A Relational Ethics of Immigration: Hospitality and Hostile Environments. Introduction

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'The aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration… what we don't want is a situation where people think they can come here and overstay because they're able to access everything they need'
Home Secretary Theresa May, May 2012[1]

'Brothers, you have opened your arms to our 25 thousand siblings from Syria. Now, do not pay heed to those who strive to expel them from here. They are our siblings [part of our religious fraternity]. They came here because they trust and believe us… We will be *ensar* [helpers], we will open our arms, we will never give credence to this discord and unrest'
Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan, 11 May 2013[2]

'Democrats are the problem. They don't care about crime and want illegal immigrants, no matter how bad they may be, to pour into and infest our Country, like MS-13. They can't win on their terrible policies, so they view them as potential voters'
President Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump, June 2018[3]

'At the toughest moment of migration, when there is xenophobia, persecution and rejection, Colombia opted for fraternity with the #TemporaryProtectionStatute for Venezuelans [#EstatutoDeProtección Temporal para venezolanos] and we show the world that although we are not a rich country, we are in solidarity. #JóvenesALaCancilleria'
President Ivan Duque, @IvanDuque, 9 February 2021[4]

Within a wide variety of traditions and cultures, hospitality, welcome, solidarity and friendship are considered 'goods'; virtues, practices or characteristics to be pursued, praised and provided wherever possible. It is rare to see hostility acclaimed in quite the same way. Until relatively recently, an 'hostile environment' was something we might see described in employment law journals, or on Human Resources websites, as something to be avoided at all costs. A 'hostile environment' in this context is a workplace that knowingly allows severe, pervasive and persistent discrimination against the protected characteristics of an employee (such as their age, race, religion or disability) (see Muller, 2020). Hostility in this context is

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[1] Quoted in Kirkup and Winnett, 2012.
[2] See translation in Öztürk, 2017:. 40 alongside alternative in Tol, 2018.
[3] See archived copy of the Tweet at: https://perma.cc/K6B4-65AZ (last accessed 21 May 2021).
[4] 'En el momento más duro de l a migración, cuando existe xenofobia, persecución y rechazo, Colombia optó por la fraternidad con el #EstatutoDeProtección Temporal para venezolanos y demostramos al mundo que aunque no somos un país rico, sí somos solidarios. #JóvenesALaCancillería'. Translated by Twitter. Available at: https://twitter.com/IvanDuque/status/1359266992344231936 (last accessed 21 May 2021).

found in exposure to overt prejudice and bigotry. This is perhaps the kind of hostile environment for immigrants created in the US and exemplified by President Trump's objectification and dehumanisation of immigrants as 'illegal' figures that 'pour' in and 'infest' the host country like a plague of pests or parasites.[5]

When faced with threatening, invasive life-forms, however, a hostile environment can often appear to make sense to anything that considers itself 'native'. For the host that finds it has become infested with unwelcome, parasitic guests, creating a hostile environment is a matter of extinguishing the means necessary for those guests to continue living. In scientific journals, an environment is described as hostile to life when it has low microbial activity, limited biodiversity and weak development of an ecosystem (Williams and Hallsworth, 2009). It is only in extreme locations such as the hot, salty lakes of Africa's Rift Valley that we find environments too hostile to support life as such (Pennisi, 2019). But even in its more limited form, a biological 'hostile environment' is somewhere that smothers diversity, stifles difference, preventing the flourishing of life. This is more the sense in which the UK's then Home Secretary, Theresa May, used the term. She decried a 'situation' in which immigrants to the UK felt that they could 'access everything they need'. The solution was therefore to remove access to such necessities, choking off the possibility of life and its survival.

What unites both forms of hostile environment is the implication that the host society can ensure the pest, the unwanted guest, experiences their non-belonging, their unwelcomeness, and the necessity of their exclusion and rejection. This can be done either in the form of prejudice and discrimination authorised or permitted from above, or through the systemic removal of access to the material necessities that sustain life, such as food, heat, water, shelter and meaningful relationships. In contrast, appeals to hospitality, solidarity, friendship and compassion suggest the exact opposite: the welcoming of the stranger, their treatment as human subjects worthy of equal care, response and perhaps, even, belonging.

Immigration is always a matter of hospitality and hostility: the welcome received or refused; the extent to which the host society makes the immigrant feel 'at home' or out of place; the length of time the guest is permitted to stay before they are deported or 'integrated', becoming a host or ejected for overstaying their welcome. Immigration is also frequently discussed using the language of hospitality and hostility, whether the characterisation is made by politicians,

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[5] Each of the quotations (from May, Erdogan, Trump and Duque) at the start of this Introduction link to specific policies and practices of hospitality that will be the focus of the coming chapters. The UK's hostile environment will be explored in Chapter 5; Turkey's fraternal welcome will be explored in Chapter 3, along with Trump's white supremacism and Colombia's solidarity.

international organisations, the news media, civil society groups or simply as part of everyday conversation. For instance, 'Refugees Welcome' has become an international network of individuals and families welcoming refugees into their homes.[6] It has also become a rallying call that unites cities (e.g. Gdansk, Leipzig, Manchester, Vienna and Zagreb) across a Europe that has largely closed its national doors, and a banner at protests and rallies throughout the world (European Resettlement Network, 2015). Similarly, *Migrants Organise* is a platform for immigrants themselves to organise their advocacy, campaigning to 'turn the UK into a welcoming and hospitable country' by directly challenging the government's hostile environment.[7] In the US, groups such as *Welcoming America* seek to build hospitable communities through local work and national campaigns like 'Belonging Begins With Us'. Such campaigns aim to build 'a more welcoming nation where everyone – regardless of their background – can feel they belong'.[8] A more overtly religious response is found in the Catholic NGOs and charities that make up the network of shelters, local communities and humanitarian organisations along the Mexican migration corridor. This *Dimensión Pastoral De La Movilidad* (Pastoral Dimension of Human Mobility) network aims to provide hospitality to people in transit, seeking entry or having been deported from the US (Olayo-Mendez et al., 2014).

