:** Yeah, it’s going to mean different things to different people in this room.

**Ali:** You can be part of the Bradford community, you can be part of the Muslim community, you can be part of the South Asian community, so it depends where you identify yourself.

**Paul:** That’s the difficulty, you know, community is two or more people. That’s the difficulty. You know, you’ve got the good community, the community of interests, you’ve got a whole range of different things.

**Ali:** It depends what your ideas are, but you can join any community you like.

This conversation highlights the contested nature of ‘community’, linking to discussions in chapters one and five concerning the ability to take what can be a relatively empty term and populate it with other concerns. The fact that community can mean different things to different people in the room, let alone the wider community, city or country highlights the potential difficulty of constructing a singular and specific definition of the term. Community did however remain an inviting term, although there were some potential issues. For example, although one ‘can join any community you like’, can just anyone become a member of the south Asian community?
This suggests a possible tension with the use of the term.

These specific understandings of the nature of community (which themselves would be contested between the two groups) impact on how the groups understood and positioned themselves in relation to notions of cohesion. Ibrahim, for example, understood cohesion to be problematic in much the same way as the idea of community:

If you ask the average person now, we’re here from all different organisations, from different parts of Bradford, and we’re giving our own perspective on what we think community is, which will probably be ten different versions, we may have slight differences here or there but in terms of our own view, it’ll be what we’ve experienced or what we think. Um, but again, as you say, it’s such a difficult thing to define in terms of community, the agenda, or cohesion or whatever you want to call it. Getting a general view is going to be next to impossible, because you have people sat there with all different views (Ibrahim, Bradford).

Ibrahim suggests that cohesion and community are capable of conforming to a multitude of definitions. The difficulty in constructing a singular and specific definition is that the concept risks not speaking to the people it is aimed at, if those people do not agree with the definition. As discussed in chapter five, however, the notion of Community Cohesion was constructed to be very specific. This suggests the very nature of Community Cohesion policy contains issues, particularly in areas that feel more segregated, precisely because of the multiple definitions and understandings of the concept.

Jas however discusses the notion of cohesion without using the term, but instead through drawing upon views normalised in government policy, employing a specific perspective:
I think there’s a failing in our whole society, in our fabric, our culture whether it’s, um, South Asian culture, or Islam or whichever, we’re losing what bounds us together, our families, I think it’s becoming more… [inaudible] (Jas, Bradford).

Jas invokes ideas similar to that of bonding social capital – the form of social capital New Labour wanted to avoid – or the lack thereof, as an important issue. He frames it initially as a society-wide failing, but returns to the perspective of specific ethnic and/or religious experience. This may demonstrate that when discussing the issue of cohesion directly, those in Bradford are more willing to problematise the concept, but when discussing issues related to cohesion are perhaps more likely to revert to accepted frames, such as those used by the New Labour government.

Discussions around welfare also tended to gravitate toward issues of ethnicity and in some cases nationality. This was particularly the case when ideas of welfare were inherently tied up with issues of abuse and exploiting the system:

**Ibrahim:** I mean, like I say, yeah, uh, and there’s another thing as well that we discussed, drugs, education, blah-de-bla-bla, some people are exploiting, without labelling anyone, but they’re exploiting the system. Um, they are applying [unintelligible] they’re coming up from European countries, and they’re applying for four/five children in terms of working tax credit, or is it child tax credit? I don’t know the difference between the two. And the children are not even here. There was a case I think on the news not so long ago

**Azra:** What, they don’t exist or they’re still in Europe?

**Ibrahim:** They’re applying for benefits on their behalf

**Ali:** They don’t exist

**Ibrahim:** And they’re not even here!

**Azra:** Is it not a policy where the children should come in?
Ibrahim: See, that’s what I’m saying, that’s why I think the whole system needs reviewing and looking at in a way that’s going to look at these issues, uh, and um they need radical changes to it because it’s being exploited.

Ali: It’s the case with children with special needs, they don’t get the benefits there

Azra: I mean you’ve got extreme situations with jobs, how they claim benefits and people who are genuinely disabled are told actually you’re fit to go to work.

The above conversation shows participants’ focus on negative aspects of welfare provision and possibly ethnic difference. The discussion on welfare moves directly to the issue of people exploiting the system – particularly people from mainland Europe. Ibrahim takes his example from a news story he remembers, highlighting the role of the media in constructing particular imagery. Azra changes the focus of the conversation to the role of the government in branding the ‘genuinely disabled’ as fit to work. Neither of these two ways of approaching the issues of welfare is positive; it is either a negative story about benefits tourism or a negative story about government actions towards the disabled. All the participants involved support welfare reform in some capacity, be it reforming the system to make it tougher to claim benefits, or introducing reforms that do not force disabled people into work. In both representations, however, there is an undercurrent of division and possibly suspicion.

Bradford’s story seems to revolve around issues of difference, frustration and suspicion. These frames encourage a negative perception of issues related to community, cohesion and welfare to develop. However, it is not entirely negative – for example people do feel that there are positive
communities to join when asked directly, though the more subtle discussions may belie this somewhat. The Birmingham focus groups produced many similarities to the Bradford groups, although there were some key differences.

6.2.2. Aston’s story – frustration with the system; battling to change perceptions

Unlike participants in Bradford, participants in Birmingham were less likely to think in terms of ethnic groups. This does not mean that communities and ethnic groups were never equated with one another, however. Participants here were more likely to bring up socio-economic issues without necessarily couching them in ethnic imagery, for example. An interesting point of comparison between the two groups was how empowered they felt. One participant in Birmingham described the feeling of a lack of empowerment in the community, and how a cycle of powerlessness could lead to divisions within it:

I’m not specifically targeting Aston, I’m just using it as an example, people feel so let down they don’t want to take on an action by themselves. So that’s a barrier that you have already because they feel like, you know, because that’s the community’s already separated and divided, it’s a hard task within itself to get people to follow and move forward, so that’s why it’s difficult to get them to engage and come forward (Linda, Birmingham).

Linda describes an area that has been let down so many times it has caused apathy to set in. This is similar to the feelings reported in Bradford, that being in a position of diminished influence has been normalised. Some participants felt that this feeling of apathy and powerlessness was exacerbated by others within the community who exploited a possibly
privileged position, or an awareness of local programmes:

**Linda:** I think that as well, there’s people in the community who know how to work the system.

**Michael:** yeah, yeah, yeah,

**Linda:** so to speak. And other people who don’t so it can seem very much like they get everything, but they just know how to go through the system the right way.

**Bridget:** But if they’ve got a family, in a job, the family is helping their people.

**Linda:** yeah

**Bridget:** Which in people like me who hasn’t got anybody, I don’t get help. I work all my life since I was 19.

**Linda:** We, we, there was something that we had, particularly in Aston, it was a funding by, uh, Aston pride. That was a very good example [murmurs of agreement from the room] they had millions of pounds put in to the area, but you tend to find the people who needed it didn’t actually either know anything about it, and then they didn’t have a clue about how to access it, but the people in the know [chuckle] they got what they needed out of it. And that’s really unfair.

This discussion echoes some elements of Majid’s statement concerning the perceived unfair allocation of resources. However, in this context the problem is a lack of communication (presumably from local and national government) concerning resources available to communities and groups. This would divide people based on issues of need and deserving. It conforms to some issues with social capital raised in chapter one, in that to develop or make the most of one’s social capital, one also needs some financial capital. In this context, for example, a group could help build social capital through community resource building. However, there needs to be financial capital to set such initiatives in motion – capital which may be available, but is not going to the most vulnerable because of their relative
inability to access the funds.

For some, the issues of having little influence combined with others exploiting resources came down to a lack of collective endeavour. Omid was keen to highlight that if the community wanted to change things, they had to act as a community, and not just a group of individuals:

You should also talk to your neighbours and get other people involved and let them know what’s going on and say there’s more pressure on the council or on the environment or on the person who’s causing this. You know, because it’s not going to happen with just one voice sometimes unfortunately. It takes a few people to make a change (Omid, Birmingham).

This does not necessarily suggest a fractured community, but rather a community that has retreated into itself. Omid’s argument suggests that it is not an issue of support from local or national government, but a case of helping the community develop to a position whereby they can collectively engage with institutions such as local government. To a certain extent, therefore, this does go against New Labour’s assertion that Community Cohesion policy empowered communities to influence solutions to problems.

The participants portrayed Aston itself as a relatively pleasant community. Frustration was directed at those who labelled Aston in a particular way, particularly when participants, such as Peter, felt the label was unjustified:

I went to primary school in this area, started secondary school in this area, but then moved to another secondary school which was in Sutton, and when I started going there and people knew where I was from, there was an automatic view of me being someone who was, who wasn’t right, who was a bit dodgy, just because I was from Aston. And all the people I was going to school with lived in Four
Oaks and Little Aston and I think people actually do have this view of places like Aston, that it is, you know, there is gang violence all the time, there’s drugs all the time there’s all this stuff going on all the time, and it’s not actually like that. It’s just what people hear. People don’t hear the good stuff that happens in these areas, because it does happen (Peter, Birmingham).

This suggests a division not between ethnic groups, but neighbourhoods. This division could be based on social status considering the idea that Aston, as a more deprived area, could be considered ‘a bit dodgy’. Peter’s reporting of others’ perceptions of Aston chimes to an extent with New Labour’s position on social exclusion and cohesion, in that those with less life and employment chances are more likely to turn to gangs and so on, which is more likely to happen in more deprived neighbourhoods. Peter’s main frustration however is the fact that good things do happen in Aston, but ‘people don’t hear the good stuff that happens in these areas’. This may suggest a community that is in less need of empowerment as New Labour saw it, and more in terms of being able to show the positive sides of the area, particularly to those not from Aston.

A further conversation between Peter and other participants on this issue illustrates how an area such as Aston is affected by inequality, and in some cases how elements of aspiration and even empowerment can work against the cohesiveness of the community:

**Omid:** As people have worked their way up in life, they choose to live where they want to live. Where they feel comfortable. But not everybody can choose where they want to live.

**Peter:** People don’t move into areas like this, wanting to stay here. People move into these areas through whatever choice they have, if they’ve just come here from somewhere else or the council have put them here or something, soon as they have the ability to get out of
this area, they’re gone. Because they don’t feel part of the area, it’s just a place where their house is, it’s not their home.

**Richard:** Why do you think that?

**Peter:** Why? Because I just think that’s the mindset that people get in to, you know, it’s not, people have this mindset of you know if you’re successful or, you know, you want to live a happy life where your kids can go and play in the street and stuff, this isn’t the area to do it in.

In this context, aspiration is something that has the potential to divide the Aston community. Not everyone can choose where they live, so some people are stuck in Aston. When they can afford to get out, they do. This suggests that more economically deprived areas may be less cohesive, because people do not put down roots and develop a stake in the community. However, how much this is due to Aston’s reputation and how much is caused by economic deprivation, social exclusion and a lack of cohesion, cannot be ascertained from these discussions.

The main feelings in Aston centred on frustration and powerlessness, although at the same time there were elements of positivity and pride in the community. A stark difference between Aston and Manningham was that participants in Aston were less likely to frame this frustration through ethnicity, instead using socio-economic issues to frame their arguments. This difference in framing, coupled with the feelings of frustration and anger in the groups, affected how the participants made sense of concepts such as community, cohesion and welfare.

