We all dreamed it: The politics of knowing and un-knowing the ‘war on terror’

Introduction:

In reference to the planes that crashed into the Twin Towers on September 11th, 2001, Jean Baudrillard (2002, 5) said the following: “The fact that we have dreamed of this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree – is unacceptable to the Western moral conscience.” To be clear, what is unacceptable to the Western moral conscience is that ‘we’ dreamed it and yet Baudrillard insists that ‘we’/everyone did; it could not be otherwise. Here Baudrillard presents us with a truth claim that cannot be verified because it must be denied even to ourselves. It is an unconscious truth/the stuff of dreams. These are the facts.

From a social scientific point of view, this quote baffles and yet this paper will argue that an interrogation of this quote and Baudrillard’s logic may offer us valuable insights into the politics of knowing and un-knowing associated with the ‘war on terror.’ This article is interested in the question of how it came to be that post 9/11, the seemingly most powerful and secure on the planet came to be identified as subjects of terror/trauma within the context of a global war (otherwise known as the ‘war on terror’). But, even more tellingly and related to Baudrillard’s quote, this paper is interested in the ‘(un)consciousness of risk’ that preceded the attacks such that we can meaningfully make sense of Baudrillard’s claim that the attacks were in some sense anticipated – even if only at the recesses of consciousness.

1 Many thanks to Victoria Browne, Gary Browning, Chris Hesketh, Veronique Pin-Fat, Doerthe Rosenow, the journal editors and the reviewers of this article for the feedback and encouragement you provided along the way. I am indebted.

2 The specific question of whether the events of 9/11 were also desired is beyond the scope of this paper – except to say that, of course, bodies were differentially aligned with and against hegemonic configurations of power – often in complex and contradictory ways.
What were the conscious, semi-conscious and unconscious avowals and disavowals that marked the contours of a re-emergent, if vulnerable, ‘West,’ as ‘a community at risk’ in the period preceding the attacks and that has shaped understandings of risk and the ‘war on terror’ since? Baudrillard’s quote is invoked as a provocation – one that will be used first to unsettle contemporary understandings of risk and the ‘war on terror’ and then to investigate the power relations that structure both the conscious and unconscious experiences and daily forms of knowing and un-knowing that give meaning to and invigorate articulations of risk.

To be clear, foreboding knowledge as related to Western vulnerability in the context of the ‘war on terror,’ has been the subject of investigation in the social sciences, particularly in the literature on risk and precautionary risk stemming from Ulrich Beck’s (1999) World Risk Society thesis. Beck has directed our attention to change at the level of ontology – or the contemporary structural features of our globalized and post-industrial world – and the emerging consciousness and/or rationalities that follow, including consciousness of the changing nature of risk. As will be discussed, others have adapted this to understand early efforts to make sense of the 9/11 attacks and the ‘war on terror’ to follow – in light of risk consciousness and precautionary risk rationalities. What is absent, in relation to Baudrillard’s provocative statement, is any sustained engagement with what might be called ‘the stuff of dreams’ – which, for the purposes of this paper, refers to the desires or the conscious/unconscious/semi-conscious disavowals that are formative of an emerging risk consciousness and/or rationality and any ‘we’ who might (really and/or imaginatively) hold these in common. Arguably, these are outside of the social sciences frame and for good reason – as they are hard to objectively document and quantify. However, if the aim of the social scientific project is neither to distort, nor to reify the ontology, vocabularies and rationalities of the powerful – i.e., if the aim is not to displace ‘the work’ of anxieties and desires within a frame reason/rationality, extending a particular temporal and spatial logic of
‘the West’ as reason/transcendence in the process - we must think anew about what and how we see and consider the tools we have for doing so. This is my argument.

To make this case, this article will first point to the limits of contemporary risk approaches towards making sense of the terrorized, traumatized Western liberal subject, i.e.: the subject of/at risk. Second, it will propose an alternative methodological approach - drawing upon postcolonial and feminist International Relations (IR) scholarship, critical race studies and critical phenomenology to better identify the power relations that structure both the conscious and unconscious experiences and daily forms of knowing and un-knowing that give meaning to and invigorate articulations of risk. Third, and following from above, it will outline an alternative genealogical account of the terrorized, traumatized Western liberal subject – one that highlights contingency, power relations, and the formative disavowals that enable and sustain contemporary configurations of risk, its subjects and the ‘war on terror’ waged in their name.

**Risk and the ‘War on Terror’:**

Engagements with questions of ‘Western’ consciousness of contemporary risk – if not a sense of foreboding - would be remiss without some reference to the work of Beck’s (1999) *World Risk Society*. So, this essay will begin here – outlining Beck’s thesis briefly before moving on to consider the usages and adaptations of this thesis that have taken place to make sense of the ‘risk consciousness’ and ‘logics’ that have variously informed understandings and practices of the ‘war on terror.’ Beck’s *World Risk Society* thesis describes a transition from early modernity (wherein the risks of industrialization could be tamed, managed and controlled through expert knowledge and rational calculation) to late modernity (wherein these risks have escaped our control and ‘we’ have consciousness of this). We are conscious that the outcomes of industrial ‘progress’ – including nuclear, chemical and genetic technology as well as the environmental consequences of ‘modernization’ – cannot be
reasonably managed and accommodated through traditional insurance schemes or security logics based on calculable threats and dangers (50-53). The genie is out of the bottle, so to speak, and ‘we’ have awareness of this with the result that late modern Risk Society becomes “reflexive”: “an issue and problem to itself” with socio-political ramifications for the very foundations of post-industrial society (72-81). The key points for this paper are as follows: (a) while consciousness of these changes is a social phenomenon (and, indeed constitutes the second stage in the transition from Industrial to Risk society) it is derived from the changed reality outlined above (the first stage in the transition); and (b) while the risks are global in nature (and cannot be contained to one community or even nation), the consciousness that emerges in response to these changes is that of ‘the West’ – emerging from its industrial history, political traditions and intellectual heritage. According to Beck, the latter may be re-harnessed to correct the mistakes of the past and to usher in a new “European global domestic policy” and “ecological enlightenment” (69-70).

Applied to the ‘war on terror,’ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen (2002) argues that the events of 9/11 actualized fears already present in the Western consciousness – in the form of the ontological insecurity experienced by the West in the 1990s. Rasmussen’s interest lies in the fact that in the absence of a clear statement of purpose from al-Qaida as to why they targeted the Twin Towers specifically, the attacks were interpreted within a framework of globalization that came to dominate Western conceptualisations of world order post-Cold War and to frame Western anxieties: “The most powerful explanation that first came to light was that al-Qaeda had chosen to attack the World Trade Centre because of its value as a symbol of globalization” (234). The question is how/why this explanation was so readily accepted and how/why globalization became the dominant framework for interpreting the
meaning of the attacks. But, despite the constructivist undertones informing this inquiry, Rasmussen, like Beck, arrives at a largely “realist” explanation:

This way of constructing 9/11 shows the reflexive nature of security policy in the late modern age. The new reflexivity manifested itself in the conclusion that even the U.S. had become a vulnerable ‘risk society’…Terrorism is regarded as an inherent risk in modern sociability because it is constructed as the negative consequence of the globalization process. The very process by which the West is believed to be transcending the modes of conflict and production of the 20th Century thus entails the creation of new threats and new modes of conflict (327).

