




THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN POST-SOVIET SOCIETIES

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ABSTRACT

The central concern of the thesis is to investigate the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies. Contrary to previous scholarship studying identity narratives enhanced and produced by political and economic elites within the space of the former USSR, this thesis focuses its analysis on how the wider public's perception of their national identity may have changed as a consequence of increased globalisation since 1991. In order to showcase the voices of the previously unrepresented masses, the thesis as a case *sui generis* approaches the study of globalisation and nationalism in the post-Soviet world from both quantitative and qualitative perspectives. It uses a mixed-method approach that confronts wider statistical trends identified on the region for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in one post-Soviet state, namely in Kazakhstan.

The findings reveal that globalisation and nationalism may interact in rather contradicting ways in post-Soviet societies. University-educated people especially, through contact with globalisation may develop both nationalist and globalist attitudes. Using the case study of the former Soviet Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, with its dual state-led promotion of a civic Kazakhstani identity and an ethnic Kazakh identity, the thesis demonstrates that not only the rooted "somewheres" but also the cosmopolitan "anywheres" can be seen to embrace a national "resistance identity" opposing globalising tendencies and/or dominant elite narratives on national identity. Contrary to the dominant Western view, the thesis does not find an individual's educational background to be the main defining criterion for nationalist sentiment within the states of the former USSR. Rather than education, both the statistical and non-statistical analyses find a post-Soviet citizen's age, gender and pre-university social experiences act as an important predictor for a nationalist attitude. The thesis therefore asks future research to critically review the main criteria that differentiate a nationalist from a cosmopolitan in general. It also suggests that using a gendered lens on globalisation might offer new insights into the complexities of globalisation and nationalism.

*To my beloved parents, who taught me to leave no
stone unturned and to aim high*

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

BRI	China's Belt and Road Initiative
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
Covid-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
EVS	European Value Survey
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDP PPP	Gross Domestic Product per capita based on Purchasing Power Parity
glmer()	R function to run a generalised logistic multilevel regression analysis
GPI	Global Peace Index from the Institute for Economics & Peace
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICC	Intraclass Correlation
icc()	R command to calculate the intraclass correlation
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISSP	International Social Survey Program
(k.)	Kazakh language
KZT	Kazakhstani Tenge, currency of Kazakhstan
lmer()	R command to run a linear mixed-effects regression analysis
MGCFA	Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBGI	Person-Based Globalisation Index
PC	Portable Computer
R	Free Software Environment for Statistical Computing and Graphics
(r.)	Russian language
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic

U.N.	United Nations
(ukr.)	Ukrainian language
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991) = Soviet Union
WVS	World Value Survey

GLOSSARY OF KAZAKH AND RUSSIAN EXPRESSIONS

<i>Abai Qunanbaiuly (k.)</i>	Kazakh poet, composer and philosopher (10 August 1845-6July 1904)
<i>Almaty (k.)</i>	'Apple-mountain', 'full of apples', biggest city and former capital of Kazakhstan
<i>Aktau (k.)</i>	'White Mountain', city on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea with oil and gas fields
<i>Astana (k.)</i>	'Capital', former Akmola, since March 2019 renamed Nur-Sultan, capital of Kazakhstan
<i>Baursak (k.)</i>	Puffy fried bread served on special occasions all over Kazakhstan
<i>Beshbarmak (k.)</i>	Kazakh national dish, consisting of boiled horse meat and noodles
<i>Bolashak (k.)</i>	'Future for Kazakhstan' government-funded students-mobility programme
<i>Bolashaks (k.)</i>	Former exchange-students who participated in the <i>Bolashak</i> program
<i>Shymbulak</i>	Ski resort in the upper part of the Medeu Valley in the Zailiisky Alatau mountain range near Almaty
<i>Druzhba Narodov (r.)</i>	'Fraternity of peoples', Soviet concept
<i>Elbasi (k.)</i>	'Leader of the Nation'
<i>Ene (k.)</i>	'Mother-in-law'
<i>Grashdanin Mira (r.)</i>	'World Citizen'
<i>Gulag (r.)</i>	Forced labour camps situated in Siberia and Kazakhstan under Stalin
<i>Kalym (k.)</i>	A sum of money or quantity of goods given to a bride's family by the groom in order to compensate for the family's loss of a female worker.
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev	Second president of Kazakhstan elected on 9 June 2019.

Kazakh Khanat	<i>Chinggisid</i> nomadic state (15 th -19 th century) area roughly corresponds to modern-day Kazakhstan
<i>Kelin</i> (k.)	‘A young married Kazakh woman’
Khanat of Khiva	One of the Uzbek khanates of Central Asia; refers to a political entity in the region of <i>Khorezm</i> that existed from the early 16th century until 1920.
Khurshechevian (r.) ‘thaw’	Period in the history of USSR (1950s-1960s) when repression and censorship were relaxed and millions of Soviet political prisoners were released. It also led to a relaxation in Soviet foreign policy.
<i>koli lav</i> (k.)	Same-sex and provocatively dressed women
<i>Korenizatsiia</i> (r.)	Soviet ‘indigenisation’ ‘nativisation’ policy
<i>Kumis</i> (k.)	A mildly alcoholic national beverage of Kazakhstan made from fermented mare's milk.
<i>Kvass</i> (r.)	Traditional Slavic and Baltic beverage made out of rye (black) bread
<i>Mangystau</i> (k.)	‘Coat of arms’, region of Kazakhstan located at Caspian Shore.
<i>Mankurtstan</i> (k.)	2011 anti-utopian Kazakh novel by Aktan Tokish
<i>Mankurts</i> (k.)	Kazakh people who have lost their native language and sense of national belonging
<i>Matroyshka</i> (r.)	‘Puppet’
#HeМолчи (r.)	“Don’t keep silent” digital feminist campaign in Kazakhstan
<i>Nomenklatura</i> (r.)	The political and bureaucratic Soviet elite, who enjoyed access to goods and services out of reach for ordinary people, such as trips abroad, better housing and health services, and Western consumer goods.
<i>Nur Otan</i> (k.)	‘Light of Fatherland’, ruling political party in Kazakhstan

Nursultan Nazarbayev	First president of Kazakhstan 1990-2019
<i>Oblast (r.)</i>	Region
<i>Okrug (r.)</i>	District
<i>Oralman (k.)</i>	Ethnic Kazakh returnee to Kazakhstan post-1991
<i>Shala (k.) Kazakh</i>	'Asphalt': an urban Kazakh who does not speak Kazakh and mainly communicates in Russian
<i>Sovietskii Narod (r.)</i>	'Soviet people', citizenship in USSR
<i>uvazheniia k starchim (r.)</i>	Cultural tradition 'to show your respect to the elderly'
<i>Uyat (k.)</i>	'Shame'

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

All Kazakh and Russian terms and phrases are rendered in English. Transliteration from Kazakh¹ and Russian² is based on the Library of Congress system, whereby 'я' is rendered as 'ia' except at the beginning of a word, where it has been written as 'ya' for greater readability. Also, for reasons of accessibility to non-Russian/Kazakh speakers, the soft sign has been connoted by a single apostrophe, except in proper names, where it has been dropped. All names of Kazakh political actors and places are transliterated as indicated by official governmental online sources such as <https://www.akorda.kz/en>. For example, the newly elected president of Kazakhstan is spelled Kassym-**J**omart Tokayev rather than Kassym-**Z**homart Tokayev in this thesis. All foreign words are *italicised* with the exception of proper names.

¹ <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsol/romanization/kazakh.pdf> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

² <https://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsol/romanization/russian.pdf> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

INTRODUCTION

“Globalisation is an inescapable process that reinforces and sustains sentiments of patriotism and nationalism.”³

In the light of the current COVID-19 pandemic that taught us how fast borders can be re-erected by nation states, the quote above from an interview with an entrepreneur in Kostanay (Kazakhstan) from June 2019 seems rather far-fetched and optimistic. At that time, his interpretation of globalisation, however, seemed accurate, because he had spent part of his childhood under Communist rule and his later life in a “soft- authoritarian” setting (Schatz 2009: 207-213).

The collapse and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 heralded the beginning of a new epoch for the former Soviet countries. Hitherto, only a tiny minority of the Soviet population often belonging to the *nomenklatura* enjoyed access to the non-Communist world (Lane 2005: 147f, 2011: 928; Salmenniemi 2012: 7). This changed with the break-up of the USSR; the density and intensity of cultural and economic links with the wider non-Soviet world increased dramatically. This new global connectedness with the capitalist world not only started to affect national economies and states, but it also had a significant impact on post-Soviet people’s perception of their national identity. Now, former cultural patterns were being challenged by people’s encounter with Western lifestyles and ideas.

In the aftermath of the disintegration of the USSR, the ruling elites of the successor states, therefore, faced a single but contradictory challenge: the need to adapt to general rules of globalisation and, at the same time, to negotiate their newfound national status. It is argued that in this context of increased insecurity and frustration, resulting from the dramatic structural changes, the Soviet

³ FG6, male Kazakh, aged 33, Kostanay

institutionalisation of nationhood may serve as an “easy and reliable map” (Suny 2001: 893) for the nation-building policies of the successor states’ elites.

Despite this assumption, the political elites in the 15 former Soviet republics varied greatly in their responses to the newly obtained independence. Some regimes took “what was most useful from their Soviet-era histories to create new historical narratives” (Hirsch 2005: 325). They started to strive for more inclusive citizenship, based on civic criteria, such as common political institutions and liberal principles (for example Belarus). Yet others, such as the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia, manifested strong anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments and sought to defend their newly independent statehood from Soviet “occupation”. They became so called “nationalising states” (Brubaker 1996: 8-9) and pursued a strong nationalising agenda by favouring restrictive citizenship legislation.

Consequently, I recognise the *non-essentialist* case that public opinion and therefore people’s perception of their national identity can be shaped by the agenda setting of elites. Yet, previous studies on the former Soviet space have convincingly challenged the *non-essentialist* view (Barrington et al. 2003; Blackburn 2019; Isaacs and Polese 2016b). They have shown that there may exist large gaps between how nations are imagined by a state’s elites and how they are perceived by its citizens.

The study of nation-building policies with an exclusive focus on political elites seems even more questionable in the light of the growing and continuing strength of populist movements in the West. These distinct anti-globalist and anti-elite movements suggest that, sometimes, contemporary national identities may emerge from below, opposing top-down, elite-oriented, institutionalised national narratives. These national “resistance identities” (Castells 2011: 421) are particularly prevalent amongst those citizens who feel that they have been left defenceless by the process of globalisation, the so-called “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f). Out of concern about losing their jobs to foreigners and out of discontent with their own cosmopolitan establishment, these “losers” are predicted to identify strongly with their traditional local/national communities.

Discussion of case selection

For all their merits, the dominant scholarly approaches to post-socialist transformation do not shed much light on how globalisation has influenced the wider post-Soviet public's identities and everyday life. Rather than changes in mass identities, the focus has been on elite identity narratives and state nation-building policies. This is where my thesis, *observing the impact of globalisation on national identities* in post-Soviet societies, makes a contribution. In investigating *how post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation may have changed as a consequence of increased globalisation since 1991*, I follow the arguments of *scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism* that some identities can be expected to arise independently from or even in opposition to the nation-building attempts by national elites.

In my view, the former Soviet republics offer an interesting context to observe the impact of globalisation on mass identity narratives, mainly because unlike in the USA and Western Europe globalisation seems to be a rather recent phenomenon in this region. Until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the wider public in most republics was barely exposed to any form of non-Communist culture.

Within the post-Soviet region, Kazakhstan seems to be both a typical and an atypical case. Thanks to the country's vast oil, gas and metal deposits, Kazakhstan experienced rapid economic growth in the 1990s and early 2000s and is now Central Asia's biggest and most globalised economy. However, unlike other prosperous successor states of the USSR, the wider Kazakhstani public has been largely isolated from most Western cultural and social influences until the introduction of cheaper 3G and 4G communication technologies in the 2010s. Furthermore, on the one hand Kazakhstan seems to be a compelling example of a state created by Soviet nationalities policy. On the other, the state's inherited multi-ethnic population did not permit the promotion of an exclusive ethnic identity but rather the promotion of two identity narratives, an ethnic Kazakh and a civic Kazakhstani identity. I therefore argue that Kazakhstan serves as a good case study to illustrate how globalisation may interact in rather complex ways with ordinary post-Soviet citizens' perception of their identity because of the country's state-led dichotomy of nationhood and its rather recent exposure to global culture.

