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Feminist attitudes toward tradition are typically suspicious and subversive. Yet, as feminism itself has become a political tradition, significant questions have emerged for feminists to address. How can feminism draw productively on its own history, without passively conforming to expectations of the past, or elevating the past as a nostalgic ideal against which to measure and compare the present? Conversely, how can we usher in new ideas and approaches without simply “burying” feminisms of the past? And how can we speak of “feminist history” without instating or reproducing a singular master narrative? This book considers such questions through investigating the concept of “historical time,” and the ways in which feminists conceptualize and produce the temporalities of feminism.

In recent years, feminists have become increasingly critical of the “great hegemonic model” of feminism as an ascending series of “waves” or “phases” (Sandoval 2000, 47). This model severely constrains the ways in which feminist histories can be mapped and understood, and fosters problematic historiographical orientations and habits of thought. The ordering of different feminisms into successive waves or phases implies that only one kind of feminism is possible at a time and, moreover, that older forms of theory and practice necessarily become obsolete as time moves on. This begets a closedminded attitude toward the past, preventing us from grasping the unfinished possibilities of feminisms from earlier times. Further, the hegemonic model privileges the trajectories of Western European and North American feminism, and implies that feminisms everywhere have undergone, or will eventually undergo, the same shifts and patterns. In this way, it perpetuates the idea that some feminisms are more “advanced” than others.

As a means of overturning the linear wave model, various feminists have called for alternative, nonlinear concepts of historical time: more specifically, for concepts that are multilinear, and could therefore account for coexisting feminist “histories in the plural” (Friedman 1995); and that are also multidirectional, and could thus facilitate productive conversations between feminisms of the past and the present (see, e.g., Fernandes 2010; Roof 1997). However, while such multidirectional or multilinear concepts of historical time have been mooted, there is further work to be done unpacking and explaining exactly what this might mean. There have been several insightful, provocative investigations into time and history within feminist and queer theory over the past decade or so (see, e.g., Brown 2001; Freeman 2000, 2010; Grosz 2004, 2005; Halberstam 2005; Wiegman 2000, 2004; ). 1 Yet despite this “time and history boom,” I suggest that the specific concept of “historical time” remains somewhat vague and under-articulated within feminist historiographical discourse. Indeed, historical time is one of the most notoriously elusive concepts within historiography and the philosophy of history more generally speaking. When we invoke historical time, are we referring to “objective” or “subjective” conceptions of time? To a “time in which” historical events occur, or to the temporality of historical events? And what does it mean to say that historical time “moves in more than one direction,” or to speak of “different times at the same time”? Is historical time bound by the laws of physics? Is it “real” or “imagined” time?
In light of these kinds of questions, this book undertakes an indepth, philosophical investigation into historical time, to elucidate and make sense of the idea that historical time is multilinear and multidirectional. In the first instance, I argue that historical time needs to be understood as a form of *lived time*. This gives us a solid basis for claiming that historical time “moves in more than one direction,” because what accounts of lived time consistently demonstrate—whether they are phenomenologically, hermeneutically, or sociologically oriented—is that our various ways of living time do not conform to a straightforward past–present–future chronology. Perception and experience are constituted through a complex blend of retention and anticipation, memory and expectation. Hence, there is a dynamic interplay and interrelation between past, present, and future as modes of temporal orientation. Further, I argue that historical time should be understood as *polytemporal*. It is an internally complex, “composite” time, generated through the interweaving of different temporal layers and strands. As such, there is no “one” historical time or temporal structure within which diverse histories are all embroiled. On the contrary, there will always be multiple, shifting patterns of historical time, as different histories have their own mixes of time and their own temporalities.

This basic understanding of historical time as *lived* and *polytemporal* will be sketched out in a preliminary fashion in chapter 1. Then, to move toward a more nuanced and fine-grained account, the rest of the book is organized around four kinds of time that play a vital role in determining configurations of historical time: the *time of the trace*, *narrative time*, calendar time, and *generational time*. Chapter 2 will investigate the *time of the trace*, characterized by a “two-way” temporality, as past events spill forward into the present in the form of traces, and conversely, through tracing the past we are oriented “back in time.” Chapter 3 takes on *narrative time*, which generates temporal orders through marking beginnings, middles, and ends; flashbacks and flashforwards; turning points and returns. Chapter 4 conducts an analysis of *calendar time*, which dates and organizes history through temporal markers such as years, decades, and centuries. And finally, chapter 5 explores *generational time*: a relational time that enables the transmission and negotiation of cultural and political heritages.

Over the course of the book, I draw on a variety of theorists including Dipesh Chakrabarty, Johannes Fabian, Paul Ricoeur, Reinhardt Koselleck, Walter Mignolo, Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Luce Irigaray, Judith Butler, and Hortense Spillers. It is an eclectic range, but if historical time is multilayered and multifaceted, then it requires a theoretical approach that is itself multilayered and interdisciplinary (Couzens-Hoy 2009, 185–6; Ricoeur 1984, 21). Moreover, what these theorists share in common is a desire to articulate and engage with lived temporalities and the politics of time. Thus, from their different phenomenological, hermeneutical, or sociopolitical perspectives, each brings valuable insights to feminist historiography, as we seek to develop nonlinear concepts of historical time, and explore its different dimensions as a traced time, a narrated time, a dated time, and a relational time. 4

Before beginning this reconstructive project, however, it is important to outline in more detail exactly why feminism needs alternative concepts of historical time in the first place. As such, I will use the rest of the Introduction to clarify my terms, my philosophical approach to feminist historiography, and the problematic of historical time that I am seeking to address.

**PHILOSOPHICAL FEMINIST HISTORIOGRAPHY**

The term “historiography” has two key meanings. In the first instance, it refers to a self-reflexive mode of historical practice: “a critical consciousness at work in the writing of history” (Chandler 1999, 77). In the second instance, it refers to a theoretical or philosophical exercise that takes a step...
back from the actual writing or producing of history to critically examine the “deeper” conceptual models that underpin historical practice. In this book, I refer to “historiography” primarily in the second sense, and use the term “feminist historiography” to mean a theoretical meta-reflection on the ways that feminists conceive and construct histories of feminism, and the resulting impacts upon feminist political and intellectual practice. As such, while it does take a philosophical “step back” from substantive history, this kind of approach does not take a disinterested view of the dynamics of feminist history-making. Rather, it is a strategic, engaged historiography, intimately linked to political concerns (La Capra 1985).

“Feminism,” it should be acknowledged, is itself a contentious term, particularly when associated with the universalizing presumptions of certain strands of white “western feminism.” Consequently, various alternative terms such as “womanism,” “third world feminism,” “US third world feminism,” “black feminism,” or “Mestiza feminism” are frequently used, which emphasize geographical, cultural, and historical specificity, and mark a feminist consciousness and practice that is attentive to differences between women as well as to shared circumstances and potential commonalities. While registering its potentially problematic connotations, however, this book retains the term “feminism” as a “placeholder.” I use it in its broadest sense to denote the plethora of groups and individuals engaged in challenging the subordination and oppression of women within male-dominated societies, and the marginalization and distortion of women’s knowledges and experiences within androcentric discourses. This means adopting a problem-centered understanding of “feminism,” as opposed to understanding it as a coherent political identity or unified theoretical framework. That is, I use the feminist “we,” not in presumption of a shared perspective, approach, or experience, but rather in presumption of a shared interest in a certain set of problems (Elam and Wiegman 1995; Marder 1992).

In the simple sense that feminism means challenging patriarchal domination and androcentric norms, the field of “feminist history” (which I use throughout as a form of shorthand for “feminist histories of feminism”) necessarily overlaps the field of “women’s history” (i.e., “feminist histories of women’s lives”). Certainly the historical project of recovering female pasts and making women visible in history is a vital feminist practice (Bennett 2006; Lerner 1979). Yet, the distinct idea of “feminist history” has emerged in conjunction with the consolidation of the idea of “feminism” itself, as a self-consciously articulated, organized intellectual and political movement, or coalition of movements. As Susan Stanford Friedman explains, “the feminist desire to ‘make history’ entangles the desire to effect change with the desire to be the historian of change.” This means that “writing the history of feminism functions as an act in the present that can (depending on its influence) contribute to the shape of feminism’s future” (Friedman 1995, 13). In other words, feminist narrations of the history of feminism have themselves become part of the history of feminism (Scott 1996, 18). My interest is thus in how feminists have sought to position themselves within histories and legacies of feminism, thereby self-consciously and strategically building an intellectual and political tradition, and a historiographical community.

