Representations of Ancient Cynicism in French Texts, 1546-1615

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis traces *prima facie* references to ancient Cynicism in a wide range of French texts from the mid-sixteenth to the early-seventeenth century. Cynicism, a popular philosophical movement in antiquity, was transmitted through a diverse tradition of sayings and anecdotes. The tradition presents the Cynics, and particularly Diogenes of Sinope, turning their lives into humorous and scandalous philosophical performances. By focusing on *prima facie* representations of Cynicism, I show how early modern writers understood and used Cynic performance for their own purposes. Part I of the thesis is devoted to early modern repositories of Cynicism. I establish the nature and availability of ancient and Medieval sources, and how they are used in neo-Latin and vernacular collections of sayings, miscellanies and encyclopedias. Adaptation and invention of Cynic sayings in collections show how the Cynic tradition encourages improvisation. The discursive treatment of miscellanies illustrates the diverse associations of Cynicism, from idealized, Christian portrayals to titillating discussion of Cynic public sex. Part II concentrates on more developed and playful use of Cynicism. Rabelais uses Cynicism, notably in the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*, to identify his work with carnival, and to raise the question of the writer's role in society. Paradoxes exploit Cynic performance, which is eminently paradoxical and thereby serves to reveal the scope of early modern paradoxes. The key Cynic practices of shamelessness and freedom of speech are used by early modern authors to raise shocking questions about morality and the body, and to articulate opposition to the status quo. Cynicism stands for a radically free and humorous way of life, which is used by early modern writers to raise strange ideas in seriocomic ways. This thesis fills a gap in intellectual and literary history by providing readings of a large number of little-known texts which allow for new perspectives upon canonical works.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS

Abbreviations


BHR  *Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance*

CWE  *Collected Works of Erasmus* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974-)


ÉR  *Études Rabelaisiennes*


THR  *Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance*

Conventions

The following conventions have been adopted for quotations from, and titles of, early printed books: 'i' and 'j' have been distinguished, as have 'u' and 'v'. I have adopted modern conventions for capitalization within titles. In quotations from early Latin books, diacritics have been resolved according to modern usage. Otherwise accents and spelling have been respected.
Chapter One

Introduction

Chaque siècle, et le nôtre surtout, auraient besoin d'un Diogène; mais la difficulté est de trouver des hommes qui aient le courage de l'être, et des hommes qui aient le courage de le souffrir.

D'Alembert, *Essai sur la société des gens de lettres* (1759)

The ancient Cynics have been endurably provocative figures from antiquity to the present day. Writers as diverse as Lucian, Diderot and Nietzsche, as well as Erasmus, Rabelais and Montaigne, have all been inspired by aspects of ancient Cynicism. The reception of Cynicism is ongoing, as is illustrated by Peter Sloterdijk's *Critique of Cynical Reason*, first published in 1983, which became a best-seller in Germany.¹ The humorous, scandalous, and naturally free lives of the Cynics, and, in particular, their best known representative, Diogenes of Sinope of the fourth century BC, have proved consistently fascinating. Anyone tracing the reception of Cynicism through the ages would discover a great deal about how past cultures defined themselves. Diogenes adopts an extreme position of virtue over convention, of nature over culture, and hence of freedom from taboos and freedom to speak the truth. Such a philosophy is clearly far removed from the modern sense of 'cynicism'. Diogenes' radical critique of normative values led D'Alembert in the eighteenth century to claim that every epoch needs its own Diogenes, and that the Cynic's stance is courageous and therefore dangerous. The outrageous nature of Diogenes' philosophy has led successive generations to formulate their own responses to his shocking example. Analysing the nature of these responses invariably leads to understanding how the past imagined a life of radical freedom, and consequently some of the ways in which it conceived morality, the body, and the self.

This thesis will trace the reception of Cynicism in French texts, focusing on one particularly rich period from the *Tiers Livre* (1546) to *Le Moyen de parvenir* (c.1615). The extreme philosophical stance of the Cynics infiltrates, or serves as a revealing comparison with, cultural tensions and uncertainties in the early modern period. Diogenes' scandalous yet humorous performance invariably encourages similarly
outrageous and seriocomic adaptation in early modern texts. This is true, for example, of the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*, in which Rabelais identifies himself and his book with Diogenes who, we are told, was a ‘philosophe rare, et joyeux entre mille’. In his short essay, ‘De Democritus et Heraclitus’, Montaigne describes Diogenes ‘roulant son tonneau et hochant du nez le grand Alexandre’, while in his longest essay, ‘L’Apologie de Raimond Sebond’, Diogenes’ public masturbation serves as an example of radical commitment to nature and virtue. Diogenes’ lantern, with which he sought for a man in the crowd at midday, is illustrated in emblem books throughout the period, turned to radical political purposes in an anonymous late-sixteenth-century poem from the Spanish Netherlands, and used as a comic symbol of folly in Brusambille’s early-seventeenth-century paradoxes. The reception of Cynicism in early modern French texts is as unpredictable as it is amusing.

Tracing representations of Cynicism provides unexpected insights into varied aspects of early modern thought and writing. While any division of material by time and space is bound to be fairly arbitrary, the period on which I focus nonetheless provides unusually rich pickings as far as literary representation and use of the Cynics is concerned. There are several possible explanations for this, the main one being the availability of sources. The sixth book of Diogenes Laertius’s *Lives*, of the third century AD, which is the main source of early modern and modern knowledge of the Cynics, was unknown in the Middle Ages. Similarly, two other important sources of Cynicism, Plutarch and Lucian, returned to prominence in Western Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Sixteenth-century representations of the Cynics are part of the period’s general fascination with ancient material of all sorts. The aesthetic of the period, roughly characterized, encourages a mixing of registers and the abundance of examples. Generic boundaries, particularly in prose texts, are not rigidly defined, nor are they restricted by notions of *bienséance*. All these factors give mid-sixteenth to

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early-seventeenth-century French texts room fully to explore Cynicism in a way that was not true before, owing to lack of sources, or soon after, due to a marked change in aesthetic. It is also likely that the radical freedom of the Cynics resonated during this time of religious strife and moral and philosophical questioning. I shall focus on works in French, including several books printed outside France's geographical boundaries. However, to offer as full a picture of views of Cynicism as possible, I shall include selected discussion of neo-Latin works from throughout Europe. I shall also consider some texts in other European vernaculars (mostly Italian) translated into French during the period. My purpose is not to offer an exhaustive survey of representations of Cynicism, many of which are commonplace. However, in giving readings of a wide range of primary texts, I hope to have taken the vast majority of unusual and interesting instances of use of Cynicism into account.

In the first part of this introduction I shall give an overview of ancient Cynicism. The second part will establish my methodology and objectives. In the third part, I shall survey previous studies of the reception of Cynicism in the sixteenth century and their shortcomings. The fourth part will outline the organization of the thesis, and survey the kinds of primary works I analyse, and the questions I ask in my reading of them.

Part One

Ancient Cynicism

Cynicism was a popular philosophical and cultural movement which had its origins in classical Athens, and which returned to prominence in the Roman empire, thereby encompassing the period from the fourth century BC to the sixth century AD. Despite its philosophical and literary influence, Cynicism was practically ignored by modern scholarship until the late twentieth century. Since the 1970s, however, there have been many studies of Cynicism and its reception, including two collections of articles. Le

\[\text{\footnotesize 4  Although still useful, Donald Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the Sixth Century AD (London: Methuen, 1937) has been superseded by recent scholarship. Farrand Sayre, Diogenes of Sinope: A Study of Greek Cynicism (Baltimore: Furst, 1938) and The Greek Cynics (Baltimore: Furst, 1949), are vitiated by a strange hostility towards the Cynics. The usefulness of Ragnar Höistad’s Cynic Hero and Cynic King (Uppsala: 1948) is diminished by his rejection of the anecdotal tradition surrounding the Cynics.}\]

Any study of ancient Cynicism must acknowledge the virtual lack of authentic early Cynic writings. This makes Cynicism less easily identifiable than, say, Platonism or Stoicism. Modern and early modern knowledge of the Cynics is effectively derived from a tradition of sayings and anecdotes recorded in sources from the Roman Empire, that is to say up to eight centuries after the original Greek Cynics. These sources are particularly influenced by Stoicism. Some Stoics sought to establish their Socratic heritage by postulating the succession of philosophers found in Diogenes Laertius. Diogenes Laertius posits Antisthenes, the pupil of Socrates, as the first Cynic, and teacher of Diogenes, who became the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity and influenced Crates, the master of Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism. The salient point here is that sources of Cynicism cannot be separated from reception of Cynicism. This has the important consequence that there is more than one version of Antisthenes and his followers in the ancient sources. For example, Diogenes Laertius draws on several sources for his biography of Diogenes, and these betray hostile or sympathetic reactions depending on their ideological perspective. Cynicism is a diverse set of traditions, not a unified philosophical system. This means that the reception of Cynicism

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8 DL, VI, 20-81.
in early modern French texts is different from the reception of the rather more stable philosophical propositions of, for instance, Platonism, Stoicism, Aristotelianism, Epicureanism and Pyrrhonism. It also has important consequences for my methodology, which I shall explain below. However, I shall first give further details of the varied traditions that form ancient Cynicism, which also have to be taken into account in formulating the objectives and research questions of the present study.

Recent scholarship has opened up new approaches to ancient Cynicism and its reception. Of these, I have found Branham’s article, ‘Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of Cynicism’, to be the most richly suggestive for study of early modern French texts. Until Branham, philosophers and classicists tended to concentrate on Cynicism’s place in the Socratic tradition. According to this view, the aim of Cynicism, like Epicureanism, Stoicism and Pyrrhonism, is happiness. For the Cynics, like the Stoics, virtue is sufficient for happiness, and virtue consists in living according to nature. Natural living is achieved by rigorous physical training (askesis) and by minimizing needs in search of self-sufficiency (autarkeia). Animals provide a standard of freedom and self-sufficiency, which explains the adoption of the nickname ‘Cynic’ (literally ‘dog-like’). For the ancient Dogs, imitating animals was not meant merely to lead to imperturbability (apatheia), but to god-like independence. The Cynics thereby subvert normative notions of the human being’s place in the world, and of civilization, by suggesting that humans become divine by behaving like animals. The virtuous, dog-like person is happy and free while all non-virtuous people are unhappy and not free. Cynic freedom of speech (parrhesia) and action (eleutheria) ‘deface the currency’ of taboos which serve as obstacles to happiness.

While this overview is not false, it ignores the rhetorical or literary aspect of Cynicism, and, in particular, its use of the seriocomic (spoudogeloion), which is precisely what distinguishes Cynicism from all other ancient philosophical schools.
Diogenes' performance invites interpretation and imitation. This dimension of Cynicism means that it is ideally suited to literary adaptation and improvisation by writers whose ends may not be identifiable with Cynicism understood in the philosophical sense outlined above. As Branham has shown, adaptations of seriocomic Cynic performance began in antiquity. Writers like Lucian and Dio Chrysostom use Cynicism not as a stable set of eternal ideas, but as a style of performance which they turn to their own ends. I shall argue that this is true of many major and minor early modern writers, including, for example, Rabelais, Gabriel Meurier and Bruscambille. Such authors adapt Diogenes' performance for their own purposes, not those of Cynicism.

What Branham calls 'Diogenes' rhetoric' is exemplified in an anecdote from Diogenes Laertius: '[Diogenes] was going into a theatre, meeting face to face those who were coming out, and being asked why, "This," he said, "is what I practise doing all my life."' (DL, VI, 64) Diogenes' paradoxical performance is self-conscious, his defacement of convention is pre-meditated. As Branham puts it, 'Diogenes' most brilliant invention was not a set of doctrines, let alone a method, but himself - a concrete yet malleable demonstration of a modus dicendi, a way of adapting verbally to (usually hostile) circumstances' ('Diogenes' Rhetoric', p. 87). This gives Diogenes' philosophical performance an ad hoc, improvised quality. He is the rhetorical construct of an anecdotal tradition, which does not convey a unified, coherent body of thought. This makes it impossible to gauge, for example, whether hedonism or asceticism is dominant in Diogenes' thinking, since the tradition conveys sayings which appear to advocate both positions. It is however clear from the tradition that Diogenes rejected all philosophical and social systems which take people away from the practice of virtue. He applies his rhetoric to persuade his contemporaries to adopt the Cynic way of life, partly by mocking the theoretical pretensions of abstract philosophy. For Diogenes, philosophy is not a matter of conceptual analysis, but of living well, which involves self-conscious performance to oppose those who live badly. Hence when someone accused

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him of being an ignorant philosopher, Diogenes replied that 'Even if I am a pretender to wisdom, that in itself is philosophy' (DL, VI, 64). It is practically impossible to separate Diogenes' life from his thought. Diogenes' authority in both ancient and early modern texts derives from this combination of theory and practice. His performance is heuristic, that it is to say it is designed to encourage his audience to learn Cynicism for themselves, by following his example.

For Bakhtin, Diogenes stands for the individual who rejects the socio-cultural categories according to which his contemporaries run their lives. He has the 'ideological and linguistic initiative necessary to change the nature of his own image'. In this, he is similar to 'popular masks' of clowns, fools and jesters, who are 'heroes of free improvisation and not heroes of tradition'. The Diogenes of the Cynic tradition is shown turning his life into a work of art, self-consciously transforming himself into a comic figure who invariably goes against the grain of the society in which he lives.\textsuperscript{14} Bakhtin's brief comments on Diogenes are illuminating, and his notions of carnival and the universality of the body provide essential insights into representations of Cynicism in more than one early modern French text. Diogenes is often presented in early modern works as a carnivalesque fool-monarch and 'popular mask', and his shameless bodily display invokes the 'bodily material principle'.\textsuperscript{15} However, not all early modern texts use Diogenes in these ways, and it is striking that although Cynic performance is similar to carnival, its inversions were meant to be real and permanent, while those of carnival were symbolic and temporary. For these reasons, although I borrow key insights from Bakhtin, I do not propose to offer a purely Bakhtinian reading of early modern representations of Cynicism.

Bakhtin's and Branham's view of Diogenes provides a means of approaching early modern representations of the Cynic which use him because his improvised performance has the potential for further improvisation. As Branham points out,

\textsuperscript{13} Branham, 'Diogenes' Rhetoric', pp. 87, 92.
Greenblatt's thesis in *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (1980), which maintains that self-conscious self-fashioning was only fully developed in the early modern world, collapses in the face of his and Bakhtin's reading of Diogenes. Diogenes stands for a radical form of self-conscious performance, which is used by diverse early modern French writers, including Rabelais, Guillaume de La Perrière and Montaigne, in their own self-fashioning as authors. Although Branham uses the term 'rhetoric', I refer to Diogenes' 'performance' as a way of alluding to the Cynic's self-conscious display and its representation in early modern texts. I have not found any references to Diogenes in the rhetorical treatises of Pierre Fabri, *Le Grand et vrai art de pleine rhétorique* (1521) or Antoine Fouquelin, *La Rhétorique française* (1555). However, Thomas Wilson's *The Arte of Rhetorique* (1553) makes considerable use of Diogenes, who is the second most cited philosopher after Cicero. Diogenes' sayings are used to illustrate broad rhetorical tropes, including, for example, under 'Dissemblynge', that is to say 'when we speake one thing merelye, and thyncke an other earnestlye' (p. 296), which is practically a definition of the seriocomic. Wilson, who was influenced by Erasmus, is a useful point of reference given his explicitly rhetorical interpretation of Diogenes. For his French contemporaries, rhetorical understanding and use of Diogenes is always implicit.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of Diogenes' performance as related in Diogenes Laertius is its humour. Diogenes is the funniest philosopher in Diogenes Laertius's *Lives*, and this makes him appealing and useful to numerous early modern writers. Bakhtin's view of laughter as uncrowning, destroying hierarchy, fear and piety, is well illustrated by Diogenes' encounters with Alexander, including the famous occasion on which the most powerful man in the world offered the Cynic anything he wished for, and Diogenes asked him to get out of the way of the sun. The laughter here is seriocomic: its serious dimension can be seen as Diogenes' rejection of the

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18 *The Dialogic Imagination*, p. 23; DL, VI, 38.
social, economic, military and political order in favour of nature, which even Alexander
cannot control. Many of Diogenes' jokes have this seriocomic quality; his humour is
heuristic. Humour is not incidental but instrumental to Cynic performance. The
seriocomic is a kind of literary tool which disorientates and provokes, and which goes a
long way to explaining the endurance of Diogenes' performance.\textsuperscript{19} The seriocomic is an
essential element of some of the best known, and most notoriously playful and
duplicitous, early modern texts, including Erasmus's most famous work, \textit{The Praise of
Folly}, and much of Rabelais's book. The early modern period, with its peculiar taste for
playful, seriocomic and paradoxical works, recognizes the same qualities in the tales of
the ancient Dogs, and uses them accordingly.

While I would argue that Bakhtin and Branham's view of Diogenes is vital for
appreciating the most interesting and playful adaptations of Cynic performance in early
modern texts, it would be wrong to suggest that all mid-sixteenth to early-seventeenth
century French texts portray Diogenes as a philosophical jester. Since there is more
than one Diogenes suggested by the Cynic tradition, there are potentially multiple
Cynics available to the early modern era. For example, one strand of representations of
Cynicism is that of the idealized, Stoicized version of Diogenes, which is found in
Epictetus and Seneca, among others.\textsuperscript{20} This strand is easily identifiable in early modern
works not least because it often leads to Diogenes being placed in an explicitly
Christian frame. However, I shall argue that it is not the dominant version of Cynicism in
mid-sixteenth-century and early-seventeenth-century French texts. Furthermore, many
early modern works are hostile to Cynicism, and this hostility can itself have various
motivations and sources. Studying the reception of as unusual a philosophy as
Cynicism gives rise to peculiar methodological demands, which I explain below.

\textsuperscript{19} Branham, \textit{Unruly Eloquence}, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{20} Margarethe Billerbeck, 'The Ideal Cynic from Epictetus to Julian', \textit{The Cynics}, pp. 205-21.
Part Two

Methodology and Objectives

The diversity of Cynicism, the fact that sources of Cynicism are inseparable from its reception, the absence of a set of Cynic doctrines, and the potential of Diogenes’ seriocomic performance for further adaptation have methodological consequences for studying early modern representations of Cynicism. It is because Cynicism and its reception are broad phenomena that I shall restrict my analysis to \textit{prima facie} references to Cynics and Cynicism in early modern French texts. The vast majority of these references will be to Diogenes’ cameo appearances in various works, since Antisthenes and Crates are not so well known, and the Roman Cynics are virtually ignored. These \textit{prima facie} references cannot be reduced to a single ‘Cynicism’, because Cynicism is always already a heterogeneous group of sayings and anecdotes. Hence I refer to ‘representations of Cynicism in French texts’ rather than ‘Cynicism in French texts’ \textit{tout court}. In some ways, the word ‘representation’ is misleading since it could be taken to imply that early modern texts merely recreate or reflect the original. In fact, if early modern representations of, or responses to, Cynicism are to have any autonomous interest at all, it will be because they depart from the ancient model. I use ‘representation’ as a way of referring to \textit{prima facie} references, and by ‘Cynicism’ I mean the set of ancient sayings and anecdotes which are also known as the Cynic tradition.

By tracing \textit{prima facie} references, I am able to accommodate and analyse a spectrum of representation and use of Cynicism in French texts. At one end of this spectrum are works which remain close to their source material, at the other are texts which improvise upon seriocomic Cynic performance. The spectrum also encompasses the range of possible reactions to Cynicism, from anxiety and outrage to sympathy and playfulness. Since it is wrong to assume any given content of early modern representations of Cynicism \textit{a priori}, my approach will lay particular emphasis on presentation. Through detailed analysis of texts, I am able to show how they understand and use Cynic tradition. Given that this tradition contains much shocking
and humorous material, it will come as no surprise that many early modern writers employ Cynicism as a means to introduce extreme ideas into their own playful and paradoxical works. This is why tracing *prima facie* references to Cynicism is liable to throw up less predictable results than, say, tracing *prima facie* use of more readily acceptable and well-defined philosophical schools such as Stoicism. However, it is precisely by gaining a good idea of fairly run-of-the-mill use of Cynicism in Part I of this thesis that I shall be in a position to put more playful adaptation of the Cynic tradition, discussed in Part II, into context.

My methodological approach will be similar to that of several recent studies on the reception of Pyrrhonism in sixteenth-century texts. These works use poetics to view early modern texts not as statements of a stable doctrine or ideology but as sites of puzzlement and anxiety, which can open up previously unimaginable conceptual terrain.21 This approach differs from that of intellectual historians who tend to focus on philosophical content at the expense of analysis of the rhetorical workings of the text, although the latter are highly sensitive indicators of sixteenth-century understanding and use of ancient philosophy.22 The tools of poetics, which are well adapted for analysing the early modern reception of Pyrrhonism, are essential for examining early modern representations of Cynicism. Pyrrhonism is an anti-philosophy which, as Tournon and Cave have shown, gives rise to rhetorical responses that cannot be reduced to stable philosophical positions. Cynicism on the other hand is an unstable group of philosophical traditions, conveyed in the form of a set of rhetorically-constructed anecdotes, from the outset. In fact, it is probably because of the impossibility of pinning Cynicism down to an abstract philosophical system, method, or anti-system that it has been virtually ignored by intellectual historians of the early


22 Cave, 'Imagining Scepticism', pp. 194 and 205; p. 193, n.1 for the work of historians of ideas on Pyrrhonism.
I do not wish to claim that Cynicism is a major philosophical or ideological force in the early modern French texts, unlike Pyrrhonism or Stoicism. However, my research fills a gap in intellectual history insofar as I trace responses to the Cynic practices of shamelessness and freedom of speech in encyclopedic, legal, medical, religious and literary works. Characteristically of Cynicism, these are not abstract ideas, but I would argue that this is what gives them their provocative philosophical force.

Each reference to Cynicism in early modern texts is by definition an echo from the past, and a more or less complex and equivocal message, which is authorially and rhetorically structured. Since humour is culturally conditioned, my focus on the presentation and use of Cynic jokes is inevitably sensitive to the historical and cultural frame which makes such jokes possible. My approach involves me dealing with fragments of a large body of heterogeneous texts and the sum of my analyses could be seen as a group of coordinates in the shifting sands of early modern thought. Hence, as well as being part of the history of ideas, my micro-analysis of prima facie references to Cynicism in literary and other texts, could be seen to play a part in various 'pré-histoires', in the sense defined by Cave. Cave's methodology involves micro-analysis of textual traces of various phenomena, which are not yet fully understood, and give rise to disquiet, followed by the identification of points at which these traces form a fault-line where mentalities start to change. The points of reference I uncover have a role to play in various 'pré-histoires' including, for example, of the self, of biography, of sexuality, of obscenity and of political discourse in opposition to the status quo. The motley and provocative nature of Cynicism prompts unpredictable, volatile responses, making it a privileged site for the opening of fault-lines of the kind analysed by Cave. However, Cynicism is but one of several factors in such 'pré-histoires', and Cave

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23 See, for example, The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. by Charles Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhardt Kessler and Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), which contains virtually no discussion of Cynicism.
24 Branham, Unruly Eloquence, p. 6.
25 Pré-histoires I and Pré-histoires II: langues étrangères et troubles économiques au XVIIe siècle, Les seuils de la modernité, 5 (Geneva: Droz, 2001); see the introductions of both volumes.
26 Cave, Pré-histoires II, p. 16.
himself recognizes that his methodology is unsuitable for any thesis which attempts to gather as much information as possible on a single subject. Furthermore, far from consistently coalescing to form a threshold or fault-line, traces of Cynicism can sometimes be seen to disappear, which is what happens when Cynic sayings become proverbs, their Cynic origins forgotten.

Although I restrict my analysis to *prima facie* references, I do not pretend to have located or analysed every single reference to Cynicism in mid-sixteenth to early-seventeenth-century French texts. I have, however, selected a great number of references for analysis, to gain as full and detailed a picture as possible of early modern use of Cynicism. My selection ranges over many different types of text, since references to Cynicism are not restricted to any particular genre. I shall say more in part four below about my choice of texts. As far as my choice of references is concerned, I have sought to select those which are the most interesting and informative about early modern representations of Cynicism. There is a sense in which these criteria are arbitrary and question-begging, that is to say I would be interested in those references I find interesting. In practice, however, it is not hard to see when a given reference is doing something unusual, as opposed to when it is doing little more than merely citing a given Cynic saying or anecdote. For instance, the story about Diogenes’ pride, in which he tramples on Plato’s carpets, claiming to stamp on Plato’s conceit, to which Plato replies that this is another sort of arrogance (DL, VI, 26), became a commonplace in the sixteenth century. It is cited in Coelius Rhodiginus’s miscellany, the *Lectiones antiquae* (1516), in Erasmus’s collection of ancient sayings, the *Apophthegmata* (1531), in Marguerite de Navarre’s *L’Heptameron* (1559), in the preface to Dominique Reulin’s *Contredicts aux erreurs populères de L. Joubert* (1580), and in numerous other works. None of these texts play with the anecdote in any significant way. Such straightforward citation is uninteresting in itself, and uninformative about early modern use of Cynicism, beyond showing the survival of a commonplace. An analogous case would be Diogenes’ encounter with Alexander, which is the most frequently cited of all Cynic

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anecdotes in the sixteenth century. While the majority of references to their meeting are commonplace, others, including those in Rabelais, Montaigne and Béroalde de Verville, play with it in novel ways which are worthy of particular attention. By concentrating on interesting *prima facie* references, I do not seek to reduce representations of Cynicism to a balance sheet of positive and negative portrayals. Hostility and distrust towards the Cynics can often be more revealing than texts which present a favourable but tame version of the Dogs.

By focusing on informative and/or playful references to Cynicism, I intend to demonstrate that far from being meagre and commonplace, representations of Cynicism enable skilled writers to broach outrageous material and dangerous ideas in unexpected ways. This is due to the odd, varied and provocative nature of the Cynic tradition, which is unlike any other ancient philosophy and its early modern reception. The only way to justify these claims is by giving detailed analysis of informative *prima facie* references. This approach has not been adopted before, as is apparent from previous scholarship on the early modern reception of Cynicism.

**Part Three**

**Studies of the Early Modern Reception of Cynicism**

The advantage of restricting my analysis to *prima facie* references is that there can be no doubt that I focus precisely on the use that is made of the Cynic tradition in early modern texts. My approach is different from those critics who have addressed the reception of Cynicism in sixteenth-century French texts, and who tend to use 'Cynicism' as a catch-all term embracing phenomena which, although maybe reminiscent of ancient Cynicism, cannot strictly be shown to bear any direct relation to it. I would argue, however, that the usefulness of an already broad concept such as Cynicism decreases in proportion to the number of phenomena or ideas with which it is associated. Michèle Clément's thesis 'Le Cynisme à la Renaissance en France, 1515-1550', which is the only book-length study of the reception of Cynicism in sixteenth-
century France, suffers from precisely such an overly wide definition of Cynicism.\textsuperscript{28} Clément takes ‘cynisme’ to be a philosophy propagated by humanists, including Erasmus and Rabelais, which is embedded in specific literary forms, ranging from puns to diatribes. Given the diverse nature of Cynicism, and its peculiar transmission through non-Cynic texts, this is a dubious view, and I would argue that it leads Clément to exaggerate the importance of Cynicism in the sixteenth century. The most important weakness of Clément’s thesis is that it suffers from an over-generation of supposed references to Cynicism where there is no \textit{prima facie} evidence that the author would have been aware that he or she was making any such allusion. My methodology is designed to avoid this flaw in Clément’s thesis. Taken to extremes, Clément’s approach leads her to find a Cynic behind every dog and bone in sixteenth-century French texts or, as she puts it, ‘sous des mots comme “os”, “chien”, ou “kyne”, le cynisme peut réapparaître’ (p. 88). For example, according to Clément, such important texts as the prologue of \textit{Gargantua} (with its famous, marrow-sucking dog) and the fourth dialogue (between two dogs) of the \textit{Cymbalum Mundi}, are examples of sixteenth-century Cynicism, although neither contain \textit{prima facie} references to the Cynic tradition. The same approach is adopted by Edwige Keller in a recent article, which claims that the \textit{Histoire comique de Francion} is marked by Cynicism, despite the fact that there is only one \textit{prima facie} reference to the Cynic tradition in Sorel’s work.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, I have found no evidence to link the Cynics with atheists who bark at Christ, contrary to the claims of Malcolm Smith in a discussion of the latter text.\textsuperscript{30} All Cynics are dogs, but not all dogs are Cynics. Unfortunately, Clément’s approach leads her to neglect texts which do contain remarkable use of Cynicism, so that, for example, her discussion of the prologue of the \textit{Tiers Livre} is short and disappointing. Although she is right to argue that study of the reception of Cynicism requires the tools of poetics as well as those of the history of ideas, her ‘poétique de la parole cynique’ (pp. 103-17) finds latent Cynicism in all puns, satire, diatribe, mock-encomia and the written equivalent of freedom of


speech. If Clément were right, a great deal of sixteenth-century literary output is marked by Cynicism. Thus while I agree with Clément that Cynicism has been neglected by intellectual historians and literary critics of the sixteenth century, I take the position that she goes too far in the opposite direction, which leads her to neglect the remarkable, prima facie use of Cynicism.

Niklaus Largier's *Diogenes der Kyniker* (1997) contains an essay on the figure of Diogenes in Medieval and Renaissance literature and a selection of texts that contain reference to Diogenes. The texts are given as an appendix to the essay and Largier does not provide close readings of them. German texts predominate in this brief anthology. Strangely, Largier includes the commonplace reference to Diogenes from *L'Heptaméron* while the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*, the most extraordinary adaptation of the Cynic tradition in French literature, is absent. Largier's stated objectives are similar to mine. His intention is to offer a 'Diogenes-reader' which would provide an intertextual picture of Diogenes, drawn from references to him in all kinds of texts. He has also read Branham, and argues that Diogenes is often cited and used in early modern works because of his rhetoric, which sees him expressing ethics through humour. Largier does not, however, support his arguments with close reading of primary texts. His central thesis, that there is a formal shift in representations of Diogenes between the Middle Ages and the early modern periods from exempla to a more open 'novel' form, is therefore not properly justified. I would argue that such a broad historical and aesthetic characterization of representations of Diogenes in any case erodes too many important details, differences and similarities in the presentation of Diogenes between and within Medieval and early modern texts. This problem is symptomatic of Largier's approach, which favours the larger picture almost to the exclusion of the detail, to the extent that he does not meet his stated objectives.

Daniel Kinney's article, 'Heirs of the Dog: Cynic Selfhood in Medieval and Renaissance Culture' (The Cynics, pp. 294-328) is a more sophisticated and

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provocative treatment of the reception of Cynicism than either Clément's or Largier's. The starting point of his article is that there are two main versions of what a Cynic is, a proper, dignified, upper-case 'Cynic', who can be presented as a proto-Christian, and a disreputable, unprincipled, lower-case 'cynic', who is more readily associated with fools and tramps than with saints (pp. 294-95). Yet this distinction is found in ancient sources, so Kinney's contrast between 'Cynic' and 'cynic' is misleading. He looks at these interdependent notions of Cynics in the anecdotes surrounding Diogenes, and how Diogenes' self-conscious performance is used by Valla, More and Luther to construct their own authorial selves. Like Largier, Kinney makes bold claims about the contrast between Medieval and Renaissance culture, and, like Clément, he cites More and Luther despite the fact that there appear to be few direct references to the Cynics in either author, although the former does talk of 'cynicus Lutheri mos' in his *Responsio ad Lutherum* (1523) (p. 322). Kinney is right to emphasize the dichotomy in representations of the Cynics between the idealized and the disreputable versions, the latter allowing More to turn the epithet 'Cynic' into an insult. He also correctly observes that Diogenes is regularly associated with various types of folly in the early modern period. However, although Diogenes' outrageous performance is reminiscent of fools' jests, this does not mean that all fools are Cynics, which is what Kinney suggests. Nonetheless, Kinney poses a potential challenge to my methodology when he argues that Valla's explicit references to Cynicism in *De Voluptate* are misleading, because Valla's paradoxical work reverses the authors he cites for support, and uses Cynic strategies even as he condemns the Cynics (pp. 316-21). What is true of Valla's work could potentially be true of numerous early modern French texts. However, careful analysis of *prima facie* references will take their rhetorical frame into account, and will therefore be sensitive to this possibility. Furthermore, Kinney's argument is premised on a broad notion of Cynicism, which I reject as unhelpful.

Sylvain Matton's contribution to *The Cynics*: 'Cynicism and Christianity from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance' (pp. 240-64) provides a useful if uninspiring survey of Christian interpretations of the Cynics. His findings will be of particular use to me in my own discussion of Medieval sources, in Chapter Two.

Joel Relihan's article in *The Cynics*, 'Menippus in Antiquity and the Renaissance' (pp. 265-93) argues that Menippus is rarely resuscitated in either vernacular or neo-Latin works which borrow from Lucian. My reading of French texts supports this hypothesis. Menippus is known for the genre of satire which is attributed to him, and as the character of the *eiron*, or falsely naïve observer, in Lucian. The most interesting and relevant example Relihan gives is Petrus Cunaeus's *Sardi Venales. Satyra Menippea, in Huius Seculi Omines Plerosque Inepte Eruditos* (1612), which, he argues, opposes Diogenes' wisdom with Menippus's more worldly vision (pp. 286-89). This attitude is similar to that expressed in Philibert de Vienne's *Le Philosophe de court* (1547), which is the only example I have found of a French text which contrasts Menippus and Diogenes.

The Cynic origins of the genre of Menippean satire are legendary, but in practice it is known through non-Cynic writings. Jean Passerat, to whom the 'Deuxième Advis' of *La Satyre Ménippée* (1594) is attributed, ascribes the genre to Menippus, and posits a succession from him to Varro, Petronius, Lucian, Apuleius and then to Rabelais and Justus Lipsius. Clément argues that this justifies her hypothesis that all Menippean satires, and Rabelais's book, are indelibly marked by Cynicism (p. 113). If anything, however, the 'Deuxième Advis' shows the reverse, that is to say that the Cynic origins of Menippean satire are purely philological. Study of the genre of Menippean satire has no place in the present thesis for this reason, and in any case I agree with De Smet that the number of Menippean satires in the sixteenth century has been greatly exaggerated, owing to the overly broad definitions employed by modern theorists. In the same way as De Smet applies Ockham's razor to Menippean satires, so I apply it to representation and use of Cynicism. As for *La Satyre Ménippée* itself, it contains no other
references to Cynicism, its title being an afterthought applied to the first book version of what had been a pamphlet. Scott Blanchard, like Clément, makes overly bold claims for the Cynic origins not only of Menippean satire, but of mock-encomium, although he contradicts himself when he later ascribes the latter genre to the Sophists. It is likely that the Cynics used the mock-encomia they are reported to have written, including Antisthenes' praise of poverty and Crates' eulogy of the lentil, to 'deface the currency' of moral assumptions. However, in the absence of Cynic texts, Blanchard's hypothesis that the Cynic tradition absorbed the mock-encomium for this purpose cannot be justified (p. 16). Blanchard also claims that the 'Cynic attitude would gain respectability and centrality in the turbulent atmosphere of fifteenth-century Italy' (pp. 15-16). Although Blanchard does not explain what he means by 'Cynic attitude', it appears to consist in the debunking of authority, or the mixing of hierarchies, which he also calls a 'Menippean sensibility'. Blanchard therefore thinks that Platonized or idealized portrayals of the Cynics found in Italian writing are misunderstandings of Cynicism. However, this dichotomy of views and uses of Cynicism in fifteenth-century Italian texts mirrors that found in sixteenth-century French works, and is due to the varied nature of the Cynic tradition. Following De Smet, I would argue that the texts Blanchard puts under the headings 'Cynic' or 'Menippean' would be better described as Lucianic. Lucian was as influential on early modern Italian writing as he was on sixteenth-century French writing, as David Marsh and Lauvergnat-Gagniére has shown. However, although many of the most interesting representations of Cynicism in early modern French texts are found in texts which bear the hallmarks of Lucian, including the prologue of the Tiers Livre and the burlesque mock-encomia I analyse in Chapter Six, it is false to suggest that all Lucianic works are Cynical. This is because, although it is an

32 La Satyre Menippée ou La Vertu du catholicon, ed. by Charles Read (Paris: Librairie des Bibliophiles, 1878), pp. 11-12.
important vector of the Cynic tradition, Lucian’s work cannot be reduced to Cynicism or the so-called ‘Cynic attitude’, not least because his own use of the Cynics is ambivalent.\textsuperscript{36} Judging from David Marsh’s analysis, particularly of Alberti’s dialogue ‘The Cynic’ from \textit{Dinner Pieces} (1438-40) (pp. 59-67) and from Blanchard’s observations, including on a passage in Giovanni Pontano’s \textit{Charon} in which Diogenes lauds his Cynic diet of cabbages for making him fart, thereby driving Alexander away (p. 72), early modern Italian representations of Cynicism would be worthy of further study along the methodological lines adopted here. Early modern English use of Cynicism has not received little critical attention. Unlike their French contemporaries, English authors such as John Lyly, Thomas Lodge and Samuel Rowlands devoted whole works to Diogenes. Lievsay did some preliminary work on these texts over half a century ago, but much remains to be done.\textsuperscript{37} Within the constraints of the thesis, I shall examine only the handful of English works which can be seen to have imported their use of Cynicism from French texts.

The recent revival of scholarly interest in ancient Cynicism and its legacy has been mirrored by works of what could be called popular philosophy, which are examples of the modern reception of Cynicism. As well as Sloterdijk’s \textit{Critique of Cynical Reason}, the philosophers Michel Onfray, André Comte-Sponville and Lucien Guirlinger have all produced works inspired by Cynicism.\textsuperscript{38} Unlike the majority of their early modern forebears, these writers tend to try to turn Cynicism to their own theoretical ends, which, in the case of Comte-Sponville, are explicitly stated as being different from ancient Cynicism. In practice, they neglect the vital point that the Cynics eschewed abstract argument in favour of paradoxical performance.\textsuperscript{39} In my opinion, they are less interesting than either ancient Cynicism or its early modern reception. One of Comte-

\textsuperscript{36} The Cynics, pp. 16-17 and below, Chapter 2, part 1, section 3.
Sponville’s chapters, ‘Montaigne cynique? Valeur et vérité dans les *Essais*’, does not trace Montaigne’s *prima facie* use of ancient Cynicism but attempts to distil a coherent ethical system, distinct from ancient Cynicism, out of Montaigne’s book. My approach, which involves me paying close attention to the rhetorical workings of the *Essais*, is unlike that of Comte-Sponville who in my view does violence to Montaigne’s text in treating it as if it were a set of aphorisms.

Alongside works more or less devoted to the Cynic tradition, many other critics touch on the reception of Cynicism in sixteenth-century French texts, particularly in relation to Rabelais. In Chapter Five, devoted to Rabelais’s use of Cynicism, I shall provide a critique of these critical responses. There are, however, two common critical misconceptions about the Cynic tradition which I should dispel immediately to avoid any confusion. The first is the view that, in referring to Cynicism, Rabelais and other sixteenth-century writers meant something akin to the modern sense of cynicism, that is to say a negative, sceptical world-view. I have found no evidence that the modern sense of the word was in use at the time, and it is clear that when Rabelais refers to sex ‘à la Cynique’ or when Montaigne mentions ‘la licence des embrassements cyniques’, they are referring to the shamelessness which is not only unique to Cynicism in the ancient sense but is practically synonymous with it. The second misconception, put forward by Screech in particular, is that when Rabelais and his contemporaries refer to Cynicism they are in fact alluding to Stoicism. This claim has a grain of truth to it, given that there are similarities between the two schools (as there are between all Hellenistic schools, early Christians, hellenized Jews, and so on) and that some Stoics

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39 For a criticism of Sloterdijk’s work, which applies to all these examples of the modern reception of Cynicism, see Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, “The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the Enlightenment,” *The Cynics*, pp. 329-65 (pp. 363-65).
40 *Valeur et vérité*, pp. 55-104.
claimed Cynic ancestry and idealized the ancient Greek Cynics. Nonetheless, Screech's view misses the point that Rabelais and others do not refer to Cynicism as a supposed set of doctrines but use it as a seriocomic tradition of jokes and anecdotes which they exploit for their own purposes. Viewed as such, Cynicism is very different from Stoicism. Few early modern writers conflate Cynicism and Stoicism for this reason, although (as will be shown in Chapter Seven) Montaigne is an important exception. Even Georgius Pictorius, whom Screech cites in his edition of the Tiers Livre in defence of his view of that the sixteenth century sees Cynics as Stoics, appears to be having fun at the Stoics' expense when he refers to Diogenes laughing and joking ('jocabundus & ridens') as an example of Stoic imperturbability ('apathes'). It is characteristic of the period to present Diogenes as a comic character, not as a Stoic sage.

Part Four

Thesis Outline

Throughout the thesis, I shall be asking firstly what prima facie references reveal about early modern understanding and use of Cynicism and secondly what this tells us about the text in question and, in particular, its responses to frequently provocative and challenging material. Part I (Chapters 2-4) is devoted to earlier sources and early modern repositories of Cynicism. Chapter Two will establish the availability in the early modern period of ancient and Medieval sources of early modern knowledge of the Cynic tradition, and look at how this knowledge is conveyed in the works of Erasmus, the most influential humanist, as well as in neo-Latin commonplace books and miscellanies. Here I shall be asking standard bibliographical questions, including date of first edition, number of editions and date and number of Latin and French translations. I shall also place each source in the context of the Cynic tradition in qualitative terms, that is to say I shall be questioning what type of Cynicism it conveys. Chapters Three and Four both treat early modern repositories of the Cynic tradition, but are divided according to genre.

Birthday, ed. by Heiko Oberman and Thomas Brady, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 14 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 3-60 (p. 6).

Chapter Three is devoted to analysing the framing (that is to say, arrangement and ideological context) of Cynic sayings in French collections of sayings and emblem books. Chapter Four examines the role of Cynicism in encyclopedias and miscellanies. Although these dividing lines are helpful in structuring my discussion they are only sketched in, since generic boundaries are not rigidly defined at this time. Analysis of the framing of Cynic material in these characteristically sixteenth-century works is doubly revealing. First, it shows the varied ways in which Cynicism was understood and used at the time. Furthermore, it reveals the strategies employed by these little-studied texts. In Chapter Three my questions will be more about the frame than about the Cynic sayings themselves, for it is the frame which reveals how the source is understood and the uses to which it is put. An important example of this is a phenomenon I call idiomatization, through which given Cynic sayings become proverbs, their origins in the Cynic tradition forgotten. Other processes, which are characteristic of Cynicism's unusual means of transmission via humorous sayings, are adaptation and invention of a new Cynic saying. All these processes are less about moral philosophy than about wit, and are therefore concerned with the performance of readers in conversational and epistolary contexts. Hence they are unexpectedly close to 'Diogenes' rhetoric' and foreshadow the playful treatments of the Cynic tradition addressed in Part II (Chapters 5-7). Chapter Four also provides vital points of reference for Part II, but not so much in terms of performance as of content. In particular, the Cynic practice of public sex, which is one of the main themes of Chapter Seven, was often addressed in miscellanies. Encyclopedias and miscellanies contain fairly developed representations of Cynicism, which allow for the emergence of points of tension which Cynic material invariably creates.

Part II will be devoted to works which combine the narrative treatment of encyclopedias and miscellanies with the improvisation seen in collections of sayings. Chapter Five will focus on Rabelais's use of Cynic performance, to give an answer to the question why he identifies himself and his book with Diogenes. I shall also examine the ways in which some contemporary writers used the story of Diogenes from the
prologue of the *Tiers Livre* in their own works. My in-depth reading of the non-standard use of Cynicism in a single author, and his influence on his contemporaries, will be informed by the standard use of Cynicism I uncover in Part I. Chapter Six examines the role of the Cynics in paradoxes, in which I include Lucianic mock-encomia, serious, Stoical paradoxes and collections of arguments for and against, which were thought of as paradoxes at the time. The main question here will be how sixteenth-century paradoxes define themselves in relation to the extreme nature of Cynic paradoxical performance as related in the ancient tradition. Chapter Seven will look at representations of two key Cynic practices of shamelessness (*anaideia*) and freedom of speech (*parrhesia*). These practices are both dangerous, in the sense that the former is morally and culturally transgressive while the latter is politically hazardous. They are linked through the body, which is centre stage in the performance of public sex and masturbation, and put at risk of violence in free speaking. By concentrating on the presentation of these phenomena I shall be able to answer questions about what these provocative practices tell us about how the early modern period envisaged morality, the body and opposing dominant political forces. In my conclusion, I shall stress the fact that the Dogs appealed by virtue of their humorous, liberated and natural lives, even though they proved hard to domesticate. Diogenes' paradoxical performance is singled out by early modern writers as an unusual and radical form of self-fashioning, which they understand and exploit in playful ways that enable them to broach strange and dangerous ideas.

The Cynics often walk onto the stage of early modern French texts, and I have tried to do justice to their performance by tracing as much of it as feasible. Examining *prima facie* references to any other philosophical school would probably have been unrewarding and depressing. However, the variety and humour implicit in ancient Cynicism, and the fact that it invites playful interpretation and adaptation, mean that it provides an unusually rich and stimulating set of materials. The use of Diogenes and his friends in early modern French texts shows that you can after all teach old Dogs new tricks.
Chapter Two

Sources of Cynicism in the Sixteenth Century

Je suis bien marry que nous n'ayons une douzaine de Laertius, ou qu'il ne soit plus estendu ou plus entendu.

Montaigne, Essais (II, 10, 416)

Cynicism poses a specific problem of sources. Few authentic Cynic writings survive from antiquity. Hence the sixteenth century, like modern times, depends for the most part on sayings and anecdotes recorded in non-Cynic texts for its knowledge of Cynicism.\(^1\) The Cynic tradition is conveyed to the sixteenth century in numerous ancient works, as well as in intermediary collections from the Middle Ages. Given that such a wide range of texts contribute to the sixteenth century’s knowledge of Cynicism, it will be possible to give only an overview of the principal sources here, of their editions and translations. The first part of this chapter will address the major ancient sources. The second part will investigate Medieval works, including encyclopedias, Christian collections, and an Arabic compendium of the eleventh century. The third part will survey early-sixteenth-century neo-Latin commonplace and miscellaneous reference books, including the works of Erasmus.

Part One

Ancient Sources

1. Diogenes Laertius

The sixth book of Diogenes Laertius’s Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers was the principal source of knowledge of ancient Cynicism in the early modern period, as it is today. Ambrogio Traversari produced a Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius between 1424 and 1433 under the title Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in philosophia probati fuerunt.\(^2\) His translation was published in Rome by 1472. The Greek text was printed by Froben in Basel in 1533.\(^3\) The sixth book of Diogenes Laertius was unknown

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\(^1\) The Cynics, pp. 3-4.


\(^3\) Matton, p. 242. The Greek edition, Diogenis Laertif de vitis, decretis et responsis celebrium philosophorum libri decem (Basel: Froben, 1533) was at least one of Montaigne’s sources for his borrowings from Diogenes Laertius, some of which also appeared on the beams of his library.
in the Middle Ages. Numerous editions of the Latin translation were printed throughout
the sixteenth century, at least fourteen of them between 1540 and 1595, spread evenly
through the period, demonstrating a continuity of interest. Paulus Leopardus brought
together a translation of Diogenes Laertius's life of Diogenes with a selection of other
anecdotes about him drawn from Stobaeus, Plutarch, Cicero, Aulus Gellius and others
in his Vita, & chræ sive apophthegmata Aristippi, Diogenis, Demonactis, Stratonicis,
Demosthenis & Aspasiae (1556). Although by no means a major source, judging from
the fact that there was only one edition, Leopardus's translation is nonetheless a good
example of the characteristically sixteenth-century practice of collating sayings
('chræae'). Since Cynicism's primary means of transmission is the witty saying, it is often
well-represented in such works, and indeed Diogenes and Demonax take up almost half
of Leopardus's short book. Principal among the Latin editions of Diogenes Laertius was
Henri Estienne's edition of 1570, Diogenis Laertii de vitis, dogmatis & apophthegmatis
eorum qui in philosophia clararunt, libri X which included notes from Estienne, the
Greek text, and subsequently the Latin translation. Estienne published a further edition
in 1593 which had the Greek text and Latin translation side-by-side, and included
Casaubon's Notae ad Diogenis Laërtii, which had originally been published in 1583.
The contrasting lives of Diogenes and Aristippus are used to evoke the ideal courtier in
Henri Estienne's dedicatory letter of this edition, addressed to Wolfgang Zundelin.
Following a discussion as to who is top dog out of the Cynic and the Cyrenaic, Estienne
proceeds to argue that the ideal future philosopher would find a happy medium
between Diogenes and Aristippus, particularly as far as life in court is concerned:
'Those philosophers are suitable for princes' palaces in the future who are neither
completely courtiers (that is, endowed with courtly qualities, as was Aristippus), nor

The Médiatheque Concordet de Libourne has a copy bearing his signature, see Alain Legros,
Essais sur poutres: peintures et inscriptions chez Montaigne (Paris: Klinksieck, 2000) p. 209,
n.189 and Dorothy Gabe Coleman, 'Notes sur l'édition grecque de Diogène Laërce que possédait
Montaigne', Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne, 27-8 (1978), 93-95. He may also have
used the Latin translation, see Pierre Villey, Les Sources et l'évolution des 'Essais' de Montaigne,

4 The Bibliothèque Nationale catalogue lists editions in 1524, 1542, 1546, 1551, 1559, 1561,
1562, 1566, 1568, 1570, 1585, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1595.
have nothing of the courtier about them. Such comparisons of philosophers (Diogenes has nothing of the courtier about him) are characteristic of much sixteenth-century writing about ancient philosophers.

No French translation of Diogenes Laertius was published until 1601. The translator, François de Fougerolles, was a doctor and author of medical treatises as well as of several French translations. He apparently encountered some unspecified opposition to his enterprise:

\[\text{je n'euz pas si tost donnê jour à nostre Diogene, que quelques uns le repoussoyent aux tenebres avec des attaintes Timoniennes, qui furent neanmoins rabatues des plus notables personnes de la France, qui me solliciterent de le faire mettre sur l'impræse, avec admiration que personne ne s'estoit trouvé jusques à moy, qui aye voulu entreprendre de le faire voir en nostre langue.}\]

The motives for these attacks are unclear, and even if they were invented in order to stimulate interest in the work, Fougerolles's translation was re-issued only once, in the following year, and there were no further editions. Any translator of Diogenes Laertius's life of Diogenes of Sinope is faced with two fairly explicit references to masturbation in public. Fougerolles, like Hicks, the translator of the Loeb edition (1925), elects to use a euphemism. He follows the example of the Latin translation in the first instance, so that Diogenes is described as doing 'quelque chose des mains par le marché' (p. 383). Fougerolles adds his own, unacknowledged, commentary to the second, lengthier discussion of Diogenes' shamelessness:

\[\text{Or il faut noter, qu'il n'avoiit pas honte de faire & dire publiquement tout ce qu'appartenoit à l'usage de Ceres & de Venus; & mesme pour montrer qu'il n'y avoit point de mal, il conclouoit ses raisons par tels argumens [...] Nous avons desja dit, comment il travailloit quelque fois par la ville, & qu'il souhaittoit de s'appaisser aussi bien la faim en se frottant le ventre, qu'en travaillant des mains pour avoir à manger. (p. 396; my italics)}\]

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5 Diog. Laert. de vitis, dogm. & apopth. clarorum philosophorum, Libri X [...] (Excud. Henr. Steph., 1593), pp. 3-4: 'videri mihi eos prae caeteris principum aulis accommodatos philosophos qui neque omnino sint aulici, (id est, aulico prorsus ingenio, qualis fuit Aristipp [sic]) neque nihil aulicum habeant.'
6 See below, Chapter 6, part 1.
7 Le Diogène françois tiré du grec [...] (Lyon: Pour Jean Ant. Huguetan, 1602), fol. 6v.
8 DL, VI, 46 and 69; the Greek used in both anecdotes is χειροποιήσις which means 'to do of the hand', but its meaning is obvious, given the context.
9 The Latin gives 'in foro manibus operans'.
Such use of euphemism and addition of commentary to modify and sanitize the text is a clear sign of understandable embarrassment on Fougerolles's part. His reaction recalls the approaches of sixteenth-century medical writers, and authors of facetious works.¹⁰ His comment that he has already had to translate a reference to masturbation is perhaps a sign of exasperation, or even a hint to read between the lines. The key Cynic practice of freedom of speech (parrhesia) is translated as 'liberté' (p. 396), again indicating that Fougerolles translated from the Latin, which gives 'libertas'. Fougerolles provides occasional explanatory marginalia as well as brief additional material on the philosophers, including Antisthenes and Diogenes, at the end of each of Diogenes Laertius's versions of their lives. At the end of the work, he gives a kind of family tree of philosophers, as well as a table of the sects of philosophy, which defines the end of Cynicism as 'estre contens de leur fortune & de vivre selon nature' (sig. GGg 3). Such a philosophical definition of Cynicism, distilled from the anecdotes, is unusual in the early modern period. Fougerolles is not using Cynicism, but seeking to define it in relation to other philosophical schools. However, unlike Cyreniac philosophy, Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism, Cynicism does not warrant a table explaining its doctrines, doubtless because its arguments are not easily abstracted.

2. Plutarch

Plutarch is the second major source of sixteenth-century information on the Cynics. Although far from unknown in the Middle Ages, it was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century that his works began to return to prominence.¹¹ The Moralia frequently refer to Cynic anecdotes and sayings, some of which are duplicated in Diogenes Laertius. The Lives are not so important as far as Cynicism is concerned, although they do occasionally contain discussion of the Cynics, most famously in their version of the encounter between Diogenes and Alexander in the Life of Alexander. The history of the

¹⁰ See below, Chapter 7, part 1.
transmission of Plutarch's *Moralia* is dealt with in detail by Aulotte. A full Latin translation of the *Lives* was available in 1470, the individual treatises that make up the *Moralia* were also translated into Latin from the fifteenth century onwards, by various authors, including Budé. The Greek text of ninety-two treatises constituting the *Moralia* was first printed by Aldus Manutius, with the cooperation of Erasmus, in Venice in 1509; that of the *Lives* was first printed by Giunta in Florence in 1517. A further Greek edition was published by Froben in Basel in 1542, of which Rabelais held a copy. Henri Estienne produced a Greek and Latin edition of the *Moralia* in 1572. There were numerous Latin translations throughout the sixteenth century, by Erasmus among others: Aulotte lists fifteen full editions of Latin translations of the *Moralia* along with over a hundred Latin versions of individual treatises. Plutarch was translated into French as early as the fifteenth century and there were over thirty French translations of individual treatises throughout the century, as well as François Le Tort's digest, *Le Tresor des morales de Plutarque* (1577). The dissemination of Plutarch in French circles was completed by the best-known French Plutarch, Amyot's *Les Vies des hommes illustres* (1559) and *Les Œuvres morales et meslées* (1572). The latter contains a passing reference to Diogenes’ public masturbation, in 'Les contredicts des philosophes Stoiques', which, as Fougerolles's case demonstrates, poses particular difficulties for the early modern translator. Amyot also opts for euphemism, so that Diogenes publicly 'abusoit de sa nature'. The disapproving tone here mirrors that found in Plutarch, which explains why Amyot's translation is less obviously embarrassed than Fougerolles's.

3. Lucian

Generally speaking, Lucian is not a discursive writer in the mould of Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. His importance as a source of Cynicism is, therefore, due not so much to

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13 Aulotte, pp. 23 and 325.

14 *Les Œuvres morales & meslées de Plutarque [...] reveiés & corigées en ceste troisième édition [...]* (Paris: Vascosan, 1575), fol. 566".
his conveying of Cynic anecdotes and sayings but because of his use of Cynic characters and voices in his work, to seriocomic effect. As a result, he could loosely be described as the primary 'literary' source of Cynicism. Branham and Goulet-Cazé summarize Lucian's career within, and influence upon, the Cynic tradition, as follows:

For Lucian, Cynic literature was a liberating example of innovation and subversion within the classical tradition. The Cynic classics (and Cynic ideology) gave him nothing less than a license to write satire on all things Greek, which now, of course, included Cynics and Cynicism itself [...] His many works using Cynic personae [...] or indebted to Cynic traditions of parody and satire [...] give us the liveliest images we have of what the Cynic classics might have been like, and are the primary means whereby Cynic traditions became part of European literature.

Consequently, there is a sense in which sixteenth-century imitators of Lucian, including, among others, More, Erasmus and Rabelais, are part of a Cynic literary tradition. Marsh is right to argue that Lucian is one of the main vectors for the 'satiric wit and paradoxical rhetoric dear to the Cynic tradition'. However, given that the Cynic classics are now lost, it is of course impossible to say precisely in what Cynicism's literary tradition consisted. Having acknowledged this crucial fact, it follows that it would be at best optimistic to label works bearing the influence of Lucian as being 'Cynic'. Furthermore, Lucian's portrayal of the Cynics in his works is highly idiosyncratic. For example, Cynic contemporaries of Lucian are both eulogized (Demonax in The Life of Demonax) and mocked (Peregrinus in On the Death of Peregrinus). Even Diogenes himself is not preserved from Lucian's satire (Philosophers for Sale, 10, and Menippus), although he is portrayed in a predominantly favourable way elsewhere (Dialogues of the Dead, 13). Lucian adopts and adapts Cynic characters and attitudes for his own purposes, including with the aim of mocking Cynicism. Authors like Rabelais who themselves adapt the Lucianic model are therefore engaged in a practice that is characteristic of the reception of Cynicism, precisely because it departs from the ancient model. The prologue of the Tiers Livre, in its manipulation of a passage from How to Write History, is the most spectacular example of Rabelais's use of Lucian and of Cynicism to his own

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16 The Cynics, pp. 16-17.
17 Lucian and the Latins, p. 50.
ends. Like Lucian, Dio Chrysostom employs and adapts the Cynic tradition for his own purposes. His work is far less influential, although it was available in the late sixteenth century, principally through editions in 1551 and 1555.

The history of editions and translations of Lucian into both French and Latin has been thoroughly surveyed by Lauvergnat-Gagnière. The Greek text of Lucian was published by Aldus Manutius in Venice in 1503. There were nine further versions of the complete works of Lucian published in Greek in the sixteenth century, and over a hundred Greek editions of individual and collected works. A good example of the transmission of one of Lucian’s adaptations of Cynicism is a translation by Pietro Balbi (1399-1479) of a dialogue between Diogenes and Alexander (Dialogues of the Dead, 13) which survives in manuscript, and which was printed, in 1494, in a volume edited by Benedetto Borndone, De veris narrationibus. Erasmus and More collaborated on a Latin translation, published in 1506. Remarkably, according to Heath, ten out of thirteen of Erasmus’s translations of Lucian’s dialogues in this edition involve the Cynics Menippus and Diogenes. Numerous Latin and Greek and Latin editions as well as French translations of various works of Lucian followed throughout the century. Although Lucian’s Œuvres were not available in French until Filbert Bretin’s translation of 1581, there were many translations of individual works, the earliest being Jehan Miélot’s translation of Dialogues of the Dead, 12, in 1475 (Le Débat d’honneur entre trois chevalereux chevaliers) and another important example being Geofroy Tory’s translation of thirty of Lucian’s dialogues in 1529. Jean Le Masle translates Dialogues of the Dead, 13, into verse in his Nouvelles récréations poétiques (1580). He not only adds his own moralizing passages, but also provides the following epigram at the end of his translation:

20 Dionis chrysostomi orationes LXXX (Venice: F. Turrisanum, 1551), Dionis Chrysostomi […] orationes octoginta in latinum conversae […] Thoma Naogeorgo […] (Basel: J. Oporinum, 1555).
21 Lucien de Samosate et le lucianisme en France au XVIe siècle, pp. 343-421.
22 Lauvergnat-Gagnière, pp. 28, 44-45, 371.
Celuy qui pense estre riche & prospere  
Resve en dormant & ne s'esveille point  
Jusques à tant que la mort, qui tout pointgt,  
Ouvrant ses yeux, luy montre sa misere.  

Such sermonizing constitutes an attempt to idealize Diogenes and Cynic poverty. Jean Le Masle feels the need to put his translation in a Christian frame, thereby launching a kind of pre-emptive defence against accusations of atheism with which Lucian and his supposed followers had become associated by this time.  

4. The Cynic Epistles  
A large number of mostly apocryphal Greek letters, including those of Diogenes and Crates, circulated in the early modern period. According to Kristeller, they were among the favourite works of the humanists, since there are many surviving editions and manuscripts. Part of the attraction lies in the fact that such letters seem to give access to the man behind the philosopher, general or politician. There are, however, few borrowings from the Cynic Epistles in early modern French texts, presumably because their content is less amusing and stimulating than Diogenes Laertius's Lives. The authorship and dating of the pseudoepigraphic letters of Diogenes and Crates remain obscure. It is however clear that they spring from a fairly late Cynic context, some time between the second century BC and the first century AD. Goulet-Cazé offers a helpful characterization of the letters: ‘Sans prétention littéraire aucune, ces lettres rédigées à des époques diverses sont une sorte de catéchisme cynique qui s'adresse à des gens simples et leur rappelle les grands préceptes de la morale diogénienne’. Billerbeck offers a similar analysis of the epistles, whilst pointing out that the letters avoid extreme positions, are frequently somewhat apologetic in tone, and have a tendency to idealize the Cynics. Clément, who also provides an edition of Loys du Puys's 1546 translation

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24 Lauvergnat-Gagnière, p. 86.  
25 Les Nouvelles recreations poétiques de Jean Le-Masle Angevin contentans aucuns discours, non moins recreatifs & plaisans, que sententieux & graves (Paris: Jean Poupy, 1580), fol. 65v; Lauvergnat-Gagnière, p. 119.  
26 Lauvergnat-Gagnière, pp. 194-96.  
28 Paquet, ed., p. 20.  
29 Billerbeck, pp. 209-11.
of the letters of pseudo-Diogenes, *Les Epistres de Diogenes*, gives a brief account of
the various editions of the Cynic epistles. Her main points are summarized here. The
*Epistles* were translated into Latin in the fifteenth century by Francesco Griffolini
Aretino. The letters appeared in numerous editions from the late fifteenth century
onwards, as the *Cratis* and *Diogenis epistolae* were published both separately and with
other pseudoepigraphic letters, including those of Hippocrates and Brutus. Crates’
*Epistles* were one of the first texts to be produced by the Sorbonne, in 1471. Clément
cites editions of the letters of pseudo-Diogenes in 1475, 1487, 1495, 1497, two in 1505
and one in 1554. Two of these editions of the *Diogenis epistolae*, namely those of
Avignon in 1497, and Paris in 1505, are included in the works of Lucian, given under
the title of *Luciani Palinurus*. The only Greek edition was that of Aldus Manutius in
1499, in his *Epistolarum graecorum collectio*. This edition contains fewer letters than the
Aretino translation, and also differs from the Latin version as far as the order and the
addressees of the letters are concerned. It therefore seems likely that there was more
than one Greek manuscript of the Cynic epistles circulating in fifteenth-century Italy.

