READERLY DEICTIC SHIFTING TO AND THROUGH ‘I’ AND ‘YOU’: AN UPDATED HYPOTHESIS

Introduction

This chapter explores the readerly deictic shifting involved in processing the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ in narrative literature. Within literary scholarship both pronouns are often noted to facilitate readerly identification with the textually inscribed position, and to evoke a sense of readerly conceptual immersion in the fictional world of the story. Cognitive poetics and cognitive narratology have employed deictic shift theory (DST), largely based on the work of Duchan, Bruder and Hewitt (1995), to attempt to offer a cognitive account of how these interpretative effects are created (see Stockwell 2002, 2009, McIntyre 2006, and Macrae forthcoming, together with Herman 2002 and Ryan 2001). However, this account remains limited and vague in places. This is partially due to omissions and ambiguities within the original theory. This chapter addresses problems within some recent critical commentaries on the interpretative effects of ‘I’ and ‘you’, and proposes some amendments to and extensions of DST to offer a more comprehensive cognitive poetic account of readerly processing of narratorial uses of these pronouns. This account is then demonstrated through an analysis of a brief extract of literary narrative. The chapter closes by suggesting some future lines of research with a view to further enhancing understanding of deictic shifting.

Narratological and stylistic views on the functioning of ‘I’ and ‘you’ in literature

The personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ are often (within literary criticism, narratology and even some cognitive poetic studies,) considered to operate in similar if not identical ways. For example, in discussing the first person pronoun ‘I’, Fludernik writes ‘the interlocutor’s ‘I’ leads to […] an effect of vicarious experience’ (1995: 106), while Jeffries (2008: 71) states ‘the use of first person in a narrative both identifies the narrator and provides a perspective for the reader to enter the text world’. In relation to the second person pronoun, Jeffries (ibid.: 80) asserts that ‘the second person generalized usage helps the reader see the ‘story’ as relating to both a specific third person and also to ‘anyone’, including him/herself’, and Wales claims ‘the you of a singer’s ‘I love you’ ballad may well be fictional, but the audience will often (separately!) identify themselves with this personage’ (1996: 72) (though it is interesting to note that Wales does not assume the audience will identify themselves with the ‘I’ of the singer’s phrase). Ryan describes ‘our instinctive reaction to think me when we hear you’ and explains how ‘through this identification, the reader is figuratively pulled into the textual world and embodied in the narrative scene (unless, of course, the I-you communication is of the metafictional type, in which case the effect is decentering)” (2001: 138, italics in the original), and Kacandes talks of an irresistible ‘identification’ with ‘you’, even if the reader is at the same time aware that the identification is somewhat ‘duplicitous’, as in the case of specification of that ‘you’ conflicting with his/her own gender, attitude, behaviour, etc. (1993: 138-9).

All of these comments seem fair, and yet three points are worth observing. Firstly, narratorial uses of ‘I’ and ‘you’, though attributed different functions regarding the narrator, are discussed in similar ways in terms of facilitating readerly imaginative adoption of the perspective anchored to each pronoun as part of his/her conceptual immersion in the text. In this respect, ‘you’ is implied to be interpreted in the same
way as ‘I’. Secondly, a tension is pointed out in the use of ‘you’. It is noted that ‘you’ can provoke readerly interpretation of direct address to the reader him/herself. However, ‘you’ can also prompt readerly awareness of his/her distinction from that ‘you’, depending on how far and in what ways the textually inscribed ‘you’ is specified in terms of attributes, beliefs, etc., and can in turn prompt awareness of the potential for ‘you’ to address anyone. Thirdly, none of these comments, or the texts within which they occur, indicates how narratorial use of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ might actually function, how the reader might process them, what we actually do when we encounter them in text. Given the frequency of such pronoun use in literature, these issues warrant analytical investigation. Such investigation can productively be begun through DST.

The current account of deictic shifting through ‘I’ and ‘you’

All pronouns are essentially deictic. Deictic references are the terms within a language which, rather than characterise the referent, designate some kind of relation. Deictic reference can only be understood in the context of use. For example, the category of deictic terms ordinarily termed ‘person’ or ‘perceptual’ deixis includes the personal pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, and ‘she’, and demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, the meaning of which depends on who is saying the deictic term, when, and where. The same is true for temporal deictics such as ‘now’, ‘an hour ago’, and ‘tomorrow’, and spatial deictics such as ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘left’ and ‘ahead’ (Bühler 1982). As I write them, the referential values of the words ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘I’ are different for me to their referential values for you, if you speak them aloud as you read this, and different again for every other reader encountering these words.