When asked what the term ‘community’ meant to them, participants responded with a number of different conceptions. However, the major
theme running throughout was that of solidarity, or the need for solidarity:

For myself, it’s unity. Coming together to nurture and protect the things you love. You know, for example, I remember growing up and every neighbour looked out for every child and you know, everybody just looked out for everybody, you know, it was nothing for a neighbour to go to another’s for a cup of tea and you know, playing over at a friend’s house, and it’s totally different for my daughter. She can’t just go out and play and it’s totally changed. People, uh, there’s a fear there now. People don’t trust each other, and um, you know it’s a fear to have different people in your home, and to mix with different people, and to get to know people. I’d like to see that, them barriers broken down and people just getting back to what it used to be like (Linda, Birmingham).

For Linda, community is people binding together in order to look after each other and their area. She views community retrospectively; as something that once existed, but no longer does in the same way. Her comments echo elements of the two original reports on the 2001 riots, in that divisions within communities can lead to fear and mistrust that ultimately affects cohesion (Home Office, 2001a; 2001b). However, Linda is advocating an idea of community that is most closely associated with bonding capital over bridging capital, which is contrary to what New Labour wanted to foster (Husband and Alam, 2011: 42).

For others, community wasn’t necessarily a retrospective term. However, it still retained appeals to solidarity, particularly when participants argued for the development of community as a defensive resource:

So when we’ve got a community, to me a community is a group of people who are sort of battling against the decision makers, because I don’t feel as though decision makers give central, local, or you know regional government, actually participate in what communities feel they need. And you know, it’s like if you’ve got a family member that is in charge of the house, and doesn’t really listen to anybody and does their own thing. You, everyone else is going to
get frustrated and that’s what I feel communities are feeling at the moment (Richard, Birmingham).

For Richard, the idea of ‘community’ goes beyond designation of ethnic groups, socio-economic groupings or neighbourhoods. For him community is a family, in which everyone has a role to play. However, this is counterposed with the fact that community is ‘a group of people who are sort of battling against the decision makers’. This does not reflect the development of empowerment suggested in the policy literature analysed in chapter five. Richard paints the picture of a community frustrated precisely because they have not been empowered, or have not been able to empower themselves.

Like for those in Manningham, participants in Aston see community as something to aspire to, or to which one should hark back. The lack of an obvious ethnic dimension to their understanding of community perhaps opens the concept up to being framed in multiple ways, and perhaps means it retains a broader quality. This is unlike the specificity of the term within the policy literature. This enables residents of Aston to understand cohesion in multiple ways, too.

For many participants in Aston, cohesion also resonated as a normative term. Much like their approach to community, cohesion was seen as something people needed to struggle for:

I would like to see the resources that are in the areas actually utilised fully. I definitely would like to see that. A lot of the community don’t realise what they’ve got right under their noses. Don’t access it, don’t use it. I’d like more of a voice for them to be able to, um, have it more specifically tailored towards what the community wants as
opposed to what people think the community wants. And I’d actually like to see cohesion, instead of hearing it (Lydia, Birmingham).

Cohesion is directly, yet implicitly, linked to community in this statement from Lydia. She shows frustration at hearing about cohesion without seeing its effects in her neighbourhood. She echoes to an extent Richard’s position in arguing that more effort should be put into developing what the community wants, as opposed to what others (presumably in higher positions of influence) think a particular community wants.

In other circumstances, participants looked at cohesion in relation to deprivation, social exclusion and the pressures of modern life leaving people feeling alienated from one another:

**Samir:** We’re living in those times in which other people can’t, cannot sacrifice their time, they’re just in a rush to either, just to fulfil their own desires, fulfil their own selfishness, we’re living in this social degradation, you know, morals and values have just been thrown out of the window.

**Moderator:** If people agree with the idea that morals and values have been thrown out, or have been degraded, why do you think that’s happened?

**Richard:** I think it’s in part due to, um, the way our policies have been planned, our governmental policies. We have too many policies that are policies in theory, not policies in practice. You know, we can have a model that might work really really well for Southend, but won’t really work for the deprived areas of north Birmingham [...] Nowadays especially, it’s best economic use, best economic use. But economic use doesn’t actually give you a sustainable future, it just gives you short term investment.

Samir’s position could be related somewhat to those communitarian positions that stress the prior nature of a moral community as the anchor for cohesion. In general, Samir’s position suggests that there is not necessarily a
lack of trust between people and groups, but simply an apathy brought on by modern lifestyles. As with Linda above, Samir’s idea of cohesion draws upon a possibly idealised past where people were more neighbourly and looked out for one another. Richard however takes a more functionalist view. For him, community-orientated policies have not been localised enough, going against the multiple pronouncements in the policy literature. He is particularly worried about ‘best economic use’ that provides short term gain without long-term sustainability. He thus links issues of cohesion with that of economic development, jobs and so on. Richard translates this directly into issues of welfare, particularly regarding governmental and community support, which Omid uses as a springboard to highlight what he sees as inequalities associated with the idea of welfare:

**Moderator:** What comes to mind when we start thinking about welfare?

**Richard:** For me I initially think of it as something to support people who are trying to support themselves. I know it’s not always used in that case, but there are ways that we could use, that people on benefits or people that are coming out of prison or whatever can still be part of communities, as long as we work out a scheme that allows them to feel part of it, so I’ve been saying for a while that they should have a reduction of council tax rates for example.

**Omid:** I tell you what, we’re in England, yeah? Everybody should be loaded, and I tell you why, because England is a very small country, yeah? And we’ve robbed most of the world, so all this oil that we’ve robbed, and all these luxuries we’ve taken from every other country, why is anyone in poverty in this country? We should all be getting cheques every week. Why are you cutting, cutting, cutting, and making them suffer, because you want them to beg. You’re making your people beg you, and they’re not going to beg you, hence, why the riots.

Richard considers welfare provision to have community building potential. This would lead, presumably, to greater cohesion within and beyond the
community. Richard echoes some of New Labour’s positions on welfare, particularly the idea of the enabling welfare state that helps people help themselves (e.g. Blair, 2002). Welfare in this context must help combat social exclusion in order to help promote and develop strong communities. Omid however sees things differently. He takes a broader view that understands welfare as almost an unconditional right. Welfare provision should have reparative qualities; if the UK (or in Omid’s words, England) has stolen resources that has made the country money, that money should at least go into the communities so that all can benefit. Omid’s wider point by implication, however, seems to be that the state, instead of looking after its citizens, instead stockpiles resources through stealing other states’ resources and through cutting budgets at home. Fractured communities could develop from this state of deprivation juxtaposed with a seeming stockpiling of wealth ‘hence, why the riots’.

Lydia sees welfare as a double-edged sword: it can do a lot to help and empower the people receiving assistance, but its capacity for community development may be limited, perhaps because of the potential development of aspiration alongside the empowerment:

**Lydia:** Cos let’s face it if you’re living on a council estate and you do your training and you get a good job, what’s the first thing that happens? You move. And then you move to a you know a [obscured by noise] area, that’s, you know, got decent parks and decent education for your kids, so you move, so then you have another sort of family on benefits move in to the area, so you’re not actually growing the area, you’re just growing people to move out of the area [agreement from around the table] but you’re keeping it as a poor community, um, again.

**Moderator:** Can we… combat that?

**Lydia:** oh… [chuckle from some on table] I think there’s always a
solution for things, um, but it’s actually you know, finding that solution that works. Um, and I do think sometimes in them sort of lower communities you know the education in the schools are all quite bad. So I think if you can build up, um, the aspirations of the kids that are going to them schools and give them the best chance in life, um, then actually you could try and grow that new generation out.

Lydia advocates a more long-term solution, as opposed to short-term unemployment benefits, that needs to be rooted in the community and community infrastructure. Her main issue with welfare as it stands is that it helps individuals but not communities. Therefore particular communities and neighbourhoods become holding areas for certain groups of people who do not have the resources to develop that community. This may, to an extent, chime with a liberal conception of welfare provision in that stigma is used to encourage people to better themselves and to get themselves off welfare, at which point they may be in a position to move to an area that is perceived as nicer. For Lydia, the solution lies in developing local educational capacity so that younger generations feel empowered and confident in themselves to break what others may see as a cycle of poverty.

The participants in Aston told a story primarily concerned with frustration. There were elements of powerlessness and division, as with Manningham, but these were not portrayed in the same way. Participants seldom framed issues through ethnic categories; the use of the term community, for example, generally referred to one’s neighbourhood or area. Furthermore, on multiple occasions there were attempts to transform frustration into action, at least discursively. This did not come across as strongly in the Manningham focus groups.
This section has presented the discussions and positions of participants in Manningham, Bradford and Aston, Birmingham. What is striking is the similarities between the two accounts. In general one can see many of the same concerns and frustrations coming to the surface in discussions. Almost equally as striking is some of the key differences: the two sites’ approach to the idea of community, the prominence of ethnicity, and how participants understood their position in relation to local and national government, as well as their relative positions of influence within and beyond their ‘communities’.

**Conclusion**

This chapter, through relaying the most commonly discussed issues in a series of focus groups, has presented the discussions of participants in the Manningham area of Bradford and the Aston area of Birmingham regarding their positions on issues of community, cohesion and welfare. It has illustrated the issues that are important to the participants, elaborating on some of these points to show their connection to previous debates found in chapters one, three and five. It highlighted the similarities and differences regarding participants’ positions on commonly held issues, whilst providing some background context to the discussions. This helps lay the foundations for the analysis of discourse and logic within the focus group discussions, which is the preserve of chapter seven.

The chapter has illustrated the different frames used by participants in Bradford and Birmingham to make sense of key issues related to cohesion and welfare, such as participants in Bradford relying more heavily on
frames of ethnicity to make their points. It highlighted that although there are many areas of shared importance between participants in the two sites, they are likely to understand the subtleties of the positions in different ways. This may be, in part, due to the more homogenous make-up of the Bradford focus groups, for example. A particularly interesting difference between the two groups was how they understood a shared feeling of frustration and relative powerlessness. For participants in Bradford it felt more normalised, whereas in Birmingham there were some attempts to break free discursively from such feelings.

The discussions in this chapter help to frame an understanding of common sense conceptions of, and approaches to, cohesion and welfare. Through providing context and background, these discussions also help lay the foundations to explore whether, and the extent to which, one can understand ‘cohesion’ as a political project that draws upon elements of New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform policies, as well as whether or not this project can be considered in any way hegemonic. This ties in with the debates in chapter four concerning New Labour’s attempt to reconcile problematic elements in order to appeal to all sectors and all visions, which would (to an extent) make any disjuncture in the language and aims of policy potentially less problematic.

This chapter has therefore provided the groundwork from which one can employ a plausibility probe to explore the viability of some of the thesis’ main arguments. Chapter seven builds upon the points made in this chapter and probes them further, exploring the possibility for the participants to
destabilise logics and contaminate discourses, which will in turn facilitate an exploration of the extent to which New Labour’s response to unrest post 2001 can be considered in any way a hegemonic project.
CHAPTER SEVEN – EXPLORING THE ‘COMMON SENSE’
OF COHESION AND WELFARE

Chapter six presented the discussions of the participants in Bradford and Birmingham, discussing their feelings of, and positions in relation to, community, cohesion and welfare. It found that in general one can talk of a number of similarities between the two sites in how they make sense of these concepts in their everyday lives. However, there were also a number of differences, varying in subtlety, that provide a snapshot of how participants modify their treatment of the concepts in order to make them more relevant to their situation.