The letters of pseudo-Diogenes were translated into French by Loys du Puys,
under the title, *Les Epistres de Diogenes, philosophe cynique, œuvre tres utile, &
necessaire, pour en seule veneration de vertu obtenir vraye libertê d'esprit: & parvenir
au mespris, & contemnement de toutes les choses humaines* (Poitiers: Marnef, 1546).
In his dedicatory letter to his father, Du Puys informs the reader that he began his
translation of the letters of Diogenes some time ago during his studies in Paris. He had
previously encountered the Latin translation of Francesco Aretino, during his schooling
in Tournon. Du Puys's translation appeared in two further editions, in 1549, and 1557.

Given all this, and that Poitiers was a university town (Du Puys himself remarks that
Poitiers was 'en grand' frequence d'Escoliers, et pareille commodité d'Imprimeurs' (fol.
3'), Clément's claim that the *Cynic Epistles* were used in schools and universities is not
an unreasonable one. Her hypothesis is supported by Muret's placing of the

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30 Clément, pp. 29-35.
31 Matton, p. 242.
32 Clément, p. 33.
Epistolarum Graecorum collectio (Venice: Aldus Manutius, 1497) side-by-side with Cicero's Epistolae in his pedagogic program, found in his Orationes (1575):

Je veux qu'ainsi préparé l'adolescent se donne tout entier à Cicéron et s'immerge dans cette richissime et abondantissime source d'éloquence - en gardant toujours cette habitude, que nous avons établie dès le début, de comparer les Grecs aux Latins, le semblable avec le semblable. Quand il lira les Lettres de Cicéron, qu'il parcoure avec le même zèle celles de Platon, d'Isocrate, de Démothène et des autres Grecs (on les trouve aujourd'hui réunies en deux volumes).33

Although it seems highly likely that the Cynic Epistles played a minor role in school and university curricula, this is not enough to demonstrate, as Clément claims, either that Cynicism was a major current in sixteenth-century thought, or that the letters themselves were one of the primary vectors of Cynicism in the early modern period. The former is partly illustrated by the fact that Muret does not mention the Cynics, indicating, unsurprisingly, that he considered them less significant than Plato, Isocrates or Demosthenes. If the latter were true, it would be reasonable to expect frequent references to, and borrowings from, the letters in a wide range of texts, whereas in fact such allusions are thin on the ground. Furthermore, Du Puys does not give a confident espousal of Cynicism, but offers a highly defensive dedication:

je trouvoys aussi plusieurs lieux, qui aucunement contraires à nostre Chrestienne religion, povoient donner occasion aux ennemys de vertu, et conspirateurs capitaux de la ruine de toute humanité, de nous condamner d'impiété, avec nostre auther: mesme sans ouyr noz defenses. (fol. 214r)

Far from expounding on Cynicism, Du Puys assimilates the content of the letters to Christianity, and, judging from the subtitle of his translation which promises 'mespris, & contemnemen de toutes les choses humaines', to a kind of popular Stoicism reminiscent of Rabelais's Pantagruelism. Typically of the reception of Cynicism, the outrageous dogs are domesticated by identifying them with more recognizable and acceptable forms of thought. An even clearer example of Du Puys's embarrassment is

seen in his footnote to letter 9, in which Diogenes explains his refusal to visit the king of the Macedonians: ‘Prends garde à la perplexité où je suis, estant contraint, à ainsi parler, pour mieulx t’exprimer le sens de ton autheur’ (fol. 8'). Cynic freedom in the face of political power, a dominant feature of the anecdotes as related in Diogenes Laertius, is a genuine cause for anxiety in François I’s France. However, where sixteenth-century authors can cite Diogenes’ rejection of what Alexander stands for without falling into ‘perplexité’, Du Puys is unusually uneasy. There are two reasons for this: firstly because the epistolary genre is more direct than the anecdote, and secondly because the Cynic Epistles explain what remains implicit in Diogenes Laertius: ‘nous n’obéirons à l’empire d’homme vivant’ (fol. 8').

5. Stobaeus (John of Stobi)

Stobaeus’s fifth-century AD anthology, originally composed for his son, contains over a hundred Cynic sayings and anecdotes, several of which are not duplicated in any other source. The work gives an indication of how Cynic chreiai were used in rhetorical and even grammatical textbooks in antiquity.34 The Stobaei collectiones sententiarum graece (Venice: Vittorio Trincavelli, 1535) was highly influential in the sixteenth-century’s own use of sententiae.35 In France, Stobaeus was best known through Conradus Gesnerus’s (Konrad Gesner) Greek and Latin edition, Johannis Stobaei sententiae ex thesauris Graecorum delectae. It was first published in Zurich in 1543, was reprinted four times up to 1559, and was re-issued in 1581 and 1608.36

6. Classical Latin Sources

Classical Latin works pose a particular difficulty given that their representation of the Cynics is often strongly influenced by Stoicism. This is not the place to develop this complex issue in any detail.37 Roughly speaking, in the case of Epictetus, Seneca, and Julian, Diogenes and Crates are idealized as proto-Stoic heroes, while contemporary

Cynics, as in Lucian, are often despised (though Seneca’s admiration for Demetrius is an exception). Unsurprisingly, idealized portrayals of the Dogs suppress their shamelessness and even their comedy. This may explain why, although available in the sixteenth century, such sources are rarely employed in discussion of the Cynics. The following excerpt from Simon Goulart’s 1595 translation of Seneca gives a flavour of the idealization of the Cynics in these works:

Diogenes, homme vrayement genereux entendoit bien cela: aussi donna-il ordre qu’on ne peust lui oster chose quelconque. Appelle sa condition pauvreté, nécessité, disette: donne à la vie tranquille de ce personnage si ignominieux nom que tu voudras. J’accorderay qu’on ne le devra pas estimer heureux, si tu me trouves quelque autre qui ne perde rien. Ou je suis trompé, ou celui là est Roy entre les avares, trompeurs, affronteurs, & pillards, à qui nul ne peut nuire. Si quelqu’un doute de la felicité de Diogenes, qu’il dispute aussi așcavor si les Dieux immortels vivent à leur aise ou non, pourqu’ils n’ont point de champs, ni de jardins, ni de terres à bled, ni d’argent en banque. N’as tu point de honte, toy qui demeures ravi & esbloui de tes richesses? Je te prie, contemple l’univers: tu verras les dieux tout nuds, donnans tout & n’ayans rien. Penses tu que celui qui s’est despouilla de toutes choses fortuites soit pauvre, ou semblable aux dieux immortels?

While some writers sought to establish the Socratic heritage of Stoicism by idealizing the Cynics, others, notably Cicero, rejected Cynicism, and in particular its practice of shamelessness. Cicero opposes ‘decorum’ to Cynic turpitude, which leads him to balk at Cynicism as a whole, since it opposes normative moral values: ‘The Cynics’ whole system of philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, nothing morally good’. Not all Roman sources are so serious, however. For example, Apuleius’s discussion of Crates’ and Hipparchia’s ‘dog-marriage’ in Florida, 14, delights in its own prurience. Passing references to the Cynics in Aelian, Aulus Gellius, Horace, Juvenal and others illustrate a sustained background interest in, and use of, the Cynics. One thing that emerges from

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37 For an introduction to the problems with Roman sources, see Billerbeck, pp. 205-21.
40 On Roman attempts to deal with this aspect of Cynicism, see Krueger, pp. 222-39.
41 ‘Cynicorum vero ratio tota est eicienda; est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum’, De Officiis, trans. by Walter Miller, (Loeb, 1913, repr. 1968), 1.148.
this very brief survey of the sources of Cynicism from the Roman empire is that the Cynics constitute a highly provocative subject, that leads to both eulogy and disgust, but few reactions in between these extremes. The Romans developed various hermeneutic strategies in their attempts to come to terms with the Cynics' outrageous behaviour. This process of trying to come to terms with the Dogs was ongoing in the sixteenth century, as it is today.

7. Early Christian Sources

The link between Cynicism and early Christianity is a vast topic which most recently has been studied by Dorival and Downing in articles in *Le Cynisme ancien et ses prolongements*, and by the latter, particularly in *Cynics and Christian Origins*. These works will allow me to provide a brief sketch of the early Christian sources which were available in the sixteenth century. What Dorival says of the Greek fathers seems to hold true of all early Christian sources, namely that they make of Cynicism 'l'adversaire grec par excellence' (p. 431) so as to distinguish it from Christianity. However, these attacks on Cynicism, which are often to all intents identical to those found in pagan authors, are mitigated by frequent praising of the Cynics in patristic writings. The Church Fathers have an ambivalent attitude towards the Cynics, which was passed onto the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century.

One of the most frequently cited early Christian discussions of the Cynics in the Middle Ages and sixteenth century is found in St Augustine, book 14, chapter 20 of the *City of God*: 'The ridiculous indecency of the cynics'. The *City of God* was printed on numerous occasions throughout the sixteenth century and was translated into French in 1570 by Gentian Hervet who also translates Juan Luis Vivès's commentary, which first appeared in 1522. Augustine offers a polemic against Cynic shamelessness, and in particular the practice of having sex in public, which he claims had more to do with

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43 Kreuger, pp. 222-39.
45 Dorival, pp. 432-39.
publicity-seeking than with philosophy. In any case, according to Augustine, man's sexual organs are no longer under the control of his will, as they were before the Fall, so shame inevitably intervenes to render the Cynic position ridiculous: 'a natural sense of shame has prevailed over this mistaken idea.'

Vives's commentary links Augustine's polemic to the criticism of Cynic turpitude in Cicero. He also comments on Cynic garb, which Augustine discusses as part of his claim that there were Cynics in his own day. Oddly, he cites Lucian's *Philosophers for Sale!,* which offers a positive portrayal of Cynic dress, but goes on to claim that Donatists and Circumcellions, who were contemporaries of Augustine, were Cynics and used their sticks to beat Christians.

Augustine's argument features in more than one late-sixteenth-century discussion of Cynic shamelessness, and will therefore be dealt with in further detail in Chapter Seven below.

Another favourite reference of Medieval encyclopedists is found in Jerome, *Adversus Iovianum.* Jerome's *Opera* were printed by Froben in Basel, with the assistance of Erasmus, in 1516. Unlike Augustine, Jerome offers a positive portrayal of Antisthenes, and his best-known disciple:

[Antisthenes] was already famous himself as a rhetorician, but it is said that when he heard Socrates for the first time, he told his own disciples, 'Go and find a teacher for yourselves, I've just found mine.' Then at once he sold everything he had, divided the proceeds among the ordinary people, keeping nothing back for himself but a small cloak [...] His most famous disciple was the renowned Diogenes, the man who was more powerful than King Alexander: Diogenes was able to conquer human nature [...] His splendid self-restraint was also shown by his death. In his old age he was on his way to the Olympic Games which used to be attended by great crowds of people from all over Greece. But he was overcome by a fever, and lay down on a bank alongside the road. Friends wanted to put him on a beast or in a cart, but he refused. He just moved into the shade of a tree and said, 'Go on, please, and watch the games. Tonight I myself will be either a winner or among the losers. If I worst the fever, I'll go on to the games. If the fever worsts me, I'll be on my way to the world below.' During the night his windpipe broke [eliso guttere]. And, as it's said, it's not so much that he died as that he used death to drive out the fever.
The phrase ‘eliso guttere’ is ambiguous since it can mean both ‘with his throat constricted’ and ‘constricting his throat’. This allows Lorenzo Valla (1407-57), in *De voluptate*, to turn the above eulogy into a diatribe against Diogenes, whose suicide is presented as being a ridiculous, theatrical act.⁵¹ According to Downing, Tertullian also praises Cynic suicides.⁵² This surprisingly positive attitude towards the Cynics is found throughout the latter’s works, particularly in his treatise on the cloak of the philosophers, *De pallio*, and forms part of his general favouring of asceticism. Typically, however, Tertullian is not consistently approving of the Cynics, whose form of patience or equanimity is held to be insufficient in *De patientia*.⁵³ Tertullian’s complete works were published by Froben in Basel in 1521. Origen offers a similarly ambivalent view of the Cynics, since his *Commentary on Matthew* contains both a criticism of Cynic shamelessness and a eulogy of Crates’ freedom, which came as a result of his throwing of all his worldly goods into the sea.⁵⁴ Crates’ action, which Origen views as proto-Christian, is criticized by Clement of Alexandria, who is best-known for trying to persuade wealthy would-be Christians that Jesus’s command to surrender worldly goods was not to be taken literally.⁵⁵

Part Two

Medieval Sources

The Cynics were known to the Middle Ages through ancient works, both pagan and Christian, as well as through an Arabic text, *Mukhtar al-hikam* of Abu’ l’Wafa’ al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik (written 1048/9). As noted above, the sixth book of Diogenes Laertius’s *Lives*, which is by some way the most important source of Cynicism in the sixteenth century and beyond, was not available in the Middle Ages. Nonetheless, as

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Matton argues in his useful survey, there is at least some continuity between the presentation of the Cynics in Medieval texts and in those of the sixteenth century. This is partly demonstrated by the fact that Medieval works were still being printed in the early modern period. The purpose of this brief investigation into Medieval views of Cynicism is to offer a flavour of these intermediaries from the Middle Ages, and to suggest some points of comparison and contrast between them and their sixteenth-century counterparts. The representation of the Cynics in the Middle Ages is potentially a very large topic, it will suffice here to offer a brief survey of a handful of predominantly encyclopedic works, following for the most part the selection and analysis already offered by Matton.

1. Encyclopedias and Related Works

John of Salisbury's twelfth-century *Policraticus sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum* was printed at both the beginning and the end of the sixteenth century, illustrating that it was in use throughout the period. Its most substantial discussion of the Cynics is found in book five, chapter seventeen: 'Pecuniam contemnendam esse prae sapientia, quod estiam veterum philosophorum probatur exemplis'. Diogenes' poverty and asceticism are positively portrayed. Following Jerome's *Adversus Jovinianum*, John of Salisbury goes so far as to name Diogenes as a victor over human nature: 'Hui diogenes ille famosissimus sectator fuit potentior rege alexandro & naturae humanae victor' (fol. 105').

Vincent de Beauvais's mid-thirteenth-century *Speculum maius*, which includes the *Speculum historiale*, is among the largest of all Medieval encyclopedic works. It was printed as early as 1473 and had over a dozen editions, in both Latin and French translation, from the late fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century. Unlike John of Salisbury, the first of the two main chapters devoted to Diogenes, 'De Dyogenes & de

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57 Matton, p. 243.
57 The Bibliothèque Nationale holds an undated early printed copy. I consulted the 1513 Paris edition held at the Bibliothèque de l' Arseneal, 4º BL 5127. There was a further edition as late as 1639. The work was translated into French in 1372 by Denis Foulcet for Charles V, but this translation seems to have remained in manuscript only, see Paul Chavy, *Traducteurs d'autrefois*, 2 vols (Geneva: Slatkine, 1988), I, pp. 772-73.
sa lignee’, opens with a summary of Augustine’s objections to Cynic shamelessness from the *City of God*. However, following this criticism, Vincent de Beauvais proceeds to give a favourable account of the Cynics, using mostly the same material as John of Salisbury, including an extended borrowing from Jerome. As well as the usual sources, the *Miroir hystorial* refers to a text of Helinandus which may now be lost, since the passage is not found in Helinandus’s *Flores*, compiled by Vincent de Beauvais himself. This unusual section runs as follows:

Certes de cestuy Dyogenes est il racompte que comme il se seoit avec un autre au soleil au quareffourg dune voye & un aveugle venist contre luy et le blessast de son baston, il luy dist. Oste ton oeil appellant le baston de celluy oeil de luy. Et si comme celluy le demandoit que il faiisot illec: il respondit. Je suis ce dist il cy pour chasser et ceulx que je presis je Nay mye, & ceulx certes que je ne prenis mye jay, & il queroit les pouz en son vestement. Et pource que ceulx que il prenoit il getoit hors. Et pource disoit il que il navoit pas les prins, & il aivoit ceulx que il ne prenoit pas. (fol. 93v)

This passage is a rare Medieval example of Diogenes in his role of jester, so prevalent in Diogenes Laertius’s biography, and in sixteenth-century representations of the Cynic.

Alard de Cambrai’s thirteenth-century *Livre de philosophie et moralité* is for the most part a verse translation of the *Moralium dogma*, ascribed to Guillaume de Conches, which was itself translated into French prose at the same time. It makes fairly frequent reference to a Diogenes in chapters entitled, for example, ‘Dyogenes dit que grandres guerredons vient dou cuer que de la borse’ and ‘Dyogenes nous aprent que tuit li bien sont natural’. There are however very few obvious references to the Diogenes of the tradition, a reference to Alexander the Great in the former chapter being a rare exception. The Diogenes presented here is a highly idealized, and virtuous, version of the ancient Cynic.

The early-fourteenth-century *De vita et moribus philosophorum*, falsely attributed to Walter Burley, which draws heavily on Vincent de Beauvais, also opens with

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58 *Le Premier volume de Vincent Miroir hystorial* (Paris: 1531), fol. 93v. This translation was first published in 1477, and is ascribed to Julien Macho and Jean Batallier, revising Jean de Vignal’s translation of c.1325, Chevy, II, p. 1434.
Augustine's criticism of the Cynics. However, he too moves on from this to offer a positive portrayal of Diogenes. Again, there were well over a dozen editions of this work, although most of these, unlike Vincent de Beauvais's work, are concentrated at the end of the fifteenth century. It too was nonetheless printed in the seventeenth century. John of Wales's late-thirteenth-century *Breviloquium de virtutibus antiquorum principum et philosophorum* and *Compendiloquium de vitis illustrium philosophorum* also appeared in several printed editions in the late fifteenth century, although they were not as numerous as those of pseudo-Burley. Matton describes the *Compendiloquium* as 'the most fully worked-out attempt of the Middle Ages to reconcile Cynicism with Christian ethics' (p. 247). John of Wales thereby presents Diogenes as a kind of proto-Christian exemplar. He also uses him to shame young Christians into the ways of virtue, by demonstrating that pagans led virtuous lives, with only reason to guide them. John of Wales devotes fourteen chapters to Diogenes, although two of these involve confusion with Diogenes of Seleucia. The *Compendiloquium* emphasizes Diogenes' poverty, constancy, patience, courage, and so forth.

Jacques Legrand (c.1365-1415) was an Augustinian who composed encyclopedic works not only in Latin but also in French, thus allowing him an audience beyond the erudite elite. His *Archiloge Sophie* and *Livre de bonnes meurs* are largely inspired by John of Wales. They therefore offer a predominantly positive portrayal of the ancient Cynics. There is only one reference to Diogenes in the former work, which comes in the chapter, 'Comment les philozophes ont amé sapience': ‘Diogenes aussi refusa tout avoir pour science acquérir, comme dit saint Jerome “contre Jovinien”’ (p. 38). The Cynics are cited more frequently in the *Livre de bonnes meurs*. Diogenes is again praised for his abstemiousness, in a chapter entitled ‘Comment abstinence est cause de plusieurs biens’:

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61 Matton, pp. 241-47.
62 I consulted *Summa Joannis Valenis de regimine vite humane seu Margarita doctorum […]* (Venetiis: G. de Arrivabenis, 1496). The biography of Diogenes is found on fols 181v-185v.
Abstinence est cause de plusieurs biens, car par abstinence raison maistrie la char et osté toutes superfluitéz, elle engendre et nourrist les vertus. Et a ce propos nous lison comment Dyogenes, qui fu un sage phiosophe, desprisoit habondances de viandes et toutes superfluitéz, comme recitc Valere en son .IIII. livre. (p. 324)

Diogenes and his disciple Crates are cited at greater length in two subsequent chapters, 'Comment l'estat de povreté est moult agreable et plaisant a Dieu' and 'Comment l'estat de povreté doit estre agreable a Dieu'. As these chapter-titles suggest, the Cynics are placed firmly within a Christian frame here. Diogenes and Crates are explicitly compared to the poor in spirit (Matthew 5.3) in the latter chapter:

Et nostre Sauveur dit en l'Euvangile que benois sont les povres d'espirerit, c'est assavor ceulx qui ne sont oint en leurs cuers convoitex: car pou vault povreté foraine se le cuer n'a souffissance en soi. Et a ce propos aussi nous avons plusieurs exemples comme de Dyogenes le sage philosophe, qui des biens mondains ne tenoit compte [...] Et outre plus saint Jeroisme en sa .XXXV. epistre recite comment Crates, qui estoit de la cite de Thebes, jadis estoit moult riche; mais ii renonça a tout en disant que c'estoit fort d'acquerir richesses et vertus ensemble. Et mieulx vault perdre richesses qu'estre perdu par richesses. (p. 365)

Legrand also refers to the tale of Crates' throwing his worldly goods into the sea (p. 339). Given the nature of the work, it is hardly extraordinary that it contains a Christianized portrayal of the Cynics. However, if he had wanted to, Legrand could have produced a damning account of ancient Cynicism, if, for example, he had decided to draw from the attacks on Cynic shamelessness found in St Augustine and Cicero. A positive, albeit Christian, account of the Cynics is far from inevitable at this time, and John of Wales and Legrand in particular show some real appreciation for ancient Cynicism, and especially its emphasis on self-sufficiency, which the latter again compares to being poor in spirit: 'povreté espirituele et vraie souffisance furent jadis es sages, comme fu Dyogenes' (p. 338). The final reference to Diogenes worth consideration here comes in the chapter, 'Comment nul ne doit estre curieux de sa sepulture' (p. 395). Legrand offers an appreciative account of Diogenes' request to be left unburied and be eaten by the birds and the beasts. This story, which is drawn from Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, I, 43, 104, is the inspiration for a fifteenth-century
illustration of a scantily-clad Diogenes, standing next to his barrel, being pecked at by birds.\(^{65}\)

It would of course be foolish to pretend to offer a grand narrative on Medieval reception of the Cynics following this brief survey. However, from the works investigated here, it should be noted that the most salient feature of representations of Diogenes at this time is the attempt to place him within a Christian frame. His rejection of worldly riches and his asceticism are consistently interpreted as instances of proto-Christianity. When anxiety is expressed, in Vincent de Beauvais and pseudo-Burley, about Augustine’s condemnation of Diogenes’ shamelessness, it is dealt with in the opening section, before moving on to the standard eulogy of the Cynic. As Matton points out, this kind of Christianized reading of Diogenes does not die out with the rediscovery of Diogenes Laertius. However, because of its access to different sources (and there are many other reasons), the sixteenth century tends, as will soon become apparent, to offer a more playful and diverse version of the Cynics than that encountered in the Medieval works investigated here.

2. Medieval Arabic Source: *Les Dictz moraulx des philosophes*

The *Mukhtar al-hikam* of Abu’ l’Wafa’ al-Mubashshir ibn Fatik was written in 1048-49 and was translated into Spanish under the title *Bocados de Oro* before 1257.\(^{66}\) This Spanish version was in turn translated into Latin by the end of the thirteenth century, some manuscripts being entitled *Liber Philosophorum Moralium Antiquorum*, others *Dicta et Opiniones Philosophorum*.\(^{67}\) This Latin version was translated into French by Guillaume de Tignonville in the early fifteenth century. The translation was published, under the title *Les Dictz moraux des philosophes*, c.1477.\(^{68}\) The English translation of the French book, by Anthony Wydeville, *The Dictes and Sayengies of the Philosophres*, was the first book published by Caxton in England in English. The French translations

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\(^{65}\) This illustration is is found in a manuscript held at the Musée Condé at Chantilly (MS 297) and is reproduced as the front cover of *Les Cyniques grecs*, ed. by Léonce Paquet.


\(^{67}\) Matton, p. 242.

\(^{68}\) Chavy, I, p. 448.
had further editions in Paris in 1531 and 1532. As far as the Cynics are concerned, the primary interest of the work comes from the fact that it contains many anecdotes and sayings not present in the Greek and Latin sources. The chapter on Diogenes is fairly lengthy, running to four folios in-8. The Cynic presented therein is more respectable and serious than the seriocomic character encountered in Diogenes Laertius. The opening of the chapter gives a good idea of its general tone and content:

Dyogenes fut d’aucuns surnomme chenu c’est adire ayant aucune dition de chien. Fut le plus sage qui fust en son temps. Moult desprisant le monde: et gisoit en ung tunnel qui n’avoit qu’ung fons lequel il tournoit a l’avantage du vent et du soleil ainsi qu’il luy plaisoit sans avoir autre maison. Aussi vivoit & estoit content de deux robes de laine & ainsi se gouverna jusqu’a son decez. Si luy demanderent aucuns: pourquoi on l’avoit surnommé chenu et il rendit pource qu’il abayoit aux fols et il blandissoit et honnoroit les sages. Et vit Alexandre le grant parler a luy duquel il tint moult pou de conte. Il luy dist ‘O Diogenes a quoy tient que tu ne fais conte de moy veu que je suis roy et nay faulte de riens: quuel il rendit: je nay a faire du serf de mon serf. Ors dist Diogenes Alexandre: ‘Comment suis je donc serf de ton serf’. Diogenes rendit que ouy: ‘Car je suis seigneur & maistre de toute convoitise & la tiens soubz les piedz comme ma serve: mais convoitise est ta maistresse et tu es son serviteur: & doncques sera ce que je me sert’. (fols 24*-25*)

Much of this passage is reminiscent of Diogenes Laertius. However, the Diogenes seen here is altogether more saintly than the one encountered in Diogenes Laertius. For instance, he offers a serious explanation of his rejection of Alexander’s way of life, rather than merely telling him to get out of the way of the sun. Moreover, here he barks at fools, and fawns on the wise, as opposed to those who give to him, as in Diogenes Laertius’s biography. Diogenes, often amusing and undogmatic in the Greek, is generally rather po-faced in the translation from the Arabic. Further examples of Diogenes’ piety, from the middle of the chapter, include:

Dist, ‘Celluy est villain qui respond deshonnestment a celluy qui laidement a parolle a luy. Et celluy est noble qui respond paciement’. 
Dist, ‘Il n’est nul meilleur tresor que sens & discretion: plus grant pourrete que ignorance, meilleurs amys que bonnes meurs, meilleur gouverneur que fortune, ne meilleur creace que bon enseignement. Maladie est la prison du corps & tristesse la prison de l’ame’. (fol. 28*)

69 I consulted the copy in the British Library of which the title-page is missing, but which is catalogued under La Forest et description des grands et sages philosophes du temps passé; contenant doctrines et sentences pour toutes sortes de gens (Paris: P. Leber, 1529), it is in Gothic type, unlike Les Dictz moraulx des philosophes (Paris: Galliot du Pré, 1531), which updates the spelling of the translation (e.g. ‘chien’ for ‘chenu’, etc.)
70 DL, VI, 60: ‘Being asked what he had done to be called a hound, he said, “I fawn on those who give me anything, I yelp at those who refuse, and I set my teeth in rascals”’; see Gutas, p. 489.
Naturally, any Medieval or early modern author borrowing from this source is likely to offer a more respectable version of Diogenes than that encountered in the Greek. This is true, for example, of the late-fifteenth-century compilation of pseudo-Seneca, *Des mots dorés, des quatres vertus cardinales*, which offers a brief selection of the material from *Les Dictz moraulx des philosophes*. However, in the sixteenth century and beyond, Greek and Latin sources can be filtered to present an idealized version of the Cynics, and the Arab version can be put side-by-side with Diogenes Laertius, to produce a typically multifaceted portrayal of Diogenes and his disciples.

Part Three

Erasmus and Neo-Latin Commonplace-Books and Miscellanies

The representation of Cynicism in Erasmus and in contemporary neo-Latin reference, commonplace and related works could be the subject of a longer study than it is possible to offer here. They are significant both as sources in their own right, and as examples of the reception of Cynicism in the sixteenth century. Nonetheless, the sententious nature of many neo-Latin printed commonplace-books is not well suited to giving Cynic sayings and anecdotes full rein. Their vernacular equivalents, to be considered in the next chapter, often adopt less rigid structures, which allow for the kind of adaptation and improvisation that Cynicism encourages.

1. Erasmus

Brief references to the Cynics are scattered throughout the works of Erasmus. Most of these allusions are commonplace. In fact, Erasmus went a long way to transform Cynic sayings into commonplace material through his collection of Diogenes' *chreiai* in the *Apophthegmata* (1531). This relatively late book is the most significant of Erasmus's *œuvre* as far as his reception of Cynicism is concerned. By comparing some of Erasmus's passing references to the Cynics in a variety of his works with his presentation of Diogenes in the *Apophthegmata*, it will be possible to gain an overview

71 The relevant passage is cited by Clément, p. 13, but she fails to point out that it is drawn from the Arabic source.
of his use of Cynicism. Probably the most interesting and influential instance of
Erasmus's reception of Cynicism outside of the Apophthegmata is found in 'The Sileni
of Alcibiades', which first appeared in 1515 as one of the longest entries within his huge
collection of metaphors, the Adages (1500-). The comparison between Socrates and a
silenus (ugly exterior, philosophically beautiful interior), which derives from Plato's
Symposium, became a commonplace one. Erasmus extends the image to include two
Cynics and a Stoic:

A Silenus of this sort was Antisthenes, who with his staff, his satchel and
his cloak surpassed the wealth of the greatest kings. A Silenus of this
sort was Diogenes, commonly regarded as a dog; but in this dog
something of the divine must have been detected by Alexander the Great
[...] when in his admiration of his nobility of mind he declared that he
would wish himself, were he not Alexander, to be Diogenes, whereas he
ought to have wished for the spirit of Diogenes all the more because he
was Alexander. A Silenus of this sort was Epictetus, a slave and
penniless and lame [...] but at the same time (and this is the greatest of
blessings) dear to heavenly powers in a way that only integrity of life
combined with wisdom can secure. (Ill, iii, 1)72

The ancient philosophers are explicitly presented as proto-Christians, since Erasmus
eventually identifies Jesus as the greatest silenus of all. Attempts to idealize the Cynics
have characterized the reception of Cynicism from ancient times.73 As was seen above,
Medieval representations of the Cynics also often seek to reconcile them with
Christianity. Erasmus's endeavours here are therefore part of a long-established
tradition. Diogenes is cited over twenty times in the Adages, including in 'Vita dolliaris' (I,
viii, 61, 'Life in a tub'), which gives a fairly lengthy and positive portrayal of his
asceticism, which is contrasted with those whose lifestyle involves 'too much meanness,
too much hardship, too much dirt'.74 Erasmus seeks to save Diogenes from association
with beggars and tramps, in much the same way as later Stoic writers sought to
distinguish their Cynic heroes from the Cynics who walked the streets in their own day.
Idealized representations of the Cynics are also found in Erasmus's educational
writings, showing that he wished to employ the Dogs to pedagogical ends. This is true
of passing references to the Cynics in the Colloquies, including, for example, an explicit

72 CWE, XXXIV, ed. and trans. by R. A. B. Mynors, pp. 263-64.
73 Billerbeck, pp. 205-07.
comparison between Christianity and Cynic asceticism in 'The Epicurean'.

Similarly, in 'The Sober Feast', one of the speakers selects a Christian-style saying of Diogenes as his favourite:

> Among all the famous sayings of Diogenes nothing delights me more than his reply to someone who had asked him how he might best avenge himself on an enemy. 'By showing yourself as upright and honourable a man as possible', he said. (p. 927)

It is tempting to think that generations of schoolchildren became familiar with the Cynics through their presence in the highly successful Colloquies. There are also two brief references to Diogenes in Vivès's educational Dialogues. However, there is an insufficient number of allusions to Cynicism to suggest that the Cynics had anything other than a very minor role to play in school curricula, which is hardly surprising given the wholesome content of humanist pedagogy. Furthermore, Cynicism is absent from Mathurin Cordier's Colloques. More significantly, Erasmus employs Alexander's comment about Diogenes to argue for the prince's need for a philosophical education in the dedicatory letter of The Education of a Christian Prince (1516), addressed to the future Charles V:

> A very famous remark of Alexander the Great points usefully in the same direction; he came away from talking with Diogenes the Cynic full of admiration for his lofty philosophic mind, unshakeable, invincible, and superior to all mortal things, and said: 'If I were not Alexander, I should desire to be Diogenes'; in fact, the more severe the storms that must be faced by great power, the more he well might wish for the mind of a Diogenes, which might be equal to the immense burden of events.

Here, Erasmus applies the same anecdote which served to present Diogenes as a proto-Christian in the 'The Sileni of Alcibiades' to political ends. Erasmus's wish is that Charles should become a philosopher king. The need to idealize the Cynic here is plain enough, since a prince who truly had 'the mind of a Diogenes' would be strange indeed. The one other reference to Diogenes in The Education of a Christian Prince again uses him for broadly political purposes, warning the prince against flatterers (p. 245).

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75 CWE, XXXIX-XL, ed. and trans. by Craig R. Thompson, p. 1075.
76 Plutarch, Moralia, ed. and trans. by Frank Babbitt and others, 15 vols, (Loeb, 1927-76), 88b.
Idealization can lead Erasmus to employ Diogenes to ends which are radically opposed to the scandalous figure encountered in many of Diogenes Laertius's anecdotes. For example, in *On the Writing of Letters* (1522), Erasmus cites Diogenes' famous lighting of a lantern at midday to search for a man in favour of the Platonic view that 'philosophy withdraws the mind from physical and coarse things to those that are eternal and intelligible'.

Both Alexander's remark and Diogenes' search for a man are cited in *On Education for Children* (1529), to argue for the need for a philosophical education. In the same treatise, Diogenes' qualities as a teacher of Xeniades' children, as detailed in Diogenes Laertius, are praised (pp. 325-26).

All such carefully selected and controlled references to the Cynic allow Erasmus to turn him to his Christian educational, moral and political ends. Indeed, his varying use of the same sayings and anecdotes puts Erasmus's theory into practice. One of the initial exercises suggested in *De copia* is to take a group of *sententiae* and put them to as many different uses as possible, like moulding a piece of wax into numerous shapes. Nonetheless, the fuller version of Diogenes' sayings found in the *Apophthegmata* inevitably challenges Erasmus's project of idealizing the Dogs, and of moulding them as he sees fit.

The *Apophthegmata* (1531) constitute one of the largest collection of attributed quotations in the early modern period. The first edition contains 2290 apophthegms, while subsequent editions contain over 3000. It is certainly the fullest and most influential sixteenth-century collection of Cynic sayings and anecdotes, by virtue of the fact that the quotations are organized according to speaker, not commonplace. This forms part of Erasmus's educational method. The absence of headings encourages the creation of an image of the philosopher in question, Erasmus's definition of an apophthegm being the brief and witty expression of someone's personality. It also leaves the thematic organization of the material to the reader. According to Erasmus's

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60. *De pueris instituendis*, in *CWE*, XXVI, pp. 303-04.
61. DL, VI, 74.
62. CWE, XXIII, p. 303; the advice is also given by Quintilian.
64. Balavoine, p. 59.
preface, the wit of the ancients is meant to inspire 'lively minds and joyous spirits'. Hence ancient sayings are proposed as examples for imitation, their wit and wisdom to be digested by young people in the formation of their own personalities. The aim of the *Apophthegmata* was pedagogical: they were intended to inspire conversation and reflection on moral topics.

The third book of the *Apophthegmata* is dominated by Diogenes, with 227 apophthegms to his name, compared to 100 for Socrates and 62 for Aristippus. Books seven and eight, first issued in the second edition of 1532, contain 61 apophthegms attributed to Antisthenes, 29 to Bion, 20 to Crates, and 2 each to Hipparchia and her brother, Metrocles, and 3 to Demonax. During the sixteenth century, the *Apophthegmata* were reprinted 90 times, and there were 12 translations into 4 different vernacular languages. Antoine Macault's French translation was first printed in 1539, and was reprinted at least 4 times in the following decade. There was also a translation into quatrains by Gabriel Pot in 1573, who was doubtlessly inspired by the fashion established by emblem books. Although most of the apophthegms are drawn from Plutarch, those of Diogenes are taken from Diogenes Laertius. Erasmus spares his reader the biographical detail with which Diogenes Laertius opens his life of the Cynic. More importantly, Erasmus also excludes tales of Diogenes' shamelessness. This is indicative of a tension which is also apparent in some of the commentaries which Erasmus adds to many of the Cynic's apophthegms. The omission of some apophthegms, as well as the addition of commentaries, are reminders of the impossibility of separating source and reception in the history of the transmission of Cynicism. Furthermore, Erasmus's commentaries form part of an attempt to appropriate Diogenes' sayings, and to prepare them for the moral use of the readers of the *Apophthegmata*. For Erasmus, the pithy sayings (*scite dicta*) of the ancients constitute *bonae literae*, which have an aesthetic and above all an ethical dimension. In a way,

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65 Moss, p. 186.
66 Lobbes, pp. 139 and 141.
67 *Suite des troisieme, et quatrieme livres des apophthegmes, contenant les dict & sentences de Socrate, Aristippe & Diogene [...] Reduits en quatrains, par Gabriel Pot, parisien* (Lyon: Benoist Rigaud, 1573); Balavoine, p. 55.
Cynic sayings are ideally suited to such a context, given their frequent combination of philosophy and wit, of the *utile* and the *dulce*. The lack of theory surrounding Diogenes’ *chreiai* leaves a void that can be filled by Erasmian evangelism. Nonetheless, it is typical of the ancient Dogs to confound any attempt to tame them. Erasmus opens his chapter on Diogenes with a comparison between the Cynic and the two philosophers who preceded him:

> Ce ne sera point a mon advis chose mal ordonnee, Si apres la recreative saincteté de Socrates, apres la joyeuse liberte d'Aristippus, nous faisons memoire de Diogenes Sinopense: qui a grandement surpassé les deux autres, en toute grace de bien parier.89

Erasmus insists on Diogenes’ rhetoric. His wit is his defining characteristic, and puts him on a par with Socrates and Aristippus. The Cynic’s gift of the gab does of course make him particularly suitable for a collection of apophthegms. Nonetheless, the fact that Erasmus emphasizes the form of Diogenes’ sayings already betrays a willingness to distance himself from the content of some of them. Nonetheless, his commentaries are mostly positive and didactic. For example, the anecdote according to which Plato ate all the figs which Diogenes offered him, provoking the Cynic to remark that he told him to take the figs, not to devour them, can be applied to more serious topics, namely ‘ceux qui abusent de la permission de leurs princes, precepteurs ou parens, es choses non permises’ (p. 268). Sometimes, Diogenes’ wit inspires Erasmus to go a little further. This is true of the anecdote on the guardians of a temple carrying off a thief, about whom Diogenes quips that the big thieves are taking away a little thief.90 This saying ‘peust vrairement dire alencontre d’aucuns Magistrats Chrestiens’ (p. 299). However, the logical consequences of the Cynic argument, according to which, if it is not bad to eat, it is not bad to eat in public,91 are hard for Erasmus to stomach:

> Jusques à cecy Ion pourroit endurer le syllogisme cynique, mais qui pourroit souffrir celuy qui vouldroit ainsi de descharger le ventre, pisser,

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88 Lobbes, p. 146.
90 DL, VI, 25 and 45.
91 DL, VI, 69; the Greek version contains a play on words, see Branham, p. 94.
Erasmus experiences much the same embarrassment as Fougerolles at the end of the century as far as Cynic sexual shamelessness is concerned. Elsewhere, Erasmus is happy to narrate the story according to which Diogenes cocked his leg and urinated like a dog on some dinner-guests who had thrown bones in his direction, but he cannot countenance the philosophical motivations for Diogenes' shamelessness here. His project of harnessing the Dogs for the Christian moralizing aims of *bonae literae* cannot fully embrace their shamelessness. He chooses to adopt the Ciceronian stance, which rejects shamelessness on the grounds of 'decorum'. Hence Erasmus joins Cicero in rejecting the Cynic argument that if an act is not shameful, the word describing the act is not shameful. He applies this rule to 'Christian speech' in *De copia* (p. 315). There is a more developed discussion of obscenity which follows similar lines, though without reference to the Cynics, in *The Institution of Christian Matrimony* (1526). Pierre Fabri also adopts the Ciceronian stance in opposition to 'les philosophes stoycques et cinicques' in his *Rhétorique* (1521), and advocates using 'circonlocution' to describe shameful bodily parts and functions. Nonetheless, one of the speakers in Guy de Bruès's sceptical *Dialogues* (1557) uses the Cynic position to question the philosophical basis of such euphemism. Montaigne in particular playfully exploits the convention for circumlocution, most famously in 'Sur des vers de Virgile', but also with reference to Cynic shamelessness in 'L'Apologie de Raimond Sebond'. Erasmus's reaffirmation of social and sexual norms does not properly counter the Cynic challenge. The fact that Diogenes parodies logical forms makes his argument all the more dangerous, since it seems as if he has good philosophical reasons for going against fundamental civilized

92 'Ut sementem feceris, ita et metes' ('As you have sown, so also shall you reap'), *Adages*, III, viii, 78, CWE, XXXII, p. 166; DL, VI, 46.
93 *De Officiis*, 1.128.
97 See below, Chapter 7, part one.
values. Paradoxically, it is because Erasmus has reached a high level of understanding and appreciation of the Cynics that he feels the force of their most outrageous positions. The appeal of Diogenes and his followers to Erasmus is demonstrated not only by the former's dominance of the third book of the *Apophthegmata* but also by references to the Cynics throughout his works. Ultimately, however, Erasmus fails fully to domesticate the Dogs, and, as will become apparent in the following chapters, his idealized vision of the Cynics does not dominate sixteenth-century French representations of Cynicism.

2. Neo-Latin Commonplace-Books and Miscellanies

The history of Renaissance neo-Latin commonplace-books has been thoroughly studied by Ann Moss, who demonstrates their importance to the structure of sixteenth-century education, thought and writing. Analysing the heads under which Cynic sayings appear in such works would of course provide some clues to the understanding of Cynicism at this time, but probably the findings would be modest. Without a commentary like that given by Erasmus to the *Apophthegmata*, commonplace-book treatments of Cynicism are unlikely to be particularly rich. This is true, for example, of Henri Estienne's *Virtutum encomia* (1573), which contains a handful of Cynic sayings in its second part, which is devoted to apophthegms. The serious, didactic moral nature of Estienne's work makes certain Cynic sayings unsuitable, but this is not true of an earlier book of *facetiae* arranged under commonplaces, the *Facetiarum exemplorumque* (1518) of Lucius Domitius Brusonius (Lucio Domitio Brusoni). Diogenes has a very minor role to play in this large book, and his name does not feature in the headings. This is not true of Joannes Gastius's (Johannes Gast), *Convivalium sermonum* (1541), which, following the lead of Erasmus and Brusonius, presents ancient sayings as examples of morally useful wit and also contains various jests, including those of fools, all under

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100 *L. Domiti Bruonii Contursini Lucani Facetiarum exemplorumque. Libri VII* (Rome: Iacobum Mazochisu, 1518).
commonplaces. This short book includes thirty-four sayings headed ‘Diogenes’, the vast majority of which are drawn from Diogenes Laertius, and all of which are comic, thereby demonstrating an implicit association between Diogenes’ wit and fool’s jests which is exploited by various writers, including Rabelais, throughout the early modern period. The jokes about Diogenes include the story of him spitting into the face of someone who had warned him not to expectorate under the heading ‘Diogenis sputum’. Gastius was a Swiss theologian who edited a Greek New Testament, Erasmus’s letters and a theological compilation, the Parabolarum (1540). He joins Erasmus in viewing the sayings of Diogenes as instances of bonae literae. His work is meant to be simultaneously comic (jocis), useful (utilibus) and serious (seris). The large number of Diogenes’ sayings again indicates that material culled from Diogenes Laertius was thought to be ideally adapted to the demands of bonae literae.

More significant as far as the reception of Cynicism is concerned are the Protestant Conrad Lycosthenes’s (Konrad Wolffhart, 1518-61) Apophthegmata ex optimis utriusque linguae scriptoribus (1555). Recently Étienne Ithurria has sought to establish that the manuscript marginalia in a 1560 edition of Lycosthenes he owns are in Montaigne’s hand. This is not the place to enter into the debate as to the validity of Ithurria’s claims. However, whether the ‘scripteur’ is Montaigne or not, the presence of the marginalia, which often refer to other sources of ancient apophthegms, is a further example of the sixteenth-century fascination for collections of such material. Lycosthenes’s work maintains the Erasmian project of collecting Cynic and other ancient sayings and putting them in a Christian frame. He converts Erasmus’s Apophthegmata into a commonplace-book, and adds some commonplaces drawn from

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2. DL, VI, 32.


Stobaeus among others. By putting apophthegms under headings Lycosthenes provides an immediate ideological context for his readers which Erasmus deliberately avoided for heuristic reasons. Hence Lycosthenes’s work can be said to have been produced with a readership of less imaginative schoolchildren in mind. This helps explain why it was almost as successful as its predecessor, having at least 25 editions until 1635. As with Erasmus, Cynic chreiai are particularly well-represented in Lycosthenes’s commonplace-book: there are 226 index references to Diogenes, while Socrates has 160, Plato 64, and Aristotle 56. This does not, however, prove Clément’s claim that Lycosthenes’s Apophthegmata ‘sont la preuve flagrante de l’énorme impact du cynisme dans la philosophie morale du XVIᵉ siècle’ (p. 19). The fact that Diogenes has almost four times as many apophthegms as Aristotle does not show that he is four times more important for sixteenth-century moral philosophy. It does however demonstrate that Cynicism (unlike Aristotelianism) is particularly well-adapted for inclusion in the numerous sixteenth-century collections of ancient apophtegms, which are of course far from being major philosophical works. In Lycosthenes, as in the Apophthegmata of Erasmus, Diogenes’ sayings are often given more as examples of wit than of morality. As Clément points out, Cynic sayings are frequently found under headings which emphasize style over content, including ‘De libere dictis et parrhesia loquendi’ and ‘De facete et jocose dictis’. In vernacular collections, to be analysed in the next chapter, Cynic sayings eventually lose all trace of morality and of source to become solely instances of eloquence. The collections of Erasmus, Gastius and Lycosthenes, by often stressing style at least as much as significance, unwittingly begin a process at the end of which the origins of ancient apophthegms are forgotten.

Further treatments of Cynicism are found in some of the neo-Latin reference-books which appear in Italy in the first few decades of the sixteenth century. The

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105 Moss, p. 187, n.3; Matton, p. 242. Lycosthenes also produced editions of Brusonius’s Facetiarum exemplorumque in 1559, 1560, and 1562.
107 Engamarre, p. 470.
Frenchman Ravisius Textor (Jean Tixier de Ravisi) produced an alphabetically-arranged compilation of epithets attached to nouns, the *Specimen epithetorum*, first published in 1518, and which was reprinted on numerous occasions, becoming one of the most widely consulted reference books of the sixteenth century. It contains a brief biography of, and set of references to, Diogenes. Textor's *Officina* (1520) was another much reprinted and revised miscellany, which opens with a very long list of causes of death, including Diogenes, who is reported to have died from a dog bite. Textor's works are not major sources for knowledge of Cynicism, but they are closely related to the vernacular miscellanies and encyclopedias to be analysed in Chapter Four below.

More interesting as far as the reception of Cynicism is concerned are the *Lectiones antiquae* of the Greek and Latin scholar Ludovicus Coelius Rhodiginus (Lodovico Ricchieri, 1453-1525), which were first published in Venice in 1516. This large miscellany was published in an expanded edition in Basel in 1542. There are nine references to Diogenes in the immense alphabetical index, most of which refer the reader to brief apopthegms given as *exempla*. Oddly, Rhodiginus opens a chapter devoted to the link between clothing and pride with a discussion of Diogenes. He argues that although Diogenes' sayings are often skilful, they need to be appropriately reviewed since the Cynic regularly forgets himself, and inadvertently puffs himself up with pride. It is perhaps for this reason that two of Diogenes' insults addressed to those who care too much for fashion are tempered by Plato's accusation that the Cynic had his own brand of pride (p. 482). A similarly muted account of the Cynic is found in a brief discussion of poverty. According to Rhodiginus, whoever is poor lacks the strength to do or say anything, hence Diogenes 'babbles about trifles to defend himself against us' ('pacto ipse mops tantum nugaris deblatei asque adversum nos') (p. 785).

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109 Clément, p. 18.
111 Moss, p. 98; Kenny, *Palace of Secrets*, p. 46.
Rhodiginus is consistent in this patronizing attitude towards Diogenes, which he maintains even in the face of the latter’s shameless public masturbation:

To the majority the body is the instrument of desire and a burden to the soul. However that same body ought to have provided some kind of cloak and veil for the soul. From this workshop of pleasures it is remarkable how many routes of filthiness and disgusting desires arise [...] And Plutarch writes about a habit that is absurd even to talk about, but which Diogenes was praised for indulging in. They say that Diogenes masturbated in public, when he would say, 'I wish I could as easily rub off the barkings of the belly.' But why do we deal with frivolous matters? (p. 518)\textsuperscript{114}

Rhodiginus is sufficiently confident in his Platonic distaste for the body to dismiss Cynic shamelessness as ‘absurd’ and ‘frivolous’. In this, he goes further than Plutarch, who also misses the point of the story in claiming that Diogenes acted merely for the sake of pleasure.\textsuperscript{115} Rhodiginus does not seek to establish Diogenes as a model so, unlike in Erasmus’s \textit{Apophthegmata}, the Cynic is in no position to bite back. Expressing outrage and disgust at Cynic dirtiness requires engaging with it more or less seriously, but Rhodiginus adopts the strategy of denying its force from the outset. While other writers, including Fougerolles, seek to defuse shamelessness through euphemism, Rhodiginus tries instead to present it as being frivolous. However, Rhodiginus’s apparent refusal to be provoked is itself revealing. The topic of masturbation is embarrassing, it is too ‘absurd even to talk about’, which indicates that, despite his protests to the contrary, Rhodiginus is vaguely troubled. Cynic shamelessness poses a fundamental threat to the kind of Christian-Platonizing notions of the body expressed here. Rhodiginus’s dismissal of, and embarrassment towards, Cynic shamelessness show he is dimly aware of the danger it poses. His attitude therefore serves as an important point of reference for the subsequent history of sixteenth-century discussions of the topic, to be examined in Chapter Seven.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Lodovici Caelli Rhodigni Lectionum antiquarum libri xxx [...]} (Basel: Froben, 1542), p. 481.

\textsuperscript{113} DL, VI, 26.

\textsuperscript{114} ‘Plurimis corpus voluptati est animi oneri: quanquam illud natura, ut quandam vestem ac vetamentum circundisset animo. Ex hac voluptuaria officina mirum est, quanta se promant foeditatum agmina, quae ibidinum turpitudo [...] Quàm verò etiam dictu absudum, in quo tamen suisse laudatum Diogenem, scribit Plutarchus. Quem publicitús solitum refer pudenda perfricare, quum diceret etiamnum: Utinam pariter ventris latratus possem atterere. Sed quid levia confectamur.’

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Moralia}, 1044b. Other sources for Diogenes’ saying include DL, VI, 46 and 69.
Conclusion

I opened this chapter with a note of caution concerning what is to all intents the absence of authentic Cynic sources in the sixteenth century. For the sixteenth century, Cynicism does not exist separately from the Cynic tradition of sayings and anecdotes recorded in numerous non-Cynic texts. These sources are therefore always already engaged in a process of reception, which can involve idealization, as is the case with many Roman sources, and apparent improvisation from Cynic models, as is the case with Lucian. Furthermore, given the variety of genres and ideologies to which these sources belong, the Cynic tradition is always already diverse and manifold. Hence it is no surprise to discover that there are several different versions and accounts of Cynicism in the sixteenth century. It would be foolish to talk of a renaissance of Cynicism since Medieval views of, and approaches to, Cynicism persist into the sixteenth century and beyond. It is however striking that the comic and disreputable Diogenes so often found in the pages of Diogenes Laertius was practically unknown in the Middle Ages. Similarly, there was a surge of editions and translations of Plutarch and Lucian in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries. This access to new sources, combined with a fascination with ancient sayings as models of wit and behaviour, goes some way to account for the large number of Cynic sayings recorded in both Erasmus's and Lycosthenes's Apophthegmata. Their attempts to present the Cynic tradition as bonae literae already show signs of tension, as do Rhodiginus's efforts to defuse Cynic shamelessness. These points of stress show where the version of the proto-Christian Cynic is becoming less viable, thereby opening up new areas for subsequent writers to explore.
Chapter Three

Cynic Sayings in Vernacular Collections and Emblem Books

Les sentences & sages responses de ce filosofe sont infinies

Pedro Mexia, trans. by Claude Gruget, Les Diverses leçons

The previous chapter showed that there was no shortage of sources of Cynic sayings and anecdotes in circulation in the sixteenth century. Cynicism is unique in the history of philosophy for having humorous anecdotes and witty sayings (*chreiai*) as its primary means of transmission. Appreciating the ways in which sixteenth-century writers play with Cynic *chreiai* in collections of sayings will therefore provide essential indications as to how Cynicism was thought of at the time. The importance of the witty remark within Cynicism accounts for the large number of Cynic sayings in Erasmus’s and Lycosthenes’s *Apophthegmata* which revealed a dual fascination with ancient apophthegms as sources of wit and of moral wisdom. However, interest in such gnomic ancient material is not restricted to Latin works. This chapter will focus on the presentation of Cynic sayings in various kinds of vernacular collections of sayings. I have chosen the word 'collection' both as an equivalent of the French 'recueil' and as a deliberately broad term to designate a wide range of texts, from the sayings collated by Guillaume Tardif in the late fifteenth century for Charles VIII to the phrases for love letters collected in *Les Marguerites des lieux communs* (1595). I have tried to make a distinction between the collections of sayings to be considered here, and the encyclopedic and miscellaneous works whose more discursive treatment of Cynic anecdotes and sayings will be analysed in the next chapter. While this way of dividing up texts holds in the majority of cases, there are some texts which could have been placed in either chapter. The distinction should not therefore be seen as a rigid one, but simply one that proved helpful in discussing works that often resemble one another closely.
There have been few studies of French collections of ancient sayings. Claudine Balavoine’s article (‘Bouquets de fleurs et colliers de perles: sur les recueils de formes brèves au XVIᵉ siècle’) has many insights, including the recognition that Erasmus singles out Diogenes for his wit, and that this wit often takes the form of a metaphor, which can be verbal as well as visual, the latter being true of his famous search for a man in the middle of the day while carrying a lantern (p. 58). She does however concentrate on neo-Latin compilations to the extent that their vernacular counterparts are practically ignored. Moreover, she focuses on an attempt to find definitions for ‘maxim’, ‘apophthegm’, ‘adage’, ‘metaphor’, ‘proverb’ and so forth. Whatever the validity of her definitions of these closely related concepts, they are of little use for analysing Cynic sayings, which regularly belong to more than one of these categories simultaneously. It is for this reason that I have chosen to use the term ‘saying’ to describe the objects of my analysis. ‘Saying’, although fairly neutral, still conveys the original, oral nature of the material. French collections lie beyond the scope of Ann Moss’s work on printed commonplace-books. She nonetheless points out that although vernacular commonplace-books may be coarser versions of their Latin counterparts, they are similar in providing a ‘model of ready response and repartee, a mode of improvisation within a set of norms, which is consistent with the style of behaviour moulded by the commonplace-book, even if not exactly with its style of words’ (p. 208). Moss also acknowledges the existence of ‘vernacular collections of sayings, proverbs, and similitudes, which do not replicate the commonplace-book’s arrangement of its material under heads and suggest a much looser pattern of perusal and use’ (p. 207, n.23). It is precisely the looseness of these works that is of interest here, since it allows for the adaptation and improvisation of Cynic sayings within the given collection. Pierre Villey has given the most likely explanation for the lack of critical interest in vernacular collections of sayings:

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1 Pierre Villey gives a still useful introduction to collections of sayings, encyclopedias and miscellanies, in Les Sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne, II, pp. 7-37. Vernacular collections of sayings are not discussed in the histories of rhetoric by Marc Fumaroli, L'Âge de l'éloquence: rhétorique et "res literaria" de la Renaissance au seuil de l'époque classique.
It is however precisely because these works were so prevalent in the sixteenth century that they deserve critical attention, since the various vernacular manifestations of collections of ancient material were received by the widest possible reading public, and are more representative of sixteenth-century cultural production than the atypical works of Rabelais and Montaigne. This chapter will therefore seek to redress the balance a little. There has been a study of English sixteenth-century collections of sayings: Mary Crane, *Framing Authority: Sayings, Self, and Society in Sixteenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Her notion of ‘framing’ is helpful. She offers three main definitions which she claims were current in sixteenth-century England, namely ‘to give material form to an immaterial idea’, ‘to arrange in coherent order’, and ‘falsify’ (the latter being close to the modern sense, ‘to incriminate’) (p. 202, n.6). Framing can, however, be more usefully defined for my purposes as the arrangement of sayings within a collection, and their ideological context. My starting position is that these two aspects of framing are linked. This is seen, for example, in Lycosthenes’s *Apophthegmata*, in which Cynic sayings were arranged to encourage imitation along Christian moral lines. Crane claims that framing of sayings enabled writers to define themselves both as authors and as political figures:

“Sayings” were a useful tool because they were supposed to combine matter and words (*verba* and *res*), to transmit the authority of antiquity without transgressing modern cultural codes, to provide the matter for copious speech while making sure that speech was grounded and controlled, and to provide a socially and politically empowering facility with language while making sure that its wielder remained within the existing social hierarchy. (pp. 7-8)

de leur classe et leur fonction'. Erasmus's attempts to put the authority of the Cynics to political ends, notably in the dedicatory letter of *The Education of a Christian Prince*, were noted above. This bears out Crane's hypothesis, as does Erasmus's embarrassment, in the *Apophthegmata*, on encountering some Cynic sayings which violate ancient and modern taboos. However, Erasmus's insistence on the wit of Diogenes' sayings sits uneasily with Crane's notion of sayings as a tool for harnessing authority. Since I shall argue that French collections emphasize the use of Cynics as models of repartee, I do not believe they generally support Crane's interesting view, nor that of Pons, but it should nonetheless be borne in mind in specific instances, especially in collections which were at one stage or another destined for a royal audience.

The first part of this chapter will investigate the treatment of Cynic sayings and anecdotes in compilations of apophthegms, proverbs, witticisms, riddles, similitudes and questions-and-answers. The second part will briefly examine the remarkable role Diogenes plays in Stefano Guazzo's definition of ideal conversation in *La Civil conversatione* (1574). The third part will investigate what happens to Cynic sayings and stories when they are placed in the characteristically sixteenth-century form of the emblem book. The collections are at their most interesting when they do not merely follow their own sources, but leave them behind, to comment on the given saying, to adapt it in some significant way, or even to invent a new one. These points of departure, which are encouraged by the loose structure of many vernacular collections, leave vital traces of the ways in which sixteenth-century writers understood and used Cynicism.

Part One

Vernacular Collections of Sayings

Erasmus's *Apophthegmata* sought to present Cynic sayings as examples of *bonae literae*, which have both a moral and an aesthetic function. Erasmus singled Diogenes out for his 'grace de bien parler', and he tried to recuperate as much of Cynicism as he

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2 Alain Pons, 'La rhétorique des manières au XVIe siècle en Italie', *Histoire de la rhétorique dans*
could for his Christian moralizing ends. I shall argue that vernacular collections, particularly in the second half of the sixteenth century, concentrated on Diogenes' wit and neglected the moral dimension of his sayings. The same is presumably true of sayings culled from other philosophical schools, but they, unlike Cynicism, are not primarily transmitted through witty remarks. This finding is the opposite of Ullrich Langer's claim that vernacular collections of sayings focus almost exclusively on morality.\(^3\) Langer's hypothesis is based principally on discussion of a single collection, the *Tresor de vertu*, which I discuss below, but which is by no means representative of vernacular collections, particularly from the second half of the sixteenth century.

The absence of theory surrounding Cynicism leaves a vacuum which encourages comic adaptations and improvisations as well as Erasmian evangelism. These adaptations lead to Cynic sayings being presented not as *bonae literae* but as 'facéties', 'bons mots', 'énigmes' or 'curiosités'. Nonetheless, it is in this way that Cynic sayings enter the French language as proverbs or idioms. This phenomenon is the mirror image of the process, described by Natalie Zemon Davis, in which 'popular' French idioms and proverbs are put into learned collections.\(^4\) This is a useful indication that, far from being wholly separate, 'popular' and learned culture exchanged materials. Vulgarization of Cynic sayings is closer to Diogenes' practice as related in the Cynic tradition, which taught through example rather than theory, than to Erasmus's attempt to harness them for his evangelical purposes. Texts will be discussed for the most part in chronological order so as to show the changes the framing of Cynic sayings undergo over time. I have sought to give as large a selection of these little-studied works as possible.