Focusing on the “internal” dynamics of feminist history—that is, on how feminists conceptualize, construct, and mobilize feminist histories—does admittedly risk a kind of feminist insularity. After all, one of the biggest problems facing feminists in contemporary contexts is how feminism is represented by the “outside,” for example, by discourses declaring the “end of feminism,” or referring to “postfeminism” as a way of marking feminism’s decline or obsolescence (Henry 2004, 19). Another serious problem is the appropriation and redeployment of feminist concepts, for instance, by advertising companies advising on what is “empowering” for women, or by governments justifying military invasion in the name of “feminism” (Butler 2004; Power 2009).
Theories and narratives that are too internal to feminism, as Nancy Fraser points out, can “fail to situate interior changes in relation to broader historical developments and the larger political context” (Fraser 2008, 101). Moreover, separating feminism off as its own field can signify a failure to appreciate the various pathways into and out of feminism, and the ways in which feminisms have arisen in tandem with antislavery, antiracist, and anticolonial struggles, or with nationalist and modernization movements (Heng 1997; Roth 2004).

By treating the “internal” temporal dynamics of feminism as a distinct topic, however, I am not thereby arguing for the autonomy of feminism per se. Engaging with wider political and socioeconomic contexts, and with antifeminist discourses, are undeniably crucial feminist tasks. Yet, as Diane Elam insists, “while the backlash against feminism must be taken seriously . . . merely instituting protective measures against threatening patriarchal intruders would be too simple a solution to the problem. Rather . . . it is important to ask some serious questions about what is happening within feminism” (Elam 1997, 55; see also Siegel 1997). On the one hand there is a pressing urgency to reclaim histories of feminism in response to the persistent erasure and misrepresentation of feminism, but this project must not be a simple resuscitation of the same old stories and historical models. This is because, in Friedman’s words, “our actions as feminists—including the productions of our own history—run the risk of repeating the same patterns of thought and action that excluded, distorted, muted or erased women from the master narratives of history in the first place” (Friedman 1995, 12). As such, we need to reflexively examine the ways in which we are constructing and representing feminist histories to ensure that the kinds of stories we are telling and models we are using are not contrary to our aims.

Such reflexive investigations have begun to appear fairly regularly within feminist theory in the past few years, identifying the various guises of feminism’s “great hegemonic model,” and how it is secured through various representational and rhetorical techniques (see, e.g., Bailey 1997; Gillis et al. 2004; Hemmings 2005, 2011; Hewitt 2010; Sandoval 2000). Yet, as well as scrutinizing our writing habits and “political grammar” (Hemmings 2011), we must also interrogate our philosophical presumptions about historical reality and historical time. If we continue to believe, for example, that historical time is “really” unidirectional, or that there is ultimately “one” historical time that we are all “in,” the thoroughgoing reconceptualization of historical time that feminist historiography requires cannot be achieved. Thus, it is not simply a question of being reflexive about how we write histories, but also about our philosophical presumptions concerning history and historical time more generally. To this end, it is illuminating to situate the problems ailing feminist historiography within the broader context of the philosophy of history, and to consider how feminist theory has both challenged, and been shaped by, prevailing philosophical paradigms. The focus in the following discussion will be on the legacy of the speculative philosophies of “world history” that emerged in Europe during the “age of Enlightenment” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

THE LEGACY OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF “WORLD HISTORY”

It must first be emphasized that there is no singular or uniform “Enlightenment” philosophy of history. There are philosophers of the era such as Hamaan or Herder who repudiated not only the idea of human progress, but further the idea that one can understand human histories in unified terms at all (Hamaan 1996a; 1996b; Herder 1969). Moreover, those philosophers such as Kant and Hegel who do develop a speculative philosophy of “world history” or “universal history” differ significantly in terms of the principles or ends that they postulate, and moreover, their general philosophical systems which inform their philosophies of history 13 (Hutchings 2008, 39–46). Nevertheless, while it has been formulated in a variety of ways, the basic speculative thesis that history has reason, purpose, and direction, and can be treated in the collective singular as “world” or
“universal history,” is a recurring and central feature of Enlightenment philosophies during this era (Brown 2001; Gray 2007; Koselleck 2004; Nisbet 1980). Indeed, several feminist theorists have argued that the concept of historical time brought forth by Enlightenment philosophy is irredeemably bound to notions of teleological progress. In Julia Kristeva’s renowned essay “Women’s Time,” for example, she describes “the time of history” as the time of “project, teleology, linear and prospective unfolding” (Kristeva 1986c, 192).

Of all the speculative philosophies of history, Hegel’s has arguably been the most influential. It is outlined most explicitly in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975), which are worth briefly summarizing here for the exposition that Hegel provides of his core ideas of “graduated progression” and historical “totality.” In the Lectures, Hegel claims that the immanent purpose or goal of history is for human beings to become conscious of themselves as freely and historically self-determining beings. “World history,” he writes, represents “the development of the spirit’s consciousness of its own freedom and of the consequent realization of this freedom” (Hegel 1975, 138). Freedom, or self-determination, is the telos within Hegel’s philosophy of history and also the principle or “mechanism,” as the emergence of such self-consciousness is what drives history forward (Houlgate 2005, 21–2). Freedom, in Hegelian terms, is not an ahistorical phenomenon grounded in the will of individuals but rather one that is only meaningful within institutionalized relations of mutual recognition (Hutchings 2008, 44). The realization of freedom, in Hegel’s account, is thus not simply about individual enlightenment. He proposes that the ultimate end of “world history” is that “spirit” should “actualize” or “objectivize this knowledge and transform it into a real world, and give itself an objective existence” (Hegel 1975, 64). As such, the rise of the modern state is vital to Hegel’s account of “world history” where the state emerges as the self-conscious imposition of constraints by a community of autonomous individuals. It is an explicit realization of history’s implicit principle and telos:

The state is the more specific object of world history in general, in which freedom attains its objectivity and enjoys the fruits of this objectivity. For the law is the objectivity of the spirit, and the will in its true expression; and only that will which obeys the law is free: for it obeys itself and is self-sufficient and therefore free. When the state or fatherland constitutes a community of existence, and when the subjective will of men subordinates itself to laws, the opposition between freedom and necessity disappears. (ibid., 97)

According to Hegel, all societies are working out this underlying logic of realizing freedom through the institutionalization of the state. “World history,” he writes, unfolds in a variety of “determinate forms”—different “nations,” “civilizations,” or “worlds”—which can be interpreted in terms of different levels of self-conscious recognition of the meaning of social life as self-determination (ibid., 51–4). Hegel speaks of four “worlds” in his Lectures: “Oriental”, “Greek”, “Roman” and “Germanic”. Though tenuously linked to specific geographical areas and historical eras, they are better described as “world-outlooks” that stand in a formal relation to one another (Rauch 1988, ix). Thus, Hegel writes that while there may be a coexistence of different “determinate forms,” each represents a “particular stage of development, so that they correspond to epochs in the history of the world” (Hegel 1975, 64). This makes it possible for Hegel to delineate a temporal hierarchy in which particular nations or geographical regions become identified with particular stages of historical development. At any given time, there will be a culture or civilization that is most “advanced”:

The aim of the world spirit in world history is to realize its essence and to obtain the prerogative of freedom . . . but it accomplishes this in gradual stages rather than at a single step . . . Each new individual national spirit represents a new stage in the conquering march
of the world spirit as it wins its way to consciousness and freedom . . . the world spirit progresses from lower determinations to higher determinations and concepts of its own nature, to more fully developed expressions of its Idea. (ibid., 63)

For Hegel, “world history” must therefore be treated as a unity, even though different societies and cultures do not work out and “actualize” the underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination at the same time or at the same rate. While a merely empirical study might suggest there is simply a plurality of human societies, cultures, and histories, for Hegel, the “philosophical” perspective enables us to subsume this plurality under a higher principle of unity or totality. 18 “The principles of the national spirits in their necessary progression,” he writes, “are themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, which ascend through them in the course of history to its consummation in an all-embracing totality” (ibid., 65). Moreover, though empirical studies may indicate that historical events arise and relate to one another in an arbitrary and haphazard way, the “philosophical” perspective reveals a rationally determinable pattern, principle, and purpose within history. This perspective, Hegel argues, permits us to see beyond not only the apparent arbitrariness of historical happenings, but also beyond historical injustices and atrocities, via the process of “intellectual reconciliation.” The “only thought which philosophy brings with it,” he claims, “is the simple idea of reason – the idea that reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process” (ibid., 27). Accordingly, philosophy “transfigures reality with all its apparent injustices and reconciles it with the rational” (ibid., 67).