Deixis in fiction operates according to the same principles as deixis in naturally occurring language, and is largely responsibly for the determination of narrative point of view. Herman, one of the leading narratologists working with deixis, asserts that ‘to say that an event or object or participant is focalized in a certain manner is to say that it is perspectivally indexed, structured so that it has to be interpreted as refracted through a specific viewpoint and anchored in a particular set of contextual coordinates’ (2002: 302-303). These ‘contextual coordinates’ are the ‘here, now, I’ of the perceiving participant, the ‘deictic centre’, or locus of orientation, of the focaliser.

Deictic shift theory (DST) offers a model of how the deictic referents determining such contextual coordinates are processed by readers, and how this contributes to readers’ conceptualisation of the world of the story (or ‘storyworld’). DST, based on the work of linguists such as Bühler (1982), Lyons (1977), Fillmore (1982), and Levinson (1983), was formulated through the interdisciplinary work presented in Duchan, Bruder and Hewitt (1995), and was further developed along cognitive poetic lines by Green (1995), McIntyre (2006), and Stockwell (2002, 2009). As argued in traditional theory of deixis (cf. Bühler 1982 and Lyons 1977), when processing deictic referents anchored to the perceptual locus of an addressee conceptually projects, or ‘shifts’, into the addressor’s deictic centre. For example, if someone I am talking to on the phone says ‘Oh, the dog’s just come in’, the spatial deictics ‘come’ and ‘in’ signal the speaker’s spatial deictic relations – the dog’s movement towards him/her from outside of the space in which the speaker is located to inside that space – and I must shift into that speaker’s locus to resolve the references. This is a necessary part of resolving the deictic cues and comprehending the utterance. Thus in your initial reading of the words ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ two paragraphs ago (which is in itself a discourse deictic reference – note), after I had foregrounded my own perceptual position with the words ‘As I write’, you most likely interpreted them as anchored to my own locus, the ‘I’ referring to the author of this article, the ‘now’ referring to sometime in your past, the place referred to as ‘here’ unknown to you but different to your current ‘here’, and so, in resolving these referents, you conceptually shifted to (your perception of) my locus. (It is for this reason that I then specifically asked you to speak the same words aloud: in articulating ‘here, now, I’ yourself, you are not interpreting the referents as filtered through my (your addressor/narrator’s) locus, but simply stating them as anchored to your own.) According to deictic shift theory (articulated most clearly in Stockwell 2002), the processing of deixis in
literature, in the act of conceptualisation of a fictional world, likewise demands that the reader cognitively shifts to the deictic centre to which those deictic cues are anchored.

Personal pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘you’, according to theory of deixis, are ‘empty’ (Benveniste 1971: 220; cf. Fludernik 1995: 99, 121): they are open to occupation by anyone. With regard to the second person pronoun, Herman (2002) distinguishes five different ways in which ‘you’ can refer: ‘I – you transfer’ describes the employment of the second person pronoun for self-address (as in a character addressing him/herself), hence the deictic value of ‘I’ in that communicative situation is ‘transferred’ to ‘you’. ‘Fictionalized address’ describes use of ‘you’ to refer to a specified character-addressee. ‘Generalized you’ describes the impersonal use of ‘you’ in a similar fashion to ‘one’, meaning, in effect, one and all (encompassing all potential actual readers). ‘Apostrophic address’ is interpreted as an address to the actual extrafictional reader. The ‘doubly deictic you’, finally, is that which is employed in second person fiction (fiction in which the protagonist is referred to as ‘you’ throughout), this ‘you’ referring to both a storyworld entity and an extrafictional addressee (Herman 2002: 331-371; see also reports of reader responses in Kacandes 1994: 330-4). Herman doesn’t, however, explicitly discuss the readerly shifting involved in the processing of each of these uses of ‘you’.