The fashion for 'recueils' of ancient sayings in the sixteenth century was anticipated by Guillaume Tardif who included a selection of sayings of the ancients in an ornate incunabulum presented to Charles VIII in c.1490. Tardif was professor of

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eloquence at the Collège de Navarre and a 'Lecteur ordinaire du roi'. The first part of his work, preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale (Vélins 611), is a selection of stories mostly taken from Lorenzo Valla’s Latin translation of Aesop. The second part, of relevance here, features 92 sayings, including 22 sayings of Diogenes, all of which are drawn from Diogenes Laertius, presumably via Traversari’s Latin version. The Cynic thereby gets a greater share of sayings than the other philosophers included (10 for Bias, 13 for Aristippus, 2 for Zeno). More interesting however than this numerical dominance is the remarkable fact that these Cynic sayings were presented to the king for his entertainment. Tardif writes a prologue giving guidance as to how his collection of sayings should be read and used by his distinguished readership:

Francois Petrarque en certain traicte qu’il fait des facecies des nobles hommes dit que ainsi comme l’ennui et fatigation qui est es pensees et operations humaines est releve et recree par interposition de esbas et de jeux: pareillement l’ennuy qui peut estre en narrant ou recitant choses utiles & prouffitables est recree & releve par ditz et paroles facecieuses et recreatives. A ceste cause mon tresredoubte & tres souverain seigneur apres la translation des apologues dessus di j’ay converti mon entendement a vous translater sommerement et en brief aucuns ditz moraulx et paroles joyeuses des nobles hommes anciens. Affin que vostre royale majeste laquelle peut aucuneffois estre ennuyee de ouyr narrer et receiter les grans affaires de vostre royaulme: puisse avoir a main aucunes choses recreatives et tant de vous que des nobles hommes assistans en vostre court royale lesquelz dit vous seront a main & porront estre par vous reitez selon les matieres occurrentes pour cause de joyeuseté ou pour satisfaire a l’importune requeste de aucuns, ou pour respondre par parole urbaine et courtoise couverte de aucune trammumtive similitude a celui ou ceulx envers lesquelz votre tresredoute & tressouveraine majeste les saura mieulx applicuer.

The first part of Tardif’s introduction places a clear emphasis on enjoyment over instruction, the sayings being above all ‘facecieuses’, ‘recreatives’ and ‘joyeuses’ and only secondarily ‘moraux’. Clearly, many of Diogenes’ sayings fit well in such a context. Furthermore, Tardif proceeds to suggest that the king could use the sayings as a source of his own humour and put-downs (thereby foreseeing the presentation of Cynic sayings, particularly in the latter half of the sixteenth century). The sayings of the ancients, in which Diogenes’ rhetoric has numerical pride of place, are therefore

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presented as models of wit ripe for use by the king and his court. Hence the demands of selecting Diogenes' quips for royalty are less to offer a sanitized or idealized version of Cynicism than to provide sayings which would make a king laugh. It is practically impossible to say what the royal sense of humour would have been, but judging from the fact that Charles VIII's accounts record several monetary gifts to fools in the service of nobleman, and of clothing for an unnamed 'fou du roi' in 1487, it seems likely that he would have taken Diogenes' quips in the right spirit. Nonetheless, incomprehension or anxiety is occasionally apparent not only in Tardif's translation but also in the 'morals' he supplies to most of the sayings. These morals were cut out altogether of the version of Tardif's work which was printed in Lyon in 1531 by Denys de Harsy for the bookseller Romain Morin. The importance of this edition is that it is an excellent example of what Pérouse calls 'vulgarisation humaniste' (p. 182). Although the 1531 text remains faithful to Tardif's translation of Diogenes' sayings, the fact that they have been moved from a luxurious royal edition to a cheap printed version illustrates the popularization which Cynic and other ancient bons mots were undergoing at this time. Oddly, the sayings of Aristippus are omitted from Morin's book. Pérouse suggests that this may be due to the Cyrenaic's bad reputation at this time (p. 181). If this is true, it is presumably because Aristippus held pleasure to be the supreme good, a view which was habitually condemned in the sixteenth century, particularly in discussions of Epicureanism. Diogenes may be saved by his asceticism and proto-Stoicism, even though his sayings are generally more disreputable than those of Aristippus. Certainly some of the more disgraceful elements of Diogenes' behaviour are not suppressed in Tardif's work.

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6 A. Canel, Recherches historiques sur les fous des rois de France et accessoirement sur l'emploi du fou en général (Paris: Lemerre, 1873), pp. 87-90. There are no obvious references to the Cynics in Guillaume Budé's 'Recueil manuscrit d'apophtegmes, présenté à François 1er en 1519', Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal: MS 5103.

7 The relevant section, entitled Les Paroles joyeuses & ditz memorables des nobles & saiges hommes anciens [...] is included in the same volume as Le Paragon des nouvelles honnestes [...], which are also drawn from Tardif's work. There is a modern edition, Le Paragon de nouvelles, ed. by Gabriel-André Pérouse and others (Geneva: Droz, 1979). Quotations of sayings will be from this edition.

8 The jokes of Aristippus and Diogenes are often similar, which is one of the reasons why contrasts between the Cyrenaic and the Cynic, not always in favour of the latter, are commonplace. See below, Chapter 6, part 1.
Following two fairly innocuous sayings, Tardif offers the following 'dit joyeulx' to Charles VIII:

Ung quidam invita ledit Diogenes à disner, en sa maison tapissee et paree de grant et sumptueux appareil. Et pource que ledit Diogenes crachoit voulentier, l'oste qui invite l'avoit luy dist qu'il ne crachast point contre les paroys, pour raison de la tapisserie. Eulx estant à disner, il eut voulenté de cracher et en effect addressa et lança son crachas contre le visage de celluy qui invite l'avoit. L'oste, qui fut irrité, luy demanda pourquoi il avot ce fai. Et il luy dist: "Pource qu'en toute la maison n'ay peu trouver plus vil lieue ne moins acoustrê que ta face". (pp. 209-10)

The above is an adaptation of the following from Diogenes Laertius:

Some one took him into a magnificent house and warned him not to expectorate, whereupon having cleared his throat he discharged the phlegm into the man's face, being unable, he said, to find a meaner receptacle. (VI, 32)

Tardif has added considerable narrative detail to the ancient anecdote, thereby making it more like a 'facecie' or 'nouvelle' than a 'sentence'. The two genres were clearly closely related. 9 Ruelle has shown that Tardif's translation of Valla is similarly free (p. 35). Tardif gives a surprising moral to the tale, which makes a Cynic-style appeal to nature: 'Par ce est donne a entendre que on ne doit point interdire ne defendre a une personne ce qui lui est donne par ordonnance de nature'. However, the more obvious, and presumably more dangerous, meaning of the tale is that 'nature', even in the form of the Cynic's spit, is preferable to luxury and magnificence. The spitting story is followed by a 'dit moral et argument' which reveals similar confusions on Tardif's part:

Toutes choses appartiennent aux dieux, les saiges sont amis des dieux, et toutes choses sont communes entre les amis: il s'ensuyt doncques que toutes choses sont et appartiennent aux saiges. (p. 210) 10 Par ce veult donner a entendre que cest ung des grans biens qui puisse estre que vraye amitie et union entre les hommes.

While Tardif's moral is innocent, it does not take much imagination to see Diogenes' mock-syllogism as a subversive justification of beggary and theft. 11 It is likely that the Cynic's chop-logic was too transgressive for Tardif, and that he therefore failed to get the joke. This apparent incomprehension and unwitting whitewash is revealing of what


10 DL, VI, 37.
aspects of Cynic humour were acceptable at this time. Both it, and the earlier justification of spitting, show a curious willingness to excuse some of the more shocking aspects of Diogenes' performance, which in turn leads to a blindness as to its subversive meaning. Sometimes, however, Tardif is not oblivious to the fact that he is cleaning up the ancient source, as is clear in the following 'dit joyeulx':

\[
\text{Ung quidam demanda audit Diogenes, ung jour qui passa, en quel aage ung homme se devoit marier. Il respondit: "Ung jeune adolescent ne se doit pas marier trop tost". (p. 214)}
\]

This saying does not require any moral. It is no joke, unlike the version in Diogenes Laertius:

Being asked what was the right time to marry, Diogenes replied, "For a young man not yet: for an old man never at all". (VI, 54)\(^\text{12}\)

Hearing Diogenes speak out against marriage was apparently less acceptable than hearing of him spitting in someone's face. Interestingly for a selection made for a royal audience, Tardif includes two of Diogenes' clashes with Alexander the Great, although he omits the famous tale of sun-bathing:

\[
\text{Alexandre le grant, roy de Grece, dist une fois audit Diogenes: "Que te semble de moy? Je suis Alexandre, le grant roy". Et il luy respondit: "Et je suis Diogenes, le grant chien abayant". (p. 211)}
\]

\[
\text{Alexandre, roy de Grece, demanda une fois audit Diogenes se il le craignoit point. Il respondit: "Es tu bon ou mauvais?" Alexandre luy dist: "Je pence estre bon". - Et tantost Diogenes luy dist: "Certes, je ne te crains point doncques". (p. 215)}\(^\text{13}\)
\]

Since they are presented as being 'recreatives' and 'joyeuses', Tardif uses a kind of fool's licence in his proffering of the sayings of the ancients. These two 'dictz de Diogenes', the first of which emphasizes the fact that Alexander was himself a king, use this same licence. They are therefore amusing precisely because they could be subversive if framed differently. Tardif's blind spots can furthermore be usefully contrasted with Erasmus's understanding of some of the dangers of Cynicism. This indicates that the most scandalous aspects of Cynicism were far from obvious at the turn of the sixteenth century. There is, I would argue, nothing in Tardif's collection to

\(^{11}\) Branham, 'Diogenes' Rhetoric', p. 93: 'Using the form of the syllogism allows Diogenes to invoke the authority of reason even as he parodies its procedures in a single gesture'.

\(^{12}\) DL, VI, 54; the saying was also too shocking for Mexia, see below, Chapter 4, part 1.

\(^{13}\) DL, VI, 60 and 68.
support Crane’s hypothesis that the framing of sayings invariably involved the self-fashioning of authors and political players. In contrast, however, ancient sayings in Jean Thenaud’s *Le Triumphe de vertu* are turned to broadly political ends. Thenaud’s moral and educational treatise was commissioned by Louise de Savoie for her children, Marguerite d’Angoulême and the future François Ier. Diogenes’ poverty is praised, but Thenaud immediately proceeds to cite two passages, from Cicero and Seneca respectively, which argue that there is no contradiction between philosophy and wealth.  

In this way, Cynicism is simultaneously lauded and then defused for political reasons.

Guillaume Telin’s *Bref sommaire* (1533) is a short encyclopedia which addresses a wide range of subjects, from the liberal arts to the inventors of things. Diogenes appears as one of many philosophers in a section entitled ‘Les dictz et bonnes sentences des sages et scavans philosophes’. The material on Diogenes is drawn from the Arabic source, *Les Dictz moraulx des philosophes*. The opening is identical, and Telin proceeds to select some sayings from the remainder of the work:

\[
\text{Il disoit quant tu reputeras pour mal ce que tu verras sur autruy, si te garde bien de l’avoir sur toy. Amour de luxure est une maladie qui vient aux gens par trop grant oysivete & plus son peu exerciter en autres choses […] Quiconque faict bien pour la bonte du bien seullement/il le doit faire, devant chascun sans craindre louenge ne blasme. (fol. 116v)}
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The fact that Telin opts for these sayings demonstrates that there is no such thing as an impartial choice of sayings. Any selection implies the construction of a Diogenes out of the raw material of the Cynic tradition. In this case, the Cynic presented is one who is best suited to Telin’s Christian pedagogic purposes, unlike Tardif, who wanted to create an amusing picture of the philosopher.

Antoine Du Moulin’s translation of Epictetus, *Le Manuel d’Epictete [...] plus y sont ajusteées les sentences des philosophes de Grece, traduictes en langue francoyse, par Antoine du Moulin masconnois* (Lyon: Jean de Tournes, 1544), which was reprinted in 1553 and 1558, is a double repository of Cynicism. It not only,  

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naturally, contains Epictetus's idealized representation of Diogenes, but Du Moulin adds a selection of sayings from Greek philosophers, including 5 from Antisthenes, 13 from Diogenes, and 1 from Crates. All of these sayings are drawn from Diogenes Laertius, whose order Du Moulin follows, although he gives no hint as to his source. Diogenes' sayings are brief enough to be cited here, to give a flavour of Du Moulin's selection:

Le bon Homme est image de Dieu.
L'amour des paresseux est, Oysiveté. 16
Poureté est miserable en vieillesse.
Parolle douce, est licol de miel.
Le ventre est un gouffre de la vie.
Belle putain, est mortelle douceur.
Ceux qui disent de belles chose, & ne les font, ilz sont semblables à la Harpe qui sonne aux autres, & ne l'entend, ny pareillement ne le sent.
Ceux qui accordent les son avec du boys dans un Psalterion, ilz font ce par mocquerie, veu qu'ilz ne reglent leur esprit à vivre selon raison.
Celuy qui ne se soucie de bien vivre, vit en vain.
Celuy qui est beau, & parle vilainemnt, il tire un couteau de plomb d'une guaïne d'yvoire.
Le serviteur sert son maistre, les meschans servent aux convoitises.
Science, aux jeunes est sobriéte, aux vieilz soulas, aux poures richesse, aux riches honneur.
Noblesse, gloire, & richesse sont couverture de malice. (pp. 75-76) 17

This choice of sayings gives the impression of an eminently respectable, and utterly humourless, Diogenes, appropriate for a volume which also contains a translation of Epictetus. Although Du Moulin draws on Diogenes Laertius he nonetheless follows Telin's approach, so as to silence the more disreputable stories and sayings, unlike Tardif.

Almost exactly the same selection of Antisthenes' and Diogenes' sayings is found in the second part of Charles Fontaine, Les Dicts des septs sages, ensemble plusieurs autres sentences latines, extraites de divers, bons, & anciens auteurs, avec leur exposicion francoise (Lyon: Jean Citoys, 1557). This section, entitled 'Autres sentences, & mot dorez au nombre de 150. Recueilli de divers auteurs, avec leurs noms (aumoins pour une grande partie) & de diverse matiere, selon que je les ay rencontrez, & extrait par longue lecture', is not lifted entirely from Du Moulin. This is plain from the fact that Fontaine gives the sayings in both Latin and French, translates

16 This is a mistranslation of DL, VI, 51: 'Love [is] the business of the idle'.
differently (he does not mistranslate the second saying), includes an extra saying from Diogenes and two sayings from Crates, neither of which are found in Du Moulin. It is likely that both Du Moulin and Fontaine take their selection from a further source. This does not however change the crucial point that these two compilers, although they do not deliberately play with their sources, nonetheless construct a Diogenes, and a dull one at that, by virtue of their selection.

A similar collection of sayings to those of Du Moulin and Fontaine is the *Tresor de vertu* now ascribed to Pierre Trédéhan, which seems to have first appeared in Lyon in 1555. The authorship of the work is far from obvious since both its Lyon printer, Jean Temporal, and its Italian translator, Bartolome Marassi, claim the *Tresor de vertu* for themselves in their respective letters to the reader. In an attempt to double its market, the book has French and Italian text side-by-side. This leads Ann Moss to characterize the *Tresor* as a down-market commonplace-book (p. 262). Its sayings are classed under headings, like a commonplace-book. A further indication of its status as a primarily commercial venture is given by its publication in 1581 by Nicolas Bonfons, who specialized in popular works on the ways of virtue. Somewhat surprisingly, given the serious and sententious nature of the work, the sayings of the Cynics, represented by Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, and Bion, are cited on some twenty occasions in the second part of the book. However, the sayings selected, drawn from Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch, are inevitably among the more respectable or obviously virtuous passed on by the tradition. The Cynics are used to pronounce against flattery, envy and the seeking of worldly riches. Diogenes’ remark to an astronomer that it is stars that err, not

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17 DL, VI, 51, 61, 64-66, 68, 72.
18 *Tresor de vertu, ou sont contenue toutes les plus nobles, & excellentes sentences, & enseignemens de tous les premiers auteurs [...]* (Lyon: Jean Temporal, 1555). The second book of the *Tresor de vertu*, of relevance here, is also found in a trilingual edition (in Spanish, Italian and French), published in Antwerp by Juan Richard in the same year: *Les Tréselegantes sentences de plusieurs sages princes, roys, et philosophes [...]*. Both were conceived at least in part as learning aids. The *Trésor de vertu* had at least five further editions in 1556, 1560, 1576, 1581 and 1583. See Langer, *Vertu du discours, discours de la vertu*, pp. 25 and n.29, 114, 118-20 and n. 40, who claims to have found a 1553 edition.
19 Moss, p. 262, n.10; Bonfons also published Gabriel Meurier’s *Tresor de sentences* and *Bouquet de philosophie morale* (see below).
people, is even cited in the first chapter, ‘De la puissance de Dieu’. Nonetheless, the picture generated of the Cynics is slightly more rounded than that found in Telin, Du Moulin and Fontaine, not least because the reader gets to hear Diogenes crack a few jokes.

Fortunately, there is a racier compilation than the Tresor de vertu, which does come from Italy: Lodovico Guicciardini’s Les Heures de recreations, which were first translated into French by François de Belleforest in 1571. Guicciardini divides his work into commonplaces, twenty-four of which are devoted to the Cynics, drawn again for the most part from Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. Appropriately for a work which is meant to be amusing, Guicciardini does not shy away from sharing a few of Diogenes’ witticisms with his reader so that, for example, the chapter entitled, ‘Les Philosophes donnent souvent de gaillardes, & non attendues responces’ contains the following: ‘Diogène Cynique, estant interrogué de quel vin il beuvoit plus volontiers, respondit, de celui des autres’ (fol. 18r). One of the most interesting of Guicciardini’s commonplaces as far as the Cynics are concerned is devoted to the notorious ‘dog-marriage’ of Crates and Hipparchia. It is ironically entitled ‘L’Amour avoir effort sur les cueurs les plus tendres des filles’ and relates the story of Crates’ attempt, at the bequest of Hipparchia’s parents, to dissuade her from marrying him, by throwing off his cloak in front of her, thereby exposing his hunchbacked nakedness and, by extension, all his worldly possessions. Guicciardini continues the story as follows:

Hipparchie accepta la condition, & ainsi ce venerable philosophe estendit gentilment son manteau par terre, & y met l’espousé dessus, & sans honte de personne il l’accolla, & consomma le mariage en presence de tous les parens de la fille; & le meilleur fut, que comme on luy demandast

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21 Les Heures de recreations et après-disnées de Louys Guicciardin citoyen & gentilhomme florentin, traduit d’italien par François de Belle-Forest comineois (Paris: Jean Ruelle, 1571); there were further editions in 1573, 1576, 1578 and 1610; see Michel Simonin, Vivre de sa plume au XVle siècle ou la carrière de François de Belleforest, THR, 268 (Geneva: Droz, 1992), pp. 121-22.
22 DL, VI, 54: ‘To the question what wine he found pleasant to drink, he replied, “That for which other people pay”’; Montaigne gives another version: ‘[C] Diogenes respondit, selon moy, à celuy qui luy demanda quelle sorte de vin il trouvoit le meilleur: lestranger, feit-it’, Essais, III, 9, 951. This saying, along with that entitled ‘Quand est-ce qu’il faut disner, selon l’opinion de Diogenes’, is reproduced in Thresor des recreations [...] tiré de divers auteurs trop fameuz (Douay: Baltazar Bellere, 1605), pp. 250 and 260.
qu'est ce qu'il faisoit, il respondit je plante un homme. Autant en dit-on de Diogene surnommé Cynique. (fols 13r-14r)

The above combines elements from Diogenes Laertius and Apuleius, who also has the dog-marriage being consummated in public, although there does not seem to be any ancient source for the final saying, which is indeed often ascribed to one of the Cynics.23

Unlike *Le Trésor de vertu* and *Les Heures de recreations*, Gabriel Meurier’s *Le Bouquet de philosophie morale jadis esparse entre plusieurs autheurs italiens, & ores entierement & moult succinctement radunnée & reduicte par demandes & responses* (Anvers: Jean Waesberghe, 1568) is not a commonplace-book, preferring a more random arrangement of sayings and proverbs.24 Meurier is best known as a language teacher, based in Antwerp, who wrote language books and dictionaries most of which were designed for use by merchants.25 Some of these language books make use of the Cynic tradition, and will be analysed briefly in the light of the considerable use of Cynic sayings in *Le Bouquet*. The monolingual *Bouquet* is part linguistic resource, part marketing venture based on the fashion for collections of proverbs and sayings. The genre of ‘demandes & responses’, otherwise known as *quaestio*, has many examples in works of coarse humour and folk wisdom.26 Diogenes is foremost among the philosophers featured in *Le Bouquet*, being quoted nine times. Among Diogenes’ sayings is the following unexpected image of the Cynic as a fisherman:

D. Comment pourroit un pescheur emporter quand & soy ce qu'il n'a pas encore pris, & laisser ce qu'il a pris?
R. En laissant les poissons qu'il a pesche & emportant (dit Diogenes) les poux qu'il n'a pas encore pris. (sig. B4v)

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24 Moss, p. 207, n.23. Further editions were printed in Lyon in 1577, in Rouen in 1578 and 1579, in Paris in 1581, in Lyon in 1582. There were at least two seventeenth-century editions, in 1617 and 1652.
26 See, for example, *Plusieurs demandes joyeuses, en forme de quolibet* (c.1540) and *Mil lll vingt quatre demandes avec les solutions & responses a tous propoz, oeuvre curieux et moult recreatif […]* (Paris: Galliot du Prê, 1531). Ortensio Lando, *Miscellaneae quaestiones* (1550), translated into French as *Questions diverses, et reponses d'icelles [...]* (Lyon: la veufve Gabriel Cotien, 1570) is a more serious example of the genre.
This saying is drawn from Vincent de Beauvais’s *Miroir hystorial*. Although there is no obvious philosophical significance to this question-and-answer, it nonetheless shares the comedy of Diogenes Laertius’s biography. Consequently, citing Diogenes here helps to establish him as a philosopher-buffoon. The comedy of Diogenes is often more pointed than the above:

D. Qui est le serviteur qui eut dire à son maistre je n’ay que faire de toy qui es serviteur de mon serviteur?
R. C’est un pauvre serviteur servant l’avariceix & convoiteux. Ainsi dit Diogenes à Alexandre le grand. (sig. H8*)

This question-and-answer employs Diogenes as a kind of authority figure, whose existence is devoted to overcoming the kind of desires and ambitions to which Alexander was subject. It is however the more obviously comic Cynic who is most in evidence in *Le Bouquet*:

D. Quand doit on prendre femme?
R. Le jeune pas encore, & le vieil dit Diogenes jamais. (sig. C5*)

D. Quels sont en ce monde les plus sages monteurs & qui sont plus à louër & à priser?
R. Ieux (dit Diogenes) qui dient de se marier, & demeurent sans femme. (sig. C8*)

The above are perhaps supposed to add some philosophical kudos to the general misogyny of the work. Citing Diogenes also adds to the humour. The selection of all these sayings amounts to a kind of characterization of Diogenes, so it is not particularly surprising to find him cited in the following which has no obvious ancient nor Medieval source:

D. Comment pourroit l’homme eschapper de tout mal?
R. Et non obeissant (dit Diogenes) aux femmes. (sig. D2*)

The apparent invention of a saying not only constitutes a characterization of Diogenes but it also illustrates an unusual aspect of the reception of Cynicism. Diogenes is sufficiently well-known to be cited as a kind of authority like many other ancient

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27 See above, p. 41.
28 *La Forest et description*, fol. 25', cited above; cf. DL, VI, 66: ‘He said that bad men obey their lusts as servants obey their masters’.
29 DL, VI, 29 and 54.
30 For two typical examples of this misogyny, see sig. B7*: ‘D. Qu’elle estoit la cause que le Philosophe conseilloit de plus tost prendre une petite femme qu’une grande? R. Par ce que
philosophers. However, his performance also encourages further adaptation and improvisation. As by some way the funniest philosopher in Diogenes Laertius's *Lives*, Diogenes inspires facetious inventions. It is true to say that the names of Plato and Aristotle can be ascribed facetious parts in comic dialogues, including, for example, one of Meurier's *Colloques, ou nouvelle invention de propos familiers* (1557). However, these roles go deliberately against the grain, while similar presentation of Diogenes is in character. Such invention is also seen in the following sayings:

D. Pour quelle raison affermoit Diogenes (parlant à la fois facecieusement) le fromage vieil & dur estre de mout plus grande vertu & efficace que le frais?
R. par ce qu'en faissant toussir de nuit ce luy qui en mange à son soupper il intimide tellement les larrons qu'il n'osent enfraindre, rompre ne se fourrer en sa maison. (sig. G8')

D. D'où procede que plusieurs ont le nez tant cardinalisé ou rouge?
R. Pour ce (dit Diogenes) que leur chair est encore crue ou mal cuite.
(sig. K1')

These sayings show that Diogenes was primarily characterized as a joker. Of course, unlike many of the jokes recorded in the Cynic tradition, the above have no philosophical content. However, they do show how Diogenes was viewed as an ancient authority-figure ripe for adaptation. This reworking can be fairly close to the tradition, as is the case with Diogenes' misogyny in the invented saying above, or it may simply share its comic nature. It is however equally easy to take away Diogenes' name from one of his sayings as it is to attach it to a new one. For example, the following two questions-and-answers are drawn from Diogenes Laertius's life of Diogenes:

D. A quelle heure doit on diner?
R. Le riche quand il veut, & le pauvre quand il peut (sig. H2')

D. A quoy se doibt accomparer de jeune de beau corsage & de vil courage,
R. A une dague de plomb en une belle gaine. (sig. F2')

The fact that Diogenes is not cited here is indicative of a process which is a natural result of the collecting and distributing of ancient sayings, in works like those of Erasmus, Du Moulin and Fontaine. The latter saying is indeed featured as one of the

mieuxx vaut un petit mal qu'un grand mal' and sig. F2"': 'D. Quand est-ce que le mal se repose avec le mal, R. C'est quand une femme est malade'.
Adages: 'In eburna vagina plumbeus gladius' (I, vii, 25). The use of the Adages by Rabelais and Shakespeare is well known. By dint of repetition, a given saying starts to work its way into the language like an idiom, that is to say the source is forgotten or neglected, but the saying remains. This particular saying of Diogenes found its way into both the French and the English vernaculars. Already Rabelais refers to Panurge as 'fin à dorer comme une dague de plomb' (Pantagruel, 16). A characteristically witty dialogue, entitled 'Pour apprendre à marchander, ou vendre, & acheter', from Meurier's Colloques contains the following exchange between Mathieu and a 'Hollandois':

M. Or, regardez, & maniez bien l'endroit, & l'envers. Voyez vous qu'elle largeur & espessee: vous ne l'userez de vostre vie, moyennant que le contragardesz des quatre Elemens: a scavoir, du vent, du feu, de l'eaue, & de l'air.
H. Il est fin comme une dague de plomb, & si gros & mal tissu, qu'on void le jour parmy, & il ne duist que pour faire doublure.

The dialogue form here shows the originally Cynic saying being used both as a proverb and as a source of sixteenth-century wit. Meurier also includes the saying in La Perle de similitudes:

En gaine d'or, gist souvent glaive de plomb: Tout ainsi que lon juge grandement messeoir à une personne d'avoir le cops ord & sale, & d'estre vestu de soye, d'or & de pourpre. Il n'est pas moins messeant & detestable que tres-ville à toute creature humaine d'este doüée d'une naive & grand beauté de corps & de face, & farci d'œuvres nefandes & de parolles deshonnestes.

31 DL, VI, 40 and 65. The latter question-and-answer is found, in a slightly different form, on sig. G4°. This is but one example of the frequently repetitious nature of the work.
32 CWE, XXXIV, p. 82.
33 Margaret Mann Phillips, 'Comment s'est-on servi des Adages?', Actes du colloque international Érasme (Tours, 1986), ed. by Jacques Chomarat, André Godin and Jean-Claude Margolin, THR, 239 (Genève: Droz, 1990), pp. 325-36.
36 Colloques, ou nouvelle invention de propos familiers: non moins utiles que tresnecessaires, pour facillement apprendre frangois & flameng [...] (Anvers: Christofle Plantin, 1558), sig. G4°. The edition I consulted, in the British Library (628.f.30 (1)), is probably a reprinting of the first edition of 1557.
37 La Perle de similitudes [...] (Malines: Gilles Cranenbroeck, 1583), p. 73.
Jean-Antoine de Baïf refers to 'Lame de plomb, guaine d'ivoire' in his own collection of proverbs, again without mentioning Diogenes. Further evidence of the penetration of Diogenes' metaphor into the French language by the early seventeenth century is found in the prologue to the *Facieuses paradoxes de Bruscambille* (1615) which maintains that 'Nostre Scene ne sera point prophanee de ces dagues de plomb en fourreaux d'argent.' Later in the seventeenth century, the phrase becomes a 'vulgaire' curiosity in Antoine Oudin, *Curiositez francaises* (1640): 'fin comme une Dague de plomb i., grossier, lourdaut, niais, vulg.'

This process, which for want of a better term could be called idiomatization, is typical of the reception of ancient Cynicism throughout the ages up to, and including, the present day. The sayings and anecdotes of the tradition are by their very nature more accessible than abstract philosophical argument, and thereby easily work themselves into the popular imagination. This accounts for the durability of Cynicism, despite the fact that barely any authentic Cynic texts survive. Although Cynicism as a way of life may have died out, echoes of Diogenes' philosophical practice are still heard today because it was always ripe for idiomatization. This process also brings with it certain limitations for the reception of a philosophy. For example, the saying cited in Meurier and Baïf's collections is typical of Cynicism insofar as it opposes someone's outward appearance to the state of his or her mind. Similar sayings can be found in Diogenes Laertius, VI, 64 and 65, and are included in Du Moulin's translation, given above. When Meurier and Baïf fail to cite Diogenes it is in some ways a sign of the success of the Cynic tradition. Paradoxically, however, Cynicism is forgotten at the very moment at which it penetrates the popular imagination. The instance of this one saying is obviously fairly trivial. However, when the mutations the word 'cynicism' has undergone are considered, the limitations of transmission by idiomatization become apparent. It is clearly the case that *Le Bouquet's* presentation of Diogenes is far from

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39 *Facecieuses paradoxes de Bruscambille, & autres discours comiques [...]* (Rouen: Thomas Maillard, 1615), sig. Av°v°.
being the most profound in the history of Cynicism. However, it does serve as an excellent example of the processes of idiomatization, adaptation, and invention which have characterized the reception of the Cynics from antiquity onwards.

Although not a collection of sayings, Meurier’s bilingual *Colloques* (1557), which were destined for a German readership who wished to learn French, are, according to the author’s preface, ‘pleins de recreation, meslée avec la gravité des sentences & manieres de parler’ (sig. A2”). ‘Sentences’ are thereby explicitly presented as a linguistic learning device. One of the dialogues, ‘Colloques propres en Banquet’, features the following interlocutors: Gautier, Rogier, Lucrece, Xantippes, Hanibal, Francisquine, Vergile, Diogenes, Scipion, le Prevost des Mareschaux, Pictagoras, Aristote, Terence, and Platon. It is a comic dialogue in the form of a banquet, of the kind that was in vogue throughout the period, including Béroalde de Verville’s *Le Moyen de parvenir*. It predicts Béroalde’s work in giving new, facetious identities to often eminently serious speakers.41 As in *Le Moyen*, however, there are coded references to the Cynic tradition, as seen in the following exchange:

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G. vous plait il un traiet de biere? Sire
D. Qui entre une fois en la biere, jamais n'en retourne arriere: & pource aimerois-je mieulx un tantinet de yin
R. Quel vin vous plaist il?
D. Vin sur taille, ou qui rien ne me couste, me plaist fort bien (sig. l4')
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Both a contemporary witticism about beer and an ancient saying about wine, recorded in Diogenes Laertius (VI, 54), are put in the mouth of the Cynic. The use of Diogenes here is similar to that found in *Le Bouquet*: ancient material is adapted and improvised upon to portray the Cynic as a comic character. This presentation of Diogenes does not serve any philosophically interesting function, unlike that found in *Le Moyen de parvenir*. It does however show that it was unexceptional to focus on the comic Diogenes, as opposed the serious, ascetic and idealized Diogenes, particularly in the mid-to-late-sixteenth century. Meurier’s *Communications familiieres* (1563), a bilingual text designed to teach English merchants some French, provides further evidence of

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this purely comic characterization of Diogenes. One of the interlocutors of the ‘Festin ou convive’ suggests going ‘chez nostre maistre Diogenes, car nous rirons à gorge deployée’ (sig. C4'). Two of them share a Diogenic joke: ‘T. A quelle heure doit on diner? E. Le riche quand il veut, & le poure quand il peut’ (sig. C3’; DL, VI, 40). However, Diogenes himself speaks some lines which it would be hard to imagine being pronounced even by the multifarious figure of Diogenes Laertius’s biography, including, for example:

D[iogenes] Ou sont les perdris: les cailles, les grues, Phaisans, & chapons?
V[alerien valet] Ils sont aux champs & aux forests
D. Naîtrons nous que du pain?
V. C'est le meilleur à quy a faim
P[lato] La nature se content de peu
D. Prenés en gré ce qu'il y a en attendant mieux (sig. C7')

This exchange, which is reminiscent of the many banquets in Rabelais, is the comic counterpart of idealized representations of Diogenes. In Diogenes Laertius, the Cynic is already a diverse and seriocomic character whose performance is bound to inspire further improvisation. In the same way as serious, idealized representations of Diogenes silence his comic side, so purely comic portrayals inevitably neglect the serious side of his philosophical project. It would be wrong to seek to construct a single, true Diogenes out of the many strands of the Cynic tradition. It is nonetheless fair to say that overall sixteenth-century representations of the Cynic as a seriocomic character are truest to the figure encountered in most of Diogenes Laertius.

Jean Le Bon’s *Adages et proverbes de Solon de Voge. Par l’Hetropolitain* (Paris: Nicolas Bonfons, 1577[?]) contain a large collection of mostly serious-minded proverbs, worthy of the Cardinal de Guise’s physician, only two of which have anything to do with

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42 *Communications familières non moins propres que tresutiles à la nation angloise desireuse & diseteuse du langage français/Familiare Communications No Leasse Propre Then Verrie Proffytable to the Inglishe Nation Desirous and Nedinge the Ffrench Language* (Anvers: Pierre de Keerberghhe, 1563).
the Cynics.\textsuperscript{43} They are worth consideration here since they do not repeat the ancient sources, but offer an improvised characterization of Diogenes:

\begin{quote}
Si ce n’est offencé Dieu la vie de diogenes [sic.] seroit la meilleure (sig. P\textsuperscript{viii})
La vie de Diogenes vault mieux que l’or-potable (sig. R)\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

While Meurier exploited the ‘comic’ Diogenes for his improvisation, Jean Le Bon turns to the ‘serious’ Diogenes for his. Putting Le Bon’s new proverbs side-by-side with Meurier’s jokes illustrates the extent to which Diogenes is a multifaceted figure. Jean Le Bon also includes one of Diogenes’ witticisms in the final section of his work, entitled, ‘Questions enigmatiques, recreatives & propres pour deviner, & y passer le temps’. The ‘enigme’ was a highly popular genre in the sixteenth century, the most famous literary example coming at the end of Gargantua. As it happens, Le Bon appears to have borrowed this Cynic ‘enigme’ from the anonymous Questions et demandes recreatives (1574).\textsuperscript{45} It runs as follows:

\begin{quote}
Quel est l’animal à deux pieds sans plumes?
L’homme. Ainsi le definit Platon: mais Diogene le Cynique, mist au milieu de l’escole des disciples de Platon, un coq desnue de toutes ses plumes leurs disant: Voyez cy l’homme de Platon. Parquoy fut ajusté à la definition, À larges ongles: d’autant que les oyseaux n’en ont point de telles. (p. 6)\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

The Questions et demandes recreatives also include ‘demandes’ and ‘reponses’ set out in the same form as those of Meurier, but none are obviously drawn from the Cynic tradition. However, the crucial point about Diogenes’ slapstick performance here is that it is adjusted to fit a paradigmatically sixteenth-century form, the ‘enigme’, in the same way as his sayings are adapted into questions-and-answers in Meurier. Cynic sayings are not merely repeated, but reworked into sixteenth-century genres. Since Diogenes is cited here it is not an obvious case of idiomatization. Nonetheless, there is a sense in

\textsuperscript{43} The edition I consulted, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, 8\textsuperscript{o} BL 33227, was undated, although it does contain a dedicatory letter dated 1577; see Davis, Society and Culture, p. 340.
\textsuperscript{44} L’or potable, a mixture of oil and gold chloride, was prescribed as a universal remedy by apothecaries, see Gargantua, 34 (Huchon, ed., p. 97) and Gabriel de Castaigne, L’Or potable qui guarit de tous maux (Paris: 1611).
\textsuperscript{45} Questions et demandes recreatives pour resjouir les esprits melencholiques, propres pour deviner, & y passer le temps honnestement Avec les responses subtiles, & autres propos joyeux pour rire (Orleans: Eloy Gibier, 1574).
\textsuperscript{46} DL, VI, 40. See Le Parangon, p. 210 and Montaigne, Essais, II, 12, 544.
which, by converting the anecdote into a riddle, the philosophical import of the story, namely the mocking of useless abstraction, is neglected to the point of being lost.

The idiomatization of Cynic *chreiai* is taken one stage further in works whose primary purpose is to provide proverbs and witticisms with which their readers can strew their writing and speech. The impression that the sayings of Diogenes were framed for inclusion in letters is confirmed by the epistolary models provided in Bartolomeo Taegio, *Les Doctes et subtiles responces de Barthélemy Taegio* (1577), which was translated by Antoine du Verdier, and which contains occasional references to the Cynics. The fashion for works of wit and wisdom seems to have spread from Italy to France, particularly in the mid-to-late sixteenth century, in such works as the anonymous *Bonne responce a tous propos* (1547) and Lodovico Domenichi’s *Facecies* (1557), both of which make a few borrowings from the Cynic tradition. The Italian influence is also seen in the case of Guicchiardini, and in the fact that *Le Tresor de vertu* is a bilingual text. Although these works, along with Meurier, concentrate more on style than on substance they nonetheless maintain some kind of commitment to moral guidance. *Les Conceptions tres-excellentes* by Giralomo Garimbeto on the other hand dispense with this moral aspect altogether. They were translated into French from Italian in 1585, and were re-issued in 1604 as the *Subtiles conceptions*. Les Conceptions, which contain numerous Cynic sayings, is like a commonplace-book insofar as it constitutes a repertoire of *topoi* under heads, but these are set out according to performative action (praising, consoling, exhorting), as opposed to content. Hence, the reader who wants to condemn flattery would look up ‘L’adulation & flaterie’ under the general heading ‘Blasmer’, and he or she would find, among other things, Antisthenes’ saying that it is better to fall in with crows than flatterers, since the former only eat dead meat, whilst the latter consume the living (fol. 38°

48). The book is therefore designed not for continuous reading but to allow the reader easy access to sentences with which to embellish his or


48 DL, VI, 4.
her correspondence or conversation. This is made explicit in the French translator's preface:

je m'esbahis de quoy ce livre a esté si long temps sans estre traduict par quelqu'un des nostres, veu le plaisir & utilité que on peut recueillir d'iceluy. Car il contient les dicts & sentences les plus exquises des Philosophes, Orateurs, Empereurs, Rois, Princes, Ducs & grands personnages, qui ont esté par luy choisies, par un singulier jugement, & disposees par bon ordre tant des Autheurs Grecs que des Latins, tant aussi des vieux que des modernes. De sorte que si vous voulez deviser ou escrire, vous aurez une instruction, moyennant laquelle vous tirerez matiere d'ornier & augmenter vostre oraison. (sig. † il invit)

Although the Cynics are not the only philosophers cited in *Les Conceptions tres-excellentes* they have an unusually important part to play given the variety of uses to which their sayings can be put. It will come as no surprise to discover that the greatest number of sayings of Antisthenes and his disciples are found under such general headings as 'Blasmer' and 'Reprendre', but Diogenes is also found under 'Consoler: De pauvreté' and 'Exhorter: A bien vivre'.

The heading under which most Cynic sayings are given is 'Dire le mot'. This category is defined as follows: 'Dire le mot [...] est commun à tous les genres de persuader: mais ordinairement c'est une maniere de parler chiche en paroles, & toutes fois abondante en sentences & en inventions subtiles & promptes' (fol. 169r). This definition entails that many, if not all, of the sayings given in *Les Conceptions* could be classed as 'Dire le mot'. By extension, those included under this rubric are exemplary in terms of form, but difficult to place in terms of function. Effectively, it is hard to see what use a sixteenth-century reader could have made of Diogenes' wit when being sold as a slave (fol. 171r) or of his comment that people give more readily to cripples than philosophers since they can imagine becoming the former, but never the latter (fol. 170r). It is tempting to argue that the fact that over a dozen Cynic sayings are found under 'Dire le mot' indicates that they are beyond the bounds of both categorization and occasionally of comprehension. This impression is supported by the inclusion of witticisms which rely on an appreciation of Cynic paradox in order to be understood:

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49 DL, VI, 29 and 56.
Diogenes estant appelé fol par un quidam: fol ne suis-je pas (respondit-il) toutefois je n’ay pas le même entendement que vous autres avez. (fol. 173°)

Diogenes allant une fois à rebours en l’Academie des Stoiciens, & voyant que chacun s’en rie, il dit, vous n’avez point de honte de cheminer à reculons au vrai chemin de vivre, & toutefois vous m’attribuez à vice, seulement parce que je me promene. (fol. 174°)

Indeed, in classifying sayings according to use rather than content, *Les Conceptions* undermine philosophical significance in favour of rhetorical function. This process is made complete when the given function of the saying is itself purely verbal, as is the case with the otherwise unclassifiable sayings found under ‘Dire le mot’, and it sub-categories of ‘Mots facetieux’, ‘Picquans’ and ‘Subtils’.

Although it is true that Garimberto shows no interest in philosophical theory, this paradoxically entails that he remains unusually close to Diogenes’ practice. After all, *Les Conceptions* package Cynic sayings so that they can be performed in conversational and epistolary contexts by their readers, to allow them to show off their wit. In principle, Cynic sayings can be put to any use, since Diogenes is presented as being a rhetorical model, rather than a philosophical exemplar. It was however always the case that Cynicism is transmitted by imitation of Diogenes’ performance, as opposed to any set of theoretically-defined philosophical propositions. What is unusual about *Les Conceptions* is that they take the process of transmission-by-mimesis back one stage. Similar compilations, such as the *Tresor de vertu*, place Cynic sayings in some kind of theoretical or hermeneutic frame. Meurier’s *Bouquet de philosophie* renders them in a popular genre of the time. Diogenes’ practice is therefore adapted as well as imitated. In *Les Conceptions* on the other hand they are practically as free of interpretative or poetic framing as it is possible to be, particularly when placed under the category of ‘Dire le mot’. The readers are thereby encouraged to improvise their own interpretation or adaptation. Nonetheless, the fact that Garimberto chooses to cite the philosophers from whom he borrows entails that it is possible for the reader to place his or her own interpretative frame on a given saying by applying their knowledge of Diogenes from other texts.

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There is, however, a collection which adopts the same *modus operandi* as *Les Conceptions tres-excellentes* but whose sayings are all anonymous: *Les Marguerites des lieux communs* (1595). This work was re-edited in 1605 and 1610, and had many competitors including *Les Fleurs du bien dire* (Lyon: Pierre Roche, 1595) and François Des Rues's *Les Marguerites françaises* (Lyon: Pierre Colle, 1595). Since a great deal of this fairly short work is devoted to phrases that could happily be inserted into love letters, it is unremarkable that it contains few sayings of Cynic origin. However, when it comes to 'Accuser & reprendre en general', 'Accuser & reprendre de flatterie & dissimulation', and 'Des richesses', the sayings of Antisthenes and Diogenes do find a place:

Le vray moyen de se faire sage est de reprendre en soy-mesmes ce qu'on trouve de mauvais en autruy. (p. 3)
Les flatteurs sont semblables aux courtisanes, qui desirent en leur amoureux toutes sortes de biens, hors que prudence & jugement. (p. 6)
La plus cruelle beste de toutes les sauvages c'est le mesdisant: & des domestiques le flateur. (p. 6)
Les richesses ne sont que vomissements de fortune. (p. 28)

It is striking that all bar one of these sayings are found in Garimberto. *Les Marguerites des lieux communs* take his way of framing sayings to its logical conclusion, which finds the saying stripped of its philosophical background to become an ornament. This raises the question as to what constitutes a Cynic saying, for there is no reason to suppose that the reader of the above would have recognized them as such. The only criterion for a saying to be considered Cynical is that a source can be found for it in the Cynic tradition. However, when that saying becomes detached from its traditional background, which in the case of the Cynics is always a mixture of biography and philosophy, it loses its moorings in 'Cynicism'. In other words, it ceases to be a reference to, or representation of, a broad set of practices and their underlying ideas. This is perhaps an inevitable result of the fact that Cynicism is from the outset not so much a single

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52 Moss, pp. 262-63.
53 See *La Forest et description*, and Telin, cited above, and Garimberto, fol. 225v.
54 Ascribed to Antisthenes by Garimberto, fol. 38r.
55 DL, VI, 51; Guicchiardini, fol. 64v; Fontaine, no. 14.
ideology or anti-ideology, but a diverse tradition. The many traces of this tradition encourage improvisation and idiomatization, which in turn lead to the traces being lost. This could be seen to show Cynicism to be a precarious philosophy, whose success holds within it the seeds for its ultimate failure to sustain itself. It could, however, also be said to demonstrate the Cynic tradition taking on a life of its own, the wit of the ancient Dogs ever finding new ways to work its way into people's minds.

Part Two

Diogenes in *La Civil conversatione* (1574)

Mid-to-late-sixteenth-century collections in particular adopt Diogenes more as a model of wit than of morality, using what Erasmus called his 'grace de bien parler' but not attempting to turn him to any philosophical or ideological ends. As a result, such collections remain unwittingly close to Diogenes' rhetoric, which sought to persuade the audience through performance, not theory. The impression that the sixteenth century viewed Diogenes in this light is confirmed by Stefano Guazzo's dialogue, *La Civil conversatione* (1574), translated into French by both Gabriel Chappuys and François de Belleforest in separate editions in 1579. The existence of two translations shortly after the original is an indication of the success and influence of Guazzo's work, which was also translated into Latin, German and English. There were numerous Italian editions, and at least three further editions of Belleforest's translation, in 1582, 1592, and 1609, while Chappuys's version was reprinted in 1580. Guazzo gives Diogenes a surprisingly important role to play in his definition of ideal conversation. *La Civile conversation* thereby provides a kind of theory behind the practice suggested by vernacular collections.57 I have found no discussions of the unexpected part Diogenes has to play

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56 Garimbeto, fol. 35r, where the saying is ascribed to Diogenes.
57 *La Civile conversation du seigneur Estiene Guazzo gentil-homme Monserradois, divises en quatre livres [...] le tout traduit d'italien en francois par F. de Belleforest, Commingeois* (Paris: Pierre Cavellat, 1582), the first edition of 1579, held at the Bibliothèque Nationale, is inaccessible. See Simonin, *Vivre de sa plume*, which characterizes the translation as one of Belleforest's most faithful although it sees him 's'efforçant de personnaliser son labeur alors même qu'il traduit au fil du texte', p. 16. Most of the sayings of Diogenes recorded in Guazzo are also found in Guicchiardini.
in Guazzo's dialogue. The work is divided into four dialogues, the first being devoted to the fruits of conversation, the second and third to public and private conversation respectively, while the fourth is an exemplary conversation held during a banquet. The first three dialogues are between Hannibal, who stands for Guazzo, and a Chevalier. The latter has fallen into a melancholic state about human relations which threatens his sanity and his life, and the former attempts to rouse him from his depression by persuading him of the benefits of conversation. Diogenes' quip to a spendthrift he finds dining on olives, to whom he remarks that had he breakfasted in that fashion he would not so be dining, is cited in the final dialogue. The wit of Diogenes is thus placed in the context of 'civile conversation'. This impression is confirmed by the use of the Cynics in the rest of the work, particularly in the first dialogue. It is worth noting that Diogenes is cited more often than Plato, Aristotle and Cicero. Guazzo employs two anecdotes about Diogenes to discuss the question as to what profit philosophers can draw from conversation. The speaker argues that since philosophers are exceptional, they tend to be solitary. Hence Diogenes' comment that he saw many people at the baths, but few men, shows 'bonne grace' (fols 18v-19r).

The story of 'ce plaisant, & moralement misterieux Philosophe, Diogene' walking in the opposite direction to everyone else also suggests that the best conversation is found among the happy few (fol. 19). It would appear, then, that Diogenes is being used against conversation, but even the above anecdotes point to another view, namely that no kind of potentially profitable social interaction should be avoided a priori:

Parainsi ce que vous dictes que feit Diogene Sinopeen, vous declare assez, que cestuy disant que le Philosophe est discordant de la populace, vouloit dire cecy, non pour blasmer la conversation, laquelle il cherissoit sur tout autre philosophe, ainsi que j'espere encore vous deduire. (fol. 24v)


DL, VI, 50.

DL, VI, 40.

It is striking that Diogenes is singled out as being the ultimate philosopher of social intercourse. This is not simply another acknowledgement of Diogenes' wit, but a recognition that the Cynic used this wit in order to practise philosophy within society. This is after all the point of the two sayings, which are used to prove the above point:

\[\text{d'autant que je vous ay dit cy dessus que je pourray encor parler de Diogene: je ne pretens vous celer les sages reponses que [...] il a faictes: entre lesquelles est ceste cy, qu'un je ne scay qui l'ayant repris de ce qu'il hantoit avec les meschans il dit: le Soleil aussi espand ses rayons es lieux sales, sans en estre souillé. Et un autre luy reprochant le mesme: les medecins (dit-il) sont tous les jours avec les malades, & n'en sont point infectez. (fol. 43r)\]

This characterization of Diogenes is remarkable since much of his behaviour and speech would normally be assumed to be far from being 'civile conversation'. Nonetheless, it is also apposite, for the Diogenes of the anecdotes is one of the most socially-engaged of all ancient philosophers. He is a peculiarly urban philosopher, whose performance is designed to attract an audience that could only be found in public civic spaces. The crowd would of course have been made up of all kinds of people: 'il ne messied point de hanter avec toute sorte de gens, tant soient ils de basse condition: ce que monstra Diogenes' (fol. 171'). Along with Socrates, Diogenes makes his philosophy out of his social relations with others. This accounts for Guazzo making him the philosophical representative of 'civile conversation'. The type of conversation discussed in Guazzo's dialogue is not merely about social relations, but a state of mind and a way of life:

\[\text{Faites compte, que tout ce que jusqu'à present nous avons dit, touche seulement au plaisir de l'oreille, & est exterieur: & que maintenant il faut adviser plus avant, & les choses propres aux moeurs, nourritures & faisons de vivre requises en la civile conversation: d'autant que Diogenes souloit dire, que les Mathematiciens contemplent le Ciel & les Estoilles, & ne voyent point ce qui est devant leurs pieds: & que les Orateurs s'estudient à bien dire, mais non à bien faire. (fol. 130v)}\]

The notion of 'civile conversation' encompasses wit, morality and behaviour. Diogenes is again chosen as an exemplary figure, since there is no gap between his philosophy,

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62 Stobaeus, III, 13, 43; cf. DL, VI, 63.
63 Krueger, p. 227.
64 DL, VI, 27.
his wit, and his behaviour. Unity of thought, word and deed is a noble as well as a Cynic ideal:

Hannibal: Mais l’excellence de la noblesse fut comprise sous plus de restriction par Diogene Cynique: auquel estant demande lesquels d’entre les hommes estoient les plus nobles, respondit, ceux qui mesprisent les richesses, la gloire les plaisirs & la vie mesme, qui surmontoient les contraires de tout ceci, à sçavoir la pauvreté, le travail, & la mort.
Chevalier: Je croy que la race de ces nobles de ceste sorte, & de ceste noblesse de Diogenes soit perdué à present au monde. (fol. 154*)

The notion of Diogenes as a representative of a noble ideal, which is looked back on with regret at its current absence, involves some familiar idealization of the Cynic. However, Guazzo's presentation of Diogenes is not limited to such idealization. Instead, he uses Diogenes to articulate a movement between the philosophical nobility outlined above and seeking profitable conversation with all kinds of people. The Cynic can even provide a way out of the problem posed by marginal and disreputable members of society, who may disrupt normal social intercourse:

Il me semble que c’est une espece d’injustice de vouloir permettre à ceux-cy, ce qui est defendu aux autres, & leur souffrir qu’ils facent du vice vertu: & voulez (à ce que je comprends) que tout ainsi qu’il est loisible aux Egyptiens & Cingeurs de desrober, que ceux-cy ayent aussi le privilege en leur terre seule de rouer publiquemement: mais je voudroy qu’ils se souvinssent que les places doivent servir au peuple, pour y tenir les marchez, & à la noblesse pour y dresser tournoyes, joustes, & autres louables passetemps & spectacles dignes, & plus propres pour les Gentils-hommes & guerriers, que ne sont ny les dez, ny les cartes. Et ne voy aucune excuse qui puisse garentir ceste leur coustume, que celle de Diogene, lequel interrogé pourquoi il prenoit son repas en place publicque, il respondit, à cause que j’ay fain en la place, & ceux-cy aussi jouent en ce lieu d’autant que c’est là que leur en vient la fantasie. (fol. 53*)

The vagabond figures of gypsies and other underworld characters (‘Egyptiens & Cingeurs’) pose a threat to normative values, which they seem to invert (‘ils facent du vice vertu’). Guazzo does not take them too seriously, unlike the rhetoricians and poets whose erudite defence of dubious people and practices constitutes the peculiarly threatening rhetorical technique of paradiastole, in which something normally considered to be a vice is presented as a virtue, or vice-versa.65 It is striking that

65 Quentin Skinner, ‘Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 76 (1991), 1-81 (pp. 28-39); Skinner’s views on paradiastole were revised in
Diogenes’ saying fails to resolve the difficulty posed by the bohemian types discussed here. Diogenes’ socially-engaged but eccentric behaviour thereby provides such people with a fool’s licence to carry on with their disreputable antics, so long as they do not interfere with more noble pursuits. Similarly, Crates’ and Hipparchia’s ‘dog-marriage’, which Guazzo relates in much the same way as Guicciardini, is used to illustrate the point that people should be open about their physical and psychological failings (fol. 229’).

Guazzo’s understanding and use of Cynicism is inevitably more developed than that encountered in sixteenth-century collections of sayings. His notion of ‘civile conversation’ encompasses morality, and social interaction of all sorts, which leads him to turn to a subtle version of Diogenes as a conversational exemplar. This notion of conversation is more complex than that implicitly adopted by Meurier and Garimberto, for example, for whom the Cynic served as a model of wit. However, whether from Guazzo’s more theoretical perspective, or from the compiler’s wish to provide his reader with a verbal arsenal it was Diogenes’ rhetorical practice which was singled out by sixteenth-century writers.

Part Three

French Emblem Books

Alciati’s Emblemata (Augsburg: 1531) established a fashion for emblem books in France and beyond which flourished in the mid-sixteenth century and continued into the seventeenth century.66 The Cynics and their sayings are included in the majority of mid-sixteenth-century French emblem books, including Guillaume de La Perrière’s Le Theatre des bons engins (1540) and La Morosophie (1553), Guillaume Gueroult’s Le Premier livre des emblemes (1550) and Pierre Coustau’s Pegma, cum narrationibus

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philosophicis (1555). There are however no prima facie references to the Cynics in the
Emblemata, which may in turn explain why they are also absent from Gilles Corrozet's
Hecatomgraphie (1540) and Barthélemy Aneau's Imagination poetique (1552).²⁷ There
are two reasons for this perhaps surprisingly high number of representations of the
Cynics. Firstly, the Cynics' performance, both in terms of the actions related in the
anecdotes and of the images conjured up by their sayings, is often picturesque.
Secondly, their sayings can be turned into didactic moral messages, of the kind which,
as Saunders has shown, the emblem form generally demands. The emblem genre in
France has recently received a great deal of critical attention, notably in the works of
Saunders and Russell. In focusing on the small but interesting role the Cynics and their
sayings play in mid-sixteenth-century French emblem books, I shall pay particular
attention to the framing of Cynicism in these works, to see what use this
characteristically sixteenth-century genre makes of its occasional uses of Cynic sayings
and anecdotes. This part of my study will thereby provide a parenthesis to previous
work on the emblem in France, which does not raise the issue of Cynicism.

There is however a wide-ranging and well-illustrated study of pictorial
representations of Diogenes in sixteenth and seventeenth-century emblem books and
paintings, particularly from the Netherlands, by Stefan Schmitt.⁶⁶ Schmitt shows that
Diogenes' encounter with Alexander, and his search, with a lantern, for a man, were
frequently chosen as subjects, the presentation of the Cynic being remarkably varied.
For example, the greatest, and best illustrated, borrowing from the Cynic tradition in
emblem books comes from the Netherlands: Laurentius Haechtanus's (Laurens van
Haecht Goidtsenhoven) Μικροκόσμος Parvus mundus (Antwerp: 1579), the emblems

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²⁷ Claude Mignault’s commentary, Omnia And. Alciati V. C. Emblemata [...] (Paris: 1571), fol. 24", points out that one of the emblems, ‘Impossibile’/‘Abluis Aethioem’ (Les Emblèmes, p. 67), which is taken from one of Erasmus's translations of Lucian, is also a saying of Diogenes, as recorded in Antonios and Maximus, Sermo de hominibus mali, cited in Paquet, ed., p. 111; see Barthélemy Aneau, Alector ou le coq, ed. by Marie-Madeleine Fontaine, 2 vols (Geneva: Droz, 1996), II, p. 472, n.3.

⁶⁶ Diogenes: Studien zu seiner Ikonographie in der niederländischen Emblematic und Mabref des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, Studien zur Kunstgeschichte, Bd. 74 (Hildesheim: Olms, 1993). Of the sixteenth-century French emblem books to be analysed here, Schmitt includes only a very brief study of La Morosophie.
engraved by Gerard de Jode. The work was translated into French from Latin by Henric Costerius in or before 1589. Of the 74 emblems in the edition I consulted, 5 are devoted to Cynic anecdotes: no. 34: 'L'Homme de Platon', the story of Diogenes plucking a chicken and calling it 'Plato's man', no. 36: 'Le Sage de peu se contente', Diogenes telling Alexander to get out of his sun, no. 37: 'Au sage, ce qu'il a luy suffit', Diogenes breaking his cup, no. 38: 'Quels les hommes sont', Diogenes' search for a man, and no. 39: 'Les Mespris des richesses', Crates throwing his worldly goods into the sea (figs 8-12). Each illustration is accompanied by a lengthy explanatory and moralizing verse on the facing page, and a Biblical quotation at its base, thereby putting each of these Cynic anecdotes in a more overtly Christian frame than any of the French emblem books to be considered below. The continued interest of authors of emblem books in the Cynics is demonstrated by Achille Bocchi's representations of the first encounter between Diogenes and Antisthenes and the anecdote about 'Plato's man' in his Symbolicarum quaestionum de universo genere (Bologna: 1574). Two illustrations of Diogenes both of which find him sitting in his barrel, the first calm in a storm, the second outraged at Aristippus's courting of kings, are found in Otto van Veen's Emblemata Horatiana (Antwerp: 1607) (figs 13-14). Examining the majority of early modern European pictorial representations of Diogenes lies beyond the scope of this study, but it is important to recognize that the emblem books to be analysed here are at the beginning of a new era of illustrations of the Cynic.

Guillaume de La Perrière, who was town chronicler for Toulouse between 1537 and 1552, has the distinction of being the author of the first emblem book in French, Le

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69 DL, VI, 37, 38, 40, 41, 87. The edition of the French translation I consulted in the Bodleian Library (Douce M.756) is missing its title-page and has had some emblems removed. At the end of the book the following gives place (Antwerp) and date (1589): 'Iste Microcosmus fideliter est è Latino translatus, & absque periculo Imprimi potest. Quod attestatur infra scriptus. Datum Antverpiae hac 19. Ianuarii, Anno Domini 1589.' A manuscript note at the front of the book tells that it belonged to one Petrus Losson in 1594. He apparently annotated emblem no. 36 with the comment 'Diogenes animo fidelus sed mobiliis ede'. The British Library has a copy of the French translation (C.125c.31) which was printed in Antwerp by Jean Keerbergen in 1592. A Dutch version of these Cynic emblems, by Joost van den Vondel, was published in 1613. See also Jean-Marc Chatelain, Livres d'emblèmes et devises: une anthologie (Paris: Klinsieck, 1993), pp. 33-34, 86.