However, as we see with the quotations from Erdoğan and Duque that began this Introduction, the language of hospitality is not confined to grass-roots activists, charities and social movements. It has been central to Turkey's response to Syrian refugees and Colombia's justification for taking in displaced Venezuelans. And these are not the only examples of hospitable state responses: in February 2017, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres praised Germany, and specifically Chancellor Angela Merkel, for acting as a symbol of tolerance and 'hospitality' towards those forcibly displaced by the Syrian regime, a 'symbol I would like to see followed in many, many other parts of the world' (UN News, 2017). Likewise, in March 2018, the UNHCR and the IOM launched a joint appeal for donors to meet the needs of the 900,000 Rohingya refugees and 330,000 'vulnerable Bangladeshis in the communities hosting them'. The Bangladheshi government and people were praised for their 'extraordinary generosity and hospitality', with the UN Resident Coordinator in Bangladesh noting that this hospitality went far beyond providing immediate protection:

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[6] See https://www.refugees-welcome.net/
[7] For example, Migrants Organise led the way in establishing the National Refugee Welcome Board, coordinating activist interventions in the hostile environment. This also included campaigns such as 'Patients not Passports' aims to keep the NHS open to all. See: https://www.migrantsorganise.org/?page_id=26373.
[8] See https://welcomingamerica.org/belonging-begins-with-us.

In terms of first responders, in terms of providing land, in terms of keeping its borders open, in terms of providing asylum, in terms of building roads, extending electricity networks, providing food, seconding civil servants, providing police and army to keep order in the camp. The biggest donor to this crisis continues to be the people and the government of Bangladesh. (UNHCR/IOM, 2018).

These elements of the Bangladeshi welcome – including food, space, energy, protection, infrastructure and resources – are providing precisely for the living 'needs' that a hostile environment seeks to stifle. What this brief tour of global examples demonstrates, then, is that hospitality and hostile environments have become the language of everyday immigration ethics. These are the concepts and practices through which societies understand and negotiate their responsibilities and obligations toward the inclusion and exclusion of those coming from outside their borders. As Mirielle Rosello (2001: 6) argues, 'whether or not the word is explicitly used, hospitality is now at the center of this political, social, and economic controversy' of immigration. And, of course, this controversy is also always already one of ethics – responsibilities, obligations, rights and justice.

A central claim of this book, then, is that the language and practice of hospitality must be unpacked and understood in the increasingly noisy immigration ethics debate taking place in international political theory. But what might 'unpacking and understanding' hospitality mean? Until quite recently, academic discussion of the responsibilities and obligations incurred by the movement of people across state borders has been largely absent, especially in the discipline of politics. Latterly, there has been a steadily growing interest in the concept and practice of hospitality, with an increasingly wide range of books exploring its historical, gendered, commercial, racial, philosophical, spatial, religious and political aspects (see Baker, 2011; 2013; Bulley, 2017a; Hamington, 2010a; Claviez, 2013; McNulty, 2007; Siddiqui, 2015; Molz and Gibson, 2007). Yet, as I will outline in Chapter 1, we still lack a proper exploration of what hospitality might mean in terms of immigration ethics, an investigation that responds to the more popular claims for open borders, no borders and individuals' right to free movement (Bauder, 2014; 2018; Carens, 2013; Hayter, 2003; 2004; Jones, 2017; Anderson et al., 2009), or for the constrained rights of states to restrict that movement and control its borders (Bauböck, 2009; Miller, 2007; 2016; Walzer, 1983; Wellman, 2008; Pevnick, 2011).

To take hospitality seriously means offering it the same level of critical attention as discussions that originate in liberal principles of freedom and moral equality, human rights and communal self-determination. Given that so much of the public debate around how states and societies ought to respond to migration revolves around hosting and hostility – the acceptance and

abuse of hospitality, making refugees welcome and making them unwelcome, the opening and closure of arms and homes – it is time hospitality received the attention it deserves. Ultimately, my claim is that hospitality can offer a very different, *relational* approach to the ethics of immigration; and alternative voice to the more straightforwardly normative positions of open borders, free movement and states' rights to border control.

Hospitality as Relational Practice: *Caveat Hospes*

What is so important, invigorating and infuriating about hospitality is that it is not the kind of abstract and rigorously explicable idea that tends to dominate academic ethical debates. It has certainly played little role when those debates concern immigration. Hospitality is not as grand or all-encompassing as 'human rights' (Benhabib, 2004), in that it does not seek to cover all bases or ground itself in a universal understanding the 'human'. Equally, hospitality is not novel or unfamiliar in the same way as a concept such as 'non-domination' (Honohan and Hovdal-Moan, 2014). Nor does hospitality alienate activists, politicians and undergraduates by being as abstract and unapproachable as ideas like 'associative ownership' (Pevnick, 2011). It is recognisable, comfortable even. It is something we see as a grounded, everyday experience, a normal practice of human sociality – the acceptance and welcoming of others from outside into 'our' home space, and vice versa. There is nothing ambitious or exceptional about hospitality; on the contrary it appears rather dull and banal next to the expansive selflessness of deontological categorical imperatives, or the hard-nosed calculations of consequentialism. It is not suited to forming an egalitarian theory of global justice within which the dominant theories of immigration ethics place themselves (Walzer, 1983; 1994; Miller, 2007; Carens, 2013). Indeed, hospitality appears so limited, unambitious and familiar that many took it for granted before the global Covid-19 pandemic made hosting first large gatherings, and later single individuals and even family members, a criminal act in many countries.[9]