It is in this adaption, however small it may be, where issues of common sense can be drawn out and extrapolated upon. Considering that common sense is an amalgamation of ideas, practices and positions (Rupert, 2003: 185), one should not expect complete uniformity across the two sites. Rather, it is the subtle differences between the two sites and the small adaptions to definitions that provide the opportunity to explore how participants accept, resist and modify discourses in a process of contamination. Through this exploration, the plausibility of understanding New Labour’s development of cohesion and welfare as a hegemonic project can be discerned.

This chapter therefore has two main aims. Firstly, the chapter develops the narratives and subjects discussed in chapter six, and provides more depth to them. It explores if, how and the extent to which the discourses and logics discussed in chapter five are used by the participants to make sense of or influence how participants understand community, cohesion and welfare, as
well as the participants’ role(s) in relation to them. Secondly, the chapter explores the plausibility of the argument that discourses found in the policy literature are present in everyday narratives, and that the constituent logics contribute to the construction of a political project of cohesion, which can be understood as hegemonic. These aims help delve deeper into the notion that the disjuncture between language and aims and perhaps, to a lesser extent, state and citizen is possibly a result of a series of contradictory messages and problematic combinations that then needed to be smoothed out in order to function. In other words, the development of common sense, and the creation of a hegemonic project (intentional or otherwise) could be seen as a reaction to (or the reason for) the implicit contradictions found within and between New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform policies.

The chapter therefore makes a number of arguments. Firstly, it argues that the discourses and logics found in policy literature can be seen, to varying extents, to have influenced participants’ understandings of community, cohesion, and welfare, which influences participants’ approaches to these issues. Secondly, this influence does contribute to a common sense understanding of cohesion that promotes and legitimises the specificity of New Labour’s response to unrest. Finally, the chapter argues that although the discourses and logics do legitimise a specific common sense understanding, the discourses are open to contamination that allows participants to resist elements of the common sense, even if only marginally.

To achieve its aims and draw out these arguments, the chapter is divided
into a number of sections. Section one deals with the common sense understandings of community, cohesion and welfare. It builds upon the outline of participants’ understandings of these concepts from chapter six, bringing in discussions on how the discourses and logics influence these understandings, and how they vary or remain similar between sites. Section two explores the plausibility of cohesion as a political and hegemonic project. It discusses the relative strength of the logics in everyday discussion, how this contributes to the development of common sense, the extent to which the discourses are contaminated, and whether or not this contamination is sufficient to challenge the common sense developed through the logics.

7.1. ‘Common sense’ understandings and the influence of discourses and logics

This section, using the discussions from Manningham and Aston from chapter six, explores how the discourses and logics discussed in chapter five help develop a common sense understanding of community, cohesion and welfare, and indeed if the participants make sense of these terms through common sense understandings in the first place. It highlights how the three political logics may influence how participants make sense of these issues, as well as how they adapt particular discourses and concepts to make sense in local and personal contexts. Through this exploration one can see common sense as the amalgamation of various positions rendered universal, and as such as the beginnings of a hegemonic project. This section will deal with the three main concepts in turn, highlighting the presence of the discursive logics in the everyday discussion of each.
7.1.1. Community

In terms of making sense of cohesion and welfare, the idea of community was key in both sites. It acted as a conceptual anchor to which participants could relate discussions, rather than trying to navigate more complex and nuanced terms that may appear in the policy literature but would be less likely to be used in normal conversation, such as ‘active citizenship’.

Although participants in Birmingham were more likely to take a position that was against current orthodoxies, this was not the case in every instance. When discussing issues of togetherness for example, Omid invokes a number of policy positions, whilst also drawing upon a number of discursive logics:

**Omid:** I believe it’s certain communities in the areas where they’re lacking understanding of one another, and understanding the cleanliness of the area and it’s down to everybody, it’s a team effort […]

**Moderator:** Do you think there’s a problem, let’s say, of people not doing enough, like getting involved?

**Omid:** Well, I think it’s the depression factor, you know, no work, their backgrounds like the lady says, the countries they’re coming from, there’s no understanding of each other, they just isolate themselves and nobody’s going round trying to make everybody come together. You know everybody just leaving everyone to their own devices and from a community and a city where we’ve grown up with doors open and everybody arms open for each other, all of a sudden everyone’s starting to isolate themselves again. And this is mainly the people who have just come into the country. So it’s our job to get them out and you know show them a bit of love, and show them that, you know, we’re all together as one (Birmingham).

In this discussion, which covered issues such as provisions for various neighbourhoods, the efficacy of local councils and the roles of local residents, Omid explains an idea that can be approximated as active
citizenship. He argues that it is the job of all the local residents to ensure that the neighbourhood is clean, and that new arrivals feel welcome. In this sense, one can see the influence of the logic of rights and responsibilities; everyone has the right to live in a nice neighbourhood, and it is the responsibility of the residents to provide that kind of area. The logic of assimilation and integration can be seen clearly through the appeal to groups to stop isolating themselves, drawing parallels with the original self-segregation thesis (Home Office, 2001a; 2001b; Flint and Robinson, 2008). This conceptualisation of a fractured community plays into the ethical argument found in the policy literature, in that these fractures are not necessarily the fault of structural issues, but rather of individual choices (the choice to isolate oneself, to not make an effort to understand one another, to not foster community spirit). Omid does make reference to some structural concerns (the ‘depression factor’ and the potential lack of jobs), but this is overshadowed by the rest of Omid’s argument. Community can be seen as the arena in which deliberation regarding the role of the citizen and the nature of the neighbourhood, city and, by extension, country, takes place.

For some participants in Bradford, community represented an ever changing goal. In order to pin down an understanding of community\textsuperscript{74}, the logics of rights and responsibilities and assimilation and integration were drawn upon:

\textbf{Paul:} I’d put the thing as why [inaudible] is because of lack of stability. Things are changing too fast, to be able to create something stable, to be able to feel a sense of community. Things, you know, we don’t understand people coming into neighbourhoods, we don’t have the same lang… you know, the fact these, there’s three East

\textsuperscript{74} Particularly considering the discussion in Manningham, found in chapter six, concerning how community can mean many different things to different people.
European families come in, I’ve sort of said hello to them and that’s it, you know, I haven’t made an effort, a conscious effort to talk to, um, my East European neighbours, I’m too busy to do things, and I think you know, but it’s a combination, it’s like, there are probably more family breakdowns now, so again, unstable, bit more, you’ve got…I would look at areas where they are stable, I bet those people in those stable areas feel a better sense of community, I’m guessing.

Ali: But community is better if the people keep not constantly changing, you know, like in a street like you’re saying how many times do you introduce yourself to people? And there’s a time where you think ok this property goes on the market for rental every six months someone new’s moving in, and you just give up, because there’s no point saying hi to them because after six months they’re not going to be there (Bradford).

The conversation between Paul and Ali highlights a general feeling of insecurity due to a community in flux. As discussed in chapter six, they believed that community was hard to define because it could incorporate so many elements. However, here community is understood as a neighbourhood. Furthermore this community, or a sense of community, is under threat because of the constant and quick pace of change. Community is therefore contained within an idealised past; community is what was. This speaks clearly to the logic of assimilation and integration, drawing stark parallels with the notion that local and national government must support existing communities and bring diverse communities together (Home Office, 2004: 19).

Conversely, one could argue that the community in which this conversation takes place must be fairly diverse already; Paul and Ali, who are from different countries, share similar feelings, for example. The idea that a community that is heterogeneous can view itself as self-contained, and want new arrivals to conform to a particular way of life can confirm the logic of
assimilation and integration. It is confirmed because diverse communities need to be integrated into existing ones in order to develop a semblance of stability, as argued within the policy literature.

Yet Paul does not put the entire onus on new arrivals. Invoking the logic of rights and responsibilities, he admits that he does not make enough of an effort to get to know his ‘east European’ neighbours. He argues that this is due to the fact he is too busy, and then shifts focus to the issue of family breakdown. Ali also helps move the focus of responsibility by blaming the practice of moving in and out of an area over a short period of time. Although not explicitly mentioned, these two discursive acts could arguably strengthen the responsibilities component of the logic of rights and responsibilities, particularly when concerned with the responsibility of ‘diverse’ communities to integrate.

However, community was not always used in this way. In an act of contaminating the dominant discourse on community, Lydia highlights power asymmetries between members of the same community, which helps entrench (a feeling of) division:

I think sometimes as well, you sort of get your power people within a community and you’ve also got like residents groups and certain groups that seem to take control of the area, and sometimes if you’re just a local resident and you go to those meetings and you speak up for yourself, they don’t really like it. They like to have their own little parties together, you know, the amount of people who do things because they obviously get a say, I find that a lot of people have been saying that when they do go to local meetings when they hold them, that they’re not interested in what they’re saying, they’re just interested in certain people in the community, and if you’re not a member of that one group then to be fair you don’t get a say, you don’t get a voice (Lydia, Birmingham).
Lydia draws upon the logic of rights and responsibilities and the logic of assimilation and integration, but in such a way as to contaminate their original thrust. Whereas in the policy literature one would find messages to empower oneself and improve one’s local community, Lydia highlights that only those already in positions of influence can achieve this. The implication here is that all have the right to be heard, and all have the responsibility to listen. For Lydia, the problem isn’t finding ways to support existing communities whilst bringing diverse communities together, but rather breaking up cliques within communities that keep them fragmented. Through this position, she begins to contaminate the logic of assimilation and integration, in that a community cannot be truly integrated if those in positions of influence are ‘just interested in certain people within the community’. This point holds a wider relevance regarding the specificity of New Labour’s project of cohesion, considering the tendency to target problem groups, whilst presenting the image of a more universal programme.

Participants in Bradford at times also engaged in a process of problematising and contaminating the logics, particularly assimilation and integration. For Ibrahim and Azra, this took place on well-trodden ground in terms of the policy literature – ethnicity:

**Ibrahim:** You [Azra] mentioned the word suspicion. And, it’s a key point you’ve mentioned actually, because now, as well, when you’re walking out, as a Muslim, now, I’m talking about [a] different situation that applied, you feel that you’re under constant scrutiny, by wherever you are, you’re watching the airport, you know, you feel that, and, um, because you’re a Muslim, and if you have a beard it’s more, or wearing a Hijab, you feel under more scrutiny and you shouldn’t have to feel that way. That’s unfortunate the way it is.

**Azra:** Yeah, I mean that does exist, I’ve experienced a lot of when I
didn’t cover and I think looking back they found it difficult to integrate someone who was Asian in the community, you know, um, but I think when, I mean I don’t normally think about what I’m wearing, but sometimes I’m in a meeting and I, you know, you can get that judgementalness.

Ibrahim: Yeah, people are looking at you thinking ‘ooooh’ you know.

Azra: Yeah. But you know, there is that kind of feeling, but, which I don’t normally think about, sometimes you’re in situations where people will make you think about you (Bradford).

Azra and Ibrahim discuss the difficulty to integrate, as a Muslim, when suspicion is levelled at them. The policy literature says that although everyone has a responsibility to integrate, ‘common citizenship doesn’t mean cultural uniformity’ (Home Office, 2001a: 20). This does not seem to be the case for Ibrahim and Azra. One can see the feeling of coercion they may experience. Azra’s comments in particular are very telling; as someone from a ‘diverse’ community, she is expected to integrate. However, ‘they’ (presumably the ‘host’ community) ‘found it difficult to integrate someone who was Asian in the community’. This suggests that Azra has made an effort to integrate, which has possibly been met with resistance. Indeed, ‘sometimes you’re in situations where people will make you think about you’.

As discussed at various points throughout the thesis, the notion of community and the notion of cohesion are not easily separated. This is particularly the case when discussing issues such as Community Cohesion.