70 Schmitt, illustrations nos. 56 and 66.
Theatre des bons engins, which was first published in 1540.\textsuperscript{71} He was unusually intrigued by the Cynics whom he uses in the former and in his later emblem book, La Morosophie (1553). He also discusses Cynicism in passing in his political treatise, Le Miroir politique (1567).\textsuperscript{72} In Les Considerations des quatre mondes (1552), he amusingly attributes Diogenes' supposed view that all substances are connected through air via invisible pores to the Cynic's verbosity:

\begin{center}
\begin{quote}
Diogenes osa bien tant parler,
Que le principe \& l'estre de ce Monde,
Attribua à l'Element de l'air,
Comme matiere en la machine ronde.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}
\end{center}

Saunders describes the non-illustrated Considerations des quatre mondes as a 'para-emblem book' (p. 164) since both its decorative borders and its use of quatrains are similar to La Morosophie, which was published in the following year. However, since the subject-matter of the above quatrain, and of the Considerations des quatre mondes as a whole, is highly abstract, and therefore hard to illustrate, it could perhaps be called the antithesis of an emblem book. Cynicism normally avoids such abstraction, preferring bold action and striking saying. This is true of Antisthenes' remark that it is better to fall among crows than flatterers (DL, VI, 4). This is turned into the forty-fifth emblem (fig. 1) of Le Theatre des bons engins:

\begin{center}
\begin{quote}
Flateurs de court, sont par leur beau devis,
Pis mille fois, que ne sont les corbeaux:
Car le flateur devore les corps viz,
Contrefaisant propos mignons, \& beaux.
Mais le corbeau ne cherche les morceaux,
Que sur corps morts, ou puante charongne.
Le faulx flateur, toujours, le vif empoigne,
Pour à la fin le rendre pauvre, \& mince:
De tel babil, \& de si saincte troigne,
Se doibt garder le bon, \& saige prince. (sig. Gii')
\end{quote}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{72} Le Miroir politique, contenant diverses manieres de gouverner \& policer les republiques [...] (Paris: Vincent Norment \& Jeanne Bruneau, 1567), fols 10\textsuperscript{v} and 86\textsuperscript{r}.

\textsuperscript{73} Les Considerations des quatre mondes, à savoir est divin, angelique, celeste, \& sensible comprises en quatre centuries de quatrains, contenas la cresme de divine \& humaine philosophie (Lyon: Macé Bonhomme, 1552), sig. N5\textsuperscript{v}. The source for this view, DL, VI, 73, is dubious. See Paquet, ed., p. 128, n.143; Diogenes Laertius, ed. and trans. by Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé, p. 739, n.3. These physical theories are in fact drawn from Anaxagoras and Empedocles, but were taken at face value in the sixteenth century; see Essais, II, 12, 539.
La Perrière's portrayal of Antisthenes' saying is an exemplary instance of idiomatization. Not only is the Cynic not cited, but his saying is adapted to sixteenth-century concerns. It is converted into a piece of advice to princes, warning against flatterers as, for example, Erasmus had done, using a saying of Diogenes, in The Education of a Christian Prince. The fact that Antisthenes' apophthegm is applied to courtiers puts it in the context of the anti-courtier trend which, like writing against flattery, is a theme of much mid-sixteenth-century French writing. It is no coincidence that this saying, which is easily comprehensible to a sixteenth-century audience, should have been readily assimilated both here and in many of the collections of sayings discussed above. A further example of the idiomatization of this saying is found in Ortensio Lando, Questions diverses (1570):

Pourquoy disoyent les Anciens, qu'il valoit beaucoup mieux choir entre les mains des Corbeaux, que des Flatteurs? Parce que les Corbeaux nous mangent morts: mais les Flatteurs nous mangent tous vifs.75

The fact that the saying is here attributed to 'les Anciens' further illustrates the point that it has taken on the status of proverbial wisdom, quite unlike Erasmus's concept of the apophthegm as the expression of its speaker's personality. La Perrière had been involved in organizing Marguerite de Navarre's visit to Toulouse in 1535. He records how he gave her a collection of emblems, which were eventually to become Le Theatre des bons engins, in the dedication to his Annales de Foix (1539):

Puys doncques que tant de mauux & de scandalles viennent par Flateurs, nest pas de merveille si Diogenes cynique, disoit. Qu'il valloit trop mieux tomber entre Corbeaulx, quentre Flateurs. Car (disoit il) les Corbeaux ne mangent que les corps mortz, & les Flatteurs mangent & devorent les corps vifz. O dict digne detemelle rememoration. Cest Apophtegme tant excellent j'ay pieca reduict en Embleme a la centurie des Emblemes desquelz je vous fis present (tresillustre Princesse) au chasteau de Balma pres de Tholoze, a vostre nouvelle arrivee.76

74 See below, Chapter 6, part 1.
75 Questions diverses, et responses d'icelles, divises en trois livres assavoir, questions d'amour, questions naturelles, questions morales & polytiques [...] (Lyon: la veuve Gabriel Cotier, 1570), p. 304. French version of Miscellaneae questiones (1550). Idiomatization of this saying also in Le Bouquet de philosophie morale, sigs C1v and G4v.
76 Les Annales de Foix [...] (Tholose: Nicolas Vieillard, 1539), sig. Civxv; cited in Saunders, ‘Introduction’, Le Theatre; the saying is also misattributed to Diogenes in Lodovico Domenichi’s Facecies et mots subtilz [...] trans. by Du Haillan (Lyon: Robert Granjon, 1557), fol. 23v.
Any irony in including discussion of this saying in an inevitably flattering dedication is presumably unintentional. The fact that La Perrière misattributes the saying to Diogenes is an unsurprising indication that the disciple is better known than the master, and is therefore more readily cited as an authority. More importantly, La Perrière's framing of this Cynic saying exemplifies Crane's hypothesis that sixteenth-century writers turned to the authority of ancient sayings in political self-fashioning. La Perrière not only associates himself with the wisdom of the ancients which is 'digne deternelle rememoration' but implies that he is the right man to commemorate it. He thereby not only assumes the authority of an ancient saying, but adapts it to the concerns of his royal readership. In all this La Perrière, who was after all a little-known provincial writer, seeks to bolster his reputation.

*La Morosophie* (1553) is an emblem book which, as its title suggests, plays with the paradoxical concept of foolish wisdom or 'fole sagesse', particularly in its dedicatory letter addressed to Antoine de Bourbon, the son-in-law of Marguerite de Navarre, to whom La Perrière dedicated *Le Theatre des bons engins*. The paradoxical notion of *morosophe* is drawn from Lucian, *Alexander*, 40, and is employed by Erasmus in the *Praise of Folly* (5) where it is used to designate fools who attempt to appear wise. However, in Rabelais's portrayal of the fool Triboulet in the *Tiers Livre*, 45-46, Pantagruel uses the term, presumably without irony, to mean someone who appears superficially to be a fool, but is wise on a deeper level. The association between Diogenes and fools is hardly unexpected, given the frequently fool-like quality of his behaviour, particularly vis-à-vis the powerful. In La Perrière, Diogenes is employed as a primary example of 'fole sagesse' and, in a way not dissimilar to Rabelais's prologue of the *Tiers Livre*, the Cynic comes to represent the book, and to apologize for it:

> J'ay nommé mon dit œuvre, MOROSOPHIE, par diction Grecque composée, signifiant en Grec comme fole sagesse en Françoys. Je suys assuré que plusieurs me noteront de temerité, de ce que je vous ay fait present de ma folie, chose fort repugnante à vostre sagesse [...] Or suys je bien assuré, que quelque censeur critique lisant ma presente Morosophie dira, que je me suys tant oblié, que j'ay publié ma folie,

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78 Kinney, p. 302 and n.22.
laquelle je devoys soingneusement cacher [...] Mais si telz censeurs ont oncques succé de bon laict, & salué les Muses de front, ilz trouveront aux escritz du Divin Philosophe Platon, que bien souvent l'on ha veu sortir d'une bouche estimée folle, mainte parole sage: car celle espece de fureur, que les vulgaires & ydiotz appellent folie, symbolize bien souvent à vaticination. Or posez le cas (Tresillustre Prince) qu'il soit ainsi, que je soye noté de temeritè. Diogenes (celluy qui pour raison de sa secte canine, fut appelé Cinic, & qui toute sa vie d'un tonneau feit maison) fut de la pluspart de ceux qui estoyent de son temps, repute pour fol, maniac & incense: mais du grand Roy & Monarche Alexandre, il fut repute lessage. Si ceste particuliere bonne reputation qu'eut Diogenes envers ce grand Roy, eut plus d'efficace, que l'universelle de plusieurs ydiotz, que me doit il challer, si tous tiennent mon present œuvre pour folle, pour veu que vous seul la tenez pour sagesse? [...] Au surplus, quand seroit ainsi que lesditz censeurs voudroyent dire, je ne fais aucun double, qu'entre tans de mes folies ne se treuve quelque sagesse [...] Il plaira (doncq) à vostre Principauté, de tenir envers mon present œuvre le lieu, que Alexandre tint à Diogenes [...] Et ce faisant, ne craindray les brocardz desditz censurs (sigs A4°-A6°)

La Perriére again employs Diogenes for the purposes of what Crane calls 'authoritative self-fashioning' (p. 3). He is paradoxically keen to flaunt his learning in his praise of folly, giving the ancient Greek etymologies both of his title and the word 'Cinic', and referring obliquely to Plato's *Meno*. Unlike in his *Annales de Foix*, La Perriére here recognizes and exploits the paradoxical or foolish-wise type of authority wielded by Diogenes. La Perriére plays with the concept of 'fole sagesse' to cast Antoine de Bourbon in the role of Alexander the Great and himself in the role of Diogenes, and to suggest that his critics are themselves fools. By donning the mask of Diogenes' foolish-wise performance, La Perriére offers both a pre-emptive defence of his book, and suggests that its content is in some way outrageous, and therefore worth reading.