Within contemporary historiography, it is very rare to find an advocate of the speculative approach. 19 In the first instance, any philosophical account that postulates an overall historical “direction” is easily discredited when faced with historical actualities. Hegel’s claim that reason and freedom are gradually becoming “realized” in social life and institutions, for example, is difficult to defend in light of empirical evidence to the contrary. Moreover, Hegel’s insistence that “reason governs the world” is extremely problematic in light of the injustices and atrocities that have continued to occur throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries (Adorno 1973, 306; Arendt 2006, 86–8; Ricoeur 1988, 205). 20 Speculative philosophies of history such as Hegel’s, or at least the version he presents in the Lectures, have therefore been largely abandoned: first, on epistemological grounds, as we admit the impossibility of grasping human history as a whole and determining an overall pattern; and second, on ethicopolitical grounds, as we oppose reconciliatory attempts to rationalize historical injustices and atrocities.

This second point relates strongly to postcolonial theories that link speculative Enlightenment philosophies of history with colonial logics and practices. 21 The rationalization of colonialism in terms of bringing “civilization” to peoples who are “behind” is clearly connected with the idea of a unified teleology, which makes it possible to devise a temporal hierarchy for coexisting geographical regions. Indeed, while this logic is arguably made most explicit within European Enlightenment philosophies of history like Hegel’s, Latin American theorists, such as Enrique Dussel, have traced the emergence of colonial temporalities back to the late fifteenth century, over three centuries before Hegel presented his Lectures at the University of Berlin. The Eurocentric perspective on modernity, Dussel argues, presumes that modern forms of subjectivity and historical consciousness originated exclusively in Europe, and pays singular attention to the so-called Italian Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, German Enlightenment, and French Revolution (Dussel 1995, 10). 22 But in Dussel’s account, the “birthdate” for modernity was in fact 1492: Europe’s “discovery” of America and “confrontation with the Other” (ibid., 12). When this earlier period becomes our focus, he argues, we see that modernity has arisen out of conquest and colonization, when Europe began to “organize the world system” and install itself as the “managerial” center and “reflexive consciousness of world
history.” As a result, non-European cultures that have been equally constitutive of modernity became relegated to the “periphery” or “underside,” or in temporal terms, to the permanently “behind” (ibid., 9–11; see also Dussel 1996, 2011; Alcoff and Mendieta 2000). 23 Dussel, therefore, not only challenges the idea that modernity is an endogenously European phenomenon; he also demonstrates the firm alliance between colonial domination and the speculative attempt to devise a “world history” under the sign of “progress.”

Feminist theorists have also been instrumental in challenging ideas of teleological progress and “world history.” With the exception of those, such as Shulamith Firestone, who offer “grand narratives” of the history of patriarchy, 24 feminists have frequently argued that diverse histories cannot be subsumed under universalizing categories and temporal schemas. The approach of “gendering” history, for example, is premised upon the principle that differently positioned subjects experience and make sense of historical shifts and events in different ways (see, e.g., Kelly 1984; Lerner 1979; Newton 1989; Scott 1986). From this perspective, “individual groups have their own distinct histories, rhythms and temporalities quite apart from traditional forms of periodization” (Felski 2000, 3). Nonetheless, when it comes to narrating histories of feminism itself, feminists have often imported those very historical models and temporal logics that they have so vehemently criticized. 25 The “great hegemonic model” of feminism as a series of successive “phases” or “waves” maps out a “graduated progression” of feminist thought, and presents an integrated account of “feminist history” as a whole. In this sense, the legacy of speculative philosophies of history is more entrenched within feminist theory than may be immediately apparent.

THE HEGEMONIC MODEL OF FEMINIST HISTORY

The idea of different “phases” of feminism is perhaps most famously articulated by Kristeva in “Women’s Time,” first published in French in 1979, and in English in 1981. 26 In this essay, Kristeva outlines three key historical phases through which feminism has passed, each characterized by a distinct attitude toward time and history and a distinct way of positioning itself within space. 27 The first phase or “attitude,” she writes, embraced an “egalitarian” ethos, and a commitment to a progressive concept of historical time. Included in this phase are not only feminists of a liberal persuasion but also Marxist/ socialist feminists. In contrast, Kristeva proposes, the second phase of feminism has been guided by “Freudianism” and relinquished the earlier generation’s aspiration to progressive incorporation into the social contract. This more radical generation, she writes, has engaged in an “almost total refusal” of linear temporality, and an “exacerbated distrust of the entire political dimension” (Kristeva 1986c, 194). Accordingly, in Kristeva’s depiction, the feminist struggle in its second phase becomes a separatist struggle with difference and specificity:

By demanding recognition of an irreducible identity, without equal in the opposite sex . . . this feminism situates itself outside the linear time of identities which communicate through projection and revindication. Such a feminism rejoins, on the one hand, the archaic (mythical) memory and, on the other, the cyclical or monumental temporality of marginal movements. (ibid.)

Kristeva views the second phase as an improvement on the first phase, due to its more thoroughgoing investigation into the relationship of the subject to power, language, and meaning (ibid., 196–8). However, while feminism has “at least had the merit of showing what is . . . deadly in the social contract,” she claims, it has in fact reverted to another means of regulating difference and fabricated a “scapegoat victim” (ibid., 209–10). This is the inevitable result of invoking a universal subject “Woman” and “mak[ing] of the second sex a countersociety” (ibid., 202). As a way out of this “inverted sexism,” Kristeva points to a new phase of (post)feminism 28 that is emerging in Europe.
She characterizes this as an “avant-garde” form of consciousness and practice, that can “break free of [the] belief in Woman, Her power, Her writing,” and “bring out the singularities of each woman, and beyond this, her multiplicities, her plural languages” (ibid., 208).

In fact, Kristeva’s historical narrative of feminism functions in “Women’s Time” as a way of framing her main discussion, which concerns the possibility of transforming the symbolic order from a productive to a reproductive economy. Indeed, Judith Roof suggests that the gesture of locating a history of feminism in the essay is a “false counter” or “decoy” to her other, more “monumental argument” (Roof 1997, 81). Further, while presenting a highly schematic account of feminism’s history, Kristeva’s intention is actually to propose a more complex understanding of historical time, characterized by a multiplicity of temporalities (Jardine 1981). For her, it is the “third attitude” of avant-garde (post)feminism that holds the key to this novel understanding. She claims that the third attitude does not exclude the previous two attitudes, but rather makes possible “the parallel existence of all three ‘phases’ of feminism within the same historical time” (Kristeva 1986c, 209). In other words, the previous two attitudes—“insertion into history and the radical refusal of the subjective limitations imposed by this history’s time”—can be mixed or held together in the third attitude (ibid.). She also suggests an interesting way of rethinking the term “generation” in the essay, arguing it can imply “less a chronology and more a mental or ‘signifying space’” (ibid.).

However, despite the promise of a new understanding of historical time, Kristeva does not develop these ideas in much depth or detail. Moreover, by-reserving temporal complexity for the “third phase” alone, the essay cannot accommodate the different temporalities and positions that have coexisted throughout feminist pasts and presents. It therefore effectively blocks the thought of a more complex kind of historical time, where temporal plurality is conceived in terms of “slicing across time instead of being enclosed within a particular period or epoch” (Felski 2000, 3). Kristeva’s enticing conception of “generation” as a “signifying space” is similarly undermined by her presentation of the three “generations” of feminism in terms of a linear generational succession, even as she purports to dislodge “generations” from chronology. Consequently, while Kristeva’s essay opens up the problematic of time and temporality as a crucial site for feminist exploration, and also the possibility of a different understanding of historical time, it also ultimately repeats and reinforces the linear model of history that she wishes to refuse (Osborne 1995; Roof 1997).

Since the publication of “Women’s Time,” the idea of “phases” of feminism has become deeply ingrained within Western feminist theory, across its various institutional contexts and theoretical strands. This is not only due to Kristeva’s influence, but also the influence of several classificatory typologies constructed by prominent feminist theorists in Europe and the United States in the 1980s, as Chela Sandoval demonstrates in her survey of “hegemonic feminism” (Sandoval 2000). The typologies and narratives examined by Sandoval often differ quite markedly from one another in terms of their specific content, and in terms of their author’s own theoretical position. Yet, there are similarities in terms of general content, and also in terms of historiographical form. Thus, as Sandoval puts it, “manifestly different types of hegemonic feminist theory and practice are, in fact, unified at a deeper level into a great structure” (ibid.).