7.1.2. Cohesion

Cohesion is a concept that was not often mentioned specifically, but instead contributed to wider discussions. The political logics, particularly rights and
responsibilities and assimilation and integration, relate the notion of cohesion back to the anchor of community, as the following conversation between Jas and Majid demonstrates:

**Jas:** If I’m honest, one thing we don’t really… don’t pick up on is a point we’ve actually mentioned, quite rightly, as a community or as South Asian or Muslim etcetera, we use the word discrimination, racism as an excuse sometimes. If anything, I think we are not as receptive to other communities as we could be. You know, that’s the reality of it.

**Majid:** Absolutely, Jas

**Jas:** I don’t, I wasn’t going to use this term, I think we’re more racist sometimes than the host community, about wanting to integrate, about wanting to get together – we would rather stay out of it. I think even the younger community, the young community now is unfortunately, it’s, it’s the world issues that are taking the forefront rather than what’s happening around here (Bradford).

In this conversation, Jas aligns himself strongly with the logic of rights and responsibilities, and the logic of assimilation and integration. Even though he has lived in Bradford all his life, he separates himself from the ‘host’ community, and places blame on himself and his ‘community’ for using racism as an excuse not to integrate. This conforms strongly to the arguments in chapter five that New Labour’s project of cohesion increased (the sense of) responsibilities without increasing the counterpart rights. The statement, ‘I think we’re more racist sometimes than the host community’, brings up two points. Firstly, it is an admission that the ‘host’ community can be racist. Secondly, it conforms strongly to the original ‘parallel lives’ thesis of the Community Cohesion policy programme. Jas’ position puts him in a diminished position of influence because he is willingly accepting blame for the issue of fragmented communities and the lack of cohesion.
However, using a similar theme, Amolika begins to contaminate the discourses associated with these logics. She widens the scope to take into account more than just ethnic difference, using the example of perceptions of Asians being noisy and sociable:

Some of it, the white flight business, some of it is about misunderstanding, so you don’t get to know your neighbour, you don’t actually know hang on this is all normal behaviour, it’s a bit loud, and feels a bit [inaudible], but it’s perfectly normal, and actually quite community spirited, you know, coming to support someone through a bereavement or whatever it is, um, it’s easier to just think ‘oh my God, they’re right noisy beggars, I’m off’, you know… At the best end, and at the worst end it’s racist. Not in every case, but also, there’s something here about class as well, so if you think about you know people’s, um, middle class culture where it’s Asian, whether it’s African-Caribbean, whether it’s… there’s a lot more similarities. So if you move into a middle class area, your behaviour is much more genteel, so our cars won’t be quite so loud (Amolika, Bradford).

Amolika begins by using an argument commonly found in the Community Cohesion literature, in that many of the problems leading to a lack of cohesion begin with a simple misunderstanding of one another. Her argument contaminates the logic of assimilation and integration somewhat, in that the ‘loud’ nature of the south Asian ‘community’ is in fact community spirited. This can count as a contamination because it goes against the idea of conforming to a particular set of British values whilst not undermining the responsibility to integrate. It also subverts the logic because it highlights a positive element of bonding capital (the community spirit of south Asians), and places an equal amount of responsibility on the shoulders of those outside the south Asian community to understand the group’s cultures, be they traditional or more modern. Finally, she relates
issues of cohesion to that of class, highlighting an alternative way of understanding the perceived and real divisions in Bradford. In a middle class neighbourhood people will be quieter, regardless of their ethnic background.

In Birmingham, some participants discussed the issue of community centres and community initiatives as a way to foster cohesion. The following discussion between Lydia and Linda highlights the development of common sense positions, as well as the syncretic nature of common sense itself:

**Lydia:** I think sometimes as well, yeah, I think that the bigger people do make an issue. When they’re setting up community centres, you know, we find that they’ll have a brand new building put up and they’re trying to take over, just not far from here, a community centre, but it’s predominantly for the Asian group youth, and then, but like, the Asians and the blacks, the whites, might have a group of friends that have got multiculture, so it just means right you three can go to that youth centre, but actually we’ve got to go down the road to another one, because, just because of that. And I think sometimes they make that divide, whereas if it’s a youth centre for the youth, it should be open to everybody and it shouldn’t just be targeted to that one group of individuals [...] So really by letting them all use the one you’ve sent out, you’re actually helping relationships between the different sort of groups of people, rather than just having it at targeted groups everywhere, so different places.

**Linda:** It also doesn’t help that you’ve got the particular ethnicities in particular areas, so if you’ve got a load of black people there, a lot of Asian people there, a load of white people there, then perhaps that black person isn’t going to want to go into that, um, that predominantly white area or that Asian person isn’t going to want to go into that black area. So you know, I think it stems from housing as well (Birmingham).

Lydia and Linda both adopt a common sense position to cohesion to an extent, in that the mixture of normative grammars, discursive logics and broader discourses inform their understanding of community relations. Lydia discusses the issue of separate youth centres, whilst Linda highlights
what she sees as the problem of there being neighbourhoods for different ethnic groups. This follows closely New Labour’s policy stance on Community Cohesion, in that these divisions must be broken down. However, Lydia problematizes the government’s programme of targeting through highlighting that by allowing the construction of community centres that predominantly cater for one group over another can increase division rather than fostering dialogue. This contaminates to an extent discourses linked to the logic of assimilation and integration, and the logic of rights and responsibilities. Assimilation and integration is contaminated through highlighting the problematic nature of the targeting strategies, whilst still agreeing with the overall purpose of integration. Rights and responsibilities is contaminated through illustrating that whereas the responsibility to integrate may rest with the members of the various communities and neighbourhoods, they can only work with the resources and the structures that are available to them. This places more responsibility on the shoulders of local and national government than was accorded to them within the policy literature.

Linda adopts a common sense position in that she sees ethnic segregation as a barrier to cohesion. She echoes sentiments in the policy literature that this separation breeds mistrust, fear and anger, so that certain neighbourhoods become no-go areas for people of particular ethnic backgrounds. Yet, her focus is not on the people in these neighbourhoods and their responsibility to integrate into a particular British way of life. Instead the focus is on the problem of spatial segregation; that the properties that people can afford (o
in the case of council tenants, the properties that are allocated) are
centrated in certain neighbourhoods, so there is little option of where
one can settle let alone opportunities to integrate into various areas.

Salim, Lydia and Linda embark on a similar conversation regarding cultural
sensitivity as a route to cohesion. Again, the conversation demonstrates
elements of common sense, alongside elements of contamination that may
lead to further problematisation. It also provides an example of how
individual voices can become lost within larger groups:

**Lydia:** Well, I had an issue in my daughter’s school, they’d actually,
some people saying, it’s really really racist, and actually when it all
came out it wasn’t. We had, um, a supply teacher come in that had
the full head gear on, and all the parents was in uproar. And when I
went in it was like well you know the supply teacher’s got the right,
really, to be in there. There weren’t really so much of a problem that
she was in there as a culture, but it was just the fact that she actually
frightened the kids because she had the full headgear on […] But I
understand that she got the right to go in dressed how she dresses,
but on the same time she was teaching kids that don’t really, of like
8 and 9, that don’t really understand that. You know, and it really
sort of caused a lot of tension…

**Salim:** She should have had more understanding that hold on a
minute, I’m working with 8/9 year olds, I need to interact with them.
And this is my own personal, ok, if I wish to choose to cover my
face fair enough, but I’m working here so maybe I should, you know,
relax that, that personal preference for work purposes, and for the
benefit of the kids that she’s working with – that’s my take on that
anyway, but I’ll probably be classes as a, um, some other branch of,
uh, fundamentalist, and I’m a Muslim!

**Linda:** … I think it’s a bit late for them to go backwards with that.
For example, when I go to Dubai, or when I go to Turkey, I’m
British, and I go into their country, I respect the rules of their
country. So if I wear a bikini in England, that’s fine, but if they want
me to cover myself up over there, that’s absolutely fine for me,
because I can respect their country and their culture. If Britain had
established that before, fair enough, but now this is as much their
home as ours now, it’s too late. You know, you can’t let us all come
over into these different countries, let us do what we want to do and
then tell us, it’s too late because then we’re going to feel like no,
we’ve got a right now (Birmingham).
Lydia begins by providing the example of the supply teacher in full Islamic dress. This example taps into a common sense understanding of cohesion and cultural sensitivity. The supply teacher is teaching in a British school and should understand the impact this may have on impressionable children, as Salim argues. However, according to Lydia, the teacher has the right to wear such outfits. Lydia presents herself as a lone voice against an orthodoxy that culminated with the parents in uproar. Yet the tension is not necessarily caused by the teacher’s clothing choices, but the lack of sensitivity regarding the potential effects such choices may have. Of course, it may be useful for children to come into contact with the teacher if they live in a multicultural area. It is Salim who feels able to say that perhaps the teacher made the wrong choice in going to school in full dress. This is perhaps because, as he points out, he is a Muslim. This debate highlights the contingent positions inherent in this issue. One can argue that both positions are equally legitimate, in which case neither argument can win out.

Linda’s argument takes this potential impasse, and in so doing helps contaminate the logic of assimilation and integration. Her argument, that it is too late to tell established groups how they should act, highlights how the discursive logics can destabilise attitudes and positions. Expecting well established groups to be more ‘British’ for example may ring hollow if these groups already feel British, or part of a composite culture. This also highlights the importance of the logics interacting, strengthening and legitimising one another, in order to maintain some resilience to such implicit questioning so that individuals and groups feel they can conform to
these logics on their own terms.

There is evidently much overlap between the ideas of community and of cohesion. The final concept, welfare, also contains these overlaps, and also helps develop attitudes favourable to common sense understandings of community and cohesion, as seen in the policy literature and the focus groups.

7.1.3. Welfare
Discussing the idea of welfare brought out many different yet intertwining threads of conversation. Its multifaceted nature however would generally be simplified to aid understanding, usually around key tropes. The immediate response to the question of welfare in Bradford provides an interesting start point:

Moderator: So if I just said the word ‘welfare’, what comes to mind?

Mo: NHS.

Jas: Well, a few things, it depends doesn’t it? Welfare, um, well obviously it refers to the benefit side of it, um, but also I suppose welfare in general, health wise, and that’s your area [ref: Khalida]. I think, for us, welfare as far as benefits and everything as a community, um, it saddens me because, um I think we’ve become so dependent, especially I suppose in the last decade. I mean if I go back to when I left school, not that long ago, twenty years plus [chuckle] I’ll say, um, I mean my father would not even dream of thinking about signing on or going to the job centre etcetera, it just wouldn’t be a done thing – not acceptable [...] Not the majority, but a lot have unfortunately become, where there’s estates going that way, have become very dependent on the benefit system and almost sometimes use that excuse even when they have the opportunity of work they won’t (Bradford).

Considering the discussions participants had around the notion of ‘community’, particularly in Bradford where a common theme was that it
could mean many things, the participants’ definition(s) of welfare in this group are relatively specific. Welfare is equated with the major institutions of state-administered welfare – the NHS, the benefits system – as opposed to more multifaceted understandings of welfare that may originate within community structures, as may be encouraged by Community Cohesion policy and more contemprotarily the Big Society. Jas makes an automatic connection in the above discussion that links with a common sense understanding of welfare propagated in the policy literature. He immediately associates welfare with benefits, and with dependency. This echoes a large proportion of New Labour’s welfare discourse, particularly after the publication of the Freud and Gregg reports.