The thirty-first emblem of *La Morosophie*, which represents Diogenes' paradoxical midday search, with a lantern, for a man (DL, VI, 41), fits neatly with *La Morosophie's* theme of foolishness, and foolish-wisdom (fig. 2). For an emblem book, *La Morosophie* is unusually playful and enigmatic. The emblems have one page for illustrations and the facing page for a Latin *tetrastichon* and a French *quatrain*. Such brevity is itself indicative of a willingness to be witty, as is the fact that many of the emblems (but not that picturing Diogenes) are drawn from Erasmus's *Parabolaet*. The difficulty of the material may also explain the fact that there were no further editions of
the work, and La Perrière's wish to apologize for it in his preface, in much the same way as Rabelais apologizes for the oddness of the *Tiers Livre* in the prologue, through the Ptolemy story. It is likely that the engraver was Guirard Agret, but the artist is unknown and may have been La Perrière himself. It is however noteworthy that the illustrations were made specifically for *La Morosophie*, since the verse and illustration invariably fit together. This is not always the case with emblem books and other illustrated works, which sometimes borrow illustrations from elsewhere, whether or not they match the accompanying text. Diogenes is easily recognizable in the illustration, not only because he is going out in the midday sun with a lantern, but because he is next to his barrel, and carrying a stick. He is however inappropriately dressed, since he is well wrapped up while the Cynics were in fact famous for doubling up their cloaks. It may also be of significance that the scene appears to be more rural than urban, since this could be a hint that Diogenes' search shows that people who fail to live naturally do not count as men. Searching for a man in a crowd of people seems eminently foolish, but La Perrière's French quatrain explains its philosophical significance:

```plaintext
Diogenès jadis chercheoit un homme,
Parmy de gens plus de mil & cinq centz
Mais entre tous il n'apperceut en somme
Qu'hommes de peau, & n'en veit un de sens. (sig. F4r)
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La Perrière spells out what is left unsaid in Diogenes Laertius. Such a didactic approach is practically demanded by the emblem form according to Saunders, who emphasizes that it was this aspect of useful moral instruction that was of greatest importance to sixteenth-century French authors of emblem books. Nonetheless, unlike in his presentation of Antisthenes' saying about crows and flatterers, La Perrière does not

81 See, for example, *Le Jardin d'honneur, contenant plusieurs apologies, proverbes, & ditz moraux [...]* (Paris: Estienne Grouilleau, 1550) which borrows illustrations from *Le Theatre* and Corrozet's *Hecatomgraphie* and accompanies them with often random texts (*Sixteenth-Century French Emblem Book*, p. 62, n.48 and p. 63, n.54). The illustration of Diogenes does not seem to have been reproduced in any contemporary works.
82 Raphael represents Diogenes in this traditional state of undress in 'La scoula di Atene' as does Nicolas Poussin's 1648 painting (now in the Louvre) of Diogenes throwing away his drinking cup at the sight of a boy drinking water from a river with his cupped hand (DL, VI, 37); see Diskin Clay, 'Picturing Diogenes', *The Cynics*, pp. 366-87 (pp. 375-76).
frame Diogenes' paradoxical search to make it obviously relevant or useful for his sixteenth-century readership. It thereby retains a strangeness appropriate for a book devoted to foolish wisdom.

Guillaume Gueroult's *Le Premier livre des emblemes* (Lyon: Balthazar Arnoullet, 1550) includes two Cynic-flavoured emblems, one of which pictures Diogenes. The twenty-seventh emblem, 'Folle despence destruit la maison mais prudence l'enrichist' (fig. 3), is adapted from an anecdote found in Diogenes Laertius:

Seeing a spendthrift eating olives in a tavern, he said, "If you had breakfasted in this fashion, you would not so be dining." (DL, VI, 50)

The illustration of this story shows Diogenes as a bearded old man in a tavern, addressing a younger man. Gueroult greatly expands the original anecdote in a verse entitled 'De Diogenes & d'un gourmand':

Un gourmand dissippa son bien  
Si bien, qu'il ne luy resta rien.  
Dont escheust que de faim extresme:  
Il devint languissant & blesme.  
Un soir esperant se souler  
Voulust à la taverne aller:  
Ou (pource qu'il n'avoit pecune)  
On ne luy bailla chose aucune:  
Sinon des olives sallee.  
Lesquelles presques avalees.  
Ce qu'il ne pensoit luy advint,  
Car Diogenes là survint  
Qui luy ha dit (en souzriant)  
Entens à moy pour friant,  
Si disné eusse de cecy:  
Tu ne soupperois pas ainsi.  
Monstrant qu'il faut toute saison  
Prudemment regir sa maison,  
Et que despence mesuree:  
Fait le bien de longue duree. (pp. 68-69)

The end of the verse constitutes the same kind of didactic moral message that was found in La Perrière's *Theatre des bons engins*. Seeing Diogenes advising on matters of personal finance and 'prudence' is unexpected, and this contributes to the humour of the verse, since the spendthrift is both shocked to encounter Diogenes in the tavern, and the Cynic gives his view 'en souzriant'. The most striking aspect of this adaptation is, however, its sheer length, which is required by Gueroult to explain the link between

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illustration and accompanying quatrain: ‘La prudence & raison / Enrichist la maison, / Mais despence excessive: / La rend poure & chetive’ (p. 68). The unwieldy structure of title, illustration, quatrain and explanatory fable is found throughout the *Premier livre des emblemes*, and poses difficulties that are not unique to Gueroult’s depiction of Diogenes.\(^{84}\) Paradoxically, the constraints of the emblem genre as practised by Gueroult leads him to adapt Diogenes Laertius in an unusually free way. He appears to take even greater liberties with this ancient source in the preceding emblem, ‘Les princes doivent fuyr les flateurs comme la poison’ (fig. 4). The story, which is again illustrated and subsequently explained in a lengthy verse entitled ‘D’un philosophe: & d’un flateur’, is of a philosopher who spits in the face of a flatterer. It is likely that the anecdote is an improvisation on a story found in Diogenes Laertius (VI, 32), and in *Les Paroles joyeuses & dictz memorables* taken from Tardif’s translation, discussed above.\(^{85}\) At the end of Gueroult’s verse, the philosopher’s own voice is used to explain his shocking behaviour to the flatterer:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{Je n'ay commis contre vous aucun tort,} \\
&\text{Car contemplant la grand magnificence} \\
&\text{Qui en ce lieu reluyt par apparence:} \\
&\text{Pour y cracher jay pris le lieu plus ord.} \\
&\text{Par ce monstrant qu'un prince doit plus fort,} \\
&\text{De tous flateurs eviter le blason:} \\
&\text{Que lieux infaitz: ou la mesme poison. (p. 67)}
\end{align*}
\]

It is possible that Gueroult is using a source other than Diogenes Laertius here. If, however, as seems probable, it is inspired by the Cynic anecdote, it constitutes an unusual example of idiomatization. Not only are there no references to Cynicism in Gueroult’s version of story but it is given a new twist, against flatterers. Gueroult adapts the Cynic anecdote, which had initially opposed luxury, to make it immediate to sixteenth-century concerns about the flattery of courtiers, in much the same way as La Perriére had done in his framing of Antisthenes’ saying about crows. The trend for

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\(^{85}\) Much the same story is found in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Aristippus, DL, II, 75: ‘One day Simus, the steward of Dionysius, a Phrygian by birth and a rascally fellow, was showing him costly houses with tesselated pavements, when Aristippus coughed up phlegm and spat in his face. And on his resenting this he replied, “I could not find any place more suitable.”’
writing against flattery in the sixteenth century means that the philosopher's actions can be presented as being both justifiable and laudable.

The Cynics are also used to speak out against flattery in Pierre Coustau's *Pegma, cum narrationibus philosophicis*, which was published by Macé Bonhomme in Lyon in 1555. This work is similar to Gueroult's emblem book in accompanying the more or less standard format of title, illustration and verse with a further explanatory piece, a prose 'narratio philosophica' in this case, which generally runs to two or three pages. A French version, omitting the 'narrations', was printed nine days after the Latin original, but a complete translation by Lanteaume de Romieu was not published until five years later. Like *Le Theatre des bons engins, Le Pegme* portrays Cynic sayings as opposed to the Cynics themselves, but Coustau does identify the sources of his emblems, including two consecutive ones which are attributed to Diogenes: 'On cognoist l'homme à la parolle & non à la robe' and 'Sur le portrait d'un flateur' (figs 5-6). They are adaptations of the following sayings both of which are found in Diogenes Laertius:

[Diogenes] said he marvelled that before we buy a jar or dish we try whether it rings true, but if it is a man are content merely to look at him.

[Diogenes] used to say [...] that we ought to stretch out our hands to our friends with the fingers open and not closed. (DL, VI, 29-30)

The context of the first saying, omitted by Coustau in his 'narration philosophique', sees Diogenes being put up for sale as a slave. Coustau's failure to mention this brings the moral of the story, namely that people should be judged on what they say rather than how they appear, to the fore. He nonetheless thereby neglects the characteristically Cynic twist that Diogenes makes this point when he himself appears to be at the lowest level of society. Similarly, the second saying is presented as a condemnation of flattery:

D'amour & soy le siege est en la main,
Dont si quelqu'un, de façon peu aymée
Cachant en luy un cuer rien moins qu'humain
A son amy donne la main fermée,
C'est un flateur (p. 154)

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While the original saying seems to suggest that friendship should be an open exchange, it is not obviously referring to flattery. Coustau's interpretation of Diogenes' enigmatic saying associates it with pronouncements against flattery. His treatment of Diogenes' sayings serves to make them less strange than the original, something that is also true of Gueroult's version of the spitting story. This impression is confirmed in one of the non-illustrated set of *quatrain* s at the end of the book, 'Sur Diogenes: N'adhere aux opinions du populaire': ‘Voulant le peuple hors d'un lieu departir / Diogenes insistoit au contraire, / Notant par là qu'on ne doit consentir / Aux opinions du badault populaire’ (p. 413).87 This view of Diogenes as an elitist misses the point of the original anecdote, which sees the Cynic entering a theatre when everyone else is leaving, thereby showing that hedevotes his life to anti-conventional performance. It also contrasts starkly with Guazzo, who uses a similar anecdote to launch a subtler version of the Cynic. The didactic and simplifying treatment of Cynic sayings is partly a consequence of putting them in the emblem form, which generally requires a straightforward and succinct moral message, *La Morosophie* being something of an exception.

Framing Cynic sayings and anecdotes in the form of emblems generally produces two results: a didactic explanation together with a freedom rarely seen in vernacular collections, which mostly remain close to their sources. Similar use of the Cynic tradition is found in emblem books in the second half of the sixteenth century, including Laurentius Haechtanus’s *Mikrokosmos*, discussed above, and Geoffrey Whitney's *Choice of Emblemes* (1586), which also portrays Alexander's encounter with Diogenes, and accompanies it with a lengthy moralizing verse (fig. 7).88 The two consequences of didacticism and fairly free adaptation of sources might be seen to contradict one another, but in fact a certain amount of leeway is required to spell out the meaning of a given saying, or to render it suitable for illustration and clarification. This process often produces surprisingly interesting results which are, in a sense, ahead of

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87 DL, VI, 64.
their time, since comparable adaptation and idiomatization are not generally found in vernacular collections of sayings until later in the century.

Conclusion

Transmitting a philosophy via the inevitably fragmented form of mostly witty sayings was bound to produce unpredictable results. Any selection of sayings involves the construction of some idea of Cynicism out of the raw material of the tradition. The framing of chreiai for moral purposes, as Erasmus had sought to do, plays a part in several of the collections analysed above, and is in practice a structural requirement of emblem books. However, this use of Cynic sayings becomes less and less common as the sixteenth century progresses. Humanist confidence in the wedding of wit with wisdom implicit in bonnes lettres gives way to a focus on the former at the expense of the latter. Guazzo is unusual in recognizing the link between Diogenes' sociable, serio-comic performance and his philosophy, which leads him to present the Cynic as an exemplar of 'civile conversation'. For Meurier and Garimberto, however, Diogenes' humorous sayings were ideally suited to a more down-to-earth form of conversation. By using Diogenes for his wit, and not attempting to extract any moral message from his sayings, these compilers come close to Diogenes' rhetoric, which is non-didactic. Furthermore, this leads Meurier in particular comically to adapt Cynic sayings, to invent new ones, and to employ Diogenes' sayings without citing the Cynic. The latter phenomenon of idiomatization is particularly significant as far as Cynicism is concerned, since it marks the point at which the trace of Cynic practice is lost in sixteenth-century use of the Cynic tradition. This raises the unanswerable question as to how much of the Cynic tradition has been subject to idiomatization, its traces now lost. Non-Cynic sayings would also have been subjected to idiomatization: Pibrac's Quatrains (1574), for example, contain numerous sayings taken from uncited Stoic sources, but their ideological moorings remain obvious, which is not the case with Cynic sayings which have been subject to idiomatization. There is, however, room for further research on the processes of adaptation, improvisation and idiomatization within collections of sayings.
In terms of the sixteenth-century reception of Cynicism, compilations provide vital points of reference. In particular, they show that, even when transmitted via its most basic form, the Cynic tradition invites unexpected adaptation and improvisation. They therefore mirror the playful use of Cynicism in such figures as those to be discussed in Part II, including Rabelais, Montaigne, Bérald de Verville and Bruscambille. However, since their use of Cynicism is inevitably limited, they rarely exploit the seriocomic nature of Cynic performance, either presenting it as eminently serious or purely comic. Cynicism does not serve as an unsettling philosophical presence in these works, which do not follow Tardif and Erasmus in offering commentaries which can highlight hostility, tensions and misunderstandings. These effects can however be seen in narratives on Cynicism, including those found in encyclopedias and miscellanies which, like collections of sayings, are early modern repositories of the Cynic tradition.
Guillaume de la Perrière, Le Théâtre des bons engins (1560)
Guillaume de la Perrière, *La Morosoplie* (1553)
PREMIER LIVRE

Folle dessence destruite la maison
mais prudence l'enrichist. 27

La prudence & raison
Enrichist la maison,
Mais despence excessive:
La rend povere & chetiuue.

De Diogones & d'un gourmand.

N gourmand disipp. son bien
si bien, qu'il ne luy restriuient.
Dont s'cheust que de saim extrême:
Itacuit languiuissant & blesme.
V'n jor esperant se souler
V'orient à la tauerne aller:
Ou pourcu qu'il n'anoit pecune
On ne luy bailla chose aucune.

Guillaume Gruaült, Le Premier livre des emblèmes (1550)
Les Princes doivent fuir les flatteurs, comme la poison.

Prince Heroiques,
Des flatteurs iniques
Luyez le blason;
Comme la poison.

D'un Philosophe & d'un flateur.

Pour sefloyer quelque Seigneur notable
Un Prince fit le festin preparer.
Pour lequel rendre encor plus honorable:
Fit son palais de beaute admirable,
De fin velours tapisser, & parer.
Puis voulust tant ce Seigneur honorer.
Qu'un Philosophe au banquet invita:
Qui d'y aller vistement s'apresla.
Pierre Courtois, Le Pegne (1560)
D'amour et de l'air, le siege est en la main,
Dont si quelqu'un, de si doux, peu ay
Cachant en, luy un cœur rien moins
qu'humain
A son, amy donne la main fermée,
C'est un flateur. En amour confirmée
De recevoir telles gens garde toz:
Car en, flateurs & vendeurs de fame,
Ny eut jamais assurance de foy.
IN christall towers, and turrets richlie sette
With glittering gemmes, that shine against the sonne:
In regall rooms of Jasper, and of sette,
Contente of minde, not alwaies likes to wonne:
But oftentimes, it pleaseth her to staye
In simple cortes, clothed in with walles of claye.

DI OGENES, within a tonne did dwell,
No choice of place, nor store of pels he had;
And all his goodes, coulde B I A S bearre right well,
And C O D R Y S had small cates, his harte to glade.
His meate was rootes: his table, was a froule.
Yet thesee for witte, did set the worlde to scoole:

Who couettes still, or hee that liues in feare,
As much delighte is wealethe vnto his minde,
As musick is to him, that can not heare,
Or pleasant showes, and pictures, to the blinde:
Then sweete content, ofte liketh the meane estate.
Which is exempte, and free, from feare, and hate.

What man is riche? not he that doth abounde.
What man is pore? not hee that hath no store.
But he is riche, that makes content his grounde.
And he is pore, that couettes more and more.
Which proues: the man was ritcher in the tonne,
Then was the Kinge, that mane landes had wonne.
Toute bonne donation, & tout don parfait est d'en haut, descendant du Père des lumières. Iac. I. c.
Nous n'ayons point ici de cité permanente : mais nous cerchons celle qui est à venir. Ebrieux. 13. c.
Certes, pieté avec contentement est grand gain. Timothee. 6. b.
En effet, ce n'est que toute vanité de tout homme qui vit. Psaume 39. b.
Mieux vaut peu de chose au juste, que la soif de biens de beaucoup de méchants. Plectume. 37. b.

L. 2
Otto van Veen, *Aenae Hortae rum cura*, Emblemata Horatiana (1607)
Otto van Veen, "In quocumque vitiis genere philosophiaeacer", Emblemata Horatiana (1607)
DIOGENES PHILOSOPHE

OVELOVN: par aduerture a ouy parler en ieu ou comme par risée, entre les ignornes & gens machiniques, de celui dont l'effige est cy représentée, telle qu'elle me fut donnée en la ville d'Andreople en Grece, que l'on masleua avoir est prins sur celle qui fut trouvée en Chalcedoyne, du tems des Empereurs Basl & Constan-

111i
Chapter Four

Encyclopedias and Miscellanies

J'ay veu faire des livres de choses ny jamais estudiees ny entenduês, l'autheur commettant a divers de ses amis scavants la recherche de cette-cy et de cette autre matiere a le bastir, se contentant pour sa part d'en avoir projeté le dessein et empié par son industrie ce fagot de provisions incogneuês; au moins est sien l'ancre et le papier.

Montaigne, *Essais* (III, 12, 1033)

The sixteenth century abounds with encyclopedic and miscellaneous texts which transmit diverse knowledge on various subjects, including the Cynics.¹ Medieval and sixteenth-century encyclopedias attempt to offer a closed circle of learning arranged in a significant order, such as the trivium and quadrivium, whereas miscellanies dispense with these notions, presenting learning in a more haphazard fashion. However, the distinction between miscellanies and encyclopedias is not always clear-cut, since some miscellanies can be more encyclopedic than others, and vice-versa. Miscellanies can also be anti-encyclopedic in structure as is the case with Erasmus's *Adages* and Montaigne's *Essais*. Given the wide range of Cynic sayings and anecdotes, it is not surprising to discover that they are often found in deliberately diverse discourses, or in encyclopedias which deal with broad moral themes. Furthermore, the saying or story will inevitably be adapted in some way, however minor, to make it fit into its new frame. Borrowings from the Cynics can blossom in such contexts, where they can crop up anywhere, for almost any purpose. The framing of the Cynic tradition in Medieval encyclopedias and in sixteenth-century neo-Latin miscellanies, notably of Erasmus and Coelius Rhodiginus, was discussed in Chapter Two above. This chapter will examine their vernacular counterparts, which allow for a more discursive treatment of Cynicism than is possible in the vernacular collections of sayings analysed in the previous chapter. As above, I shall analyse a wide range of these little-studied works, discussing them in chronological order, and their framing of ancient Cynicism will be my focus.

¹ My discussion and definitions of encyclopedias and miscellanies are drawn from Kenny, *Palace of Secrets*; on Renaissance encyclopedism, see pp. 12-35, on encyclopedias and miscellanies, see pp. 35-54.
One difficulty that must be acknowledged is that of genre. For, as Kenny suggests, it looks as if the term ‘miscellany’ serves as a ‘taxonomic dustbin’ for works that prove hard to categorize (pp. 50-51). A possible solution is only to consider works which define themselves as miscellanies. The genre would therefore include texts with terms such as ‘miscellaneous’, ‘meslanges’, and ‘diversités’ in their titles. Although there are many such works, the generic boundaries of the miscellany cannot be so easily defined due to the fact that the late sixteenth century would not recognize such distinctions. This is apparent from, for example, Pierre de Saint Julien’s foreword to his *Meslanges historiques* (1588), which places a very wide range of works, from Aulus Gellius’s *Attic Nights* to Montaigne’s *Essais*, in the category of miscellany.\(^2\) Similarly, Jean-Pierre Camus lists fifty-six titles from the ‘genre d’escrire divers et meslé’ in his *Diversitez* (Paris: Claude Chapelet, 1609).\(^3\) For the purposes of this study discussion of two works in particular, Nicolas de Cholières’s *Matinées* and *Après-disnées* (1585) and Montaigne’s *Essais*, will be postponed until Chapter Seven, despite the fact that they fall under the sixteenth-century category of miscellany. This is because their treatment of the provocative, and characteristically Cynic, practices of shamelessness and freedom of speech warrants particular attention. The approach to these topics in *Les Séréès* (1584-98) of Guillaume Bouchet will be analysed in Chapter Seven alongside that found in Cholières and Montaigne, but Bouchet’s discussion of less shocking Cynic material will be addressed briefly here, in Chapter Four. The topic of Cynic shamelessness appealed to more than one sixteenth-century writer of miscellanies. Their approaches to the topic will therefore serve as vital points of comparison with those of Bouchet, Cholières and Montaigne. The latter are distinguished as being more willing to play with their sources, owing to the fact that they draw from the banquet and dialogue traditions, or because, as is the case with Montaigne at least, they can be said to push the miscellany ‘genre’ to such extremes that it becomes something else altogether. This chapter is divided into three parts, parts one and three are devoted to

\(^2\) The relevant passage, sig. e 5\(^{iv}\), is cited in Kenny, *Palace of Secrets*, p. 52. The *Meslanges* do not contain any obvious references to the Cynics.

\(^3\) Fols 462\(^{v}\)-463\(^{v}\); Kenny, *Palace of Secrets*, p. 51.
earlier and later texts respectively, while part two concentrates on two ‘lives’ of Diogenes from the 1580s.

Part One

Mid-to-Late-Sixteenth-Century Texts: Mexía, La Porte, Breslay, Du Verdier, La Primaudaye

The French taste for miscellanies in the late sixteenth century was largely inspired by the success of Pedro Mexía’s *Silva da varia lección* (1540), which were known in France through by Claude Gruget’s translation, *Les Diverses leçons de Pierre Messie* (1552). There were at least eleven further editions in French up to 1616. Mexía deals with various, often commonplace, subjects in brief ‘leçons’, not arranged according to any significant order. The ‘leçon’ devoted to Diogenes, entitled ‘De l’estrange vie de Diogenes Cinique, & de ses sentencieuses proposicions & responses’, is drawn for the most part from Diogenes Laertius and Plutarch. Mexía seeks to convey Diogenes’ life through something approaching a biography, his narrative is unlike Erasmus’s approach in the *Apophthegmata*, which viewed short, witty sayings, as opposed to biographical details, as the expression of their speaker’s personality. Many of the miscellanies which followed Mexía engage in such biography *avant la lettre*. Mexía occasionally adds what is apparently his own commentary to the ancient material. In an introductory section, he informs the reader that Diogenes was a philosopher ‘qui fut excellent en vie & doctrine, les meurs & condicion duquel furent estranges, & neanmoins estoient fondées en vertu & bonté’ (fol. 50v). For Mexía, Diogenes is a philosophical freak whose outlandish behaviour is paradoxically based on ‘vertu’. Much the same characterization of Diogenes is found towards the end of Mexía’s chapter, although he now informs the reader that some of the stories involving the Cynic are too ‘vulgaires’ or well-known to bear repeating:

Les sentences & sages responses de ce filosofe sont infinies, lesquelles nous tairons pour estre assez vulgaires. Il estoit fort sage & docte en toutes sciences, il fut disciple d’Antisthenes, du temps de Platon &

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Aristote: Il desprisoit les artz & sciences qui estoient sans profit, & ceux qui estudiaient plus pour savoir que pour exercer la vertu. (fol. 52")

Mexia's brief characterization of Diogenes reveals that the humanist had some difficulty reconciling Diogenes' combination of humour and philosophy. Hence he opines that Diogenes' saying that the right time for a young man to marry is not yet, for an old man never, was given 'plus par moquerie, que pour opinion qu'il en eust' (fol. 51’). Above all, Mexia wants to maintain that Diogenes is a philosopher who deserves to be taken seriously, not unlike his contemporaries, Plato and Aristotle. This leads him to adopt the self-contradictory position that Diogenes was 'doctes en toutes sciences' and that he rejected all abstract study in favour of practising virtue. Mexia therefore fails fully to embrace the paradox he himself put forward, namely that Diogenes demonstrably devotes his life to philosophy (i.e. the practice of virtue) precisely because he engages in strange and comic behaviour. Like Guillaume Tardif, Mexia shows a willingness to turn Diogenes to broadly moralizing ends but this blinds him to the true nature of Cynic humorous performance. Mexia's 'leçon' on Diogenes can be said to represent a middle-of-the-road sixteenth-century humanist's view of the Cynic, with which more playful and complex uses of Cynicism can be helpfully contrasted.

The *Epithètes* of Maurice de La Porte (1571), are an alphabetically-arranged collection of epithets under various nouns, like those of Textor. They are primarily of interest for providing clues to average or clichéd sixteenth-century notions. This work, intended as a dictionary for poets, gives the following entry under 'Diogene':

*Cynique, fameus, journalier, mordant, facetieus, gausseur ou gaudisseur, contemplatif*. Diogene a esté un philosophe cynique fort renommé, lequel ne faisoit conte des mondaines richesses, & sembloit estre né pour contrarier entierement au genre humain. Il mourut accomplissant l'an 90. de son aage, & commanda que son corps ne fut enseveli. (fol. 82")

These epithets neatly demonstrate the competing views of Diogenes which existed in the sixteenth century. He is a 'bad dog', being infamous ('fameux') and insignificant

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5 DL, VI, 54; the saying was also too shocking for Tardif, see above, p. 67.
('journalier'), though presumably not at the same time. He is also a 'good dog', with a clear emphasis on his being amusing ('facetieus, gausseur'). Moreover, he is a philosopher ('contemplatif') and a satirist ('mordant'). The epithet 'cynique' belongs with 'fameux', that is to say it is to be taken in the wide sense of shameless or outrageous. This explains why one of Epicurus's epithets is also 'cynique', as well as 'voluptueus' and 'grossier' (fol. 89). Given so many contrary epithets it is easy to see why La Porte comments that Diogenes was born to counter human kind. Contradictory epithets under a single noun are not a sign of confusion on La Porte's part, but indicate his wish to offer as complete a collection as possible. His entry is an excellent example of the way in which Cynic paradoxes provoke paradoxical responses.

Pierre Breslay's _Anthologie_ (1574) is an unusually short miscellany which devotes a chapter to the Cynics, 'Plusieurs choses estre mauvaises par le seul abus des hommes, & de la vilanie de Crates Philosophe Cynique'. This is one of several chapters that Jean Des Caurres lifts in its entirety to put in his lengthier _Oeuvres morales_ (1575). Having argued that things are good or bad according to the use to which they are put, Breslay, or whoever Breslay is borrowing from, proceeds to condemn Crates' throwing away of his money:

Et si c'est louange de tirer utilitê de ses jurez ennemis, certainement le Thebain Crates bien a philosophé beotiquement, c'est à dire, à la lourde, quand il noya son argent: Car ce n'estoit condamner l'abus aînoïes indiscretement punir la chose innocente du vice d'autruy. Minerve ne t'avoir encore (ô nouveau Philosophe) arraché des yeux le nuage qui t'empeschoit la veue de l'indiference des choses externes, bonnes ou mauvaises suivant l'usage qu'on leur scâit donner: & avois quand & quand une maigre opinion de ta philosophie, luy prohibant ainsi l'administration d'un peu d'argent, comme à quelque mauvaise mesnagere: ou tout au rebours jamais le monde ne se portera bien, que premier les Philosophes n'en manient les principaux affaires, ou que ceux qui les manient ne philosophent. Tu craignois peut estre que la

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8 Clark, 'Un dictionnaire des idées reçues', pp. 195-96.
9 _L'Anthologie ou recueil de plusieurs discours notables, tirez de divers bons auteurs grecs & latins_ (Paris: Jean Poupy, 1574), fols 64r-66r.
There is no obvious ancient source for this passage. Crates' action is often eulogized, particularly in patristic and other Christian writings, but it was also criticized, notably by Clement of Alexandria, although his attacks on Cynicism are by no means as developed or as vitriolic as the one found here. The assault on the Cynics continues: they are criticized for being economically and politically unsophisticated, for if everyone threw away their money, there would be nothing left for them to beg for. Similarly, if everyone took Crates' attitude towards Alexander the Great's proposal to rebuild Thebes, no-one would bother founding cities. The Cynics are thereby accused of being naive, which would be acceptable if they were spiritual, but in fact they turn their unworldliness to unseemly ends:

'tels estoient les Cyniques, gens sans soing, discretion, ny conscience: ainsi nommez, à cause de leur éshontment, & contumeliuse medisance. Ils entroient par tout comme chiens, abbayans les actions de chacun, & ne doutoient exercer en plain marché ce que l'honnesteté naturelle oblige aux plus espeses tenebres de la nuict. Toutefois bien que les femmes, signamment dames de qualité, aient accoustumé en tels actes endurer spectateurs trop plus envis que les hommes: si est-ce que Hipparchie, Damoiselle de riche maison, enamoure de ce bossu besacier, le requist de mariage, & se laissa mener par luy en cuer de jour soubs un porche fort hanté, où il l'eust depucelee à la veuë de tout le monde, sans Zenon, qui estendit son reitre au devant, fist ombre à l'abhumanition de son maistre. (fol. 66)'

The final image of Zeno of Citium covering up the misdeeds of his master is drawn from Apuleius, *Florida*, 14, which also portrays the dog-marriage of Crates and Hipparchia, albeit in a predominantly positive way. Otherwise, this polemic against Cynic shamelessness most resembles book 14, chapter 20 of the *City of God*. It is likely that Breslay is drawing on an unidentified syncretistic source for his assault on Cynic shamelessness. His sensationalist criticism of Cynic shamelessness was by no means inevitable at this time, and should be compared with more developed contemporary treatments of the subject discussed in Chapter Seven below. Indeed, miscellanies like those of Breslay are not geared to thoughtful philosophical discussion but to providing sensationalist and titillating material that would presumably have appealed to his}

11 DL, VI, 93.
readership. It is also worth noting that there is nothing specifically Christian about this polemic against the Cynics. Breslay drops the theology, in order to focus on the sex.

Another sign of the influence and popularity of Mexia’s *Diverses leçons* is the fact that they received many imitators, including two French texts which make their debt to the Catalan explicit: Antione Du Verdier's *Diverses leçons […] suivans celles de Pierre Messie* (1577) and Louis Guyon's *Les diverses leçons […] Suivant celles de Pierre Messie & du Verdier* (1604-1617). The first of these texts does not follow Mexia in devoting a chapter to Diogenes. In fact, there are only three obvious allusions to the Cynics in the entire work, albeit that the story of Crates throwing his money into the sea is cited on two occasions (pp. 145 and 363). One of these references is worth mentioning here because it draws on a source which is rarely used, namely Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, which is interesting in that, like Diogenes Laertius, it presents Diogenes as a shamelessly outrageous character:

Et comme [Aristippe] fut repris d’un sien familier de ce qu’il despendoit tant d’argent aprés ceste femme, veu qu’elle avoit accoustumé de recevoir Diogene sans salaire, respondit: je donne beaucoup à Lais à fin de prendre mes plaisirs avec elle & non pour empescher qu’un autre n’en jouisse. Diogene luy disant un jour, ô Aristippe tu penses avoir affaire tout seul avec Lais & c’est une paillarde publique: Ou meine vie Cynique comme moy, ou bien laisse la (p. 178)

The fact that Du Verdier does not play with the source in any way (it is cited in a chapter on the life of Lais), is in itself paradoxically significant, since it shows that Diogenes’ shamelessness could be dealt with in a neutral or historical manner in the late sixteenth century, which, like Mexia’s life of Diogenes, can be seen as an instance of the pre-history of biography. Du Verdier also mentions Diogenes’ condemnation of the crowd who rushed to hear him whistling, but ignored him when he was making a serious

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12 Glidden notes that Breslay’s work resembles popular *canards* and handbooks of miracles, p. 84.
speech (DL, VI, 27). The way in which Du Verdier draws a moral from this tale is typical of much sixteenth-century use of Cynic anecdote:

Nous n'avons plus faute à présent de tels hommes qui s'attendent à l'ombre de l'asne & préfèrent les choses ridicules aux salutaires. Ils laisseront d'ouïr le sermon pour aller voir un bateleur. Et si le predicateur presche choses hautes & divines qui soient dignes de connaissance, ils s'endormiront tout incontinent. Mais s'il se mettoit à compter des sorinettes & faire des comptes de la cicogne, les voyla soudain esveillez & plus attentifs que jamais. (p. 343)

Similarly, the story about Diogenes asking for money from statues, so as to practise being refused (DL, VI, 27), is used by the Protestant Pierre de La Primaudaye to launch the following harangue in his Académie Françoise (1581):

Quand aussi nous pourrons jusques là commander à nous-mêmes, que de fuir tant de vaines occupations & de nul profit, où les hommes de ce siècle se délectent, ne servant que d'attraicts & amorces à delices et voluptez, ne rougissons point ne les vouloir suyvre: & disons, que nous apprenons à mespriser ce qui est contemptible, & à choisir (suivant cest ancien precepte de Pythagore) la vie la meilleur qui soit, à fin que l'accoustumance nous la rende peu à peu aisee & plaisante.¹⁵

Diogenes' joke is an odd choice to demonstrate La Primaudaye's point, but this shows all the better the ways in which even the most unexpected anecdotes can be adapted to produce a sixteenth-century moral. Although Du Verdier stays close to the sense of the original story, his disapproval is addressed, albeit in a roundabout way, towards those who are 'à l'ombre de l'asne', that is to say concerned with frivolous or foolish things, and therefore prefer carnival, and fool preachers, to serious church teaching.¹⁶

La Primaudaye's work is one of the longest sixteenth-century French encyclopedias. The first volume, which contains at least nineteen references to the Cynics, is devoted to ethics and covers a broad sweep of topics, giving it many of the characteristics of a miscellany. La Primaudaye provides a minimal fictional setting to his work, by putting it into dialogue and dividing it into days as well as chapters. The fictionalization of encyclopedias, while miscellanies are often discursive, indicates again the extent to which genres were not defined at this time. All of La Primaudaye's

¹⁵ Académie Françoise, en laquelle il est traité de l'institution des mœurs, & de ce qui concerne le bien & heureusement vivre en tous estats & conditions: par les preceptes de la doctrine, & les exemples de la vie des anciens sages & hommes illustres (Paris: Guillaume Chaudiere, 1581; repr. Geneva: Slatkine Reprints, 1972), fol. 22'.
allusions to the Cynics are positive, although they are for the most part predictable. For example, the encounter between Alexander and ‘cest excellent Philosophe’, Diogenes, is cited in a chapter entitled ‘De la pauvreté’ (fol. 110v). Despite the fact that the Cynics’ role as proto-Christians is not as explicit as in medieval encyclopedias, La Primaudaye nonetheless chooses the most obviously Christian-friendly of the Cynic anecdotes, thereby ignoring tales of shamelessness. This inevitably leads to a rose-tinted view of the ancient philosophers. The Académie Française’s moralizing use of Cynic anecdote is made clear when, having cited two stories about Diogenes, namely his walking backwards to demonstrate the wayward virtues of the Athenians, and his criticism of Aristippus’s courting of tyrants, La Primaudaye remarks ‘Combien d’utile doctrine on peut puiser en ces Philosophiques risees & rencontres!’ (fol. 35v). This saying neatly summarizes the presentation of Diogenes who is viewed as being simultaneously comic and worthy, as he was for the most part in Erasmus’s Apophthegamta.

Although Cynicism is by no means the dominant philosophical trend in the Académie Française, the number, length and importance of its references to the Cynics means that the Dogs are given a surprisingly significant part to play. For example, a borrowing from Plutarch is used to illustrate the Socratic (and Cynic) doctrine that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Alexander’s misery at the prospect of there being an infinity of worlds for him to conquer is contrasted with Crates’ contentment, and Agamemnon’s woe at being a commander of men is opposed to Diogenes’ insouciance at being put up for sale as a slave:

Par lesquelles vies opposees l’une à l’autre, il appert assez, que c’est au dedans de nous mesmes, & non pas és choses exterieures, qu’il fault que nous cherchions le fondement d’une joye certaine, qui s’arrouse & florist en vigueur [...] En quoy nous pouvons bien remarquer, que de la seule Vertu depend tout l’heur, repos & contentment de l’homme, & non pas de la grandeur & gloire mondaine. Et pour ceste raison le mesme Diogene voyant qu’un estranger venu en Lacedemone, s’estoit reparé plus curieusement que de coutume, en un jour de feste: il luy dist. Comment? L’homme de bien n’estime-il pas que tous jours soient festes pour luy? (fol. 101v)

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16 Pues cites some of Du Verdier’s disapproving views of carnival, p. 18; on fool preachers, see Carol Clark, The Vulgar Rabelais (Glasgow: Pressgang, 1983), pp. 84-85.
17 Stobaeus III, 4, 83 (cf. DL, VI, 64) and DL, II, 68.
18 Plutarch, Moralia, 466e-f and 477c.
La Primaudaye makes explicit what was already present in Plutarch, which in itself demonstrates some appreciation for Cynicism. More interesting is La Primaudaye's insistence on virtue being enjoyable. Rather than leading to a neutral state of ataraxia, virtue gives rise to 'joye certaine', seen in Crates passing his time 'gayement' and in Diogenes viewing life as one long party. The comic escapades of the Cynics make them well-suited to an exposition of this view, although their apparent asceticism, when presented in a different way in Medieval encyclopedias, does not sound quite so enjoyable.

Part Two

Lives of Diogenes: Thevet's *Vrais pourtraits* (1584) and Duboys's *Académie* (1587)

André Thevet's *Les Vrais pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres* (1584) is a different kind of book in terms of both format and content from those considered thus far. Unlike most of the works considered thus far, *Les Vrais pourtraits* would have been expensive, being large (in-fol) and containing high-quality illustrations. This may explain why there was only one sixteenth-century edition, although a smaller version was produced in the seventeenth century, as well as an English translation of some of the portraits, including that of Diogenes. Strictly speaking, it is neither a miscellany nor an encyclopedia, although in his dedicatory letter to the king Thevet, 'Premier Cosmographe du Roy', makes it clear that *Les Vrais pourtraits* forms part of his work as royal cosmographer, which was an encyclopedic occupation:

> Pour m'acquiter de l’estat de Cosmographe, auquel il a plu à vostre Majesté me coucher, me restoit ceste derniere partie de la Cosmographie scàvoir la Prosopographie, laquelle gist à resusciter & reveiller du sombre & oublieux tombeau de l’ancienneté les cendres, actions, gestes & renommede de tant d’illustres personnages qui ont flóry en vertu, magnanimité, erudition singuliere, subtîlité & industrie (sig. a iii)

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According to Lestringant, *Les Vrais pourtraits* are a logical extension of Thevet's cosmographical project, which seeks to fix time and space in a timeless representation.\(^{20}\) As far as their content is concerned, the *Pourtraits* are a set of fairly brief lives of eminent individuals, apparently chosen according to the classic criteria of *orantes, bellatores* and *laboratres*.\(^{21}\) The *Pourtraits* are the French answer to Paolo Giovio's *Elogia*, Achille Statius (Aquille Estaço)'s *Inlustrium vior[um]* (1569) and Fulvio Orsini's *Imagines et elogia* (1570).\(^{22}\) Although a portrait of the Cynic is found in Statius, together with a quatrain about his life, Diogenes is still a surprising inclusion in Thevet's work, given the frequently disreputable nature of much of what is reported about him. The Cynic is not included in similar contemporary works, including Du Verdier's *Prosopographie* (1574). The books of Giovio, Statius, Orsini, Du Verdier and Thevet are all part of the pre-history of biography, which was already apparent in Mexia. In his lengthy letter to the reader, Thevet gives further details about his enterprise:

Quant à moy, je puis asseurer, que la plus part des cabinets & Bibliothèques tant Françaises qu'estrangieres ont esté par moy visitées, à celle fin de pouvoir recouvrer au moins mal qu'il me seroit possible toutes les rarités & singularités, que je cognoissoie propres & nécessaires, pour l'accomplissement de mon dessein. D'ailleurs a falu, que j'aye recherché les ouvriers, lesquels j'entendoye estre experts, bien duits & entendus pour graver & représenter au naïf l'air & le pourtrait des personnages que je propose. Et pour cest effect à falu, que de Flandres j'aye attiré des meilleurs gravueurs, que je pouvoye choisir (sig. b iii")\(^{23}\)

Each biography is headed by an engraved portrait of the person in question. The illustration of Diogenes (fig. 15) sees him 'portant un baston en sa main, & une poche sur son espaule' (fol. 52") which is typical Cynic garb. In order to establish the authenticity of the portrait, Thevet opens his chapter on Diogenes with an elaborate account of its provenance. This strategy is adopted throughout the *Pourtraits*, even

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\(^{20}\) Lestringant, p. 284.

\(^{21}\) In his ‘Advertissement au Lecteur’ at the outset of the second volume of the *Les Vrais pourtraits*, Thevet informs the reader that his intention was to ‘dresser trois bandes de ceux, qui, ou par le glaive, ou par l'industrie de leurs mains ont tenu escorte au premier front des Philosophes et Docteurs de l'Eglise tant Grecs que Latins', fol. G gii v, cited by Lestringant, p. 280.


\(^{23}\) On the origin of the portraits, see Lestringant, p. 377.
when the account is demonstrably false, as is the case with portraits which have been borrowed from Orisini’s *Imagines*. This in turn casts doubt on the truth of Thevet’s claims about other portraits, which were not taken from Orsini, including that of Diogenes. Diogenes’ ‘pourtrait’ opens as follows:

> Si quelqu’un par-adventure à oüy parler en jeu ou comme par risée, entre les ignorans & gens mechaniques, de celuy dont l’effigie est cy representée, telle qu’elle me fut donnée en la ville d’Andrenople en Grece, que l’on m’asseura avoir esté prïse sur celle qui fut trouvée en Chalcedoyne, du temps des Empereurs Basil & Constantin freres, l’an de nostre seigneur neuf cens septante huict. II ne faut pourtant estinner qu’il ayt esté homme abject & contemptible. Que si nous voulons regarder plustost à l’interieur que à l’exterieur, nous le jugerons digne d’une grande loaange. Car comme nous lisons de deux Philosophes anciens, Democrite & Heraclite, lesquelz taxoient, l’un par ris & l’autre par plueurs continuelz, la folie des hommes, tendans neantmoins tous deux à un mesme but: Aussi entre les Philosophe le Stoicien a esté severe, l’Academicien douteux, le Peripateticien Politique, & le Cynique libre & volontaire: & toutesfois ils tendoient à une mesme fin, sçavoir de philosoper. Or entre tous ceux qui ont suuvy ceste vie Cynique, Diogenes a obtenu le premier lieu, comme celuy qui a tousjours vescu libre, & sans aucuns biens ou moyens. (fol. 52*)

Plainly, Thevet feels the need to justify Diogenes’ inclusion in his book of eminent men and women. This apology consists in contrasting, like Erasmus in ‘The Sileni of Alcibiades’, Diogenes’ external appearance with his philosophy. However, whereas Erasmus concentrated on the supposedly spiritual nature of Diogenes’ asceticism, Thevet emphasizes the fact that Diogenes exemplifies his school of philosophy which, by implication, is to be considered on a par with Stoicism, Aristotelianism, scepticism, and so forth. It is striking that, for Thevet, the defining characteristic of the Cynic way of life is freedom. Although Thevet feels the need to defend Diogenes against those who talk of him ‘en jeu ou comme par risée’, in his account of the ‘vie estrange de Diogenes’ he is happy to admit the frequently comic nature of his sayings and doings. In this, he differs from Mexia, who is an important source for Thevet’s life of Diogenes. Despite the fact that Thevet also characterizes Diogenes’ existence as being ‘estrange’, he is more ready than Mexia to countenance the more seriocomic aspects of Cynicism:

> Il se raconte beaucoup de ditz memorables de cest excellent Philosophe, aucuns desquelz (encores que facetieux, neantmoins pleines de grande erudition) il ne m’a semblé que bon d’inserer en ce present discours. (fol. 52*)

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24 Dwyer, p. 473.
Like Mexia, Thevet does not include any tales of Cynic shamelessness. This could perhaps be seen as an underhand way of sanitizing the Cynic's image for inclusion in a book on 'hommes illustres'. Thevet's recognition that Diogenes' sayings are simultaneously 'facetieux' and 'pleines de grande erudition' makes the Cynic a worthy, if not entirely comfortable, inclusion in his work.

One final point worth noting about Thevet's biography is his account of Diogenes' death, which follows two of the stories given in Diogenes Laertius, namely that he died from eating a raw octopus and from committing suicide by holding his breath (VI, 76-77). Oddly, however, in Thevet's version, the octopus metamorphoses into 'le pied d'un bœuf tout crud' (fol. 54r). Thevet is presumably the source for Cholieres's *Apresdisnées* (1585) which have Diogenes dying from exactly the same cause. It is possible that Thevet is himself drawing from another source. The same version of Diogenes' death is also found in Pierre Duboys's *L'Academie des philosophes* (1587), which could of course have drawn it from either Thevet or Cholieres. This is a further indication of how, given that genres are not codified at this time, cross-fertilization can easily occur between them.

Duboys's *Académie* is a more overtly philosophical collection than most of those considered thus far. A fairly short work devoted to the lives and sayings of twenty philosophers, from Homer to Seneca, it devotes a substantial section to Diogenes (roughly one sixth of the whole book) and a much shorter section to Antisthenes. It offers a selection of Cynic sayings as well as a more discursive treatment of Cynic anecdote, thereby combining the approach of collections of sayings, with the narrative of miscellanies. Like many of his predecessors discussed above, Duboys is interested at least as much in the sayings of the ancients as examples of wit as of argument or argument.

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26 L'Academie des philosophes, contenant leur vie, mœurs, gestes, dicts, sentences, devises, exemples, demandes, et responces, decorées de belles et plaisantes similitudes, adaptées à toute qualité de personnes [...] (Lyon: Benoist Rigaud, 1587), p. 214; Clément suggests, in discussion of Duboys alone, that this may be evidence that the sixteenth century had access to sources that are now lost, p. 16.
moral instruction. It is for this reason that the Cynics are well represented in the Académie, Diogenes and Antisthenes receiving a chapter each, along with a further eighteen philosophers. Duboys divides his account of Diogenes into four sections. The first is a brief biographical introduction, and the second consists of twenty-five numbered ‘Sentences proferees par Diogenes’. Duboys characterizes Diogenes’ philosophy, expressed through these sayings, as offering ‘singuliers preceptes par lesquels enhortoit ceux qu’il voyoit s’escarter du sentier de verité, leur proposant de mots qui meritent d’estre insculpés en lettre d’or’ (p. 174). Diogenes’ oddness tends to give rise to extreme reactions but Duboys’s eulogy does not lead to a straightforward idealization of the Cynic. This is seen in the third, and longest, section of his biography, ‘Responces facetieuses & morales faictes par Diogenes’, a title which indicates Duboys’s appreciation of the essential link between comedy and philosophy within Cynicism. The final, brief section is devoted to the different accounts of the Cynic’s death. While the first section is drawn from Diogenes Laertius, the source of the majority of the twenty-five sayings is Guillaume de Tignonville’s translation of the Arabic source, Les Dictz moraux des philosophes. The beginning of the third section is also taken from this work. This is a further indication that the Arabic source remained of importance throughout the sixteenth century.27

For the most part, Duboys is faithful to his sources. However, he cannot resist embroidering the anecdotes with additional details and explanations. One example of this is the story of Diogenes with a lantern searching for a man in the middle of the day. While the anecdote gets one sentence in Diogenes Laertius (‘He lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he went about, “I am looking for a man”’ (VI, 41)), Duboys exploits its dramatic and comic potential:

Un jour qui faisoit beau soleil, il s’en alla en le marchè avec une chandelle allumee, & faisoit comme celuy qui cerchoit diligemment quelque chose perdue, regardans par derriere les sacs du bled, derriere les tables, & de tous costez, quand on lui demandoit qu’il cherchoit, ne vouloit dire mot: mais estant allé au milieu de la place ou ny avoit personne, & ou le soleil nuisoit, se mit là à cercher plus fort qu’auparavant, le peuple s’esbayyssant de ce qu’il faisoit, luy dit, Es tu devenu fol, Diogenes, que fais tu la? Il leur dit en faisant bonne mine,

27 See above, Chapter 2, part 2, section 2.
j'ay tout aujourd'hui cherché un homme, & encore n'en puis je trouver aucun: voulant dire qu'il ne voit les hommes selon sa volonté: ains au contraire addonnés à toute sorte de vices. (p. 191)

Duboys's rendering of this anecdote is clearly true to the spirit of Diogenes Laertius, but the considerable addition of narrative detail, including the delay in revealing the point of Diogenes' ironic search, is his own variation on the original theme. His didactic explanation of the anecdote, like that of La Perrière in La Morosophie, may not be Cynic in character, but it does show that he has got the joke. Similar improvisation is found in his version of Diogenes' encounter with Alexander, which takes similar liberties with the ancient sources, and also delays the punchline:

Alexandre le vint voir, & le trouva tout auprès de son tonneau, qui colloit certains vieux parchemins, & les faisait essuyer au soleil, auquel il dit, bien Diogenes as tu faute de quelque chose, il luy dit, Attens un peu, je te parleray tantost, Alexandre ne le voulant pour lors destoumer se retira un peu, attendant qu'il luy vint parler: mais voyant qu'il demeuroit par trop, il retourne le voir, & le treuva qu'il recommençoit d'encoller d'autres; auquel dit, Je t'ay toujours attendu Diogenes, mais ce pendant tu n'es point venu parler suyvant ta promesse. Je ne te voulois autre chose, dit Diogenes, sinon que t'ostasse du Soleil pour cause que me faisois ombre. (p. 178)

Duboys's version of the story plays with the sources to produce an original slant on the meeting between Cynic and king. The parchments, here juxtaposed to the barrel, are also found in the nineteenth letter of Du Puys's translation of Diogenes' epistles. Their inclusion here amounts to a characterization of the Cynic as a writer, and also gives Duboys an unusual explanation for Diogenes' famous reply. This could be seen as an attempt at whitewashing Diogenes' reputation, turning him from a sunbather into an intellectual. However, if anything, it adds a further dimension to Diogenes' insolence and to the humour of the infamous episode. Duboys departs from the letter of the sources, to produce both a livelier rendering than that found in Diogenes' letters and one which is truer to the Cynic known through Diogenes Laertius. Nonetheless, Duboys

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29 In the letter, Diogenes is sitting by a theatre, so as to emphasize the performative character of the encounter.
30 Another example of this characterization is encountered in the prologue of the Tiers Livre in which Diogenes lends his writing-tablets to a friend before rolling his barrel. Diogenes is also pictured reading in Raphael's 'La scuola di Atene' and in Whitney (fig. 7). See, however, DL, VI, 48, cited in Montaigne, Essais, I, 26, 168.
offers an even more enigmatically euphemistic version of the tale of Diogenes' public masturbation than that given in Fougerolles's translation:

Un jour en pleine rue il frottoit ses mains l'une contre l'autre, & disoit si bien qu'on le pouvoit entendre, À la mienne volonté que j'eusse puissance de guerir mon ventre par le frotter quand la faim me demange, tout ainsi comme je fais de mes mains. (p. 195)

From the above, it would appear that Dubois failed to read between the lines of the euphemistic Latin translation of Diogenes Laertius. He is either being naive or deliberately obscure, showing how euphemism can lead to obfuscation. Dubois's treatment of Cynic anecdotes is, however, generally quite playful, and demonstrates a willingness to adapt the sources in a way not dissimilar to that of Meurier in Le Bouquet de philosophie morale. Parts of his chapter on Diogenes are in some respects less like that of a compiler than like that of a more obviously creative writer. This is typical of a period in which 'creative' works, including dialogues and Montaigne's Essais, often have a strong element of compilation about them. It is not therefore a shock to discover that compilations often have a creative component. Dubois's improvisation serves as a reminder of two crucial facts. Firstly, since the history of Cynicism cannot be separated from that of its reception, it follows that there is no 'source' which is not also a representation of Cynicism. In other words, all sources, and all uses of sources, are bound to bear traces of their own interests, sympathies and confusions vis-à-vis the tradition in which they themselves play a part. Secondly, it illustrates that our way of dividing up works, and hence of thinking about 'philosophy', 'history', 'biography' and 'literature', is not the same as the sixteenth-century way of conceiving these things.

Part Three

Late-Sixteenth to Early-Seventeenth-Century Texts: Bouchet, Charron, Camus, Guyon

Although Pedro Mexía's Diverses leçons was the most widely imitated miscellany of the sixteenth century, Montaigne's Essais also had a remarkably rapid influence on

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31 DL, VI, 69.
contemporary writers. Guillaume Bouchet makes considerable use of Montaigne, to the extent that he appears as a speaker in his dialogues, *Les Sérées* (1584-98).\(^{33}\) The best-known imitator of Montaigne is Pierre Charron, whose *De la sagesse* (1601) can be seen as an attempt to make the *Essais*, and, in particular, their use of ancient scepticism, systematic. Both works are in Montaigne's wake, but they are very different: Bouchet's is a facetious dialogue, and Charron's is a sententious work of philosophy. This has consequences for their framing of Cynic anecdotes. For example, one of Crates' jokes is used in the second book of *Les Sérées*:

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Un de la Seree, qui ne scavoit, tant estoit rude, & mal apprins, que c' estoit d'amour, va dire, que pour attiedir ces affections bouillantes, qu'il ne falloit recors au cordeau, selon la recepte de Crates Thebain:
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La faim, l'absence, & le sejour
Peuvent guerir le mal d'Amour
S'il n'en peuvent venir à bout
La mort les guerira du tout. (p. 207)\(^{34}\)
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The Cynic joke fits well in this comic setting, although, in a way similar to Meurier's *Colloques*, purely comic portrayals of Cynicism inevitably ignore its seriocomic nature.

The closeness of Bouchet's dialogues to miscellanies and collections of sayings is well illustrated by his long treatment of the topic of Cynic poverty in the thirtieth 'série' of the third book, 'Des Pauvres & des Mendians'. The speaker lists practically all of the relevant anecdotes from Diogenes Laertius, from Diogenes' barrel to his asking statues for alms (p. 297). Such lists are a further indication of the sixteenth-century taste for collections of such material, which are found in facetious dialogues as well as in compilations of sayings.

Predictably, Charron's work gives a less playful version of Diogenes than that found in his master, as is seen in his perfunctory imitation of Montaigne's essay 'De Democritus et Heraclitus' (I, 50) in a chapter entitled 'Vanité': 'Il n'y a point d'autre chose en l'homme [...] tant comme de vile inanité [...] Dont recontroit mieux Democrite se riant [...] qu'Heraclite qui pleuroit [...] Et Diogenes qui donnoit du nez, que Timon le


\(^{34}\) DL, VI, 86.
Diogenes’ encounter with Alexander is put in the context of Stoic theories of emotion in a chapter entitled ‘Desirs, Cupiditez’:

Il ne n'aist, & ne s'esleve point tant de flots & d'ondes en la mer, comme de desirs au coeur de l'homme [...] Les uns sont naturels, ceux cy sont justes & legitimes, sont memes aux bestes [...] Les autres sont outre nature, procedans de nostre opinion & fantaisie, artificiels, superflus, que nous pouvons pour les distinger par nom des autres, appeller cupiditez. Ceux-cy sont purement humains [...] Or il advient souvent (juste punition) que cherchans d'assouvir ses cupiditez, & se saouler des biens & plaisirs de la fortune, l'on perd & l'on se prive de ceux de la nature; dont disoit Diogenes à Alexandre apres avoir refusé son argent, que pour tout bien il se retirast de son soleil. (pp. 78-79)

Diogenes stands for the rejection of human desires in favour of natural ones. Alexander’s request of Diogenes to ask him anything he wishes is seen as an offer of money, thereby adding a rejection of wealth to the Cynic’s rebuttal of political and military power. Unlike Montaigne, Charron makes no mention of shamelessness, which could perhaps have served as an example of natural appetites which humans share with animals. He puts Diogenes in a Stoic light for his own purposes, but does not play with Cynic anecdotes, as his illustrious forebear does.36

The works of Bouchet and Charron, as well as Mexia, Breslay, Du Verdier, La Primaudaye and Thevet, demonstrate very varied use of Cynicism which alters according to the frame in which it is put. Other works, however, are more like present-day reference books in their relative absence of such framing. One example is Mohy’s Le Cabinet historial (1610), an alphabetically-arranged miscellany which contains brief biographies of Diogenes and Crates.37 The material is drawn from the usual sources, including via Pierre de la Primaudaye, indicating again the way in which such works operated through close imitation. Mohy comments at the end of his biography of Diogenes that ‘Il a dit encor plusieurs autres propos de risée fort bien adressez, aucuns se verront cà & là parmy le Cabinet & ailleurs’ (p. 216). Diogenes’ wit is too tempting to

36 For a recent, sympathetic view of Charron, see Christian Belin, L’Œuvre de Pierre Charron, 1541-1603: littérature et théologie de Montaigne à Port-Royal (Paris: Champion, 1995).
37 Le Cabinet historial de messire Remacle Mohy […] (Liege: Ardt de Corsuvarëm, 1610).
be filed away in a single drawer of the cabinet, hence he is found elsewhere, including, for example, the entry on Alexander the Great (p. 57).

A more developed treatment of the Cynics is found in *Les Diversitez* by Jean-Pierre Camus, the first volume of which appeared in 1609 and which were completed by a thirteenth volume in 1618. Camus makes over thirty references to the Cynics in the course of his lengthy work, although they are far from being a dominant presence. Many of these references are commonplace, including Crates’ throwing away of his worldly goods, and of Diogenes’ encounter with Alexander in a chapter entitled ‘Des Richesses’. Indeed, Camus frames commonplaces in such a way as to invite readers to redeploy them elsewhere. It is no great surprise to discover that Bishop Camus does not mention the most shocking material about the Cynics. Camus is, however, unusually interested in the style of language employed by the Cynics. He goes beyond borrowing from Cynic anecdotes to bolster his own verbal arsenal by drawing attention to the Cynics’ own rhetoric. Whether or not Camus is aware of the fact that freedom of speech and wit are essential aspects of ancient Cynicism, the Cynics nonetheless receive pride of place in two chapters, ‘Du parler libre’ and ‘Des Arguties’. Camus defines the former as ‘une façon de parler brusque, naïve, prompte, qui a bien de vérité quelque air d’inconsideration & légèreté, mais qui part d’un courage boussy, de je ne sçay quelle fierté genereuse, dédaignant toute adstriction & circonspection’. The latter are ‘traits aigus nez d’une grande souplesse & prompte vivacité d’esprit’ (fol. 130°). Camus informs us that ‘Ceste franchise de parler du Philosophe Diogenes à Alexandre est cognue aux enfans’ (fol. 117°) and it is indeed cited in both chapters, along with other examples of the frankness and repartee of the Cynics, drawn from Diogenes Laertius. Camus’s interest in, and commentary on, the form of Cynic sayings is not particularly profound and is, if anything, revealing of an attempt, whether conscious or not, to defuse their potential impact by giving them the status of mere witticisms. He shows little or no interest in their philosophical content. This impression is confirmed by

Camus's most interesting attack on the Cynics, found in his 'Traité des passions de l'âme':

pour Diogenes, il y a en toutes ses actions, tant de vanité & de sottise qu'à peine me semble-il mériter le nom de Philosophe, si ce n'est pour quelques reparties visibles & promptes, & autres apophthegmes qu'on lui attribue, qui encore considérez attentivement, ont plus du baseleresque que du serieux.\[41\]

Camus had already criticized Diogenes for his pride, in two negative stories related by Diogenes Laertius.\[42\] Descrains is right to argue that Camus's use of the Cynics demonstrates that he borrows from them according to a 'nécessité rhétorique occasionelle', but in no way embraces their philosophy, and that this points to the fact that Cynicism was a minor ideological force at the time, unlike scepticism or Stoicism.\[43\] Nonetheless, Camus's representations of the Cynics are numerous and occasionally interesting enough to indicate a curious double movement of attraction and repulsion on his part. Cynic commonplaces are admired for their force and wit, and are employed in varied contexts thanks to their adaptability, but they are still philosophically beyond the pale. It is almost as if Camus cites the Cynics because this is the done thing, even to the point that, like Rabelais, he identifies his work with Diogenes' rolling of his barrel (IX, p. 114).\[44\] In the end, however, Camus, in a way that recalls Mexia, is incapable or unwilling to think through the Cynic paradoxes which he inserts into his discourse.

Louis Guyon's Les diverses leçons [...] Suivant celles de Pierre Messie & du Verdier represent the death throes of a fashion for mammoth miscellanies that had been current for over half a century. The first volume of Guyon's Diverses leçons was published in 1604, to be followed by a second in 1613 and a third in 1617. While Du Verdier's Diverses leçons had numerous re-editions, Guyon's work proved less successful. The first volume of Guyon's work was reprinted four times (1605, 1610, 1613, 1617), the second volume twice (1617, 1625) and the third volume only once.

\[42\] Les Diversitez, IV, fol. 216v; V, p. 193; VII, p. 560; DL, VI, 26 and 41.
\[43\] Descrains, I, p. 331.
\[44\] See below, Chapter 5, part 4.
Another reason for this comparative failure may be due to the accuracy of Pues's description of Guyon's *Diverses leçons* as the work of a 'vieillard quelque peu radoteur' (p. 29). While the first volume is apparently bereft of references to the Cynics, the second, like Mexia, contains a chapter devoted to Diogenes, and the third includes a chapter on one of the Cynic's shocking views. Guyon also gives an unusually detailed description of the Cynic school in an earlier chapter of volume two which is concerned with the definition of philosophy, and its various sects:

Les Cyniques estoyent des Philosophes doctes, qui mesprisoyent les biens de ce monde, ne faisans aucune provision de chose qui leur fust nécessaire, mais vivoyent au jour la journée, comme ils la pouvoyent acquerir par mendication, ou de presens qu'on leur faisoit. Ils n'habitoyent jamais aux maisons, mais habitoyent & faisoient leurs gistes aux portaus des temples, és portes des villes, aux Theatres, aux halles, ou pieux de marchez, se contentans d’un bissac pour mettre leur peu de meuble & vivres, & d’un baston pour se se soustener. Ils s'appelloyent Cyniques, c’est à dire, Chiens ou vivans comme chiens, & à la chiennerie. Parce que Diogenes Philosophe mena une telle vie, fut apellé Cynique, du depuis tous les Philosophes qui ont ensui vis tradictions, & façon de vivre, ont esté appellez. Ils alloient pieds nuds, ne portans qu’un braye de cuir, une juppe de gros dap, & manteau dessurs, la teste peu ou jamais couverte. Ils estoyent hardis en leur parler, & en responses tressubtils. (II, pp. 575-76)

It is striking that Guyon's definition of Cynicism concentrates almost entirely on its external aspects, the objectivity of his presentation keeping the Dogs at a safe distance. Although he insists they are 'doctes' he does not say what their doctrine consisted in, other than that they rejected worldly goods. This definition is an early indication of Guyon's difficulties in conceiving Cynicism, which become more apparent in two contrasting chapters, the first also in volume two, the second in volume three.

Guyon's most developed treatment of the Cynics occurs in a chapter entitled ‘De Diogenes Philosophe Cynique, qui habita avec une femme publiquement, & de la raison qu’il en rendit aux Atheniens, & de plusieurs autres de ses gestes, & dits’. The piece is considerably longer than Mexia's chapter on Diogenes, running to eleven pages. The opening passage of the chapter is taken from Diogenes Laertius. Guyon's

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45 Pues, pp. 28 and 39.
sole comment on the material is to note that 'les personnes doctes, & de bon jugement, relevoyent bien ses dits sententieux' (II, p. 801). This amounts to a curious apology for the Cynic's inclusion in the *Diverses leçons*, since it shifts some of the responsibility away from Guyon, onto unnamed 'doctes'. Despite his unwitting anxiety, Guyon proceeds to devote the middle section of his chapter to one of the most shocking aspects of ancient Cynicism, namely the practice of shamelessly copulating in public. Having established that Diogenes had sex in the market-place in full view of the crowds on a feast day, and that the Athenians were disgusted by this behaviour, Guyon goes on to offer a Diogenic 'harangue' in defence of his shocking actions. Use of the dramatic voice Diogenes is fairly unusual. Guyon, or whoever Guyon is drawing on, thereby gives another example of the adaptation of Diogenes' verbal performance in early modern texts. Indeed, here Diogenes' gift of the gab is used to excuse his shameless bodily display:

Seigners Atheniens, il court un bruit de moy, plein de scandale. Presques tous les Citoyens me detestent, les femmes m'ont en horreur sans sujet. Vray est que j'ay sceu la cause, qui est, pour ce que j'avoy habité publiquement avec une femme. Je le confesse, mais que pour cela je doive estre abominable a ceux de ceste cite, je n'y voy nulle raison. Au contraire vous estes dignes de plus grande reprehension, qui vous cachez le plus que vous pouvez, soit homme, ou femmes, à la copulation charnelle. Quant à moy lors que je faisoy cet acte, c'estoit en intention de planter, c'est à dire, d'engendrer un homme, dont tous ceux qui le peuvent faire, imitent les Dieux, à entretenir ce beau monde, qu'ils ont créé, & sans l'habitation qu'avez avec les femmes, vostre Republique seroit bien tost reduite à neant. (II, p. 802)

Diogenes' harangue continues by citing at considerable length the spectacles people are keen to witness, including public executions and fighting, so as to point out the hypocrisy of the Athenians' objections. Although this speech borrows something from Diogenes' status as a philosophical performer, it is noticeably serious, and thereby neglects the kind of playfulness that normally characterizes Diogenes' rhetoric. Nonetheless, Guyon informs us that it was successful:

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*françois, italiens, espagnols, allemands, juifs & arabes*, 3 vols, II (Lyon: Abraham Cloquemin, 1613) and III (Lyon: Claude Mirillon, 1617).

47 Two examples of Diogenes' dramatic voice, from Alexandre Sylvain's *Les Epitomes de cent histoires tragiques* (1581) and the anonymous *Diogènes, ou du moien d'establir* (1581), both of which pre-date Guyon, are discussed in Chapter 6, part 2, and Chapter 7, part 2, respectively.
Le peuple Athenien, prenant grand plaisir à sa defense, qui estoit pleine de grande invention & d'un bel artifice, & qu'il y avoit quelque apparence de verité, se riot de cest acte, & prenoit plaisir d'en parler devant les femmes. Et cest harangue eut tant de vertu, que plusieurs mal avisez usoyent des femmes publiquement, & d'autres de despit fascheux & melancoliques, couperent les cercles du tonneau dudit Diogenes, luy absent, n'approvans ses façons de faire [...] il fut deffundu, par les Areopagites, de n'user de l'acte venereen publiquement, sur peine de certaine amende pecuniaire pour la premiere fois, & notte d'infamie pour la seconde fois, autrement plusieurs se fussent mi de ceste secte de Philosophie Cynique [...] S. Augustin reprouve fort cest acte de Diogene, & n'en dit pas du bien. (II, pp. 804-5)

The breaking of Diogenes' barrel is reported in Diogenes Laertius (VI, 43), but it is not associated with a reaction against his shamelessness. Despite the time Guyon devotes to Cynic shamelessness he can barely countenance the possibility that such bizarre behaviour might come from a philosophical standpoint concerning the nature of virtue, unlike Montaigne. This is seen in his maintaining merely that Diogenes' views 'avoit quelque apparence de verité' and that the fad for public sex that they established was easily eradicated by social control. The insertion of Augustine's opinion reads like an afterthought which similarly reveals a kind of discomfort on Guyon's part in toying with these potentially dangerous ideas. Guyon, who returns to Diogenes Laertius for the remainder of the chapter, ends this piece on Diogenes by maintaining that 'il parvint à la science de Philosophie, par laquelle il acquit une grande reputation, autant ou plus, que nul qui aye esté devant ni apres luy' (II, p. 809). Such a characterization of the Cynic is reminiscent of Mexia and seems to protest too much, thereby indicating a kind of embarrassment about the material contained in the chapter.

Guyon's puzzlement concerning Cynics is made more obvious in the third volume of his Diverses leçons, in which he contradicts the points that he made in his chapter on Diogenes in volume two. Such inconsistency is not in itself exceptional because Guyon is not interested in producing a coherent philosophical treatise. Guyon's self-contradiction is however so blatant that it is fair to say that it comes from a desire on his part to take back a good deal of what he had proposed earlier. The first stage of Guyon's denial of Cynicism comes in a chapter entitled 'Contre certains Philosophes, qui ont grandement faillis, d'avoir en horreur indifferentemment toutes les femmes'. Having
criticized Diogenes for two of his misogynistic sayings, Guyon moves on to counter many of the points that had previously been raised in Diogenes' defence:

Quoy qu'il fist semblant de hayr le mariage, & les femmes, si est-ce que cest hypocrite habitoit avec ses femmes, tant en public qu'en cachette: ce qu'il fit en Athenes un jour de marche; & comme aucuns luy dirent, qu'est-ce qu'il faisoit, il respondit: Je plante un homme. Voulant par cest acte, donner à entendre que c'estoit chose licite d'exercer l'acte Venerien sans aucune honte, & publiquement; ce que n'ont oncques approuvé les peuples plus sauvages, que les Espagnols, & autres nations, ayent descouverts. Disant pour ces raisons, qu'il estoit plus civil d'habiter avec une femme devant tous, que de voir pendre, decapiter, & faire endurer autre tourment à un homme, qu'on faisoit mourir par sentence de juge, ou à la guerre par les armes. (III, p. 35)

Jean de Léry similarly denies that the peoples of south America engaged in public sex, which he takes to be an indication of the naturalness of shame. Guyon however offers no theological nor philosophical argument against the Cynics, but is content simply to contradict the views expressed in Diogenes' harangue. He is therefore confused as to what to make of Cynic shamelessness, which for Guyon is both a source of entertainment and of concern. His attack on Diogenes takes a different turn in a chapter entitled 'Detestable opinion de Diogenes, disant ne scavoient ré à ses parents de l'avoir engendré pour leur volupté, & non pour luy faire plaisir'. Diogenes' view is drawn from the sixth letter of Du Puys's translation of Diogenes' *Epistres*, which Guyon cites in its entirety. This letter makes an unusually technical point to the effect that, since the parents are focused on 'volupté', rather than conception, in the act of sex, it makes no sense for children to be grateful to their parents for having conceived them. Guyon counters this point with a theological argument:

N'estoit-il pas insensé de tenir telle opinion, veu que la grande sapience de Dieu, tant aux hommes qu'aux animaux a mis de la volupté en leur generation, à fin que toutes choses multipliant, & que chacun y fust provoqué, pour ce faire? Dieu n'est point tant admiré d'avoir créé l'homme & les animaux de rien, comme il est de l'avoir perpetué jusques à present, & fera eternellement s'il luy plait, & ce par les copulations des masles & des femelles. (III, p. 549)

In a way, then, Guyon's account of Cynic attitudes to sex turn full circle, for they are used both as an example of excessive 'volupté' and to point out the moral benefits of that same emotion. Taken individually, Guyon's arguments about Cynicism are not

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48 See below, Chapter 7, part 1.
particularly interesting, and taken together they are incoherent. However, it is precisely because the Cynics provoke these extreme and contradictory reactions that Guyon’s *Diverses leçons* are worthy of study here. In particular, he will serve as a useful counterpoint to more sophisticated and playful responses to the same issues which are discussed in Chapter Seven below.

**Conclusion**

The structure of miscellanies and encyclopedias clearly allows for more developed discussion of Cynicism than is possible in collections of sayings. Nonetheless, the framing of the Dogs in these works varies greatly depending on what feature of Cynicism the author wishes to emphasize. Some writers offer a ‘clean’ version of the Cynics, whether to turn them to broadly Christian heuristic use (La Primaudaye), to make them acceptable for inclusion in a work on illustrious individuals (Thevet), or to turn them to neo-Stoic philosophical ends (Charron). Such works can nonetheless betray incomprehension of Cynicism’s seriocomic nature (Mexia), or ostensibly fail to get Diogenes’ jokes (Camus). Other works make Cynic sexual practices the focus of their discussion. Although this issue can be addressed in a fairly neutral way (Du Verdier), it invariably provokes extreme reactions, be it an anti-Cynic polemic (Breslay) or a response which is so confused that it shows the unsettling effect of Cynic paradox (Guyon). The attitudes revealed in these works demonstrate that tales of Cynic shamelessness remained enduringly provocative and discomforting at this time. Having observed this, it is nonetheless worth noting that the topic was not so dangerous as not to be broached at all. In fact, tackling the subject, particularly in a sensationalist manner, would have probably delighted readers of the time. Then, as now, it seems that sex sells.
Conclusion to Part I

Early modern repositories of Cynicism show the varied nature of the Cynic tradition, and illustrate the fact that all sources of Cynicism are instances of the reception of Cynicism. The diversity of the ancient and Medieval sources proved infectious in early modern Europe. This is clearly visible in the works of Erasmus who uses the idealized version of Diogenes in pedagogical works and in 'The Sileni of Alcibiades' but seeks to exploit the witty, seriocomic Cynic in the *Apophthegmata*. Erasmus’s commentaries on Cynic sayings in the latter work and, to a lesser extent, those of his predecessor, Guillaume Tardif, alongside the commonplace-books of Gastius and Lycosthenes, demonstrate a desire to combine wit with wisdom. Indeed, the large number of Cynic sayings in these works shows that it was thought that the Cynic tradition was ideally adapted to the demands of *bonae literae*. Diogenes’ peculiar brand of self-creation was thereby presented as a model for imitation in the formation of sixteenth-century selves. However, Cynic shamelessness is a source of discomfort for Erasmus, and unwitting embarrassment for Rhodiginus, both responses marking a point where the idealized, proto-Christian version of the Cynic ceases to convince. It is not without irony then that this topic in particular should become a favourite theme of late-sixteenth-century and early-seventeenth-century miscellanies, where it gives rise variously to tabloidesque prurience, confusion or the comic presentation of Guicciardini’s commonplace-book. While emblem books show that moral, didactic use of the Cynics persisted into the second half of the sixteenth century, contemporary collections of sayings concentrate on wit, and ignore the wisdom. Their adaptation, improvisation and idiomatization of Cynic sayings highlight the plasticity of Diogenes’ rhetoric, which encourages playful imitation.

The multiple associations of Diogenes, combined with the potential of his performance for further improvisation uncovered in the texts analysed here, indicate why writers like Rabelais and Montaigne also turned to him in their writings. It would, however, be wrong merely to subordinate the texts analysed here to prefigurations of canonical works. Instead, the creativity revealed in compilations, encyclopedias and
miscellanies is the mirror image of the encyclopedic elements of Rabelais's fiction, and the miscellaneous character of Montaigne's book. The potential for cross-fertilization between texts not codified by genre makes my gathering together of examples of what could be called standard early modern representations of Cynicism essential. It provides a set of co-ordinates which will enable me to put more playful and developed use of the Cynic tradition into perspective. The unexpected richness of standard representations of Cynicism points back to the diversity of the Cynic tradition and forward to further playful portrayals of the ancient Dogs in early modern texts.
Part II
Chapter Five

Rabelais

Envers les guerroyans je voys de nouveau percer mon tonneau. Et de la traicte (laquelle par deux precedens volumes (si par l'imposture des imprimeurs n'eussent estè pervertiz et brouillez) vous feust assez congneue) leurs tirer du creu de nos passetemps epicenaires un guallant tiercin, et consequitivement un joyeulx quart de sentences Pantagruelicques. Par moy licite vous sera les appeller Diogenicques.

"Prologue de l'Autheur", Tiers Livre