The commonplace, everyday nature of hospitality is perhaps what makes it so appealing to public and private actors, from states to civil society groups. It is an easy way of communicating policies, responsibilities and goals to a wider public. As a metaphor, hospitality is a simple way to make sense of and understand what is going on in immigration – where a national society stands in as an upscaled version of the family home and the migrant becomes

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[9] For a useful map of 'stay at home' restrictions and their development through the pandemic (from 1 January 2020), see https://ourworldindata.org/covid-stay-home-restrictions

a welcome or unwelcome guest. But it is also a 'metaphor that has forgotten it is a metaphor' (Rosello, 2001: 3). States and their borders are increasingly governed as if they were a 'home', with departments of 'Homeland Security' and 'Home Offices', discussions of 'fortress' Europe and migrants told to 'Go Home' (Walters, 2004; Jones et al., 2017). Along with hostile environments this has meant that immigration policies and their daily enactment are treated *literally* as practices of hospitality. Though the very everydayness of this rendering makes it appealing for public debate, it also makes hospitality an imprecise, messy, and elastic mode of behaviour. Standards and norms of receiving strangers vary wildly depending upon context, culture, time and place. Judith Still (2011) has noted that a large part of hospitality's appeal is that it is seen as universally significant. But that very universality can easily cover over the fact that 'hospitality' means different things, at different times, to different cultures and traditions.

This variety includes disparities over at least three things. First, there is no agreement over who or what even constitutes the *subject of hospitality* – who is a guest and who is a host? Are friends and family the only guests toward whom one has a true responsibility? Or are friends and family actually 'hosts', and true hospitality is accorded only to complete strangers, as suggested by Jacques Derrida (in Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 25)? A second element in its diverse constitution regards the *space of hospitality* - how much of the home must the guest be given access to? Only the 'reception' rooms, or the entirety of the space? Must the host literally make the guest 'feel at home', giving up their own feeling of 'at-homeness' and ultimately reversing the relationship and becoming a guest (Derrida, 1999: 92-3)? And finally, disagreement about regarding the *temporality of hospitality* – how long must the guest be allowed to stay? Even the famously generous Bedouin hospitality only lasts for three days and a third (Shryock, 2012). So when does a guest outstay their welcome and warrant expulsion? And when has a guest become so established, so integrated, so in charge, that they become a host?

In these enquiries, it becomes clear that questions about the subject, space and time of hospitality all implicate and overlap with each other. Equally clear is that they have no simple or universal answers. Neither is there an easy answer to the question of when restrictions to the subjects, spaces and times of hospitality slide beyond the acceptable – when our hospitality becomes its apparent opposite, turning the home into a hostile environment. Hospitality is thoroughly marked by this imprecision and insecurity; hostility is not the opposite of hospitality but always contained within it. We can even see this etymologically in the fact that for both Latin (*hospes*) and French (*hôte*), the same word is used for both 'host' and 'guest'. The subject of hospitality is unstable, reversible and interchangeable: as Derrida notes, the giving, open host (*hôte*) can easily become the *hostage* of the guest (*hôte*) (in

Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 123-125). Hospitality, as the opening of the home to the stranger is not a peaceful gesture that institutes justice and equality. It *marks* a power struggle rather than ending it: a struggle over the subject, space and time of hospitality that has no easy resolution. It is in this sense that, just as contract law customarily dictates *caveat emptor* (let the buyer beware) regarding the purchase of property, any invocation of hospitality must be accompanied by *caveat hospes* (let the guest/host beware).

These many caveats and blurry edges surrounding the subject, space and time of hospitality may lead one to despair of ever defining it. Derrida warns us of that any precise delineation of hospitality is doomed to fail as its variability refuses to be tamed within discrete limits (2000: 6). For others, this ambivalence makes hospitality an interesting but ultimately inappropriate and doubtful concept for employment in ethical debates (Benhabib, 2004: 39; Altman, 2017: 94). I agree with parts of this argument: hospitality is not an *idea* or a *concept* that can be drawn out and defined in the abstract and then applied to concrete situations, in immigration or elsewhere. It does not fit with this vision of what I call normative ethics, which Margaret Urban Walker (2007: 58)[10] describes as follows:

> The regnant type of moral theory in contemporary ethics is a *codifiable* (and usually *compact*) set of moral *formulas* (or procedures for selecting formulas) that can be applied by *any* agent to a situation to yield a justified and determinate *action-guiding* judgement. The formulas or procedures (if there are more than one) are typically seen as rules or principles at a high level of generality… These formulas model what the morally competent agent or ideal moral judge does or should know, however implicitly.