Overall, I find that globalisation – particularly its cultural and social forms – can produce both nationalist and globalist attitudes among people in the successor states of the USSR. The data gathered in the interviews confirm my assumption that social and cultural globalisation can engender civic- and ethnic-centred “resistance nationalism” within the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan.

Different forms of cultural and social globalisation seem to encourage young Kazakh women to define themselves more in civic terms and to embrace a civic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421-424) opposing the state-led “retraditionalisation” of a woman’s role in Kazakhstan society. The same forms of globalisation seem to have a different effect on young male Kazakhs. Contrary to their female fellow citizens, young men, through their contact with *otherness* overseas or in big cities, seem to become more aware of their *Kazakhness* and as a result develop a stronger attachment to their Kazakh identity. For these often well-educated and well-travelled Kazakh men, so-called cosmopolitan “anywheres” (Goodhart 2017: 3), the increased global interconnectedness with the West poses a threat against which the uniqueness of their Kazakh cultural identity and mentality has to be protected. In response to cultural homogenisation, reinforced by globalisation, they develop an ethnic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421).

Consequently, my findings suggest that the influence of globalisation on people’s perception of their identity is not black and white in countries that have experienced socialism. In contrast to Western scholarship’s observations, I find an individual’s age and gender, in combination with their pre-university educational and social experiences, rather than their acquired educational status in adult life, act as a more accurate predictor for a nationalist attitude. Thus, I ask future research in the fields of globalisation and nationalism to review the main criteria that distinguish nationalists from globalists. In summary, the evidence presented here advances the general understanding of the complex and contested relationship between globalisation and contemporary national identities within post-Soviet societies.

How the study is approached

Often the topic of globalisation and national identity in the former republics of the USSR has been tackled through the prism of citizens who, due to their educational or social background, can be expected to benefit from the increased interconnectedness with the world.

I argue that this practice seems rather questionable, especially in the light of growing anti-elite sentiments that reflect the widening rift between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (Tamir 2019: 98-99, 166) in the West. Some scholars predict this “fault line” between the liberal cosmopolitans and the more traditionally minded masses to be deepened by the current Covid-19 pandemic (Woods et al. 2020: 11). In order to incorporate the voices of the rooted “somewheres” (Goodhart 2017: 3), I decided to focus on nationalism as a sentiment experienced at the grassroots level in post-Soviet societies.

As far as I know, the impact of globalisation on ordinary post-Soviet citizens’ perception of their national identity has not been studied in a large-N comparative context, though comparative investigation is best suited to assessing such dynamics due to the fact that including comparison over both time and location increases the overall macro-level N and hence the power of the resulting models. However, large-N statistical analyses have their own drawbacks. They may produce general trends across cases, but they remain vague about how globalisation may resonate with citizens’ perception of their identity in an individual country.

An additional single case study in one post-Soviet state allows the incorporation of multiple micro-variables, so-called country-specific factors. These factors can be related to their historical, institutional and political context as required, rather than needing to be separated in a search for theoretical “elegance”. Moreover, a case-based technique will also demonstrate whether concepts like internationalisation or westernisation are more appropriate to capture the increased social, cultural, political and economic interconnectedness than globalisation. Microresearch using empirical data from interviews provides useful insights for one case, but often runs the risk of being labelled as “unscientific speculation” (Martens et al. 2015: 226).

In light of the limitations of both variance-based and case-based methodological techniques, I decided that the soundest strategy to incorporate the previously neglected voices of the rooted “somewheres” would be a partially mixed sequential equal status design that confronts wider statistical trends in the post-Soviet space for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in one former Soviet state, namely in Kazakhstan in 2019. Furthermore, a mixed methods design that combines the best of both methodological approaches permits the formulation of a more nuanced answer to the thesis’ research question of *how any causal relationship between globalisation and national identity* may be interpreted and understood within the states of the former USSR.

Rationale for the research

The research is valid and timely for a number of interlinked reasons. First, for its own sake: to my knowledge, there has been no mixed-method research on a comparable scale observing the impact of globalisation on ordinary people’s perception of their national identity in post-Soviet societies. My thesis therefore constitutes a valuable and insightful contribution to the existing literature addressing the debate on nationalism and globalisation in the context of the former Soviet space.

Second, as a case *sui generis* I ran statistical regressions to investigate the impact of globalisation on national identity over both time (1990s, 2000s and 2010s) and the post-Soviet space. Hitherto scholarship has focused mainly on a single nation and on cross-national comparisons, limited primarily to Western European states and the Western world in general (Antonsich 2009; Ariely 2011, 2012; Kunovich 2009).

Third, the employed statistical approach adds texture to the overall methodological debates on how to observe the impact of globalisation on national identity by statistical research in general. So far, there has been no statistical analysis measuring both national identity and globalisation among multiple dimensions in a longitudinal framework.

Fourth, my thesis contributes to the (small, but growing) body of work on how globalising flows may influence ordinary citizens' perception of their national identity within the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan. In contrast to previous research on Kazakhstan, I also give prominence to representatives of the working classes and people without higher education, in order to incorporate the previously neglected voices of the rooted "somewheres" of globalisation. A detailed study of how different constitutive features of globalisation (mass migration, foreign investments, social networks, gender equality and LGBTQ+ etc.) are received among the wider population illuminates previous scholars' discussion of whether globalisation can be used interchangeably with other pre-existing buzzwords, such as internationalisation and westernisation in the context of Kazakhstan.

Finally, my thesis provides a study that identifies broader general trends that can provide data for future research in the wider field of globalisation and national identity.

Thesis structure

In order to accommodate the two different methodological approaches and to avoid the impression of two separate studies, the study has been organised accordingly.

In Chapter One, various theoretical and comparative debates in the field of globalisation and national identity studies, alongside the legacy of the Soviet national identity policy are discussed. Both concepts of globalisation and national identity are outlined within the context of the post-Soviet space and Kazakhstan. Overall, the general consensus among the debates on national identity and globalisation foresees globalisation to have an impact on post-Soviet peoples' identification with their nation, be it positive or negative. Previous area studies see increased globalisation as having a positive impact on former Soviet citizens' identification with their nation. Out of concern about losing their cultural values and identity, post-Soviet people tend to develop a stronger attachment to their national identity in opposition to the alien, globalised Western world.

In Chapter Two, the methods utilised by previous area scholars to study the complex interrelation between globalisation and national identity, as well as the current debate concerning the use of mixed methods in social and behavioural

science, are presented. It is argued that the most appropriate approach to investigate the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies is a mixed-method approach, which challenges wider statistical trends identified for the post-Soviet space for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in Kazakhstan.

Chapter Three's objective is to test first whether the macro-condition – a former Soviet republic's level of globalisation, the independent variable – affects ordinary post-Soviet people's attachment to their national identity, the dependent variable and whether a higher degree of globalisation influences former Soviet citizen's relationship to their national identity positively or negatively. For that, several cross-national generalised logistic multilevel regressions in *R* for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s (where applicable) were conducted. The chapter demonstrates that globalisation (and its cultural and political forms in particular) seems to play an important role for post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation in today's fast-changing world, but not just that: The results reveal that social globalisation may have had a twofold influence on some university-educated people's national identity in the post-Soviet world in the 2010s. They either developed a stronger or weaker attachment to their national group. However, some individuals, who have acquired higher education, through their contact with social globalisation, may even have embraced an integrated dual identity that embodies both cosmopolitanism and patriotism and therefore is compatible with patriotic obligations.

Chapters Four and Five contrast some of the statistical trends identified in Chapter Three with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in Kazakhstan.

Chapter Four addresses the question of whether ordinary citizens' newly attained "globality" (Scholte's 2008: 1485) is substantial or merely a façade of the Kazakhstani leadership's "soft-authoritarian" nation-branding strategy (Koch 2013: 42; Schatz 2009: 208-213). It shows that although "networked authoritarian" (Anceschi 2015: 282) strategies continue to dominate people's lives, globalisation is perceived to mark the beginning of a new epoch in contemporary Kazakhstan, especially since the launch of cheaper 3G and 4G mobile handsets and

smartphones. Kazakhstan's "globality" above all seems to stem from Kazakhstan's increased interconnectedness with Europe and the USA. Thus, globalisation, in propagating predominantly Western values in Kazakhstan, seems to be used as an equivalent to westernisation, irrespective of the predominance of the Russian media and the growing Asian cultural influence, resulting particularly from Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and Korean popular culture (K-pop).

Chapter Five seeks to further evaluate the diagnosed statistical prognoses in Chapter Three, in assessing how the increased interconnectedness with the West influences Kazakhstan's citizens' attachment to their national identity. It demonstrates that despite the government's promotion of an inclusive civic Kazakhstani identity, Kazakhs are more likely to define themselves in ethnic than in civic terms, irrespective of an individual's social class or the degree of urbanisation she or he is exposed to. It finds especially cultural and social globalising forces to be responsible for the wider public's shift towards a more exclusive ethnic-based understanding of nationhood. In doing so, the chapter reaffirms the findings outlined in Chapter Three and Four insofar as it demonstrates that "winners" of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f) seem to react in one of two ways when they come into contact with other cultures and lifestyles on- or offline; they can either embrace or resist *otherness*.

In the Conclusion, the main findings of the thesis are brought together, theoretical considerations are raised and areas for future research identified. It is argued that especially the increased cultural and social interconnectedness with the West play an important role for ordinary post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity. Overall, I find the myriad forms of globalisation to interrelate in rather compound ways with people's national identities within post-Soviet societies.

Contrary to the dominant Western view, in the context of the former USSR, cosmopolitan "anywheres" (Goodhart 2017: 3) can be drawn to define themselves in national and/or global terms as a reaction against both globalisation and/or dominant elite narratives on national identity. My findings demonstrate that a person's semblance of cosmopolitanism (university education) is not necessarily a precondition for a globalist mindset. Rather than educational background, I found age and gender in combination with the pre-university social experience influenced the identity choices of post-Soviet people. Accordingly, I invite future scholarship in

the fields of globalisation and nationalism to reconsider the main criteria that separate a nationalist from a globalist. One possible way would be to advance feminist thinking on globalisation. Such research seems particularly prevalent in the light of the current pandemic that once again proves that globalisation does not benefit all humanity equally.

It is argued that, rather than condemning the anger of the vulnerable masses as reactionary and allowing it to be exploited by populist parties in the post-pandemic world, it should be given a voice, not only to express frustration but also to fight the growing inequalities that come with globalisation and that have been widened by Covid-19. More research exploring the interplay of pandemics and nationalism seems essential in order to prevent culture wars from breaking out between the cosmopolitan “anywheres” and the rooted “somewheres” (Goodhart 2017: 3) in the near future. To improve our understanding of the potential of such cultural clashes in the political arena, more research on how the current pandemic affects the wider public’s trust and pride in their political establishment is required both within countries that have experienced socialism and within those that have not.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Within my thesis I seek to examine how different aspects of globalisation influence non-elites' perception of identities in the former states of the USSR. Before I go on to evaluate the most appropriate approach to such research, it is worth pausing to consider what is meant by the twin concepts of globalisation and national identity in the post-Soviet world. For that purpose, this chapter reviews the theoretical and comparative debates in the field of globalisation and national identity studies, alongside a consideration of the legacies of the Soviet nationalities policy. This will provide the necessary background to develop a better understanding of the two phenomena of globalisation and national identity within the context of the former Soviet Union in general and the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan in particular. This will help us to get a better idea of why Kazakhstan is a typical and an atypical case within the region. The chapter is structured in the following way.

The first section introduces the different debates on globalisation and addresses the question of whether globalisation is a recent phenomenon in the former USSR. Given the successor states' lack of economic, social, cultural and political connectedness with the non-Communist world prior to 1990, globalisation is an increasingly pressing issue to post-Soviet citizens. The section then moves from a general discussion of the post-Soviet world to the particular case of Kazakhstan.

In order to develop a better understanding of how the Communist past continues to shape post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity, the subsequent part conceptualises the term national identity in the context of the former USSR and Kazakhstan.

The final part presents the prognoses of the different schools of thought on nationalism and the interrelationship between globalisation and national identities in the post-Soviet world. Overall, the current debates on globalisation and nationalism find contemporary national identities to arise mainly as a backlash against the side effects of globalisation. Turning to the case of Kazakhstan, with its two interpretations of nationhood, an ethnic Kazakh and a civic Kazakhstani variant, the section explains why and how globalising flows may interact in rather complex ways with ordinary citizens' perception of their identity.