Rasmussen further explains that in adopting the framework of globalization to make sense of the attacks “the West [in fact] made its own fear al-Qaeda’s reason” (324, italics added).

This latter statement is particularly interesting, raising as it does questions about the consciousness of risk that preceded the attacks. But, what is noteworthy for the purposes of my analysis, is that fear, anxiety and vulnerability emerge for Rasmussen, much like Beck, as consciousness of structural risks: risks resultant from the particular configuration of the given economic and political order - in this case globalization. It is also noteworthy that ‘Risk Society’ and ‘the West’ appear again as ontological givens.

Like Baudrillard (2002), Rasmussen’s analysis seemingly stems from an interest in the foreboding knowledge (or sense of risk) that preceded the events of 9/11 such that the event itself may be understood as actualizing fears/desires already present: We all dreamed it. But, whilst Baudrillard directs our attention to the political unconscious which (arguably) underpins this foreboding and the politics of knowing and un-knowing associated with the ‘war on terror,’ Rasmussen directs our attention away from the knowing/un-knowing subject who dreams to our contemporary ontology and the objective insecurities produced by it. Like Beck, he assumes that risk consciousness, and even fear, derives from an apprehension of reality. The role of the social sciences, it seems, is to make transparent that which ‘is,’ but

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3 Beck describes himself as both a realist and constructivist. The limits of constructivism, he suggests, pertain to not being able “to define or declare what really ‘is’ or ‘is not’.” Realism enables him to engage with “new and contrary experiences of the global age of global risks” wherein, he argues, the nature of risk itself (and seemingly the nature of what is) has changed (133-134).
lies beyond immediate perception (the structural features of our world, for example) so that we might better understand our world and the possibilities within it. While nothing about this is particularly radical from a social scientific point of view, and may even appear sensible, the presumed link between risk (as a calculation of probability associated with structural change) and risk consciousness, even fear, is problematic. Why are we conscious of some risks and not others? Why fear? The aim of this project is to direct our attention back to the subject who perceives risk, does so as a member of a political community (‘the West’) and understands 9/11 as evidence of the risks associated with the fluidity of national borders and ease of movement associated with globalization.

Critical governmentality approaches to risk or, post-9/11, to pre-cautionary risk as a logic, rather than an ontology, are helpful here. Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (2007) have been particularly instructive, highlighting the ascendancy of the principle of precautionary risk logics in the aftermath of 9/11 not as a response to reality, but as a modality of approaching reality – a means of “organizing reality, disciplining the future, taming chance and rationalizing individual conduct” (95). In a nutshell, unlike risk assessments, precautionary risk logics demand that we act not on the basis of knowledge, but on the basis of “catastrophic contingency” – on the basis of the slightest conceivable risk of the absolute worst that could happen (101). Defined thus, “pre-emptive strikes…Guantanamo Bay, practices of extraordinary rendition…indefinite detention” and, I would add, generalized internet and phone record surveillance are all examples of “technologies appropriate to precautionary risk” (103). Tellingly, they cite Tony Blair’s decision to go to war against Iraq on the basis of the slightest conceivable risk that Iraq might possess any weapons of mass destruction as an exemplary example of the logic at play (105). Aradau and Van Munster point out that precautionary risk logics have become increasingly ascendant and they depart from Beck in two significant ways: (1) in the proposition that in
the absence of knowledge, modern technologies of governance and efforts to capture and
control contingency proceed unabated, if not with more vigour, via a logic of precautionary
risk; and (2) as indicated above, in their insistence (contra Beck) that this framework for
thinking and acting upon the ‘war on terror’ is just that: a frame generated not by risk itself,
but by a particular “dispositif of risk” (91).

The critical import of their project lies in the latter and should not be underestimated
as it allows them to shift the focus from risk per se (as given) towards an analysis of the ways
“the world and existing problematizations are made into risks” and “what effects this form of
ordering entails upon populations” (2007, 97). Of particular interest to this essay, is the fact
that later, in a later Special Issue of *Security Dialogue*, they, along with Luis Lobo-Guerrero,
point out that precautionary risk logics can re-activate Orientalist frameworks for seeing
(Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 151). This is a point Louise Amoore
(2007), amongst others, develop elsewhere and I will return to such analyses later. But,
rather than reading the work of these authors as illustrative of the above statement, I will use
it to disrupt the grammar in Aradau and Van Munster’s (2007) claims – a point which ties
into my main criticism of their development of Beck’s *World Risk Society* thesis. My
criticism is this: despite the critical intent of their work, their analysis does not go far enough
if we want to understand the subjects of/at risk (the emergence of the terrorized, traumatized
Western liberal subject) and it may, in fact, distort our understanding of the salience of
precautionary risk logics. It should be stated from the outset that this critique should in no
way be interpreted as a reflection of the rich body of scholarship these scholars have
contributed to. What I will describe as one of consequences of Aradau’s and Van Munster’s
(2007) analysis does not necessarily reflect (and may, indeed, offend) their intentions. These
qualifying remarks are important – not only in the spirit of collegiality and fairness, but
because if the effects I describe do betray their intentions, the question is ‘how/why did this
happen?’ The reasons for this, I suggest, have methodological and epistemological implications for critical IR scholarship in terms of questions of how we know and larger issues pertaining to the politics of knowing and un-knowing at work in IR.

Certainly, this critique builds on the work of those before me (many of whose insights I will draw upon in the alternative genealogical account of risk and the ‘war on terror’ to follow). It contains, for instance, strong echoes of Meera Sabaratnam’s (2013, 259) reminder (citing Wallerstein) that “Eurocentrism has many avatars.” My distinct contribution lies in pointing to additional ways that Eurocentrism has taken root in our disciplinary frameworks for seeing and knowing with a particular focus on the literature on Risk and the ‘War on Terror’ (even and perhaps most tellingly in the critical literature), and in pointing towards ways we might see and know differently. Following Sabaratnam (2013), Eurocentrism often remains rooted in our basic ontologies, albeit as so unremarkable as to escape notice - beginning for instance with a cartography that takes as given the distinctiveness of ‘the West’ as an entity with its own logics, history and attributes. It simply is or inadvertently becomes in our writing as if it was there all along and whatever our critically-informed starting point. My critique of Aradau and Van Munster (2007) is precisely this. Regardless of their starting point or intentions, their analytical framework leads them to an analysis that reproduces and even extends a particular historiography of ‘the West’ as an actor with its own reasons and logics - as opposed to one that would have us inquire into the conditions of ‘the West’s’ possible articulation, insofar as it is possible to speak of something like a Western consciousness or political unconscious.