Hospitality does not allow itself to be translated into this kind of ethics. There are too many *caveats* impinging on the *hospes* (host and guest) to permit hospitality to become a codifiable formula, even if we thought that this is what ethics is, or what it ought to be (which I do not). Rather, the value of hospitality lies in the fact that it is a *practice* – what I am defining as a set of behaviours that make sense within, are produced by, and conversely also reproduce, a specific social and political context. It is a 'performed activity directed at particular individuals' and groups (Hamington, 2010c: 32). If we abstract hospitality from that particular context,

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[10] Margaret Urban Walker does not describe this dominant understanding of ethics as 'normative', but I prefer this label to that which she uses: the 'theoretical-juridical' model. This is dealt with further in Chapter 2. However, it is important to note here that I am adapting Walker's work throughout this book, rather than employing it in a straightforward fashion. I take inspiration from her 'expressive-collaborative' model in constructing hospitality as an relational ethics, but my adaptation is loose rather than slavishly following her approach, and the result is unlikely to be something she would find easy to endorse.

drawing it out, finding its 'true' principles as a normative concept that will tell us 'right' from 'wrong' or 'good' from 'bad', it is no longer a practice. As Pierre Bourdieu argues, to treat practices in such a way is to strip them 'of everything that defines them distinctively as practices, that is, the uncertainty and "fuzziness" resulting from the fact that they have as their principle not a set of conscious, constant rules, but practical schemes, opaque to their possessors, varying according to the logic of the situation' (Bourdieu, 1990: 12).

As I will argue in Chapter 2, though practices such as hospitality cannot be defined in precise, codifiable formulas and universal terms, we can say something about their structural organisation as practices – what separates them from other, similar practices such as caring, humanitarianism or friendship. Whatever else is involved in hospitality, I suggest that it is always a *spatial* and *emotional* practice in which *power* is employed to include and exclude, enforcing belonging and nonbelonging. In itself, this definition is purely structural – it points only to the relations between moving parts (space, emotion, power), parts that will be very differently constituted depending upon the context. So, whereas caring and humanitarianism may require spatial and emotional elements, the emotions involved are rarely those of belonging and non-belonging; the spatial elements do not necessarily include the movement across a threshold of belonging; and the exercise of power is unlikely to be employed to include and exclude from a 'home-like' space. My claim is that for a particular activity to be constituted as one of hospitality and/or hostility, it requires a structural relation between those specific parts: space, emotion and power.

What this definition cannot offer is the normative formulas that regnant moral theory would perhaps aim for, a clear set of guidance on how hospitality, the inclusion and exclusion of others, *ought* to be practiced. The rendering I am offering is primarily descriptive, without clear resources for prescription. Rather than treating ethics as a determinable code for how we *ought* to behave toward strangers, I propose hospitality as a relational ethics – an ethics without moralism – that helps us understand and possibly transform the way we actually *do* embrace and evade obligations and responsibilities to each other. I do not argue that being hospitable is an ethical good; the argument is not that we *should be* more open. Rather, hospitality is developed as a structural and emotional response, a practice which involves drawing and redrawing boundaries of inside and outside, belonging and non-belonging, responsibility and its evasion or deflection. It thereby actively creates a society as a communal space with a particular ethos, rather than welcoming strangers to a pre-existing community.

Hospitality is therefore treated as a critical mode of reflecting on *how* we create a 'we' and relate to others. It is a 'performative act of identity' in the sense that it is only in the practical

action, the performance of welcome and unwelcome, that the host (whether an individual or a society) comes to *be*, and *be known* (Hamington, 2010c: 24). How we relate to others, welcoming and refusing them, making them comfortable or encouraging their insecurity, tells us about a society's lived, concrete identity, ethics and values – not the ethical principles it *claims* or *professes*, but those it actually enacts. It is in this sense that we can say, 'Hospitality is context' (Ahmed, 2010: 118). And only through such a reflective understanding of social context and its practices of welcome can we hope to transform immigration regimes so they better reflect an alternative or aspirational ethos, or so they simply cultivate rather than undercut a society's capacity to respond to those they constitute as outsiders.

My understanding of ethics, then, emerges from a tradition that I refer to as 'relational' – a tradition that ties together parts of critical feminist, poststructuralist, decolonialist and non-Western philosophies such as Confucianism and southern African *ubuntu* (see Fagan, 2011; Metz and Miller, 2016; Ngomane, 2019; Odysseos, 2017; Robinson, 1997; Tronto, 2012). Despite the massive differences within and between these approaches, all accept that particular responsibilities for other people are not generated simply by a common humanity, or a shared citizenship/nationality. Rather, *particular* responsibilities are generated through interaction, interdependence and connection. Whether those relationships are tight or lose, close or distant in time and space, whether they are economic, political, social, historical, or biological in nature, they are morally significant and generate responsibilities (Young, 2006; Tronto, 2012).

In Chapter 2 I therefore outline hospitality as a relational ethics that effectively helps us draw out where our responsibilities lie and how we 'map' and assign them, endorsing and accepting some as requiring response, deflecting and denying others (see Walker, 2007). Such a mapping, I argue, does not include the resources to tell us how responsibilities *ought* to be assigned and accepted. Rather, it offers an understanding of a society, a culture. It prompts critical reflection rather than necessitating moral endorsement or disgust. Possible re-mappings, including actionable changes, are always available; we can see them in the way a society's ethos of hospitality, its responsibility map, is contested and opposed from within. Other responses always exist, countering the dominant approach (as we will explore more in Chapter 6). But there is no timeless, universal, ideal scenario of welcome. Advocacy of a 'better', more response-able vision of hospitality is crucial. But it is an ethico-political stance we must take and negotiate in a particular context, according to the different forces and factors at play. The *right* way to welcome or reject others cannot be generated or endorsed in any simple way from a relational ethics of hospitality.