In narratorial use of the first person pronoun, logic suggests that DST would propose a conceptual shift by the reader into the deictic centre of the narrator speaking ‘I’ (as implied by the initial comments by Jeffries and Fludernik reported above). However, Duchan, Bruder and Hewitt (1995) and Herman (2002) predominantly neglect the speaking locus of the narrator, proposing rather a direct shift into the locus of a character within the storyworld when that character speaks ‘I’. Much of DST acknowledges the narrator only if he/she is a character within the story.

Consider the model of the ontological levels of fictional narrative depicted in figure 1 (a slight adaptation of Genette’s (1980) original model of narrative levels conventionally adopted by narratologists). The reader exists at the extrafictional level (as does the author) – that is, outside of the fiction. The narrator conventionally operates at the extradiegetic level, outside (in some way) the world of the story (except in the rare circumstances of some forms of first person present tense narration), and characters exist within the diegetic level, or ‘storyworld’. Like Duchan, Bruder and Hewitt (1995), Herman’s (2002) work on fiction is oriented around a model of the narrative hierarchy in which the extradiegesis is generally omitted, hence his definition of you as a coded reference to an ‘I’ is posited as reference to a fictional protagonist (rather than possibly an extradiegetic narrator using it in reference to him/herself), and his notion of ‘vertical’ address to the reader. Also, the doubly deictic effect is attributed
solely to one of the five uses of ‘you’: ‘double deixis is a name for the ontological interference pattern produced by two or more interacting spatiotemporal frames – none of which can be called primary or basic relative to the other(s) – set more or less prominently into play when we read fictions written in the second person’ (Herman 1994: 381). The doubly deictic effect, creating the simultaneous alienation and immersion noted by Ryan and Kacandes (discussed above), is regarded as specific to second person fiction, caused by the alternating conceptual projection of the reader into the deictic centre of the ‘you’ situated within the storyworld and conceptual return to his/her own extrafictional locus as the ‘you’ addressee. As already suggested, however, the tension between alienation and immersion seems common across many encounters of ‘you’, not solely those within second person fiction. More significantly, perhaps, though many characters within a story can speak ‘I’, a narrator only does so from within the diegetic storyworld if the narration abides by that storyworld’s parameters (e.g. in the circumstances of first person present tense narration). In all other circumstances, the narrator exists at some sort of ontological distance from the storyworld, even if simply at a later time, looking back on it (and possibly an earlier version of him/herself) retrospectively. Thus, though some work within DST provides a slightly more detailed hypothesis of the functions of ‘I’ and ‘you’ in places, aspects of the model’s founding notions of narrative, narrators and readers are unsatisfactory, and the readerly processing involved in comprehending the pronouns remains under-investigated.

**An updated hypothesis: deictic toggling**

In order to distinguish the ways in which narratorial use of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ function differently in their evocation of perceptual identification and conceptual immersion in fictional worlds, I propose several steps. To provide a more comprehensive cognitive poetic account of the functioning of ‘I’ and ‘you’, more careful delineation is required regarding the roles of the narratee and the narrator, together with recognition of the extradiegetic the level at which they operate. These steps are crucial to better understanding readerly conceptual shifting to and from different perspectives.

In properly acknowledging the primary perceptual locus of the narrator at the (thus reinstated) extradiegetic level, the reader’s conceptual identification with the narrator speaking ‘I’, as suggested by the comments discussed at this article’s opening, can therefore be depicted as shown in figure 2: the reader conceptually projects to the narratorial position through which the storyworld is focalised and to which deictic referents are primarily anchored (e.g. third person reference to characters, past tense reference to the events narrated, distal spatial referents, etc.).