Jas discusses the sadness he feels at the fact that people are now dependent on welfare, when people of his father’s generation would never dream of ‘signing on’. This emulates the moral argument legitimised by the logic of conditionality that encourages people to see those on welfare as less successful and/or as people who have made the wrong choices. This is juxtaposed with the connotation of dependency; that to be dependent is usually involuntary. The moral argument combined with this connotation helps legitimise the logic and the practice of conditionality in order to help people off benefits. In this respect, the logic of conditionality is evident in Jas’ understanding of welfare, and as such he draws upon the common sense understanding of welfare discussed in chapter five.

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75 Within the context of the politics of welfare however, ‘dependent’ is linked to moral underclass discourses (e.g. Dunn, 2014:5; Murray, 1996; Dean and Taylor-Gooby, 1992: 3-4).
However, alongside conforming to common sense understandings of welfare, there were also instances where some participants attempted to contaminate the discourse and problematise the logics:

**Moderator:** Some people say if you’re unwilling to work you shouldn’t get benefits. What do you think about that idea?

**Mo:** If you’re voluntarily unwilling to work then obviously they shouldn’t be [entitled to benefits] because they’re waiving their right. Because they’re able to work but they don’t want to work. Presumably they don’t want to claim the benefit – they shouldn’t be entitled to claim the benefit. Unless it’s involuntary incapacity they’re unable to work, which is different then, i.e. disability or whatever reason which prevents them from working, you can understand that.

**Amolika:** But the question is who would define unwilling? And the reason I’m thinking is, with all these welfare reforms we’ve all heard that actually women are the group who are probably going to suffer the most. Similarly working as well, if you think about it. So a woman may according to the system and the tests they put in for testing unwillingness, it may appear that she’s unwilling but if she’s been at home for twenty years looking after family […] you know, she may have even had a degree at some point, but if her life choices ended up so that she was um, she’s chief home maker and bottle washer, you know, who decides that she is unwilling because her unwillingness might come from complete lack of confidence […] But the personal choice element is if you, if you don’t want to work because you don’t want to work, then you should have the means to support yourself (Bradford).

Mo represents the common sense position most clearly in this conversation. He makes the straightforward and relatively unremarkable argument that if one is able to work, one has a responsibility to work. In this respect he taps into an element of the logic of rights and responsibilities that helps justify the logic of conditionality. Working for the majority of people is a choice, but also a responsibility. For a well-functioning society people must make the correct, responsible choice of going out to work. When combined with Jas’ position on deserving, the notion that being on welfare benefits is an
entirely rational choice is strengthened: people are dependent on benefits as their source of income (therefore fulfilling the responsibility to earn an income, but not the responsibility to work for it), and some people then use dependency as an excuse to not take a job offered to them. This goes against commonly held values in the citizenry, and so those who have calculated to live such a lifestyle should be punished by having their ‘right’ to benefits withdrawn.

Amolika however begins to contaminate such discourses through a simple line of questioning: who has the power? She makes the implicit point that unwillingness must be defined. Following from debates and analysis in chapter five, it is likely that unwillingness will be defined by policy makers, and then transmitted into public consciousness, as demonstrated with Jas and Mo. As her argument develops, however, she falls slightly closer to the common sense position. She has problematized the idea of unwillingness, but she rests on a common trope to sustain it. The idea that the most common reason someone (in this case a housewife and/or mother) does not want to work is a lack of confidence. The argument remains in generalities; she does not, for example, discuss the idea that someone may be unwilling to work in job x but is happy to take on job y. Indeed, the notion of a lack of confidence being a major barrier to work plays into all three political logics. It helps justify conditionality, in that some people may need more of a push, as well as a strict framework, to be helped back into work. It helps justify rights and responsibilities, in that it is the government’s responsibility to help such people back to work, and it is the responsibility of those people to
take up the offer of help. Finally, it facilitates the logic of assimilation and integration through the fact that this lack of confidence could lead to social exclusion, which is a barrier to cohesion. Therefore inserting this unconfident person into work increases her interaction with, therefore increasing her cohesion within, the local community.

When asked the same question, participants in Birmingham had a very similar conversation. Based on headlines handed round the participants, Salim, Linda and Lydia discuss some of the relationships between inequality, migration and welfare, linking multiple understandings and positions, whilst also drawing upon the discursive logics:

**Salim:** Do immigrants really come to Britain just for the benefits?  
**Linda:** I think that’s just stereotyping straight away [agreement from the table]

**Lydia:** I think Cameron should come and live for a couple of weeks one of the lives that, um, people on benefits do live. I think it’ll give him a bit of a shock to actually come down and, down to the real world. Um, and listen to people and find out what’s going on, on the ground. I think sometimes he just lives in fairy land.

**Moderator:** So you think there’s a big divide then between what people are saying and what the real experiences actually are?  
**Lydia:** Yeah.

**Linda:** Absolutely.

**Lydia:** I mean he probably hasn’t had to worry about where his next wage is going to come from, actually how he’s going to feed his children, and many of the families I support actually live on benefits, um, and that’s their only, and they’ve [voice recorder muffled]... feed the kids so they can eat. Um, there’s never been more, if you look at families now that actually go in to have food parcels and rely on them food parcels to feed their kids, um, has he ever had to put that, do that with his kids? I don’t think so. Has he ever had to go into a charity shop, and have second hand clothes? I don’t think so. So, I think, you know he does need to come down, and I would love him to come down to some of the places that I work and to live, live, you know, with some of these families and see what they actually
This conversation explicitly questions some of the foundations upon which the UK welfare system is built. Interestingly when asked a general question about welfare, participants in Birmingham answered much like those in Bradford. However, with a more specific focus the participants begin to question the power relationship between themselves, and the architects of policy. In this discussion the discursive logics are contaminated more strongly. They are implicitly questioned through the desire for Cameron to live on benefits. They essentially argue that developing a welfare system that has progressively tighter restrictions and conditions is easier when those developing it do not have to experience it. This chimes with the analysis in chapter five that those in the welfare system are in a diminished position of influence and do not in fact have the resources and wherewithal to empower themselves and improve their lives in a significant way. The participants contaminate the logic of rights and responsibilities by articulating the responsibility of Cameron to experience first-hand the life of someone on benefits. As discussed in chapter five, without a strong logic of rights and responsibilities, the justification for, and the logic of, conditionality is also weakened. This conversation, calling in to question the very measures of conditionality, attests to this.

Peter, Omid and Richard discuss the role and nature of welfare in a way that

\[76\] The focus groups took place after 2010, with Cameron as Prime Minister. This may have provided an easier focus for anger as opposed to New Labour considering the two parties’ traditional positions on welfare, although this cannot be proven from the evidence available in this thesis.

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also contaminates discourses and logics to an extent, whilst tying it into wider socio-economic concerns:

**Peter:** I think what all this stuff and all these headlines show is you were talking about value earlier. People have now placed more of a value – this is going to sound strange – more of a value on money, and making money for themselves than they do on people’s lives. So that’s why they’re cutting welfare for disabled people, they’re saving money, but it’s hurting these people. That’s why you’ve got all these people who are getting all this stuff taken away from them and not getting given all this stuff, because people care more about saving money and making money than they do about people’s lives.

**Omid:** Brother, can I just say something? Do you think they give a damn about the disabled and the poor and the weak? No.

**Peter:** But this is the point, this is the point, they place more of a value...

[...]

**Peter:** What I’ve got, what I’ve got because I’ve worked for this and they haven’t got that because they don’t deserve it, they haven’t worked for it, they haven’t earned it. And that’s a big problem because I think because if people come from the mindset of if well you haven’t got it because you don’t want, that’s not true for fair enough there are some people who go I don’t want a job, I’ll get benefits I don’t want a job, but for the majority of people who don’t have support, and it’s not through anything they haven’t done themselves. It’s just people don’t care.

**Richard:** Or they don’t understand the support’s there (Birmingham).

In this conversation Peter questions the intentions behind various welfare reforms. He directly contaminates dominant discourses on welfare and integration through questioning the purpose of welfare initiatives. Whereas New Labour argued that, for example, increasing programmes of conditionality would empower people and help integrate them into wider society, therefore increasing cohesion, the legacy of these policies (according to Peter) is to devalue people’s wellbeing in the pursuit of saving
money. This conforms to the argument that New Labour aimed to develop a situation whereby flexibility and competitiveness based on ‘affordable’ labour was key (e.g. Gray, 1998; Jessop, 2003). Omid puts this into more straightforward language, accusing the government of not giving ‘a damn about the disabled and the poor and the weak’. Peter moves on to invoke discourses associated with the logic of conditionality, particularly discourses surrounding deserving. He questions the notion that those who do not have everything they desire simply haven’t worked hard enough for it. Through arguing that for the majority of people, it is because the right kind of support is not available, he implicitly blames the lack of cohesion and community spirit for this situation. He argues that the majority of people do not have the support, through no fault of their own. The major problem is that others do not care.

A discourse of entitlement and deserving helps keep barriers between those designated as deserving and undeserving, as illustrated in chapter five when discussing conditionality. This is because those with more resources feel that they have earned them without help, and so those on benefits should not receive (excessive) help either. By invoking discourses and logics in such a way, Peter can be seen to be directly contaminating the discourse. Richard then employs normative grammar, invoking a statement that works in a similar way to ‘such questions as “What did you mean to say?”’, “What do you mean?”’, “Make yourself clearer”, etc.’ (Gramsci, 1985: 180). He returns the conversation to ground more concurrent with common sense understandings of cohesion and welfare through asserting that instead of
there being a systemic problem concerning value and priorities, people become trapped on benefits because ‘they don’t understand the support that’s there’.

This section has explored how the three political logics discussed in chapter five influence participants’ understandings of community, cohesion and welfare, as well as their positions in relation to these concepts. It has highlighted that although there were elements of contamination in both sites that varied in their strength, there was also plenty of instances where participants relied on a common sense understanding of these issues. In some cases participants regulated themselves, and in other cases one participant would regulate another.

Regardless, this highlights two things: firstly, that one can see the influence of the political logics in everyday discussion, and; secondly, that participants were able to contaminate discourses and subvert logics, even if this was not a conscious aim. A final point of interest is in the similarities and differences in the understanding of the concepts. Community and cohesion were more likely to be interpreted differently in the two sites, with participants drawing upon the logics in various ways to legitimise their position (or indeed legitimising the logics through their position). Understandings of, and attitudes towards, welfare however seemed to be more uniform across the two sites. This highlights the important role the social logic of welfare plays in constructing and legitimising a project of cohesion, particularly regarding the (re)production of the political logic of conditionality.
The next section takes these positions and conceptions and explores the extent to which one can talk of a political project of cohesion that incorporates elements of welfare reform and Community Cohesion, and whether or not this project can be seen as hegemonic.

7.2. The plausibility of cohesion as a political and hegemonic project

This section takes the discussions from the two sites from chapter six and the discussions of how the logics influence participants’ understanding of community, cohesion and welfare in order to explore whether, and the extent to which, one can conceive of cohesion discursively as a hegemonic project. This is based on the common sense positions of the participants, as well as the contamination of the discourses and logics that make holding such positions possible. This section investigates these questions using Bradford and Birmingham as case studies, drawing out the strengths of the political logics and their susceptibility for contamination. This is after a recap of how the political logics interlink and interact, in order to understand their relative strengths and how they reproduce a common sense understanding of cohesion and welfare.