By shifting from risk as an ontology to risk (or precautionary risk) as a logic, Aradau and Van Munster (2007) politicize risk. But, the framework and grammar they employ - wherein a particular risk dispositif emerges, inscribes reality and governs - has the effect of disembodying precautionary risk logic, separating it from the desires and anxieties that
animate it and from the co-constitution of the subjects of/at risk. This grammar is evident, for example, in the following statements: “the ‘war on terror’ displays an insatiable quest for knowledge” and “risk inscribes reality as harbouring ‘potential dangerous irruptions’” (91 and 98, bold and italics added). While the ‘war on terror’ is presented within quotation marks, highlighting the term’s obsequiousness, the effect remains that risk logics and/or the ‘war on terror’ (read through the logic of precautionary risk) act on bodies that are always already present as members of a ‘Western’ population. In a sense, this is the point – i.e., to demonstrate that “[g]overnmental rationalities and technologies [in this case, those associated with precautionary risk] affect behaviour and ‘construct’ forms of ordered agency and subjectivity in the population to be governed” (97).

In addition to subsuming questions of human agency, not to mention power relations, the effect of their analytical frame is to ascribe governmental modalities with transparency - as if they speak for themselves. Ultimately, this enables Aradau and Van Munster (2007) to go so far as to claim that within the dominant dispositif of precautionary risk, the “war[s] of Afghanistan and Iraq do not speak of a recent rediscovery of militarism,” but of a technology of precaution, “mobilized alongside other technologies of precaution…to avoid terrorist irruptions in the future” (105, bold and italics added). The voice of power and critique merge here. It is almost as if the ‘we’ of ‘the West’, understood as the targets of terror, are being governed by a particular logic seemingly fit for ‘our’ secular, cosmopolitan, postmodern age. It is almost as if, in this brave new world, it is rationalities and logics that govern. Hence, even if we heed Aradau and Van Munster’s injunction to think critically about these developments and their effects, those charged with ‘our’ security can be considered to be drawing upon a particular form of reason, extemporaneous of power relations. In this way, critique becomes complicit with and perpetuates the deceits of power, displacing fear and desire with reason and rationality in ways that grant the ‘War on Terror’ a certain logic. And
‘the West,’ as a foreign policy actor, (re)appears in ways that resemble the stories told about ‘it’ by heads of state and security experts – ontologically distinct – in ways that do nothing to disturb contemporary cartographies and frameworks for thinking risk/war.

How did this happen? It is in asking how this came to be – how otherwise critical scholarship failed to produce what Sara Ahmed (2004a) might call “effects that are critical, in the sense of challenging relations of power that remain concealed as…givens” – that this paper moves from an engagement with particular texts towards an engagement with larger questions about methodology and epistemology in IR. Having outlined the particular regime of visuality offered by certain risk/governmentality analyses of contemporary security issues and the limits of these approaches, insofar as they tend to reproduce dominant ways of seeing and knowing, the next section will offer suggestions for how we might see differently. How might we move from a focus on the sayable and the said to the unsaid (to the formative disavowals and politics of un-knowing) and to the bodies that negotiate this terrain, rendering particular logics of risk and the subjects of/at risk intelligible, if not simply given?

Returning to David Campbell’s (1998, 1) point that danger does not exist independently from those to whom it poses a threat, this essay seeks to extend his insights to the literature on risk and build upon them – inquiring into the status of the logic of precautionary risk as a relation of power/knowledge. More specifically, in a reversal of Aradau and Van Munster’s suggestion that contemporary wars can be understood as a technology of a precautionary logic, this essay will attempt to situate the logic of precautionary risk as a tactic of war (in a Foucauldian sense) - animated by a wide range of desires, interests and anxieties in a context of highly unequal power relations.
Methodological considerations:

Taking a page from Carol Cohn’s (1987) ground-breaking article ‘Sex, Death and the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals,’ that shifted the discussion from one of the logic of deterrence theory (good or bad?) to one of the fears and desires that gave rise to it, this article will urge an approach that puts the talking heads in their place. However, in a departure from Cohn, it will do so without recourse to the psyche or the psychological make-up of the terrorized, traumatized Western subject. Its concern rather is what might be called “the aesthetic subject” of terror – to adapt Michael Shapiro’s (2013, 11) phrase. Taking from Shapiro, “the value of conceiving subjects aesthetically rather than psychologically [derives insofar as] [t]heir movements and dispositions are less significant in terms of what is revealed about their inner lives than what they tell us about the world to which they belong” (11). But, unlike Shapiro, my concern with the aesthetic subject is not specifically with those “who, through artistic genres, articulate and mobilize thinking” (11). More broadly and more narrowly, my concern is with the bodies that simultaneously invigorate and, in a sense, come to be in and through discourses of precautionary risk.

The aim is not to ascertain the truth of the subject in terms of the meaning or intent underlying their speech, but the value of a particular discursive formation – such as the dispositif of precautionary risk. On this, Shapiro (2013) points to a particularly useful passage by Foucault:

To analyse a discursive formation is…to weigh the value of statements. A value that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange (4, italics added).

It is to ask about “the historical moments in which alternative subjects emerge within different historical worlds” (Shapiro 2013, 6) – when, for example, the most powerful and secure on the planet seemingly identify as collective subjects of terror/trauma within the context of a global war. Seen thus, the dispositif of precautionary risk is less important as a
governing logic per se than as a currency of exchange within a particular set of power relations.

Adding to this, in ways that arguably move us beyond Foucault, this project involves, in Ann Laura Stoler’s (1995, 5) words, “disassembl[ing] the neat divisions that could imagine a European history and its unified collectivities apart from the externalized Others on whom it was founded and which it produced” (Also see Sabaratnam 2013). This is not simply a matter of pointing to the ways the ‘war on terror’ draws upon and reproduces Orientalist stereotypes and power relations in terms of hierarchical binary divides between the ‘us’ over here and the ‘them’ over there – as pre-constituted categories available for (re)production and re-articulation. Here Ahmed’s (2007) work on the phenomenology of whiteness and the surfacing of bodies will be drawn upon as it can draw our attention from the spoken word and economies of logic to the bodies or aesthetic subjects that speak and cohere around particular words and discursive formations. More generally it can draw our attention to ‘the bodily’ or that which Diana Coole (2007, 175-176) might refer to as the “entire corporeal subtext of lived meanings [that] is always interwoven with cognition and discursive exchanges.” These lived meanings and performances – the various gazes, the politics of knowing and un-knowing, and the cultural politics of emotion that Ahmed (2004b; 2007) describes in terms of feelings of towards-ness and away-ness and shrinking and expanding, that pepper our everyday exchanges and shape our very being-in-the-world, tend to escape our analysis. Yet, this article will argue that they can offer us a great deal more in terms of our ability to understand the logic of precautionary risk’s capacity for circulation and exchange than a history of Western consciousness offered by Beck (1999) and extended by Aradau and Van Munster (2007).