A brief comparison between Kristeva’s account in ‘Women’s Time’ and the typology formulated by Alison Jaggar in Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983) can demonstrate this effectively. The different phases of feminism that each author identifies in their respective texts do not exactly map on to one another. For example, Kristeva puts liberal, Marxist, and socialist feminisms together within one phase of “egalitarian” feminism, whereas Jaggar separates out liberalism and Marxism into two distinct types, and she also distinguishes between Marxist and socialist feminism, presenting socialist feminism as a synthesis of radical feminism and Marxism (Jaggar 1983, 123).
Thus, Kristeva identifies three phases: (1) egalitarian, (2) radical, and (3) avant-garde, while Jaggar’s account identifies four: (1) liberal, (2) Marxist, (3) radical, and (4) socialist. Moreover, the two authors offer different diagnoses of the feminist present and future. Kristeva, as we have seen, characterizes the (post)feminist present in terms of a nascent avant-garde attitude that can “bring out the singularities of each woman.” In contrast, Jaggar identifies the feminist present with an emerging form of socialist feminism that can register the significance of class and race-based differences, while continuing to challenge the inequitable socioeconomic structures of capitalist patriarchy. In this way, she hopes, it will “synthesize the best insights of radical feminism and of the Marxist tradition and . . . simultaneously will escape the problems associated with each” (Jaggar 1983, 123).

Despite the divergences between Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s respective accounts, however, both authors recount a similar general storyline, portraying feminist thought as a singular journey that begins with a universalistic egalitarianism; moves on to challenge the terms of the social contract and explore a specially female worldview; and finally, registers the significance of the differences between women. Moreover, there is a similarity of form, as both authors construct a linear narrative of progress that culminates in the author’s own theoretical position in the present. Kristeva depicts her preferred avant-garde (post)feminism as an “emerging” phase of feminism that is eclipsing the earlier forms; similarly, Jaggar portrays her preferred socialist feminism as a “developing” theory that has grown out of Marxist and radical feminisms and is moving beyond them. In both cases, the theoretical position to which the author aligns herself is accorded superiority through being designated as present or emergent, surpassing all the other phases that feminist theory has passed through to arrive at this moment of theoretical sophistication and promise for the future.

Admittedly, the comparison above extracts Kristeva and Jaggar’s typologies of feminism from the context of their broader bodies of work, which potentially does both theorists an injustice. Kristeva has been highly influential in developing nonlinear understandings of temporality through her notion of the “subject-in-process,” and also her discussions of maternal temporality (1986b; 2002). And elsewhere, Jaggar has been careful to register and think through the ambiguities and tensions within feminist theory, for example in Living with Contradictions (1994). Nevertheless, the comparison of Kristeva’s and Jaggar’s respective typologies in ‘Women’s Time’ and Feminist Politics and Human Nature is instructive, because it shows how different feminist theorists have relied upon a common historiographical structure when they construct a narrative of feminist history, even when they do not share a common theoretical perspective.

Clare Hemmings’ more recent research study into “feminist storytelling” in the 1990s and 2000s further attests to the ubiquity of this historiographical structure (Hemmings 2005; 2011). She argues that since the late 1990s narratives of feminist history have become crystallized around decade-specific periodizations—the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s—and more concentrated around questions of racial and cultural difference. In the accounts that Hemmings surveys, “1970s feminism” is consistently associated with universalizing and essentialist perspectives, and represented as largely white and middle class. The 1980s is associated with “challenges” to those perspectives by black and US third world feminists, and characterized as the era of “identity politics.” Finally, the 1990s is associated with the rise of a more “sophisticated” form of feminist theory, most notably post-structuralism, and an embrace of difference and diversity. Once again, we find a common storyline that moves from “sameness to difference,” and is organized around a series of phases that overcome one another in steady succession.

Hemmings claims that this storyline is generally told from three different vantage points in the present. The first views the rise of post-structuralism as a positive phenomenon, and thus tells the
story as a “progress narrative”; the second views the rise of post-structuralism as a sign of feminism’s depoliticization and institutionalization, and hence tells the story as a “lament” or “loss narrative.” The third vantage point tells the story as a “return narrative” that uses similar markers and rehearses similar shifts, but adds on an “emerging” phase of “new materialism.” This is presented as a synthesis of the “earlier” focus on the material and the “later” focus on the cultural and the linguistic, within a “new materialism” that can take us forward into the future (2011, 97). Indeed, one of Hemmings’ most interesting observations is that while protagonists of new materialism often propose “a nonlinear methodology that transforms the past rather than relinquishing or returning to it,” this proclaimed epistemological openness is often undermined by the schematic structure of the narratives that repeat the same phases of the hegemonic “common sense” narratives of feminist history, only with a new phase added on (ibid., 108; see also Ahmed 2008). As with Kristeva’s ‘Women’s Time,’ a more complex understanding of historical time and the time of feminism is being promised; yet the narratives framing these proposals fall back on the progressive, singular model of history under disavowal.

As a final illustration, feminism’s “great hegemonic model” can also be found within narratives of feminist “waves.” The “wave” trope is the preferred term within discussions about feminism conducted outside the academy, particularly in the media. Moreover, while the narratives of “phases” examined above concentrate predominantly upon intellectual shifts in feminist thought, narratives of feminist “waves” usually take a broader view of feminism outside, as well as inside, the academy. “Wave” narratives therefore tend to focus more upon specific political goals and events as well as theoretical developments. For example, the beginning of the “first wave” in the United States is conventionally marked by the Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York, 1848, with its “ebb” being marked by the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 (Hewitt 2010, 3). The beginning of the “second wave” is similarly marked within wave narratives by significant political events, such as the rise of the Civil Rights movement and counter-cultural protests in the United States and Europe, or the passing of the Equal Rights Amendment (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 9–10). We should also register the specific temporal implications of the trope of “waves,” which connotes a surge or swell of activity followed by a decline, whereas the idea of “phases” implies a more continuous transition from one phase to another.

Yet, while there are features that render the “wave” trope distinct, wave narratives do tend to present shifts in feminist consciousness very similar in content to those presented in the phasic accounts of academic feminist theory cited above. The first wave is generally associated with an egalitarian consciousness and a reformist approach, the second wave with a consciousness of sexual difference and a revolutionary approach, and the “third wave” with a consciousness of diversity and a pluralistic approach. Further, each self-designated “wave” has tended to view themselves as “both building on and improving” the wave(s) that preceded them (Hewitt 2010, 2, emphasis added; see also Bailey 1997). Like the phasic narratives, then, wave narratives unify “feminist history” into the collective singular, and classify feminist thought according to a developmental taxonomy, representing higher and higher levels of historical, moral, political, and aesthetic development (Sandoval 2000, 47).

In sum, these different variations of the hegemonic model of feminist history reinscribe two of the key characteristics of Hegel’s speculative philosophy of history outlined above: first, the idea of a “graduated progression,” and second, the idea that diverse histories can be treated as instances of a more general pattern or unified historical trajectory. Sandoval, Hemmings, and others, have already made trenchant critiques of the hegemonic model; however, in the final part of this chapter, I want
to clarify the major problems that result from its deployment, focusing on what I identify as its two core temporal logics: “teleological totalization” and “sequential negation.”

**TELEOLOGICAL TOTALIZATION**

“Teleological” is a term usually associated with speculative philosophies of history that postulate an *inevitable* progression toward ever-greater freedom and enlightenment. Such teleological philosophies of history are rooted in metaphysical meta-narratives that imbue the course of history “as a whole” with meaning or purpose: in the case of Hegel, an immanent conception of “spirit” or human nature as self-conscious self-determination (Dray 1964, 62–3). Yet, “teleology” can also have a more restricted application, denoting the retrospective designation of a particular course of events as a developmental trajectory, which has culminated in the present of the narrator. That is, teleological reasoning focuses on the end as a means of explaining and justifying the course of historical development (Hutchings 2008, 51). The term “totalization,” similarly, need not only be used in the “grand” sense of speculatively making “history as a whole” into a “complete picture” (Dienstag 1994). Rather, the term can also be used to refer to the practice of totalizing a designated “segment” of history from a standpoint in the present (Megill 1995). 36

To claim that the hegemonic feminist narratives are “teleological” or “totalizing” thus does not mean they adhere to anything like Hegel’s “grand narrative” of “world history” as the inevitable realization of reason/freedom in history. The point, rather, is that they import teleological and totalizing logics into their accounts when they construct a “master narrative” and discern an overall direction within feminist history that has culminated in the present. In other words, the particular present of an author is accorded with a diagnostic privilege as they identify a singular trajectory leading from the past to the present moment: totalizing the past from the perspective of a knowing present and understanding their own approach as “last and best” (Spencer 2004, 9). 37 A major problem with the teleological approach is that it denies contingency, and blocks out alternative ways of thinking about or reading the past. It gives rise to a sense of inevitability and implacable certainty that we know what the past was all about, what it has meant, and what it has to teach us. This results in a “closedness to the past”: a resistance to letting the past surprise us and interrupt our subject positions and perspectives in the present. Further, the treatment of the past as a complete story that has led up to the present can also lead to a “closedness to the future,” as it encourages us to think that the identified direction will necessarily continue, and hence can prevent us from considering the future in terms of unpredictability, or a range of possibilities.