The logic of rights and responsibilities can be seen to underpin a project of cohesion, in that how people conceive of their rights and, more importantly in this case, their responsibilities underlines their basic attitudes to the requirements and rules associated with the other two logics. The logic of conditionality provides the sanctions if people do not meet their responsibilities, which has a knock-on effect of diminishing the amount of rights they are entitled to realise. Reciprocally, the logic of conditionality...
cannot function unless people understand and accept a specific configuration of rights and responsibilities. Finally, the logic of assimilation and integration draws upon the prioritisaiton of responsibilities over rights to prioritise assimilation over integration; in other words, using a mixture of coercion and encouragement so that people conform to a particular set of rights and responsibilities, which is actioned through the process of conditionality. With this discursive mesh in mind, one can now explore its specific operation within the contexts of Bradford and Birmingham.

7.2.1. Bradford
As discussed in section one, participants in Bradford were able to contaminate a number of discourses and therefore problematize the political logics. However, it is also the case that participants also drew upon, and in some cases relied upon, common sense understandings of key concepts. All three logics can be identified through the course of the discussions in Bradford, although the extent to which each is drawn upon differs.

The logic of conditionality was utilised most prominently when discussing issues surrounding welfare. This is not surprising, considering that in the policy literature conditionality is most explicitly associated with welfare reform. Within such discussions, the logic was strong, as shown by the participants’ adherence to common arguments regarding welfare dependency. The logic was undermined a little when discussing whether or not certain people deserved to receive unemployment benefit, for example. However, the debates in this area remained largely within the frame of the logic. This suggests that the ‘rules’ of the logic are sufficiently flexible to
allow a small level of disagreement or dissent from the usual tropes concerning welfare. In this respect, it may have provided participants with enough room discursively to allow them to consider their position a result of rational deliberation, which could lead to the development of spontaneous consent.

As also may be expected, it was more difficult to find clear-cut uses of the logic of conditionality when discussing cohesion or community. As argued in chapter five, this is likely because its use within the cohesion literature by necessity is more subtle and informal. It also relies much more on integrating with other logics, such as the logic of rights and responsibilities. Indeed, the clearest use of the logic of conditionality outside of welfare for participants in Bradford still concerns economic issues, particularly regarding unfair resource allocation. This suggests that on the surface the logic of conditionality plays a fairly specific role within the discursive mesh, but that the implications of the logic stretch further as shown in how it integrates and interacts with the other logics.

Use of the logic of rights and responsibilities was evident throughout the Bradford focus groups. It was key in the participants’ understanding of community, cohesion and welfare, and therefore played a large role in connecting these areas. As argued in chapter five, participants rarely (if ever) speak of rights, unless it is to explain why and when rights are waived. Instead, participants rely heavily on the notion of responsibilities when discussing their position(s) within their community and within society as a whole. Uses were multifaceted: people have a responsibility to look for
work, to get to know their neighbours, to be respectful of others, to integrate with the ‘host’ community, and so on. Conversely, because of the wide frame of this logic participants were also able to contaminate it more frequently. For example, local and national government had a responsibility to allow those in Bradford to direct their own affairs, the media had a responsibility to report news fairly, and there was a shared responsibility to incorporate a multitude of values into society. However, there are two elements implicit within this contamination. Firstly, the arguments are still framed as responsibilities; only the focus of these responsibilities has changed. Secondly, if one were to equate the responsibilities of more influential agents as rights for those in diminished positions of influence, the strong discursive link between rights and responsibilities is not broken. In that respect the debate can easily be brought back on to the terrain of responsibilities over rights.

The logic of assimilation and integration was most visible in discussions regarding community and cohesion, but variations on the traditional understanding of the concepts that constitute the logic could be seen within discussions on welfare. As in the policy literature, participants did not talk of assimilation, but integration. However, what was particularly noticeable in Bradford was how the participants generally spoke from a diminished position of influence. Jas’ proclamation that his ‘community’ can be more racist than the ‘host’ community, and does not do enough to integrate speaks to this. Ali’s and Paul’s conversation regarding the stability of neighbourhoods, which echoes sentiments that existing communities should
be supported whilst diverse communities are brought together, also highlights the strength of the logic of assimilation and integration, in that it is understood as a reasonable position to advocate. The logic was contaminated at times, but not to the extent of the other logics. In general, this contamination was along the lines of questioning methods of integration for particular groups, such as Muslims. The contamination of this logic usually centred on highlighting power inequalities, such as through Azra’s feelings that ‘sometimes you’re in situations where people will make you think about you’.

Regarding welfare, there were some examples of the logic of assimilation and integration being used. In general, they focused on the integrative effects of employment, echoing the policy literature, although this was questioned particularly by the idea that when most people have returned from work there is no one around to integrate with. The logic is contaminated to an extent, for example when participants questioned the notion of being unwilling to work. However, the contamination remained within the broader frame of accepted discourses that in fact helped legitimise conditionality, in that unwillingness to work may simply be an issue of a lack in confidence, which integration into the workplace would help.

The overall picture in Bradford is of fairly resilient political logics. Furthermore, one can see the interaction of these logics to a certain extent, as described at the beginning of section 2. The ease with which participants reproduce dominant discourses and the extent to which they keep debate
within the general frames of the three logics – even when these logics are being contaminated – suggests that overall, participants do construct a common sense understanding of community, cohesion and welfare based on the discursive rules transmitted by the logics. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the participants can and do find room to move within these discursive frames, allowing for a sense of agency and rationality regarding the development of the participants’ attitudes towards key issues. Through this, participants can feel a sense of ownership of the positions; that they have come to these positions entirely on their own, hence strengthening the position. Other positions are not really considered in a deep way, and participants generally fall back into established ways of thinking on the issues, which suggests that there is only one rational position that has been reached through deliberation, as opposed to multiple coexisting positions. However, this is not enough on its own to successfully argue that the idea of a hegemonic project of cohesion, which incorporates elements of Community Cohesion and welfare reform, is more plausible. The next subsection therefore examines the positions of the participants in Birmingham in relation to the common sense position.

7.2.2. Birmingham

Much like in Bradford, participants in Birmingham were able to contaminate discourses and problematize logics, but also generally stayed within the broad discursive frames allowed by the logics. In some cases, it could be argued that the contamination of discourse in Birmingham was taken further; this is possibly due to the wider focus participants had on issues such as ethnicity. Again, all three logics can be identified within the
various discussions that took place in the Birmingham focus groups.

As in Bradford, the logic of conditionality could be seen most prominently in discussions concerning welfare. This logic had perhaps slightly less hold on participants in Birmingham, although it was not weak enough to be inconsequential. Individual participants, such as Peter, questioned the discourses associated with the logic quite strongly, for example questioning the motives behind increasing conditionality and lower benefit levels. There was a higher instance in this site of other participants keeping the conversation within the frame of the logic, as Richard did with Peter when he reiterated the policy line that people do not understand the support that is available, rather than there being a problem with the support itself. Others contaminated discourses related to the logic of conditionality through pointed anger, such as through calls for Cameron to live on benefits in order to understand the lives of people in that situation. Although heavily problematized regarding welfare, the logic of conditionality was hard to see when discussing community and cohesion. Rather, its influence was felt in relation to the logic of rights and responsibilities and the logic of assimilation and integration.

The logic of rights and responsibilities was the most prominent and most widespread logic in Birmingham, which correlates with experiences in Bradford. Again, although in Birmingham there were many occasions where the logics influenced debate, the logic of rights and responsibilities was questioned more strongly than in Bradford. This was often placed within the context of unequal power relations; participants felt that it was difficult to
empower oneself if they were not in a position to do so, and that there was a responsibility for all, and particularly local government, to help all. However, within this contamination participants still adopt common sense positions. Linda, for example adopts a common sense position through arguing that ethnic segregation damages cohesion, and that there is therefore a responsibility to integrate. However, within this position the focus is on spatial and systemic inequalities, rather than the need to conform to a ‘British’ set of values. Again, this highlights the necessary room for manoeuvre within a syncretic common sense, so that multiple positions and attitudes can be maintained within a wider set of values.

Regarding welfare, participants in Birmingham were more likely to highlight the responsibilities of local and national government to support those who are vulnerable. Again, participants would actively contaminate the discourses related to welfare, as well as the logic of rights and responsibilities. However, as in Bradford, participants rarely talked of rights or made sense of debates from a rights-orientated position. This suggests that even when being contaminated, the logic of rights and responsibilities maintains its resilience, because of the implicit connection between rights and responsibilities, and the implicit prioritisation of responsibilities over rights.

The logic of assimilation and integration was seen most clearly in discussions concerning cohesion and community, echoing the Bradford focus groups. Again, participants did not frame discussions in terms of assimilation, but integration. It was perhaps the logic that maintained most
resilience in the discussions in Birmingham. Omid conforms heavily to the rules within the logic, for example, highlighting what he saw as a problem of isolation that breeds fear and mistrust between groups. The solution for Omid was to get the various groups to integrate. He shows awareness of other positions within this argument (such as ‘the depression factor’), but remains clearly within the dominant discourses found in the policy literature. The main way the logic was contaminated in Birmingham was through problematizing power relations. Again, one can draw upon Lydia’s argument that ‘you get your power people within a community’ who want to control matters, which can impact on the extent to which, and how effectively, people can integrate with one another.

Perhaps in one of the most powerful instances of contamination, Linda argues that it is too late to get various communities to adhere to particular British values; because they have been resident in the UK for so long, their way of life now already takes place within a British context. This is also perhaps the closest the participants come to invoking a prioritisation of rights, in that it is now the right of various communities to uphold their cultural practices, considering the length of time they have been doing this in the UK with relatively little interference.

The overall picture in Birmingham is perhaps characterised by a stronger feeling of defiance. There were more instances of discourses and logics being contaminated within Birmingham, with these contaminations generally being stronger than in Bradford. That being said, participants in Birmingham are certainly not free from the common sense position
promoted by the discursive mesh of political logics. Indeed, by contaminating them, participants still draw upon the logics to make sense of the issues being discussed, and in this way the foundation of their understanding remains within the frame of the common sense position as analysed in chapter five.

As with discussions in Bradford, the ability for participants to question discourses and concepts, and to subvert or problematize logics, helps legitimise the overall discursive mesh through developing spontaneous consent. It is certainly the case that participants in Bradford and Birmingham do not see eye to eye on every subject. However, they make sense of their experiences and positions via common discourses and themes, such as deserving and undeserving, entitlement, integration, responsibilities, and misunderstanding and miscommunication. The strength of the common sense position in Birmingham can be found in its arguably more subtle nature, so that participants feel a larger sense of defiance without it being too strong that it actually challenges the established order.

Taking together the overviews of how the logics are seen to operate in Bradford and Birmingham, it seems that the two sites share a number of similarities regarding how they make sense of key concepts such as community, cohesion and welfare, even though there are some differences in the specific ways participants reacted to the logics. This, combined with the analysis in chapter five, suggests that it is plausible that a political project of cohesion has been created, which retains a sense of universalism whilst accounting for some local differences. Considering participants’
framing of, and sometimes reliance on, common sense conceptions and debates, it is also possible to understand this project as hegemonic, at least discursively. As a hegemonic project, it draws upon common threads in Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy (as demonstrated in chapter five), whilst constructing a set of discursive rules and structures around these threads (e.g. normative grammars, political and social logics, and ‘common sense’). Discursively, these threads hinge on the issues of segregation (both ethnic and socio-economic) and one’s responsibility to the community, which allows other strategies such as an increase of conditionality to be legitimised and developed further.