What we have then is another *caveat hospes*. The 'relational ethics' of hospitality that I will explore and unpack in this book does not offer security, a guarantee of best practice, right conduct or a clear conscience. My rendering of hospitality does not offer it up conceptually as a set of firm principles which can guide actions and judgements. Such a normative understanding of moral inquiry as a 'safety net', which promises and assures us of our own goodness (Caputo, 1994: 18), is not what I am aiming for, let alone hitting. Far from it.[11] I am not attempting to clean up the messiness of hospitality as an everyday practice, blunt its sharp edges or polish away its imperfections. Instead, I see that messiness, those jagged boundaries and limitations as key characteristics of an ethics that explores and reflects upon concrete situations, real inter-human relations and the responsibilities they generate. Such a relational ethics can only operate in and through the real world of inconsistencies, power struggles and resistance without the expectation of ultimately resolving or pacifying the skirmish.

Notes on Method

The book's argument emerges from the claim that for ethical and political theorists to have a purchase on immigration debates, they need to start from the actual behaviour of immigrant societies and the language commonly used to justify and contest its practices. Whilst public discussions of 'our' responsibilities for immigrants has taken place in terms of the everyday experiences of hospitality and hostility, recent *scholarly* debate on immigration ethics has been dominated by largely abstract concepts taken from normative liberal (international) political theory. Rather than isolate an ideal from the messiness of hospitality, making it into some kind of normative model (e.g. Benhabib, 2004), such as an unconditional openness or an ideally conditional welcome, I advocate exploring hospitality as a grounded, relational ethics. To do so, requires that we treat hospitality as a set of practices, actions and inactions that makes sense within, are produced by, and conversely also reproduce, a specific social and political context. Such practices of making welcome and unwelcome, encouraging belonging and enforcing non-belonging, need to be drawn out of specific examples in the contemporary world.

Taking my lead from Margaret Urban Walker and her 'mappings' of responsibility, then, the method I employ in this book is one of '*reflective analysis* of forms of moral life', an analysis that can 'only operate on information about the flow of interactions in daily life' (2007: 11). To

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[11] As Derrida notes, 'An ethics with guarantees is not an ethics. If you have an ethics with some insurance, and you know that if you are wrong the insurance will pay, it isn't ethics. Ethics is dangerous' (in Payne and Schad, 2003: 31-2).

draw out the lived, everyday ethics of a particular policy or practice, such a reflection needs to compare and contrast between societies and within them. We can most effectively draw out the ethos of a society, the particular ways in which it maps its responsibilities for both nationals and non-nationals, through a contrast with other societies that may espouse similar or different values and ways of being-in-relation. For instance, I began this Introduction by comparing the language of hospitality and hostility used by UK, Turkish, US and Colombian politicians - examples I will go on to explore further in Chapters 3-6. But we can also note how a particular society's ethos is endorsed or contested, both from within by domestic societal actors (see *Welcome America* and *Sanctuary Cities* in the US), and by transnational actors in international society (*Refuges Welcome International* and the UNHCR). The primary method of the book is therefore to draw out the particular ways in which responsibility is assigned, accepted, deflected and denied through practices of hospitality and hostility in states and societies around the world. This will include a range of illustrative examples in Chapters 3-6, including practices from Australia, Canada, Colombia, Turkey, Lebanon, Tanzania, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, the US and Vanuatu.

A true attempt to draw out a culture, ethos or 'moral order' of a society, is of course enormously demanding, intricate, and arduous. Such a method is nevertheless necessary to a relational approach that tries to step beyond a theorist's own beliefs and understandings. As Walker outlines it:

> An empirically saturated reflective analysis of what is going on in actual moral orders needs to be supplied by many kinds of factual researches, including documentary, historical, psychological, ethnographic, and sociological ones. These researches are not themselves moral philosophy, but without them ethics has nothing to reflect on but moral philosophers' own assumptions and experiences. Giving up on the pure core of moral knowledge, and trying to make the best and most complete sense of all the information we can get about the real forms morality takes in diverse human lives, is no small task for moral philosophy. (2007: 11)

A relational approach is not, however, purely descriptive – it also requires critical reflection on the cultures of responsibility that are drawn out by these empirical enquiries. Such critical reflection asks whether these 'moral understandings really are intelligible and coherent to those who enact them', whether they can account for themselves morally in their own terms, whether 'what is going on in moral orders makes the right kind of sense to the participants in those ways of life' (2007: 12). To put this in different words for an immigration context, critical reflection means asking whether the values revealed by practices of hospitality are an

accurate image of a society's self-understanding. What kind of ethos is unveiled by a society's practices of hospitality and hostility? Is the ethos a coherent and fair reflection of how that society sees 'itself' in terms of moral beliefs, attitudes, and standards of behaviour toward others? Is a society's mapping of its responsibilities – those it accepts and those it deflects – a fair reflection of its self-image? Does this mapping efface and ignore responsibilities generated by histories of interaction, interdependence and connection? Would a more coherent ethos, or a more complete mapping of responsibilities, lead to more or less openness to strangers? In what ways could such a hospitality be more responsive to those with whom a society shares significant connections?

After having noted above that hospitality does not lend itself to grand visions of ethical theorising, such a method now appears almost outrageously comprehensive and far-reaching. The 'empirically saturated reflective analysis' of a range of different societies is beyond one academic career, let alone one book. We certainly cannot cater for it through what I'm calling a range of 'illustrative examples'. I also lack the sociological, anthropological, psychological, historical and documentary training for what Walker is recommending.