The other key problem with the logic of teleological totalization is its embroilment in universalizing and evolutionist presumptions. That is, teleological models lend themselves to universalizing evolutionism because it is presumed there is an inevitable logic being worked out in local instances. As we have seen, Hegel’s hierarchical treatment of diverse cultures and societies as representative of different stages of historical development depends upon his thesis that different cultures and societies are all working out the same underlying logic of self-conscious self-determination (Hegel 1975, 51–4). In the case of feminism, the legacy of this kind of teleological thinking is evident in the common presumption that the supposed trajectory of Western feminist theory is the trajectory of feminist theory, and thus, that feminisms everywhere are working out the same kinds of issues and problematics. The teleological aspect of feminism’s hegemonic model thereby accedes to the temporal structure of “First in the West, and then elsewhere” that has functioned as a cornerstone of colonial philosophy and policy (Chakrabarty 2000, 8). 38

For example, the attempt to universalize historical trajectories specific to Anglo-American and Western European feminist movements has resulted in the presumption that feminism is something
that Western women “export” overseas: that the first and second waves of feminism in the West are “precursors” to feminist movements in other parts of the world (Spivak 1981, 160–1; Tripp 2006, 54). Moreover, the universalization of “time-charged terminologies” such as Kristeva’s three-stage theory of feminist consciousness has led to assumptions and judgments that non-Western feminisms are “stuck,” for example, in the “liberal stage” or the “nationalist stage” (Shih 2002, 98). A clear example of this kind of attitude, Shumei Shih argues, is discernible in Kristeva’s text Des Chinoises or “About Chinese Women” (Kristeva 1986a). In this text, we find Kristeva struggling to determine the status of Chinese women according to “the usual temporal hierarchy of the West over China” (Shih 2002, 98). Chinese women had greater legal equality with Chinese men than did European women with European men in the 1950s and after. This subverts the usual temporal hierarchy in which the West is more “advanced.” Yet Kristeva’s attitude toward this state of affairs is highly ambivalent. The advanced legal status of Chinese women, Shih writes, is “both the site of envy and anxiety . . . For Kristeva, Chinese women were both liberated under Mao and embodiments of the silent, primordial Orient” (ibid.). While Kristeva registers Chinese women’s legal equality with men, her analysis remains rooted in the temporal topographies of “French High Feminism” (Spivak 1981, 160–1). Ultimately, then, European modes of subjectivity and sociality must still be somehow “ahead.”

SEQUENTIAL NEGATION

The logic of teleological totalization frequently goes hand in hand with the logic of sequential negation when accounts of teleological progress are presented as a “graduated progression,” where a “series of successive determinations” are organized into an ascending order as each negates and overtakes the former (Hegel 1975, 138). As we have seen, this is one of the main organizing mechanisms of the hegemonic model of feminist history, as feminist history is consistently divided into categories like “liberalism,” “Marxism,” “radical feminism,” and “poststructuralism,” which are mapped onto a progressive chronology, and presented as different phases or stages that oppose and come one after the another.

Different feminisms do of course emerge at different times. Poststructuralist feminist theory, for example, informed by theorists such as Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida, or Spivak, has emerged at a later time than liberal feminist theory informed by thinkers such as Wollstonecraft or Mill. Yet, liberal feminism has not simply disappeared following the advent of post-structuralist theory; rather, it persists, and poses its own challenges to post-structuralist feminism in return. Indeed, feminist theorists often insist upon the productivity of such disagreements, debates, and arguments (Howie and Tauchert 2004; MacCormack 2009). The logic of sequential negation, however, seeks to contain and manage these disagreements through the imposition of a neat sequential order, where one phase comes after and displaces another. This implies that the discussion is closed, and moreover, that there are neatly bounded positions or types of feminist theory in the first place. While some feminists do indeed describe their feminism in distinctly titled terms (e.g., “Marxist,” “liberal,” or “post-structuralist”), other feminists have in fact often moved “between and among” different approaches and strategies, especially given feminism’s interdisciplinary nature (Sandoval 2000, 57). But this kind of methodological fluidity and coexistence cannot be grasped by the logic of sequential negation, with the consequence that productive explorations of the interrelations between different approaches and histories may be precluded.

A related problem with the logic of sequential negation is the implication that perspectives and approaches derived at earlier times necessarily become redundant and “out of date.” We therefore confine them to the “dustbin of history” or treat them as a “historical artefact” rather than as a project or part of a living body of work (Weeks 2011, 117). This way of treating the past is a consistent feature of modern historicism, when a given text or theoretical paradigm is treated as
“not only of its time—developed within a particular political conjuncture and conceptual horizon—but as only of its time” (ibid.). In other words, the gesture of “locating” a text, idea, or practice within a historical context often comes with a presumption that this is where it should stay, that it has no relevance outside of this context: “Each contribution is fixed to a linear time by a logic . . . that marks, seals, and divides each moment” (ibid.; see also Fleissner 2002). 39

It is certainly necessary for feminism to be attuned to changes in social, economic, and cultural conditions. Indeed, the most promising aspect of self-declared third wave feminisms, I would argue, is the level of commitment to grappling with the “specificity of our historical situation” (Heywood and Drake 1997, 4). Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for instance, are particularly keen to outline the economic determinants of third wave feminism in the United States, emphasizing that “transnational capital, downsizing, privatization, and a shift to a service economy have had a drastic impact on the world these generations have inherited” (Heywood and Drake 2004, 13). The claim here is that the “new world order” necessitates an “overhaul” of feminism, as we come to recognize that “global capitalism is overtaking many of the social structures under which second wave feminists operated” (Sidler 1997, 37–8).

Having said this, however, there is a marked tendency within third wave literature to present the theoretical outlook of the third wave as an inevitable by-product of its historical moment (Henry 2004, 35). The problem with this kind of presumption is that, in actuality, there is no easy correlation between the context, the problem, and the type of theory that is required, as third wave narratives often seem to suggest. Gillian Howie describes this kind of slippage as a confusion of the “logic of intellectual debate with the condition of the world,” for example, when post-structuralism or postmodernism is mapped on to post-Fordism as the next historical stage (Howie 2010b, 5). This leads to presumptions that only postmodern theory is able to contend with the “messiness” of globalized high-capitalist conditions, when it might well be argued that postmodernism is part of the problem rather than the solution. Such slippages or presumptions are fuelled by the logic of sequential negation, which implies that only the newest forms of theory are adequate to deal with political challenges in the present.

The logic of sequential negation is particularly potent when it is deployed as a form of “temporal othering,” 40 or as Johannes Fabian terms it, “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983, 30). This occurs when all those characteristics an author wishes to define their own position against—universalism, essentialism, racism, ethnocentrism, heterosexism, prudishness, humorlessness, authoritarianism—are projected backwards in time, most often on to second wave or “1970s feminism.” As a consequence, feminist work produced during this era is frequently dismissed in a generalizing manner as “essentialist” or “universalizing,” without being engaged with in any detail or depth (Hemmings 2011; Henry 2004). An example of this can be found in Rory Dicker and Alison Piepmeier’s introduction to their anthology of third wave feminist essays, where they write that “[whilst] many of the goals of the third wave are similar to those of the second wave, some, such as its insistence on women’s diversity, are new” (Dicker and Piepmeier 2003, 10). The claim here that “insistence on women’s diversity” is something “new,” something that belongs to third wave feminism, implies that (old) second wave feminist theory did not address the issue of women’s diversity, or consider it important, without offering any arguments or citational evidence for thinking that this was the case.