The prologue of the Tiers Livre is not only the best-known adaptation of Cynic stories in sixteenth-century French texts, but within it Rabelais explicitly identifies himself and his book with Diogenes. When Rabelais self-consciously and clearly informs his readers that his writings can be described as 'Diogenicques' he is giving them a guide to his notoriously enigmatic work. I shall argue that Rabelais's identification with Diogenes in the prologue of the Tiers Livre is best understood as a commitment to seriocomic performance, including at times of war. I shall also suggest that the identification of 'sentences Pantagruelicques' with Diogenic performance is close to carnival in inverting norms and in laughing at oppressive seriousness. In Part I, I showed that several different versions of Diogenes are found in ancient, Medieval and sixteenth-century writings. Rabelais constructs a Diogenes who owes something to more than one of these strands of the Cynic tradition, and to his own improvisations. For instance, the portrayal of the Cynic in Rabelais recalls Erasmus's emphasis on Diogenes' rhetoric in the Apophthegmata, and the invention and adaptation of Cynic sayings in vernacular collections of sayings, including the works of Gabriel Meurier. Rabelais is one of many writers who use Cynicism not as a philosophy, but as a set of performative practices open to reworking and improvisation.

I do not wish to claim that Diogenes is a key to all aspects of Rabelais's work. Tales of Diogenes, as related in Lucian in particular, are of course but one of a myriad of influences on, and sources for, Rabelais. However, since Rabelais allows his readers to call his books 'Diogenicques', he is inviting them to make comparisons between his presentation of Diogenes' performance and his writing. The comparison could be ironic,
but I shall argue that it is not. The majority of this chapter will be devoted to close reading of Rabelais’s adaptation of Cynic anecdotes in order to support my arguments. The first part will analyse the description of Diogenes in the underworld in Pantagruel, the second the prologue of the Tiers Livre, the third the handful of other references to Cynicism in Rabelais, and the fourth a small number of texts written after the Tiers Livre which borrow from Rabelais’s version of the story of Diogenes’ barrel-rolling. This final part of the chapter will therefore give indications of the ways in which Rabelais’s contemporaries understood and used Rabelais’s rendition of this particular Cynic anecdote. This chapter is not therefore devoted exclusively to Rabelais but will put him in the context both of the ‘standard’ representations of Cynicism examined in Part I and of the adaptations of his use of the Cynic tradition by his contemporaries.

There has of course been a great deal of critical writing on Rabelais’s book generally, as well as on the prologue of the Tiers Livre in particular. Throughout this chapter I shall indicate which critical works I found helpful and those which I found misleading. From what I say above, it is clear that I am indebted to Bakhtin’s seminal work on Rabelais, and to those who can be said to follow him.¹ I do not, however, wish exclusively to identify myself with any one critical school on Rabelais, not least because I have found a variety of insights in critics with very different approaches to Rabelais. Nor do I wish to presuppose a Rabelais along the lines sometimes drawn by critics. Oppositions between ‘serious’ and ‘popular’, as well as between a Rabelais self-consciously concerned with writing and one who provides glimpses of the history of his time, are unhelpful because it is clear that Rabelais’s book holds within it both poles of these supposed opposites.²

Given the amount of Rabelais criticism, I do not pretend to offer wholly original research here. However, the fact that I am in a position to place Rabelais’s use of Diogenes in context of the Cynic tradition, as expressed in ancient, Medieval and sixteenth-century texts, is the primary justification for subjecting Rabelais’s much-
studied book to further analysis. While it would be false to say that this is the first study to try to do this, other critical treatments of Rabelais’s place in the Cynic tradition have tended to be cursory at best, and none have looked in detail at all the instances of his presentation of Cynic anecdote. The sixth chapter of Michèle Clément’s thesis sought to establish that Rabelais’s book is imbued with Cynicism, but did not offer much in the way of close reading. My approach is very different. I do not argue, as Clément does, that Rabelais adopts a philosophical or ideological position in identifying himself and his book with Diogenes. Instead, through detailed analysis of Rabelais’s *prima facie* presentation of Cynic anecdote, I shall argue that by identifying his writing with Diogenes’ performance, Rabelais is saying that his work is paradoxical and seriocomic, but he is not reducing it to a single, straightforward point of view. Neither Cynicism nor Diogenes can be used as a key to explain Rabelais. Hence I disagree with Floyd Gray’s discussion of the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* in *Rabelais et le comique du discontinu* (1994).³ He claims that the comic attitude to philosophy, the notion of philosophy as therapy, as well as the use of word-play and sign-language found in Rabelais and in Cynicism demonstrate undeniable links between the two (pp. 62-63). I argue, however, that there is no justification for moving from broad resemblances to causal links. Similarly, Gray ascribes Panurge’s ‘naturalness’, poverty, freedom and misogyny to Cynicism, while I would maintain that the character of Panurge is neither ‘natural’ nor ‘Cynical’, but a composite comic creation whose primary trait is verbal inventiveness, which is also one of Diogenes’ dominant characteristics, although Gray does not note this.

The arguments of Clément and Gray are needlessly reductive in their willingness to explain Rabelais’s text by putting it under the sign of Diogenes. Cynic performance is by its nature resistant to such reduction. This does not mean, however, that the Cynic tradition, and Rabelais’s use of it, are open to any interpretation. For example, Gray’s claim that Diogenes ‘vise sans cesse au plus grand contentement, au plaisir’ (p. 62) has little, if any, basis in the sayings and anecdotes. Many other Rabelais critics betray a

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lack of understanding of Cynicism and its peculiar transmission. Mireille Huchon’s note in what is now the standard critical edition of Rabelais shows the difficulty into which the most eminent critics fall when faced with Cynicism: ‘Assimilation du terme de Diogeniques à Pantagruelicques, à remarquer’. In a way, this chapter could be seen to replace this note which is not one. Huchon leaves a difficult question unanswered, but other critics give wrong answers as far as Cynicism is concerned. In a recent introductory work on Rabelais, the reader is informed that Diogenes was a ‘a cynic and doubter’, and that his barrel is filled with uncertainty. The error here is anachronistic, since it is based on the assumption that Rabelais is using the modern meaning of ‘cynicism’. The same mistake is found in another critic who claims that Diogenes’ attitude is negative and judgemental because Rabelais describes him as ‘le philosophe cynic’. Diane Desrosiers-Bonin does not justify her claim that Diogenes ‘représente pour les humanistes de la Renaissance l'idéal de la sagesse mise au service du bien commun’. In fact, none of the humanists analysed in Part I (Erasmus, Lycosthenes, Rhodiginus, Mexia) hold this view of Diogenes. Other dubious interpretations of Diogenes will be noted in the course of the chapter. Such misleading views of Diogenes derive in part from a failure to appreciate that, for Rabelais and others, Cynicism is exciting because it combines performance and philosophy, and that this performance works on many levels at once. By concentrating on Rabelais’s adaptation of Cynic performance, I hope to offer some new observations on this much studied material.

Part One

Diogenes in Hell: Pantagruel, 30

The first, brief reference to Diogenes in Rabelais occurs in Epistémon’s description of the underworld. Having had his head chopped off during the battle with the Dipsodes, Epistémon is resuscitated by Panurge, and he proceeds to tell the tale of what he witnessed in hell. The passage as a whole has been subjected to divergent

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4 Huchon, ed., *Œuvres complètes*, p. 1368, n.9. All references will be to this edition.
interpretations, not all of which are pertinent to the portrayal of Diogenes. What is relevant is the fact that Epistémon's account turns the world upside down, so that the great and the good from myth, history and Medieval romances, are all reduced to lowly roles in the after-life. Those who lived humble lives on earth get to rule the old rulers in hell. Diogenes is first among them:

En ceste façon ceulx qui avoient esté gros seigneurs en ce monde icy, guaingnoyent leur pouvre meschante et paillarde vie là bas. Au contraire les philosophes, et ceulx qui avoient esté indigens en ce monde, de par delà estoient gros seigneurs en leur tour. Je veiz Diogénes qui se prelassoit en magnificence avec une grand robbe de pourpre, et ung sceptre en sa dextre, et faisoit enrager Alexandre le Grand, quand il n'avoit bien repitassé ses chausses, et le payoit en grands coups de baston. (p. 325)

As Lauvergnat-Gagniere makes clear, such reversals of fortune are found in farces, but these do not talk of ancient philosophers. Rabelais nonetheless provides a dramatic tableau for Diogenes and the other inhabitants of the underworld. One of the apparent sources for the reference to Diogenes is probably Lucian's *Menippus or the Descent into Hades*, 18, in which Menippus gives an account of what he witnessed in the underworld, including what Socrates and other ‘wise men’ were doing:

And good old Diogenes lives with Sardanapallus the Assyrian, Midas the Phyrgian and several other wealthy men. As he hears them lamenting and reviewing their former good-fortune, he laughs and rejoices; and often he lies on his back and sings in a very harsh and unpleasant voice, drowning out their lamentations, so that the gentlemen are annoyed and think of changing their lodgings because they cannot stand Diogenes.

It is immediately noticeable that the passage in Lucian does not contain any reference to Alexander the Great, nor any indication that Diogenes has converted to hedonism in Hades. Rabelais's representation of Diogenes here owes something to Lucian, but the

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8 The resurrection itself and the parody of epic poetry in which the hero descends into Hades, are more or less irrelevant to the discussion here. See Manfred Babeck, 'Epistemons Unterwelsbericht im 30. Kap. des *Pantagruel*, ÉR, 1 (1956), 29-47 and Janis Pallister, 'Three Renaissance Soujourns in 'Hell': Fafeu, Pantagruel, Le Moyen de parvenir', Romance Notes, 17/2 (1976), 199-203.
9 Lauvergnat-Gagnière, pp. 245-47, cites *Farce nouvelle tresbonne et fort joyeuse de la résurrection Jenin à Paulme* as an example.
10 *Lucian*, ed. and trans. by A. M. Harmon and others, 8 vols, (Loeb, 1913-67) IV, pp. 103-05 (all references will be to this edition); Huchon, ed., p. 1329 n.2 and p. 1333, n. 10.
11 This conversion does however take place in *A True Story*, II, 18: 'Diogenes the Cynic had so changed his ways that he not only married Lais the courtesan, but often got up and danced and indulged in tomfoolery when he had had too much', *Lucian*, I, p. 321. If this is a source for Rabelais, it is transposed to his depiction of Epictetus. Alexander and Diogenes are paired in
Greek author is perhaps more influence than source.\textsuperscript{12} The stories and sayings surrounding Diogenes invite such variations and improvisations, the detailed nature of which provides the only viable indications of Rabelais's understanding and use of Cynicism. In the earliest version of the text, the Cynic was the sole philosopher, and he kept predominantly disreputable company, including Pathelin, the hero of the eponymous farce, two fools, Caillette and Triboulet, and Villon, all of whom treat the former ‘gros seigneurs’ in cruel fashion. The Diogenes of the anecdotes fits well with such people, not least in his comic and fool-like behaviour towards Alexander the Great, to which Rabelais alludes by putting them together in Hades. The cruelty of the erstwhile poor towards the former great ones makes the point that, in the real world, violence is generally perpetrated by the powerful on the weak. The danger Diogenes ran in speaking freely to Alexander is an essential element of their encounter, and of all instances of freedom of speech (parrhesia).\textsuperscript{13} In the topsy-turvy underworld, it is appropriate that Diogenes should give Alexander a beating.

In 1534, Epictetus, who was not present in the 1532 edition, joins Diogenes in metamorphosing into a hedonist in hell: ‘Je veiz Epictete […] auecques force Damoizelles se rigolant, beuvant, dansant, faisant en tous cas grande chere, et auprés de luy force escuz au soleil’ (p. 325). This portrait is reminiscent of the representation of Socrates in the prologue of Gargantua, which portrays the philosopher ‘tousjours riant, tousjours beuvant d’autant à un chascun, tousjours se guabelant, tousjours dissimulant son divin scâvoir’ (p. 5).\textsuperscript{14} A large part of the humour here comes from giving philosophers, who generally represent wisdom, down-to-earth or downright disreputable appearances and activities. Such jokes are already present in the anecdotal tradition surrounding many ancient philosophers, one of the most commonplace examples being Thales contemplating the sky, and falling into a well. Diogenes and, to a lesser extent, Socrates, are, however, unusual in having pre-empted these jokes thanks to their

\textit{Dialogues of the Dead}, 13, in which the Cynic prescribes drinking from the river Lethe so that Alexander can forget the grief of leaving his worldly riches behind, \textit{Lucian}, VII, pp. 67-73 (p. 73).
\textsuperscript{12} Lauvergnat-Gagniére, pp. 245-47; Marsh, pp. 71-75 (p. 74).
\textsuperscript{13} See below, Chapter 7, part 2.
willingness to distance themselves from what could be called professional philosophy. For Socrates, this consisted in declarations of ignorance and irony, but the Cynic went much further in mocking the supposed wisdom of his contemporaries, his primary target being Plato, who did not refer to him as 'Socrates gone mad' for nothing.\textsuperscript{15} The place of Socrates and Diogenes in the pantheon of philosophers is also peculiar owing to the fact that no written works survive from either. More importantly, and partly as a result of this, both men unsettle standard notions of what it takes to be a philosopher and what constitutes wisdom. Hence I would argue that Rabelais is attracted by the figures of Socrates and Diogenes not only because the tradition surrounding them has great potential for further comic adaptation, but because comedy was already part of their philosophy. Probably no two other philosophers would have allowed for such playful coupling of the serious and the comic, as Socrates and his Cynic successor. This is also why Bakhtin singles Socrates and Diogenes out as 'hero-ideologues' who stand for free improvisation, not tradition.\textsuperscript{16}

By adding Epictetus to form a pair with Diogenes, Rabelais adds another level of suggestion to his presentation of the Cynic. Diogenes is indirectly associated both with the idealized version of him found in Epictetus and others, and with the infamous beggar-philosopher encountered in Diogenes Laertius. The former image of the Cynic is of course also found in Erasmus's famous adage, 'The Sileni of Alcibiades', which is the principal source of the prologue to \textit{Gargantua}, and which cites Socrates, Diogenes and Epictetus among others as examples of sileni prefiguring Christ.\textsuperscript{17} In his expansion of the silenus metaphor, Erasmus moved from the original opposition (repulsive outside, divine inside) to encompass another (worldly poverty, treasures of the mind). Rabelais converts Erasmus's spiritual riches into material wealth. The reversal of fortunes takes the form of a recognition of moral worth in terms of economic, political and (in the case of Epictetus) sexual success. Alexander's famous comment already shows that

\textsuperscript{14} Screech claims that Rabelais probably interpolated Diogenes into \textit{Pantagruel} at the same time as he was working on this prologue, \textit{Rabelais} (London: Duckworth, 1979), p. 216.
\textsuperscript{15} DL, VI, 54.
\textsuperscript{16} Bakhtin, \textit{The Dialogic Imagination}, pp. 36-38.
\textsuperscript{17} See above, Chapter 2, part 3, section 1.
Diogenes wields a paradoxical kind of power that comes from his fool's licence which allows him to say and do as he pleases insofar as he is free from normal socio-political constraints. Rabelais converts and dramatizes the Cynic's strange authority in his version of the underworld. It is likely that only a small number of Rabelais's wider audience would have known who Diogenes was, or recognized the references to Lucian and Erasmus. They would, however, have been able to place Diogenes and Epictetus in the context of the ceremonial exchange of roles that took place during carnival, and in particular the crowning of fool kings. The emphasis on Diogenes' costume and his stick, which is part of the fool's garb as well as that of the Cynic, all contribute to this impression.18

Despite its brevity, Rabelais's framing of Diogenes here plays with many of the associations of the multifarious Cynic. He is predominantly influenced by Lucian, but there are traces of Erasmus. He links Diogenes above all to contemporary farces and carnival. It is even possible that the change of fortunes of Diogenes and Epictetus is a way of representing the evangelical message that the kingdom of heaven belongs to the poor.19 Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that what Jesus had in mind here was that the poor should end up beating the wealthy with sticks, and it is certainly wrong to argue, as Duval does, that the 'message' of Alexander and Diogenes' role-reversal is primarily evangelical.20 Instead, the reversal in the underworld can be compared to Rabelais's book as a whole, and its use of the tradition of carnival in particular.21 As a 'silens', Diogenes is double-sided by definition. In his prologue of Gargantua Rabelais had already associated his book with a silenus, in the prologue of the Tiers Livre he associates himself with Diogenes.

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Part Two

Diogenes in Corinth: The Prologue of the Tiers Livre

Diogenes is the central figure of this prologue which is among the most studied of all passages in Rabelais.\(^22\) Some critics give helpful introductory characterizations of Diogenes' typical performance, including Thomas Greene who summarizes it as 'irreverent, prankish, hostile to authorities, capriciously and wittily anti-social', and André Tournon who describes it as 'paradoxale, provocatrice, à deviner dans la gesticulation incongrue d’un énergumène'.\(^23\) However, many commentaries on the prologue of the Tiers Livre betray confusion as far as Cynicism is concerned. Such perplexity is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the transmission of Cynicism through non-didactic anecdotes and sayings, as well as through works which attempt to turn the Cynics into Stoic heroes. In fact, among the most influential of the misconceptions about Diogenes is the view that he invariably stood for a Stoic sage for Rabelais and his contemporaries.\(^24\) Indeed, Spanos is so convinced that Diogenes represents a Stoic sage that she neglects to mention that he was a Cynic. Although it is true that the idealized version of Diogenes found in some Stoic writers was current in the sixteenth

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century, notably in Erasmus's 'The Sileni of Alcibiades', it was one of several, often competing, interpretations of the Cynic in currency at the time. I showed above that Rabelais kept more than one possible Diogenes in play in *Pantagruel*. Restricting *a priori* the potential meanings of the Cynic's behaviour to its resemblances to Stoicism would inevitably lead to a distorted picture. Screech in particular is guilty of an unwittingly embarrassed response to Diogenes' paradoxical performance, which he seeks to defuse by associating it with a more acceptable, and easily identifiable, school of thought. His distaste is apparent in his comment that Diogenes was a 'morose hermit revelling in the squalour of his tub and rejecting orthodox morality', a remark which ignores the comedy of Diogenes' performance, an essential aspect of the ancient anecdotes, and of Rabelais's use of them. 25 Similarly, Schwartz claims that the prologue is marked by the 'severe, sombre irony of the Cynic' (p. 90), which is an odd characterization of the amusing philosopher encountered in Diogenes Laertius and in Rabelais. Berry and Weinberg give highly eccentric readings of Diogenes. The former claims that Diogenes stands for 'clarity of mind, sight, the sun' (p. 73) while the latter uses the etymology of Diogenes (god-engendered) to argue that 'Diogenes represents truth in religion, truth in worldly affairs, and ultimately Platonic Absolute Truth, the sun itself' (p. 551). Arguing from the etymology of a historical figure, as opposed to a fictional character like Panurge, is dubious. I would also argue that both Berry and Weinberg give misreadings of the prologue in confusing Cynicism with Platonism when the two are radically opposed.

All of the above misreadings follow in one way or another from a failure to recognize that Rabelais identifies with Diogenes' seriocomic performance, rather than a philosophical position *per se*. Rabelais uses the figure of Diogenes to represent his book to bewilder and provoke his readership. In this, he was unusually successful, at least as far as modern criticism is concerned. He was also faithful to Diogenes' performance as related in the Cynic tradition, in which we see the Cynic acting in comic,  

24 Screech, 'Some Stoic Elements in Rabelais's Religious Thought', p. 78; Desrosiers-Bonin, p. 50; Spanos, pp. 34-36; see above, Chapter 1, part 3.
bizarre and outrageous ways to force his audience to make the effort to understand his behaviour. This odd way of doing philosophy invariably invites differing interpretations, as does Rabelais's text. The seriocomic is integral to both Rabelais's book and Diogenes' performance in the Cynic tradition, and consists in what Defaux describes, in an insightful commentary on the prologue of *Gargantua*, as a 'volonté délibérée de dérouter le lecteur'. Although Defaux does not refer explicitly to either the seriocomic or to Diogenes, his comments on Rabelais's use of a comic mask of Alcofribas in *Gargantua* apply to the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* in which the learned voice of Dr Rabelais is invariably drowned out by the rhetorical barracking of Alcofribasian narrator. Furthermore, in the course of the prologue, Rabelais dons the comic mask of Diogenes. Duval usefully argues that the *Tiers Livre* as a whole is a 'Diogenic performance designed to implicate the reader directly in the problem of interpretation and judgment'. This makes Diogenes an apt central figure for the prologue, without implying that Cynicism dominates the *Tiers Livre*. There is, however, a trivial sense in which all works of literature, and indeed of philosophy, involve their readers in hermeneutics. Nonetheless, Duval's comment is still helpful because Diogenes' actions, like Rabelais's book, not only make no pretence of closure nor of transparency but they also highlight the demands and difficulties of interpretation. This is particularly true of the *Tiers Livre*, which dramatizes the act of interpretation in Panurge's consultations. The analogy between Diogenes' performance and Rabelais's book is an open one, so it would be wrong to appeal to Diogenes to explain too much. Duval's claim that Pantagruel is a 'Diogenic hero' because he counters Panurge's folly with sarcasm is disingenuous, because Pantagruel's seriousness is far removed from Diogenes (p. 84). More generally, the relevance of the prologue to the 'design' of the *Tiers Livre* is not my primary concern here. Diogenes sets the tone of the book, but he does not explain it. The reading of the prologue to be offered here is by definition one of several possible views of a text which flaunts its own inexhaustibility.

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Diogenes is introduced directly and dramatically in the first line of the prologue, but the bumbling narrator appears to veer off the subject equally rapidly:

Bonnes gens, Beuveurs tresillustres, et vous Goutteux tresprecieux, veistez vous onques Diogenes, le philosophe Cynic? Si l'avez veu, vous n'aviez perdu la veue: ou je suis vrayement forissu d'intelligence, et de sens logical. C'est belle chose voir la clairte du (vin et escuz) Soleil. J'en demande à l'aveugle né tant renommé par les tressacres bibles: lequel ayant option de requerir tout ce qu'il vouldroit, par le commandement de celluy qui est tout puissant, et le dire duquel est en un moment par effect representé, rien plus ne demada que voir. (p. 345)

The association between the Cynic and the privileged readers of Rabelais's book, the 'Beuveurs' and the 'Goutteux', is immediate. This is an early indication of how Rabelais uses the same kind of techniques as in the description of the underworld in Pantagruel to present Diogenes in a way that makes him easily understandable to those in his audience who may never have heard of the philosopher. These people are, however, kept waiting to hear more about Diogenes, as the narrator proceeds to digress onto the subjects of sight and wine. The reference to Ecclesiastes ('C'est belle chose veoir la clairte du (vin et escuz) Soleil'), complete with Freudian slip, alludes to the famous encounter with Alexander, in which the Cynic asked the king to get out of the way of the sun. It is hard to say how many of the 'Beuveurs' and 'Goutteux' would have recognized this reference, but such a play on levels of understanding is typical of Rabelais, as was at least partly clear from his presentation of Diogenes in the underworld. Screech also sees a link between Diogenes and the blind man 'in their common acceptance of basic priorities', which the blind man shows more definitively than the Cynic by not asking for riches or power but for sight. This is an odd reading, not least because there is nothing basic about a blind man wishing for, and being granted, the power of sight. It presumably forms part of Screech's wish to present the Tiers Livre as a work of 'Christian Stoicism, Christian Cynicism and above all Christian scepticism' (p. 216). The difficulty with this claim, at least as far as Cynicism is
concerned, is that it does not specify in what ‘Christian Cynicism’ consists. Certainly Rabelais does not use Diogenes against Christianity, but nor does he provide an obviously Christianized version of the Cynic, of the kind found in Erasmus’s ‘The Sileni of Alcibiades’, as well as in many contemporary compilations and encyclopedias, as was seen in Chapters Three and Four above.32 Moreover, the Diogenes encountered in the prologue is not the austere, serene and Stoical figure the title of ‘Christian Cynic’ may imply.

Following his digression on sight and wine, the narrator finally returns to the philosopher who was introduced in the first line:

Si veu ne l’avez (comme facilement je suis induict à croire), pour le moins avez vous ouy de luy parler. Car par l’aér et tout ce ciel est son bruyt et nom jusques à present resté memorable et celebre assez […] Si n’en avez ouy parler, de luy vous veulz presentement une histoire narrer, pour entrer en vin, (beuvez donques) et propous, (escoutez donques). Vous adverissant (affin que ne soiez en simplesse pippez comme gens mescreans) qu’en son temps il feut philosophre rare, et joyeux entre mille. S’il avoit quelques imperfections, aussi avez vous, aussi avons nous. Rien n’est, sinon Dieu, perfaict. Si est ce que Alexandre le grand, quoy qu’il eust Aristoteles pour præcepteur et domestic, l’avoit en telle estimation, qu’il soubyait, en cas que Alexandre ne feust, estre Diogenes Sinopien. (pp. 345-46)

In the prologue of Gargantua, Socrates was described ‘sans controverse prince des philosophes’, whose grotesque appearance concealed ‘entendement plus que humain’. Diogenes is presented differently: he is merely ‘celebre assez’ with ‘quelques imperfections’ but he is also a ‘philosophe rare, et joyeux entre mille’. For Rabelais, Diogenes’ reputation does not rest on some kind of divine wisdom, but on his humour and what could be called his humanity. Apologies for Diogenes tend to idealize the Cynic, but Rabelais reverses the process. Diogenes is a philosopher by virtue of his being ‘joyeux’, and having imperfections, like everyone else (‘aussi avez vous, aussi avons nous’), which is perhaps a nod towards his disreputable and shameless antics. Unlike Erasmus, for whom Diogenes was a silenus like Socrates and Christ, Rabelais suggests that Diogenes’ philosophy and his strange behaviour are one and the same and not opposed, as the appearance of a silenus is to its inside. This makes what

32 The term is also adopted by Kinney, who takes ‘Christian Cynicism’ to be a fusion of ‘freedom and unfreedom’, The Cynics, p. 314. This is misleading, since overtly Christian readings of
Erasmus describes as Alexander’s ‘divine observation’ all the more paradoxical, since Alexander would not be wishing for superhuman wisdom, but a kind of humanity which Diogenes exemplifies by his bizarre but basic lifestyle. Furthermore, such ‘humanity’ is not found in the ‘professional’ philosophy of Aristotle. This stage of Rabelais’s presentation of Diogenes is in the tradition of the majority of sayings and stories preserved by Diogenes Laertius, which does indeed often show the Cynic to be a comic character, a ‘philosophe rare, et joyeux entre mille’. It is this aspect of Diogenes that Rabelais chooses to emphasize, and not his supposed Stoic indifference, nor his asceticism.

The story Rabelais tells about Diogenes comes from Lucian, How to Write History, possibly also via Budé’s preface to his Annotationes in Pandectas (first edition, 1507) and it concerns the Cynic’s reaction to the fervent preparations for war by the Corinthians. A very brief version of the anecdote is also found in Achille Bocchi’s translation of Plutarch’s Vita Ciceronis (1508), in which he claims to imitate Diogenes in order to enhance his literary prowess. Erasmus’s adage, ‘Volvitur dolium’ (IV, 3, 6), characterizes barrel-rolling as a kind of foolishness, for the barrel, unlike the wise man, is easily moved, and Diogenes’ actions appear to be foolish. Rabelais’s version of the anecdote is, however, substantially different from his predecessors, not least in its length. This is first seen in the description of the Corinthians’ activities, which are described by lists of military actions and items that are comic in virtue of their sheer length and technical detail. It is likely that Rabelais is alluding to the work undertaken on the defences of Paris in 1544, when fears that Charles V might mount an invasion of the French capital were rife. The preparations for war in both Paris and Corinth proved

Diogenes tend to play down his freedom.

33 DL, VI, 32 and Plutarch, ‘Life of Alexander’, XIV, 2-3. For Erasmus’s frequent use of this saying, see above, Chapter 2, part 3, section 1.


36 Huchon, ed., pp. 1384-65, n.5.
to be unnecessary. Diogenes reacts to the Corinthians' actions in characteristically peculiar and spectacular fashion:

Diogenes, les voyant en telle ferveur mesnaige remuer et n'estant par les magistratz employé à chose aucune faire, contempla par quelques jours leur contenence sans mot dire: puys, comme excité d'esprit Martial, ceignit son palle en escharpe, recoursa ses manches jusques es coubtes, se troussa en cuilleur de pommes, bailla à un sien compaignon vieulx sa bezasse, ses livres et opistographes, feit hors la ville tirant vers le Cranie (qui est une colline et promontoire lez Corinthe) une belle esplanade: y roulla le tonneau fictil qui pour maison luy estoit contre les injures du ciel, et, en grande vehemence d'esprit desployant ses braz, le tournoit, viroit, brouilloit [...] (p. 347)

There is a good deal of detail in this part of the prologue's presentation of Diogenes, far more than in Lucian's version of the story: 'Diogenes [...] belted up his philosopher's cloak and very busily by himself rolled the crock in which, as it happens, he was living up and down Cornel Hill' (3). Rabelais's adaptation of the anecdote combines elements of the Cynic tradition with his own inventions. The 'traditional' Diogenes is seen in his doubled-up cloak and in his wallet, both of which are essential elements of Cynic garb. More famous than Cynic dress is the barrel which serves as Diogenes' home 'contre les injures du ciel'. This evocative phrase suggests that the Cynic's tub is a place of refuge, which in turn contrasts with the bizarre uses to which it is eventually put.

Rabelais's own variations on the 'traditional' version of Diogenes are seen in his comparing the philosopher to a 'cuilleur de pommes', an idiomatic expression which derives from the dishevelled appearance of apple-pickers. Describing Diogenes in this way is part of Rabelais's 'popular' rendering of the Cynic. It is also an echo of Panurge's entry in Pantagruel, 9, when Pantagruel takes his future companion for a 'cueilleur de pommes du pais du Perche' (p. 246). Unlike Gray, I do not believe there are any causal links between Diogenes and Panurge, but this echo points to the broad resemblances between the two: both are disreputable, fool-like in their humour and they are both

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37 Lucian, VI.
38 See DL, VI, 22.
39 See DL, VI, 23 and Les Dictz morauxx des philosophes: 'Diogenes gissoit en ung tonnel qui navoit qu'ung fons lequel il tournoit a l'avantage du vent et du soleil ainsi qu'il luy plaisoit sans avoir autre maison' (cited above, Chapter 2, part 2, section 2).
rhetorical tricksters trading chiefly in the coin of their own personalities.40 Further improvisation on Rabelais’s part is found in his giving Diogenes books and writing-tablets, thereby characterizing him as a reader and writer. There is no mention of these objects in Lucian’s version of the story, and one saying in particular in Diogenes Laertius’s biography shows Diogenes to have been suspicious of reading and writing, even though he is reported to have written a great many works himself.41 Making Diogenes a reader and writer contributes to the contrast developed throughout the passage between the Cynic’s original calm contemplation, and his subsequent furious tub-tumbling. It also adds to the impression of Diogenes as a seriocomic character, who expresses his philosophy through humorous performance. This final point is crucial, since it gives an excellent indication as to why Rabelais identifies himself as a writer, and his book, with the Cynic.

Although the above details are essential to understanding what Rabelais is doing in his adaptation of Lucian, by far the most striking difference between the two is Rabelais’s contribution of a comic list of over sixty rhyming verbs, all actions performed on the barrel. Schwartz follows Rigolot in contrasting the predominantly useful, referential terms applied to the activities of the Corinthians with the self-evidently incoherent ‘festival du verbe’ (p. 101) of Diogenes’ performance with his tub, although neither mentions that the description of the Corinthians’ activities ends with a series of lewd double-entendres, which already adds a pathetic touch to their supposed usefulness.42 Schwartz’s view of the barrel as ‘an emblem of the freedom of the signifier to challenge the authority of referentiality’ (p. 99) is, however, not wholly true. Rabelais’s description of Diogenes’ antics with his barrel is literally meaningless but this comic

41 See DL, VI 48: ‘Hegesias having asked him to lend him one of his writings, he said, “You are a simpleton, Hegesias; you do not choose painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true training and would apply yourself to written rules”’, cited in Essais, I, 26, 168. On Diogenes as a writer, see Branham, pp. 83-84, nn.8-9, and above, Chapter 4, part 2, n.30.
42 Rigolot, pp. 101-02; Schwartz, p. 93.
verbal craziness points to the futility of the Corinthians' supposedly useful activities. In a way, then, Rabelais's list of verbs imitates a characteristic trait of Diogenes' rhetoric in which an apparently ridiculous action (such as searching, with a lighted lantern in the middle of the day, for a man, or entering a theatre when everyone else is leaving), is seen to have a serious meaning. The sense of Diogenes' barrel-rolling becomes clear in his own explanation:

[Diogenes] le devalloit de mont à val [...] puys de val en mont le rapportoit, comme Sisyphus faict sa pierre: tant que peu s'en faillit, qu'il ne le defoncast. Ce voyant quelqu'un de ses amis, luy demanda quelle cause le mouvoit à son corps, son esprit, son tonneau ainsi tortmenter. Auquel respondit le philosophe qu'à aultre office n'estant pour la republicque employê, il en ceste façon son tonneau tempestoit pour, entre ce peuple tant fervent et occupé, n'estre veu seul cessateur et ocieux. (p. 348)

Most critics agree that Diogenes' intention is to mock the Corinthians. Desrosiers-Bonin is an exception to the rule, but her argument is unconvincing not least because it inadvertently calls the philosopher's sanity into question. She also claims, incorrectly, that the story of Diogenes' barrel-rolling is found in Seneca and Juvenal, when in fact these are merely references to Diogenes' barrel tout court. In my view, her mistakes derive from a wish to take the seriocomic seriously, when in fact it is neither wholly serious, nor purely comic. Rabelais makes the uselessness of the Cynic's actions transparent by comparing them to Sisyphus's rock-rolling. This detail is absent from Lucian's version of the story: 'When one of his friends asked: "Why are you doing that Diogenes?" he replied: "I'm rolling the crock so as not to be thought the one idle man in the midst of all these workers"' (3). Crucially, Rabelais has also added the notion that Diogenes did what he did because he was not otherwise employed by the republic. The question of Diogenes' relation to the society in which he lives is not raised in Lucian. The importance of this addition becomes apparent when the prologue shifts back to the voice of the bumbling, drunken narrator:

Je pareillement, quoy que soys hors d'effroy, ne suis toutesfoys hors d'esmoy, de moy voyant n'estre faict aucun pris digne d'œuvre, et

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45 Rabelais et l'humanisme civil, pp. 213-19 (p. 214, n.4).
This passage marks the point where the prologue moves from narrating the story of the barrel to associating it with the writing of the *Tiers Livre*. The over-blown, comic character of the narrator’s rhetoric here only becomes fully apparent, as is often the case with Rabelais, when read aloud. Ostentatious assonance and spoonerisms make it impossible to take the narrator’s claim to help the kingdom of France entirely seriously. Rabelais is doing something different from Lucian, who relates the anecdote to his work thus:

> So in my own case [...] to avoid being the only mute in such a polyphonic time, pushed around open-mouthed without a word like an extra in a comedy, I thought it a good idea to roll my barrel as best I could; not to produce a history or even merely chronicle the events - I’m not so bold as that: don’t be afraid that I should go that far. I know the danger of rolling it over rocks, particularly a poorly baked little barrel like mine. Just as soon as it hits a tiny piece of stone we shall have to pick up the pieces.

Branham’s commentary on Lucian’s use of the Diogenes anecdote is illuminating. He stresses the fact that *How to Write History* is a serious historiographical essay, but that Lucian’s identification with Diogenes’ irony means that his reader cannot take him entirely seriously, even here. This is typical of Lucian, and of his use of seriocomic writing, which constitutes ‘a flexible set of literary methods to which the disorienting and subversive effects of humor are instrumental’. This definition of the seriocomic applies to Rabelais’s presentation of Diogenes in particular, and to much of his book in general. Budé’s version of the barrel story is less obviously ironic than Lucian, but it also expresses fear that the ‘dolium forte fictile ac fragile’ might be broken by the stones that lie in its way. Budé is, however, more troubled about potential criticism than Lucian, who satirizes his contemporaries. In fact, Budé rolls his barrel so as not to appear lazy and be reproached:

> So when I thought some programme ought to be entered into for the leisure of a man endowed with some ability, or without doubt initiated into

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46 Thomas Greene claims that there is nothing in the praise of war that immediately follows this passage that allows it to be taken ironically, but it is also undermined by a flashy display of rhetoric, ‘The Unity of the *Tiers Livre*’, p. 295.

these literary works, I determined to roll a barrel, lest I should be believed to have withered away in idleness and sloth, while others were busying themselves. Besides, I did not want to be depressed in domestic gloom, a charge which men by no means despicable had held against me more than once.48

Budé, unlike Rabelais and Lucian, does not appear to apply Diogenes’ irony to his own activity as a writer. He introduces the idea of idleness, which brings the Cynic’s situation closer to his own. Like Lucian, however, he seems to employ the story of Diogenes to discuss writing when so many others are keeping themselves occupied (‘rem attentissimis’). Rabelais, however, is alone in explicitly using the story to raise the issue of a writer’s place in society, particularly in a time of war.49 This makes the analogy between Diogenes and Rabelais stronger than that between Diogenes and Lucian or Budé. This is for the simple reason that the circumstances of Rabelais and Diogenes are more alike: both have a decision to make about what to do in the face of the fervent military activities of their fellow countrymen, and not merely in the face of the writing about those activities. This raises the question as to whether Rabelais, like Diogenes, intends to mock his compatriots’ military zeal. Plainly, his assistance is of no practical benefit:

Par doncques n’estre adscript et en ranc mis des nostres en partie offensive, qui me ont estimé trop imbecille et impotent: de l’autre qui est defensive n’estre employé aulcunement, feust ce portant hotte, cachant crotte, ployant rotte, ou cassant motte, tout m’estoit indifferent: impute à honte plus que mediocre estre veu spectateur ocieux de tant vaillans, disers, et chevalereux personnaiges, qui en veue et spectacle de toute Europe jouent ceste insigne fable et Tragicque comedie: ne me esvertuer de moy mesmes, et non y consommer ce rien mon tout, qui me restoit [...] Prins ce choys et election, ay pensa ne faire exercice inutile et importun si je remuois mon tonneau Diogenic, qui seul m’est resté du naufrage faict par le passé on far de Mal’encontre. A ce triballement de tonneau que feray je en vostre advis? Par la vierge qui se rebrasse, je ne scay encores. (pp. 348-49)

48 Omnia opera, ed. by Coelius Curio (Basel: 1557; repr. Famborough: Gregg Press, 1966), III, sig. a 3": ‘Sic & ego cum otii rationenem reddendam esse censerem homini quidem aliqua facultate praedito, aut certe litteris his initiato, dolium volvere institui, ne desidia aut inertia emarcuisse crederer, aliis ad rem attentissimis, atque in umbraculis domesticis animum despondisse, quod mihi a viris haud spermendis non semel objectum est’; Rabelais also uses the adjective ‘fictil’, suggesting Budé was at least one of his sources.
49 Surprisingly few critics have recognized this difference between Lucian and Budé on the one hand, and Rabelais on the other. Floyd Gray, ‘Structure and Meaning in the Prologue to the Tiers Livre’, incorrectly claims that all three use the anecdote in the same way, and that consequently Rabelais is primarily interested in ‘literary effort and importance’, p. 59. Critics who have perceived the difference include Lauvergnat-Gagnière, p. 238; Duval, The Design of Rabelais’s ‘Tiers Livre de Pantagruel’, p. 19; Gauna, The Rabelaisian Mythologies, p. 123.
As in Lucian, Diogenes' barrel has come to represent his book. Rabelais's barrel-book is however not a delicate clay model but a refuge from the portentous-sounding 'naufrage faict par le passé on far de Mal'encontre', in much the same way as Diogenes' tub was his home 'contre les injures du ciel'. This reference to a shipwreck has remained obscure, but the bathetic impact of swearing by the virgin who lifts up her skirts is plain enough. The narrator proceeds to drink for inspiration. His barrel-book is suddenly full of wine:

Puys doncques que tell est ou ma sort ou ma destinée: (car à chacun n'est outroyé entrer et habiter Corinth) ma deliberation est servir et es uns et es autres: tant s'en fault que je reste cessateur et inutile. Envers les vastadours, ce que feirent Neptune et Apollo en Troie [...] je serviray les massons, je mettray bouillir our les massons, et le past terminé au son de ma musette mesureray la musarderie des musars [...] Envers les guerroyans je voy de nouveau percer mon tonneau. Et de la traicte [...] leurs tirer [...] un guaylant tiercin, et consecutivement un joyeulx quart de sentences Pantagruelicques. Par moy licite vous sera les appeller Diogenicques. (pp. 349-50)

The presence of Diogenes is felt throughout this passage, from the commonplace yet highly appropriate saying about Corinth to the use of the word 'cessateur', which was also employed by the Cynic. More importantly, Rabelais explicitly identifies his book, and 'Pantagruelism', with Diogenes, in a passage cited at the outset of this chapter. Some critics have been confused or embarrassed by the association between Rabelais and Diogenes. The primary link between Diogenes and Rabelais's book is however fairly obvious when due attention is paid to Rabelais's adaptation of Cynic stories, and it lies in performance or what Tournon calls 'simulacres'. In the same way as Diogenes performed in front of the Corinthians, so Rabelais now proposes to perform for his contemporaries, with his book-barrel and his bagpipes, the latter being a paradigmatically plebeian instrument. Rabelais's performance is of course less direct than that of Diogenes, since it is a written one. Nonetheless, Rabelais gives such a bravura display of his linguistic and rhetorical abilities throughout the prologue that his

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50 Terence Cave, Pré-histoires I, p. 147, analyses this passage in terms of its use of the first person. Although it is true to say that the allegory of the shipwreck inevitably refracts the 'je' evoked here, it is even more clearly undermined by bathos.
51 Huchon, ed., p. 1368, n.9, cited above; Screech, 'Some Stoic elements in Rabelais's religious thought', p. 78.
52 Tournon, <<En sens agile>>, p. 54.
language incessantly calls attention to itself, as a performance of sorts, and indeed the strong traces of orality in the prologue as a whole suggest it was designed to be read aloud. Rabelais also performs by virtue of donning the mask of Diogenes. Many other critics have recognized Rabelais's use of the language of the mountebank from the outset of the prologue, and his use of theatrical language ('ceste insigne fable et Tragicque comedie').

There are two main ways of taking Rabelais's Diogenic performance. Firstly, it can be viewed as wholly negative and mocking, cynical with a small 'c'. This is how Coleman reads the prologue:

> by aligning himself with the activities of Diogenes whose contempt for public affairs and refusal to involve himself must have been well known to him, Rabelais is indicating his unwillingness to be committed at the political and religious level and declaring instead his unique commitment to his writing.

Coleman is, however, doubly incorrect. She is wrong about Diogenes, who expressed his philosophy through witty performance, thereby inevitably involving himself in the affairs of his audience. She is also wrong about Rabelais, for if he had been uniquely interested in his writing, he could have treated the barrel anecdote in the same way as Lucian or Budé, but instead he chose to raise the issue of the writer's role in society. Rabelais seems to recognize that in writing an author inevitably engages him or herself ideologically. This fact is particularly salient in troubled times. However, like Diogenes, Rabelais does not explain the point of his seriocomic performance, so the nature of his self-conscious commitment is never entirely obvious. At face value, Rabelais is a warmongerer, but the constant presence of irony and bathos makes any such reading of the prologue hard to sustain. Insofar as it is possible to characterize the nature of Rabelais's ideological engagement at all, it appears to consist in a commitment to joyousness in troubled times. This appears to be the case in a celebrated passage in which, following the Ptolemy story, which expresses anxiety that 'mon thesaur soit charbons' (p. 351), Rabelais compares his book-barrel to a cornucopia:

> De ce point expedié, à mon tonneau je retourne. Sus à ce vin compaigns [...] Si bon ne vous semble, laissez le [...] Et paour ne ayez,

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53 Bakhtin, p. 171; Berry, p. 75; Freccero, p. 142; Fanlo, p. 11.
que le vin faille, comme feist es nopces de Cana en Galilée. Autant que vous en tireray par la dille, autant en entonneray par le bondon. Ainsi demeurera le tonneau inexpuisible. Il a source vive, et vene perpetuelle. Tel estoit le brevaige contenu dedans la couppe de Tantalus representé par figure entre les saiges Brachmanes: telle estoit en Iberie la montaigne de sel tant celebrée par Caton: tel estoit le rameau d'or sacré à la déeze soubsterraine, tant celebré par Virgile. C'est un vray Cornucopie de joyeuseté et raillerie. Si quelque foys vous semble estre expusé jusques à la lie, non pourtant sera il à sec. Bon espoir y gist au fond, comme en la bouteille de Pandora: non desespoir, comme on bussart des Danaides. (pp. 351-52)

Cave's commentary on this passage has practically become a critical commonplace. He notes that the passage appears to perform what it maintains in offering a cornucopia of examples. Diogenes, a 'philosophe rare, et joyeux entre mille', would be a suitable exemplar for a book which is 'un vray Cornucopie de joyeuseté et raillerie'. This straightforward reading is, however, troubled by the presence of counter-examples. Moreover, as Cave points out, two of the positive examples, the cup of Tantalus, and Pandora's box, appear to imply the opposite of the cornucopia, since the former is full but inaccessible, and the latter is a symbol of deceit and evil. In fact, a curious all-or-nothing logic is found elsewhere in the second half of the prologue, in the reference to 'ce rien mon tout, qui me restoit' (p. 349) and the narrator's fear that his treasure might turn out to be coal (p. 351). I would argue that Diogenes' barrel is a particularly appropriate emblem for this movement between plenitude and emptiness. This is particularly apparent in the meeting of Alexander, who seemingly has everything, and Diogenes, who appears to have nothing, apart from his barrel 'contre les injures du ciel' (p. 347). However, in a carnivalesque inversion avant la lettre, it is the Cynic, answering to nature as opposed to culture, who usurps the king.

Cave argues that Rabelais's barrel, which is all that was left to him following the 'naufrage fait par le passé on far de Mal'encontre' (p. 349) is like Panurge's codpiece, which was 'son dernier refuge contre tous naufrages d'adversité' (p. 372). Both represent the falling away from an imagined ideal of plenitude ('le tonneau inexpuisible'). Panurge's rhetoric in the early chapters of the *Tiers Livre* in particular, in his running of the 'chastellain de Salmiguondin' (ch. 2) and in his praise of debts (chs 3-
4), can be said to be premised on the notion of a cornucopia, as if Panurge had endless resources at his disposal, when in fact all he has is language. Furthermore, when he stops wearing his codpiece (ch. 7), to have no mediation between himself and nature, he surrenders himself to what Cave calls ‘empty repetition, associated with self-expenditure, sterility, and non-performance’ (p. 192). Cave is right to argue that Rabelais’s book, in the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* and elsewhere, is self-consciously aware that, despite the endless capacity of language to generate itself, it can never generate the things it talks about, so that all turns out to be nothing.

Greene proposes a viable alternative to Cave’s pessimistic reading, which consists in reversing the poles of his argument. Instead of starting with a mythical cornucopia that turns out to be empty, it would perhaps be more faithful to Rabelais’s text to start with an emptiness which is partly filled, or to look at things from Diogenes’ point of view, rather than Alexander’s. The cornucopia is of course an absurdity in the normal order of things, but Rabelais associates it with the time of carnival, a time of ‘joyeuseté et raillerie’, when habitual lack is symbolically suspended and notions of abundance are entertained. Rabelais’s presentation of the cornucopia emphasizes joyousness. Even Panurge’s management of the ‘chastellain de Salmiguondin’ is initially portrayed in an indulgent way, the festive mood apparent in the ‘festins joyeulx’ (p. 357), all of which recalls the temporary rule of a fool-monarch. Diogenes is presented as being on the side of carnival both as the ‘philosophe rare, et joyeux’ of the prologue and as the fool-monarch found in *Pantagruel*, 30. When Rabelais associates his book with Diogenes, he is therefore associating it with this kind of joyousness, which can also be seen as an appeal to the reader to take his book in the right spirit of ‘Pantagruelisme, moienant laquelle jamais en mauvaise partie ne prendront choses quelconques’ (p. 351). Textual joyousness, represented by Diogenes’ barrel, is in part a defensive gesture to ward off dangerous interpretations, and by extension a place of

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refuge 'contre les injures du ciel' or from the 'naufrage faict par le passé on far de Mal'encontre'. These phrases point to a painful reality outside the text, which is in a sense unknowable, but which can nonetheless serve as reminders that Rabelais is being bold in turning to his book for refuge at a time when men were burnt for their books.

The *Tiers Livre* was placed on the list of proscribed books by the Sorbonne, along with *Gargantua* and *Pantagruel*, at the end of 1546, despite the fact that it had a royal *Privilege*. According to Screech, the risks Rabelais ran in publishing the *Tiers Livre* in Paris are unclear, although Jean du Bellay's secretary, François Bribart, who had offered Rabelais assistance in his secularization, was burnt at the stake in Paris in 1545. By March 1546, Rabelais left Paris for Metz, then a safe, Imperial free city. A letter from Sturm claims that 'the times' have driven Rabelais out of France, but the precise reasons why Rabelais found himself in trouble remain obscure. Although Screech is in a sense justified to say that the *Tiers Livre* is in general a confident book, its prologue is not only often defensive but it also conveys fears about the reception of the book and strange references to what may have been personal suffering. Hence, it is fair to say that, when Rabelais raises the issue of the writer's role in society, in identifying his book with Diogenes' performance, he is making a courageous claim to joyousness even at times of hardship and conflict. Bakhtin helpfully describes the prologue as a whole as protecting 'the rights of laughter which must prevail even in the most serious historic struggle' (p. 179).

The other side to Rabelais's defence of laughter is to attack enemies of 'joyeuseté'. Here again he dons the mask of Diogenes, who is famed for his contempt for those who failed to live in the right way. In a stream of abuse addressed to the various critics of his book, Rabelais instructs them, in a clear echo of Diogenes' famous encounter with Alexander, to get 'hors de mon Soleil'. He also proposes to beat them: 'Voyez cy le baston que Diogenes par testament ordonna estre prés luy posé après sa

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60 DL, VI, 38 and Plutarch, 'Life of Alexander, XIV, 2-3.
mort, pour chasser et esrener ces larves bustuaires, et mastins Cerbericques'. In Cicero, Diogenes’ remark is a joke to show how little he cares about what happens to his dead body. Rabelais, in taking the saying out of context, emphasizes its folly. This concentration on foolish-wisdom is one of the predominant aspects of Rabelais’s characterization of Diogenes throughout the prologue. It is often noted that the *Tiers Livre* is the first book in the series to which Rabelais put his own name. Rabelais chooses to use this text to explore the complex and dangerous question of his role as a writer in society. Putting on the mask of Diogenes is in part a defensive gesture, making the nature of his commitment deliberately ambiguous. Nonetheless, Rabelais’s choice of Diogenes to represent himself and his book is not an innocent one. It is not as if any philosopher chosen at random could have been used to the same effect. This is because Diogenes’ performance, as seen in Diogenes Laertius and in passages of Lucian, constitutes a radical, and more often than not humorous, form of self-creation in opposition to normative values. Since Diogenes turned his life into a work of art, his life-story is itself ripe for literary adaptation. This is seen in Rabelais’s considerable improvisation on themes found in Lucian, Diogenes Laertius and Cicero, as well as in his own inventions. While it would be misleading to say Rabelais was himself a neo-Cynic, he clearly saw parallels between his writing and Diogenes’ performance. Not only are they both seriocomic and outrageous, but they also require a kind of engaged independence from the normal activities of society, particularly when that society is at war. Diogenes, his barrel and Rabelais’s book are presented as partaking in a joyousness which is reminiscent of carnival and portrayed as being both a feature of Rabelais’s writing and a requirement of reading Rabelais. This joyousness is defensive in seeking to restrict certain attitudes and the readings which follow from them, but it also affirms everyone’s right to imagine plenty at times of lack, to laugh during troubled times, and to envisage a reversal of the normal order of things.

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Other Cynic Sayings and Anecdotes in Rabelais

There are no other major references to the Cynic tradition in Rabelais, but what small use there is gives further indications which are helpful for understanding his use of Cynicism. Diogenes does not reappear in the *Tiers Livre*, although Rondibilis does refer to one of his sayings in his consultation with Panurge (p. 450). More importantly, Panurge resorts to a discussion of Cynic sex in his discussion of the sibyl's judgement on his dilemma. Panurge gives the following explanation as to why so many ancient authors require Venus's fruit to be 'secretement et furtivement cuilly':

Pour ce que la chosette faicte a l'emblée, entre deux huys, à travers les degrez derriere la tapisserie, en tapinois, sus un fagot desroté, plus plaist à la déesse de Cypre, (et en suys là, sans préjudice de meilleur advis) que faicte en veue du Soleil, à la Cynique, ou entre les precieux conopées [...] (pp. 406-07)

This passing reference is a further indication that the Cynic practice of public sex was something of a commonplace. I showed above that the topic of Cynic shamelessness was a preferred *topos* within early modern miscellanies, including those of Rhodiginus, Breslay, Du Verdier and Guyon. Rabelais's comic portrayal of Cynic sex is, however, closest to that found in Montaigne. It is also proof that the meaning of the word 'Cynique' retained its ancient meaning at this time. Diogenes does reappear in the *Quart Livre* in two brief, comic episodes, both of which are drawn from Diogenes Laertius. On both occasions, it is Pantagruel who cites the Cynic. This could be seen as lending Diogenes some credibility, or, more likely, giving Pantagruel some humour. The first story, in which Diogenes sits by the target while a bad archer is firing arrows, is in the spirit of the foolish-wise performance of the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* (pp. 660-61). Diogenes' saying on the right time to dine (for the rich man when he is hungry, for the poor man when he can) is cited in one of Pantagruel's lists of classical

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62 *Essais*, II, 12, 584; see below, Chapter 7, part 1.
commonplaces (p. 690). This handful of passing references to Cynicism illustrates again that Rabelais's knowledge of the Cynic tradition was fairly extensive. Rabelais consistently presents Cynicism and its most famous exponent as being 'joyeux'. He does not give an obviously Christianized or Stoicized version of Diogenes at any stage of his book. In *Pantagruel*, and particularly in the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*, Rabelais combines elements of the Cynic tradition with his own improvisation and invention to create an amusing and paradoxical Diogenic performance of his own.

**Part Four**

**Rolling out the Barrel: Other Versions of the Corinthian Anecdote**

The story of Diogenes rolling his barrel soon found its way into other works, both in prologues and elsewhere. These versions show how commonplace this anecdote became, and they demonstrate the adaptability of the Cynic's performance. They also give a good indication of how the story was understood by Rabelais's contemporaries. It is surprising, therefore, that these works have remained to all intents untouched by Rabelais specialists. The following is a list, and brief analysis, of instances of the craze for tub-tumbling.

The dedication of Antoine Mizauld's *Planetologia* (1551) to Charles de Lorraine contains a partial translation of Rabelais's version of the anecdote. Having described the Corinthians' activities at greater length than Lucian, but not to the same extent as Rabelais, he goes on to describe the Cynic's performance, and to associate it with his own writing:

> They say that in the daytime Diogenes left to one side his philosophy, his felt cap and his cloak, and rubbed his wrinkled forehead above his eyebrows with his thumb. His long hair was white and uncombed, and besides he had a ragged beard hanging down in front; his arms were covered with hair and his nails were very long. He would roll his barrel (which he called his palace, changing his position according to the weather) up and down a hill near the city. For several days he would roll it back and forth and up and down. When the bystanders wondered at this, and asked him why he wore himself out with this novel and unaccustomed labour, he replied, 'Lest I should be the only idle person among so many workers.' This is indeed a saying worthy of so great a philosopher. And when I heard about this, it made me a man without

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64 DL, VI, 40.
doubt; and strongly reminded me of my duty. For when I saw all the most learned men deserve well of literature and posterity, by busily reading, writing and teaching; by happily striving against ignorance with Palladian stratagems; by continually drawing up new lines of battle against that same ignorance, which would attack that ignorance and its devoted followers both with edge and point, under the guidance of most distinguished generals. I thought that, insignificant as I was, the reward of my work would be to join them in the middle of the battlefield; and that I should not be the only loiterer among a crowd of brilliantly fighting men (as Diogenes said).\(^{66}\)

It is clear that Mizauld knows Lucian's version of the anecdote since he quotes a phrase from Lucian (αὐω κοῦ κατω). Unlike his predecessors, Mizauld chooses to emphasize Diogenes' appearance, which is that of a bizarre, unkempt, tramp-like figure. This image fits well with his odd behaviour with the barrel but it clashes comically with the claim that he is so great a philosopher. It would be hard to take any remark of such an obviously disreputable individual seriously, let alone to use him as an exemplar. Hence Mizauld can be seen to be treating the barrel anecdote in a similarly ironic way to his predecessors, although, characteristically of Cynic anecdote, he improvises a novel source for his irony. His identification with Diogenes is closer to Lucian or Budé in referring to the act of writing rather than to the question of a writer's place in society. However, the kind of writing with which he is engaged is compared to a battle against ignorance. Mizauld thereby adopts a middle ground between Lucian, who cites the anecdote to mock his contemporaries and put a comic spin on a serious work, and Rabelais, who uses it to raise the question of the writer's role in society. The *Planetologia* was written in the context of a debate between adherents of Pierre

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66 *Antonii Mizaldi Monstluciani Planetologia, rebus astronomicis, medicis, et philosophicis erudite referata [...]* (Lyon: Macé Bonhomme, 1551), sig. aa iiii: ‘ferunt µερσφοβθοµµ Diogenem, deposito philosophico & pileo, & pallio, fronte supra pollicare supercilium corrugata, impexo capilitio, coque cano & sesquipedali, ad haec procexa & incomplessa barba, setosissque brachis, ac unguis ad enorme excrumentum prominentibus, dolium illud suum versatile (quod palatium cum coelo, & aeris tempesstatibus sese immutans nuncupare solebat) per vicinum urbi collum, αν ω κοου κατω (quod Graeci dicunt) hoc est sursum ac deorsum, aliquot dies voluisse, revisisse, subvoluisse, ac devolisse. Quod cum plerique admirarentur, atque adeo rogarent, ecquid insolito, novo que labore sese conficeret, ne inter tot operarios (respondit) solus cessator videer. Dignum me hercule tanto philosopho ανοσφοθηµµ. Quod ubi ad aures meas venit, me virum planæ fecit: meique officii serio commonvit. Cum enim doctissimos quosque in hac Parisiensi Academia, legendo, scribendo, docendo, & aliter certatim de literis & postittere bene mereri viderem: Palladissis que machinis adversus ανυνααα felici Marte pugnare: & eam in rem novas acies subinde instruere: quae & caesium, & punctum in illam, eiusque fautes & convivatos sub praestantissimis ducibus irrunt: precium operae facturum me putavi, si pro mea tenuitate, in medium campum cum illis prodirem; nec inter tot egregiè militantes, unus de multis (ut d cebat [sic.] Diogenes) cesseraber [...]’
Galland, who followed Aristotle, and Pierre Ramus, who followed Galen. Charles de Lorraine was a referee of sorts for this debate, which also touched Rabelais.67 Mizauld’s work may have been published in Lyon to avoid the eye of the storm of this controversy, a reminder that writing is by definition an act of ideological engagement.68 It therefore seems likely that Mizauld’s identification with the eccentric figure of Diogenes is a defensively self-deprecatory gesture (he claims to be ‘insignificant’). However, as in Lucian, this gesture may itself be ironic. Mizauld apparently had sufficient reason to wish to mock some of the learned men of Paris, which he may well be doing in a sly way in this dedication, responding to their ‘Palladian stratagems’ with barrel rolling.

Ralph Robinson’s preface to the first edition of his translation of Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1551), ‘To the right honourable, and his very singular good master, Master William Cecil, esquire, one of the two principal secretaries to the King his most excellent majesty [...]’, contains a partial English translation of Rabelais’s version of the anecdote. Robinson proceeds to compare Diogenes’ performance with his own work as follows:

In semblable manner, right honourable sir, though I be, as I am indeed, of much less ability than Diogenes was to do anything that shall or may be for the advancement of the public wealth of my native country; yet I, seeing every sort and kind of commonwealth’s affairs, and especially learned men daily putting forth in writing new inventions and devices to the furtherance of the same, thought it my bounden duty to God and to my country so to tumble my tub: I mean so to occupy and exercise myself in bestowing such spare hours as I (being at the beck and commandment of others), could conveniently win to myself, that though no commodity of that my labour and travail to the public weal should arise, yet it might by this appear that mine endeavour and goodwill hereunto was not lacking.69

Like Mizauld, Robinson sees it as his duty to write when many others are writing, but this is not so much to join in a battle against ignorance, but to contribute to the ‘public weal’. The trace of Lucian is seen in Robinson’s concern about producing a book at a time when many other ‘learned men [are] daily putting forth in writing new inventions and devices’. However, Robinson goes further than Rabelais in explicitly linking his tub-tumbling to the public good. This is a bold claim and, like Mizauld, Robinson uses self-

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67 Huchon, ed., p. 1350.
deprecation to tone it down, pointing out that he is 'of much less ability than Diogenes' to assist his country. This is tantamount to saying he is of no use at all, and the passage indeed ends with a rather limp claim to 'goodwill'. There is, however, a sense in which Robinson is not being ironic when he says he is 'of much less ability than Diogenes': Diogenes' practical and philosophical independence from the Corinthians is not mirrored in Robinson's situation, since he is 'at the beck and commandment of others' as a writer dependent on patronage. Robinson is scarcely in a position to satirize his contemporaries, as Diogenes does at Corinth, as Lucian does, and as Mizauld appears to do under the protection of Charles de Lorraine. Hence he claims to be of even less use than the Cynic. The apparent underlying bitterness to Robinson's identification with Diogenes may explain why his preface is absent from the second edition of his translation, published in 1556. Robinson was doubtlessly prepared to put such unexpected irony in a letter of dedication only because he went to school with William Cecil.

Julien Tabouet's dedication of his De republica, et lingua francica (1559) contains a version of the barrel anecdote which is slightly longer than that given by Lucian, and similar to that found in Budé (Tabouet also uses the adjective 'fictile' to describe the barrel). There is no textual evidence that Tabouet was familiar with Rabelais's version of the anecdote. He follows Robinson in interpreting it as referring to the writer's role in society, which was originally Rabelais's innovation. He begins his dedication with a discussion of two laws of Draco according to which idle citizens who did nothing to help the state should be executed, and those who increased their fathers' wealth should be rewarded. Tabouet's consideration of these laws leads to discussion of Diogenes:

I myself was mindful of this law and also reflected that I should uphold public safety and I very much wanted to seize the chance of increasing those written records which my ancestors had left for the use of the art of war. I therefore preferred to be very busy among my idle contemporaries, co-citizens, and class, who did nothing for the public weal, being encouraged in this by the delightful and unusual example of Diogenes.

That philosopher saw his Corinthian fellow citizens (who used to be idle, learned and happy) on account of a disastrous war threatened by Philip, one and all busily engaged in war work. Greatly wondering at this, he immediately put on his philosopher’s cloak, and wrapped in this, began to roll an earthenware barrel down a little hill just by Corinth, and, besides, turn it up and down all night and all day. When eventually his friend asked him why he was so busy doing this for no reward, he said jokingly, ‘I roll my barrel up and down in case I should be the only idle man among all my fellow citizens.’ Thus I (and may God so love me), who was given a narrow prison in my barrel, may roll it and return to the labours of Aristophanes and Cleanthes, literary works of a sounder minting. I determined to make selections from these authors which would be useful to a literary state.72

Diogenes’ example is amusing and strange (‘deletatus acromate & exemplo non vulgari’), and the Cynic’s explanation of his behaviour is jokey (‘jocabundus’). However, although Tabouet does not take the story of Diogenes seriously, he does appear to put it to serious use, castigating his fellow countrymen and claiming to be useful to a literary state (‘literariae civitatis’). It is probably no coincidence that Tabouet’s presentation and use of the anecdote is found in the dedication to a treatise on the French nation and its language. Tabouet self-consciously turns the amusing example of Diogenes, who mocked the Corinthians’ bellicose patriotic fervour, to broadly nationalistic ends. The act of writing is thereby linked to the literary representation of the nation state, in contrast to Mizauld, for whom the barrel anecdote was used to discuss a battle against ignorance, and unlike Robinson, who could only express good will to the ‘public weal’. Tabouet’s reference to his barrel as a prison is odd: it could be a similar kind of self-deprecation to that found in Mizauld and Robinson, or it might even recall the ‘naufrage faict par le passé on far de Mal’encontre’ in implying past troubles and current restrictions.

72 De republica, et lingua francica [...] (Lyon: Theobaldum Paganum, 1559), pp. 3-4: ‘Huiusce legis egomet conscius & memor publicae salutis candidatus, & augendarum facultatem cupidissimus earum, quas nostri maiores reliquerunt in usum militae literariae, negotiosus esse malui inter otiosos mei gregis, loci & ordinis homines, que nihil agere in publicum, memorabili Diogenes Philosophi deletatus acromate & exemplo non vulgari. Cornithiacos etenim cives ille suos (qui prius oscitantes, otiosi & geniales erant) ob denuntiatas Philippo instantis belli clades, videns & imperitem demirans, ad militaria certatim opera perquam occupatos, con festim pallium induit philosophicum, & eo praecinctus, fictile dolium, per monticulum Corintho proximum, devolvere, & ultra atomorque, sursum ac deorsum versare cœpit noctu & interdix, donec ab amicis rogatus quidnam ageret tam studiosem, & fine fructu, respondit jocabundus, Dolium meum devolvere, & subinde revelvo, ne meos inter cives, unus cessator videar. Sic ego (Deus ita me amet) cui pro dolio datus est angustus carcer, evolvere, & ad Aristophanis, atque Cleanthes lucernam revolvere, probioris monetæ codices, & ex illis carptim in usum literariae civitatis colligere nonihil statui [...]’
Estienne Pasquier's letter, 'A Monsieur Bigot, Seigneur de Tibermeuil, Advocat au Parlement de Rouen', which was written in 1560/1561, that is to say at the onset of the Wars of Religion, follows Rabelais in using the image of Diogenes' barrel-rolling to represent the act of writing in troubled times:

Vous en rirez, je m'asseure; aussi que scaurions nous maintenant faire parmy ces tumultes qui voguent par la France, sinon à la Diogenique rouler, tourner et retourner en nostre vaisseau, je veux dire feuilleter et refeuilleter nos papiers?73

The image of Diogenes rolling his barrel had clearly become a commonplace by this time. This is seen in the fact that Pasquier does not narrate the story, but uses an adjective ('Diogenique') to refer to it. This brief passage may not therefore owe much if anything to Rabelais. It is nonetheless striking that Pasquier emphasizes the uselessness of his Diogenic barrel rolling, since it is reduced to the shuffling of papers ('feuilleter et refeuilleter') which mirrors the Cynic's bizarre behaviour with his tub ('tourner et retourner'). Pasquier thereby reverses the process found in Rabelais, Miziaud and particularly Tabouet in presenting his writing as being separate from political concerns.

John Eliot's language book, the Ortho-Epia Gallica (1593), which makes numerous borrowings from Rabelais in its pedagogical dialogues, also gives an English translation of the story of Diogenes from the prologue of the Tiers Livre in the dedicatory letter, addressed to London-based French language teachers.74 Eliot's emphasis is on the humour of the story. He claims not to have wished to appear idle among so many active language teachers. He does not develop the story in any significant way. It is nonetheless striking that he puts it in the context of carnivalesque merriment, seen in his references to Bordeaux wine, and in his citing of Epictetus's motto from Pantagruel, 30, at the end of his dedicatory letter: 'Saulter, dancer, faire les tours, / Et boyre vin blanc et vermeil: / Et ne faire rien tous les jours / Que compter

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escuz au soleil' (ed. Huchon, p. 325). For Eliot, the story of Diogenes is joyous and thoroughly unserious.

Further evidence for the commonplace status of the story of Diogenes and his barrel is found in the early seventeenth century. For example, it is cited in Les Jours et les nuict du Sr de la Fontan (1606) in a letter entitled 'Combien l'oisiveté est pernicieuse'. Camus uses the anecdote in the ninth volume of Les Diversitez (Paris: Claude Chapelet, 1614) to justify his choice to write about philosophy when the church is under the constant threat of heresy:

Or je m'asseure qu'on ne faudra pas de s'estonnner qu'en un siecle tellement infecté d'heresie, comme le nostre, je m'amuse à escrire de ces matieres philosophiques plus concernantes les mceurs que la doctrine; il semble que l'heresie combattant l'Eglise à outrance, & luy livrant des assauts si furieux, les Theologiens ne deussent qu'à la refutation de ces erreurs, sans se divertir à d'autres sujects. A cela je respondrois que j'imiter Diogene, lequel en un siege de ville où il estoit, se sentant inhabile au maniement des armes, se mit à rouller le tonneau où il habitoit, de peur de paroistre inutile, chacun travaillant: Aussi ne me sentant pas assez ferme pour manier ces armes dangereuse de nos controverses, je remue les sujects plus simples plus proportionnés à ma portée [...] (pp. 114-15)

Like Pasquier, Camus uses the anecdote in a defensive, and self-deprecatory, way. The confidence of Tabouet, and the slyly satiric aims of Mizauld and Robinson, which were also muted by self-deprecation, have given way to writerly modesty in the face of dangerous controversy. Camus is unusual in giving no hint that Diogenes' barrel-rolling is ironic and mocking. It is not impossible that Camus missed the ironic point of the anecdote, which would in turn indicate that the Cynic's paradoxical performance remained as obscure to some early modern writers as it has to a few modern critics.

Conclusion

It is striking that all of the writers above, and in particular Mizauld, Robinson and Tabouet, use the barrel story in slightly but significantly different ways. This is another reminder that Cynic performance is very open to adaptation. These three writers all recognize the essential irony of Diogenes' barrel-rolling, and they all compare it to their

75 Les Jours et les nuict du Sr de la Fontan. Où sont traitéz plusieurs beaux discours & epistres consolatoires dont le subject se peut voir au contenu de la table (Paris: Charles Sevestre, 1606), fol. 9°.
own activity as writers, but they each put it to different ends. For Mizauld, writing is an opportunity to engage in a battle fought by the humanists against ignorance, but his identification with Diogenes is also probably a means of mocking a faction of humanists with whom he is in disagreement. Robinson uses the anecdote to insist that he writes for the public good, but goes on to suggest that his contribution is limited by his dependence on patronage. Tabouet employs the barrel story confidently to argue that his writing is in the service of a literary nation. This confidence is, however, conspicuous by its absence from subsequent, and commonplace, presentations of the story of Diogenes in Pasquier and Camus. Mizauld, Robinson and Tabouet all follow Rabelais (consciously or not), and not Lucian, in raising the issue of the writer's role in society. Unsurprisingly, however, none are as playful and paradoxical as their better-known predecessor. This difference is partly accounted for by differences in genre between serious humanist works, in the case of Mizauld and Tabouet at least, and Rabelais's book. However, Rabelais was himself the author of serious humanist works, which makes his use of Diogenes in the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* all the more extraordinary. His portrayal and use of Diogenes' seriocomic performance, which he links to the temporary joyousness of carnival, is unmatched in sixteenth-century French texts. Nonetheless, he was not alone in viewing the Cynic as a paradoxical figure to be turned to paradoxical ends, as I hope to show in the following chapters.
Chapter Six

Paradox

What age is this, where honest men,
Plac'd at the helme,
A sea of some foule mouth, or pen,
Shall overwhelm?
And call their diligence, deceit;
Their vertue, vice;
Their watchfulnesse, but lying in wait;
And bloud, the price.
O, let us plucke this evill seede
Out of our spirits;
And give, to every noble deed,
The name it merits.

Ben Jonson, *Catiline*

Cynicism is the most paradoxical of all ancient Western philosophies. While other Hellenistic schools, notably Stoicism and Pyrrhonism, followed Socrates in fundamentally challenging beliefs based on opinion (doxa), as I have shown above, the Cynics are alone in making the performance of acts designed to 'deface the currency' of everyday norms and values an indispensable part of their practice. 1 Cynicism is therefore intrinsically paradoxical, although of course not all paradoxes are Cynical. The sixteenth century was an age of paradox. 2 Renaissance paradoxes derive from classical models, as Erasmus's letter to Thomas More, prefaced to the *Praise of Folly* (1510), makes clear. In order to apologize for his work, which some might find vicious or silly, Erasmus cites mock encomia by Isocrates, Seneca, Plutarch and Lucian, among others, as antecedents. 3

Modern critics have been equally keen to establish a tradition of paradox, extending from the ancient to the early modern world. Since the Cynics were nothing if not paradoxical, their presence in sixteenth-century paradoxes is unsurprising. However, while almost every imaginable source for sixteenth-century paradoxes has

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been cited by scholars, the anecdotes and sayings of the ancient Cynics are consistently neglected. I do not wish to argue that the Cynics are a dominant presence in paradoxical literature, but I do intend to demonstrate that the presentation of Cynic anecdotes is often unusually revealing in a way that is not true of more readily acceptable material, including, for example, Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicorum*. Cynic stories and sayings are often too provocative and outrageous for them not to force texts to reveal, whether wittingly or not, their own ideological ground. This is because Cynic sayings and anecdotes repeatedly provide a kind of paradoxical extreme which, when acknowledged, serves as a high-water mark against which other paradoxes must be measured. Consequently, even fairly brief references to the Cynics in sixteenth-century paradoxes can be peculiarly significant, for they regularly compel frequently playful and equivocal texts to reveal their true nature. I shall seek to show that this is the case with reference to a selection of mock encomia and collections of arguments *pro* and *contra* which contain representations of Cynicism. I have sought to give as large a selection as possible of these texts, and I shall indicate similar works which contain no discussion of the Cynics in the course of the chapter.