Weaving in the “corporeal subtext of lived meanings” will, for the purposes of this article, involve looking beyond official government statements – although these will be
included as they too form part of the web of meaning and experience - to the news media, popular culture, literary fiction and personal lived experience. It will involve extending the regime of visuality from the stuff of official record (the officially said and the say-able) to the myriad forms of communication and exchange – the everyday power relations that underpin and undercut the public discourse of precautionary risk. Literary fiction can be particularly valuable here. As Alina Sajed (2103, 10) has said of the value of literary texts for IR scholarship, they are able “to draw on complex maps of socio-political interactions.” Similarly, I hope to offer a new story and/or an alternative genealogy of the dispositif of precautionary risk, one that does not dismiss those offered previously, but resituates ‘risk society’ and precautionary risk logics within a more complex map of power relations.

This alternative mapping will trace articulations of precautionary risk – and, more specifically, articulations of the subject of precautionary risk – across three utterances chosen to represent three distinctive temporal moments characterizing ‘Western’ negotiations with the ‘War on Terror.’ It will begin by returning to the Baudrillard (2002) quote that instigated this paper and which speaks of a consciousness of risk that preceded the 9/11 attacks. Next, it will turn to the popular refrain, ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ to chart the transition from the language of risk to the language of war. Finally, this article will turn to the infamous quote by then U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, which reflects another shift, away from a framework of war towards the more abstract framework of risk - albeit here I suggest that we can see that the framework of risk is also/always a framework of war. The aim is to draw attention to the links between the abstract subject of precautionary risk (or the subject who is interpellated within a logic of “catastrophic contingency” [Aradau and Van Munster 2011]) and the terrorized/traumatized Western liberal subject – highlighting the corporeal subtext of lived meanings and uneven power relations that underpin public forms of speech and abstract logics.
To be clear, whilst this paper is focussing its discussion around articulations of risk, its concern is to untangle that “which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange” (Foucault quoted in Shapiro 2013, 4). Its concern is with the formative disavowals, the politics of knowing and un-knowing that call forth, invigorate and give meaning to particular articulations of risk. Here I wish to introduce a more corporeal and textured tale of the emergence of the dispositif of precautionary risk – by looking beyond the statements to the bodies that utter and cohere around them. Objectors may point out that the account developed herein is also particular: that there are other ways lines could be drawn and dots connected between texts, events and experiences (i.e., that there are other stories that could be told). To this, my response is simply ‘yes’ and in the spirit of what I understand to be post-structuralism’s most valuable contribution to IR, let’s tell more. But, I begin here.

**We all dreamed it:**

I begin again with Baudrillard’s (2002) quote and the suggestions it contains for how we might see/know differently before adapting this, in line with the methodological considerations I outline above, to introduce a new story or perhaps to re-tell a story we knew all along but somehow forgot. Once again, this story begins before it began – or at least as some of us remember it, with a sense of foreboding in a time not so long ago:

The fact that we have dreamed this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it – because no one can avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree – is unacceptable to the Western moral conscience (5).

This articulation of a sense of foreboding risk captured by this statement is provocative in and of itself, but particularly notable to the extent that, contra Rasmussen, Baudrillard invokes and unsettles ‘the Western subject’ of/at risk as something other than and Other to itself. Not only did ‘we’ dream it, ‘we’ wished it, asserts Baudrillard: “If this is not taken into account, the event loses any symbolic dimension” (5). ‘We’/everyone wished it (as countless
Hollywood movies attest) not necessarily because of malice or a suicidal death wish, but because, for Baudrillard, it simply could not be otherwise (6-7).

And yet, it is because this dream and that which Baudrillard suggests underlies it – i.e., knowledge of a highly unequal and inherently unstable set of power relations - must be disavowed, at least by some, that there is a schism embedded at the heart of this sentence between a universal ‘we’ and a particular ‘we’ with a “Western moral conscience.” Herein lay the seeds of a tale about risk and its demarcations and the wars fought to establish and re-establish these lines. More specifically, here begins a story about the subjects who locate themselves within and against the moral-political complex of knowing and un-knowing in the ‘War on Terror’ and the formative disavowals which reside at the heart of identity formation, culture and understandings of risk. Charting this tale is to ask questions about what within the terms of a Western moral consciousness or ideological frame cannot be known, is unknown and/or is necessarily excluded within particular discursive formations. With this as our starting point we might begin to see the circulation value of the language and logic of ‘risk’ – a language that, par excellence, keeps some forms of seeing and knowing at a distance.

But, first things first. In the days and months preceding 9/11, what forms of knowing were kept at a distance? Here Rasmussen’s (2002) argument regarding the narrative construction of 9/11 within the framework of globalization can again be useful, less as a particular account of risk than in terms of what this particular excludes from view - notably the issue of power relations. While fear factors in Rasmussen’s account, fear emerges from consciousness of the risks associated with globalization/openness. Even whilst contemplating elements of imperialism in the U.S. response to 9/11, imperialism was identified in terms of a Hobbesian moment and one that signified a pivot point for the future of world order and global society: “it took decisive action to counterattack terrorism at the
same time as it emphasized that the ontology of modern society still ought to be defined by liberal ideas” (337-8). Imperialism, as Rasmussen describes it, did not feature within globalization per se. It harkened back to a time prior, albeit threatened to return as a “people realize[d] that the societal foundations of their lives [were] not as secure as they believed them to be” (337). As Rasmussen explains, the belief in American exceptionalism – in this case the idea that that the U.S. was the only substantial force standing in the way of terrorism and guarding civilization - could yield imperialism’s return in the form of the U.S. as global Leviathan. This was the concern. And this concern signified for Rasmussen the tensions inherent in the globalization discourse: “globalization is a way of conceptualising a time of transcendence [wherein “Western victory in the Cold War had allowed it to define the world on its own terms” (342)], but it is also a political means to get a desired kind of transcendence” (343). Hence, debates between conservative imperialists and liberal cosmopolitans ensued, concerning how best to make it so: whether by appealing to a global Leviathan to defend ‘the West’ (defined in terms of globalization) or extending the liberal values of ‘the West’ across the globe (343).

Framed thus, imperialism always resided within globalization – at its very heart. This is the stated and unstated and the known and un-known that underlies Rasmussen’s analysis. Rasmussen momentarily recognizes globalization within a framework of war (in the terms of “Western victory”), but almost simultaneously disavows this knowledge. He does this, as illustrated above, by splitting Western liberal cosmopolitan values from imperialism – a cut which makes sense insofar as liberal cosmopolitan values are global/transcendent and we can imagine their spread (in the contemporary context) outside of a context of war and a cut which ignores the tremendous body of scholarship that points to liberalism’s historic entanglement with imperialist aims. Remarkably, had he not performed this ‘cut’, the sense of foreboding that he describes as existing prior to 9/11 would hardly appear so mysterious!
The analysis to follow will demonstrate that a deeper exploration of the tensions within globalization discourse can help to bridge the gap between knowledge of ‘structural risks’ of openness and consciousness of these risks – and, indeed, can tell us something about the subject of/at risk.