This section has explored the extent to which the political logics of conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration affect participants’ everyday discussions regarding cohesion and welfare. It has also explored whether or not one can conceive of a political project of cohesion that can be understood as hegemonic. Drawing upon discussions in section one, this section has argued that one can indeed think of cohesion as a political project that, at least in discursive terms, can be considered hegemonic. This is because of participants’ reliance on common sense understandings of cohesion and welfare, which are used to make sense of these concepts in relation to participants’ everyday lives. However, although the section argues that it is plausible, it cannot comment definitively on its status beyond the discursive. This would require further empirical research that looks explicitly beyond the discursive elements of policy and everyday discussion.

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Conclusion

Through engaging with an exploration of the use of political logics in everyday discussion concerning cohesion and welfare, this chapter has investigated the plausibility of there being a political project of cohesion that in the right circumstances can be thought of as hegemonic.

The chapter has found that participants do draw upon the political logics analysed in chapter five to make sense of the key concepts of community, cohesion and welfare, and that through their engagement with the logics, the participants help construct and reproduce a common sense understanding of cohesion. Furthermore the use of these logics and common sense positions across policy areas and across research sites suggests that there may be some plausibility in understanding cohesion as a political and hegemonic project.

It perpetuates the political logics to populate the concepts of cohesion and welfare with particular meanings and purpose, which in turn leads to the construction of cohesion as a political project, incorporating these two policy areas. The participants have in general accepted and legitimised this project through a process of contamination and deliberation that eventually leads to the participants in the two sites providing spontaneous consent to the overall programme, if not some of the specifics. It is this process that helps give the participants a feeling of ownership and which ultimately strengthens the hegemonic elements of the project.

The arguments in this chapter link to the thesis’ main arguments in that the construction of a common sense approach to, and understanding of,
cohesion enables the development of such a specific approach to unrest in the UK. Furthermore, it contributes to the argument that although there are a number of contradictions and tensions within the project (argued in chapter five) as befits a hegemonic project, the discursive mesh of logics and its use in discussions by participants help present the project as largely unproblematic. It has attempted to journey further into the notion that the disjuncture between language and aims and perhaps, to a lesser extent, state and citizen is possibly a result of a series of contradictory messages and problematic combinations, which can be seen through the selective and/or unconscious use of language, that then needed to be smoothed out in order to function. The development of a hegemonic project may be a result of the need to smooth out implicit contradictions found within and between New Labour’s Community Cohesion and welfare reform policies.

The thesis now turns to the concluding chapter, which contains a summary of the arguments of the individual chapters, as well as how they engage with one another in order to contribute to the thesis’ main arguments.
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has engaged with New Labour’s development of Community Cohesion and welfare reform policy since 2001. It has argued that the language presented in cohesion and welfare policy documents differed to the actual aims of policy. This pointed to (or was a result of) deeper processes of coercion and consent, designed to create citizens amenable to an appropriate ideology of competition, responsibility and self-sufficiency. Discourse found in policy has been contrasted with everyday narratives to draw out this disjuncture, but also to show elements of dissent from dominant discourses, as well as the multiple ways in which the everyday narratives conform to a series of discursive logics, lessening the impact of this disjuncture.

It has examined Community Cohesion policy and welfare reform policy between 2001 and 2010, contextualised by a historical overview of New Labour’s policy trajectory (chapter one) and academic debates on citizenship, welfare and cohesion (chapter four). What the policies promised was individual and group empowerment, both socio-culturally and socio-economically, but in reality individuals and groups were further responsibilised and encouraged to conform to a specific cultural and economic ‘Britishness’ (chapter five). This was strengthened through hegemonic discourses and discursive logics, which helped construct a political project of cohesion that utilised these policy frameworks. However notwithstanding their strength, these hegemonic discourses are susceptible to contamination (chapters six and seven).
These claims were explored and sustained through utilising critical discourse analysis and focus groups. The critical discourse analysis focused on 10 years of policy concerned with Community Cohesion and welfare reform, and examined discursive logics and normative grammars found in the documents. The focus groups subjected the findings of the discourse analysis to a plausibility probe, in which through discussion with people in areas affected by both Community Cohesion concerns and issues related to welfare reform brought out whether or not, and the extent to which, discourses found in policy were also found in everyday narratives and whether or not they could be seen at all to be hegemonic.

As such, the thesis contributes to literatures concerned with social and Community Cohesion, and their intersection with wider issues of citizenship and welfare. Furthermore, it contributes to discursive studies of New Labour’s policy and legacy. It provides a more systematic joined up analysis of the influence of discourse and the importance of understanding language use in policy and its wider influence, but also of examining welfare and cohesion in conjunction, building upon the already substantial separate literatures on the two subjects, and drawing upon the existing social investment state literature.

A final contribution is through an examination of the assumed power relations inherent within discourses and language structure found in the policies and in selected citizens’ everyday narratives. The use of a Gramscian analytical frame, when combined with discourse analysis, provides a method of understanding and exploring language and power, as
well as the possibility of hegemonic discourses and by extension the construction of a hegemonic project that legitimises and encourages (through coercion and consent) people to conform to a specific notion of what it is to be a ‘good’ citizen. The interrelation of discourses and logics develops a ‘common sense’ conception of cohesion that contributes to the creation of a hegemonic culture of cohesion.

**Implications of the findings**
The main findings outlined above and discussed in detail throughout the thesis bring into focus a multitude of implications, which are concerned with empirical, analytical and methodological issues, limitations of the study as a whole, and considerations for future work. The aim of this section is to deal with these issues in order to provide a deeper scholarly context for the preceding work. In doing so, the section will also provide further discussion regarding the thesis’ overall contributions.

**Implications of the thesis’ arguments**
The main arguments and findings of the thesis throw up a number of implications that require further discussion. The first of these involves the role of discourse in influencing and legitimising a focus on ethnic over socio-economic concerns regarding cohesion. As discussed in the introduction and early chapters, one can see an ethnicisation of language in New Labour’s policy (e.g. Blackledge, 2006), which obscures other important elements of cohesion (such as inequality) (Ratcliffe, 2012). This is, the thesis argues, not least down to the discursive focus of ‘communities’ in the cohesion policy literature, as well as the original focus of

Alongside this, New Labour developed a wide-ranging and comprehensive system of welfare reforms focused on promoting integration, particularly via paid work (e.g. Hulse and Stone, 2007: 114; DWP, 2006: 2). In this sense, there was still a focus on socio-economic elements of cohesion, particularly considering the influence of social investment (e.g. Lister, 2003) and asset-based (e.g. Finlayson, 2009) models in the development of UK welfare. However, this focus in itself provides legitimacy to the overly ethnic and cultural focus on race relations in Community Cohesion policy, because the socio-economic elements of cohesion and integration have been taken up (albeit perhaps not as comprehensively as they could be) within the welfare framework. Furthermore, considering that welfare in the UK is seen as a safety net that only some may access, the focus on integration (and by extension, cohesion) only impacts on certain sectors of society. This, as the thesis discusses, throws into question the specific focus on ethnicity in the cohesion framework.

Underpinning the discursive processes of legitimisation is the mesh of social and political logics. The argument that the three political logics focused upon – conditionality, rights and responsibilities, and assimilation and integration – form a resilient discursive mesh raises implications regarding the creation of a strong discursive framework that effectively legitimises and strengthens particular approaches to cohesion, integration and welfare. Specifically, it is this mesh that provides the fertile ground for the
development of ‘common sense’, which engenders a sense that New Labour’s approach to cohesion (in terms of focusing on ethnicity, and providing an implicit focus on socio-economic problems, mainly through welfare) is in fact the only (or only sensible) option. Its development therefore contributes to the legitimisation of this specificity.

It is the focus groups that suggest this argument is at least plausible, in that the common sense approach to cohesion and welfare can be seen in participants’ everyday narratives. Participants utilise elements of the three political logics to make sense of the key concepts of community, cohesion and welfare, which influences their understandings of the concepts so that they are more or less in line with the discourses found in policy. The evidence of dissent from these positions in places however suggests that these positions are not immutable. In fact, this dissent helps highlight the syncretic nature of common sense, and the contamination of discourses provides enough intellectual movement so that participants feel a sense of agency over their own positions on these subjects.

The significance of the specificity (in terms of the traditions it draws upon) in New Labour’s approach to welfare and cohesion contrasts to an extent with what one may expect to see from engaging with the existing literature(s) on the subject. For example, an engagement with literatures on citizenship and welfare outline a number of tensions and contradictions that could appear when certain elements of different traditions are combined. In the case of New Labour, this is the reliance on communitarian tenets (such as the importance of the prior community) within a strongly embedded liberal
political and social tradition that prioritises above all the rights and freedom of the individual (Marquand 1988). Hence Ryner’s argument that such a political project would result in citizens being faced with irreconcilable responsibilities alongside developing potentially irreconcilable ambitions (Ryner, 2002: 18). Yet Hall’s (1998) and Ryner’s arguments, that in order to sustain this New Labour engineered itself to appeal to all sectors and to produce a political culture in which all combinations were possible, highlights the utility of exploring further the roles of discourse, logics and common sense in legitimising and developing further a specific approach to cohesion, aimed at specific social, cultural and economic groups, that nevertheless presented itself as universal.

Implicit to the importance accorded to discourse, logics and common sense in the thesis is the role and composition of particular power relations, particularly ones that are constructed through tools of language such as normative grammars. Their importance is elevated through one of the main claims of the thesis – that New Labour policy was presented as empowering for all individuals and groups, but in reality was top-down, responsibilising, and coerced individuals and groups into conforming to a particular social and political culture. In order for such a framework not to succumb to potentially destabilising and unsustainable tensions and contradictions, it needs to sustain a high position of influence over those it intends to influence, whilst providing those concerned with a feeling of empowerment so that they provide their consent relatively freely (notwithstanding challenges and contamination discussed in chapters six and seven). This provides some of the rationale for focusing on community as 'a new plane or
surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualised and administered' (Rose, 1996: 331), which in turn provides ‘an appropriate ideology, i.e. a set of normative and cultural orientations, to make people more willing to accept and support the socio-economic adjustment efforts in the name of global competitiveness’ (Bieling, 2003: 66).

The focus on power relations and the construction of hegemonic discourses brings into light a further implication of the work in the thesis. In order to stabilise syncretic understandings of phenomena and a multitude of discourses that however strong are open to contamination, there is a necessary ‘attempt to get to grips with social forces that go beyond the merely conjunctural, and to grasp and develop a narrative around the changing nature of modernity itself, as befits a hegemonic project’ (Leggett, 2009: 140). In adopting the Third Way, New Labour made a number of claims and assumptions about modernity (Leggett, 2009: 140). Regardless of their truth within and beyond certain circles, these assumptions and arguments needed to be justified, sustained and legitimised within the wider population. This could be achieved through developing a common sense position, which intellectuals organise and present, so that it is a representation of a particular class’ worldview (Ives, 2005: 74-75).

This involves developing shared and implicit assumptions across policy areas, so that even without a specific shared focus as such, various elements work together to achieve shared aims. This is what the thesis argues happened between welfare and cohesion policy under New Labour.
Although this may not be entirely new (for example, the social investment literature suggests a focus on cohesion for welfare provision to an extent), the thesis’ focus on discursive links adds some extra value. Indeed, it is the analysis of the discursive that suggests that perhaps the connections between these aims are much deeper and act in tandem to achieve a culture change in the British population. The position remains syncretic, in that it is an amalgam of multiple and sometimes conflicting positions, but this syncretism is made less of an issue through the interaction of the discursive logics, which influence how people make sense of and operationalise particular concepts.