And yet, how can readerly identification with ‘you’ be represented in this model? How can we explain the variety of functions of ‘you’ proposed by Herman in terms of these ontological positions and relations? Beyond the narrator, I believe that another major factor missing from DST is the textually inscribed position of the narratee. The narratee is the textually inscribed participant role conceptually occupied by the extrafictional reader when he/she engages with the text. This occupation is fundamental to the reader’s taking part in the discourse relationship of the narrative and is essential to actual realisation of the text. The textual inscription of this participant role can be variably overt, but, as Prince (1996: 190, 199) argues, all narrators address an extradiegetic narratee in the first instance. It is via this position that the reader is able to follow through to the deictic centre of the narrator and see the storyworld through that narrator’s focalising mediation, through the narrator’s relations to it, as depicted in figure 3.
Something which seems obvious to me, and may seem obvious to you too, is that ‘I’ and ‘you’ do not function in the same way. They cannot be considered equivalent in the cognitive processing they demand or the interpretative effects they can have. I am only ‘you’ from the perspective of a speaker addressing me as such. From my perspective, I am ‘I’. To comprehend the pronoun ‘you’ as referring to me, I have to conceptually shift into the perspective of the speaker – that is the only way to resolve the reference. What occurs, then, when processing ‘you’, may be a kind of dual positioning, or deictic ‘toggling’ between the two participant positions (to borrow a term from text world theory, in which ‘toggling’ is used to describe a reader’s switching between multiple subworlds of the story, conceptualisation of and transition between which is driven by textual cues). This deictic toggling between the loci of the narrator and narratee is, I argue, fundamental to all narratorial uses of ‘you’.
What also always occurs in reading narratorial uses of ‘you’ in fiction, I propose, is some degree of the deictic multiplicity of ‘you’ – awareness of the impossibility of direct address through fictional, textual discourse, awareness of the many potential readers, etc. This ‘re-primes’ the reader’s extrafictional position (McIntyre 2006: 114-115), shifting the reader back out of the fiction and its discourse, creating that sense of alienation. As with the toggling between the deictic centres of the narrator and narratee, this shifting is also a toggling – here between the textually inscribed extradiegetic locus of the narratee and the extrafictional actual locus of the reader. This transitory oscillation between the two deictic centres can account for the sense of tension between immersion and alienation discussed above. Whereas I propose that the toggling between narrator and narratee positions is a corollary of all narratorial uses of ‘you’, the toggling between narratee and extrafictional reader positions can be intensified, or the shift to the extrafictional locus more dominant, depending on the particular use of ‘you’ (for example, depending on whether or not the ‘you’ is subsequently further specified in such a way as to alienate the reader from the occupation of ‘you’, e.g. gendered, etc.). This hypothesis of processing paths therefore accommodates the various uses of ‘you’ posited by Herman (2002). The bidirectional arrows in figure 4 depict the deictic toggling proposed.

![Figure 4. Basic path of readerly shifting evoked by narratorial uses of ‘I’ and ‘you’](image)

This hypothesis can be extended to account for the narratorial use of ‘you’ in reference to a storyworld protagonist, as in second person fiction. In that the character is referred to as ‘you’, the speaking ‘I’ to whom this ‘you’ is related as an addressee and ‘other’ remains the primary, narratorial focalising perspective, while the deictic references are also partially and secondarily anchored to the character (designated as ‘you’) through whom the narrator is focalising (equivalent to the dual anchorage in any case of free indirect discourse). The immersive effect can be particularly intense due to the frequency of deictic cues anchoring ‘you’ within the storyworld. On the other hand, a sense of alienation and readerly shifting back to awareness of his/her extrafictional locus can be equally intense in such narrative, as when caused by any specificity of the ‘you’ protagonist prompting readerly awareness of the ill-fitting, and illusory, nature of his/her conceptual occupation of the role, as well as through awareness of the deictic multiplicity of the pronoun in such a discourse context. Furthermore, the primary narratorial focalising locus can easily be foregrounded and re-primed any stage through, for example, his/her self-reference through use of ‘I’. The bidirectional arrows in figure 5 demonstrate the proposed paths of deictic shifting in second person fiction.
In Transit

I will now analyse an example of uses of ‘you’ in an extract from a postmodern text, employing the model outlined above to present a hypothesis of readerly processing and attendant interpretative effects. The extract uses ‘I’ and ‘you’ in a variety of ways as part of a metafictional thematisation of the role of the reader in fiction, and the role of ‘other’ in the construction of reality, that runs throughout the text in question. Metafictional effects foreground, discuss and/or confront aspects of the fictionality of the novel. The metafictional effects of use of ‘you’, particularly, in this novel have fuelled some critical commentary which can be elucidated and enhanced by closer attention to the deictic shifting entailed.