The crux of the problem is this: Opening my bottom floor windows on a warm sunny day does not in and of itself generate a consciousness of my heightened exposure to risk. Conscious of the closed stale air and smell of my dog, I might welcome the breeze that comes in and experience a physical sense of ease/lightness that comes with associations of summer. I might not be conscious of the risks that an intruder or foreboding storm could pose due to my heightened exposure. By contrast, Rasmussen and Baudrillard identify a sense of foreboding risk prior to 9/11 and situate it within a global political framework – a framework inextricably embedded within highly unequal power relations. However, as both analyses attest (each in their own way), this is a framework that cannot fully acknowledge the disparities at its heart (e.g., that symbolically ‘globalization’ belongs to ‘the West’).

Globalization, as highlighted in Rasmussen’s account, is situated as ‘the West’s’ to bestow, deny or impose on ‘its’ terms. Note that ‘the West’ minimally features here as an identity marker and whilst it can be appropriated in different ways, in the aftermath of the Cold War, globalization became one of ‘its’ primary signifiers: signifying no less than transcendence and enlightenment.

The result is that while ‘globalization’ (as a process, phenomenon and/or outcome of a myriad of political, economic and cultural events associated with the end of the Cold War) promised a global order premised upon universal values, ‘the West’ was reproduced within its discursive terms as the exemplar civilization. While racialized notions of superiority became a taboo narrative in ‘the West’ (as a means of justifying globalization’s global aspirations), white, middle-class masculinity remained the somatic norm (Chernobrov 2014;
Puwar 2004; Ahmed 2007). If the strains are not evidenced enough in the basic grammatical tensions highlighted in the bracketed portion of the previous sentence, they came into sharp relief when President Bush, in an admitted unfortunate choice of words, pronounced in the days after the 9/11 attacks that the “barbarians had declared war” (BBC News online) – i.e., when Western leaders on both sides of the Atlantic variously declared the events of 9/11 to be “a declaration of war against all of civilization” (See Rasmussen 2002, 333). From here on in, globalization would be divided; it had a dark side. There were barbarians amongst ‘us.’

I will return to this, but I think it is important to focus a little longer on the nascent anxieties that would be actualised through the events of 9/11, but that pre-existed the event and are of a significantly different order than Rasmussen (2002) describes – not belonging to the ‘fact’ of risk (wherein risk itself is a structural property of a globalized world). These anxieties may be thought of as a ‘structural’ property of the traumatized Western liberal subject, but in ways that are of an entirely more immanent and, indeed, intimate nature – belonging to the very process of subject formation. More than a location on a map or a population, the salience of ‘the West’ as an identity marker, like any identity marker, is always contextual - as poignantly evident in the headline, “We are all Americans [now]!” published in the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, following the 9/11 attacks (Colombani 2001). As will be demonstrated, our identifications/dis-identifications are lived embodied experiences and negotiations: sometimes habituated, sometimes owned, sometimes disowned, sometimes tried on, and sometimes transgressed/made hybrid (i.e., the stuff of popular culture sensations). ‘The West’ as an enduring category depends upon meanings and interpretations of experiences that are lived and negotiated by the individuals who variously inhabit and make meaningful or unmeaningful spatial maps. Risk consciousness is a lived experience, a practice and/or experience of identity, and a way-of-being. From a phenomenological viewpoint, Ahmed (2004b, 69) points out that “vulnerability involves a particular kind of
bodily relation to the world in which openness itself is read as a potential site of danger.”

The experience of vulnerability, in the face of the openness of globalization, is, amongst other things, a means of identifying self and home and engaging with the world.

Absented from Rasmussen’s account of the Western consciousness of risk are what Stoler (1995, 198) has referred to as the “crisis and anxieties of securing bourgeois [Western] identity in a transcultural world.” The ‘crises’ which render this identity insecure and at perpetual risk of disintegration and/or megalomaniac paranoia are of a two-fold nature which run at cross-cutting purposes. On the one hand, core and periphery no longer clearly map onto geopolitical entities – such that ‘the West’ becomes increasingly problematic as a category and is obliged to do so under the terms of globalization. On the other hand, core and periphery stubbornly persist. Media images of the disjuncture between the hype and reality of our globalized world loom large and are brought ‘home.’ Edward Said’s (1993, 396) list of those who seem to be falling through the cracks of globalized regimes of governance capture this well:

[from those involved in mass uprisings to] refugees and “boat people,” those unresting and vulnerable itinerants; the starving populations of the Southern Hemisphere; the destitute but insistent homeless who…shadow the Christmas shoppers in Western cities…[and so on and so forth].

Whilst these images may be useful towards reaffirming a bourgeois Western identity and sense of superiority in a transcultural world, they do not necessarily sit easy. In the words of British sculptor, Antony Gormley, “In a time of global unity it is just not possible to have that kind of division any more and this is the unconscious and the third world brought right into our living room to occupy space and it feels uncomfortable and causes anxiety” (Quoted in Puwar 2004, 31).

Arguably, these cracks in our contemporary world order demand new forms of governance and order and new governing rationalities. For Said (1996, 396), “[n]one has seemed so easily available, so conveniently attractive as appeals to tradition, national or
religious identity, [and] patriotism.” But, for the liberal, Western-identified subject who has 
left these things behind, and yet experiences ‘unease’ in the face of globalization, governing 
rationalities presented in terms of precautionary risk logics might offer a certain comfort, 
even appeal. Understood thus, the dispositif of precautionary risk may be understood as 
emerging from a significantly different conjuncture what has heretofore been described. 
Hence, while Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster (2008, 151) have written that 
“[s]tereotypes of the ‘other’ and imaginaries of the Islamic terrorist are insidiously 
reactivated within the framework of risk,” I contend that race was there all along, running 
under and alongside it, and calling it forth. A governing order based on precautionary risk 
logics expounds a story of modern reason and transcendence and a ‘we’ who is at risk from 
the dark side of globalization (and all those associated with it). Speaking to the theme of the 
risks and benefits of globalization at a Labour Party conference in 2001, Tony Blair 
explained that ‘the threat’ is broader than al-Qaeda or terrorism: 

…the threat is chaos because for people with work to do, family life to balance, 
mortgages to pay, pensions to provide, the yearning is for order and stability and 
if it doesn’t exist elsewhere, it is unlikely to exist here. I have long believed this 
interdependence defines the new world we live in (Quoted Abrahamsen 2005, 67, 
bold and italics added).

As Rita Abrahamsen (2002, 67-68) suggests, the quote “is worth dwelling on”: “For Blair, 
chaos is represented by those who do not go to work, who don’t have mortgages to pay, 
[etc.]”; it is signified by those who live ‘elsewhere’ and yet, as a result of globalization, have 
“the capacity to destroy the order and stability of the ‘here.’”

Risk Society, mapped onto Western Society, addresses the discomforts of what Homi 
Bhabha (1994, 86) refers to as “the menace of race” in a context of transculturalism or 
hybridity – keeping, the difference in place while ostensibly erasing the matter of race. 
Ahmed (1999, 97) summarizes Bhabha’s account, with specific reference to the colonial 
context, particularly well:
In Homi Bhabha’s account of hybridity as destabilizing, hybridity does not ‘belong’ to the mixed race subject. Rather, hybridity is determined by the very structure of the colonial address which demands both the disavowal and affirmation of difference. The colonizing mission is a civilizing one: it assumes that the colonized subject can reflect back the values and practices of the colonizer. And yet the civilizing mission must have its limits if it is to maintain the structure of authority which secures whiteness as the sign of the mark of privilege.