The globalisation debate

“Globalisation is a much contested word. On the one hand, there are those who claim that we live in an integrated global order (...) On the other hand, there are those people who are very sceptical about the extent of globalisation (...).” (David Held in Democracy and Globalisation, 1997: 252)

Despite the wide range of literature on globalisation, there is no substantial agreement on how its causal dynamics and structural consequences, if any, may be explained (Hirst and Thompson 2002: 247). Thus, it comes as no surprise that there exists a “burgeoning academic debate as to whether globalisation, as an analytic construct, delivers any added value” (Held et al. 1999: 1) for the understanding of the contemporary socio-political world order (Scholte 2008). In their book “Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture”, Held et al. (1999) identify the three broad schools of thought on globalisation that were dominant in the 1990s (and are still important and recognised today (Axford 2013: 11; Martell 2007: 173)): the *hyperglobalists*, the *sceptics* and the *transformationalists*.

According to *hyperglobalists*, because investment, industry, information, and individuals (the so-called four “I-s”) had begun to flow relatively freely across national borders by the end of the 20th century, a closed-country model of the world, analogous to the Cold War blocs, no longer held. In contrast, the four “I-s” have led to the emergence of a “borderless world” (Ohmae 1995: 4f). Nowadays, investments are no longer geographically constrained, as money no longer flows from government to government, but rather moves across private borders to those places that generate the highest return or best opportunities (Ohmae 1995: 2f; Strange 2003: 132; Yeung: 1998: 294). Furthermore, industry is far more globally oriented nowadays than it used to be (Mann 2003: 135-139; Ohmae 1995: 3). Thanks to the revolution in information technology (Strange 2003: 130f), a company is now able to operate virtually everywhere in the world, “without having to build up an entire business system in each of the countries where it has a presence” (Ohmae 1995: 4). Finally, individual consumers, through better, faster and easier access to global information, become much more sensitive to price and quality and, as a result, stop buying products “merely because of their national association” (Ohmae 1995: 4).

The implication is that economic nationalism exerts an even smaller influence on purchase decisions (Ohmae 1995: 27f). As a consequence of the “four ‘I-s’” today any corporate unit planning to enter any part of the world no longer requires the assistance of a nation state, because the globalised economy is able to function without the help of nation states (Ohmae 1995: 3f, 11; Strange 2003: 130f; Yeung 1998: 294f). Under these circumstances, nation states lose their traditional role as “middleman”, “intermediary” and “arbitrator” and finally become unnatural and expire (Ohmae 1995: 4f, 11; Held et al. 1999: 3; Yeung 1998: 294). Instead of nation states, hyperglobalists argue, “region states” (such as northern Italy, Baden-Württemberg, Wales, San Diego/Tijuana, Hong Kong/southern China and Silicon Valley) play an important role in the global denationalised economy (Ohmae 1995: 80). In having “the right size and scale” (Ohmae 1995: 5) and by owing their economic success not to state policies, but rather to the fact that they are open to foreign investments and to foreign ownership products (Ohmae 1995: 89), region states are the “true, natural business units” in today’s “borderless world” (Ohmae 1995: 5). In short, hyperglobalists define globalisation as a real, largely invisible phenomenon that heralds the beginning of a new century of human history, characterised by international capitalism and dense transnational economic networks (Mann 2003: 136; Ohmae 1995: 5, 2005: 5f).

Sceptics (Hirst and Thompson 1996; Hirst et al. 2009) question the *hyperglobalists’* proclaimed version of a “borderless world”. According to them true globalisation entails the development of a completely new economic structure, rather than “just conjunctural changes towards greater international trade and investments within an existing set of economic relations” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 7; Hirst et al. 2009: 46). Real globalisation implies “a perfectly well-integrated worldwide economy” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 2), which does not currently exist (Hirst and Thompson 2002: 263; Hirst et al. 2009: 106). *Sceptics* acknowledge that the role of nation states has changed since the Keynesian era (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 263; Hirst et al. 2009: 306). Today nation states have less autonomy and less exclusive control over their territories’ economic and social processes and, therefore, are less able “to maintain national distinctiveness and cultural homogeneity” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 263; Hirst et al. 2009: 306). Nevertheless, given their role of policing a territory’s borders (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 275; Hirst et al. 2009: 321), together with their function as “primary source of binding [and

respecting] rules and laws within a given state” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 277; Hirst et al. 2009: 324), nation states remain central to an internationalised economy and society (Hirst and Thompson 2002: 253-254, 263). In particular, their role as a source of law remains crucial, mainly because international law cannot function without nation states who implement, respect, and govern internally according to that law (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 280; Hirst et al. 2009: 327). In summary, *sceptics* argue that we are not entering a new epoch of intensified internationalisation of economic activity (Held et al. 1999: 5) for two simple reasons: Firstly, international business activities remain to a large extent “nationally embedded” (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 96; Hirst et al. 2009: 149). Secondly, production and trading activity are still unevenly distributed across the globe (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 111).

Transformationalists acknowledge the existence of globalisation but argue that its future implications remain unpredictable. There is no single outcome like a “borderless world” or a “worldwide economy” (Axford 2013: 186; Baldwin 2016: 1-7; Held et al. 1999: 7; Rosenau 1995: 39, 2003: 14f; Scholte 1997: 452; 2008: 1493-1498). They see globalisation as a long-term historical process (*long-durée histoire*) that is not a phenomenon of modernity, but rather a precondition of the premodern or medieval era (Baldwin 2016: 1-7; Held and McGrew 1998: 220; Scholte 2008: 1477). In conformity with hyperglobalists and sceptics, they believe that due to increased economic globalisation (encouraging transnational trade relationships), nation states’ power, functions and roles have changed (Held and McGrew 1998: 235). They have lost their positions as “sole commander” of their national, territorial boundaries, since international institutions, like the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or United Nations (UN), expand their jurisdiction (Giddens 1990: 73; Held et al. 1999: 8f; Scholte 1997: 443). However, rather than bringing an end to states, globalisation instead encourages them to rethink and adjust their strategies and, in doing so, helps them to become more active in certain respects (Axford 2013: 185; Baldwin 2016: 13; Held and McGrew 1998: 235; Rosenau 2003: 22; Scholte 2008: 1490). Thus, globalisation does not transform the world uniformly into a nationless, borderless void, but rather transforms identities (Axford 2013: 186; Held et al. 1999: 7; Rosenau 1995: 39, 2003: 14f; Scholte 1997: 452; 2008: 1493-1498).

Finally, in addressing the question of whether globalisation can be used interchangeably with pre-existing buzzwords such as internationalisation,

liberalisation, universalisation, or westernisation, *transformationalists* try to shed light on the etymological connotations of the term globalisation (Scholte 1997: 430, 2008: 1471). Some arrive at the conclusion that previous academic discussions on globalisation are “redundant” (Scholte 1997: 430, 2008: 1478). This is because many examples used within academic discourse to define particular aspects of globalisation are better examples of internationalisation (Scholte 1997: 430), “growth of transactions and interdependence between countries” (Scholte 2008: 1473), neoliberalisation of trade (Scholte 1997: 431, 2008: 1475f), *universalism*, a worldwide homogenisation of cultural, economic, legal and political values (Scholte 2008: 1476), or westernisation, which is described as a particular form of universalisation, “in which social structures of Western modernity (capitalism, industrialism, rationalism, urbanism, etc.) are spread across all of humanity” (Scholte 2008: 1477). On the other hand, the extent to which contemporary patterns of globalisation in whatever domain (Held et al. 1999: 430) have become less Euro- or Atlantic-centric needs to be considered in the context of the successor states of the USSR.

Does globalisation within the former Soviet space still get linked with Western world hegemony (Malešević 1999: 581) or do we have to separate it from the concept of westernisation, as Giddens (1990: 175) suggests? Moreover, why can we assume that globalisation is disproportionately affecting the post-Soviet region? The subsequent section aims to shed light on these questions.

The concept of globalisation in post-Soviet societies

In observing the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies, one could argue that this study, in accordance with *hyperglobalists* (Ohmae 1995, 2005: 5), takes globalisation as a given phenomenon. I agree with previous area scholars (Lane 2005: 131, 2011: 928, 2016: 46) that the collapse of the Cold War world order caused huge economic, political and social changes that disproportionately impacted the successor states of the USSR.

Yet, it seems far from the truth to assume that the Soviet Union’s cultural, political and economic space remained widely isolated from the outside world until its disintegration in the 1990s. A fast-growing body of literature has begun to

document the impressive scale of Soviet cultural connectedness especially with regions such as Latin America, Africa and Asia (Katsakioris 2019; Matusevich 2019; Rupprecht 2015). In the aftermath of Stalinist isolationism, the USSR embarked on a period of Krushchevian “thaw”, “during which [it] became relatively more open to the outside world” (Matusevich 2019: 27). The Soviet leadership’s attempts to host the 1957 International Youth Festival in Moscow and to found the Peoples’ Friendship University “Patrice Lumumba” in Moscow in 1960, demonstrate the regime’s embrace of some aspects of cosmopolitanism, also known as “Soviet internationalism” (Katsakioris 2019: 281; Rupprecht 2015: 10).

Nonetheless, irrespective of the newly forged alliances with some parts of the world, the Soviet republics continued to favour intra-bloc trade, see table 1 below, borrowed from Haynes (2017), and remained largely isolated from the wider global economic structures (such as the IMF or World Bank bodies), which continued to be dominated by capitalist states. As a result, the republics benefited less from foreign direct investment (FDI) into their economy, as they have done since their independence from the USSR in 1991 (Haynes 2017: 5; Lane 2005: 150f, 2016: 52f). “Of some 100 applications for FDI investment in the Soviet Union in 1987, only three had been endorsed” (Lane 2005: 140).

Table 1. Geographical distribution of USSR trade, 1950-1989. (Source: Haynes 2017: 8)

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1989
<i>% Exports to</i>					
“Socialist” states	84	76	65	54	62
Developed capitalist	15	18	19	32	24
Developing capitalist	2	6	16	14	14
<i>% Imports from</i>					
“Socialist”	78	71	65	53	62
Developed capitalist	16	20	24	35	29
Developing capitalist	6	9	11	11	9

The lack of economic connections with non-Soviet states also undermined personal contacts with countries outside the USSR. Only very few citizens were able to travel outside the communist bloc, or regularly receive news from overseas (Lane 2005: 147ff, 2011: 928; Salmenniemi 2012: 7). By 1985 Western TV entertainment programs (not informational ones) and films became accessible only to members of privileged classes (the so-called *nomenklatura*) in the Baltic states, as well as in the Leningrad and Kaliningrad *oblasts* (the Russian word for “regions”) (Lane 2005: 148). Thus, despite their increased cultural and economic connectedness with some world regions, the density and intensity of cultural and economic links with the wider

capitalist world only increased dramatically post-1990 (Bazin 2008: 24f; Lane 2005: 148-151, 2011: 928, 2016: 52f; Panov 2010: 85). Not until then did the Soviet republics gradually open up their borders for the free circulation of goods, money, ideas, commodities, values, culture and people with the non-Communist world and in doing so entered a global economic, political, social and cultural space.

“The end of communist power, resulting in the forced and reluctant entry of the country into a new world system dominated by the so-called unified market, has obviously broken the previous political and ideological order, but it has also dismantled the stable work arrangement that had been shaped by the Soviet Union. The break-up of the USSR and the decline of industry and agriculture have provoked huge population movements, bringing about various forms of mobility that are new in their intensity as well as in their very nature.” (Bazin 2008: 25)

Drawing on that background, I consider globalisation and its consequences to be real effects indicating the rise of a new era of greater interconnectedness with the Western capitalist world, at least in the successor states of the USSR (Bazin 2008: 25; Lane 2016: 52f). I argue therefore that compared with people in the USA and Western Europe, post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation can be expected to be disproportionately affected by globalisation.

Nonetheless, I agree with recent work by area scholars on globalisation that suggests that the *hyperglobalists'* account of globalisation seems to be too economic-centric to grasp the impact of globalisation on the post-Soviet space (Kerimova 2009: 73-76; Lane 2005: 147ff, 2011: 928). As a consequence of the internationalisation of economic processes, it is not only capital, investments, money, goods, services and industries that are no longer geographically constrained (Lane 2011: 928). The period has also seen the emergence of a body of international law, the internationalisation of political decision-making and the development of international security structures (Norris 2000: 157f; Spencer and Wollman 2002: 160f). Thus, globalisation additionally exhibits a huge influence on the political sphere of states (Held et al. 1999: 8f; Hirst and Thompson 1996: 263).