Brophy’s novel In Transit (1969) begins, at least, with a narrative mode of first person retrospective narration. The narratorial addressee is termed, within the first few pages, the narrator’s ‘interlocutor’, and is described as a natural and inevitable part of the consciousness of the narrator. McHale describes Brophy’s use of direct address of the reader in In Transit (1969) as an expression of a theory that ‘consciousness itself arises from love for an internalized interlocutor’, adding ‘and of course this theory is used to justify the many apostrophes to the reader that recur throughout Brophy’s text’ (1987: 226). However, analysis of some passages containing this apparent apostrophic address can reveal deeper metafictional implications brought to effect through complex trajectories of readerly deictic shifting.

The narrator introduces this notion of an interlocutor as ‘imaginary’, and yet soon posits it as external to the narrator’s own mind, and, after a brief attribution of it to ‘the public-address system’ (12) which could potentially be that of the airport which the protagonist occupies, describes it as a voice that ‘did not seem to emerge anywhence’ (12). The narrator then voices the words of that interlocutor. The second person pronoun occurs occasionally in these early pages, but not as a means of addressing the inscribed interlocutor, rather in the form of the ‘general you’ – that is, to express gnomic truths, or serving akin to ‘one’, as in ‘I sprang out of the tweed-suited chair which, sloped backwards, was designed to let you rise from it only as a very slow Venus from the foam runner, and began to stroll’ (13). The reader’s path of deictic shifting during these pages is thus predominantly via the locus of the extradiegetic narratee to the deictic centre of the focalising narrator (sometimes shifting into the diegetic entity that is the historical version of the ‘I’ narrator, whom the narrator occasionally focalises through). As described
above, though, at junctures at which the ‘general you’ is encountered, the processual demands prompt the reader to conceptually traverse the earlier stages of that path and transiently toggle between his/her actual deictic centre within the extrafictional context (in awareness of the many referential possibilities of that pronoun) and the extradiegetic deictic centres of the narratee and focalising narrator, as part of attempting to resolve the deictic referent.

On page 17, however, a passage begins in which ‘you’ seems to be being employed both in apostrophic address and in a brief instance of second person narration in which the reader is positioned as the central actor in a hypothetical situation. The passage occurs after the narrator has described his/her decision (the narrator’s gender remains a mystery even to him/herself throughout the novel) to stay in the Transit Lounge, missing his/her flight, and ruminated on the strangeness of significant decisions ‘taking effect entirely inside your own head at a time when you happen to be in public’ (17). The narrator then begins apparently addressing the reader as follows:

Suppose you are walking alone along a crowded street when you suddenly remember an errand in the opposite direction. Are you capable of just […] turning about and walking unconcernedly up the pavement you’ve been walking down? Felicitations if you are. But I’ll bet you aren’t, even though you rationally point out to yourself it’s no one’s business but your own. What do I think you do? Cross over. That’s if you’re the skulking kind. Dodge in and out of traffic a little, to place obstacles between you and any eye that might be idly taking in your course […] To walk back along the pavement on the opposite side is a far more possible act: and in any case you might have crossed the road to inspect something suddenly spotted in a shop window, whose nature (Gone Home to Fetch Cash) might have changed your mind and direction. If you’re not the skulking kind, I imagine you dramatize your decision. You halt as if the next pavement stone had opened up into a pit of hell. You tut-teeth; you swing your racquet arm up and then punchingly down […] you possibly even click castanet-fingers. Your dramatization, is, of course, a benefit performance: for the benefit of potential readers of your sign language. Not one of these actions would you commit were you, alone at home, to remember something in the kitchen as you walked through the hall. […] When, on the pavement, you at last accomplish your turnabout, your shoulders are held a little more square than sits easily on you, you perhaps loose a whispered whistle over your own propensity to forgetfulness, and your face, turned up as if to the sun, wears a great, rueful, wide-to-all-the-world, Gary Cooper grin…

I click my fingers, bite my castanet thumb at you. Got you. That’s what I think you do, hypocrite (let me alienate you) lecteur/interlocutor.

(17-18, emphasis in the original)

The narrator here appears to instruct the reader to imagine a situation. The ensuing description takes the form of second person narration, in that the reader is designated at the positions of both the extradiegetic narratee and the protagonist within a hypothesised storyworld. Several instances of apparent apostrophic address interrupt this description, however, with more potentially alienating effects. Further nuances of the narratorial focalisation and address determine more fluctuations still in the reader’s deictic positioning. The deictic vacillations disrupt the reader’s suspension of disbelief and conceptual immersion within the extradiegesis and beyond, confronting and challenging his/her relationship to the discourse of the novel.