It could be objected that paradox is, by its very nature, resistant to easy categorization, since paradoxes are liable to adopt many forms and to fail to declare their paradoxical nature. As was noted in the discussion of miscellanies and encyclopedias (Chapter Four), any demarcation of sixteenth-century genres is hazardous, and it must be acknowledged that the placing of works in the 'paradox genre' is little more than a matter of critical convention. This is no reason, however, to

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5 For example, I have found no references to the Cynics in the disease and animal eulogies analysed by Tomarken, *Smile of Truth*, chapters 6-7.

6 Colie, p. xiii; Panizza, p. 208.
adopt a catch-all notion of paradox of the kind employed by Colie and Bowen. Instead, concentrating on works which, like the *Praise of Folly*, clearly identify themselves with previous mock-encomia, will allow for a focused analysis of a recognizable literary tradition.

The mock encomium is a peculiarly versatile genre which allows for unexpected connections and the broaching of difficult ideas.\(^7\) Cynicism is used by writers of mock encomium precisely because it constitutes a philosophical position radically opposed to *doxa*, which questions basic values and serves to dissolve the boundaries between the serious and the comic. In this light, the prologue of the *Tiers Livre* could almost be seen as a paradoxical encomium of Diogenes. While seriocomic Cynic performance appealed to Rabelais and some of his paradoxical successors, for others the capacity of Cynicism to challenge entrenched notions was threatening. It is no coincidence that these effects are seen most clearly in Lucianic, duplicitous and seriocomic paradoxes, as opposed to Socratic or Christian ones.\(^8\) While the Cynics are easily sanitized in the former, they are a potentially disturbing presence in more playful paradoxes which are less carefully controlled. This chapter will be divided along chronological lines, the first part devoted primarily to two mid-sixteenth-century mock encomia, Charles Estienne’s French re-working of Lando’s *Paradossi* and Philibert de Vienne’s *Le Philosophe de court*. Although, as *Praise of Folly* shows, there were early modern mock-encomia before Lando, the *Paradossi* nonetheless represent a point at which Lucianic burlesque encomium started to come to prominence. The second part will concentrate on late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century paradoxes, which, as far as those which contain representations of the Cynics are concerned, are either serious and Socratic or in the form of arguments *pro* and *contra*. The third and final part will concentrate on the role of the Cynics in Bruscambille’s stage paradoxes.

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\(^7\) Cave, *Pré-Histoires II*, p. 188.
\(^8\) Panizza, pp. 213-19.
Part One

Mid-Sixteenth-Century Paradoxes

The vogue for paradox in the second half of the sixteenth century was largely inspired by Ortensio Lando's *Paradossi* (Lyon: Gioanni Pullon, 1543) and their French reworking by Charles Estienne, *Paradoxes* (Paris: Charles Estienne, 1553). The 1540s witnessed a flowering of paradoxes in France, particularly in Lyon, which was distanced from the restraining influence of the Sorbonne.\(^9\) Lando's work was first published there in Italian, and was followed by such anonymous works as *Paradoxe contre les lettres* (1545) and *Blasons, de la goutte, de honneur, et de la quarte* (1547). The *Tiers Livre*, first published in Paris in 1546, is the most paradoxical of Rabelais's works, which is another indication of the appropriateness of the choice of Diogenes, the paradigmatically paradoxical philosopher of antiquity, as the dominant figure of its prologue. Chapters three and four of the *Tiers Livre* are devoted to Panurge's praise of debts, while chapter eight is taken up by his encomium of codpieces. The latter is described as a 'paradoxe' by Pantagruel. With one exception, all the occurrences of the word 'paradoxe' in the works of Rabelais are found in the *Tiers Livre*.\(^10\) Estienne's *Paradoxes* were highly successful in publishing terms: there were three further editions in 1553, four others in 1554, and another eight before the century came to a close.\(^11\) As Tomarken notes, since Estienne edits and adjusts Lando's text, his version is sufficiently different from the Italian to be considered a separate, and doubtlessly more influential, source of French interest in paradox.\(^12\)

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\(^{9}\) Paradoxical works from this time, which contain no discussion of the Cynics, include Claude Colet, *L'Oraison de Mars aux dames de la court* (Paris: Chrestien Wechel, 1544); *Paradoxe contre les lettres* (Lyon: Jean de Tournes, 1545); *Blasons, de la goutte, de honneur, et de la quarte* (Lyon: Jean de Tournes, 1547); *Le Triumphe de treshaulte et puissante dame verolle, royn duy puy d'amours* (Lyon: Francys Juste, 1539); *Le Triumphe de haute folie* (Lyon: Anthoine Volant, c.1550). Bertrand de la Borderie's satire, *L'Amye de court* (Paris: 1542) gave rise to the so-called 'querelle des Amyes', which unsurprisingly did not inspire any discussion of the Cynics.

\(^{10}\) Estienne cuts some of Lando's most shocking material, including the 11th paradox, 'Non esser cosa detestabile ne odiosa la moglie dishonestaa',
Estienne's version gives guidance as to the content and use of the work: *Paradoxes, ce sont propos contre la commune opinion: debatus, en forme de declamations forense: pour exerciter les jeunes advocats, en causes difficiles*. This title not only gives the reader a definition of paradox, but also indicates that the paradoxes are not to be taken too seriously, since they amount to the kind of rhetorical games played by students of law, in which arguments were mustered in favour of a dubious proposition (*Laudatio*).

Estienne's version offers twenty-six fairly brief 'propos contre la commune opinion', all of which consist of encomia. For example, the first five paradoxes are devoted to praising poverty, ugliness, ignorance, blindness and stupidity respectively. The praise of poverty, which was a favourite subject of paradoxical literature, features Crates throwing his money into the sea, a preferred *topos* within such works (p. 75), a good example being 'La Pauvreté' by Jean Godard, which is probably inspired by Estienne, and which describes Crates as a 'philosophe sçavant' who rid himself of an 'engeance qui ameines / Tant de soins & soucis dans nos ames humaines, / Et pour qui les Mortels sentent tant de douleurs, / De miseres, de maux, de peines, & malheurs'.

The fifteenth paradox, 'Que le petit logis est plus à priser que ne sont les grans palais et maisons de plaisance', refers to Diogenes, 'qui fut d'esprit autant bon et excellent qu'onques homme de son temps' (p. 167). The positive characterization of the Cynic here is apologetic, since the author feels the need to offer a pre-emptive defence of Diogenes. Such a favourable yet cautious presentation of the Cynic recalls many sixteenth-century discussions of Diogenes, including, for example, in Mexia and Thevet (Chapter Four). It is noteworthy that this defence is still required in an overtly paradoxical text. Oddly, Diogenes is said to have lived under a 'petit taict', a word normally associated with pig sties (p. 167). The omission of the normally inevitable barrel forms part of an unexpected attempt to make Diogenes more conventional, and consequently less paradoxical.

the 27th against the *Decameron* and the three final paradossi opposing Aristotle (twice) and Ciceron; it is unclear whether inclusion of this material led to the Spanish translation being placed on the list of banned books in 1559. Peach argues that the suppression of these paradossi was due more to aesthetic than political concerns, p. 17.
One of the paradoxes of the Paradoxes is that they draw their material ‘contre la commune opinion’ from opinion-forming sources, namely the arsenal of ancient sayings which made up commonplace-books and miscellanies of the time. This is seen, for example, in the straightforward, and favourable, citing of the Cynics in ‘Qu’il vault mieux se servy d’estre servy’ and in ‘Qu’il vault mieux estre banny qu’en liberté’ (pp. 133 and 205). The Paradoxes are formed by manipulating commonplace material rather than seeking for truth beyond the commonplace. Margolin is therefore right to argue that the Paradoxes constitute a purely rhetorical game. They are paradoxes by virtue of this playfulness alone. This is because the Paradoxes are derived from a corpus of sources which, although large, is nonetheless definable and controllable, unlike ‘commune opinion’ which is potentially unstable. Hence ‘commune opinion’ risks unsettling the Paradoxes more than the Paradoxes risk destabilizing ‘commune opinion’. Furthermore, to offer anything too paradoxical would be to break the rules of this game, since it could undermine the sententious sources of ‘paradoxical’ wisdom. Consequently, I take the view that the Paradoxes are recognizable as paradoxes not because common opinion becomes stable over time (as Tomarken argues) but because they maintain a balance between commonplace opinion and commonplace paradox. It is true to say that although the Paradoxes may not seem particularly profound now, their method of presentation would have appeared exciting, witty and occasionally dangerous in the sixteenth century. Nonetheless, it was precisely because the form of the paradox had the potential to be turned to risky ends that Estienne’s version of Lando goes a long way to making its material as commonplace as possible, while still being recognizably paradoxical. This explains why, even in a paradoxical text, the impact of Cynic paradoxes is if anything more diffuse than in other, contemporary, non-paradoxical works.

14 Peach, p. 20, Tomarken, Smile of Truth, p. 145 and Margolin, p. 74.
15 Margolin, p. 73.
16 Tomarken, Smile of Truth, p. 145.
17 Panizza, p. 203.
A different kind of handling of commonplaces is found in Philibert de Vienne’s Lucianic mock-encomium, *Le Philosophe de court* (Lyon: Jean de Tournes, 1547). Although not as influential as the *Paradoxes*, Philibert’s work is subtler and more intriguing, which, along with the fact that the *Paradossi* pre-date *Le Philosophe de court*, is sufficient reason to examine the texts in this order. This short text belongs to a branch of paradoxical literature devoted to criticizing Italian court manners, the latter having become highly fashionable in France at the time, primarily owing to the influence of Castiglione’s *Cortegiano* (1528). The European reaction against the latter had already begun in Spain with Antonio de Guevara’s *Menosprecio de corte* (1539) which was translated into French by Antoine Allègre in 1542 as *Le Mespris de la court, et la louange de la vie rustique*. This work also refers to Crates throwing away his worldly goods, and Diogenes is discussed in a chapter entitled ‘De beaucoup d’illustres hommes, qui laissarent les Courts, & grands citez, & se retirarent en leurs maisons, plus par volonté, que par necessité’ (fols 4r, 43v). Philibert’s work is a more playful and evasive variation on the anti-courtier theme. It is one of the few surviving works of its author, about whom almost nothing is known. Philibert presents *Le Philosophe de court* as a treatise in which the artifice of court life is ironically depicted as a superior philosophy to the great movements of ancient thought. This artifice worked all too well, since, as Javitch has shown in his analysis of its English translation, Philibert’s irony was lost on many of his contemporaries, a good indication that his work was unusually radical and slippery for its time. It was also taken at face value by modern criticism until Mayer’s seminal article of the 1950s. Now, however, critics are in basic

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19 I consulted the following contemporary collection of paradoxes, mostly devoted to the ‘querelle des Amyes’: *Le Mespris de la court, avec la vie rustique […] L’Amye de court. La Parfaicte amyé. La Contreamy. L’Androgyne de Platon. L’Experience de l’amye de court, contre la contreamy* (Paris: Jehan Ruelle, 1545).
agreement with Mayer that *Le Philosophe de court* is a particularly successful example of the mock-encomium genre.\(^{23}\) I do not intend to challenge this general interpretation of the text, but I do wish to show how Philibert plays with the figure of Diogenes the Cynic at key points in his pseudo-treatise to modulate his satire.

Although he has often been misinterpreted in the past, Philibert is careful to make his ironic intentions plain in the prologue, addressed to ‘l’amye de vertu’:

> je vous ay escrit ce petit livret, assez rude et impoly toutesfois, comme d’un homme allant par pais, par lequel vous verrez en brief ce qui m’a tousjours semblé de la Philosophie, en laquelle posoient les anciens le Bien souverain, puys comme en ce temps elle est desguisée et fondée sur les opinions des hommes, non sur Nature. Apres cela, vous trouverez assez amplement (et non pas tant encore que j’eusse bien voulu) ce que je sens de ceste nouvelle Philosophie qui est la mode de vivre de ce temps, en escrivant laquelle je n’ay peu que je n’aye fait le Democrite, et usé de faceties. (pp. 64-65)

Philibert commits himself to ancient thought and contrasts it unfavourably with the current, ‘disguised’ philosophy which is grounded on opinion, rather than nature. Furthermore, to criticize this new philosophy, he dons the mask of Democritus, the laughing philosopher, who is sometimes synonymous with the witty type of satire to which Philibert refers here, while at other times he is identified with a more critical type of laughter.\(^{24}\) Philibert puts on a disguise not only as a defensive gesture but also all the better to condemn a masquerade of a philosophy.\(^{25}\) Since there is more than one definition of the supreme good (‘le Bien souverain’) in ancient philosophy, Philibert’s view, which identifies it both with philosophy itself and with nature, constitutes a perhaps unwitting attempt to simplify ancient philosophy. His account is closest to Stoicism, which identifies the *summum bonum* with virtue, which consists in following nature. Philibert thereby ignores the controversial position of Epicureanism which identifies the supreme good with pleasure. He also explicitly rejects Cynicism, headed by Diogenes, which takes the ideal of following nature to its logical extreme:

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Diogenes is legendary in a wholly negative way, his asceticism, represented by his barrel, being a subject of ridicule. Democritus is no longer the laughing philosopher here, but the one who, according to the commonplace, blinded himself to intensify his philosophical vision. Plainly, Diogenes is not alone in being an ambivalent figure. Such a stereotypical summary of, and judgement on, ancient philosophy is characteristic of much sixteenth-century writing and allows authors to place their works in an ideological context. Another example of philosophers being contrasted in this way is found in Antonio Fregoso's allegorical poem, *Riso di Democrito et pianto di Heraclito* (1511), translated into French by Michel d'Amboyse in 1547.26 The poet is stopped from entering the palace in the garden of philosophy by a tall, arrogant, rude and unpleasant man who, it transpires, is the paradigmatic Cynic of antiquity:

Diogenes est cestuy, qui acquit,
De Cynicus, le surnom plain de vice,
Il mord chascun, & à cela l'induyct,
L'horreur qu'il prend de l'humaine malice. (fol. 19')

The reader is left in no doubt that Diogenes is a bad dog, a misanthrope like Timon of Athens, encountered earlier in the poem. He is beyond the pale, excluded from the palace of philosophy. He is, however, unusually suited to guarding the palace, given his biting wit and challenging notion of what philosophy is. For Philibert, Diogenes' standpoint is a step too far in the return to nature, an unacceptable extreme of anti-courtliness. Hence Philibert does not merely reiterate the commonplaces, but plays with them in order to find a medium between rejecting the new, disguised philosophy and adopting a kind of neo-Cynicism. A similar play on commonplaces is found in Joachim Du Bellay's *Discours [...] à Salmon Marcin* (1552):

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26 *Le Ris de Democrite, et le pleur de Heraclite [...]* (Paris: Gilles Corrozet, 1547).
Le tonneau Diogenique,
Le gros sou icy Zenonique,
Et l'ennemy de ses yeux,
Cela ne me deifie:
La gaye philosophie
D'Aristippe me plaist mieulx²⁷

Diogenes is placed alongside Democritus ('l'ennemy de ses yeux') and Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. Aristippus, the Cyrenaic philosopher, embodies a philosophy which is the antithesis of asceticism. Contrasting commonplaces involving Democritus, Diogenes and Aristippus are also found in the *Dialogues* of Jaques Tahureau, a work which, although not technically a paradox, shares many of its features.²⁸ The dialogue consists mainly of a lecture given by Le Democritic to his pupil, Le Cosmophile. The former converts the latter to his misanthropic views on a range of subjects including court life and Italian fashions (this is one of the many points of similarity between the *Dialogues* and *Le Philosophe de court*). Le Democritic is inevitably associated with his near namesake who, as in Philibert, is admired for being 'un grand riard et moqueur de la folie des hommes' (p. 194), but despised for having gouged his eyes out. The Cosmophile suggests Diogenes as an alternative role-model:

Le Democritic: Je veux vivre plus à mon aise qu'en un tonneau.
Le Cosmophile: Que diras-tu d'Aristippe?
Le Democritic: D'Aristippe! Si j'avois autant d'yeus que les poètes en ont attribué à Argus, j'aimerois mieus me les crever tous les uns apres les autres, que d'endurer la moindre des servitudes ausquelles se soubsmettoit cet ivrongne Aristippe, faisant du chien autour de Denis roi de Sicile [...] j'aimerois encores mieux ne manger que des choux & licher deux grains de sel avec Diogene, combien qu'il ne faut point que tu aies peur que je fasse l'un ne l'autre (pp. 196-97)²⁹

²⁷ *Œuvres poétiques*, ed. by Henri Chamard, 8 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1908-85) IV, pp. 154-55, vv. 199-204. The similarity between the two passages is noted by Smith, ed., *Le Philosophe de court*, p. 62, n.23. Horace, *Satires, Epistles and 'Ars poetica*', ed. and trans. by H. Rushton Fairclough, (Loeb, 1926), *Epistles*, I, 17, 13-32, discusses the clash between Aristippus and Diogenes, also found in DL, II, 68, and comes down firmly on the side of the Cyrenaic, who is content to take the pay of princes to whom he is useful, unlike the Cynic, who leads an uncouth life.
Peach claims that there is both a principle of personal freedom and an Epicurean acceptance of social convention in operation here. However, Le Democritic's rejection of both the Cynic and the Cyrenaic ('il ne faut point que tu aies peur que je fasse ne l'un ne l'autre') is probably a more straightforward 'cynical' response, in the modern sense of the term. Certainly Aristippus is here presented as a poor version of a Cynic 'faisant du chien autour de Denis'. The clash between Diogenes and Aristippus is also featured in Le Caron's *Dialogues* (1556), which includes a stereotypical summary of ancient philosophy ('Quelle grand' et sainte doctrine peut estre venuë des escholes du voluptueux Aristippe [...] de l'impudent Diogene, du moqueur Democrite'), and in Montaigne's *Essais*, where it is used as an example of how reason is 'un pot à duex anses' (II, 12, 581). The general point is that Philibert, Du Bellay, Tahureau, and Le Caron manipulate commonplaces to offer a summary judgement on ancient philosophy which allows them to place their works in an ideological context.

While Diogenes may be disparaged for his unworldly asceticism in *Le Philosophe de court* another Cynic, Menippus, is favourably portrayed, since he, unlike his forebear, represents a friendlier side of Cynicism. The maintaining of distance between Diogenes and Menippus is traditional, for while the former is the archetypal Cynic of antiquity, the latter is best-known as a character in Lucian, who personifies the *eiron*, or falsely naïve observer. Menippus appears in his habitual role of observer in *Le Philosophe de court*, watching various philosophers entering Hades. This forms part of Philibert's ironic assault on old-style philosophers. Here, the Stoics are his main target:

Quant à la Mort, pour de laquelle eviter la peur ilz ont dit merveilles, quelques choses qu'ilz nous facent lire, je croy qu'elle les a faschez, car là le fondement de leur science, qui est Nature, est dissolu et esteint. Je m'en raporterois bien à Menipus de Lucian qui les regardoit tous venir par le fleuve d'Acheron aux Enfers, et n'en vid pas un qui ne fust estonné en entrant, excepté Diogenes, qui faisoit toujours du folastre et ne luy sceut-on jamais faire peur. Il est bien vray que Socrates, de loing,
avoit encor' bon courage, et fairoit du mauvais, mais quand il vint passer 
le guichet, il changea de couleur ausi bien que les autres. (pp. 95-96)

This is drawn from Lucian's *Dialogues of the dead*, 21, and, as in Lucian, Diogenes is 
not praised directly, but through the eyes of another (in Lucian, it is Cerberus, a 'dog' 
like Menippus and Diogenes, who tells of the bravery of both Cynics on entering 
Hades). Philibert deliberately places the source of his argument at two removes 
('Menipus de Lucian'), thereby adopting Lucian's strategy of keeping the Dogs at a 
distance. Philibert's proposal to replace nature with court manners as the foundation of 
moral philosophy is ironic, but there is still a lingering sense here that ancient 
philosophers did indeed fail properly to face death. This feeling comes from the 
unsettling presence of Diogenes, who is represented as facing death courageously, but 
only because he maintained the folly of his earthly existence. While this folly can be 
positive in the underworld ('folastre'), in the world of the living it amounts to bizarre and 
boorish behaviour. This is why Diogenes is subsequently compared unfavourably with 
Menippus, as an example of a 'curieux', that is to say someone who 'rompt la teste ès 
artz et sciences qui ne servent de rien à l'instruction de nostre vie selon vertu, c'est-à-
dire, selon la mode de Court' (p. 107). This definition of virtue is again ironic, like the 
earlier definition of philosophy as 'la cognoissance de vivre à la mode de Court' (p. 81).

However, as part of the balancing act already seen in his prologue, Philibert criticizes 
those who go too far in the opposite direction to court custom, in the same way as he 
satirizes those who follow that same custom too slavishly. Hence his mocking of the 
'curieux', who are misanthropic, unpopular and socially maladjusted:

> Dequoy leur sert ceste grand'curiosité? De se faire apeller folz et servir 
de Triboulet? Qu'îlz ayent la reputation des honnestes, civiz, courtisans? 
Jamais! Que ne voit-on là un Diogenes, avecq' son baston, son bissac et 
es escharpe, manger ses choux en son vaisseau? Les pages le 
rouleront. S'il eust eu encor' quelque Menipus, ou frere Jan des 
Antonnieres [sic.], on l'en priseroit mieux. Les autres se fondent si avant 
en la sainte escriture, cuydans que la vertu gise là, que plus tost mourir 
que les faire changer de propos. Mais à quoy pensent telles gens? Où 
est leur esprit? Qu'est-il besoing s'enquerir si avant de Dieu, et se faire 
rostir pour une sote multitude? (pp. 107-09)

Despite the fact that Philibert's criticism is laced with irony, he is still expounding 
moderation at the expense of the 'curieux'. Admittedly, the fact that a new Diogenes
would be mocked by the court pages is hardly the worst thing that could be said about him, nor is the fact that he could never be named among the 'honnestes, civiliz, courtisans'. Although it would be wrong to go as far as Smith in claiming that this amounts to an approving portrayal of the 'curieux', Tomarken is right to argue that it is two-sided and therefore troubling. This is particularly apparent in the inclusion of those who are prepared to die for their religious beliefs as further examples of the 'curieux'.

The reader is apparently being invited to view the individual who risks his life in searching for virtue against the grain of society as little more than an eccentric. The inclusion of cabbages in the portrait of Diogenes recalls two parallel stories in Diogenes Laertius, in which the Cynic assails Plato and Aristippus respectively for their courting of tyrants, while he is content to live off humble vegetables. Philibert thereby raises the question as to how the true philosopher, as opposed to the *philosophe de court*, is meant to live in society. Diogenes represents one extreme answer to this question, which is rejected, but not without regret. Philibert proposes Menippus and Frère Jean as more accessible ideals, in much the same way as Rabelais advocates his readership to 'viv[re] joyeux'. The extent to which this ideal is practicable in troubled times is open to question.

Greenblatt has argued that *Le Philosophe de court* constitutes one of the most insightful Renaissance examinations of feigning. He maintains that Philibert is particularly interested in the moments at which court artifice encounters the ethical challenge of philosophers for whom dissimulation is immoral, and he traces the example of Socrates, whose threat is defused by the ironic argument that he was himself a master of feigning. It is striking that this strategy is not adopted for Diogenes, whose

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34 This passage was omitted from George North's 1575 translation; see Javitch, pp. 111-12 and 124.
35 DL, II, 68 and VI, 58.
36 Mayer uses this comparison between Frère Jean and Menippus in his attempt to establish a causal link between the characters in 'The Genesis of a Rabelaisian Character, Menippus and Frère Jean', *French Studies* 6 (1952), 219-29 and in *Lucien de Samosate*, pp. 41-46. Although there are certain similarities between the two, these remain at too broad a level (e.g. frankness, criticizing a sect from within) convincingly to demonstrate that Lucian's Menippus directly inspired Frère Jean. Mayer is also wrong to argue that Lucian is always scathing of the Cynics, and that the Cynics can be classed as a sub-section of the Sophists, pp. 222 and 225.
37 *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, pp. 163-64.
philosophical integrity is preserved in *Le Philosophe de court*, although it is rejected both from the perspective of false court philosophy, and from that of the true, sociable philosopher. Philibert thereby uses Diogenes not as an adaptable kind of mask, as, for example, Rabelais and La Perrière do, but to represent a consistent philosophical extreme which stands in radical opposition to feigning.

*Le Philosophe de court* illustrates how talk of positive or negative framing is insufficient and sometimes unhelpful in analysing representations of the Cynics. Sixteenth-century attitudes to Cynicism cannot be reduced to a balance sheet of favourable and unfavourable portrayals. Although Philibert is considerably less enthusiastic about Diogenes than Rabelais, he, like Rabelais, uses Diogenes’ performance, as portrayed in Lucian in particular, and turns it to his own ends. Diogenes is already an ambivalent figure in Lucian, as well as in the Cynic tradition more generally, and Philibert takes advantage of this two-sidedness to raise troubling issues which often remain untouched in less interesting, but positive, representations of the Cynics such as those found in Estienne’s *Paradoxes*.

**Part Two**

**Late-Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth-Century Paradoxes**

The Cynics are also used to stand for a paradoxical extreme in a preliminary poem to what is supposed to be the translation of a French work, *The Mirrour of Madnes, or, a Paradoxe Maintayning Madness to Be Most Excellent* (London: 1576). In much the same way as Philibert dons the mask of Democritus to protect himself, James Sandford, the translator, excuses it on the grounds that the French author is a Cynic:

Reprove me not, though fame by me enlargement take
This trifling toy, this merry jeste, for solace sake,
Compiled was in foraine speache, I pardon crave,
If any bee, whom I herein offended have.
For Cynicke like the Authoure here, with skoffes doth barke
At mens madde deedes, which vainly bent no reason marke.
Wherefore in earnest some wil take, that which in jeste
Is meant of me, in doing so, they do not best. (sig. A iii')
It is possible that the translation is apocryphal, and therefore a further protective device, and that this verse is a tease to the reader, suggesting shocking content. Sandford's poem makes the Cynic a dog who barks at man's foolishness. Sandford uses the Cynics as guard dogs to defend his text, since the paradoxical nature of Cynicism serves as a counterpoint to the paradoxes he presents. If the Cynics could get away with it then so, he seems to be saying, can I. This use of the Cynics as a protective device recalls in some ways the prologues of the *Tiers Livre* and La Perrière's *La Morosophie*, where the paradoxical nature of Diogenes' performance is compared to the author's writing, so that Diogenes' example is used as an excuse and tool to open up new and strange ideas.

The capacity of the Cynics to represent extreme positions means that they are particularly well suited to inclusion in collections of arguments *pro* and *contra*, which were prevalent in the sixteenth century. That such collections, and the methods that underlie them, shared common features with mock-encomia is clear from the title of the first edition of Estienne's *Paradoxes*. The sixteenth-century taste for such material, and its link to paradox, is also neatly illustrated by Gabriel Harvey's remark: 'I would uppon mine owne charges, travaile into any parte of Europe, to heare some pregnant Paradoxes, and certaine singular questions in the highest professions of Learning, in Physick, in Law, in Divinity, effectually and thoroughly disputed *pro, & contra*. This rhetorical exercise could be put to serious use (this is what Harvey suggests), but it could also easily turn into a witty rhetorical game, of the kind found in Estienne's *Paradoxes*. Collections of arguments *pro* and *contra* have the disconcerting effect of leaving questions unanswered, and of occasionally mustering arguments in favour of ideas which would normally be considered to be vicious, albeit as a rhetorical exercise. Skinner has shown that the practice of paradiastole, that is to say arguing that a given vice is virtuous, or vice-versa, gave rise to numerous anxious reactions, all of which

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consist in arguing that everything should be given ‘the name it merits’. The collection of Alexandre van den Bushce, also known as Alexandre Sylvain, *Les Epitomes de cent histoires tragiques* (1581), occasionally falls into paradiastole by virtue of the fact that it presents each of its one hundred stories in the form of a debate for-and-against. The work is best known because its English translation by Lazarus Piot, *The Orator* (1596), is a possible source for *The Merchant of Venice* (the ninety-fifth story of *Les Epitomes* is entitled ‘Du juif qui pour sa debte veut une livre de la chair d'un Chrestien’). The eighty-ninth ‘epitome’ is devoted to a legal debate between Diogenes and Aristarchus on the subject of the latter’s coat, which he lent to the Cynic, and which Diogenes refuses to return. The exchange is presumably based on Diogenes Laertius (VI, 62): ‘When some one asked that he might have back his cloak, “If it was a gift,” replied Diogenes, “I possess it; while, if it was a loan, I am using it.”’ However, Sylvain, or whoever he is drawing on, improvises upon the original to expand it greatly, in a way that is now familiar, particularly from emblem books as well as from Rabelais. Although the law states that the item borrowed should be returned, Diogenes argues against the law on the grounds of nature:

> Je ne cognois autre loy, que la naturelle, qui me commande de ne me desfaire point, de ce que m'est necessaire, si tu m'as donc donne ce manteau, pourquoi le veux tu r'avoir où si me l'as presté pour m'en couvrir, pourquoi me le [veux] tu oster, quand plus que jamais j'en ay affaire, si tu dy que tu me l'as presté jusques à ce que j'en eusse un autre, je suis content de te le rendre alors, regarde donc si tu trouveras aucun qui m'en donne, ô que preste un meilleur, & je te rendray cestuy-cy.

(fol. 216')

The voice of Diogenes is used here to invoke nature to justify theft. Indeed, if there were any philosophical point to the original joke, it was as an illustration of Diogenes’ dictum that all things belong to the wise. However, the paradoxical or shock effect of his claims are diminished both by the triviality of the subject-matter, and by the Cynic’s concession that he will return the coat if he receives another, better one. Diogenes’

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41 *Epitomes de cent histoires tragiques, partie extraittes des actes des romains & autres, de l'invention de l'auteur, avcqs' les demandes, accusations & deffences sur la matiere d'icelles [...]* (Paris: Nicolas Bonfons, 1581).
42 DL, VI, 37.
arguments are also inevitably countered in Aristarchus's response, which also cites natural law:

Comme je te l'ay presté volontairement, ainsi te le puis oster quand bon me semblera, aussi la mesme loy naturelle, m'ordonne d'avoir pitiè de mon prochain, & de l'aider comme je t'ay aidé, tant qu'il m'a esté possible, de me passer de ce manteau, mais maintenant me commande de le reprendre, d'autant que j'en ay besoing, car qui est mauvais, où inutile pour soy mesmes ne peut estre bon pour les autres, la loy naturelle ne te commande point d'estre ingrat, vers celuy qui t'a fait plaisir, & moins de retenir force, ce que lon t'a presté par amitié. (fol. 216r)

Diogenes' selfishness is contrasted with Aristarchus's altruism, which has Christian overtones. Like the Paradoxes, the Epitomes are not designed for serious philosophical argument. Both the structure of pro and contra and the use of dramatic speech are well adapted to providing a frame in which potentially dangerous ideas can be explored safely, since they are seen not to be seriously entertained. It is, however, striking that the chosen Cynic saying is among the least shocking or interesting of the tradition. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that one of the most innocuous Cynic sayings could be turned into a fairly provocative discussion of the relation between nature and law. The Epitomes thereby illustrate the effectiveness of the paradox form in broaching difficult material, the great adaptability of Cynic sayings, and the ease with which the Cynics are used to represent extreme positions.

Charles De Miraumont's Plaidoyer contre fortune [...] en forme de paradoxe (1600) consists of two sets of arguments pro and contra the case for virtue in the face of the whims of fortune. The modus operandi is the same as the Epitomes, hence its arguments are not to be taken philosophically, but as part of a purely rhetorical exercise of the kind Miraumont, who was himself a lawyer, must have practised. Miraumont gives a standard caveat in his dedicatory letter to his father, in which he maintains that he wrote his work 'pour exercer mon esprit durant ces vacations passées' (sig. a iii'); it is presumably meant to be read in the same vein. Miraumont's claim that the Plaidoyer is 'en forme de paradoxe' again shows that the sixteenth century linked paradox with

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arguments pro and contra, perhaps because the latter invariably involve generating views against common opinion. Certainly Miraumont is not proposing a single view against doxa, but leaves it up to the reader to decide whether virtue takes precedence over fortune, or vice-versa, as he makes clear in his ‘Advertisssement au Lecteur’:

Tu te pourrois donc estonner de ce qu’ayant pris la cause de Fortune contre Vertu, & de Vertue contre Fortune, j’ay laissé indecis ce grand different: Mais je l’ay ainsi fait, afin que tu aye le contentement d’incliner d’une part ou d’autre, je n’ay point voulu captiver ton jugement par l’arrest definitivement decisif que j’eusse peu prononcer [...] (sig. e)

Unlike the Epitomes, which give one hundred cases pro and contra, the Plaidoyer has the scope to develop its arguments on the sole theme of the relation between fortune and virtue. In common with other eudaimonistic schools in the Hellenistic period, Cynicism sought to guarantee the individual’s happiness against the whims of fortune.45 Much of Diogenes’ performance in the anecdotes and sayings is designed to demonstrate his capacity to cope with whatever chance may throw at him. It is therefore only natural that Diogenes is Miraumont’s primary example of philosophers who have defied fortune:

C’est a toy Diogenes, que la protopraxie t’apartient, toy seul est suffisant pour rabattre les accidens de fortune, tu n’as point craint les demarches de sa boule, ains d’un courage asseure luy as coupé l’herbe sous le pied, quand elle t’a livré quelque combat. (p. 51)

Miraumont then proceeds to supply the reader with ‘quelques unes de ses reparties, à fin que par icelles vous jugiez le naturel du personnage’, beginning with one of the most relevant sayings: ‘On luy demandoit un jour ce qu’il avoit apris toute sa vie, de l’estude de Philosophie, rien autre chose, dict-il, qu’à me preparer contre tous les assaux de fortune’ (p. 51).46 The result is similar to the portrayal of Diogenes in Mexia, Thevet, and Erasmus’s Apophthegmata, although, unlike his predecessors, Miraumont here turns his collection of sayings to the defence of a single philosophical position. However, not all of the sayings Miraumont cites are pertinent to the issue of dealing with fortune. For example, it is hard to see the pertinence of Cynic sex to the issue:

45 The Cynics, p. 5.
46 DL, VI, 63.
Un jour on le trouva dans le grand marché comme il jouait aux dames rabatues. Comment (ce luy dict quelqu'un) tu faicts icy le Philosophe, & tu paillardes neantmoins. Tt [sic.] as mantly, ce dict-il je ne paillardois pas, je plantois seulement un homme. (p. 52)

As well as illustrating the almost commonplace status of Cynic shamelessness at this time, the inclusion of this saying is a means of illustrating the extent to which Diogenes adopted paradoxical positions. It also serves Miraumont in his attack on Diogenes, which comes in the second part of his work, 'Plaidoyer de Fortune & contre Vertu'. Although Miraumont does not counter each of the sayings given in his praise of Diogenes, he does oppose some of them, including the above:

C'est à toy Diogenes que je veux porter le premier coup, je veux rechercher tes sales & ordureuses vilenies avec ta lanterne mesmo. Je veux aboyer après toy, comme tu aboyes après les autres, & veux montrer que toutes tes actions, sont pleines d'hipocrisie & de meschanceté: Platon le recogneut fort bien un jour, quand il conseilloit à ceux qui te regardoit tout nud dans la neige, de se retirer devant toy, si l'on vouloit rendre pitié de toy, tu faisois le constant pour estre loué d'un vulgaire. Tu ressemblois ce grand Demosthene, tu te glorifiois d'estre monstré au doigt d'une chambriere: c'est le fruct que tu as recueilly de la Philosophie, ou plutost μοροσοφία. Tu plantes les hommes dans les lieux publicqs, tu mesprises les rois ausquels nous devons tout honneur, tu te resjoudis quand tu trouve des arbres peuplez de corps feminins, tu en desire des greffes & sans la femme tu ne serois point. Bref tes actions sont si meschantes, que je m'estonne comme l'on t'a laisse la vie si long temps, non seulement à toy, mais à tous ceus de ta secte: car ils ne font que ruiner les republiques. (pp. 106-08)

While Miraumont's praise of Diogenes stayed on an even keel of fairly straightforward citation, his polemic against the Cynic is more inventive. In particular, he employs Diogenic idioms, from the lantern to barking at enemies, against Diogenes. Unlike in La Perriére and Rabelais, the term 'μοροσοφία' has negative connotations here. Miraumont argues against Diogenes' shamelessness and freedom of speech on political grounds. This leads him to make a more general attack on philosophers who harm the republic, including Socrates and Theodorus the Atheist (neither of whom were Cynics). The sinister solution proposed, which was of course applied in Socrates' case, shows that the real danger of Diogenes' beliefs and methods was easily recognizable in the early modern world, perhaps particularly in the unstable political climate of the time. Other elements of Miraumont's attack are less original, however, either because they are found in Diogenes Laertius, or because they recall the kind of invective found, for
example, in the miscellanies of Breslay and Guyon. Grand conclusions about how the Cynics were understood in early modern France cannot be drawn from Miraumont's *Plaidoyer*, since it remains true to its stated objective of remaining undecided on the question of fortune and virtue. The *Plaidoyer* does, however, serve as an excellent example of how Cynic sayings and anecdotes, including, in particular, those relating to shamelessness and freedom of speech, naturally lend themselves to extreme or polemical responses, precisely because they are always already paradoxical. They are therefore ideally adapted to arguments *pro* and *contra*, which is linked to the notion of paradox. This is why Diogenes has pride of place in Miraumont’s discussion of philosophical responses to the challenges of fortune.

The duplicitous nature of the Lucianic mock-encomia of Estienne and Philibert, like the use of dramatic voice in Sylvain and Miraumont, means that the paradoxes they present, and consequently their use of Cynicism, should not be taken entirely seriously. As a result, such works open up a rhetorical space in which paradoxical material of Cynic origin can be explored in interesting ways. There is, however, another branch of paradoxical literature which follows the Ciceronian model, and offers serious philosophical, religious and moral didactic paradoxes. This is true, for example, of Benigne Poissenot’s *Traicté paradoxe en dialogue, où est montré qu’il est meilleur d’estre en adversité, qu’en prosperité* (Paris: Claude Micard, 1583), which was bound with his better-known *Esté* of the same year. The *Traicté* does not explore the playful possibilities of the paradox form, but offers a genuine praise of adversity from a Christian point of view. Its use of the dialogue form to explore its paradoxical subject-matter illustrates the capacity of the paradox ‘genre’ to adopt many different forms. The framework of the dialogue is reminiscent of Tahureau’s *Dialogues*: it also features two interlocutors, Le Solitaire and Le Mondain, whose roles and views are similar to those of Le Democritic and Le Cosmophile. Le Solitaire dominates proceedings, and rapidly converts Le Mondain to his point of view by citing from a considerable arsenal of

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commonplaces.\textsuperscript{48} The Diogenes encountered in the \textit{Traicté} is closer to the one found in, say, Medieval encyclopedias, than the 'joyeux' figure of the \textit{Tiers Livre}. This is seen in the following, free borrowing from Jerome, a favourite \textit{topos} in those same encyclopedias:

[Le Solitaire] Diogenes allant une fois aux jeux Olimpiques, se trouva tellement assailli & combattu des accès d'une fièvre, qui le tenoit, qu'il fut contraint se reposer sous un arbre, où il se plaignit que si grande multitude de peuple alloit voir ceux qui devoient combattre, & personne ne s'arretoit, pour regarder, un qui combattit sa douleur & soimesme, en un conflit plus dur & facheux à soutenir, que n'estoit celui, où les champions des jeux Olimpiques s'exercoient. Tout autant en diray-je de ceux de nostre temps, qui s'amusent davantage à contempler les bombances & bravetez de quelque pompeux, que la gentillesse de cœur d'un, qui foule son malheur aux pieds, & en despit de fortune & tous ses efforts, ne veut succomber, quelque chose qui lui puisse survenir, ains comme la palme, plus le pense elle courber & mettre en bas, davantage se releve. (fols 197'-198')

The drawing of a contemporary moral from an ancient anecdote is a technique familiar from La Primaudaye and others. What is most striking about Poissenot’s use of the story is that he removes any suggestion that Diogenes overcame his fever by letting himself die, which is the original paradox in Jerome, and which Valla used to launch a polemic against Cynicism.\textsuperscript{49} Poissenot sanitizes the story to make it agree with the point he wishes to make. As in the \textit{Paradoxes}, Diogenes is rendered less paradoxical to fit him into a paradox. However, whereas in the former tales involving Diogenes risked unsettling the purely playful and rhetorical nature of the paradoxes, here Diogenes is tailored to suit a serious, broadly Christian and neo-Stoic point of view. Poissenot thereby joins a tradition of idealizing the Cynics which dates back to antiquity, and includes Epictetus and Julian as well as Erasmus.\textsuperscript{50} Not all of the anecdotes involving Diogenes require such a ‘makeover’, as is seen in the other, straightforward references to the Cynic in the \textit{Traicté} (fols 215' and 219'). The use of Diogenes in the \textit{Traicté} illustrates that while the Cynic may have been exploited for his adoption of shockingly paradoxical positions by Poissenot’s contemporaries, it was still feasible to present an idealized, and unthreatening, version of the philosopher at this time. The \textit{Traicté}

\textsuperscript{49} See above, Chapter 2, part 1, section 7.
\textsuperscript{50} Billerbeck, ‘The Ideal Cynic’, \textit{The Cynics}, p. 206.
thereby serves as a further indication, alongside some collections of sayings, that the predominant Medieval view of the Cynics persisted into the late sixteenth century in some works. However, the serious, idealized version of the Cynic was far from the most common one encountered at the time, and he is not found in Odet de la Noue’s *Paradoxe, que les adversitez sont plus necessaires que les prosperitez* (1588), which is as similar to Poissenot’s work as its title suggest.

Didactic paradox is also found in P.R.P.F.I.S., *Paradoxe, ou sentence philosophique contre l’opinion du vulgaire: que ce n’est point la nature qui fait l’homme, mais bien l’industrie* (Paris: Nicolas du Fosse, 1605). This short work is presented as a serious philosophical paradox, and uses Diogenes accordingly. However, although the version of the Cynic given here is far removed from the disreputable, ‘joyeux’ figure found in Rabelais, Diogenes is not idealized to the same extent as in Poissenot’s *Traicté*, presumably because P.R.P.F.I.S. is not interested in presenting Diogenes as a proto-Christian. Idealization of the Cynic in the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century seems therefore to be linked to the attempt to put him in a Christian frame.

Diogenes’ strange behaviour serves as an introduction to the philosophical paradox:

*Qui t’a si fort esbloûy les yeux de l’entendment, Vulgaire estourdy, que tu ayes creu jusques icy que la figure du visage en l’homme fait l’homme, & non point sa raison interieur? Ce que tu volds de l’homme n’est pas l’homme […] C’est en quoy le Philosophe Synopean eut tant de grace, quand avec sa lanterne allumée en plein midy, entrant en une celebre assemblée des Grecs, il s’escria à haute voix: Homme, Homme: & qu’estant enquis de ce qu’il cherchoit voyant là si grand nombre d’hommes, il respondit, Qu’il y voyoit à la verité force Masques: mais qu’il seriot bien malaisé avec la lueur de sa lanterne, fust ce mesme avec la clarté du Soleil d’y reconnoistre un seul vray Homme. Diogene avoit raison: car si aujourd’huy Dieu metamorphosoit le visage de chasque homme conformément à ses entrailles, comme fit Jupiter (s’il en faut croire aux fables) du cruel Lycaon en Loup, l’Angleterre (Où par un secret de la Nature les Loups ne peuvent vivre) s’en trouveroit remplie d’une infinité, & verroit-on parmy la Cour des Grands y marcher les Tygres & les Lions (fols 2r-3r)*

Diogenes’ paradoxical performance with the lantern seems to have given rise to more improvisation on the part of Renaissance writers than any other single Cynic anecdote. Here, the version found in Diogenes Laertius, which runs to only one sentence, is adjusted to express a new moral. Whereas Diogenes’ search for a man was
presumably meant to demonstrate the paradox that only the sage can truly claim to be human, here it is used to make the point that most people are hypocrites or 'Masques'.

P.R.P.F.I.S. thereby employs Diogenes in a similar way to Philibert, in that the Cynic stands for personal integrity in the face of feigning and hypocrisy. The Cynic's radical idea of what it takes to be a man is also featured in an extended borrowing from Dio Chrysostom's ninth discourse:

C'est de ceste victoire de soy-mesme que le bon Diogene se risoit, & se moquoit de toute les autres: car oyant un jour proclamer un cry és jeux isthmiques, qu'auncun n'eut à se couronner de Pin blanc, que celuy qui seroit vainqueur: il en cueillit des fueilles & s'en fit une guirlande qu'il mit sur sa teste. Dequoy les Athletes, Luitiers, Coureurs & Escrimeurs indignez se prindrent à crier contre luy, de ce qu'il prenoit la Guirlande sans l'avoir meritee: ausquels il respondit, qu'il avoit vaincu & peut etre de plus puissans qu'eux-mesmes: On le presse de dire, qui il avoit vaincu, La Pauvrete respondit-il, la faim, la concupiscence de la chair, & la vaine gloire du monde, qui vient ordinairement à bout de tous vous autres: Auquel ils replicarent que nonobstant tout cela il ne devoit point prendre la couronne, qui n'estoit concedêe qu'aux vainqueurs du jeu: Durant ceste dispute, il survint que de deux chevaux qui s'entrebatoient l'un s'en fuyoit des-ja lassè & blessê des attaintes & morsures de l'autre. Ce que voyant il se print a courir fort hastivement, & mit dessus le chef du cheval vainqueur la Guirlande, s'escriant a haute voix, Cestuy-cy a vaincu aux jeux Isthmiques, Cestui-cy a vaincu. Si l'honneur est deu a la force du courps, couronnons les Taureaux: Si la vistesse couronnons les Leopards, & les chevaux tout ensemble. O Athletes n'avez vous point de honte de vous couronner pour des choses, en quoy les bestes vous enlevent l'avantage? (fols 9r-10r)

The reader is given edited highlights of Dio Chrysostom's 'Isthmic Discourse' here. Although he makes extensive use of the Cynics, Dio Chrysostom is rarely used as a source in the sixteenth century, presumably because his work was not well known. It is likely that the serious, didactic nature of his discourses did not appeal in an age which had such a developed taste for Lucian. However, Dio Chrysostom is ideally suited to the purposes of the author of the Paradoxe, which are to challenge the reader's assumptions of what it takes to be a man. Whereas the lantern story required improvisation and explanation, Dio Chrysostom already supplies a didactic message to Diogenes' bizarre behaviour. The Paradoxe is unusual in giving extended, serious and philosophical versions of two paradoxes of Cynic origin. Such didactic treatment of

51 DL, VI, 41.
52 See above, Chapter 1, part 1, section 3.
Diogenes inevitably lacks the amusing quality of seriocomic Cynic performance, which is what appealed to most of P.R.P.F.I.S.'s contemporaries.

Part Three
Bruscambille's Theatrical Paradoxes

In the early seventeenth century burlesque encomium returned to prominence but in a different form, the dramatic performances of Bruscambille, also known as Seigneur Des Lauriers. He worked at the Hôtel de Bourgogne from at least 1609 onwards as a kind of warm-up man whose job it was to quell the audience with a 'prologue' before the main event, be it a farce, tragi-comedy or tragedy. Although little is known of his life, a great number of his 'prologues', 'harangues', 'fantaisies' and 'paradoxes' have survived in numerous editions, although there is no modern edition available, nor any complete Oeuvres from the early modern period. The fact that the prologues were also entitled 'paradoxes' indicates that the term, and by extension some of its attendant literary features, were well-known to a wide audience at this time. His works betray the influence of both Italian bernesque satire and of a more specifically French tradition of farce. In particular, there are references to Rabelais and his characters throughout the prologues. Indeed, Bruscambille's verbal inventiveness and comedy is truly Rabelaisian, and, according to Dandrey, Molière's use of mock encomium owes a good deal to his


54 Hence references to several of Bruscambille's works will be required here; on editions, see Georges Mongrédien, *Bibliographie des œuvres du facetieux Bruscambille* (Chartres: Durand, 1926) and Alain Mercier, *La Littérature facetieuse sous Louis XIII: une bibliographie critique* (Geneva: Droz, 1991).

55 Tomarken, *Smile of Truth*, p. 163.

predecessor's performance. He would therefore be worthy of a much more extensive study than can be afforded here.

There are only occasional references to the Cynics in the prologues, but these are peculiarly interesting not only because they give as good an indication as it is possible to have of the popular connotations of Cynicism at this time but also because they constitute a very rare example of Diogenes' rhetoric being borrowed for performance on the early modern stage. More than one critic has questioned what the contemporary audience must have made of Bruscambille's more learned references. Both Tomarken and Bowen seek to cut across this problem by arguing that it is wrong to assume that audiences of the time would have been made up of one social stratum.

In fact, Bruscambille dedicates one edition of his prologues to prince Henri de Bourbon who was apparently something of a fan:

Monseigneur, Ayant cy devant pleu à vostre excellence ouyr le recit de quelques prologues tissus & bigarrez de diverses couleurs, je me persuaday que vous les jugiez, sinon d'un tel poids & mereite que la qualité des sujects diversement traittez, le pouvoit requerir, à tout le moins suffisans de vous chatoüiller & l'esprit & l'oreille.

This is an important indication that Bruscambille's audience was made up of more than one class of people. It is nonetheless needlessly patronizing to suggest that lower social classes would have been unable to appreciate such-and-such a supposedly learned allusion. For, as in Rabelais, it really does not matter if the audience had no previous awareness of who Socrates or Diogenes were, providing the reference is turned in such a way as to enable them to get the joke. Indeed, Bruscambille comically dismisses both his own, and his audience's, understanding of philosophy:

Au surplus, ne vous estonnez pas si ce discours n'est enrichy de quelque point de Philosophie, mon ingenuita me contraint de confesser que c'est une science où je n'entends que le haut Allemand, il faudroit une cervelle mieux timbree que la mienne, & quintessenciee de plus grand relief, &

57 Dandrey, p. 240.
Despite the above, Bruscambille refers to ancient philosophers fairly frequently, and to
the commonplaces associated with them, as is seen in the following:

To those in the know, these passing references, part of a characteristically lengthy
sentence, would be reminiscent of similar use of such *topoi* in Philibert, Du Bellay,
Tahureau and many others. There is, however, an additional comic dimension here,
which consists in the comedy of long lists of examples, with the bathos of horns in their
midst. This is typically Rabelaisian humour which can be appreciated without knowledge
of who Diogenes and Democritus were, nor what they stood for. The strong traces of
orality in Bruscambille’s paradoxes, which presumably derive from the original
performance, also recall Rabelais, and add to the comedy. The fact that the
philosophers are referred to here nonetheless shows that commonplaces involving the
two were part of the popular imagination, although it remains hard to say to what extent.
A similar passing reference to Diogenes and other philosophers in ‘Prologue serieux en
faveur de l’asne’ indicates that the Cynic was readily associated with disreputable
behaviour. The reader finds the following in a list of philosophical impossibilities: ‘tirer
de la doctrine de l’ignorance de Socrates [...] la verita du puy de Democrite; la pietà du
tonneau de Diogenes’.

The deliberate confusion between container (barrel) and
content (Diogenes) is itself comic. This type of joke is extended still further in ‘Harangue
funebre en faveur du bonnet de Jean Farine’, in which we are told that Bruscambille’s
late friend’s headgear had ‘plus de science souz [sa] rotondité que n’en tenoit la cuve

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60 *Facecieuses paradoxes de Bruscambille, & autres discours comiques. Le tout nouvellement tiré
de l’escarcelle de ses imaginations* (Rouen: Thomas Maillard, 1615), sig. A viw.
61 *Les Fantaisies de Bruscambille. Contentant plusieurs discours, paradoxes, harangues &
prologues facecieux. Faits par le sieur des Lauriers, comediens* (Paris: Jean de Bordeaulx, 1612),
p. 9.
62 *Les Fantaisies de Bruscambille. Contentant plusieurs discours, paradoxes, harangues &
prologues facecieux. Reveuès & augmentées de nouveau, par l’autheur* (Paris: Jean Millot,
de Diogenes'.

This claim may well be doubly ironic, since Diogenes' barrel is far from being an obvious symbol of knowledge. It certainly does not represent asceticism for Bruscambille informs his audience, in a prologue against avarice, that citing Diogenes' tub as an example of self-restraint will not do because the Cynic 'aymoit trop la volupté' for that to be the case. It would of course be wrong to suggest from these occasional allusions to Diogenes that Bruscambille is seeking to construct a consistent attitude towards Cynicism. Rather, Bruscambille, like others before him, exploits the commonplace associations surrounding Diogenes for his own comic purposes. Knowing that Diogenes was habitually linked with shamelessness is nonetheless important in understanding how he was viewed at this time. The sexual nature of Diogenes' impiety is made playfully plain in a prologue entitled 'De la Mexique':

il y a quatre chemises de Venus, faites de la main d'Aracne, & empesées par Mars, lesquelles, du toucher seulement, rendent les nouvelles mariées hardies & courageuses entre deux draps la première nuit de leurs noces. Cinq manteaux à l'antique façon Athenienne, tissus & brodez de sentences Diogeniques, avec le collet à barbe d'Escrevice, qui montre au naturel ce Plante-hominem.

A more traditional correlation is made in Bruscambille's praise of poverty, entitled 'Egestas nobilissima', which features Alexander's wish to be Diogenes, were he not Alexander, as a 'fondement bien planté'. From this basic principle, Bruscambille proceeds to cite examples of great poor men, including Crates and Diogenes:

Et si ce Thebain Philosophe ancien n'eust cognu l'excellence de la pauvreté, eust-il jetté ses richesses dans la mer, avec cette parole heroïque, mergam vos o divitiæ ne mergar à vobis [...] tant de doctes hommes & signalez n'eussent point embrassé strictam illum vivendi normam, s'ils n'y eussent trouvé plus de gout: & jamais Diogene n'eust rompu son écuelle de bois, s'il n'eust cogneu que Nature nous ait fourny de tout l'atirail nécessaire pour nostre mesnage, les pauvres dorment en repos, & vont seurement par les rues, ne craignant fly les voleurs nocturnes, ny les coupe-bourses, qui courent si souvent apres vos richesses. (p. 111)

Use of the Cynics in encomia of poverty is commonplace, and was seen in Estienne and Godard above. Bruscambille comically undermines his sources of paradoxical

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63 Les Nouvelles et plaisantes imaginations (1613), fol. 190'; on Jean Farine, of whom little is known, see Bowen, Les Caracteristiques essentielles, p. 171.
64 Les Fantaisies de Bruscambille (1612), p. 184.
65 Les Nouvelles et plaisantes imaginations (1613), fol. 75".
wisdom. What can be presented as serious philosophical arguments in Seneca, for example, are turned to facetious use. This technique puts his paradox firmly in the category of 'bluff', since the audience or readership must have been left amusingly bemused at this failed encomium.\textsuperscript{68} Bruscambille was not the first person to play with the paradox form in this way, but he is unusual in the verve of his presentation. Alongside poverty and shamelessness, and maybe following from them, Diogenes is associated with folly, as is shown in 'En faveur du nombre de trois':

\begin{quote}
Je diray encore auparavant que de conclure qu'il n'y eust jamais que trois grands Philosophes, Aristote, Platon, & moy: trois grands Orateurs, Demosthene, Ciceron, & moy: trois grands Historiographes, Plutarque, Pline, & moy: trois grands Poetes, Homere, Virgile, & moy: trois grands Capitaines, Alexandre, Cesar, & moy: trois grands fols, Diogenes, Pierre du Puy, & moy.\textsuperscript{69}
\end{quote}

Pierre du Puy, to whom Bruscambille makes numerous references in the prologues, was a well-known fool on the streets of Paris.\textsuperscript{70} He, together with Diogenes, forms the final, bathetic touch to this list of threesomes. The link between Diogenes and foolishness is also made in Cynic-style mock-syllogisms found in the third book of \textit{Les Sérées} of Guillaume Bouchet (1598):

\begin{quote}
Que tout le monde soit fol [...] Aristote dit, que nul sage est menteur, l'escriture dit, tout homme est menteur, donc nul homme est sage. Diogene dit que celuy est fol qui ne se contente, tout le monde est donc fol, parce que nul n'est content de sa fortune. (p. 321)
\end{quote}

The phrase 'tout le monde [est] fol' is drawn from Ecclesiastes I, 15 ('Stultorum infinitus est numerus'), and was both a commonplace in serious as well as comic writing about folly, and served as a motto for fool societies.\textsuperscript{71} The same paradoxes, described as being 'comme une espée à deux mains, comme un baston à deux bouts, ou comme un flacon à deux goulets', are found in \textit{Les Plaisantes idees du sire Mistanguet} (1615), a

\textsuperscript{67} DL, VI, 37.
\textsuperscript{68} For Seneca’s praise of Cynic poverty, see above, p. 36. In a subsequent edition, a new ending is added to this paradox, which further complicates matters: ‘Et pour finir je diray que l’homme qui se contente de sa petite fortune se peut dire partfaictement riche, voire plus heureux que s’il estoit comblé de toutes les richesses de Cresus, & possesseur de la monarchie d’Alexandrie, le pauvre n’a deqoy perdre & trouve tous les jours a gaigner’, \textit{Les Fantaisies de Bruscambille [...] Revuees & augmentées de nouveau, par l’auteur} (Paris: Jean Millot, 1615), pp. 279-80.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Facecieuses paradoxes de Bruscambille} (1615), fol. 43v.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Les Caracteristiques essentielles}, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{71} Carol Clark, 'Stultorum numerus infinitus: Attitudes to Folly in the Sixteenth Century and in Rabelais', \textit{Rabelais in Glasgow: Proceeding of the Colloquium held at the University of Glasgow
work which is very similar to Bruscambille’s prologues.\textsuperscript{72} Like the liar paradox, proving that all men are mad leads to self-referential incoherence, or a stick with which to beat yourself. Mathurin Regnier, a contemporary of Bruscambille and Mistanguet, plays with these ideas in his fourteenth satire, which was first published in 1613, and which opens with a nod in the direction of Diogenes and his lantern:

\begin{quote}
J’ay pris cent & cent fois la lanterne en la main, 
Cherchant en plain midy parmy le genre humain, 
Un homme qui fut homme & de faict & de mine, 
Et qui peut des vertus passer l’estamine: 
Il n’est coing & recoint que je n’aye tantê, 
Depuis que la nature icy bas m’a plantêt: 
Mais tant plus je me lime & plus je me rabote, 
Je croy qu’à mon advis tout le monde radote, 
Qu’il a la teste vuide & sans dessus dessous, 
Ou qu’il faut qu’au rebour je sois l’un des plus fous.\textsuperscript{73}
\end{quote}

Diogenes’ foolish-wise behaviour with the lantern, which was probably originally designed to demonstrate that sages are few in number, is here used to suggest something rather different, namely that everyone is mad. Like Mistanguet, Regnier playfully suggests that the paradox could be turned against himself. Later in the satire, he discusses Diogenes, along with other fools:

\begin{quote}
Il n’est pas le Cousin qui n’ait quelque raison;\textsuperscript{74} 
De peur de reparer, il laisse sa maison, 
Que son lict ne defonce, il dort dessus la dure 
Et n’a, crainte du chaud, que l’air pour couverture: 
[...] Et mil autre’accidens, bourreaux de nostre vie, 
Luy selon sa raison sous eux il s’est sousmis, 
Et forçant la nature, il les a pour amis. 
[...] En tout indifferent tout est à son visage, 
On dira qu’il est foux je croy qu’il n’est pas sage, 
Que Diogene aussi fut un foux de tout point, 
C’est ce que le cousin comme moy ne croit point, 
Ainsi ceste raison est une estrange beste, 
On l’a bonne selon qu’on a bonne la teste, 
Qu’on imagine bien du sens comme de l’ceil, 
Pour grain ne prenant paille ou Paris pour Corbeil. (pp. 195-96, vv. 137-58)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{72} Les Plaisantes idees du sieur Mistanguet, docteur à la moderne, parent de Bruscambille. Ensemble la genealogie de Mistanguet, & de Bruscambille. Nouvellement composées, & non encore veuës (Paris: Jean Millot, 1615), p. 23.

The 'Cousin' and Diogenes join forces here to enable the poet to express the age-old paradox that, in a mad world, the mad are wise. The Cousin's Cynic-like asceticism is doubtlessly a chance result of his madness, while Diogenes, according to Regnier, grounds his apparent madness on reason, which makes him a wise fool. Regnier wittily demonstrates that 'raison est une estrange beste' through a series of negatives which playfully unsettle normative notions of madness and wisdom. Characteristically, Bruscambille seeks to brush aside this paradox when he comes to treat it in 'En faveur de la Chiquane'. Having informed us that 'entre tant de Docteurs [...] je suis celuy seul qui par une infinité de travaux me suis rendu capable de porter la lanterne afin de leur esclairer' (fols 47'-48'), Bruscambille proceeds to use his lantern against Diogenes, and attack another doctor, who may well stand for Mistanguet, or Regnier, or both:

Ce Docteur in quam, chaussé en cureur de retraits, peigné en crieur de noir à noircir, esveillé comme une souche, resolu comme un porc qui pisse, hardy comme un avaleur d'enclumes [...] concluoiit ireveremment, que tous les hommes, sans en excepter les petits enfans, & les Pelerins de saict Mathurin de l'Archant, estoient fols: ô le brave Sophiste, ô le suffisant banquier de Sapience [...] Ce parangon de toute parfaicte imperfection, pour preuve de son dire alleguoit (la roupie au bout du nez, & la teste tournee en visse de pressouër) que Diogenes avec sa lanterne ne sceut jamais trouver un homme sage, & que le mesme Diogenes estoit fol, de faire une si sotte & ridicule perquisition: A quoy il concluoit avec despens. A ceste subtile proposition, je fis une response capable de donner l'admiration a tous ceux qui en auront le nez bride, & les oreilles sanglees: car je luy dis sans perdre le temps à feuiller une bastelee de livres, qu'il ne seroit pas à propos que le fol fust repute sage, qu'un petit homme fust dict estre grand, ny qu'un More fust blanc, que l'on portast les oreilles aux talons, & les yeux au cul. Concluant afin d'abolution & de despens dommages & interests, en cas qu'il voulust persistir. (fols 49'-51')

Bruscambille drums home the point that whoever claims all men are mad condemns himself with Panurge-style rhetoric. The mixture of legal language with coarse, bathetic metaphors is an important element of the comedy here. The conclusion of the prologue is also Panurgian, as Bruscambille, on hearing that the Docteur ('asseuré comme un foireux sur la chaire percee') has considerable legal knowledge takes the option of making a rapid exit: 'Je ne vous diray pas l'estonnement où je me trouvay embarrassé, ny les tremblemens qui me faisirent les mammelles du cul [...] je me retiray au petit pas' (fol. 52'). In a well established comic move, Bruscambille's display of cowardice

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75 Facesieuses parodoxes de Bruscambille (1615).
contrasts with his earlier bravura. The majority of the jokes in Bruscambille are old ones, the novelty comes from taking them off the page and putting them on the stage, where oral performance adds a new dimension, which is successfully transferred to the written text. For example, Bruscambille borrows the image of Diogenes’ lantern to make the following joke in ‘En faveur de crachat’: ‘Je cracheray donc Platoniquement pour disposer mon organe à la reception des elegantes paroles que l’acuité de mon esprit veut aujourd’hui fabricquer en faveur de tant de beaux esprits que je voy briller & esclater icy comme une lanterne en plain midy’ (fols 65r-66v). Read or heard quickly, this remark sounds like a compliment to his audience, but a second’s thought proves it to be the opposite (a lantern appears least bright at midday). Furthermore, it is an example of comic idiomatization, and therefore an archetypal instance of Diogenes’ rhetoric being assimilated for sixteenth-century performance.

Conclusion

Like Rabelais, Bruscambille exploits Cynic commonplaces for his own comic performance. Bruscambille uses Diogenes above all as an emblem of shamelessness and folly, which gives a good idea of how the Cynic was popularly perceived at this time, as do the works of Regnier and Mistanguet. Their comic use of Diogenes has the side-effect of raising Cynic paradoxes, but these are not taken at all seriously. This contrasts with the serious use of Diogenes in Poissenot and P.R.P.F.I.S., which shows again that there were competing versions of the Cynic in currency at the time. These disparities derive in part from the different strands of the paradox ‘genre’ to which these works belong. While Bruscambille’s paradoxes are an excellent example of comic use of the Cynic tradition, there is a sense in which merely analysing Bruscambille’s use of Cynicism leads to an inevitably restricted notion of his comedy. Oddly, though, focusing almost exclusively on the representation of the Cynics leads to a surprisingly rounded view of the other texts analysed here. Like a dye injected into the bloodstream, representations of Cynicism leave traces that allow for textual diagnosis. In Poissenot, Diogenes is sanitized to make him fit with the text’s Christian didactic aims. In
arguments *pro* and *contra*, Cynic paradoxes, including both the innocuous one raised in Sylvain and the more philosophical debate of Miraumont, are used to broach extreme positions and raise provocative questions which are left unanswered. This unusual effect of Cynicism is, however, most obviously apparent in Lucianic, seriocomic encomia, in which Cynic paradoxes are presented neither wholly seriously nor completely comically. In Estienne's *Paradoxes*, Cynic commonplaces are rendered less paradoxical, thereby not threatening the purely rhetorical play of the text. In *Le Philosophe de court*, the paradoxical nature of ancient Cynicism is acknowledged, but rejected as an unacceptable extreme. Sandford even uses the paradoxical qualities of Cynicism as a shield behind which other paradoxes can be launched. It would be wrong to exaggerate the influence and effect of Cynicism on the paradox 'genre' as a whole. After all, the texts dealt with in this chapter represent only a small proportion of the output of paradoxes at this time. However, it is unlikely that any other ancient philosophical school would have had this peculiar effect of compelling paradoxes to reveal their true nature.
Chapter Seven

Cynic Shamelessness and Freedom of Speech

Did I ever tell you about the man that taught his asshole to talk?

William S. Burroughs, *Naked Lunch*

‘Chacun a ouy parler de la des-hontée façon de vivre des philosophes Cyniques’: so says Montaigne in editions of the *Essais* published in his lifetime.\(^1\) Indeed, the Cynics have been notorious from ancient times onwards for their shameless ways.\(^2\) Throughout this thesis, I have given points of reference to discussion of this most provocative of Cynic practices in sixteenth-century writing. Fougerolles, the first French translator of Diogenes Laertius, obscured the description of Diogenes’ public masturbation with euphemism, Rhodiginus attempted to dismiss it as a joke and Erasmus could not stomach the subject at all, rejecting it on grounds of Ciceronian ‘decorum’. Each of these responses betrays a predictable embarrassment in the face of Diogenes’ lewd conduct. In late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century French miscellanies, however, titillating discussion of Cynic shamelessness became commonplace, whether it provoked tabloidesque outrage, as in Breslay’s *Anthologie* (1574), or confusion, as in Guyon’s *Diverses leçons* (1605-25). André Tiraqueau gives a brief, unsympathetic, exposé of the dirty dogs in *De legibus connubialibus* (1513).\(^3\) A passing reference by Panurge to sex ‘à la Cynique’ provides further evidence of the commonplace status of Cynic shamelessness at the time, as does Randle Cotgrave’s definition of ‘Faire le sucré’ as ‘To frig, to wriggle, to commit Diogenes his sinne’.\(^4\)

There is a sense, however, in which the scandalous antics of the Cynics could never be commonplace, since they pose too great a threat to civilized values. This partly explains why works which contain versions of the life of Diogenes, including, for example, Pedro Mexia’s *Silva de varia lección* (1540) and André Thevet’s *Les Vrais pourtraits* (1584), do not countenance tales of shamelessness. Similarly, few of the

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1 *Essais*, II, 12, 583, n.7. This sentence was omitted from the posthumous edition of 1595.
3 I consulted the following edition: *Andreae Tiraquelli regii [...] de legibus connubialibus & jure maritali [...]* (Lyon: Guillaume Rouille, 1586), XV, 159, pp. 314-15.
texts analysed in the previous chapter contain reference to Cynic shamelessness, as this most paradoxical of Cynic practices was too paradoxical for most paradoxes. The danger of Cynic shamelessness also gives rise to a crucial difference between accounts of Cynic shamelessness and the kind of sexual explicitness or lewdness encountered in comic or facetious literature throughout the sixteenth century. This distinction lies in the philosophical justification for the Cynics' disgraceful performance. Whether sixteenth-century writers acknowledge them or not, the possible ethical motivations for Diogenes bizarre behaviour always underlie his acts. Shamelessness is one of Diogenes' most devastating heuristic strategies for shocking his contemporaries into re-evaluating social norms. By making his body the centre of attention, Diogenes constantly reminds his audience of the physical constraints of their existence. He thereby engages in what Bakhtin calls the 'drama of bodily life', invoking the 'bodily material principle', which is universal. Since all people are embodied, jokes or obscenity that derive from the body are sure-fire subversive techniques. The danger of Diogenes' performance derives from the inevitable association of bodily control with social control. The Cynics blur the boundaries of the body by focusing their audience's attention on the fluids and gases that pass from and between bodies. The Cynics' activities are abominable because they confuse the categories between man and beast. Cynic dirtiness threatens and pollutes the normal order of things.

In the first part of this chapter, I shall analyse the diverse reactions to shameless Cynic performance in the facetious dialogues of Bouchet and Cholières, in the Essais, as well as in religious, medical and other works. These responses range from disgust to playfulness. However, none of the texts nor any of the authors of the sixteenth century are Cynical themselves in that they do not join Diogenes in advocating a reversal of the social order by returning to nature, although Montaigne comes close. Narrating a story about masturbating in public is not the same as masturbating in public. However, tracing

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5 Rabelais and his World, p. 88.
developed sixteenth-century responses to the provocative performance of the ancient Cynics is bound to highlight some of the ways in which writers thought about vice, virtue, nature, obscenity and the body.

Diogenes' authority or licence comes from his performative use of his body, which simultaneously demonstrates his exemption from civilized values and his commitment to nature. Diogenes' freedom from the constraints of shame gives him the freedom to speak his mind, whatever the risk. As Branham puts it,

the body is not just a tool for attacking enemies or shocking the public [...] it is also a source of the Cynic's authority, his warrant for engaging in parrhesia. He uses it as the visible expression of his exemption from social control, of his immunity to doxa or public opinion: it confers on his conduct the sanction of nature [...] The Cynic's anaideia and parrhesia meet in this exhibitionistic or performative use of the body.7

Freedom of speech (parrhesia) follows from shamelessness (anaideia). Cynic freedom of speech is also linked to the body because the parrhesiat is risking life and limb. Diogenes' encounters with the powerful are paradigmatic instances of parrhesia, since they involve telling the truth when this entails putting oneself in great danger.8 Diogenes' encounter with Alexander was, of course, a commonplace in the sixteenth century, and indeed Camus remarks that 'Ceste franchise de parler du Philosophe Diogenes à Alexandre est cognue aux enfans' (fol. 117v).9 In the second part of this chapter I shall examine three unusual adaptations of the Cynic performance of parrhesia, in a political poem from the Spanish Netherlands, in the Essais, and in Bérald de Verville's Le Moyen de parvenir. Again, I do not wish to argue that any of these texts are Cynical themselves. Rather, if they are of any autonomous interest at all, it is because they adapt, and improvise upon, Cynic freedom of speech. It is no surprise to discover that parrhesia resonated at this time of religious conflict and

7 Branham, 'Diogenes' Rhetoric', p. 100.
8 Branham, 'Diogenes' Rhetoric', pp. 96-98, and especially n.54. Foucault was working on the notion of parrhesia at his death, but the text of his lectures, L'Herméneutique du sujet: cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982, ed. by François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana and Frédéric Gros (Paris: Hautes Etudes, 2001), ignores this vital aspect of parrhesia, recognized only in the 1983-84 lectures (see n.28), which have yet to be published. There is, however, an account of these final lectures, in Thomas Flynn, 'Foucault as Parthesiast: his Last Course at the Collège de France (1984)' in The Final Foucault, ed. by James Bernauesser and David Rasmusser (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 102-18.
persecution in Europe. What is more surprising, however, is that Montaigne and Bérald de Béze in particular explore the link between freedom of speech and the body. It is the unruly Cynic body that links the two parts of this chapter, whether it is rejected, obfuscated through euphemism, or envisaged as a site of opposition to the status quo.

Part One
Cynic Shamelessness

Objections to shamelessness on religious grounds are found in Gabriel Du Préau’s dictionary of heresies, *De Vitis, Sectis, et Dogmatibus Omnium Haereticorum* (1569), which reproduces an attack on Cynic shamelessness drawn from one of Jean de Gerson’s late-fourteenth-century sermons in his article on Turlupins. Gerson was more concerned with refuting a contemporary cult than with ancient philosophy. By the time of Du Préau, however, further evidence of the Cynics’ foul behaviour had come to light through the dissemination of Diogenes Laertius, hence the need to produce a separate entry on the ancient Dogs:

The Cynics [...] derived their name either from [...] the doglike bite with which they attacked the lifestyle of all and sundry, or because of their habit of copulating in public like dogs, which is what Diogenes Laertius reported Crates and Hipparchia as doing. Those carnal and bestial philosophers, who believed that it was acceptable to copulate with women as shamelessly as dog with dog, were imitated by the Waldenses and similar heretics several centuries later.\(^\text{10}\)

The Cynics are not only bad dogs, but they have allegedly served as models for future generations of free-living Christian sects. As a fervent opponent of Reform, Du Préau seeks to dismiss such cults precisely by associating them with the Cynics, and vice-versa. This is a clear sign that the threat posed by Cynic shamelessness resonated in the sixteenth century, and, given the reproduction of Du Préau’s views in seventeenth-century works, throughout the early modern period.\(^\text{11}\) Nonetheless, the ‘dog-marriage’

\(^{10}\) *De Vitis, Sectis, et Dogmatibus Omnium Haereticorum* [...] (Cologne: Geruuvinum Calenium and haeredes Ioannis Quentel, 1569), fol. 136*: ‘Cynici [...] ita dicit sive a [...] canina mordacitate, qua in hominum vitas nullo discrimine invehebantur: aut (ut alii volunt) ab eo quod canum more in propatulo coire non dubitarent: quem admodum de Crate & Hipparchia tradit Laertius. Hos carnales & bestiales philosophos, dicentes licere cuique commisceri foeminis instar canum, omni pudore subiato, Vualdenses & consimiles haeretici imitari nonn erubuerunt ab hinc aliquot seculis [...]’, trans. by Matton, p. 258.

\(^{11}\) Matton, pp. 257-59.
(kunogamia) of Crates and Hipparchia could be favourably portrayed at the time, as both Guicciardini and Guazzo demonstrate.\textsuperscript{12}

Du Préau's polemic recalls that of Breslay, which had no explicit religious motivation. Jean de Léry, a Protestant explorer of Brazil, is similarly unamused. Tales of alfresco fornication inevitably led to comparisons with the peoples of the New World, who were alleged to engage in such activity, notably by Vespucci in his \textit{Mundus novus} (1503/4). Nonetheless, Léry, in his \textit{Histoire d'un voyage faict en la terre de Brésil}, first published in 1578, maintains that they do not behave in such fashion:

\begin{quote}
Au surplus, poursuivant à parler du mariage des \textit{Toïoupinambaoults}, autant que la vergogne le pourra porter, j'aferme contre ce qu'aucuns ont imaginé que les hommes d'entre eux, gardant l'honnêteté de nature, n'ayant jamais publiquement la compagnie de leurs femmes, sont en cela non seulement à préférer à ce vilain Philosophe Cynique, qui, trouvé sur le fait, au lieu d'avoir honte, dit qu'il plantait un homme; mais qu'auSSI ces boucs puants qu'on ouit de notre par-deçá, ne sont point cachés pour commettre leurs vilénies, sont sans comparaison plus infâmes qu'eux.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

In a kind of anthropological inversion familiar from Montaigne, Léry compares the Brazilians with Europeans, and finds the latter wanting. For while there are shameless 'boucs puants' at home, the native people of Brazil demonstrate a natural sense of shame. André Thevet also denies that the peoples of the new world had public sex, although he does not mention the Cynics.\textsuperscript{14} However, elsewhere Thevet does argue that, in terms of their treatment of the dead, the 'rudesse & simplicité' of the peoples of the new world is preferable to 'ce sot Philosophe Diogene Cynique', who requested that his body be left unburied.\textsuperscript{15} The Cynic's body has the capacity to outrage even in death. Léry clearly had a vested religious interest in attesting to 'honnêteté de nature'. His attitude is indistinguishable from that of Du Préau, indicating that both Calvinist and Catholic zealots are as one as far as their disgust at Cynic sex is concerned. Whether he is aware of the fact or not, his criticism of Cynic shamelessness mirrors that of