For this reason, I have made two methodological choices. First, I tried to strike a difficult balance between the general and the particular when it comes to analysing practices of hospitality. Ideally, analyses of moral orders, life worlds and their contestation would take place at a close, fine-grained level, allowing perhaps one societal case study to be looked at in depth. This is how the work of Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and her various collaborators operates - bringing together detailed, ethnographic studies of how hospitality is conducted in particular localities, refugee camps and communities focused on the global south (see Berg and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh, 2018). I want my examples to include such detailed analyses, which are basically ignored in liberal international political theory in favour of the bigger picture of global justice.

But unlike these meticulous ethnographies, I also want to be able to say something about the wider frame and make more general, comparative claims across societies of the global north and south, as well as across groups within societies. This identification of more general trends and comparisons is develops and takes inspiration from the work of a feminist theorist of hospitality, Maurice Hamington (2010b; 2010c). However, his brief but significant contributions to the debate do not engage detailed empirical examples – like Jacques Derrida's work (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003; Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000), the concentration is on exegesis of other theorists and philosophers. The general comparison is necessary to reveal differences, alternative ways that responsibilities are accepted and deflected, welcome is extended or

retracted, lines of belonging are drawn and redrawn, and environments are made more or less hostile. Without a certain abstraction, we could not compare and contrast the cultures of welcome offered to people who have been violently displaced in the US, UK, Colombia and Turkey, for example. And without it we could not include illustrative examples from both the global north and the global south. As I will argue in Chapter 2, one of the advantages of focusing on hospitality is that it allows the chance of a non-Eurocentric ethics of immigration. Unlike liberal nationalism and liberal cosmopolitanism, or even some parts of Marxism, hospitality allows us to explore the values of illiberal and non-democratic spaces. Following practices of hospitality allows us to explore states and societies that do not necessarily respect the liberal values demanded in academic debate and yet have often proven much more open and welcoming to immigrants.

Such critical contrasts demand a certain generality; they cannot realistically include the detail, precision and empirical saturation required of a relational approach to ethics. This is perhaps why so many critical approaches to the ethics and politics of immigration have focused on in-depth analysis of specific cases of solidarity, compassion and hospitality (see examples in Chapters 2 and 6). And it is perhaps why there has been no major attempt to provide a book-length relational ethics rival to the traditional ethics of immigration literature. However, as I have chosen to offer a wide range of brief illustrative examples, my analysis also often focuses on immigration *policies* rather than *practices* in a Bourdieusian sense. Policies are treated as higher level plans and guidance for how hospitality practices are meant to be carried out at a lower level of state or societal authority. However, at a certain level, policies and practices blend into each other, forming the concrete behaviour, actions and inactions of hosts and guests. More specific, grounded, in-depth and detailed analyses of local practices of hospitality are therefore important resources for Chapters 3-6, even if the critical analysis provided by this book operates in a broader, comparative context.

A second methodological choice is that, partly because I lack the expertise and detailed contextual knowledge, I have based my critical analysis in the existing meticulous and informed research of others. Where possible, this is the work of geographers, anthropologists, historians and sociologists; where no such research exists, I have used reports from journalists, NGOs and research institutions (e.g. the Migration Policy Institute), international organisations (e.g. the IOM and the UNHCR) and charities. This is not necessarily a second-best option. Critical theorists need to be keenly aware of their own positionality, never more so than when they are a white man seeking to represent cultures, societies and communities of which they have little or no lived experience (such as Colombia and Turkey). I therefore strive for self-reflection and a constant awareness of my 'unearned authority' in this regard

(Walker, 2007: 57). As much as possible, I have tried to include the voices of those that conduct the practices of hospitality, or that have the contextual knowledge that I lack, speaking for themselves. I do this in awareness of the power I exercise in editing and curating those narratives and descriptions.

With this in mind, three groups of questions animate this book's investigation into particular national examples of the ethics of immigration. The first group asks, how are the responsibilities for those entering or seeking entry mapped by particular states and societies? This means asking, in practice, who is assigned the responsibility for welcoming whom? Who accepts that responsibility of hospitality, and when? Who deflects the responsibility to welcome and on what basis? A society's practices of hospitality are a reflection of this responsibility-mapping, so these questions are crucial to reproducing a particular illustrative example. The second set of inquiries, however, asks how complete this map is: what relational ties (historical, social, cultural, political, economic) are being embraced in its immigration policies and practices? Which are being deflected, or assigned elsewhere? And which are effectively being effaced or denied altogether? The third and final inquiry asks what each society's mappings of responsibility and practices of hospitality tell us about its ethos, its moral character and way of being in relation to itself and others? This offers an insight into the practical, everyday ethics of a society, regardless of the principles and values it professes and proclaims. Chapters 3-6 will ask these questions, but not in a rigidly structure fashion, nor in this particular order.