The passage is dominated by the narrator’s hypothesis regarding the reader’s behaviour in a certain scenario. The narrator establishes ‘you’ as the protagonist within this scenario and focalises through that ‘you’ in narrating the action. The many spatial deictic referents anchored to that ‘you’ (e.g., ‘walking […] up the pavement you’ve been walking down’, ‘walk back along the pavement on the opposite side’, ‘the next pavement stone’, ‘on the pavement’, etc.) prompt the reader to conceptually shift to that diegetic position.

The reader simultaneously occupies the position of the extradiegetic narratee, nonetheless, being overtly directed to do so by the different speech acts performed by the narrator to the addressee. The
narrator’s imperative to the reader to ‘suppose’ the scenario and the present tense through which it is issued give the impression of the narrator and reader being ontological equals sharing an immediate communicative context, thus affirming the reader’s already established conceptual anchorage within the extradiegesis. The narrator’s question, ‘Are you capable of just [...] turning about and walking unconcernedly up the pavement you’ve been walking down?’, contains the first instance of ‘you’ in this passage, which further strengthens the reader’s projective path to occupy the addressee position. The interrogative also affirms the shared communicative context – even more so than the preceding imperative – in implying that an immediate communicative response from the reader is possible.

The forms of address within the passage also work against the reader’s conceptual occupation of the narratee position, however. As discussed, the use of ‘you’ inherently risks prompting readerly awareness of its deictic multiplicity and the ensuing alienation as described above. Moreover, the reality that the reader cannot reply to the narrator’s question foregrounds the ontological division between the reader’s extrafictional context and the fictional extradiegesis. The narrator initially appears to be openly ignorant of the reader’s thoughts in not pre-supposing his/her reply, highlighting that impossibility of spoken verbal exchange. The narrator does, nonetheless, offer a question, directed towards his/herself, supposedly on the reader’s behalf, and yet anchored to the narrator’s perspective: ‘What do I think you do?’ The speech act suggests partial narratorial shifting to the narratee’s locus, while the pronouns remain bound to the narrator’s. This necessarily causes further readerly conceptual oscillation between those two loci, the processual demands drawing attention to the unusual pragmatics of the utterance and further disrupting the reader’s suspension of disbelief and conceptual immersion in the extradiegetic communicative context.

The hypothesis itself may also re-prime the reader’s extrafictional locus: although the narrator acknowledges the possibility of the reader following one course of action, he/she asserts the other two to be more likely, therefore presuming of the reader kinds of behaviour which may or may not fit well with his/her self-perception. The hypothetical quality of the narrator’s suppositions regarding the reader’s behaviour is foregrounded through epistemic modal expressions like ‘I’ll bet’ and ‘I imagine’, and yet the narrator describes the two courses he/she presumes likely in great detail and with no further hedging, rather with bare declarative statements. The level of particularisation of the behaviour, combined with the occasional culturally-specific references (e.g., ‘your racquet arm’, ‘castanet fingers’, ‘Gary Cooper grin’, etc.) increases the likelihood of the reader becoming more aware of his/her extrafictional context, in comparing the behaviour and cultural references to his/her own, and may therefore undermine the immersive effect created by the second person narration.

The final sentences may be the most alienating, the most likely to re-prime the reader’s extrafictional context and reverse his/her conceptual shifting back to that locus. The passage finishes with the words ‘I click my fingers, bite my castanet thumb at you. Got you. That’s what I think you do, hypocrite (let me alienate you) lecteur/interlocutor’. Here, the focalising ‘I’-speaker is foregrounded through repeated self-reference. The second person pronoun ‘you’ although, as before, designating the addressee’s locus, is anchored to and mediated through that ‘I’’s locus, encouraging readerly conceptual toggling between the two. The insulting actions the narrator describes him/herself performing to the addressee, however, the implication that he/she has exposed and trapped the addressee (in ‘Got you’), and some of the (‘relationally’/socially deictic’) terms of address used (e.g. ‘hypocrite lecteur’) are alienating in the extreme, both discomforting the reader and making direct reference to his/her ontological relationship to the text as its (necessarily extrafictional) reader (‘lecteur’). The direct reference to ‘alienation’, the cultural and intertextual reference to Shakespearian drama, and to Baudelaire, Eliot after him, and Nabakov’s narratorial address of the reader in Lolita, after both, reinforces readerly awareness of his/her extrafictional context in relation to the fictionality of the text he/she is engaged with (its literary context, narratological conventions, etc.). In various ways, then, the reader is prompted to shift back out of the extradiegesis to his/her extrafictional locus and reconsider his/her relation to the text and its participants.