This is not to deny that the frequent characterization of the so-called second wave as “universalizing,” “essentialist,” or “racist,” for example, contains many grains of truth. It is undoubtedly true that many feminist texts written by white feminists in the 1970s (and before and since) have indeed been implicitly and/or explicitly racist, or seemingly oblivious to the differences
that racialization makes. 41 White women’s writings and activism, moreover, have received much more attention from outside and inside feminist circles, rendering it a white-dominated or “white-washed” discourse and movement (Roth 2004, 6). Accordingly, the depiction of the second wave as “homogenous” or “racist” within third wave narratives is intended as “an acknowledgement of the dominance of white feminists, and the secondary status given to black feminists or feminists of color during the last forty years of feminist theory and movement” (Henry 2004, 33).

The temporal logic of the gesture, however, often backfires, because when second wave feminism is consistently represented as white and middle class, the presence of nonwhite, non-middle class women in 1970s feminism remains erased. As Lisa Marie Hogeland writes, “it’s become a truism that the second wave was racist . . . no matter that such a blanket argument writes out of our history the enormous contributions of women of color in the 1970s” (Hogeland 2001, 110; see also Henry 2004, 33). A similar effect is produced by narratives that present the work of feminists of color as “critiques” of second wave feminism. 43 For example, feminists such as Gloria Anzaldúa or Audre Lorde are the contemporaries of many white feminists who are associated with the second wave; yet their work is consistently positioned as a response to the second wave and thus as inaugurating a “new era” of inclusive third wave feminism (Fernandes 2010). Although the intention here is to cultivate a more diverse kind of feminism, the organization of the narrative into sequential phases means that “the differences represented by . . . women of color only become visible in the last phase” (Sandoval 2000, 50). 44 Consequently, as Rita Felski argues, “difference loses much of its power by being seen in epochal terms . . . [it] is recognized only in the context of the present and subsumed within a familiar story of evolution from sameness to difference, from the one to the many” (Felski 2000, 2–3; see also Davis 1995, 282).

CONCLUSION

The aim of this introductory chapter has been to demonstrate why feminism needs alternative concepts of historical time, and to begin to situate feminist historiography within the broader context of the philosophy of history. To this end, I have considered the influence of speculative philosophies of “world history” upon the ways in which feminists have narrated and conceptualized the history of feminism. Though it may seem like something of a leap to move from Hegel’s nineteenth-century Lectures on the Philosophy of History to twenty-first-century narratives of third wave feminism, I have argued that the motifs of graduated progression and teleology that are expounded so clearly in Hegel’s lectures can also be found in narratives of feminist “waves” and “phases.” As such, the legacy of speculative philosophies of history survives within feminist historiography in the form of temporal logics, which have a powerful effect on the way that we relate to feminisms of different times and places.

The question, then, is how we might unsettle and dislodge these temporal logics and the concepts of historical time that sustain them. As Wendy Brown observes, “whilst many have lost confidence in a historiography bound to a notion of progress . . . we have coined no political substitute for progressive understandings of where we have come from and where we are going” (2001, 3). For some, the answer is to refuse the idea of historical time altogether, arguing that it is irredeemably entangled with ideas of teleological progress and totality (see, e.g., Ermath 1992). This kind of antipathy toward the concept of historical time is discernible, for example, within various feminist writings on “women’s time,” where historical time is consistently characterized as a patriarchal, “phallocentrically structured, forward moving time” (Forman and Sowton 1989, xii; see also Kristeva 1986c; Showalter 1985a). Undoubtedly, the concept of “women’s time” has opened up many fruitful enquiries into women’s temporal perspectives and experiences, which have importantly challenged androcentric and patriarchal accounts of time-consciousness and temporal existence. Yet, to
position “women’s time” against “historical time” is to overlook the important ways in which the idea of historical time has shaped, and continues to shape, women’s lives and feminist politics (Felski 2000, 3; Watts 1988, 14). 45

A different strategy is to call for a reconceptualization of historical time, rather than for its abandonment. It is certainly true that ideas about historical time have been dominated by teleological, totalizing models; however, the concept of historical time is not simply reducible to grand notions of teleological progress and totality. It has a much wider reach and range of meanings, as well as having value as a “largescale” time that enables the sharing of multiple pasts, presents, and futures. This point has been well made by Felski, who argues forcefully against any reductive or generalizing claims about the modern understanding and sense of “history” or “historical time,” and proposes that neither concept can be easily “banished from our repertoires of useful tools to think with” (ibid., 13). Following in this spirit, the rest of the book will take a reconstructive approach that seeks to articulate a multidirectional, multilinear model of historical time as a basis for thinking and constructing feminist histories differently.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION: FEMINISM AND HISTORICAL TIME


2. My conception of “polytemporality” is primarily inspired by Dipesh Chakrabarty’s conception of “heterotemporality” in Provincializing Europe (2000). However, due to the potentially heteronormative connotations of this term, particularly within the field of feminist studies, I have elected to use “polytemporality” instead.

3. This typology is predominantly inspired by Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative (most notably the fourth chapter in volume three titled “Historical Time”), where he gives focus to all of these times as crucial in configuring historical time (1988). Yet, while Ricoeur provides the basic architecture for the polytemporal typology deployed in this book, I reject his ultimate conclusion in favor of historico-temporal totality as a regulative idea (for reasons discussed in chapter 1).

4. Alongside the eclecticism of this list, another aspect that may call for comment is its omissions, perhaps most notably the absence of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze. With most projects, there are several possible routes and interlocutors, and this triumvirate may seem like the obvious choice for a study such as this. They have all been extremely influential within contemporary feminist theory (see, e.g., Colebrook and Buchanan 2000; Rooney et al. 2005; Taylor and Vintges 2004), and each offers promising ways of developing internally complex, nonlinear understandings of history and time: for example, via notions of genealogy or archaeology (Foucault 1979, 1984, 1990, 2002), becoming and the virtual (Deleuze 1990, 1994), or the trace and the archive (Derrida 1988a, 1988b, 2006). Yet, while their work is certainly relevant, what I have been seeking in this project is a focused, detailed articulation of “historical time” as a specific concept, distinct from simply “time,” “temporality,” “history,” or “becoming,” and this is not a preoccupation that these three thinkers share. Moreover, each moves in directions that significantly depart from the broadly phenomenological framework of lived time that I have found indispensable for framing and exploring the particular meanings and reality of historical time. Thus, to consider the lived, relational dimensions of historical time, and to try and grasp what historical time actually “is,” I have found more germane material in the work of other theorists, perhaps chiefly in Chakrabarty, Ricoeur, and Koselleck.

5. “Western” is a complicated and contentious term. In the context of “Western feminism, it usually refers to Anglo-American, Western European, or “Continental” strands of feminism. It is retained in this book as a form of shorthand for denoting these strands of feminism, and more generally, cultural fields and configurations that position themselves, and are positioned, as inheritors of intellectual histories including Greco-Roman philosophy and myth, European Christianity, and influential intellectual movements such as the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. It must also be understood in relation to political and cultural colonialism from the fifteenth century to the present day. For a historical and geographical sketch of the “idea of the West,” see Bonnett (2004). For more on “Western feminism” and it’s “others,” see Mohanty’s classic essay “Under Western Eyes” (1991b).

6. The term “womanism” was coined by Alice Walker, who defines a “womanist” as a “black feminist or feminist of color,” and writes that “womanist is to feminist as purple is to lavender” (Walker 1983,
Chela Sandoval (2000) uses the term “US third world feminism” to refer to work by US women of color that created “a new feminist and internationalist consciousness”: a “deliberate politics organized to point out the so-called third world in the first world”. To illustrate, she refers to Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa’s collection This Bridge Called My Back (1981) and Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s essay “Cartographies of Struggle” (1991a). For a discussion of the terms “third world feminism,” “black feminism,” “Mestiza feminism,” see, for example, Heng (1997), Mirza (1997), or Gillman (2010). To consider the problem of appropriation of political action by women in the name of “feminism” see De Groot on the case of Iran (2010).

7. For more on “negotiating the status of the ‘we,’” see Lyotard’s essay “Universal History and Cultural Difference,” (1989).

8. For more on the various definitions and classifications of a social, political, or cultural “movement,” see Cathcart (1980) or McGee (1980), both of whom argue that a “movement” can be defined through its discursive or rhetorical form, as opposed to a more traditional historical materialist approach that defines a “movement” as a social phenomenon, that is, an organized series of coordinated, collective actions in the public sphere.

9. At a time when feminism is being appropriated in this way, Butler argues, it is surely “more crucial than ever to disengage feminism from its First World presumption and to use the resources of feminist theory, and activism, to rethink the meaning of the tie, the bond, the alliance, the relation, as they are imagined and lived in the horizon of a counterimperialist egalitarianism” (ibid., 41–2).