Bhabha (1994, 86) explains “the menace of race” in terms of the threat that the integrated colonized subject poses to the colonizer – i.e., insofar as the colonized successfully mimics the colonizer (in terms of embodiment, style, dress, etc.), s/he both gains access to a new platform for resistance and un-founds colonial authority. As Ahmed (1999, 97) explains, “The colonizer can be copied; the epistemic privilege is not found in nature.”

Building on this, I propose that the “menace of race” can also translate into the desire for race and its menacing face - specifically, the desire to locate ‘it’ in the body of the other. This is the desire to recover the difference and, in so doing, the idealized self – to recover the menace (the source of the tensions I have described) as a property of the abject/the Other and, in so doing, to purify the self of hatred and violence and reaffirm the self’s claim to authority. In distinction to Bhabha’s account, my focus is less on race as something already present than something sought, albeit repressed, within the discursive terms of the enlightened Western liberal subject (although the two are bound together as the aim is to make present). This is in line with what Ahmed (2004b, 24-25) describes as the productive role of emotions in the surfacing of bodies and bodily intensities – the productive role of felt ‘vulnerability’ and ‘threat’ in creating and sustaining an ‘us’ and a ‘them.’ This desire for race, in its more sublimated form, is perhaps nowhere more evident than in success of Mohsin Hamid’s (2007) best-selling novel, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*.

Translative into more than 25 languages and shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize (Closs Stephens 2011, 225), the novel’s suspense derives from the unknown intentions of the main protagonist, a Pakistani man by the name of Changez, towards ‘the American’ whose
seat we are literally situated in. We are the audience as Changez recounts his story. This is
the story of a Muslim man who, having successfully occupied the position of a Western
liberal subject (being educated at Princeton and working as a highly paid analyst for a
financial advisory firm), becomes increasingly disenchanted with the United States in the
aftermath of 9/11 and returns to Pakistan where we learn he teaches at university and begins
to radicalize his students. What Hamid is staging is the West’s encounter with its Other – and
we sit anxiously while Changez, described by one reviewer as the “bearded, vaguely
menacing stranger” (LitLovers), reveals more and more.

Angharad Closs Stephens (2011, 256) suggests that much of the fascination with this
novel derives from the fact that in the immediacy of the moment (“before any broader
implications become clear”) when Changez first saw the Twin Towers fall on a television
screen from a hotel room in Manila, he smiled. In his words, “I stared as one – and then the
other – of the twin towers of the New York’s World Trade Centre collapsed. And then I
[and many reviewers of the novel] made big news of this extract, which was largely
considered to reveal the view of America from other parts of the world.” In the words of one
reviewer, “[The book] says things people don’t want to hear. [It] says dangerous things in
dangerous times” (Quoted in Closs Stephens 2011, 256). But, in fact, sales suggest exactly
the opposite – that people wanted to hear more. For Closs Stephens (2011, 259), the book’s
success may unfortunately “be attributed to the fact that, for a left-leaning liberal reader, we
are reassured of what we ‘already know’ – that despite the mixture of the global city, national
identities must triumph and that there is a fundamental gulf between ‘us’ and ‘them.’” But,
while there is undoubtedly some truth to this statement, to suggest that this is a limitation of
the book does it a disservice.
For while the book is staged as an encounter between ‘us’ and our Other, the Other does not simply perform according to script and, in fact, is never fully revealed as friend or foe – a point I will return to. Taken out of context, the fact that Changez smiled could suggest that he was the menace all along, but the reader knows this was not the case. The reader knew that more than a Pakistani or an American, he initially at least identified as a New Yorker. He fit in. Despite phenotype, he embodied the somatic norm. In his words:

Two of my colleagues were women; Wainwright and I were non-white. We were marvellously diverse and yet we were not: all of us hailed from the same elite universities…and not one of us was short or overweight (Hamid 2007, 42-43).

He fell in love with an American woman. He was ‘one of us.’ And he was ‘one of us’ in another way as well. For whatever we individually experienced when we first viewed one plane and then the other crash into the Twin Towers, at least according to Baudrillard (2002), we all dreamt it.

Arguably this holds even if ‘we’ didn’t know who the enemy was or what side ‘we’ were on in the immediacy of that moment. It is hardly insignificant to note that I happened to be at a renowned left-leaning Canadian university that day and can remember when, in the immediacy of the moment, some, who were taken in by the abstract symbolism of the event, cheered. This was, of course, prior to the media focus on the bodies and stories of individual lives lost. The point is that if this was momentarily interpreted by some as the first salvo in what was to be a greater war against globalization and all it had come to stand for (i.e., ‘the system’ itself), it is worth noting that perhaps for a brief moment – before George Bush’s “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (CNN.com, 2001) – there may have been tensions, but the forms of alignment our own bodies had taken/would take in relation to these were not so clear. It should not be forgotten that this happened at a time when the anti-globalization movement(s) finally seemed to be gaining the sympathy and ear of the mainstream press. There was perhaps a moment when, countering the desire for the
perpetuation of privilege, there was a nascent counter-desire (premised on a different bodily alignment) that Baudrillard (2002, 73) describes thus: one with aim “of turning around and overturning power, not in the name of a moral or religious confrontation, nor some ‘clash of civilizations,’ but as a result of the pure and simple unacceptability of that global power.” For a moment perhaps Changez, like many of us, sat on a precipice.

**Why do they hate us so much?**

But, this too had to be forgotten. As is well known, in the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks much effort was put into establishing these lines – “the split imaginative geographies of ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Gregory 2004, 11) captured nowhere more clearly than in the popular refrain ‘Why do they hate us so much?’. Derek Gregory (2004, 21) has pointed to the uneven power relations invoked in this question, accepting as it does “the privilege of contemplating ‘the other’ without allowing the gaze in return” and, in fact, demanding a great deal of forgetting. Whilst Closs Stephens (2011) is right to suggest that the novel provides a platform for this “gaze in return” (259) – which might be thought to “reaffirm the spatial demarcations between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (257) – we might read this otherwise. Whilst the novel highlights the disjuncture between the myth and reality of globalization and situates the reader in the seat of ‘the American’ who is caught within the gaze of ‘the Pakistani’ (who not only recounts his story, but reflects back to us our discomfort and ‘Western-isms’), it simultaneously undermines the naturalness of this divide by showing the multiple labours involved in its production. Here, through Changez’s eyes, we bear witness to both the megalomaniac paranoia of the U.S. in the aftermath of the attacks, but also the effects of this – as bodies re-align and bodies intensify as sites of threat/fear.