\textsuperscript{12} See above, Chapter 3, parts 1 and 2.
\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Histoire d'un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil} (1578) 2\textsuperscript{e} édition, 1580, ed. by Frank Lestringant (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1994), pp. 436-37.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique [...] } (Paris: les heritiers de Maurice de la Porte, 1558), fol. 80\textsuperscript{r}-v, see Lestringant, ed., p. 436, n.4.
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{La Cosmographie universelle [...] } 2 vols (Paris: Pierre l'Huilier, 1575), II, fol. 925'-926\textsuperscript{r}; Cicero, \textit{Tusculan Disputations}, I, 43, 104; this view is the opposite of Legrand, see above, pp. 43-44.
Augustine in book 14, chapter 20 of *City of God*. Augustine’s work was well-known throughout the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century, and was translated into French, together with Juan Luis Vivès’s early-sixteenth-century commentary, by Gentian Hervet in 1570:

Les Philosophes de Chien, c’est à dire, les Cyniques, n’ont pas veu cecy produisans contre la vergongne humaine […] C’est à scavoir que pour ce qui se faict en sa femme est juste, on n’ait point honte de le faire en public [...] Toutesfois la honte naturelle a vaincu l’opinion de cest erreur. Car combien qu’ils disent, que Diogene l’ait fait quelquefois en se glorifiant, pensant que sa secte seroit ainsi plus noble & plus fameuse [...] toutesfois les Cyniques ont puis apres cessé de le faire: & la honte à plus valu que les hommes eussent honte des hommes, que n’a fait l’erreur que les hommes taschassent d’estre semblables aux Chiens. Parquoi je pense que celuy ou ceux qu’on dit avoir fait cecy, ont plustost representé les mouvemens de ceux qui couchent ensemble, aux yeux des hommes qui ne scavoient que c’est qu’on faisoit sous le manteau, que cest voluptê la se soit peu parfaire, le regard de l’homme les pressant.16

Augustine argues that Cynic sex is theoretically and practically impossible for it goes against the natural shame that affects fallen man which entails that the sexual organs are no longer under the control of the will. This makes the Cynics doubly mistaken, for not only do they attempt the impossible, but they claim the sanction of nature for their supposed activities. For Augustine, Diogenes’ practice is a publicity stunt, the audience being unaware of what is going on under his cloak. Nonetheless, as with Du Préau and Léry, Augustine was not interested in Cynicism alone, but also in contemporary sects attacked by virtue of associating them with the disgusting Dogs. For other sixteenth-century authors, however, Augustine’s polemic was exploited for its comic potential. This is true, for example, of a brief passage in *Les Sérées* of Guillaume Bouchet. As I showed above, although not strictly a discursive work, Bouchet’s dialogue resembles commonplace-books and miscellanies in its use of ancient material while it also draws on the *conte* and banquet traditions.17 Bouchet’s brief references to Cynic

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shamelessness occur in the first book of *Les Sérées*, which appeared in 1584. The following is from the fifth ‘Séréée’, ‘Des nouvellement mariez & mariees’:

Sainct Augustin dit que telle action ne depend ny de nostre esprit, ny de nostre corps: de sorte que les parties, qui [sont] destinee à telles action, n’obeissent à nostre volonta, comme les autres membres [...] Et m’esbahis, adjouste de Montagne, d’où est venu ce congrez, & quelle assurance on y peut avoir pour rompre un mariage: car quelque assurance que tout homme se puisse promettre, il confessera qu’il nest en sa puissance de se faire paroistre capable du mariage en presence de la Justice, des Medecins, Chirurgiens, & matrones, que l’on craint, & avecques une femme que l’on tient pour son ennemie: veu que telles actions d’elles mesmes requierent une assurance, & un secret, & une amitié, & qu’elles sont hors de la puissance & de l’esprit & du corps. Ce congrez mesmes est reprouvé par les Cyniques Philosophes [...] (p. 65)

The idea that Diogenes’ followers gave up on outdoor intercourse is drawn from Augustine, whose theological arguments Bouchet renders facetiously. The topic of impotence is clearly well suited to such treatment. On the other hand, Cynic shamelessness, which might appear to be ideally adapted for facetious literature, is an uneasy presence owing to its inherent seriousness. This is partly apparent from the fact that Bouchet joins Augustine in refusing to countenance Cynic sex. Acknowledging the full force of the Dogs is no joke, so Bouchet seeks to keep them on the leash. The other reference to Cynic shamelessness in *Les Sérées* features a ‘Fesse-tondué’ who had been ‘escholier en l’eschole des Cyniques’. The joke here is that it is hard to imagine a less academic school than Cynicism, but this joke could in itself be seen as part of an unwitting attempt to render the Cynics more conventional. The Cynic in *Les Sérées* points out that the Roman law permitting unembarrassed farting is made redundant by Cynicism, according to which ‘on ne craindroit nullement de faire les choses naturelles’ (p. 123). Such an unexpectedly serious philosophical point sits uncomfortably with a characteristically facetious handling of the subject of breaking wind, and misses the point that ancient Cynicism invariably combines humour and philosophy.

The discomfort caused by attempting to squeeze Cynic shamelessness into a facetious frame is more clearly demonstrated in Cholières’s *Matinées* (1585) and *Apresdisnées* (1587), which are similar in form and content to *Les Sérées*. The ninth
and final 'Matinée' is devoted to a well-worn topic in both comic and serious works: 'De la trefve conjugale: En quel temps n'est loisible au mary de toucher conjugalement sa femme'. The two main speakers of the dialogue are Dominique, whose wife is refusing him sex, and Theodat, who attempts to demonstrate to an increasingly exasperated Dominique that there are times when couples should put sexual relations on hold.

Dominique bemoans his temporary celibacy through a series of licentious metaphors: he cannot fire off his cannon, he has the key but is not allowed to put it in the lock, and so on. Cholières delights in such euphemisms, which also play a large part in Theodat's attempt to persuade Dominique that 'la retention de la semence [...] pourroit estre grandement nuisible' (p. 302), and that there is an easy remedy to his ills:

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je ne voudroie que vous proposer l'histoire laquelle Agatius Scholasticus, au septiesme livre des Epigrammes Grecs, nous propose touchant Diogenes le Cynique, lequel au reste on tient avoir esté autant continent et attrempe qu'autre personnage de son siecle, toutesfois ne peut s'exempter des accouplemens feminins, ausquels il ne tendoit point pour quelque sale et du tout brutale lubricité, ains seulement pour, deschargeant ses reins, se garentir des mal-heurs qui suivent et accompaignent la retention de semence. On raconte que, comme il eut pris assignation avec La'is la courtisane [...] ce pauvre philosophe anheloit de l'attendre [...] Tantost levoit la teste, ores il la remettoit bas, puis encores la relevoit, pensant descouvrir sa venue [...] aprés avoir long temps attendu, en fin, parce qu'il ne pouvoit plus empescher que sa poudre ne prist feu et que son pistolet ne se deschargeast, quoy que le blanc ne fust mis a la butte, si tuy fallut il deslascher, et n'eut rien de plus hastif que de recevoir en sa main ce qu'il ne pouvoit plus retenir. Quelque temps aprés, Lais vint, mais ce fut trop tard: les plus grands coups avoient estè donnez; et pource Diogenes la renvoya, lui disant: Manus hymenæum celebrando te prævenit. (I, pp. 303-04)
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Cholières claims that the source for this anecdote is one of Agathias's Epigrams, written in the 6th century AD. This is misleading, however, for although the final witticism is featured in Agathias, it and the other significant details of the passage are in fact drawn from Galen, On the Affected Parts, which Cholières renders facetiously. This is seen most clearly in his considerable addition of lewd metaphors, none of which are present in Galen. Cholières's ascription of the anecdote to Agathias is both a joke on overly credulous readers (the story about Diogenes is rather long for an epigram) and a way of flaunting his learning, by referring to Agathias's little-known work. The passage

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concerning Diogenes in Galen was however very well known in the sixteenth century, particularly in medical works. Galen's argument that Diogenes' use of masturbation was for sound medical reasons is a serious one which early modern writers found hard to swallow. For example, Abraham Zacuto refuses to believe that Diogenes' practice constitutes an example of self-control, and Rodrigo a Castro goes still further in maintaining that the Cynic was extremely bad, since the act of masturbation is a disgusting one. Schleiner has shown that masturbation was not an easy topic to address within Renaissance medical works, and even in situations where release of sperm is recommended, a euphemistic code-word is used. While medical writers used euphemism to shelter their more innocent readers from potentially corrupting material, Cholières employs the same technique for comic effect. Nonetheless, such euphemistic treatment of the subject of masturbation by facetious and serious authors alike indicates that it, and by extension Diogenes' performance, were troubling. Although not completely taboo, there is a sense in which Diogenes' masturbation is beyond the pale in comic as well as in didactic discourses.

It is easier for Cholières to be more direct when voicing disapproval of Cynic sex. This occurs in the sixth 'Apresdisnée': 'Des Barbes'. In a Lucianic move, Camille, who speaks in favour of beards, ascribes the wisdom of the Cynics to their facial hair. His adversary, Demonax, counters by criticizing the oddness of Diogenes' life:

\[\text{je suis par ma foys d'avis, puis que vous trouvez la vie cynique tellement a vostre gre, que vous portiez la besasse et vous resserriez dans un tonneau, ainsi que faisait Diogenes: bref, que vous patronniez vostre maniere de vivre au modele de son estrange vie. Et comment est ce que vous faites cas de cest homme là? Il ne valoit pas un troignon de chou: la fin de ses jours qu'il eut monstra de quel bois il se chauffoit. Ne sçavez vous pas que quelques uns tiennent que, comme il estoit fort sujet à sa bouche, il mangea le pied d'un bœuf tout crud, dont il attira un humeur si pernicieux que depuis il en mourut; et que d'autres rapportent que, pour le regret qu'il avoir de trop vivre, il se violenta et precipita sa mort, s'estouffant dans son manteau. (II, pp. 260-61)}\]

Such criticism of Diogenes is commonplace: it recalls the Democritic's remark in Tahureau's Dialogues ('Je veux vivre plus à mon aise qu'en un tonneau'), and Valla's attack on Cynic suicide. It is nonetheless striking that it is Diogenes' body that is the
bone of contention, whether it is living in a barrel, eating forbidden foodstuffs, or killing itself. Demonax’s attack on sexual shamelessness is, however, reserved for Diogenes’ followers:

Et quant à ses compaignons, ils ne valloient pas mieux que luy: c’estoient des gens desesperez, ennemis d’honnesteté, et qui avoient perdu toute honte; de sorte que, de mesmes que les bestes brutes, ils ne se hontoioient point de s’ambloquer à la cupidique les uns devant les autres, voire ne faisoient difficulté d’aucune parole, tant sale fut elle [...] (II, p. 261)

Such a polemical attitude towards the Cynics is already familiar from Du Préau, Breslay and Léry, and is well suited to a dialogue pro and contra, in which, as I showed in the previous chapter, extreme positions are easily reached. Unlike in Les Sérées, however, no Cynic voice speaks up in favour of shamelessness. Cholières’s failure to engage in any way with the possible philosophical motivations of the Cynics’ behaviour may be a sign of the limitations of both genre and author, but it also indicates that Cynic shamelessness was in a sense beyond the pale, a topic to be dealt with either euphemistically or polemically, both responses being characteristic of underlying anxiety.

In contrast, Brantôme’s treatment of Diogenes’ masturbation in the Recueil des dames makes a point of being direct. Pierre de Bourdeille, Seigneur de Brantôme, a French nobleman, spent the final years of his life convalescing from a riding accident which occurred in 1584. He passed his time in bed writing his memoirs of gallant ladies. They were not published until 1665-66, partly because of their frequently salacious content, which has led one recent critic to characterize them as the Kinsey Report of their time.20 His brief reference to Diogenes’ outrageous behaviour occurs towards the beginning of his ‘Discours sur le sujet qui contente plus en amours, ou le toucher, ou la veue, ou la parole’. This title recalls the stages of courtly love familiar in Medieval and sixteenth-century poetry. However, where this courtly love was invariably chaste and metaphysical, Brantôme soon demonstrates that he is not interested in neo-Platonic notions of the soul, but in the body:

Or, quand à l’attouchement, certainement il faut advoier qu’il est très-dectable, d’autant que la perfection d’Amour c’est de jouir, et ce jouir ne se peut faire sans l’attouchement: car, tout ainsi que la faim et la soif ne se peut soulager et appaiser, sinon par le manger et le boir, aussi l’amour ne se passe ny par l’oye ni par la veue, mais par le toucher, l’embraser, et par l’usage de Venus. À quoy le badin fat Diogenes Cinicus rencontre badinement, mais salaudement pourtant, quand il souhaittoit qu’il pust abattre sa faim en se frottant le ventre, tout ainsi qu’en se frottant la verge il passoit sa rage d’amour. J’eusse voulu mettre cecy en paroles plus nettes, mais il le faut passer fort légerement [...]21

Brantôme gleefully flouts the convention of treating masturbation euphemistically. The *Recueil des dames* does of course belong to a different genre from either Cholières’s dialogue or medical works. These generic differences can, however, only partly account for Brantôme’s candid version of the subject, particularly in contrast to its mealy-mouthed rendering in Cholières. Brantôme has realized that Diogenes’ performance cannot be tamed through euphemism, so he gives it full rein. As Branham has recognized, Diogenes’ joke ‘blandly asserts the claims of nature without even acknowledging the restraints of culture’: acknowledging the fact that he is violating a taboo would have ruined the joke.22 Brantôme offers a syllogism: the *telos* or ‘perfection’ of love is to ‘jouir’, ‘jouir’ can only be achieved through touching, therefore touch (and not sight or hearing) is a necessary condition of love. This involves the joke that sex for one is the equal of sex for two. Brantôme’s paradox here mirrors that of Diogenes’ shocking yet comic performance. Diogenes is characterized as being a ‘badin fat’, that is to say he is both foolish and like a fool. Diogenes has fool’s licence to behave in shocking and disgusting ways. This licence is earned through wit, and there is a sense in which Brantôme can himself be said to gain it in this extract. However, neither Diogenes’ performance nor Brantôme’s playful presentation of it are merely comic. The joke in Brantôme is ultimately disconcerting since it unsettles assumptions about the nature of sexual appetites and their satisfaction in much the same way as Diogenes’ performance challenges conventional morality by forcing his audience to ask themselves why it is acceptable to satiate hunger publicly, but not sexual desire.

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A similarly playful, but more developed, presentation of Cynic shamelessness occurs towards the end of Montaigne’s ‘Apologie de Raimond Sebond’ (II, 12, 582-85). This notoriously complex text is best known for its presentation of Pyrrhonism, a Hellenistic philosophy which advocates suspension of judgement (epoche) on all beliefs. In order to achieve epoche, the Pyrrhonists employ modes of scepticism which are designed to show that beliefs based, for example, on the evidence of the senses are unjustifiable. The tenth mode of scepticism opposes different customs and laws as well as scientific and philosophical beliefs to one another, to encourage suspension of judgement on all such beliefs. Montaigne gives a characteristically playful version of the tenth mode, giving long lists of differing philosophical opinions, which he calls ‘Cecintamarrre de tant de cervelles philosophiques’ (II, 12, 516). The few pages devoted to Cynic shamelessness come at the end of Montaigne’s idiosyncratic exposition of the tenth mode. It is abruptly followed by well-known sceptical arguments based on the senses. The Cynics thereby provide Montaigne’s last word on the diversity of philosophical, and especially ethical, beliefs. This is because the Cynic stance represents a moral extreme beyond which there is nothing to be said. Hence Montaigne’s exposition on Cynicism goes beyond strict Pyrrhonism for it serves as a rhetorical tool to destabilize conventional moral beliefs rather than merely to oppose one set of moral beliefs to another. Among the great number of recent works on Montaigne’s use of Pyrrhonism, the most helpful are those which focus on the intricate workings of the text; reducing the Apologie to ‘scepticism’, ‘fideism’ or even ‘Cynicism’ eradicates too many vital details. Concentrating on Montaigne’s presentation of Cynic shamelessness may not offer a key to the Apologie, but it will show how he adapts

outrageous Cynic performance to his own shocking ends. Montaigne opens his discussion of Cynic shamelessness with a caveat:

[A] Quant à la liberté des opinions philosophiques touchant le vice et la vertu, c’est chose où il n’est besoing de s’estendre, et où il se trouve plusieurs advis qui valent mieux teus que publiez [C] aux faibles esprits. (II, 12, 582)

It is noteworthy that Montaigne’s account of Cynic practice is concentrated in the post-1588 manuscript additions of the [C] text, which often contains the most scurrilous material within the Essais. His warning to innocent readers is partly tongue-in-cheek, but there is a double movement here that is typical of Montaigne: a conservative reflex coupled with an ironic detachment from that same reflex. Much the same is seen in ‘De la vanité’:

[C] Antisthenes permet au sage d’aimer et faire à sa mode ce qu’il trouve estre opportun, sans s’attendre aux loix; d’autant qu’il a meilleur avis qu’elles, et plus de cognoissance de la vertu. Son disciple Diogenes disoit opposer aux perturbations la raison, à fortune la confidence, aux loix nature. [B] Pour les estomacs tendres, il faut des ordonnances contraintes et artificielles. [C] Les bons estomacs suivent simplement les prescriptions de leur naturel appetit. (III, 9, 990)²⁵

There is an obvious parallel between ‘faibles esprits’ and ‘estomacs tendres’. Montaigne’s concern for them is plainly fairly limited, but there is a lingering anxiety about the danger of certain philosophical positions.

Unlike all the authors discussed in this chapter thus far, and unusually for the sixteenth century, Montaigne explicitly engages with Cynicism as a kind of philosophy. This lends the Cynics a kind of authority, and consequently a danger, that they rarely have elsewhere. The Cynics are not merely emblematic figures to be rejected or laughed at but they are ‘bons estomacs’, who, among other things, demonstrate their adoption of radical moral positions through the body: this makes the corporeal metaphor particularly apposite. Montaigne does not ignore the comic character of Cynic performance, but he also recognizes its inherent seriousness. While laws take their authority from longevity, philosophers, and in particular Cynics and Stoics, adopt the standard of nature and reason:

²⁵ DL, VI, 11 and 38.
The final, comic image illustrates the point that there is no position so *prima facie* absurd that at least one philosopher has not adopted it. This nonetheless sits uneasily with the notion that such views come from careful consideration of reason and nature. There are therefore two sides to the paradox Montaigne is playing with here: firstly, widely accepted laws and customs are not derived from reason/nature, and, secondly, if reason/nature are rigorously followed it leads to views that fly in the face of convention.

Montaigne's emphasis on the combination of reason and nature here derives from his conflation of Cynicism and Stoicism as two schools which are happy to adopt unconventional positions. *Logos* was crucial for the latter school, but rarely referred to by the Cynics. Moreover, some Stoics, starting with Zeno of Citium, sought to distinguish themselves from Cynicism precisely on the grounds of their rejection of shamelessness. The Cynic tradition is, however, tainted by Stoicism, given that some later Stoics sought to establish a direct succession from Socrates via Antisthenes and Diogenes, and Cicero notes that some Stoics adopted Cynic shamelessness, which he rejects. Some confusion on Montaigne's part is therefore unremarkable, and would explain his incorrect placing of Crates and his brother-in-law, Metrocles, in the Stoic school:

Metroclez lascha un peu indiscretement un pet en disputant, en presence de son eschole, et se tenoit en sa maison, cache de honte, jusques a ce que Crates le fut visiter; et, adjoutant a ses consolations et raisons l'exemple de sa liberte, se mettant a peter a l'envi avec luy, il luy osta ce

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26 Plutarch, *Moralia*, 569b, for Chrysippus's saying.
27 Branham, 'Diogenes' Rhetoric*, p. 94 and n.41.
29 *De finibus bonorum et malorum*, trans. by H. Rackham, (Loeb, 1914; repr. 1961), 3.68.
Despite Montaigne’s conflation of Cynics and Stoics, Crates’ farting is an exemplary instance of the ancient Dogs’ brazenness in several ways. Crates demonstrates the folly of Metrocles’ shame through comic use of the body, and in particular what Bakhtin calls the ‘lower-body stratum’. Crates’ farting is far more persuasive than any theoretical argument, and much of the comedy of the passage comes from the contrast between the act of breaking wind and serious ‘consolations et raisons’. Crates demonstrates his philosophy through performative, and comic, use of the body. When Cynic shamelessness is rendered in abstract terms, as it was in Bouchet’s discussion of farting discussed above, it becomes awkward. In contrast to his facetious predecessors, Montaigne maintains the combination of philosophy and comedy that is essential to Cynic performance. He also recognizes the link between shameless bodily display and freedom of speech, since Crates’ farts work as shockingly outspoken arguments, and his flatulence becomes a powerful kind of rhetoric. This link is also exploited, in unexpected ways, in Le Moyen de parvenir. Montaigne moves from farting to sex:

\[C\] Ce que nous appelons honnesteté, de n’oser faire à descouvert ce qui nous est honneste de faire à couvert, ils l’appelloient sottise; et de faire le fin à taire et desadvouer ce que nature, coustume et nostre desir publient et proclament de nos actions, ils l’estimoient vice. (II, 12, 584)

The Cynics ‘deface the currency’ of conventional morality: vice becomes virtue, and virtue, vice. Furthermore, making ‘les Mysteres de Venus’ taboo spurs on lust: ‘[C] la volupté tres ingenieusement faisoit instance, sous le masque de la vertu, de n’estre prostituée au milieu des quarrefours’ (II, 12 584). Montaigne cites the view that the criminalization of brothels would increase their frequentation, and two of Martial’s ribald epigrams, to illustrate the paradox that obstacles to sex are in fact incentives to desire. By removing shame from sex, the Cynics effectively also take away its ‘volupté’. Hence Cynic shamelessness returns sex to true ‘vertu’ by demystifying ‘les Mysteres de Venus’.

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30 DL, VI, 94.
The rhetorical practice of presenting something normally considered to be a vice as a virtue, or vice-versa, is known as paradiastole. As I showed above, paradiastole is closely related to so-called rhetorical paradox or mock-encomium and to arguments pro and contra. Like rhetorical paradox, paradiastole need not be serious. Nonetheless, I agree with Skinner that Montaigne uses paradiastole genuinely to challenge normative values here, in one of the most daring examples of the technique in the early modern period. Moreover, it is important to appreciate that Cynic ‘defacement’ of conventional moral values is always already inherently paradiastolic. Cynic performance is a lesson in virtue wrapped up in a scandal. Montaigne’s use of paradiastole is therefore ideally adapted to exploring Cynic shamelessness, and to employing it as a tool to shake up the moral values of his own day. It means he can go further than any of the authors considered above in envisaging the philosophical reasons for, and consequences of, Cynic practice. Using the technique of paradiastole also allows Montaigne to keep his distance from the Dogs. His writing comes remarkably close to Cynic performance, yet it is framed in such a way that he does not advocate shamelessness as such but points out that, if nature and virtue are guides for behaviour, normal values should be reversed.

The most serious and influential argument against Cynic shamelessness comes from Augustine, cited above. Montaigne argues against his view, not mentioning him by name, although his better-read readers would have known whom he had in mind:

[C] C'est, comme j'estime, d'une opinion trop tendre et respectueuse, qu'un grant et religieux auteur tient cette action si necessairement obligée à l'occultation et à la vergoigne, qu'en la licence des embrassements cyniques il ne se peut persuader que la besoigne en vint à sa fin, ains qu'elle s'arrestoit à representer des mouvemens lascifs seulement, pour maintenir l'impudence de la profession de leur eschole; et que, pour eslancer ce que la honte avoit contraint et retiré, il leur estoit

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32 Skinner, 'Thomas Hobbes: Rhetoric and the Construction of Morality', pp. 27-28. Cave claims that there are few, if any, examples of paradiastole in Montaigne, Pré-Histoires I, p. 103, but there is at least one other example in I, 20, 81-82, cited by Carol Clark, 'Bradamante, Angelica and the Eroticizing of Virtue in Montaigne's Late Writing', Montaigne Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum, 8 (1996), 109-23, in which there is a ‘radical reapportionment of terrain between the words vertu and volupté’, p. 122. There are countless other examples of rhetorical reevaluations of moral terms in early modern texts, including of the word ‘curiosity’, see Neil Kenny, Curiosity in Early Modern Europe: Word Histories, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, Herausgegeben von der Herzog August Bibliothek, Band 81 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1998), p. 44.
Montaigne does more than contradict Augustine on the technical point about the possibility of having sex in public. He paradiastolically asserts that the Cynics, despite appearing to be depraved and preposterous, do in fact give 'extreme prix à la vertu'. Diogenes' open-air onanism, and the 'dog-marriage' of Crates and Hipparchia, serve as examples of lives lived outside the constraints of custom and taboo because they are entirely devoted to virtue. Montaigne's discussion of 'la licence des embrassements cyniques' is similar to Brantôme insofar as it free of euphemism. This is probably the first occurrence of the word 'masturbation' in French, a word which was avoided even in neo-Latin medical works, as Schleiner has shown. Montaigne appears to have been unique at this time in recognizing that Cynic shamelessness constitutes a radical philosophical and cultural message, one which can almost be said to demand a new vocabulary. It is not hard to see why it serves as his last word on the diversity of moral opinion. His playful, paradiastolic adaptation of Cynic performance is in many ways true to the spirit of Diogenes, who himself taught through shock and paradox.

Although it is true that Montaigne goes further than any of his contemporaries in his presentation of Cynic shamelessness, looking at him in isolation would lead to a lopsided view of sixteenth-century approaches to, and appraisals of, this endlessly provocative topic. Disgust at Cynic sex is predictable, although it can encompass a wish to titillate (Breslay) as well as deriving from religious beliefs, whether Catholic or Protestant (Du Préau and Léry). It is not inevitable, however, as is seen in Guicciardini's humorous rendering of the marriage of Crates and Hipparchia. Facetious dialogues
inevitably do not treat the subject in the same way as discursive works. Nonetheless, shamelessness is not defused by being treated facetiously. In fact, the seriocomic nature of Cynic practice makes it an awkward presence in facetious texts (Bouchet). Cholîères’s euphemistic tackling of the topic of masturbation ultimately reveals similar tensions to those found in medical works. For the sixteenth century, masturbation, whether outdoors or in private, is more taboo than public sex. It can, however, be dealt with directly, in those few works which engage with the unspoken philosophical motivations for Diogenes’ disgraceful behaviour to some degree (Brantôme and Montaigne). These texts come closest to Cynic practice, precisely because they use it as a tool to destabilize their readers’ assumptions about sex and morality. Cynic shamelessness questions values that are so basic they are rarely articulated. No one is immune to the threat posed by the Cynics to civilized norms. Hostile or anxious reactions in the sixteenth century attempt, whether wittingly or not, to negate this threat, to return to the normal order of things. This makes it all the more remarkable that the same period sees texts which engage with the philosophical implications of shamelessness. Such responses may seem unusually modern, but they nonetheless use sophisticated rhetorical tools that are very much of their time.

Part Two
Freedom of Speech

When asked what was the most beautiful thing in the world, Diogenes replied ‘freedom of speech’ (*parrhesia*). Diogenes’ encounters with Alexander, which are archetypal instances of *parrhesia*, were, as has been shown in earlier chapters, commonplaces in the sixteenth century. However, the texts considered in Part I do not interpret their legendary meetings as expressions of freedom, so much as clashes between a reflective life and a life of action, or between poverty and wealth. When a direct reference is made to the political consequences of *parrhesia* in *Les Epistres de Diogenes* (1546), their French translator feels the need to supply a footnote by way of

34 DL, VI, 69.
apology. However, the anecdotes are not so subversive that Guillaume Bouchet cannot cite them all in the thirtieth 'serée' of his second book (1597), 'Des responses & rencontres des Seigneurs à leurs subjects, & des subjects à leur Seigneurs'. Indeed, one of the speakers points to the commonplace status of parrhesia in remarking that 'Je ne diray point [...] pour estre trop commun, la liberté de parler de Diogenes à Alexandre', although, despite saying this, he proceeds to relate the various anecdotes at length (p. 154). I have found no early modern theoretical discussions of parrhesia in French, other than that found in Camus. Thomas Wilson, however, gives the following definition of 'Freenesse of speache' in his Arte of Rhetorique:

Freenesse of speache, is when wee speake boldly, and without feare, even to the proudest of them, whatsoever we please, or have list to speake. Diogenes herein did excel, and feared no man when he sawe just cause to saie his mynde. The worlde wanteth suche as he was, and hath over many suche, as never honest man was, that is to say, flatterers, fawners, and southers of mennes sayinges. (p. 396)

Wilson holds Erasmus's optimistic view that ancient rhetoric can be harnessed for Christian moral purposes. He characterizes Diogenes as the exemplar of freedom of speech, and suggests that practising parrhesia invariably involves putting oneself in danger vis-à-vis the powerful, hence references to boldness and fearlessness. However, other contemporary rhetorical theorists do not share Wilson's positive portrayal of parrhesia, nor do they suggest Diogenes as a model, but prefer Cicero's more inoffensive version of 'libera vox'. This is true, for example, of Antoine Fouquelin's discussion of 'Licence' in La Rhetorique française (1555), which he defines as a trope which 'montre quelque audace et hardiesse de dire ce qui semblait être dangereux à dire' and which is 'fort rare et infréquente aux livres des auteurs Français'. Unlike his English counterpart, Fouquelin plays down 'Licence', in a way that suggests lingering concern about its potential dangers. Such concerns are more obviously apparent in Thomas Peacham's Garden of Eloquence (1577), which defines the term 'Parrhesia' as 'when speaking before them whome we ought to reverence and feare, & having

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35 See above, Chapter 2, part 1, section 4.
36 See above, Chapter 4, part 3.
37 Traité de poétique et de rhétorique de la Renaissance, ed. by Francis Goyet (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1990), p. 431.
something to say, which either toucheth themselves, or their friends, do desire them to
pardon our boldnesse'. Peacham's emphasis is on using the trope to cause as little
offence as possible, and he points out that great caution must be exercised in its use,
'which rule wyse men have always used, and fooles abused'. It is likely that, as far as
Peacham is concerned, Cynic freedom of speech falls into the category of fool's
rhetoric. Although they express it in different ways, Wilson, Fouquelin and Peacham
each stress the danger of freedom of speech. Such danger was easily recognizable in
eyear modern Europe, and was exploited by Miraumont in his attack on Diogenes. It
also plays a part in the texts I analyse here.

Its commonplace status notwithstanding, the anecdote about Diogenes and
Alexander could still be adapted in interesting ways by skilled writers. This is true of
Rabelais, particularly in Pantagruel, 30, which reinterprets the encounter as a
carnivalesque inversion. It is also true of the three texts to be analysed here. The first of
these, by an anonymous Flemish author writing in French, is the most spectacular use
of the figure of Diogenes for political ends in the period. His Diogènes, ou du moien
d'establir, après tant de misères et de calamitez, une bonne et asseurée paix en
France, et la rendre plus florissante qu'elle ne fust jamais (Liège: 1581) is an appeal to
the French to intervene in the Netherlands against the repressive policies of Philip II.
This lengthy poem is written in the voice of Diogenes, who famously sought, with a
lighted lantern in the midday sun, for a man in a crowd. It begins thus:

Scauriez vous poinct Messieurs (mais quil ne vous desplaise)
Ou je pourroy trouver, dont je suis à malaise
Ung homme de vertu, de bons sens, & de cœur,
Qui voulust s'opposer à ce tyran vainqueur (p. 2)

Diogenes' paradoxical quest is refashioned as a search for true Frenchmen who would
stand up to the Spanish monarch ('ce tyran vainqueur'). Unsurprisingly, the audience
laughs at Diogenes' antics with the lantern, but the poet points out that they require this

38 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (1577), English Linguistics 1500-1800 (A Collection
39 See above, Chapter 6, part 2.
40 Recueil de poësies françoises des XV° et XVI° siècles: morales, facétieuses, historiques, ed. by
M. Anatole de Montaiglon, 13 vols (Paris: A. Franck, 1855-78; repr. Nendeln: Kraus Reprint,
bizarre visual aid, because they are blind to the dangers they face: ‘Et certes, puisque
goute / Ne voiez à midy, c’est raison que j’adjouste / Ce secours à voz yeulx’ (p. 3).
Diogenes' lantern here shines with the light of unpalatable truth. It is plain that the
author of this remarkable piece chose Diogenes neither for his shamelessness nor his
wit, but because he stands for truth and freedom in opposition to political oppression.
This leads to an idealization of the Cynic. In the final lines of the poem, following
Diogenes' speech and his disappearance, the poet wonders whether it was a 'homme
mortel ou quelque ange céleste?' but in any case concludes that 'François, c'est Dieu,
par luy, qui vous parle et proteste' (p. 58). Such a rose-tinted presentation of the Cynic
is in part a predictable result of turning him into a political mouthpiece. Nonetheless, it
also fits into the tradition of idealization of the Cynics, which dates back to antiquity, and
which is a strategy familiar from Erasmus and others in the sixteenth century. In this
instance, it is plain that the political points the poem makes have little, if anything, to do
with Cynicism. This does not, however, obscure the vital fact that a version of Diogenes
was chosen to make them, showing that Cynic freedom of speech could be turned into
a powerful rhetorical tool at this time. That the views expressed in the poem were
dangerous means that the poem as a whole can be seen as an example of parrhesia,
making Diogenes an appropriate choice to be its spokesman. The story of Diogenes
and his lantern is also used for political purposes in a pamphlet entitled Le Diogene
François (1614?), which gave rise to at least two angry responses, L'Homme de
Diogene (1614?) and Response au Diogene Francois (1615). It is not impossible that
Le Diogene François borrowed its lantern leitmotif from Diogènes, ou du moien
d'establir. The image of Diogenes searching for a man is used in Le Diogene François
to make similarly unpalatable points to those of its Flemish predecessor.

Diogènes, ou du moien d'establir shows that Diogenes could be an emblematic
truth-teller, and he appears in this guise in the opening pages of 'L'Apologie de
Raimond Sebond', which are devoted to a discussion of religion. Montaigne's argument
is already out-spoken: observing that people twist Scripture to their own ends, he goes

41 DL, VI, 41.
on to suggest that 'Il n’est point d’hostilité excellente comme la chrestienne' and that
‘Nostre religion est faicte pour extirper les vices, elle les couvre, les nourrit, les incite' (II,
12, 444). This in turn leads to a discussion of blasphemy which, Montaigne observes, is
attractive because the forbidden is accompanied by a frisson of pleasure. Montaigne’s
thesis is forthright, powerful, and consistent. However, the reference to two Cynics that
immediately follows it troubles any straightforward reading:

[C] Le philosophe Antisthenes, comme on l’y initioit aux mystéres
d’Orpheus, le prêtre luy disant que ceux qui se vouoyent à cette religion
avoyent à recevoir après leur mort des biens éternels et parfaicts:
Pourquoy ne meurs tu donc toi mesmes? luy fit-il. Diogenes, plus
brusquement selon sa mode, et hors de nostre propos, au prêtre qui le
preschoit de mesme de se faire de son ordre pour parvenir aux biens de
l’autre monde: Veux tu pas que je croye qu’Agesilaüs et Epaminondas, si
grands hommes, seront misérables, et que toy, qui n’es qu’un veau,
seras bien heureux par ce que tu es prêtre? (II, 12, 444)42

These anecdotes could be seen as an illustration of the pleasure of blasphemy, or of
challenging authority. However, the witty parrhesia of the Cynics here is positive,
whereas blasphemy is obviously negative. Montaigne remarks that Diogenes’ put-down
is ‘hors de nostre propos’, thus signaling a digression. Yet this digression still implies the
reverse of what was being argued previously. Moreover, in Diogenes Laertius, there is
no mention of a priest in the second anecdote, nor of the ‘veau’, which adds a colloquial
touch to the Cynic’s abuse. Rather, it is the people of Athens who want Diogenes to be
initiated. Montaigne thereby specifically characterizes Diogenes’ repartee as being
disregard for religion, rather than civil disobedience. The Cynics’ outspoken disrespect
for the promises of religion seems to be being used as an ironic way of alluding to the
idea of a Christian heaven closed to virtuous pagans (including Archesilas and
Epaminondas). The priests in the two anecdotes could also represent the mass of
supposed believers whose actions fail to match their beliefs.43 The Cynic anecdotes are
nonetheless unsettling. Like much of the Apologie, and the Essais more generally, they
imply an out-spoken disrespect for religion and spiritual mystery. However, this
disrespect never falls into outright atheism. Montaigne thereby uses the Cynics to
explore a taboo area whilst he simultaneously remains within the boundaries of those

42 DL, VI, 4 and 39.
same taboos, in much the same way as his discussion of Cynic shamelessness was circumscribed by the rhetorical practice of paradiastole.

Representations of Cynic freedom of speech need not be controversial to move beyond the commonplace. This is true of Montaigne’s short essay, ‘De Democritus et Heraclitus’ (I, 50). The pairing of Democritus, who laughed at the nature of mankind, and Heraclitus, who wept at the same thing, is one of the most widespread topoi of the sixteenth century. The best-known ancient versions of the commonplace are found in Seneca, who maintains that Democritus’s laughter is preferable to Heraclitus’s tears, both because it allows for hope and because laughing expresses a gentler emotion than crying. This commonplace was renewed by Antonio Fregoso’s allegorical poem, Riso di Democrito et pianto di Heraclito (1511), which presents Diogenes as an unamused, dangerous, biting dog, like Timon of Athens. Montaigne, like Seneca maintains that laughter is preferable to tears, and, like Fregoso, he refers to Diogenes and Timon, and compares them with Democritus. However, unlike Seneca, Montaigne prefers laughter to tears since the former is more scathing than the latter. Unlike Fregoso, Diogenes is cited on the side of Democritus’s laughter as an example of someone who scorned the vanity of human existence, as opposed to Timon of Athens, who took it too seriously:

[A] Ainsi Diogenes, qui baguenaudoit apart soy, roulant son tonneau et hochant du nez le grand Alexandre, nous estimant des mouches ou des vessies pleines de vent, estoit bien juge plus aigre et plus poingnant, et par consequent plus juste, à mon humeur, que Timon, celuy qui fut surnommé le haisser des hommes. Car ce qu’on hait, on le prend à cœur. Cettuy-cy nous souhaitoit du mal, estoit passioné du desir de nostre ruine, fuoit nostre conversation comme dangereuse, de meschans et de nature depravée; l’autre nous estimoit si peu que nous ne pourrions ny le troubler ny l’alterer par nostre contagion, nous laissoit de compagnie, non pour la crainte, mais pour le desdain de nostre commerce: il ne nous estimoit capables ny de bien, ny de mal faire. (I, 50, 303-04)

Montaigne chooses his words with care: the verb ‘baguenauder’, which means to fool around, like children who burst the pods of the bladder senna (baguenaudier), is closely

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45 See above, p. 187.
echoed by the ‘vessies pleines de vent’. Diogenes takes a pin to human vanity, cocking a snook (‘hochant du nez’) at the world’s most powerful man. Montaigne thereby characterizes Diogenes as a kind of wise fool, who demonstrates his contempt for the normal run of men through bizarre, childlike performance, which involves his body, props (his barrel-rolling, which is a reference to Rabelais’s portrayal of Diogenes in the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*) and *parthésia*. Diogenes’ freedom of speech in this passage is therefore one strand of his seriocomic performance as a philosophical jester. However, as in his discussion of Cynic shamelessness in the *Apologie*, this philosophical jester has Stoic traits, since Montaigne implies that Diogenes holds the Stoic doctrine that everything is morally indifferent except virtue and that, if only the sage understands virtue, the actions of the unwise are neither bad nor good (‘il ne nous estimoit capables ny de bien, ny de mal faire’). The paradox here, that only the wise man is wise and all other people are fools, was later comically exploited by Regnier, Mistanguet and Bruscambille. For Montaigne, however, the paradox allows him to turn the commonplace that ‘rire est le propre de l’homme’, famously placed in a preliminary poem to *Gargantua*, on its head: instead of having the power of laughter, the essential quality of man is that he is laughable or, as Montaigne puts it in the final line of his essay, ‘Nostre propre et peculiere condition est autant ridicule que risible’.46 Diogenes appears to exemplify man’s laughable nature through his apparently foolish performance towards Alexander and with his barrel, yet his own laughter at mankind defines the human condition. Montaigne exploits Diogenes’ seriocomic character to present man as both laughing and laughable.

Montaigne’s references to Diogenes’ physical performance ‘roulant son tonneau et hochant du nez le grand Alexandre’ in ‘De Democritus et Heraclitus’ recall the primacy of the body in the Cynic’s rhetoric. The link between freedom of speech and the body was more obviously apparent in the farting contest between Crates and Metrocles, related in the *Apologie*, and discussed above. The link between the body and *parthésia*.

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is also explored in Béroalde de Verville's enigmatic Le Moyen de parvenir (c.1615). Critics are agreed that Le Moyen constitutes an attack on the authority of written texts. They observe that the chapter-titles bear no relation to their content, that, although supposedly a banquet, there is an implausibly large number of speakers (over four hundred), that the conversations are transcribed by an author-figure who not only mixes everything up, but eventually joins in the dialogue himself as just another character, that readers can insert themselves or their relatives into the text. Through strategies such as these, Le Moyen undermines its readers' confidence in books that tell them how to think and live. This attack on the authority of the written word spreads itself to the speakers' names. These generally fail to reflect their historical characters and some speakers even bear mysterious sobriquets like 'Quelqu'un' and 'L'Autre'. The names of the interlocutors are to all intents interchangeable, their identities are therefore unstable. Consequently, any authority that might have come from a given name is undermined. Diogenes is something of an exception to this rule. He makes three major interventions in the dialogue, and a couple of less significant ones. More importantly, one of his interventions contains a clear allusion to the Diogenes of the tradition, and the others are Diogenic in tone and content. Diogenes' expositions on freedom of speech in Le Moyen de parvenir form part of its undermining of written texts, and preference for the spoken word.

I do not want to suggest that Diogenes is a key to this notoriously complex work, but Béroalde's rare reference to the historical character singles him out, and turns him

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49 Kenny, Palace of Secrets, p. 145.
into the obvious spokesman for freedom of speech. Kenny has shown that Béroalde, in his late works, was peculiarly interested in the topic of freedom of thought and speech, although he does not mention the role of Diogenic *parrhesia* in *Le Moyen*. Cynic freedom of speech is perhaps even more radical than the types of ‘liberté’ of expression identified by Kenny (intellectual, sceptical, satirical), for it implies that telling the truth, even from the most vulnerable socio-economic position, is an ethical imperative. Since the most innocuous forms of philosophical ‘liberté’ give rise to anxiety, it is no surprise to discover that Béroalde does not present Cynic freedom of speech as a panacea.

The ancient anecdotes relate that Alexander reacted to Diogenes’ insolence by remarking that were he not Alexander, he would be Diogenes, thereby suggesting that the Cynic’s self-sufficiency amounted to a kind of power comparable to his own power over the world. In *Le Moyen*, however, Alexander the Great would have rather given Diogenes the Cynic a beating for his lack of respect. Alexander’s threat follows Diogenes’ response to another speaker’s complaint about the coarseness of the conversation during the banquet:

**DIOGENE** - Tout est permis ici. Nous sommes pair à compagnon. On doit faire et dire ici tout ce qu’on peut et pense.  
**ALEXANDRE** - Vous y perdriez, pauvre homme, pource que si tout était permis, je vous battrais bien à ceste [i.e. gauntlet] pour me venger de l’affront que l’année qui vient, vous me fites en Grèce.  
(p. 146)

André Tournon is the only critic to have recognized that Diogenes’ name was not chosen by accident here: ‘Philosophe scandaleux, exhibiant sans vergogne sa parole et son corps affranchis de toute contrainte [...] [Diogène] incarne la folle sagesse - ni murmure mystérieux, ni masque de la raison critique, mais franc illogisme du plaisir’ (p. viii). Although it is true to say that Diogenes rejects both mysteries and abstract theory, I would argue that he does not do this to embrace ‘illogisme du plaisir’, but rather his rejection of the abstract is the other side of his commitment to practice. Tournon rightly observes, however, that Cynic practice links shameless bodily performance and truth-

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telling, as was also seen in Montaigne. Béroalde nonetheless goes beyond Montaigne and the other French texts considered above in emphasizing that the parrhesiast runs the risk of violent reprimand, thereby also connecting the body with freedom of speech. Parrhesia is defined in opposition to violence.\textsuperscript{53} The pertinence of this link is illustrated by the numerous references to the Wars of Religion in Le Moyen, as well as by the at least partly serious comment that 'il ne faut que ce texte pour faire brûler beaucoup de pauvres gens' (p. 36). Alexander stands for political and military power of the kind that can easily endanger all kinds of freedom. In the bizarre context of Le Moyen, however, the balance of power has shifted from emperor to Cynic: if everything were indeed permitted, Alexander would have given Diogenes a beating. This reversal of fortunes recalls Rabelais's vision of the underworld in Pantagruel,\textsuperscript{30} in which Diogenes is a king, giving an impoverished Alexander a beating. The fact that here it is Alexander who wants to resort to violence goes some way to invert the inversion found in Rabelais. This could be seen to demonstrate that the speakers are, as Diogenes claims, equal, but such a straightforward reading is troubled by the bizarre time-structure to which Alexander refers. Furthermore, Alexander's comment implies that freedom and equality are incompatible, and indeed freedom of speech is premised on power differences, since it consists in the politically weak speaking openly to the strong, with a view to inverting their power roles. Nonetheless, in Le Moyen, Diogenes' plea for freedom need not be universal, since he refers to the 'ici' of the banquet. The speakers in a philosophical dialogue are meant to be able to speak freely between equals as a means of searching for the truth: in Le Moyen this takes the form of a character called 'Le Bonhomme' locking the doors to the banqueting hall (pp. 81-82). All this forms part of Le Moyen's satire of books, like philosophical dialogues, which attempt to reach the truth. In particular, Alexander's intervention implies that the set-up of Ciceronian dialogues, in which a group of equals engage in civilized philosophical discussion in a comfortable setting free of political concerns, is practically impossible: authority, swiftly followed by violence, is bound to intervene. Moreover, the kind of freedom to which

\textsuperscript{52} DL, VI, 32.
Diogenes refers is not the noble and practical kind of freedom of *Diogènes, ou du moyen d'establir*, but one that enables the speakers of the symposium to relate ribald anecdotes. It may be that freedom of speech is an ideal, particularly in the context of philosophical dialogue, but Béroalde's adaptation of the Diogenes-Alexander anecdotes suggests that this ideal is dangerous and often impractical. Nonetheless, in a more obviously philosophical context, free-speaking is presented in an unusual but positive light. Following a spurious exposition on some 'points secrets de la profonde sagesse', Diogenes intervenes to rail against such esoteric pseudo-philosophy:

Diogène - Que males mules aient ces philosophes foireux qui ne font qu'anonner! Je les enverrai à mon métayer et à ses gens. Il y a plus de mille ans que le conte en est fait, mais on l'a mal retenu. La fille de ce métayer apporta des prunes à notre femme, qui lui dit: "il n'en fallait point m'amie. - C'est votre gresse, Mademeselle, prenez-les s'il vous plaît: aussi bien nos pourceaux n'en veulent point". L'après-dînée, celle de chez nous rencontra la mère de cette fille, à laquelle elle dit ce que sa fille lui avait dit. "Ardé, lui répondit-elle, Mademeselle, elle dit vrai: ces méchants pourceaux aiment mieux manger la merde". Sur le soir, je rencontrai le bonhomme, auquel je contai le tout. "Pardé! Monsieur, dit-il, ce sont bêtes: leur bouche est en paroles aussi honnêtes que le trou de mon cul". (p. 238)

Although this tale could have been told by anyone, Diogenes, whose philosophy involved mocking obscure theory through the practice of freedom of speech, is a good choice to tell it. As in Montaigne, freedom of speech is characterized as a lower bodily function, comically contrasted with supposedly high forms of discourse. *Le Moyen* in many ways exemplifies Bakhtin's notion of the carnivalesque corpus which re-asserts the body as a universal factor linking people of all backgrounds. Supposedly higher bodily functions, such as language, are inextricably tied to the body in all its earthiness. The placing of the 'lower-body stratum' over language and thought is a theme of *Le Moyen*. As one speaker puts it elsewhere in the work, 'ce seroit belle chose de parler du cul, ce seroit un langage excellent': 54 This lends the spoken word an unexpected kind of physicality:

Antiphon - Appelez-vous cela des paroles couvertes? Je crois qu'il les faut servir à couvert, de peur qu'elles ne s'éventent!

53 Kenny, "Car le nom mesme de liberalité sonne liberté", p. 18.
54 Cited by Jeanneret, p. 238.
The honest words of the farmer's family have become like things. They are a bodily by-product to be consumed, like the shit the pigs eat. The idea that words should be eaten to stop them from disappearing recalls the commonplace metaphor of digestion for reading and writing, and in particular for the practice of imitation.\(^{55}\) The alimentary metaphor is a leitmotif of Le Moyen. In fact, it is taken to extremes: as one speaker puts it, the banquet becomes a banquet of words 'Je fais bonne chere de cecy, puis l'ayant digéré, je le baille à remâcher ainsi que quand j'ay bien diné je vais fienter, et un porcien vient qui en fait son profit' (p. 167). The topos of reading as digestion has been displaced onto the spoken word. Words are both excrement and foodstuff. The readers of Le Moyen are the pigs who eat the excrement. As the author-figure puts it, 'ceux qui ont imprimé ceci sont commissaires d'excréments: ceci est la fiente de mon esprit' (p. 295).\(^{56}\) Diogenes' anecdote implies that the freely spoken word, being the closest to thought and body, is the least ephemeral of all. Hence it is no surprise to find Diogenes railing against writings about written texts:

Hé, vieux affamés de vaine réputation [...] vous vous tuez le cœur et le corps à charrier les âmes vers la mélancolie [...] ignorez-vous que d'ici à quelques siècles ce symposie ne soit, selon son mérite, tenu pour authentique, autant ou plus que toutes les falanderies grecques qui vous font bon ventre? et lesquelles vous croyez sans difficulté, suant jour et nuit après pour dégainer une pauvre parole [...] je vous avertis que vieilles folies deviennent sagesses, et les anciennes mensonges se transforment en de belles petites vérités, dont vous savez extraire à propos l'essence vivifiante qui établit vos affaires. A que faire, si cela n'est, vous donnez-vous tant de peine à griffonner le papier pour le barbouiller de commentaires sur tant de folies des poètes et orateurs et fouillacoiffes qui les ont écrites en buvant et se riant, elles estimées tant sérieuses? (pp. 75-76)

Abhorrence of commentaries was commonplace in the sixteenth century.\(^{57}\) Here, the practice of commentary is linked to the digestion metaphor, since the commentators are presented as parasites feeding off 'falanderies grecques'. Diogenes implies (ironically, given the number of recent commentaries on Le Moyen) that the symposium, despite its

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\(^{55}\) Jeanneret, pp. 234-38

\(^{56}\) See Essais, III, 9, 846.

\(^{57}\) Bowen, Words and the Man, p. 117.
lewdness, will itself become the subject of serious exegesis in a few centuries' time. Such glosses, which seek to dominate and exploit the texts they analyse, are depressing, leading to 'mélancolie'. Their seriousness contrasts with the original texts which were written 'en buvant et se riant'. Commentaries inevitably go against the grain of such texts, especially when they attempt to establish their authority and seriousness. Implicit in Diogenes' rant, and in Le Moyen as a whole, is that ribald anecdote and freely-spoken comment are preferable to books that seek to establish some kind of authority over the world, or other books. It is no coincidence that Diogenes, the archetypal anti-authoritarian figure of antiquity, is chosen to express this view. He is not, however, the lord of the banquet. In fact, just after this rant he is shouted down by the others who give him the insulting yet appropriate epithet of 'roi des gueux'. The obvious paradox in all this is that the spoken word is ephemeral, and that the privileging of the spoken word in Le Moyen is a written one. Nonetheless, a book that seeks to undermine all its bookish characteristics is clearly the most appropriate place for a written exploration of the spoken word.

Conclusion

It is striking that there is no single way of understanding or using Cynic freedom of speech in the various texts analysed here. Such divergent perspectives show that far from being some kind of eternal idea, parrhesia is best thought of as a potent and provocative set of practices with great potential for adaptation. Cynic freedom of speech can be presented in such a way as to steer clear of dangerous territory. Diogènes, ou du moïen d'establir is an unusual example of a Cynic performance being put to political ends the danger of which comes close to the ancient notion of parrhesia. The seriousness of the poem necessitates an idealization of Diogenes. Such idealization is conspicuously absent from Montaigne's playful presentation of the Cynic in 'De Democritus et Heraclitus', which uses the Cynic's seriocomic performance to point to man's laughable nature. The seriocomic is ideally suited to questioning conventions and dominant world-views, and Montaigne exploits this both in his discussion of Cynic
shamelessness and in his presentation of the Cynics' rejection of the religious demands of the Athenians. Montaigne also links freedom of speech to performative use of basic bodily functions, a connection which is exploited in unexpected ways in Le Moyen de parvenir. While Diogènes, ou du moyen d’establir uses Cynic freedom of speech in response to violence and as a call to arms, Béroalde’s rare reference to an historical figure, Diogenes, betrays anxieties about the risk of violence run by the parrhesiast. Despite these concerns, Le Moyen presents free-speaking not as an abstract ideal but as a healthy alternative to more oppressive forms of discourse, which seek to order and control the world and other books. Le Moyen seems to imply that since parrhesia is tied to the ‘lower-body stratum’, it is potentially common to all people, and could by extension be used to formulate a language in which nothing was forbidden; this presumably was one of the aims of Diogenes’ bizarre performance from the beginning.
Bonnes gens, Beuvers tres illustres, et vous Goutteux tres precieux, veistez vous oncques Diogenes le philosophe Cynic?

‘Prologue de l’Auteur’, 

Having traced Diogenes’ appearances in a broad range of texts, from a collection of the Cynic’s jokes made for Charles VIII to his interventions in Béraldine’s strange banquet, it is tempting to answer ‘yes’ to Rabelais’s joke question. Certainly Cynicism is a peculiarly picturesque and theatrical philosophy: hence the presence of Cynic sayings and anecdotes in emblem books, and the adaptations of Diogenes’ performance in collections of sayings, in the prologue of the 

Tiers Livre, 

in Bruscambille’s stage paradoxes, and in numerous other early modern French texts. Yet it is because Diogenes is a legendary, literary and emblematic figure that there is a sense in which he is invisible. First, the historical Diogenes remains inaccessible since he is always already the rhetorical construct of an anecdotal tradition. Secondly, the performance related in the tradition encourages imitation and improvisation, which is inevitably at several removes from the unknowable original. It is not therefore a single Cynic that is seen in early modern French texts, but several. In early modern texts, and in the ancient Cynic tradition, we encounter a series of extraordinary representations of the Cynics, but the Dogs themselves, and their philosophy, are forever out of sight. There are no criteria by which to assess whether early modern representations of Diogenes are any more or less faithful to the original than ancient or modern ones.

Any assessment of the philosophical impact of the Cynic tradition in early modern texts ought to be modest. Unlike Aristotelianism, Platonism, Stoicism and Pyrrhonism, Cynicism cannot be a major ideological force precisely because it is not a stable ideology in the first place. Hence I do not concur with Clément’s conclusions that Cynicism is a highly influential philosophy in sixteenth-century Europe. Although small, the philosophical effect of ancient Cynicism is not negligible. I have shown that two key Cynic philosophical practices, shamelessness and freedom of speech, were highly
provocative topics, and that Montaigne’s use of both comes close to the ideas expressed in the ancient anecdotes. Nonetheless, since I do not believe that Clément’s diffuse sense of ‘cynisme’ is justified, I do not conclude, as she does, that whole theses should be devoted to Montaigne’s Cynicism, or Erasmus’s Cynicism, and so forth. This is not to say, however, that there is not scope for further study. Work could be done along the lines adopted here on early modern Italian and English texts, and on seventeenth-century French texts, including, for example, those of the so-called ‘libertins érudits’. The word history of how and when ‘Cynicism’ becomes ‘cynicism’ is another possible area of investigation. My methodology may not be suited to studying the reception of Stoicism and Epicureanism, but if it were employed it would reveal the standard early modern notions of these schools, which may not be wholly predictable.

Within the great diversity of early modern representations of Cynicism, it is of course possible to discern certain trends. The attempt to harness the Dogs for the moral aims of *bonnes lettres*, which characterizes Erasmus’s use of the Cynics in particular, becomes less dominant as the sixteenth century progresses. Similarly, discussion of Cynic shamelessness and freedom of speech appears both to increase and to become more problematic in the late sixteenth, and early seventeenth, centuries. It is striking that the image of the Cynics as proto-Christians, which defines Medieval use of Cynicism, is not the predominant view in early modern texts. Nonetheless, Christian, idealized readings of the Cynics are seen throughout the period, from Erasmus’s ‘Sileni of Alcibiades’ to Poissenot’s *Traicté paradoxique*. Furthermore, the Cynics do not appear to be used to stand for atheists. Cynicism thereby differs from Epicureanism, which was clearly atheistic, and represented as such in numerous early modern texts.¹ Montaigne does however refer to Cynic disobedience against an Athenian cult to mock the assumptions of Christians whose behaviour does not match their beliefs, although they still trust that they are more deserving of divine reward than virtuous pagans. I have looked for but not discerned any difference between Catholic and Protestant

¹ There is little discussion of the Cynics in François Berriot, *Athéismes et athéistes au XVIᵉ siècle en France* (Lille: Atelier national de reproduction de thèses, 1984), which contains considerable evidence of the association between atheism and Epicureanism.
representations of the Cynics. The Catholic theologian Joannes Gastius is as keen to include Cynic jests in his *Convivalium sermonum* as the Protestant Pierre de La Primaudaye is to insert them into his *Academie Françoise*. Similarly, Gabriel du Préau and Jean de Léry, Catholic and Protestant zealots respectively, are equally appalled by tales of Cynic shamelessness. Such differing responses indicate that the varied nature of the Cynic tradition is not liable to be controlled by any single ideology, Christian or otherwise.

Removed from an exclusively Christian frame, the Cynics offered an attractive and liberating example of a humorous, free and natural way of life. Nonetheless, in the early modern period, the appeal of the Dogs' lives was often tempered by dismay at their shamelessness, which proved impossible to domesticate. In Part I, I showed how Erasmus’s ambivalence in the *Apophthegmata*, which presents Diogenes as an exemplar of the combination of wit and wisdom while also despairing at the Cynic’s use of his ‘grace de bien parler’ to justify foul deeds, neatly illustrates the forces of attraction and repulsion exerted by the Dogs. Vernacular collections of sayings show, however, that representations of Cynicism cannot simply be reduced to a dichotomy between good and bad Dogs. This is because compilers such as Meurier, Guicciardini and Garimberto from the mid-to-late sixteenth century, focus on wit, and neglect morality. For them, Cynic sayings are not so much models of good speech and behaviour, to be imitated by young men at school, but excellent examples of subtle and comic repartee, which they frame for use by their readers. Their presentation of Cynic sayings is a result of Cynicism’s transmission by means of witty saying, as opposed to abstract argument, and is unwittingly close to Diogenes’ rhetoric as presented in the ancient tradition, which taught through performance rather than didacticism. The adaptation, invention and idiomatization of Cynic sayings in vernacular collections demonstrate the potential of the ancient tradition for improvisation of all sorts. As a motley set of traditions, and not a single ideology, Cynicism is equally liable to appear in the learned context of Erasmus’s *Adages*, as it is to be vulgarized, giving rise to French proverbs. The latter process, idiomatization, is, I would argue, of particular importance for the reception of Cynicism.
through the ages. It marks the point at which *prima facie* traces of the Cynic tradition are lost, and indicates that Cynicism has endured not in spite of the absence of Cynic theory, but because the attractiveness of Cynic verbal practice is prone to work its way into the popular imagination.

Recognition of the essentially rhetorical nature of the ancient Cynic tradition does not always lead to the amorality seen in mid-to-late vernacular collections of sayings. Guazzo's *Civile conversation* is a remarkable example which presents Diogenes as the ultimate philosopher of human relations, who 'cherissoit [la conversation] sur tout autre philosophe'. For Guazzo, Diogenes' performance is witty, socially-engaged, even noble. The moral and didactic framing of Cynic sayings and anecdotes in emblem books is less developed, but still provides excellent examples of the adaptation and idiomatization of Cynic material. Encyclopedias and miscellanies also constitute instances of rhetorical adaptation of the ancient tradition, but the most salient feature of their treatment of Cynicism is the disruptive or provocative effect the ancient Dogs can have on their discourses. While they can offer a clean version of good Dogs, they can also betray anxiety, incomprehension or extreme responses in their presentation of the Cynics.

The two major aspects of the standard representations of Cynicism I uncovered in Part I are, firstly, the potential of the Dogs' performance for further improvisation and, secondly, the capacity of paradoxical Cynic practice to provoke revealing responses. These two factors make the reception of Cynicism, even in otherwise unremarkable texts, both unpredictable and informative. Such effects are in inverse proportion to Cynicism's philosophical influence. While Stoicism and Pyrrhonism may have the greater impact on the history of ideas, either in their effect on early modern ethical theories or in serving as an anti-philosophical corrosive, they do not share the multiple associations of Cynicism, nor its great scope for literary adaptation.

Part II was devoted to texts which take up the invitation of the Cynic tradition to broach outrageous material and dangerous ideas in playful and paradoxical ways. In fact, the strategies of paradox and paradiastole dominated the majority of works
analysed here, from the *Tiers Livre*, Rabelais's most paradoxical work, through mock-encomia and sets of arguments *in utramque partem*, to Montaigne's praise of Sebond's dubious theological work, the *Theologia naturalis*, in which he gives a paradiastolic assessment of Cynic shamelessness. Cynic performance disconcerts and appeals through its humourous opposition to *doxa*, making the mock-encomium and similar works an ideal home for the Dogs. The most remarkable adaptation of Diogenes' seriocomic performance in early modern French texts remains in my view the prologue of the *Tiers Livre*. Rabelais's association of himself and his book with Diogenes has two main implications. It indicates firstly that he adopts a position of engaged independence from society, and secondly that joyousness, reminiscent of carnival, is a dominant characteristic of his writing, and a requirement of reading him in the right spirit.

Lucianic burlesque encomia, debates *pro et contra*, and serious, Socratic paradoxes also exploit the paradoxical behaviour of the Cynics, albeit in varied ways. None approaches the verve and comedy of Rabelais's presentation, with the exception of Bruscambille, whose performance borrows from the Cynic tradition to comic effect. The opposite is true of serious, neo-Stoic paradoxes, which tend to idealize the Cynics in fairly predictable fashion. The extreme paradoxical stances of the Dogs represent a philosophical extreme against which Lucianic mock-encomia can be measured. They are rendered less paradoxical in Estienne's *Paradoxes* to conform to the rhetorical workings of the text, and they stand for an unacceptable extreme of anti-courtliness in Philibert's *Le Philosophe de court*. It is in the nature of arguments *in utramque partem* to invoke extreme positions and the technique of paradiastole. Cynicism, which adopts a radical standpoint vis-à-vis *doxa*, and is always already paradiastolic in its 'defacement' of normative values, provides a useful and revealing point of reference for writers and readers of paradoxical works. The Dogs invariably gnaw through to the 'sustantificque mouelle' of otherwise playful and duplicitous texts.

The archetypally Cynic practices of shamelessness and freedom of speech provoke a wide range of reactions in the early modern period from confusion, embarrassment and disgust to facetious euphemism and paradiastole. I showed how
Montaigne and Béroalde in particular explored the implications of the unruly Cynic body, which is the factor that links shamelessness and parrhesia. Albeit in different ways, these two authors both present Diogenes as a radically autonomous self, who demonstrates his freedom from taboos, and to speak his mind, through performative use of his body. For Montaigne, the Cynic is free from the constraints of convention, his natural living thereby inverts normative moral values. For Béroalde, Diogenes stands for freedom of speech, which is a dangerous strategy, but one that is ultimately preferable to more repressive means of communication. Although they are by no means Cynics, Montaigne and Béroalde use Cynicism to broach risky and shocking ideas which are close to those expressed in the ancient tradition.

Cynic Selfhood in Early Modern Texts

The richness of prima facie references to Cynicism in the early modern period is due to a combination of factors. The first of these is the capacity of the ancient tradition for adaptation. However, though necessary, this potential is not sufficient to explain the variety and wealth of use of the Dogs. I have demonstrated the great appreciation of major and minor early modern writers for Diogenes' rhetoric, which derives in part from a general fascination with ancient material as providing a model for language and behaviour. Imitation of Cynic models is bound to be unusually free, given the absence of Cynic theory, which might limit improvisation.

Tracing one key example, Diogenes' paradoxical search for a man, provides a series of examples which demonstrate the range of ways in which a characteristically open Cynic anecdote is adapted by early modern writers. It is worth stressing that the original story, in Diogenes Laertius, is one sentence long: "[Diogenes] lit a lamp in broad daylight and said, as he went about, "I am looking for a man"" (VI, 41). The paradox is not explained, its meaning is up for grabs. The lantern anecdote is often illustrated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, including in the emblem books of La Perrière and Haechtanus in which the Cynic, in a mixture of early modern dress and Cynic garb, shines his lantern on a passing crowd. The rural setting in both cases hints that the
Cynic's authority derives in part from following nature, while the accompanying verses give a didactic moral to the story. The story is expanded into a fairly developed narrative in Duboys's *L'Académie des philosophes*, which, like Haechtanus, interprets the story as referring to the viciousness of the majority of so-called men. I showed that in a contemporary political pamphlet from the Netherlands, Diogenes' lantern is used to turn an accusatory light on Frenchmen, demanding their intervention against Philip II. The anecdote is also used for political purposes in a set of pamphlets on the French court in the early sixteenth century. In P.R.P.F.I.S.'s serious *Paradoxe [...] que ce n'est point la nature qui fait l'homme, mais bien l'industrie*, Diogenes' search is used against hypocrisy or feigning. Regnier and Bruscambille both employ the story in playful discussions of folly, and the latter also borrows the lantern image to cast comic doubt on the brightness of his audience, in an example of idiomatization. The diversity and wealth derived from a single Cynic anecdote demonstrate both its potential for improvisation and the capacity of all kinds of early modern writers to employ the technique of *imitatio* to turn it to a variety of ends, in various styles. Such remarkable imitation is not restricted to the early modern period. Nietzsche employs a version of the story in the tale of the madman who announces the death of God in a much later example of idiomatization.

The inspirational quality of the story of Diogenes' lantern cannot, I think, be explained away merely by pointing to its openness and potential for adaptation. Rather, the Cynic's paradoxical performance poses such a basic but bizarre question about what it is to be human that it has spoken to successive generations. Clearly, given the variety of adaptations of the anecdote throughout the ages, Diogenes' lantern does not shine with transcendent truth, it is not the light of the sun outside Plato's cave. Instead, it is precisely because the anecdote asks the question about what it is to be human without giving the answer that it has proved so provocative and enduring.

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What is true of the Cynic's lantern is true of the ancient tradition in general. The Dogs shock, amuse and provoke with unexplained seriocomic performances which reveal a radical form of freedom and creation of the self. This combination of factors, which is unique to Cynicism, indicate why canonical and non-canonical early modern writers are drawn to Diogenes. The Cynic represents a highly unusual and malleable form of self-fashioning. Bakhtin and Branham have the insight to see Diogenes as a hero of improvisation, forever inventing himself in humorous, rhetorical fashion in the face of the assaults of fortune. Paradoxically, however, it is because Diogenes constantly improvises his self in performative opposition to normative values that he comes to represent a strangely permanent and extreme form of selfhood. Hence he stands against hypocrisy, and the donning of masks of all sorts, in both Philibert and P.R.P.F.I.S.. It also makes Diogenes an attractive figure for early modern self-fashioning. The theory of imitatio implies that Diogenes' sayings, as collected in Erasmus's *Apophthegmata*, both express the Cynic's personality and can be digested by Erasmus's young readers in the formation of their own selves. The number of the Cynic's sayings in this collection indicate that his performance was in some ways ideally adapted for this process.

A more explicit form of authorial self-fashioning is found in the preface of *La Morosophie* by La Perrière, who borrows from Diogenes' foolish-wise performance to define his own status as a writer. It is no coincidence that Diogenes dominates the prologue of the first book signed by Rabelais, and that within it Rabelais associates himself and his book with Diogenes. The Cynic's radical and humorous self-fashioning provides a comic mask behind which Rabelais can open up ideas about the status of his writing, himself as a writer, and even his own self. Rabelais's book is remarkably unlike modern literature, and Montaigne's *Essais*, in its neglect of the internal psychological workings of the self. All that persons are in Rabelais is expressed through action, dialogue and the body, the innermost workings of which are put on display. The possible comparisons between Rabelais's book and Diogenes' performance as related

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in the ancient tradition are obvious, but it is also Diogenes' first person, mocking the Corinthians, which Rabelais mirrors in his own strange use of the first person in the prologue. Similarly, in Béroalde's weird dialogue, in which the identities of the speakers are unstable, Diogenes is singled out as a true self.

Diogenes' conception of the human being, which he plays with in his famous performance with the lantern, shuffles the normal hierarchy of being (animal to man to gods), to suggest that animals provide an ethical standard by which men become wise, thereby metamorphosing into gods themselves (man to animal to gods). In the early Renaissance, many writers believed that the self was indefinitely malleable, and could even approach divinity. Diogenes is an archetypally flexible self. Hence the idealized version of him in Erasmus's 'Sileni of Alcibiades' maintains that he is like Christ. In Montaigne's discussion of his open-air onanism, however, it is precisely the Cynic's dog-like deeds that define him as a sage and guarantee his commitment to virtue. Diogenes is in the gutter to look at the stars. Montaigne gives an elegant formulation of the two poles of Diogenes' notion of the self, and indeed of what is to be human, in 'De Democritus et Heraclitus', in which Diogenes' foolish-wise performance both exemplifies man's foolish nature, and wisely recognizes that man is laughable.

What if Diogenes were to be brought back to life to shine his lantern on early modern representations of his life? I suspect that he would recognize that his performance had set up a series of bizarre, unpredictable echoes, but that he would be appalled that none of these amounted to the most important thing of all, that of living well. No early modern writer meets the moral challenge posed by the Cynics in their way of life. Cynic performance may have been playful and paradoxical but its message did not contain 'tres haultz sacremens et mysteres horrificques'; there was no need to analyse it 'en la perfectissime partie', instead, it was shockingly direct. Cynicism became the most popular Hellenistic philosophy in the ancient world because it was

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accessible and attractive. Nonetheless, in playfully and paradoxically exploiting Cynic performance, early modern texts are responding to a fundamental aspect of the Cynic tradition, and indeed to the main dimension of Cynicism which outlived the Cynic movement itself. Diogenes would have looked on such responses as useless, a waste of time, but he would have recognized some common ground in terms of presentation, if not of content. Unfortunately, the same is not true of my thesis, which in Diogenes’ eyes at least would be an excellent example of fruitless toil, of foolish erudition. I am happy to concede this point. The alternative, that of attempting to control the Dogs, is more disingenuous. Modern examples of the reception of Cynicism tend to attempt to put the Dogs on the leash for their own theoretical ends. In practice, they choose to ignore the fact that Diogenes and his colleagues rejected formal argument, preferring witty and bodily performance. Such theorists ought to feel the Dogs snapping at their heels, that they are in imminent danger of Diogenes spitting in their faces or of cocking his leg to show how Cynic practice can dampen any theory. Early modern instances of the reception of Cynicism may sometimes attempt to tame the Dogs, but their witty use of the Cynic tradition also opens up odd and outrageous ideas, thereby giving the Dogs more room in which to roam. They do not do this in tedious, theoretical fashion, but through playful and paradoxical practice which is directly inspired by the Cynic tradition. They therefore show that every Dog should have his day.

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6 See above, pp. 20-21.
Anonymous works listed alphabetically under title. In cases in which the edition used is not the first edition, the bibliographical entry refers to edition consulted, and cited, in thesis. I have given locations and shelfmarks for all early printed books, using the following abbreviations:

Arsenal  Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris
BL       British Library, London
BN       Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris
Bod      Bodleian Library, Oxford
Mazarine Bibliothèque de la Mazarine, Paris

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Tresor de vertu, ou sont contenue toutes les plus nobles, & excellentes sentences, & enseignmens de tous les premiers auteurs, hebreuz, grez, & latins, pour induire un chacun à bien & honnestemnt vivre/Thesoro di vertu doue sono tutte le più nobile, & excellenti sentenze & documenti di tutti i primi autori hebrei, greci, & latini, che obino indurre all’buono & honnesto vivere, (Lyon: Jean Temporal, 1555) Arsenal: 8° BL 33224


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