Furthermore, in the wake of the break-up of the USSR, this new global connectedness with the capitalist West not only began to affect national economies and states, but it also had a large impact on the cultural and social lives of individuals living in the successor states (Kerimova 2009: 75; Norris 2000: 172). Because of

the opening up of the borders to a variety of cross-border cultural and social flows, former Soviet citizens came into contact with other cultural and social values (e.g. through social media platforms) and identities previously perceived as foreign. Sometimes, they might even have adopted these new principles as their own and, in doing so, may have started to question their previous identity (Kerimova 2009: 75; Lane 2011: 928).

In summary, I argue that globalisation means more than simply the expansion of international trade and the increased movements of factors of production across international borders. It is far more complex and multifaceted and therefore multidimensional (Axford 2013: 189; Gygli et al. 2019: 544). Accordingly and in line with previous scholarship in the field of post-Soviet studies, globalisation can be described as a multidimensional (political, economic, social and cultural), dynamic process that has helped to increase the links between people who are “located at points anywhere on earth” (Scholte 2008: 1479). In this context, I describe economic globalisation as “long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges” (Gygli et al. 2019: 546). I conceptualise political globalisation as the diffusion of government policies and political alliances (Gygli et al. 2019). Often cultural and social forms of globalisation are used synonymously to refer to the spread of ideas, information, images and people across the world. I argue that social globalisation can be best described as the extent to which information and images can travel the world (e.g. the existing communication ⁴ and travel infrastructure), whereas cultural globalisation refers to the values and ideas that are promoted by the spread of images and information across the world. Moreover, cultural globalisation also features an additional dimension that refers to people’s “openness towards and the ability to understand and adopt foreign cultural influences” (Gygli et al. 2019: 557).

The extent to which the wider public in Kazakhstan is physically, financially, linguistically, culturally, and psychologically able to engage in “transworld social contacts” (Scholte 2008: 1478), is discussed in the subsequent section. By situating the country in the context of globalisation, the following paragraphs will also discuss

⁴ Of course, the growth of digital technology is analytically distinct as a phenomenon from globalisation, though there may be some empirical overlap.

the extent to which Kazakhstan is both a typical and an atypical case within the post-Soviet region.

Globalising forces within Kazakhstan

Situated in the heart of the Eurasian mainland, Kazakhstan occupies a land area equal to that of Western Europe (2,724,000 square kilometres, to be precise) (Yessenova 2003: 27). Strategically, the country connects the prospering markets of China and South Asia and those of Russia and Western Europe by road, rail and sea (through two ports on the Caspian Sea at Atyrau and Aktau) (World Bank 2019). It shares borders with Russia in the north, China in the southeast, and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in the south and southwest. With all these countries, except for China, Kazakhstan shares strong linguistic and historical ties, due to the common Soviet past.

In line with other successor states, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, it had to adapt itself to general rules of globalisation and at the same time it had to preserve and develop its own nation's originality against the forces of globalisation (Fierman 2006: 98). Until the devaluation of the Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) in 2014 and the preceding financial crisis (Blum 2016: 7; Skalamera 2020: 158; World Bank 2018), the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan coped exceptionally well with the challenges imposed by the economic aspects of globalisation. The rapid economic growth was mainly due to the country's vast oil, gas and metal deposits (Daly 2008: 5; Skalamera 2020: 158). With a stable annual growth in GDP of 4 per cent since the early 2000s (World Bank 2019: 10) post-independence Kazakhstan is often referred to as Central Asia's biggest and most globalised economy (Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 2019: 3). In being the first former Central Asian republic of the USSR to open up its economy to FDIs (Cummings 2012: 126), the country has attracted a lot of foreign investments and has become one of the wealthiest, fastest-growing and most globalised Central Asian states within the post-Soviet space (Achilov 2015: 81; Blum 2016: 7ff; Krapohl and Vasileva-Dienes 2019: 10; Laruelle 2019: 1; Sakalamera 2020: 158). Today, the Central Asian state has "the lowest poverty rate among the 'Stans'" (Daly 2008: 15) and has moved in less than two decades (1991-2007) from a lower-middle-income country to an upper-middle-income country (Blum 2016: 7; Daly 2008: 15; World Bank 2018). The country's enormous economic growth has seemed to coincide with the rise of a new middle

class, which delves into mass consumerism (Blum 2016: 8; Daly 2008: 16f, 94; Skalamera 2020: 164). All these developments were encouraged by the fact that, in contrast to other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan has not experienced “great social shocks” or “civil wars” or “coloured revolutions” (as has occurred in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, for example) until recently⁵ (Achilov 2015: 81; Blum 2016: 9; Daly 2008: 6; Laruelle 2019: 1; Turumbetova 2013: 4889). Nevertheless, it is not solely Kazakhstan’s economy which increasingly attracts FDIs, its higher education (HE) sector, also serves as a vector of economic globalisation.

In particular, since the foundation of the Nazarbayev University (NU) in 2010, which was meant to serve as a replacement for the government-funded students’ mobility programme *Bolashak* (a Kazakh expression meaning “Future for Kazakh”) (Del Sordi 2018: 215; Skalamera 2020: 164), Kazakhstan’s HE has attracted financial backing from various Western scientific funding bodies, such as the British Council (Fauve 2015: 118). In order to increase the quality of local HE and therefore to improve the economic fitness of the country’s youth for the world labour market, while equipping them with new Western knowledge, skills and values, the Kazakhstani government continuously invests in its open and global approach to HE (Del Sordi 2018: 220). In 2011 the republic even joined the Bologna educational system, the first Central Asian country to do so (Turumbetova 2013: 4891).

“In my opinion a country’s competitiveness is determined by establishing favourable conditions for raising the competitiveness of each and every one of its citizens.” (Nazarbayev 2008: 321)

As part of its global approach to HE, the Kazakhstani leadership promotes a cultural programme known as “Trinity of Languages” (Kassenova 2019: 89) that requires citizens to speak Kazakh as the official language, Russian as the language of interethnic communication, and English as the language of integration into the global economy.

Despite that, most of Kazakhstan’s population neither possesses the financial means to study at Western-style universities in Kazakhstan nor to travel and live in the more distant non-CIS countries (World Bank 2019). Unlike other

⁵ According to the World Bank’s Economic Update report on Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan’s economy is finally recovering from the crisis caused by the fall in global oil prices and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 (World bank report 2018).

economically prosperous successor states of the USSR, such as the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, only a small political and economic elite (Skalamera 2020: 164) seems to actually benefit from the recently obtained cultural and social interconnectedness. Only since the launch of cheaper 3G (2010) and 4G (2014) mobile technologies (Anceschi 2015: 280, 294), even the wider less-educated public in Kazakhstan is exposed to foreign cultural practices and values online (Bekbaeva 2013: 142; Blum 2016: 11f; Kosnazarov 2019: 247; Kudaibergenova 2019b: 364; Mingisheva 2019: 175; Nikolaeva 2015: 582).

Nonetheless, the liberating and globalising potential of the newly obtained access to the World Wide Web under conditions of “soft-authoritarianism” (Koch 2013: 42; Schatz 2009: 207-213), remains hotly debated among area scholars. According to cyber-pessimists the internet provides the Kazakhstani leadership with another tool to manipulate, regulate and monitor dissident. Strategies vary, including the use of state-sponsored bloggers and influencers (Lewis 2016: 427-433) to push positive messages and crowd out dissent; legislation that restricts internet freedom; and temporarily blocking websites and online messaging services in an ad hoc manner (Anceschi 2015: 280-282; Freedom House 2019: 4; Isaacs 2020: 2; Lillis 2019b: 45). By using less detectable mechanisms of digital censorship, Kazakhstan’s political leadership creates the impression of limited freedom of speech without generating popular distrust (Koch 2013: 42; Schatz 2009: 207). This growing grip on information and communications technology (ICT) and increasing media regulation underpin Kazakhstan’s version of “networked authoritarianism” (Anceschi 2015: 282). Of course, under those conditions the question arises as to what, if any, political forms of globalisation Kazakhstan’s citizens are exposed to.

Kazakhstan’s former long-term leader Nursultan Nazarbayev was known to use certain channels of globalisation, such as global sport events (hosting of the 2011 Asian Games, Astana cycling club) and higher education as a medium of nation-branding, to nurture Kazakhstan’s image of a multi-ethnic, multilingual, economically successful and global country (Fauve 2015: 110f; Fleming 2019: 73f; Kassenova 2019: 89; Koch 2013: 44). Nazarbayev’s nation-branding strategy, the republic’s chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010 and the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2012 and the fact that the country has been the focus of several democracy-promotion initiatives (Blum 2016: 11; Sharipova 2019: 81) may have led to Kazakhstan’s recognition on the global

stage, but has hardly encouraged any domestic political reforms (Isaacs 2020: 2; Skalamera 2020: 158).

“The political regime has been unable to reform itself to give rise to a more pluralistic scene: dissident voices are limited, opposition quasi-nonexistent, freedom of the press constrained (...).” (Laruelle 2019: 2)

In other words, in line with the political leadership in Eastern Europe (Malešević 1999: 581f) and other authoritarian-leaning post-Soviet republics (Gudkov 2018), the Kazakhstani leadership welcomes some features of globalisation, namely economic growth and new technology, but Western values such as freedom of speech and political pluralism are seen as a menace to the regime’s stability and legitimacy (Bekmagambetov et al. 2018: 541; Blum 2016: 11; Nurmakov 2017: 74-76). Nonetheless, according to cyber-optimists there is reason for hope (Kudaibergenova 2019b: 376), as the subsequent section demonstrates.

“Kazakh spring” or “Beige power transition”?

On 19 March 2019 the unimaginable happened. After having presided over the destiny of Kazakhstan for almost thirty years (since April 1990), Nursultan Nazarbayev announced his resignation from presidential office. On 9 June 2019 Nazarbayev’s carefully chosen and well-primed candidate Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the former prime minister and spokesperson of the Kazakh senate, won the extraordinary presidential election and succeeded Nazarbayev as acting president of Kazakhstan (Isaacs 2020: 2; Sakalamera 2020: 157).

The elections were accompanied by political unrest and mass protests in major Kazakh cities requesting fair and more transparent elections and political reforms (Kudaibergenova 2019b: 376; Lillis 2019b: 45; Mallinson 2019: 18; Niyazbekov 2020). As maintained by cyber-optimists, the online live streams of protests in Almaty and Astana in the aftermath of the 9 June 2019 presidential elections, showed that even in “networked authoritarian” states, ICT can be used by ordinary citizens to spread information about protest and to express public anger (Bekmagambetov et al. 2018: 541; Kudaibergenova 2019b: 376). In the aftermath of his inauguration in July 2019, Tokayev seemed to acknowledge protesters’

dissatisfaction, in promising to improve the laws on demonstrations and on political parties and in setting up the National Council of Public Trust (hereafter NCPT). The NCPT was meant to act as a public platform, distributing policy solutions and recommendations to the government to resolve current socio-political issues (Isaacs 2020: 3; Mallinson 2019: 22; Niyazbekov 2020).

Nonetheless, as rightly highlighted by Isaacs (2020: 3) it seems far from true to assume that Tokayev will cause any “coloured revolution”, mainly because Nazarbayev is not leaving entirely. Nazarbayev continues to preside over the *Nur Otan* (Light of Fatherland) party, retains the title of *Elbasi* (the Kazakh word for Leader of the Nation) and remains the lifelong chairman of the National Security Council, providing him with substantial ruling powers (Isaacs 2020: 2; Ludwig 2019: 4; Mallinson 2019: 21; Skalamera 2020: 157). All this equips Nazarbayev with the possibility to reign and to put the blame on Tokayev should something go wrong.

A number of experts argue that Tokayev is nothing more than Nazarbayev’s *matroyshka* (puppet), alluding to the Putin/Medvedev tandem (Isaacs 2020: 2; Mallinson 2019: 19; Putz 2020). In other words, Tokayev is no more than a vehicle for Nazarbayev to retain control of the transition process and possibly even to arrange a dynastic handover to his eldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva (Lillis 2019a). As former speaker of the Kazakh Senate, she would have been next in line for the presidency (Ludwig 2019: 3; Mallinson 2019: 19; Sakalamera 2020: 157). However, on 2 May 2020 this prognosis also proved flawed, as Tokayev stripped his predecessor’s daughter of her position as chairwoman of the Kazakh Senate amid Nazarbayeva’s recent messy court proceedings in the UK (Putz 2020).