The novel highlights the ways in which the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’ materialised not only in official pronouncements and media hyperbole, but in and through bodily reactions – bodily bristles, registers of vision, and the gaze. From a phenomenological
viewpoint, we notice how the ‘rightful’ claims Changez once had to the world and his sense of belonging are taken away in ways that are intimate/personal such that, to echo Fanon (1986, 83-84), “[t]he real world challenged [his] claims…the corporeal schema [he had known] crumbled.” In fact, his story begins thus: “I was a New Yorker with a city at my feet. How soon that would change!” (Hamid 2007, 51). Recounting his earlier and happier days in New York he describes his experience thus:

> It was a testament to the open-mindedness and – that overused word – cosmopolitan nature of New York in those days that I felt completely comfortable on the subway in this attire [“a starched white kurta of delicately worked cotton over a pair of jeans”]. Indeed, no one seemed to take much notice of me at all (55).

Since then, his became a body that would be stopped and forced to strip on his return flight from Manila to New York. His became a body that was now cast suspicious glances and “subject to verbal abuse by complete strangers” (148). He was told that his beard made his colleagues uneasy. Through the novel we witness less the radicalization of Changez than his racialization; we witness it as a process that occurs in the course of an individual life. This novel seems to be a case of art imitating life, albeit within the novel we get ‘life’ (or the story of a life) whereas otherwise ‘we’ (or at least the ‘we’ who fell on a different side of the dividing line and/or negotiated it differently) may only catch it in snippets. But, clearly, the snippets are everywhere. It’s a matter of how/where/when they register. In the case of this essay it’s a matter of how they register within the stories we tell of *Western Risk Society*.

Let’s consider two examples. The accidental shooting of Charles de Menezes, the Brazilian man mistaken for a terrorist and shot dead by London Metropolitan Police, can serve as one rather notorious example. By way of a more ‘mundane’ example (variations of which recur across the Western world), let’s also consider the following news snippet from a news article documenting increased attacks on Muslim pupils in the U.K.:

> In one case, a teenage Muslim pupil at school in Oxfordshire was …allegedly slapped and called a “terrorist” by classmates after a teacher raised the murders of
12 people at a French magazine in a classroom discussion and suggested Muslims should be “challenged” by the display of cartoons of the Prophet Mohamed (Milmo 2015).

In these instances, ‘the repressed’ was temporarily granted relief – at least insofar as “the myth of a liberal, colour-blind society [was] momentarily ruptured” (Pugliese, 2006). A mock, photo-shopped image of a London Tube Station ‘Service Information’ (circulated as an original on the internet) effectively makes the point:

NOTICE TO ALL PASSENGERS: Please do not run on the platforms or concourses. Especially if you are carrying a rucksack, wearing a big coat, or look a bit foreign. This notice is for your own safety. Thank you (Pugliese, 2006, bold and italics added).

In both cases, the Other is marked “in contradistinction to the normative white corpus of the English nation [and, indeed, the ‘civilized’ ‘Western world’] – and, by extension, as a threat (Pugliese, 2006). Yet, in both instances what remains repressed is that which Madeleine-Sophie Abbas (2015) has described as “white terror.” It was the Muslim pupil who, as a result of the bullying, reportedly did not want to return to school, that was labelled a “terrorist” (Milmo 2015), just as it was He who looked “a bit foreign” that British police shot dead. Via the process of abjection, the pervasive dailiness of white violence demonstrated in these accounts was projected onto ‘them’ – the terrorists who lurk everywhere.

Ahmed (2004b, 69) describes the ways in which “fear works to contain bodies such that they take up less space.” Emotions, in Ahmed’s (2004b, 69) analysis do not simply reflect the psychological state or interior world of the subject, they are productive: “emotions work to align bodily space with social space.” But, fear, whilst involving a shrinking of the body can work in unusual ways. Here Ahmed (2004b, 69) refers to the renowned example of a racist encounter described by Fanon when, while seated on a train across from a young child and his mother, the child pointed and proclaimed, “Mama, see the negro! I’m frightened”: “[In this] encounter…we can see that the white child’s apparent fear does not lead to his refusal to inhabit the world, but to his embrace of the world through the apparently
safe enclosure formed by the loved other (being-at-home).” Rather, it was Fanon (1986, 84-85), dissected by the child’s eyes – “battered down by tom-toms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, [and] slave ships” - who shrunk and took up less space, leading to Ahmed’s (2004b, 69) conclusion that “fear works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others.”

Applied to the ‘war on terror,’ we can see that the effect of war is less containment than remobilization – the return of the repressed, a re-invigoration of imperialism. In Ahmed’s (2004b, 73) words, “Bush…turns the act of terror into an act of war, which would seek to eliminate the source of fear and transform the world into a place whereby the mobility of some capital and some bodies becomes the sign of freedom and civilisation.” Within this quote we can glimpse the almost seamless transition from discourses of risk to war and, as I will outline in the next section, the slide back again such that war, in somewhat Orwellian form, is framed as simply a technology of risk. If the end of the Cold War and the calls for a newfound openness, packaged under the rubric of globalization, produced an ontological insecurity of a sort (of fears and anxieties that could not be named), leaving ‘us’ with the amorphous discourse of risk, then the ‘war on terror’ gave these fears and anxieties a home. Borrowing from Rasmussen (2002, 323), the attacks on the Twin Towers, in effect actualized risk and, indeed, Risk Society. Through the attacks emerged Risk Society’s inhabitants - as ‘victims’ of the dark side of globalization.

Indeed, Amoore (2007) has described how programs such as the American Highway Watch Program, which was re-invigorated and extended in the aftermath of 9/11 – “[moving] from the reporting of accidents, crashes and incidents during or after the event…to the post 9/11 pre-emption of terrorist attack before the event” - work, under the auspices of precautionary risk, in ways that far from defending borders that already exist, participate in the making of those borders (216). Like risk itself, Amoore demonstrates that the appeal of
this program (to ‘report suspicious activity’) presumes some basis for distinguishing between those who are under threat and those who threaten – i.e., inside and outside, who and what looks a bit foreign: “In this sense, the identity of a ‘we’ is realized – whether patriotic truck drivers, or ‘we’ the nation, or ‘we the people’ is recognized via a claim to be able to see and recognize a threat” (218-219). Here again we can see the materialisation/intensification of borders on and through bodies and in ways that draw new lines - such that for Changez, New York was no longer home. What Amoore describes is a “vigilant visuality” that both produces and conceals white terror as animated in the popular refrain ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ In this section I have set out to demonstrate that whiteness/Western, rather than being an essential something, is, in Ahmed’s (2007, 159) words, “an effect of what coheres rather than the origin of coherence.” In this case, it is an effect of the global politics of fear, a close cousin of the politics of anxiety/risk - the main difference being that fear has a clear object, whilst the object is repressed or unconscious within the terms of risk. But, this does not render the politics of anxiety/risk innocent of power relations. It simply obfuscates.

**Unknown unknowns:**

In what is by now perhaps the most exemplary statement of precautionary risk, Donald Rumsfeld delivered the following in an address to a NATO Press Conference in 2002:

…The message is there are no ‘knowns’. There are things that we know we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know….It sounds like a riddle. It isn’t a riddle. It is a very serious, important matter (Quoted in Rasmussen 2004, 381).