The final term of address, ‘interlocutor’, is yet perhaps the most disarming, for it instigates readerly revision of its earlier uses in the novel. As I mentioned earlier, the narrator has previously
attempted to locate the interlocutor, narrated the interlocutor’s words, and, moreover, established the interlocutor as an inherent part of the consciousness, and thus the constitution, of his/her narratorial self. To now name the reader the interlocutor is to confront the notion of the text as heteronomous, dependent on the reader for realisation, and to make explicit the analogy offered by much postmodern metafiction between the construction of the novel and the construction of identity and reality. In retrospect, having encountered this final term of address, the other aspects of the surrounding text make further contribution still to this implied analogy. The words ‘click’, ‘castanet’ and ‘fingers’ repeat and so recall the narrator’s description of the addressee’s likely dramatic performance (‘you possibly even click castanet fingers’), ‘for the benefit of potential readers of your sign language’, to which he/she added ‘Not one of these actions would you commit were you [...] alone’. In now pointedly describing his/her own actions with the same words, the narrator seems to be superimposing the actions, acknowledging his/her own act of narration now to be a performance, his/her own dramatisation, ‘for the benefit of potential readers’, making overt the identification between the narrator’s reader and the interlocutor of his/her consciousness. The phrase ‘hypocrite lecteur’, furthermore, brings with it echoes of its original co-text, ‘mon semblable, mon frère’, perhaps subtly suggesting an acknowledgement of kinship in performing for the other, and/or asserting a oneness between self and other in together constituting consciousness and identity and/or a fundamental interdependence between ‘I’ and ‘you’, as between text and reader. These suggestions are not only thematised here, but effectively performed throughout the passage through the processual demands made upon the reader and the entailed awareness of his/her deictic positioning and engagement.

Given this analysis, it would seem that use of the second person pronoun within In Transit by no means consistently asserts ‘love for an internalized interlocutor’, nor is this theory simply used to ‘justify the many apostrophes to the reader’ (McHale 1987: 226, as cited above). Rather, it seems that Herman’s observations on the use of ‘you’ more generally hold true for its use in this novel: the second person pronoun can ‘compel us to reflect on the conditions and limits of participation in discourse generally’ (1994: 389).

Conclusion

This article has presented a hypothesis of the processing involved in the comprehension of narratorial uses of the deictic pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’. I have proposed that recognition of the fictional participant roles of narrator and narratee, and the extradiegetic narrative level at which they operate, is crucial for a more comprehensive cognitive poetic account of this processing, and have proposed augmentation of deictic shift theory through the introduction of the concept of ‘deictic toggling’ as a means of accounting for the different interpretative effects reported to be evoked by these pronouns. Further study is necessary relating to the relative priming of the deictic centres designated by narratorial use of ‘I’ and ‘you’ and related processing in cases of explicit narratorial use of only one of these pronouns (though the one presupposes the role of the other). Cases of more ‘covert’ narration (with sparse use of deictics anchored to the narratorial locus), cases of greater specification of the narrator/narratee (e.g. through uses of pronouns such as ‘she’, ‘he’, ‘we’, ‘they’, ‘it’, etc.), and character use of these pronouns also require further investigation. Furthermore, though several psycholinguistic experiments have been undertaken in recent decades which support aspects of theory of deixis and deictic shifting (e.g. Bryant, Tversky & Franklin 1992; Morrow 1994; Rall & Harris 2000), few investigate the effects of particular pronoun use, and so more advanced empirical testing in this area would be invaluable to enhancing understanding of the cognitive processing of these pronouns. Given that the personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’ are used in many text types – fictional and non-fictional – for a huge range of purposes, a better understanding of their functioning would be valuable to a variety of discourse-related disciplines and industries (e.g. forensic linguistics, health communication, advertising), and it is hoped that this article contributes to this progress.
 Bibliography


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