Despite that, Tokayev is devoted to sustaining his predecessor’s chosen path of economic development and domestic and foreign policy for the country (Isaacs 2020: 2-5; Kassenova 2019: 88; Ludwig 2019: 5; Skalamera 2020: 157). So far, he has continued to promote Kazakhstan as a peaceful, globalising state that maintains good relationships with old brother Russia, more recent brother China and the West (Isaacs 2020: 3; Kassenova 2019: 97; Ludwig 2019: 5; World Bank 2019). At the same time, Tokayev actively censors access to dissident political information on- and offline (Isaacs 2020: 2; Lillis 2019b: 45). In short, the extent to which the wider public’s newly obtained “globality” (Scholte 2008: 1485) is real and not just a façade remains highly questionable.

Defining globalisation

In summary, this first section has demonstrated that the phenomenon of globalisation seems to be real and may be a turning point in post-Soviet people's lives since the 1990s. It is a multi-faceted and dynamic concept that entails more than simply the opening of national economies to international trade and production. Within the post-Soviet space, Kazakhstan seems to be a typical but also an atypical case. In line with other authoritarian-leaning post-Soviet states, the Kazakhstani leadership welcomes the increased economic interconnectedness with the West, promising economic growth and technological innovations. Yet, the political regime is less pleased with other aspects of globalisation, such as Western political and social culture. As a result, despite Kazakhstan's economic prosperity, until the wider launch of cheaper 3G and 4G ICTs in the 2010s, the wider public was barely exposed to global social and cultural norms. Drawing on that background, I define globalisation as *a real, though sometimes invisible, process that intensifies cross-national economic, political, social and cultural interactions, links and connections between people from different parts of the world.*

As we shall learn from the next section, the Soviet heritage continues to play an important role not only in the success of globalising tendencies in the region but also in post-Soviet people's perception of their national identity. In the context of Kazakhstan, the Soviet heritage has led the political regime to support and promote two national identities.

The debate on nationalism

“Why are men and women willing to die for their countries? Why do they identify so strongly with their nations? Is national character and nationalism universal? Or is the ‘nation’ a purely modern phenomenon (...)? And what, in any case, do we mean by the concepts of the ‘nation’ and ‘national identity?’” (Anthony Smith in “The Ethnic Origins of Nations”, 1986: 3f)

This section starts with a detailed comparative discussion of the established literature on nationalism. It ends with a consideration of the historical reality of the Soviet legacy in post-Soviet countries and Kazakhstan. Drawing on this background, the section concludes with a definition of the concept of national identity within the post-Soviet space.

Current debates on nationalism

According to *modernists*, nationalism is a “(...) political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1). The problem of nationalism, thereby, only arrives when the political boundaries of a state are not congruent with the limits of a particular nation (Breuilly 1993: 366, 390; Gellner 1983: 55; Hobsbawm 2012: 9). Thus, the phenomenon of nationalism “does not arise for stateless societies” (Gellner 1983: 3). Nationalism only started to exist with the rise of the modern nation state (Anderson 1994: 90f; Breuilly 1993: 366, 401; Hobsbawm 2012: 4f, 9). Nonetheless, *modernists* slightly differ in defining the needs that led to the birth of nationalism. Gellner’s (1983) functionalist approach sees nationalism as a form of political organisation that has deep roots in the distinctive structural requirements of an industrial society (Gellner 1983: 35). The phenomenon of nationalism is neither “an awakening of an old, latent, dormant force” (Gellner 1983: 48) nor the fruit of either “ideological aberration or of emotional excess” (Gellner 1983: 35). It came about as a necessity and as a consequence of a new form of social organisation (Gellner 1983: 48). By contrast, Hobsbawm (1994: 76f, 2012: 6f) does not call nationalism a necessary by-product of industrialisation, but rather one of many traditions “invented” by political elites to legitimise their power

in a century of revolution and democratisation. Breuilly (1993: 385ff) agrees with Hobsbawm (1994, 2012) that nationalism can serve as an instrument for the establishment to legitimise their power in the eyes of their citizens. However, nationalist appeals can also be used by political oppositions to criticise the status quo and, therefore, to challenge the legitimacy of the current government (Breuilly 1993: 387). Thus, nationalism does not emerge from the nation, but rather, out of the competition between the establishment and its political oppositions (Breuilly 1993: 400). In addition to the general assumptions by other *modernists*, Anderson (1994) emphasises the importance of print-capitalism for the spread of nationalist ideas in modern nation states (Anderson 1994: 90f). The invention of print-capitalism served to assemble related vernaculars to one standardised, fixed and unified language which helped to establish an image of antiquity that is central for an imagined nation's self-consciousness (Anderson 1994: 94).

According to evolutionary genetic *primordialism*, human behaviour is genetically predetermined (Van den Bergh 1981: 18f). Given this behavioural predisposition of humans, ethnic sentiments or solidarity are based on extended kinship sentiments or kin-based solidarities (Van den Bergh 1981: 18, 37). Yet, when the boundaries of this ethnic group became wider as a consequence of the growth of human societies, common descent became fictive. Nowadays, people's existing territorial connection to the ancestors of their nation's territory is much more central than sharing "the same blood" (Shils 1995: 101, Van den Bergh 1981: 25ff). Drawing on that theoretical background, *primordialists* define a nation as a politically conscious, "self-aware" or "self-differentiating" ethnic group "that claims the right to statehood by virtue of being" an objective entity that has existed since time immemorial (Van den Bergh 1981: 61). In this context, the concept of nationalism evolves as an ideology, serving the defences of a nation's (an ethnic group's) interest against the ruling class within a given state (Connor 1972: 334, 2004: 39; Shils 1995: 93, 104f; Van den Bergh 1981: 62).

Whereas *primordialists* limit themselves to the ethnic aspect of a nation, *ethnosymbolists* (Guibernau 2004; Smith 1986: 135, 149 1991: 61) emphasise that modern nations bear civic (common political institutions and principles) and ethnic (shared ancestry, language, religion) characteristics. In their view, no "nation-to-be" is able to survive without a homeland or a myth of common origins and descent. Besides that, no ethnic community aspiring to become a nation is able to achieve

its aim without citizenship (Smith 1986: 149, 1991: 13f). Despite that, *ethnosymbolists* (Guibernau 2004; Smith 1986: 17f, 1991) agree with *primordialists* that some nations emerged from pre-modern ethnic communities, whereas others, due to missing pre-existing ethnic ties, had to be reconstructed or even newly invented by modern political elites through nationalism, as proclaimed by *modernists* (Breuilly 1993: 385-400; Hobsbawm 1994: 76f, 2012: 6f). By connecting the *modernist* and *primordialist* accounts of nationalism, *ethnosymbolists* (Guibernau 2004; Smith 1986: 18, 1991) are able to explore how existing ethnic cores of a nation have shaped the content of modern nations and nationalisms and are also able to observe the way those ethnic ties were and are still used by political elites in order to justify their policies or to reach their short-term objectives.

Non-essentialists mainly criticise *modernists*, *primordialists* and *ethnosymbolists* for accepting nations “as real entities, as communities, as substantial enduring collectivities” (Brubaker 1996: 13). Instead of asking “what or when is a nation?” (Connor 2004: 37), these scholars examine, first, why and how nationhood as a political and cultural form came to exist and, second, how it became institutionalised (Brubaker 1996: 16; Tishkov 2000: 640). They argue that there is actually little empirical evidence that proves the existence of nations (Brubaker 1996: 15f) and their identity “either before or after modernity” (Malešević 2011: 274). “(T)he fact that something is widely believed and highly valued does not necessarily make it true” (Malešević 2011: 272). Thus, *non-essentialists* rather ask us to not treat nations as substances but as institutionalised forms and therefore, not to see nations as real entities “but as contingent event” (Brubaker 1996: 16). In doing so, *non-essentialists* aim to separate the study of nationhood and national identities from the study of nations as entities. Only by observing those phenomena separately are scholars able to retrace and understand the meaning of nationhood and the power of contemporary nationalism (Brubaker 1996; Tishkov 2000). In contrast to *primordialists* and *ethnosymbolists*, *non-essentialists* arrive at the conclusion that nations may “exist” (although for constructivists “existence” is a contested notion), but it is the ideology of nationalism produced by a state’s elites that engenders nations, rather than the other way around (Brubaker 1996: 17, 25; Eriksen 1993: 126; Suny 2014: 107; Tishkov 2000: 640f). Thus, nationalism is neither a by-product of nations nor does it originate in natural pre-existing cultural entities (Hirsch 1997, 2005; Suny 2001: 867; Tishkov 2009). A person’s felt pride in

her nation may be more a by-product of the ideology of her country's political elites' than a manifestation of her identity (Malešević 2002: 213, 2011: 273, 288). Perhaps, therefore it is not national identity that previous scholars have tried to measure, but national ideology, produced by a state's elites to unite their citizenry. What we call national identity, according to Malešević (2011: 281), is better explained as a kind of micro-level solidarity that is produced by face-to-face contact among a relatively small group of people.

Contrary to the general schools of thought on nationalism, recent work on populism and contemporary nationalism emphasise that both the elites and the masses can mobilise identities, especially in the context of increased globalisation and the current Covid-19 pandemic, as the following section shows.

Populism and contemporary nationalism

In general, scholars on *populism and contemporary nationalism* criticise *modernists*, *primordialists*, *ethnosymbolists* and *non-essentialists* for predominantly focusing on the role of nation states and their political elites in the formation of national identities (Castells 2011: 31f, 42, 44f; Kaldor 2004: 163f; Nodia 2017: 11). In the post-Soviet context, Castells (2011: 42-44) disagrees with the *non-essentialist* argument that the revival of *nationalism* in the former Soviet republics was simply a by-product of elite manipulation.

In the view of this group of scholars, contemporary *nationalism* mainly arises as a defensive reaction against three fundamental phenomena: First, against globalisation (Bremmer 2018: 10-27; Kaldor 2004: 161-166; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 454; Tamir 2019: 101, 113), which breaks down the autonomy of institutions, organisations and the protective framework of small, traditional communities (Castells 2011: 67f; Kinnvall 2004: 744). Second, as a reaction against the networking and flexibility the revolution in communications technologies has brought (Bremmer 2018: 9f; Kaldor 2004: 166) "that blurs the boundaries of membership and involvement, individualises social relationships of production and induces the structural instability of work, space, and time" (Castells 2011: 69). Finally, as a reaction against the crisis besetting patriarchal family values and traditional gender norms (Bremmer 2018: 20f; Castells 2011: 68; Hobsbawm 2012: 109).

These defensive reactions include religious fundamentalism (Kaldor 2004: 168, 172; Kinnvall 2004: 759- 763), as well as xenophobic and anti-elite sentiments (Bremmer 2018: 8-11; Hobsbawm 2012: 88f, 109-126; Nodia 2017: 16; Tamir 2019: 30, 101). They can be described as national “resistance identities” (Castells 2011: 421-424) because they are generally formed on the basis of local or communal group identities in opposition to political elites and/or the sociocultural, economic and political homogenisation encouraged by globalisation. However, these national “resistance identities” (Castells 2011: 421) do not necessarily have to be limited to traditional or ethnocentric values. They can also be embraced by proactive social movements such as women’s rights or sexual liberation movements that seek to manifest their autonomy “in their communal resistance” against the oppressive institution (for example patriarchal society) (Castells 2011: 421). Thus, national “resistance identities” (Castells 2011: 421) can acquire both, ethnic and civic characteristics.

In short, in contrast to *non-essentialists* who believe that nations are institutionalised by political, economic and cultural elites through the ideology of nationalism (Brubaker 1996: 17, 25; Eriksen 1993: 126; Malešević 2002: 213; Tishkov 2000: 647, 2009: 49), scholars on *populism and contemporary nationalism* argue that these constructed identities may evoke independently from (Barber 1992; Castells 2011: 31, 44f; Kaldor 2004: 166) or even in opposition to (Bremmer 2018: 8-11; Nodia 2017: 16f; Tamir 2019: 30, 101) the nation-building policies of national elites.

I hold that it is possible that both the elites and the masses forge identities, as the masses interact with and even challenge the way national identity has been framed and institutionalised by elites. Nonetheless, in the post-Soviet context, if we are to develop a better understanding of the interactions between elite and mass perception of identity within former Soviet societies, I agree with *non-essentialists’* argument that it seems unavoidable to discuss the underlying motivation and content of the Soviet leadership’s nationality policy. The following section discusses the Soviet nationality policy and its legacies.

The Soviet nationality policy

During the first years of Bolshevik rule, the Bolsheviks struggled to hold on to power and to extend it across the former Russian empire. In 1918 a civil war broke out between the “Reds” (Red Army supported by the workers) and the “Whites” (upper- and middle-class counterrevolutionaries, supported by Western imperial powers who feared the growing influence of communism in Western Europe). The Bolsheviks originally rejected demands for national autonomy as relics of bourgeois nationalism. However, the realities of the civil war led to the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to the “nationality question” as a means to secure power and build socialism (Slezkine 1994: 420f).