However, it is in this broader sense that one may point to a ‘project’ of cohesion – a discursive and practiced framework that necessitates a particular kind of behaviour and outlook. One that can be used as a hermeneutic device to understand the interaction of welfare and cohesion policy beyond their more mechanical elements, as well as providing a way to understand how the two areas play off one another in participant’s everyday narratives and understandings of community, cohesion and welfare.

Of course, these implications arise from how the thesis operationalises the Gramscian analytical frame, and the use of CDA and focus groups, as well as the analysis that stems from their use. It is therefore important to explore and discuss any limitations that stem from using these approaches and positions, and their combination.
Limitations of the work

As with all research a number of limitations can be identified within the thesis, which touches upon the methodological and analytical approach taken and the findings themselves. A consideration of some of the limitations of this study may provide avenues for future research.

A limitation connected with the study itself can be seen in the combination of approaches to the research, namely the use of focus groups as a plausibility probe of the arguments set out in the discourse analysis. As it stands, this aspect of the research provides some interesting material regarding the prevalence and relative strength of a number of discourses and logics in selected specific areas of the UK. However, this could be strengthened through undertaking extra focus groups, or perhaps through running a series of more in-depth one on one interviews with a number of participants, in order to probe further why they hold certain views. This would assist in the further exploration of the notion that discourses, logics and normative grammars are found in everyday narratives, which strengthen the rationale behind government policies. Furthermore, if expanded the qualitative fieldwork could also provide more substance to the Gramscian position in the thesis, in that issues surrounding common sense and particularly hegemony could be explored in more detail. It has been noted that an implication of the position taken in the thesis is that the notion of a hegemonic project could be developed further so that it is furnished with a little more clarity; the extension of the fieldwork aspect of the thesis could contribute to this.

Another way of contributing to this aspect, and to contributing to the
understanding of how discourse and logics are transmitted from policy to populace would be through examining the role of intermediaries, such as the media. This is done to a small extent in the focus groups (in that participants discuss local media, and newspaper articles are used as prompts in discussion), but in future it would be useful to undertake a more systematic exploration, perhaps utilising Fairclough’s concept of genre chains – ‘relatively durable and institutionalised relationships between genres characterised by particular principles of recontextualisation and transformation (Fairclough, 2013: 293) – to understand better the transmission and appropriation of discourse. It would be particularly useful, considering the Gramscian position taken in the thesis, to draw upon Stuart Hall’s work of encoding and decoding (Hall, 1973) to frame an understanding of the development, transmission and appropriation of discourse.

The thesis could address further whether or not the construction of a hegemonic project was intentional. The use of the term ‘political project’ when discussing the development and trajectory of policy implies intent. However, the focus on the development, reproduction, transmission and contamination of discourses, and the potential for these discourses to become hegemonic provides some ambiguity regarding whether or not there was a conscious effort on the part of New Labour to actually construct a hegemonic project. Further work could place this question more centrally, with the methods geared more specifically to answering this question. Based on the arguments and material in this thesis, one can say that the discourses were hegemonic, and to an extent this is because of decisions made by New
Labour whilst in power, but this does not necessarily point to a concerted effort to engage in what Gramsci calls the ‘war of position’ (see footnote 21 on page 67). It may simply be the case that New Labour sincerely intended to improve race relations and cohesion in the UK, whilst also tackling issues of unemployment and training in order to equip people to compete in the knowledge economy. Regardless of intent, however, one can still point to strong discourses and logics and the construction of a top-down and controlling policy framework presented as empowering. One particularly useful approach to exploring this contention further is through an engagement with Jessop’s concept of strategic co-ordination. According to Jessop, the state’s ‘powers (in the plural) are activated through changing sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state apparatus in specific conjunctures. If an overall strategic line is ever discernible in the exercise of these powers, it results from strategic coordination enabled by the selectivity of the state system and the organizational role of parallel power networks that cross-cut and unify its formal structures’ (Jessop, 2012: 8). In other words, state apparatuses produce outcomes through a range of conscious decisions, which may result in the development of an overall situation. If there is a general strategic line, in which different government departments (for example) take similar positions, it is likely that there will be a unified and coherent outcome across the board, to an extent. Strategic coordination, in this sense, could lead to the development of a hegemonic project without that project in its entirety actually being the conscious aim (although its syncretic components will, more or less, have been intended).

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Another limitation is that the Gramscian position is just one position that could be taken when exploring New Labour’s approach to cohesion and welfare. Although the use of this approach has been qualified in the analytical framework and the methodology, there are of course multiple other positions one could take, drawing upon Foucault perhaps, or the adoption of new institutionalism, focusing on institutional roles and structures more than simply the linguistic and discursive structures and transmissions of the policies the institutions produced.

This may have also helped avoid a related limitation with the study. The nature of hegemony and common sense, particularly when related to discourse, can make it hard to draw definitive conclusions on a subject; one must accept that the conclusions drawn are contingent on the approach taken in the analysis. However, this does not necessarily need to be seen as a limitation as such, as the thesis still provides an exploration and critique of New Labour’s response to what it saw as social unrest, fragmentation and a lack of solidarity (or, more correctly, community).

A number of more specific limitations can also be identified. One example is that of site selection for the focus groups. Bradford proved somewhat difficult to recruit in, presumably because of the high attention the town has experienced since the riots of 2001. This was emphasised by some of the participants’ responses: Amolika asserting that people in Bradford are ‘ok’ but ‘they don’t believe us’ and Paul speaking directly to myself as the moderator to say that Bradford is a goldfish bowl, where people come to observe people, and to ‘target things’. It may have been easier to recruit in a
similarly diverse town, but which has not had as much focus placed upon it. Although Birmingham has been the host to a number of disturbances over the years, there seemed to be many more willing participants in Aston than in Manningham in Bradford. The areas face a lot of the same problems, though Aston has not been focused on in the same way, particularly nationally.

One can also identify two limitations with the Critical Discourse Analysis. Firstly, there were far more documents published on cohesion and welfare than could have been analysed by one person. This means that although the documents eventually selected were done so to provide an overview of the entire decade, in order to hopefully capture elements of development, it still only provides a snapshot, rather than a comprehensive analysis of New Labour’s policy programme. Although this could not have been addressed entirely in a PhD thesis, one potential way to partially address the situation could have been to undertake a more general content analysis of a larger number of documents in the first instance, looking for key words and so on, followed by a more in-depth discourse analysis on selected documents.

Secondly, the methodology highlighted as a virtue the argument that Critical Discourse Analysis is more of an approach than a method (Van Dijk, 2004: 352), which allows it conceptual flexibility and affords the chance to incorporate the work of many scholars (Van Dijk, 2002: 95). However, this flexibility may sometimes sacrifice providing an entirely systematic approach. For example, the methodology points out that the study utilises work on discourse from Fairclough, Wodak, Van Dijk and Howarth, all of whom share similarities but also have differences in their approaches.
may provide a slightly more tied-together analysis to prioritise one scholar. In this case, Fairclough may have been the obvious choice, considering his previous work on New Labour and discourse. However, in doing this, the thesis may have lost some of its ability to be more wide-ranging and incorporate positions that hopefully increase an understanding of the interrelated roles of cohesion and welfare in influencing British political culture, or the overarching assumptions about the rights and responsibilities of citizen and state.

The implications of the study and the limitations provide further avenues to explore the key issues brought up in the thesis. In this way they point to a number of potential opportunities to develop further work based on these findings, implications and limitations.

**Opportunities for further work**
Through discussion of the thesis’ implications and limitations, one can identify a number of avenues in which to develop further work, both as a result of or directly related to the thesis. These opportunities range from contributing to methodological debates to undertaking further empirical studies.

Firstly, it would be of benefit to the thesis to expand the fieldwork. As discussed earlier, a significantly larger amount of depth could be achieved if more focus groups were undertaken, for example. This could take the form of a further study that is designed to directly scrutinise the findings of the thesis. For example, a study could be designed that investigates the extent the discourses and logics are used in more homogeneous and/or wealthy
communities, in order to understand better the extent to which language targets particular groups. Alternatively a study could be devised that makes use of expert interviews such as policy-makers to examine whether or not they use such discourses, or to understand better the rationale behind developing such policy.

This could possibly be done using the Lipsky’s concept of ‘street-level bureaucracy’; the idea that it is people on the front line of welfare (and in this context, cohesion) services who become the face of the ‘system’ (Lipsky, 1980; see also Fletcher, 2011). It would certainly be interesting to understand if, and how, discourses are taken on board, used, and even if they are contaminated at this level.

A related opportunity would be to carry out further discourse analysis that focuses on the role of the media as the intermediary between state and citizen, in terms of transmitting, packaging and presenting discourses to the public. This could be undertaken with a range of theoretical positions in mind; if one were to stick with the Gramscian approach, Stuart Hall’s work on the media would be a useful starting point (e.g. Hall, 1973).

The second major opportunity for further work lies in expanding the scope of the work. For example, this thesis deals with a specific time period and specific locations in a specific country. This could be expanded in a couple of ways. One could, for example, undertake a study of the current government’s approach to integration and welfare, looking to see whether or not the same or similar discourses are used, and if so the extent to which they are. This would be particularly interesting, considering that the focus
groups took place after New Labour left office, and so reference the Coalition government. A second option would be to design a study that is more European in scope. For example, how do different kinds of welfare state approach issues of cohesion and integration? Considering a trend towards liberalising welfare support across Europe (e.g. Gualmini and Hopkin, 2012), can one observe similar discourses across certain European states? How do national policy discourses differ or chime with EU-level policy? This would provide an interesting comparative angle, and put the UK case into a wider socio-political and geo-political context, particularly considering various ways in which European states have dealt with the recent financial crisis (e.g. Jackson, 2009).

A final opportunity for further work lies in the methodological and analytical approach of the thesis. Although Gramsci worked on linguistics (Ives, 2005), and critical discourse analysts such as Fairclough and Van Dijk have drawn somewhat upon Gramsci (e.g. Van Dijk, 1993: 251; Fairclough, 2001: 232), a stronger connection can be made between the two. Although one can certainly point to Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) seminal work, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, the use of Gramsci’s work in this thesis suggests that it may useful to explore the possibility of deploying Gramsci and critical discourse analysis in a less poststructuralist fashion. This would require, however, an in-depth and systematic enquiry into key ontological and epistemological assumptions of both the method and the analytical position, beyond what has been presented here. It would also be particularly interesting to pilot any contribution through undertaking further discourse analysis on a subject that has been previously well documented, so that the
different methods can be compared, analysed and evaluated.

Race relations, inequalities and social support remain as important as ever in British political discourse. This thesis has contributed to a small portion of what is a very large debate. In doing so, it has examined the importance and influence of language on how one understands and acts upon policy imperatives, as well as exploring how language within policy shapes people’s preferences and their everyday narratives on these subjects. It has questioned whether or not the policy areas of welfare and Community Cohesion can be seen as intertwined, as well as the possibility that discourse and political action have contributed to a project of cohesion, incorporating the key concerns of Community Cohesion and welfare policy. This, it is argued, produces an appropriate ideology (Bieling, 2003: 66) based on using community as a new plane on which micro-moral relations can be administered (Rose, 1996: 331). A value-added element has been exploring whether or not this project could be understood as hegemonic, through a plausibility probe that used focus groups to examine how a common sense conception of community, cohesion and welfare took root in conversations around the UK. In this sense, the thesis has contributed mainly to literatures concerned with cohesion in its various forms, whilst also touching on work on welfare and citizenship in the context of New Labour.
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