Of course, from these methodological decisions, an ontological choice also becomes clear: throughout the discussion so far, I have been reifying national states and societies. To even speak of 'immigration' – which the IOM (2019: 103) defines as '[f]rom the perspective of the country of arrival, the act of moving into a country other than one's own country of nationality or usual residence' – is to treat the notions of a 'country of arrival', a 'country of nationality' and the movement across borders from one to the other, as real, unproblematic and meaningful facts. Likewise, to speak of an 'immigrant' as someone who makes this journey into a country that is not their 'usual residence' is already to *assume* their non-belonging. Of course, critical perspectives in IR have long argued that the sovereign state and the society it governs (taken together, what the IOM is calling a 'country') is itself a 'historical effect, produced in and through practice' (Soguk, 1999: 38). And one particularly important practice of producing a state and society is the determination of membership, those that belong (citizens) and those that don't (immigrants). Instead of being 'the political expression of a common life and (most often) of a national "family"' (Walzer, 1983: 42), states and societies are produced in and through their interactions with others. Through process of differentiation

and determinations of membership, of inclusion and exclusion, the national 'family', its home, its 'values' and way of being (ethos) is constructed. So, whilst the investigation appears to start from a position of reifying the state, the three sets of questions outlined above are aimed at uncovering these constructions and assumptions, denaturalising and challenging their acceptance. The same can be said of all the dichotomies that emerge in sections of the discussion: state and society; global north and global south; hospitality and hostility; inside and outside. Though at times it may appear that my relational ethics of hospitality is reifying, asserting or working through these oppositions, the ultimate aim is to show they fall apart when interrogated with the three sets of questions outlined.

Structure of the Book

The book will proceed, in Chapter 1, by introducing the conventional ethics of immigration debate in international political theory which has ignored hospitality, with a few problematic exceptions (Benhabib, 2004; Kukathas, 2016). After exploring the role that Kant has played in parts of this discussion, the chapter explores the reasons for this lacuna, drawing out the limiting assumptions and methods of liberal international political theory. In particular, it concentrates on three issues. First, the dominant approaches of liberal cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism share a basis in liberal egalitarianism, leading to an extremely narrow and limited debate. Both assume the state as a pre-existing, morally legitimate entity; their disagreement boils down to arguments for (more) open borders and (more) closed borders (Bader, 2005). Second, due to their liberal egalitarianism, the debate is unashamedly Eurocentric – only applying to societies that share the principles of these theorists. South-South immigration is ignored, as are the ethics of societies that actually take in most of the world's forced migrants – societies that often justify their practices in terms of hospitality. A third limiting factor is the debate's tendency to avoid the everyday language and practical conceptualisations in which the ethics of immigration are discussed publicly – often the language of hospitality. In place of this 'messy' world of emotions and inconsistency, liberal theory prizes abstraction, consistency and rigorous reasoning, limiting its ability to speak to public debates and understandings of immigration control. Ultimately, the aim of liberal international political theory is to mitigate the tensions internal to liberalism: the universalism of values and the particularism of the state. The intention is to find a 'normative yardstick for judging' (Hovdal-Moan, 2014: 71), or justifying, inclusion and exclusion. In contrast, hospitality offers something different.

Chapter 2 situates hospitality within a tradition of relational ethics that particularly draws on feminist and poststructural approaches. Hospitality is introduced, based on the philosophy of Jacques Derrida, as expressing the *ethos* of a home or dwelling place, defining how we relate to ourselves and others (2001: 16-7). Drawing this out, I outline hospitality as a particular form of relation that involves at least three elements: a *spatial* practice of defining inside and outside; the exercise of *power*, trying to encourage and prevent others from crossing the boundary between the two; and an *emotional* practice of defining and enforcing feelings of belonging and non-belonging, a key aspect of any 'home'. This understanding is tied into a relational tradition of ethics that emerges from understanding individuals and societies as *social* subjects, formed through historical and ongoing connections (Young, 2013). A relational ethics therefore focuses on the responsibilities and obligations produced by these formative connections, and how 'practices of responsibility' emerge, through which we 'assign, accept or reflect' those obligations (Walker, 2007: 10). Hospitality becomes a particular type of relational ethics, similar to care and friendship, but differentiated by its particular structural and emotional practices. This leads into a deeper discussion of hospitality, how it eludes more concrete definition and cannot generate a normative ideal. It only exists in those practices of hostility/hospitality (or '*hostipitality*') that can help us understand and reveal the ethos of a time and space. The final section of the chapter unpacks those core components of hospitality: spaces (inside, outside and thresholds), emotions (belonging and non-belonging) and power (inclusion and exclusion).

Arguably the modern state is inherently hostile and exclusionary, as it is constituted in trying to establish a firm division between inside and outside. But this hostility often relies on an evasion of relational ties formed out of a violent history of colonialism, occupation, trade and exploitation. Some states and societies have, however, embraced certain obligations to welcome others, due to a shared culture and historical experience. Chapter 3 explores the way that hospitality in immigration systems throughout the world is justified as an economic calculation of the benefits migrants will bring to society (de Haas et al., 2020). Certain ties are respected, primarily those of family and kinship, but most welcomes are dependent upon a migrant's productivity. What dominates in this context is an ethos of capital accumulation, using external borders to sift and shape the immigrants that seek entry.

Societies separate more clearly in the way they treat those seeking more urgent hospitality. Based in a minimal embrace of international legal obligations, states in Europe and North America have understood this as a genuine first-time encounter, pre-empting the stranger's arrival at the border by containing them in the less wealthy states of the global south (Bialasiewicz, 2011). Northern states' responsibility for *creating* the economic deprivation,

climate emergencies and violence that produces migrant populations, through histories of displacement, environmental degradation, colonisation and unequal trade, are ignored or effaced. This has produced an elaborate exporting of borders, with the EU paying states such as Turkey and Libya to provide 'protection' for refugees (Bulley, 2017b), whilst the US has turned to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador with similar deals (Hackman and Montes, 2019), displaying an ethos of white nationalism. Responsibility for forced migrants is therefore denied or deflected, financially outsourced on the grounds of human rights and justice, with any obligation to welcome effectively expunged. In contrast, states such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Colombia have demonstrated a much more generous ethos, based in everyday principles of hospitality and fraternity. Chapter 3 explores the way that shared cultural understandings and histories of exploitation and mobility have helped generate this comparative embracing of obligation. Such hospitality is deeply conditional and often violent, yet there is still a sense in which 'universal' Western understandings of justice and human rights become a threat to local practices of hospitality.