“We are going to help you develop your Boriat, Votiak, etc. language and culture, because in this way you will join the universal culture (obshchechelovecheskaya kul'tura), revolution and communism sooner.”

(Lenin, cited in Slezkine 1994: 420)

As the quote above shows, Lenin was aware of and feared the mobilising potential of nationalism “to forge an all-class alliance for national goals” (Martin 2001: 99), which would endanger the successful establishment of socialism in the USSR (Hirsch 2005: 7f; Smith 1990: 3, 5). However, according to Marx’s materialist conception of history, each clan and tribe first had to go through a transition to bourgeois-nationalism before socialism and later a nationless utopia of communism could be achieved (Hirsch 2005: 8f; Pipes 1992: 66f, 79; Suny 2001: 876). Thus, in Lenin’s logic, by granting some minority nations living within the former Russian empire the right to some form of statehood, the problem of nationalism and the “national question” would be solved (Hirsch 2005: 10; Martin 2001: 102; Smith 1990: 5).

Thereby, to speed the former clans’ transition from feudalism to nationalism and finally to communism, the Soviet leadership began to institutionalise two entirely opposing conceptions of nationhood, under the umbrella of the Soviet nationality policy: one based on territorial autonomy and the other based on a categorisation of individual nationality (Brubaker 1996: 30-34).

As part of the Soviet ethnoterritorial strategy, the new authorities used “cultural technologies of rule”, like population censuses, passports, administrative-territorial maps and ethnographic museums to create an official definitional grid of “passport” nationalities in the Soviet Union (Hirsch 2000: 203, 2002: 42). This led to the delimitation of a multi-tiered system of national republics, districts and regions in the early and mid 1920s (Brubaker 1996: 30). As a result, after the end of the Second World War (when the three Baltic states were annexed) the Soviet Union consisted of fifteen “top tier” national territories, i.e. the union republics, and several “lower tier” sub-units, i.e. 20 autonomous republics, 10 autonomous *okrugs* (the Russian term for “districts”) and eight autonomous *oblasts* (regions) within the respective union republics, each of which was expressly defined as the homeland of a particular ethnonational group (called a titular nationality) (Wheatley 2009: 120). It was the existence of these ethnoterritorial administrative units and sub-units that led to civil war in a number of republics after the USSR collapsed. For example at the end of the Soviet period, ethnic tensions began to rise within the Georgian SSR, which as a result of the principle of ethnofederalism was an ethnically diverse republic that consisted of two autonomous republics (Abkhazia and Achara) and one autonomous *oblast* (South Ossetia) (Wheatley 2009: 121f).

As a part of their policy of *korenizatsiia* (indigenisation or “nativisation”, which essentially meant= encouraging the development of non-Russian languages and cultures), the Bolsheviks started to promote members of the titular nationality into the cadres of state and party organs within each republic (Brubaker 1996: 38; Roeder 1992: 150f; Wheatley 2007: 110f). It was introduced to ensure that the centre had reliable local cadres who would also satisfy local demands for autonomy as the regime was consolidating. Loyalty to the centre was assured by the local cadres' dependence on Moscow for their jobs (Tuminez 2003: 90f). Besides this, from the 1920s the Soviet authorities initiated a state-wide mass literacy campaign to educate the illiterate peasantry in their native language and, in a second step, in Russian (Brubaker 1996: 29, 38; Hirsch 2005: 9; Martin 2001: 103f; Rakowska-Harmstone 1992: 392; Wheatley 2007: 111). In addition to the educational campaign, national cultural institutions were set up in the republics to foster and represent the cultural interests of the titular nationality in a given republic (Martin 2001: 104; Wheatley 2007: 111; Timunez 2003: 90f).

As a consequence of the dual scheme of territorial and “personal” nationality, the population of the USSR became subsumed into official nationality categories and at the same time became incorporated into the Soviet state and society (Brubaker 1996: 32, 2011: 1787; Hirsch 2000: 203, 2005: 8; Kazhanov 1997: 126; Martin 2001: 104).

In spite of everything, the Soviet nationality policy did not primarily aim to encourage the national self-determination of all Soviet nations, nor was it a programme of “making nations” for their own sake (Connor 1992: 20, 27; Hirsch 2005: 9). This became visible when the Ukrainian SSR asked to expand its republic’s borders in 1924 (Hirsch 2005: 155), basing its territorial claim on the ethnographic principle of “national self-determination”.⁶ Soviet officials did not approve this request, because they considered Ukrainian nationalism to be too strong, nationalistic and potentially harmful for the Soviet Union’s purpose and unity (Hirsch 2005: 158). This example of Ukraine is a good illustration for Tuminez’s argument that some nations were more equal than others (Tuminez 2003: 96-99).

In summary, it was mainly due to the realities of the civil war and the Bolsheviks’ belief in the Marxist conception of development through historical stages that the Soviet officials in the 1920s and 1930s started to promote the underdeveloped self-consciousness of some of its national minorities by granting them nationhood. In doing so, the Soviet leadership institutionalised a dual conception of nationhood: one vested in the individual (internal passports, official census nationalities etc.) and the other in the territory (union republics, autonomous republics etc.) (Brubaker 1996: 30).

As Brubaker (1996) points out, this would cast a long shadow over the nation-building process and even territorial integrity in a number of post-Soviet states.

The legacy of the Soviet national identity policy

Non-essentialists maintain the opinion that in carving up the former Russian empire into nominally mono-ethnic national republics, which were expressly defined as

⁶ The Ukrainian leaders presented data from the 1920 census to emphasise the Ukrainian majorities in the inquired territories as well as petitions from the local population.

quasi-states for ethno-culturally defined core or titular nations, the Soviet leadership linked national territory with an ethnocultural understanding of nationhood. As a result, the Soviet government introduced official national identity categories amongst their citizens (Brubaker 1996: 32, 2011: 1787; Khazanov 1997: 126; Wheatley 2007: 111). These identity categories not only facilitated the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, but also continued to shape the “national question” in the successor states (Eriksen 1993: 126; Roeder 1992: 170; Suny 2001: 893).

Yet the union republics were never exclusively designed as nation states, with an ethnic homogenous citizenry. They always hosted various ethnic nationalities within their borders (Brubaker 1996: 28, 45f, 2011: 1786f; Hirsch 2005: 324f; Tishkov 2000: 5). Some republics such as Armenia were culturally rather homogeneous (Suny 2001: 895f). Others, such as the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, were home to large numbers of national groups (Sinnott 2003: 105). Some, such as the Russian Federation, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, even contained within them autonomous republics and *oblasts* that had been created as mini-homelands for certain minorities.

This was a legacy of the multi-tiered hierarchy of territories that the Soviet state had established as part of its dual concept of nationhood (Brubaker 1996: 33). This encouraged nationalist separatist movements not only in parts of western Ukraine and the Baltic states that were annexed during the Second World war, but also in parts of Russia (especially Chechnya), Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, which resurfaced and escalated in the context of Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980s (Berg 2002: 113; Tuminez 2003: 123; Wheatley 2009: 121f).

Thus, it comes as no surprise that anti-Soviet nationalist sentiments continue to shape nation-building policies advanced by political elites in some successor states. Many post-Soviet republics became so-called “nationalising states” (Brubaker 1996: 8-9, 2011: 1786-1788, 1805), pursuing a strong nationalising agenda. In the Baltic states of Latvia and Estonia, which had experienced significant in-migration of ethnic Russians during the Soviet period, highly restrictive citizenship legislation was implemented that initially excluded almost a third of their populations from citizenship in the aftermath of their independence (Suny 2001: 891-896; Wilson 1990: 40). However, while anti-Soviet nationalist activities were strong in some republics, they remained weak in Kazakhstan, as the following section shows.

Kazakhstan's ethnic-civic dichotomy of nationhood

As with all former Soviet republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan became engaged with the processes of globalisation, but simultaneously had to preserve and develop its own nation's originality against those processes (Mullojanov 2018: 121; Rees and Williams 2017: 816; Turumbetova 2013: 4842). In contrast to some other republics, the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan had no prior experience of modern statehood or political institutions until the formation of the Soviet Union (Isaacs 2015: 3, 2018: 44ff; Ó Beacháin and Kevlian 2013: 339). In the 1920s, in order to maintain control over the Central Asian regions of Russian Turkestan, the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanat of Khiva, Soviet ethnographers identified six ethnic groups as distinct national communities (Hirsch 2000: 218).

"These six peoples (Kazakhs, Turkmen, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Karakalpaks): were assigned their own administrative territorial units; had literary languages standardised for each group, along with compulsory education in these languages; and cultural and folk traditions were protected and promoted through the creation of 'national' cultural institutions." (Isaacs 2018: 45f).

Western scholars in particular argue that contemporary Kazakhstan owes its current territorial borders, together with the standardisation of the Kazakh language, the invention, protection and encouragement of Kazakh history and culture to the Soviet leadership's national identity policy (Akulov 2018: 191; Cummings 2012: 53; Kesici 2011: 348; Rees and Williams 2017: 815f; Ó Beacháin and Kevlian 2013: 339).⁷ As such, the former Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan seems to act as a compelling example of a creation of Soviet nationalities policy (Isaacs 2015: 402, 2018: 45).

The last Soviet census in 1989 found ethnic Kazakhs to constitute only about 39.7 per cent of the republic's population, whereas ethnic Russians made up 37.8 per cent and other nationalities 22.5 per cent (Sinnott 2003: 105). Thus, when Kazakhstan declared independence from the USSR on 16 December 1991, ethnic Kazakhs constituted only a minority within their own state (Akulov 2018: 191; Cummings 2012: 26; Ó Beacháin and Kevlian 2013: 340; Olcott 2005: 30; Rees and

⁷ Even though the ethnic origin of the Kazakh nation dates back to the fifteenth-century Kazakh Khanate state established under the leadership of Dzhaniyibek and Girei Khan (Isaacs 2015: 402).

Williams 2017: 816). This was in large part due to the Soviet leadership's resettlement policies of the nomadic population and the deportation and mass immigration of other ethnic groups to the Kazakh steppe, (Spehr and Kassenova 2012: 128). Kazakhstan, home of the *gulag* became a dumping ground for individual dissidents and entire peoples during the Soviet period (Isaacs 2015: 402, 2018: 17). Also, the famine in the 1930s that was the consequence of forced collectivisation wiped out a significant portion (40 per cent) of the Kazakh population (Arel 2002: 813f; Yesdauletova 2015 et al.: 537f). Today, 140 different ethnic and national groups live within the country's territory and call Kazakhstan their home (Seisen 2012: 225).

As a result, in contrast to other more homogenous states such as Armenia, after gaining independence Kazakhstan's political regime faced the additional challenge of building a cohesive nation state out of an inherited ethnically diverse population (Isaacs 2018: 15; Kudaibergenova 2018: 149f; Spehr and Kassenova 2012: 136). Contrary to Brubaker's (1996: 8-9; 2011: 1786-1788) theory of "nationalising states", the demographic constituency of Kazakhstan's population did not enable the implementation and promotion of an exclusive ethnic Kazakh identity but rather the state-led promotion of two interpretations of nationhood: an ethnic Kazakh and a civic Kazakhstani identity (Isaacs 2015: 407, 2018: 56; Kesici 2011: 31; Ó Beacháin and Kevlian 2013: 345; Rees and Williams 2017: 816).

Non-essentialists have generally sought to observe Kazakh nation-building and identity formation from a top-down perspective as conjectured by Brubaker's (1996: 8-9, 2011: 1786-1788) theory of a "nationalising state". According to this school of thought on nationalism, after independence in 1991 the government of Kazakhstan became a "nationalising state" and started to promote an ethnic exclusive Kazakh identity, based on the legacy of Kazakh history and ancestry. Through the promotion of this ethnic exclusive identity that appealed to the pre-Soviet and pre-Russian interpretations of the country's past as a nomadic proto-state (the Kazakh Khanate in the 15th century), it could be argued that the government sought to create a stable modern independent Kazakh nation (Commercio 2004: 93f; Isaacs 2015: 399, 2018; Kudaibergenova 2013: 848).