And, indeed, it is serious - especially to the extent it is taken to be so. Taken seriously, as a precautionary logic and basis for security thinking, Aradau and Van Munster (2007) have shown how the dispositif of precautionary risk has emerged as a social technology to render the future calculable and actionable in the present. It also demands a “vigilant visuality”
(Amoore, 2007) even whilst – as we have also seen in the shift in label from ‘War on Terror’ to ‘overseas contingency operations’ – it desists in the politics of naming. Whether or not, the object of fear is named, the language of risk is involved in the production of borders/worlds – in safety/mobility for some and restriction/confinement for others, making and re-making the world home for some more than others (Ahmed 2007) and in furthering actions, which under any other name would constitute war. As Campbell (1998, 1) has explained, “Danger [and here I would add ‘risk’] is not an objective condition. It does not exist independent of those to whom it may become a threat.” This essay’s main concern with contemporary theorizations of risk and the effects of risk as a framework of governance is that it obscures this simple fact, granting risk the status of a structural fact or an autonomous logic and thereby denying its appeal and, in fact, its force.

Beck himself has said that “solidarity is based on insecurity, rather than need in the new modernity – i.e., that it is through the perception of shared risk that communities become a binding force” (Quoted in Ahmed 2004b, 72). But, despite this recognition and the recognition that certain “stereotypes of the ‘other’... are reactivated in the framework of risk” (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero and Van Munster 2008, 151), the language of risk allows it to forget its own participation in the (re)mapping of imperialist landscapes and, indeed, in the constitution of ‘the West’ as a force in global politics that was and still is “partially shaped through contrasts forged in the politics and language of race” (Stoler 1995, 5). Following Stoler (1995) and other postcolonial scholars, the aim of this project has been to trouble a story of World Risk Society that has, in effect, “bracketed histories of ‘the West’” – allowing us to imagine something called a ‘Western consciousness’ forged independently of its externalized others (5).

It has been argued that the discipline of IR has effectively erased the working of racial difference and “racism as a force” (Robert Vitalis quoted in Sajed 2013, 180). Perhaps
nowhere is this more evident than in the literature on risk. Here we can see how theory works according to what Fredric Jameson has called a “strategy of containment” – “a process that ‘allows what can be thought to seem internally coherent in its own terms, while repressing the unthinkable…which lies beyond its boundaries’” (Quoted in Krishna 2001, 406). Perhaps, even more to the point, Jameson describes a strategy of containment as:

> a means at once of denying those intolerable contradictions that lie hidden beneath the social surface, as intolerable as that Necessity that gives rise to relations of domination in human society, and of constructing on the very ground cleared by such denial a substitute truth that renders existence at least partly bearable (Quoted in Krishna 2001, 406).

Within risk’s own terms, Western wars (specifically, according to Aradau and Van Munster [2007, 105], the ‘war on terror’ and consequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq) can be situated outside of the framework of militarism and all it connotes including fear, desire, and gratifying violence. War is situated within an economy of logic rather than desire. This is a strategy of containment at work – what Sankaran Krishna (2001) has referred to as the work of abstraction in International Relations. Without denying that whilst necessary to “[make] knowledge practices possible in the first place,” Krishna reminds us that “abstraction is never innocent of power”: “the precise strategies and methods of abstraction in each instance decide what aspects of a limitless reality are brought into focus and what aspects are, literally, left out of the picture” (403). Once again, we could say, borrowing from Krishna’s critique of international law, “race serves as the silent epistemic absence that ‘presences’ Europe [as ‘the ultimate repository of civilization’, not to mention reason, rationality, transcendence]’ and, by extension ‘The West’” (411). The aim of this paper has been to disassemble not only the understanding of ‘Western consciousness’ that underwrites risk, but, more specifically an understanding of a dispositif of precautionary risk outside of the historical contexts within which [it] emerged, the purposes [it] was meant to serve, the interests [it was] furthering, the specific purposes [it was] simultaneously dispossessing and empowering, and the acts of epistemic and physical violence it set in motion (Krishna 2001, 410).
In other words, the aim has been to introduce a new story of risk – one in which risk as consciousness and risk as logic do not emerge as separate from the bodies that animate and are (re)produced through them. Told thus, and taking Foucault’s (2003, 15) understanding of politics as “war by other means,” we might be more apt to reverse the formulation above and situate risk within a framework of war – as war. This would allow us to read Rumsfeld’s quote above more clearly for what it is and in the context of a truly ‘global’ politics: less a statement of risk than a call to unending war.

**Conclusion:**

When asked about the somewhat unusual format of the novel, *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, which has the Pakistani telling story to an American whose voice is never heard (such that all we know of him is what is reflected in Changez’s observations and responses), Hamid says this:

The form of the novel…allowed me to mirror the mutual suspicion with which American and Pakistan (or the Muslim world) look at one another. The Pakistani narrator wonders: Is this just a normal guy or is he a killer out to get me? The American man who is his audience wonders the same. And this allows the novel to inhabit the interior emotional world much like the exterior political world in which it will be read (Quoted in Harcourt Books).

Hamid describes the format as “an invitation” (Harcourt Books). Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the reader is literally situated in the seat of the American such that Changez is talking to us; we are his audience. Of this, Hamid says, “[i]f the reader accepts [the invitation], then he or she will be called to judge the novel’s outcome and shape its ending” which is described as purposefully ambiguous and one that reflects back the reader’s own view of the world (Harcourt Books). Hence, the spatial demarcation between the two men, the terms in which they were presented to each other, could be reaffirmed or could collapse: “Depending on how the reader views the world…the reader can see the novel as thriller or as an encounter
between two rather odd gentlemen” (Harcourt Books). In a very real sense, the novel performed a Rorschach test: what we saw was what we got in the end.

Sajed (2013), echoing Said (1993) amongst others, has written that statecraft occurs in many places – not simply in the speeches of world leaders and policy documents and not simply at border crossings. Throughout this article I have pointed to various sites where statecraft occurs – in fiction, in academic texts, in popular culture and in and through individual bodies and daily exchanges, in the myriad of intimate and sometimes even unconscious processes involved in subject formation which are also/always processes of world making. For Hamid, our frameworks of vision matter. We could imagine the relation between his two central characters in one of many ways; our vision would shape the story and ultimately the book’s outcome. Similarly, I will suggest here that if we can re-envision new possibilities of subject formation – and/or if there are certain things we cannot envision any longer (if it is the world and stories of risk presented to us that are beyond belief) – then we can tell new stories. We can envision different endings, new alignments and new forms of global politics. It was 21 years ago that Cynthia Enloe (1996, 186) first wrote that what struck her as so “unrealistic” about formal analyses of international relations was “how far [such analyses] are willing to go in underestimating the amounts and varieties of power it takes to form and sustain any given set of relationships between states.” Substitute ‘people’ for ‘states’ to capture the new reality of ‘overseas contingency operations’ and it strikes me that this critique is just as applicable today.
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