Whilst chapter 3 focused on the production and maintenance of the border through practices of welcoming and deflecting, Chapter 5 explores how internal borders are used to control the emotional aspect of hospitality: feelings of belonging and non-belonging. Between these two, however, Chapter 4 explores the production of interstitial spaces arising *between* these borders. These are the spaces and practices of *hostipitality* that result from the ever-thickening external borders of the global north and their outsourcing practices, as well as the hostile environments produced by internal borders. Such in-between spaces such as formal refugee camps, informal squats and spontaneous camps, and EU hotspots – exist in-between forms of sovereign authority, neither fully inside or outside a society's practices of welcome. They are meant to be temporary, emergency measures but have become a permanent feature of 'managed' migration. Ignored or endorsed by much of the ethics of immigration literature, these spaces such as Azraq in Jordan and the 'jungles' of Calais are an increasingly important result of practices of hospitality that seek to separate different forms of deserving and undeserving immigrant, deflecting responsibility onto international organisations, NGOs and the refugees themselves. Revealing an ambivalent ethos of racialised division, these spaces encourage and ensure non-belonging through temporary practices of humanitarianism alongside racialised separation and the harassment of those deemed undeserving.

Whereas the borders of camps and squats can often be easily determined, many internal borders are invisible or simply do not exist for those deemed 'native'. Chapter 5 therefore turns to the 'everyday bordering' practices that construct and police our feelings of belonging and non-belonging, as well as the material realities that make life liveable. It asks how belonging

is policed, by whom and through what means? How is a hostile environment created or mitigated in different contexts and practices? What mapping of responsibility is offered by the use of internal borders and what does this tell us about the ethos of particular societies? This is explored through two cases. First, the chapter concentrates on the changing internal borders of Tanzania, from independence in 1961, where Julius Nyere's autocratic regime welcomed dissidents through a socialist, pan-African ethos of *ujumaa*, to the greater and greater restrictions placed particularly on those fleeing periodic genocides in Burundi, before an unlikely offer of citizenship in 2007. We trace the changing maps of responsibility and how they relate to the imposition of neo-liberal economic policies and democratic political changes. A contrast is offered by the second case study, focusing on the UK and its hostile environment for 'illegal' immigrants, proudly announced in 2012. This environment essentially operated through an explosion of everyday bordering, in which there was an attempt to diffuse hostility throughout the UK society and population by making it responsible for internal exclusions in various sectors: from housing, health and education to driving licenses and simple movement around towns and cities. The result was a remapping of responsibility for immigrants, an aggressive form of *abandonment,* including an outright rejection of responsibility, based in an ethos of racialised autochthony. The internal borders of belonging in the UK have been weaponised with the intention of making certain forms of racialised life unliveable.

The analysis up to the end of Chapter 5 has largely focused on official, state-based policies and practices of hospitality. But there are huge range of individuals, NGOs, community groups and charities that *resist* those practices, offering forms of solidarity, friendship, care and compassion. As noted earlier, unlike a normative ethics that asks first what we *ought* to do, a relational ethics starts from what we already *do,* how societies *already* respond to immigrants and their claims. Chapter 6 therefore asks what kind of a response is possible in the context of hostile environments? Taking inspiration from everyday practices of what Abigail Taylor calls 'disobedient hospitality' (Taylor, 2020: 495), I explore the responses that are made possible by social and political resistance to hostile environments. How are particular movements using the metaphor and practice of hospitality to reorient behaviour in the face of conservative and restrictive mapping of responsibility for immigrants? What enables or allows such disobedient hospitalities to flourish? I draw out four themes in this area, each of which is specifically linked to particular practices in the global north and south – welcomes born of critical reflections on the national ethos in Finland and France; hospitality emerging from alternative mappings of responsibility, based in histories of deep connection in Colombia and South Africa; targeted resistance in sectors that produce and enforce nonbelonging, with a focus on housing in Denmark and the UK; and receptions based in reversals of the traditional host-guest power relation, underlining the impossibility of a clean conscience in Turkey and

Greece. Reading these responses through the eco-feminism of Donna Haraway, I then make the case for seeing them as part of a relational ethics' pre-figurative normativity. What all four responses demonstrate is a cultivation of the ability to respond. This is insufficient to found a normative ethics, but offers a critique the moral immunity claimed in hostile environments.

Finally, the conclusion draws the argument of the book together, summarising the central claims against the backdrop of a comparison with two currently popular approaches to the ethics of immigration: those that call for a global migration regime, which can be linked to liberal international political theory; and those calling for the abolition of borders, often emerging from radical feminism, Marxism and post/de-colonialism. Ultimately, this proves a way of sharpening and differentiating what I am claiming for hospitality as an everyday relational ethics of immigration. As well, or instead, of the traditional focus on how we *ought* to welcome, we can concentrate on how values *already are* guiding our deflection and acceptance of responsibilities to those with whom we are already related by various ties. Alongside rights and justice, we can critically explore concrete practices of hospitality, care, compassion, solidarity and friendship. Whilst this cannot provide firm claims about how space and mobility *ought* to be arranged, it does offer something different. The permanent critique of immigration practices that a relational ethics of hospitality implies a potential transformation of behaviour: a cultivation of response-ability for particular immigrants, based in attentive mappings of obligation.