As a part of its "nationalising strategy", sometimes referred to as *Kazakhisation*, the government undertook a number of reforms: constitutional

amendments in favour of native Kazakhs in ensuring the Kazakh language would become the official state language by 1995; educational reforms that led to the introduction of mandatory classes on Kazakh language and history at primary school level (Commercio 2004: 99); and the nationalization of public space by replacing Soviet statues with mythical figures such as the Golden Warrior that trace the roots of Kazakh identity as far back as the third century BC (Kesici 2011: 47). Moreover, the Kazakhstani leadership accorded Kazakhs a privileged status in the country's constitution (Commercio 2004: 97-99; Isaacs 2015: 402, 2018: 50-53; Kesici 2011: 45f). In addition, the political elite implemented several policies to change the demographic make-up of the country in favour of Kazakhs, through the relocation of the country's capital from Almaty in the predominantly Kazakh south to Akmola (renamed Astana) in the predominantly Russian north (Adams and Rustemova 2009: 1267; Commercio 2004: 98; Isaacs 2018: 52f; Köppen 2013: 590) and through a rigorous campaign for the repatriation of Oralman [Kazakh-born returnees] mostly from Mongolia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey (Commercio 2004: 98; Isaacs 2018: 52). Finally, in order to increase the birth rate amongst Kazakhs, a large part of the Kazakhstani leadership's *Kazakhisation* policy is devoted to the reproduction of a healthy Kazakh nation ("nation as people") (Kudaibergenova 2016: 228f) and the "retraditionalisation" of women's role in society and family (Beyer and Finke 2019: 318; Blum 2019: 214; Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016: 196; Kandiyoti 2007: 613; Kudaibergenova 2019b: 366-367). According to this state-led identity narrative, motherhood was and is still perceived as a national duty for Kazakh women (Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016: 196f; Snajdr 2005: 297). As a result, the state-sponsored promotion of an ethnically exclusive Kazakh identity has been far from gender-neutral.

Despite that, there is a growing body of literature that questions the effectiveness of the *Kazakhisation* policy in everyday life. Recent work on language practices among urban Kazakh families found that despite the growing awareness of the role of the Kazakh language for families' cultural identity, Russian remains the dominant spoken vernacular, even among more traditional Kazakh family members (Amantay et al 2017: 19). Today, the Russian language continues to be more frequently used in daily conversations by all ethnicities, including ethnic Kazakhs, than Kazakh, the official state language (Amantay et al 2017: 19; Buelow 2012: 105; Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2019: 19). Furthermore, a pure ethnonational

strategy has never appealed as a rational and convincing strategy to the government of Kazakhstan. Given the particular demographic, linguistic and economic factors that are a legacy of the Soviet past, the advancement of an inclusive civic Kazakhstani identity in addition to an exclusive ethnic Kazakh identity seemed to be a necessity for regime stability, especially vis-à-vis Kazakhstan's neighbour Russia in the north (Cummings 2012: 26; Isaacs 2015: 402, 2018: 53f). Overemphasising an ethnic Kazakh identity could have led to disruptions of the newly independent and flourishing economy, and would have harmed interethnic unity and harmony in Kazakhstan and as such endangered the regime's existence (Adams and Rustemova 2009: 1259; Ó Beacháin and Kevlian 2013: 345; Rees and Williams 2017: 816f).

Therefore, "in order to maintain a good reputation within the international community" (Kesici 2011: 44) and to avoid a rise in separatist feelings among the ethnic Russian population (and therefore to minimise big brother Russia's influence), the political regime at the beginning of 2007 started to integrate all Kazakhstani people into a single non-ethnically defined nation, the Kazakhstani nation (Rees and Williams 2017: 816f, 822). They did so, for example, in prohibiting political parties based on ethnic (and religious) criteria in 2002 and through the foundation of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan (APK) in 1995 (Isaacs 2018: 54). By this means, the government aimed to preserve Kazakhstan's image as a multinational, multi-lingual and ethnically and religiously peaceful former Soviet republic (Fauve 2015: 110f; Fleming 2019: 73f; Kesici 2011: 44).

Defining national identity

In summary, in the light of the legacy of Soviet-era nation-building, I assume that the concept of national identity exists, at least within the space of the former USSR, be it as a real sense of solidarity or as an ideological construct. This is mainly because the current theoretical debates on national identities in post-Soviet countries illustrate certain peculiarities in the way national identity was institutionalised in the former Soviet Union. Thus, differences in manifestations of national identity are strongly influenced by their elites' chosen national narrative (weak, strong, official pro-Soviet, anti-Soviet, pro-Western), the state's ethno-

territorial structure (existence or non-existence of sub-units such as autonomous *oblasts*, republics) as well as the country's inherited ethnic homogeneity (or lack thereof). According to *non-essentialists* this "Soviet factor" continues to influence political elites' nation-building in post-Soviet societies.

Contrary to other former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan's titular nation of ethnic Kazakhs made up only around 40 per cent of the population at the end of the Soviet period. As a result, the Kazakhstani leadership started to promote two national identity narratives: a civic Kazakhstani and an ethnic Kazakh identity. As a result, both civic and ethnic components of nation-building can be found in contemporary Kazakhstan. The state's dichotomy of nationhood makes it a special case within the post-Soviet region.

Drawing on the general consensus of the debates on nationalism and considering the "Soviet factor" in the successor states and especially in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan, the concept of national identity may be generally described as a *constructed, multidimensional, dynamic concept that leads a community sharing particular ethnic and/or civic characteristics to the subjective belief that they are part of a single bounded community*.

In the following section the outlooks of the different schools of thoughts on nationalism and the impact of globalisation on contemporary national identities are presented, on the basis of which a more detailed prognosis for globalisation influence on post-Soviet people's perception of their national identity will be formulated.

Interrelation of globalisation and national identity

Given their contested nature, the interrelationship between globalisation and national identity is likely to be complicated. The relationship between globalisation and nationalism is one that has received considerable attention from political psychologists. According to these scholars (Arnett 2002: 777), globalisation leads people to change how they think about themselves in relation to their social environment. Therefore, globalisation can encourage people to reassess and sometimes even to change their identification with their nation (Arnett 2002: 777; Hermans and Dimaggio 2007: 32, 40). In order to further define the study, it seems useful at this point to consider briefly some theories and prognoses on the causal relationship between globalisation and national identity that have been developed by the various schools of thought on nationalism.

Overall, the current debate on nationalism and recent work in the fields of post-Soviet studies find globalisation to have an influence on post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity. Nonetheless, the impact of globalisation is not black and white. People can either espouse global culture or defy it and develop a so-called national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421-424), as the following paragraphs highlight.

Outlook of current debate on nationalism

The current debate on nationalism acknowledges that the role of nation states has slightly changed, but, contrary to *hyperglobalists*, argue that they are still needed in a globalised world (Anderson 2005: 181; Breuilly 2011: 79f; Connor 2004: 45; Gellner 1983: 120; Hobsbawm 2012: 182, 192). This is mainly because, so far, a global culture, that is able to "offer the qualities of collective faith, dignity and hope" (Smith 1995: 160) and therefore could replace the ideology of nationalism and national identity, does not exist (Smith 1991: 160, 176, 1995: 158f, 2003: 284).

Nonetheless, as a result of nation states' changed role, these scholars predict that the two concepts of nationalism and national identity will alter (Connor 1972: 327-329; Hobsbawm 2012: 169, 191; Shils 1995: 110; Van den Bergh 1981: 251). Contemporary nationalism and national identities are expected to arise as a

counter-reaction to so-called constitutive features of globalisation, such as mass immigration (Anderson 2005: 185; Breuilly 2011: 80; Gellner 1983: 60f; Smith: 2007: 27, 2011: 168), mass communication (Shils 1995: 103-111; Van den Bergh 1981: 257f), labour insecurity and cultural homogenisation (Connor 1972: 327-329; Hobsbawm 2012: 170-171).

In this context, not only do culturally diverse waves of immigrants have the potential to change people's understanding of their identity, they can also reinforce their attachment to a local community. Thus, the nature of the influence of globalisation on contemporary national identities can be twofold (Connor 1972: 328-329; Gellner 1983: 60ff; Shils 1995: 103f; Smith 2007: 27, 2011: 168; Van den Bergh 1981: 257f): Some people, through their contact with the side effects of globalisation such as mass migration or intra-ethnic mass communication, may become more aware of their nation's distinctiveness and, as a result, may develop a stronger attachment to their national identity, while others may become happier to embrace world citizenship.

Scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism further develop this argument. They expect people who benefit less from the increased global interconnectedness (i.e. = globalisation) to be more tempted to define themselves in national rather than in global terms. For that purpose, let us have a closer look at the prognosis of *scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism* in the following paragraphs.

Prognosis of scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism

Scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism see the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East as inter-related with the exposure of this part of the world of Islam to the processes of globalisation (Castells 2011: 17). Thus, contemporary nationalism mainly develops as a reaction to "a threatened autonomous identity" (Castells 2011: 56) against sociocultural homogenisation by the ideology of globalisation (Barber 1992; Bremmer 2018: 20-21; Hobsbawm 2012: 109; Kaldor 2004: 170-173). Drawing on this background, as previously discussed, nations are no longer "imagined communities" exclusively constructed and mobilised by political elites (Barber 1992; Castells 2011: 33; Hobsbawm 2012: 88f;

Kaldor 2004: 163f; Nodia 2017: 16f). On the contrary, they are created through “the labours of shared history, and then spoken in the images of communal languages whose first word is we, the second is us, and, unfortunately, the third is them” (Castells 2011: 56). Contemporary nationalism, therefore, is anything but inclusive (Bremmer 2018: 11, 20f; Castells 2011: 56f; Kaldor 2004: 168).

In particular those people who feel they have been left defenceless by the processes of globalisation, the so-called “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f) can be anticipated to develop a national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421-424). They are predicted to identify strongly with their local traditional communities out of concern about losing their jobs to foreigners and out of discontent with their own cosmopolitan establishment, which is no longer seen as sharing their values (Bremmer 2018: 11; Nodia 2017: 16; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 454; Tamir 2019: 9, 30, 129f).

Greater understanding of this “fault line” between the liberal cosmopolitans and the more traditionally minded masses (Birch 2016: 107) seems particularly pertinent today in the light of growing populist movements around the globe (Bremmer 2018: 12ff; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 4f; Nodia 2017: 18; Tamir 2019: 4). These nationalist populist parties continue to exploit the anger of the vulnerable masses against their own political elites. In fact, this explanation seems congruent with some of the most notable political events of the last few years, including Marine Le Pen's candidacy for the 2017 French Presidential election and Donald Trump's victory in the US Presidential election (Bremmer 2018: 13; Nodia 2017: 17; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 135f; Rooduijn 2015: 9; Tamir 2019: 3ff). The vote for Brexit by some working-class Labour voters across the UK in 2016 was a clear vote against foreigners and the cosmopolitan elite, which seems to have lost touch with its traditional electorate (Tamir 2019: 139). The same seems to hold true for the working-class Trump voters who once supported Barack Obama (Bremmer 2018: 162). Some scholars argue that these anti-globalist and anti-elite sentiments are heightened during the current Covid-19 pandemic (Woods et al. 2020: 11).

In summary, *scholars on contemporary nationalism and populism* forecast globalisation to have an influence on people's attachment to their national identity. Specifically, globalisation can engender different identity narratives. Within the post-

Soviet space globalisation is more and more regarded as Western interference in local cultural practices, as the following section demonstrates.

Globalisation and nationalism in the post-Soviet world

In the *non-essentialists'* view, it is in the context of increased insecurity and frustration, resulting from the dramatic structural changes (caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and afterwards through the contact with globalisation) that the Soviet institutionalised national identity categories may provide a degree of predictability and security to post-Soviet citizens in the insecure and fast changing multi-cultural world of today (Suny 2001: 893).

Previous area studies scholars agree with the *non-essentialists'* school of thought on nationalism that in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the successor states' elites faced a single but contradictory task: the need to adapt to general rules of globalisation and simultaneously preserve their nation's originality (Blum 2008: 329; Hedetoft and Blum 2008: 21-24; Kerimova 2009: 73; Nuruzadeh 2017: 6f; Solovyev 2008: 308f). Several accounts suggest that in response to the challenges they encountered, some former Soviet citizens started to develop a stronger attachment to their national identity out of their contact with the process of globalisation (Blum 2008: 334; Danilova 2009: 160; Ismailzade 2005; Kerimova 2009: 73f; Krimse 2010: 384; Surucu 2002: 396f). Previous scholarship found that in some post-Soviet countries globalising and westernising forces are increasingly perceived as a threat to the nation's cultural heritage and identity (Dall'Agnola 2020: 109-116; Guliyev 2007: 126f; Hedetoft and Blum 2008: 22; Kerimova 2009: 81; Kudaibergenova 2017: 7f, 2019a: 103-106; Nuruzadeh 2017: 6f). Out of concern about losing their cultural values and identity, especially those former Soviet citizens who have experienced a huge economic disorientation as a result of the collapse of the former USSR, tend to form their national identity more and more in opposition to the alien, globalised Western world (Berg 2002: 109f; Blum 2008: 330; Danilova 2009: 152; Gudkov 2000: 37, 2018: 376; Kerimova 2009: 83-84; Panov 2010: 92). They seem to embrace a so-called ethnic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421-424), a term coined by area scholars to stand for a "negative identity" (Danilova 2009: 153, 160; Gudkov 2000: 37, 2018: 333, 376; Panov 2010:

92) that opposes Western cultural erosion of local values and identities that is encouraged by globalisation.