11. The term “Enlightenment” or Aufklärung became widespread in eighteenth-century Germany particularly. It was transferred from German into English in the second half of the nineteenth century, and became common only in the latter half of the twentieth century (Burns 2000a). For elaborations on the meaning of “Enlightenment,” see the collection What is Enlightenment? (ed. Schmidt 1996), which presents a variety of perspectives from both the late eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, including Kant’s famous essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” In this essay, Kant defines Aufklärung as a continuous process leading to emancipation from prejudice and superstition, and a capacity for independent thought and “mature” judgment, rather than an already enlightened “age” (Kant 1996).

12. Herder, in his 1774 text Yet Another Philosophy of History, criticizes the idea that one can “group into one mass the people and periods which succeed each other eternally like the waves of the sea” (Herder 1969, 181). Hamaan, in his 1784 letter to Christian Jacob Kraus, offers a political critique of Enlightenment philosophy that argues that the so-called enlightened state simply replaces one politically dominant group with another, that is, the “Enlighteners” (1996a). Moreover, in his 1784 “Metacritique on the Purism of Reason,” Hamaan takes issue with Kant’s universalistic approach to philosophy, claiming that Kant imagines he can simply “invent” a “universal philosophical language,” whereas in fact, words have meaning only in relation to the time and place where they are appropriate (1996b). Because of these challenges to the ideas of progress and universality, Herder and Hamaan are often described as “counter-Enlightenment” thinkers, a term popularized by Isaiah Berlin (Berlin 1997).
13. See particularly Kant’s “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (1991), Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975), or Condorcet’s Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1955) for influential and striking examples.

14. For more on the idea of progress in “Enlightenment” philosophy, see Nisbet’s History of the Idea of Progress (1980). The first half of the book surveys the idea of progress within the classical world, the early Christians, the Medieval era, and the Renaissance, but his key argument is that the idea of progress “triumphs” within western philosophy between 1750 and 1900. Nisbet discusses various formulations of “progress” during this period, including the influential writings of Turgot, Edward Gibbon, Adam Smith, Condorcet, William Godwin, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, Saint-Simon, August Comte, Karl Marx, and of course, Kant and Hegel. For more on the impact of Hegelian thought upon contemporary philosophy more generally see Butler (1999), or Rockmore (2003).

15. To be clear: we must distinguish between Hegel’s philosophy overall, which covers a huge range of philosophical topics and concerns, and Hegel’s philosophy of history. For example, Hegel’s accounts of morality and politics, the relationship between freedom and the state, and the relationship between particularity and universality have informed feminist philosophy in many important ways. For investigations into feminist philosophy’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy more widely conceived, see Hutchings (2003), Mills (1996), or Sandford and Stone (1999). It is also important to recognize the plethora of Hegelianisms that have emerged within western philosophy over the past two centuries, many of which reject or attempt to rework the philosophy of “world history” that Hegel presents in his Lectures. Such revisionist readings approach the Lectures selectively, or turn to other works of Hegel’s to reconstruct a “weaker” philosophy of history that abandons any overarching teleology or final synthesis (see, e.g., Houlgate 2005, Malabou 2005, or Nancy 2002).

16. Hegel explains that the realm of the “spirit,” as opposed to the realm of “nature,” is that realm “created by man himself” and “encompasses everything that has concerned mankind down to the present day” (Hegel 1975, 44; see also Hegel 1977). “Spirit” is a complex term, but it is best understood as the world of intersubjectivity that is self-determining and self-changing. “Subjective spirit” refers to individual self-conscious existence and experience, while “objective spirit” refers to all that self-conscious existence has produced in terms of culture (including art, religion, and philosophy), law, institutions, habits, and the “second nature” of an environment produced through human labor (Hutchings 2003, 39–40). In fact, as Hutchings explains, objective and subjective spirit may be analytically distinguishable, but they are in fact inseparable and mutually constitutive in an ongoing process. Thus for Hegel, self-determination is “the truth of a complex, mediated and self-reflective whole rather than that of an individual agency” (ibid.).

17. Hegel writes that in the “Oriental world”—an extremely broad category stretching from Ancient Egypt to China—the “Orientals” knew that only one person (the monarch) was free; the Greco-Roman world knew that some people are free; and in contrast, “our own” knowledge, that is, the modern Germanic world of Christian Europe, is that all people are free, in terms of the spiritual identity accorded to all individuals, which means all have the capacity for self-determination (Hegel 1975, 54–5).

18. This constitutes a significant difference from Kant who theorizes the relation between empirical and philosophical history in much more ambiguous terms. Indeed, Kant writes in his “ninth proposition” in his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose” (Kant 1991) that “it is admittedly a strange and at first sight absurd proposition to write a history according to how world
events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends” (ibid., 51). In light of this tension between empirical and philosophical history, he casts the idea of progress as a regulative idea, rather than a guaranteed outcome. Nevertheless, elsewhere in the essay, he does tentatively make the claim that civil freedom is in fact “gradually increasing,” that enlightenment is “gradually arising,” and a universalistic, cosmopolitan “feeling is beginning to stir” (ibid., 50–1). I discuss the Kantian approach of postulating historical progress and unity as a regulative idea further in chapter 1, in relation to its endorsement by Ricoeur in the third volume of Time and Narrative (1988).

Examples of relatively recent speculative approaches to history include the writings of Reinhard Niebhr, who proposes a theological defense of the idea that history has meaning and direction. This meaning or story may not be exhibited or manifested by the course of historical events as they actually occur; indeed, argues Niebhr, empirically observed history does not display an overarching significant pattern, and more often than not appears meaningless. For Niebhr, then, meaning is a question of faith in providence rather than observation of a pattern: there is a fundamental gap between the actual events of history and divine meaning. Other examples of relatively recent speculative philosophies of history include the work of Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee who claim that the course of history exhibits an overarching pattern, characterizing the process of history as “the rise and fall of civilizations.” Toynbee moves from the empirical study of the events themselves to the postulation of a general principle of “challenge and response,” presenting his speculative system as “a conclusion forced upon him by an empirical survey” (Dray 1964, 62–3).

20. As Adorno famously declared, after Auschwitz it is impossible to claim that “the real is rational and the rational is real” (1973, 206).

21. For more on postcolonial historiography from South Asian perspectives, see Selected Subaltern Studies edited by Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988), which contains essays by members of the Subaltern Studies group including Guha, Spivak, Gyanendra Pandey, Guatam Bhadra, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Shahid Amin, Parta Chatterjee, and David Arnold.

22. Dussel associates the Eurocentric perspective on modernity with theorists including Charles Taylor and Jürgen Habermas.

23. In The Invention of the Americas (1995), Dussel highlights Hegel’s exclusion of Latin America, and also Africa, from “world history.” The direction of “world history” in Hegel’s account has a course, East to West, with Asia as the “beginning” with Spirit in its immature infancy. But America’s degree of civilization in Hegel’s view is so inferior and undeveloped that it is in fact the “land of the future,” which only becomes significant to world history when it is discovered by the Europeans: “its culture expires the moment the Spirit draws near” (quoted in Dussel 1995, 20–1). Similarly, Africa is deemed unworthy of inclusion in the development of world history. Hegel writes: “Africa is in general a closed land . . . It is characteristic of the blacks that their consciousness has not yet even arrived at the intuition of any objectivity, as for example, of God or the law, in which humanity relates to the world and intuits its essence . . . For this reason, we abandon Africa, we will mention it no more. It is not part of the historical world; it does not present movement or historical development . . . What we understand properly of Africa is something isolated and lacking in history, submerged completely in the natural spirit, and mentionable only as the threshold of universal history” (ibid., 22).

24. Firestone’s historical narrative, presented in The Dialectic of Sex, postulates that “the biological division of the sexes for the purpose of reproduction, which lies at the origins of class” is the mechanism driving the course of historical development (Firestone 1971, 13). Firestone rewrites Engels’ formulation of historical materialism to claim that “the sexual-reproductive organization of
society always furnishes the real basis, starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation of the whole superstructure of economic, juridical and political institutions as well as of the religious, philosophical and other ideas of a given historical period” (ibid., 13–14). For recent feminist re-engagements with Firestone, see Further Adventures in the Dialectic of Sex, edited by Mandy Merck and Stella Sandford (2010).

25. I use the term “temporal logics” in the sense that “logic” refers to a means of working out, organizing, and ordering thought and phenomena.


27. I will pay more attention to the temporal/historical aspect of Kristeva’s analysis than the spatial. For more on the relationship between history and geography, time and space, see Osborne (1995, 17–20), or Young (1990).

28. I describe Kristeva’s “avant-garde” feminism here as a (post)feminism, because while on the one hand she presents her avant-garde approach in “Women’s Time” as a continuation of feminist thought, the essay also implies that the avant-garde attitude is a departure from the feminist project, which she equates with naïve egalitarianism or radical separatism, and the fabrication of a universal female subject.

29. “Hegemony,” in the sense proposed by Antonio Gramsci (1971), refers to the phenomenon whereby dominant groups maintain their dominance through “the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups” (Strinati 1995, 165). The intention behind Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is to try and explain why the majority continue to uphold the values of the dominant group and the status quo, even when these values reflect the interests and lives of just a small minority. “Hegemony” is therefore an apt term to describe the dominant model of feminist history, as feminists consistently subscribe to this model, even when we recognize that it corresponds to only a very specific trajectory of feminism.


31. Hemmings’ research is based upon a range of extracts taken from feminist journal editions from the 1990s and 2000s, including: Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society; Feminist Review; Feminist Theory; Nora: Nordic Journal of Women’s Studies; European Journal of Women’s Studies; and Australian Feminist Studies. All of these extracts are in English (including articles that have been translated into English), though there is a range in the geographical location of the journals, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and Western Europe. Hemmings’ method for this research was to analyze a series of extracts from these journals, which give “common sense glosses” of the development of western feminist theory. She deliberately highlights extracts that are tangential to the author’s main argument such as introductions or segue paragraphs. She also cites the source of the extracts she analyzes—the journal and the year—rather than the individual author, a tactic that is intended to emphasize the role of “journal communities” in establishing dominant feminist knowledge practices (2011, 22).
32. For examples of feminist “new materialism,” see the collection New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, which includes essays by prominent “new materialist” theorists Jane Bennett, Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth Grosz (ed. Coole and Frost, 2010).

33. In her article “Imaginary Prohibitions” (2008), Sara Ahmed makes a similar argument to Hemmings. While affirming that there is much useful and insightful work being done under the name of feminist “new materialism,” Ahmed calls into question its “founding gesture,” which is to point to feminism as being routinely anti-biological, or habitually “social constructionist”: a gesture that has been taken for granted and in turn offers a false and reductive history of feminist engagements with biology, science, and materialism: “You can only argue for a return to biology by forgetting the feminist work on the biological, including the work of feminists trained in the biological sciences. In other words, you can only claim that feminism has forgotten the biological if you forget this feminist work” (2008, 24–7).

34. For an example of a forceful proclamation of a second wave of feminism, see Greer’s The Female Eunuch (1970), which will be discussed in chapter 3. For examples of third wave writings see Walker (1995), Heywood and Drake (1997), Dicker and Piepmeier (2003), and Baumgardner and Richards (2000).

35. It is significant, for example, that the coining of the term “second wave” is generally traced not to an academic text but to a 1968 article written by journalist Martha Weinman Lears for the New York Times magazine on the rise of “The Second Feminist Wave” (Hewitt 2010, 1). Similarly, the term third wave feminism first gained attention when it was used in an article written for Ms magazine by Rebecca Walker, entitled “Becoming the Third Wave” in 1992 (Henry 2004, 23). Henry points out that the term “third wave” was in fact used in the academic journal Feminist Studies five years earlier, by Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith Stacey in an article entitled “Second Thoughts on the Second Wave.” However, the fact that it is Walker that is generally credited with coining the term perhaps corroborates the argument that the term “third wave” feminism is associated with feminist activism more generally speaking, rather than with a primarily academic approach.

36. According to Megill’s taxonomy, a “master narrative” claims to offer the authoritative account of a particular segment of history and a “grand narrative” claims to offer the authoritative account of history generally, while a “metanarrative” (most commonly belief in God or an immanent rationality) is what serves to justify the grand narrative (Megill 1995, 152–3).

37. To be sure, the triumphant tone is missing in the case of “loss” narratives, given that they are laments (Hemmings 2005; 2011). Nevertheless, the logic of teleological totalization is still apparent in the loss narratives. That is, the author performs a retrospective totalization of feminist history from a position of wisdom and superior knowledge in the present, charting feminism’s supposed decline and descent into theoretical impasse. Indeed, as Hemmings observes, many loss narratives not only perform totalizing diagnoses of the past and present, but further, orient themselves toward future prediction when they suggest that the only hope for the future is a return to feminism’s glorious past.

38. This evolutionary logic is further fuelled by the “inclusion paradigm,” which positions non-Western women as outside feminism, in need of the “recognition” or “inclusion” of the “third wave’s embrace” (Fernandes 2010). The presupposition, as Fernandes argues, is that feminism is a phenomenon and product of white western society that is “imported” to the non-Western world (ibid.).
39. To consider the way that historicist logics are deployed within feminist theory, Jennifer Fleissner gives a survey of the critical treatment of white American female writers of the 1880s such as Sarah Orne Jewett, Edith Wharton, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Kate Chopin, over the past forty years of feminist criticism (Fleissner 2002). The first approach Fleissner identifies can be described as “affirmative,” as it aims to build affinitive bridges between the past and present, and concentrates wholly on appropriating the “good bits” of these texts in line with feminist thought in the present. The second can be described as a “historicist” approach that aims at a “critical distance,” “locating” the texts within their particular historical moment or context, and interpreting them according to the norms and practices of their day. The affirmative approach constructs a continuity between (certain aspects of) the 1880s texts and feminist ideas of the present, while the historicist approach sets up a break, as the writings are fixed or located in their historical “moment.” In the historicist readings, “the authors are made to represent their era’s worst excesses of class snobbery, racism, cultural imperialism—all the things that the scholars who uncovered them would wish only to leave behind” (Fleissner 2002, 46–7). Yet in fact, Fleissner argues that while the affirmative approach posits an affinity between past and present, it still presumes that the present has “transcended” and essentially overcome the problems of the past: “looking back, we are able to construct a better perspective that keeps the good while rejecting the bad” (ibid., 49).


41. In an essay “Double Jeopardy” published in 1970, Francis Beale was already describing the second wave of US feminism as a “white women’s movement,” because of its insistence on organizing around the division of male/female alone, and widespread refusal to grasp the significance of racial and class divisions for the theorization of sexual politics (Beale 1970).

42. This gloss by Kristina Sheryl Wong in Piepmeier and Dicker’s anthology serves as a good example: “First and second wave feminisms sought to empower women as a united front. Although they offered a political voice for women as a whole, they didn’t acknowledge the varying agendas and experiences of individual women. Third wave feminism was a response by women of color and others who felt homogenized by a movement defined by the goals of middle-class, white women” (Wong 2003, 295).

43. Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, for example, introduce their anthology on third wave feminism by asserting that “the definitional moment of third wave feminism has been theorized as proceeding from critiques of the white women’s movement that were initiated by women of color, as well as from the many instances of coalition work undertaken by U.S. third world feminists” (Heywood and Drake 1997, 2).

44. Further, it leads to a frequent typecasting of the work of black feminists as “identity politics,” an approach that is usually characterized within feminist theory as an improvement on the universalizing tendencies of “1970s feminism,” but which nevertheless remains grounded in rigid and static identity categories (Fernandes 2010, 110). While it is often acknowledged that black feminism and poststructuralist feminism share a common concern with difference, argues Hemmings, the two camps are frequently imagined to be composed of “different writing subjects,” and it is ultimately poststructuralism that is credited with the move away from essentialist notions of universal womanhood and treated as “contemporary” (Hemmings 2011, 46). Yet in fact, as Fernandes argues, much of the work produced by black feminists and feminists of color in the 1980s, such as Anzaldúa, represents a theoretical challenge to the “logic of identification” that supposedly characterizes black feminist “identity politics” (Fernandes 2010, 110).
45. Problems have also arisen from the way in which “women’s time” has consistently been depicted as “cyclical” in opposition to the “phallocentrically structured, forward moving time” of men (Forman and Sowton 1989). This dualistic approach has come under critical fire, not only for its essentialist overtones (in equating “women’s time” with the time of “nature” or “biology”), but further, for its failure to acknowledge the ways that “linear time” is lived by women as well as men. Felski draws parallels between the way that the temporality of non-Western societies and cultures is portrayed as “cyclical” and closer to nature, in juxtaposition to the “linear” time of the postindustrial West (Felski 2000). See also Gupta on this issue (1992).