Following the work of *scholars on populism and contemporary nationalism*, who put forward the concept of national “resistance identities” (Castells 2011: 421-424), area scholars found that these “negative identities” are typically inspired by strong religious particularism and xenophobic, anti-globalist sentiments (Danilova 2009: 152f, 160; Gudkov 2000: 37, 2018: 333). In this context, organisations affiliated to the Orthodox Churches have been strongly linked to traditionalist, anti-Western and anti-globalisation narratives in several successor states. In post-Soviet Georgia, for example, the Georgian Orthodox Church takes a leading role in the country’s nation-building policies and in propagating traditionalists and nationalist values to secure the survival of the Georgian nation (Zedania 2011: 123). For reasons of simplification and consistency, the present study will be using Castells’ (2011: 421-424) term of ethnic-centred national “resistance identities” to describe such “negative identities” hereafter. The usage of anti-Western and anti-globalisation propaganda by companies for the purpose of economic competition (Danilova 2009: 154) and by some politicians to strengthen their political legitimacy in the successor states (Gudkov 2018: 339; Hedetoft and Blum 2008: 17; Kerimova 2009: 80) highlight a growing awareness of this ethnic-centred “resistance nationalism” amongst political and economic elites within post-Soviet countries.

In spite of everything, recent area studies have well illustrated that the power and influence of political elites on contemporary nation-building within the former USSR should not be overemphasised (Barrington et al. 2003: 313; Blackburn 2019: 218; Isaacs and Polese 2015: 371f; Isaacs and Polese 2016b: 253; Sharipova et al. 2017: 204, 222). There may exist multiple possibilities of nationalism within a nation state. In their study of the Russian diaspora living in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, Barrington et al. (2003: 313) found that even though these Russian communities may be imagined by the Russian Federation’s political elite as their citizens, it does not mean that these Russians see Russia as their homeland.

In short, it is important to bear in mind that there may exist large gaps between how nations are imagined by a state’s elites and how they are embraced, appropriated or otherwise internalised by its citizens. Therefore, any study that

seeks to measure the impact of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity adequately should focus its analysis on grassroots level processes and should therefore seek to engage in an active dialogue with former Soviet citizens.

Considering recent work on the divergence between mass and elite attitudes to identity, it remains questionable whether the Kazakhstani government's top-down, institutionalised, twofold national identity narrative is actually supported by the ordinary citizenry in Kazakhstan. For that purpose, the following paragraphs will tackle the observations of previous scholarship on non-elite nation-building attempts in post-independence Kazakhstan.

Non-elite nation-building attempts in Kazakhstan

As previously discussed, in the context of the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan both civic and ethnic components of nation-building can be found. As a result, we can expect globalisation to interact in rather complex ways with ordinary citizens' perception of their identity. Recent research on the conceptualisation and understanding of national identity, as well as insights from literary and cinematic works in Kazakhstan (Isaacs 2015: 399-402, 2018: 244) have shown that three additional narratives could influence Kazakhstan's citizens' perception of their identity, in addition to the two state-sponsored narratives. First, there is a distinct philosophical Tengrist narrative, with its quasi-primordial understanding of Kazakh nationhood that is rooted in the distinctive "Turkic-Mongol religion of Tengrism" (Isaacs 2015: 402). Second, a contemporary socio-economic narrative that highlights the "losers" of the post-Soviet transition in Kazakhstan (Isaacs 2018: 201). Finally, a localist versus globalist narrative that can be said to relate to Goodhardt's (2017: 3) dichotomy of rooted "somewheres" versus cosmopolitan "anywheres".

The religious philosophical Tengrist narrative locates Kazakh history and identity in pre-Soviet times (Isaacs 2015: 402). It is characterised by the spiritual belief in the relationship between Kazakhs, their land, the cycle of birth, life and death, and the symbolic role of the mother (Isaacs 2018: 244).

The socio-economic narrative offers an account of contemporary nationhood rooted in the internal division of the Kazakh nation between the predominantly

Kazakh-speaking population, living in the rural south, and the more Russified population, living in the more urbanised northern parts of Kazakhstan (as well as the former capital Almaty) (Cummings 2012: 102f; Insebayeva 2019: 186; Koch and White 2016: 194-196; Surucu 2002: 392-394; Yessenova 2003: 146-147). In particular since 2005 Kazakhstan has encountered huge internal migration from predominantly Kazakh-populated rural areas to more ethnically diverse urban communities (Burkanov 2019: 53). In this context, especially those citizens who did not benefit from the social and economic changes that have taken place in the country since 1991 (Isaacs 2018: 201) seem to develop a more exclusive understanding of nationhood out of concern for losing their Kazakh culture and language when they migrate from their rural village to the big city. The same people strongly criticise their more Russified and urbanised fellow Kazakhs for not using the Kazakh language (Bigozhin 2019: 126f; Fleming 2019: 72f). The 2011 Kazakh novel *Mankurtstan* by Kuanysh Bazargaliev refers to the fears of such people about losing their Kazakh culture and language due to urban migration as well as the settlement of foreign labour migrants in their local community. The main character in the novel discovers at the end of the book that his country has been sold to foreign investors and that his “nation is dying out due to the loss of the Kazakh language” (Kudaibergenova 2017: 8). In short, in the context of today’s increased social interconnectedness, the rural versus urban divide constitutes one of the main identity challenges that need to be addressed in Kazakhstan (Burkhanov 2019: 64; Koch and White 2016: 194-196).

In addition to mass immigration, the growing popularity of mass communication tools seems increasingly to influence ordinary citizens’ perception of their national identity in Kazakhstan. Through their growing participation in global social networks (such as Instagram and Facebook), in particular since the wider launch of cheaper 3G (in 2010) and 4G (in 2014) mobile handsets and smartphones (Anceschi 2015: 280, 294), Kazakhstan’s citizens get in touch with values and cultural practices previously perceived as foreign (Bekbaeva 2013: 142; Blum 2016: 11f; Kosnazarov 2019: 247; Mingisheva 2019: 175; Nikolaeva 2015: 582). This increased social and cultural interconnectedness can encourage people to reassess and sometimes even to change their identification with their nation.

In particular, the country’s youth, which is more active and exposed to social media platforms, can be anticipated to have a less national/country-centric

understanding of nationhood through their increased contact with global cultural flows online (Bigozhin 2019: 128-130; Blum 2016: 137, 2019: 214; Insebayeva 2019: 186; Kosnazarov 2019: 247; Mingisheva 2019: 167-168). In unpacking the hybrid nature of youth identity formation of hipsters in Almaty, Isaacs (2019: 235) partially confirms this assumption by identifying another possible identity narrative: the nexus between the more globally oriented (cosmopolitan) urban Russian-speaking hipsters and the more conservative traditional section of Kazakh youth, living in the countryside (Isaacs 2019: 237). Almaty hipsters, in adopting modern and technically sophisticated methods inspired by broader global trends in media, technology, and communication, transcend the state-led notion of civic Kazakhstani and ethnic Kazakh identity (Isaacs 2019: 239). In short, in addition to nation-building projects, possible global cultural flows shaping ordinary citizens' perception of their national identity in Kazakhstan also have to be taken into account.

To sum up, the research outlined above suggest that any study observing how processes of globalisation may impact Kazakhstan's citizens' perception of their national identity since 1991 should go beyond the state-led dichotomy of identity and should focus its analysis on individual- or grassroots-level processes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter finds that both key concepts, national identity and globalisation, are multidimensional and dynamic. Their interrelationship increasingly matters to post-Soviet people lives', especially since the dismantling of the USSR in 1991. This, at least in part, supports the argument of the *hyperglobalists* that the phenomenon of globalisation is real and heralds the beginning of a new epoch, at least for the new successor states. The processes of globalisation are alleged to have disproportionate implications on various aspects of citizens' lives in the new successor states.

According to *non-essentialists* and recent work in the field of post-Soviet studies, it is in the context of increased insecurity and frustration, which has resulted from dramatic structural changes (caused by globalisation), that the Soviet institutionalisation of nationhood may provide a degree of security to post-Soviet citizens and in doing so, continues to shape their identification with their nation.

Nonetheless, the interrelation between globalisation and national identity within post-Soviet societies is not clear-cut. Previous scholarship has demonstrated that there may exist countervailing influences of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies: Some people, through their contact with *otherness*, become more acquainted with their nation's particular character and as a result, may develop a stronger attachment to their national identity, while others become happier to identify as global citizens.

In particular, post-Soviet citizens who have experienced a social disorientation as a consequence of the dissolution of the former USSR, the so-called "losers" of the post-Soviet transition, can be expected to develop a stronger attachment to their national identity as a backlash against the side effects of increased globalisation, such as mass immigration, population movements, mass communication, labour insecurity, and cultural homogenisation, which can lead to fear, frustration and hostility. For such people, globalising forces in the form of Western culture and urban lifestyles present a menace against which their cultural practices and identity have to be protected. Out of concern about losing their cultural values and identity, these post-Soviet citizens tend to embrace a so-called national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421-424) in opposition to the alien, globalised

Western world. As proclaimed by scholars on *populism and contemporary nationalism*, these “resistance identities” are mainly inspired by strong religious particularism and anti-Westernism. In short, several accounts suggest that increased globalisation has a positive impact on former Soviet citizens’ identification with their nation. Drawing on this background, the following two hypotheses were tested in the statistical phase of this study: First, whether a former Soviet republic’s level of globalisation influences ordinary post-Soviet people’s perception of their national identity. Second, whether increases in globalisation weaken former Soviet citizens’ attachment to their national identity or not.

Given the promotion by its elite of two interpretations of nationhood, post-independence Kazakhstan serves as an interesting case study to illustrate how globalising flows may interact in rather complex ways with ordinary post-Soviet citizens’ perception of their identity. In Kazakhstan, unlike in other successor states, one might find both ethnic- and civic-centred national “resistance nationalism” (Castells 2011: 421-424). Moreover, despite the country’s economic prosperity, its embrace of new technologies and the political regime’s global nation-branding strategy, it remains somehow controversial whether Kazakhstanis’ newly obtained “globality” (Scholte 2008: 1485) is substantial and not merely a masquerade of the political regime’s “soft-authoritarian” nation-branding strategy.

Nonetheless, sometimes, as argued by scholars on *populism and contemporary nationalism*, national identities may arise independently from or even in opposition to nation-building policies by political elites. This effect can be anticipated to be particularly pronounced among “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f). They are more and more likely to “turn against both the foreigners who steal their jobs and their own cosmopolitan establishment, which is selling them out” (Nodia 2017: 16).

This is where my thesis, observing the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies makes a contribution. In not observing the impact of globalisation on political elites’ perceptions of a particular post-Soviet nation’s identity, but rather in examining how the wider post-Soviet public’s identification with their nation may have changed as a consequence of increased globalisation since 1991, I take the criticism of previous scholarship into account.

CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In Chapter One, I assessed the theoretical and comparative debates in the field of globalisation and national identity studies, alongside a consideration of the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy. This chapter aims to define an appropriate technique to analyse the complex causal dynamics between globalisation and national identity within the former Soviet space.

It begins with a critical examination of the current debates concerning the use of mixed methods in social and behavioural science. In the light of the limitations of both variance-based and case-based techniques, it concludes that a study that combines a large statistical analysis with a case study in one former Soviet state enables the formulation of a more nuanced answer to the research question of *how any causal relationship between globalisation and national identity may be interpreted and understood within the successor states of the former USSR*.

The remaining parts present the two methods employed in this study to investigate the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies.

The chosen statistical approach improves on previous studies by measuring both national identity and globalisation among multiple dimensions in a longitudinal multilevel framework. Such a technique allows the identification of potential differences in post-Soviet people's attachment to their nation over time.

The combined use of focus groups and individual interviews surpasses recent (non-statistical) work on Kazakhstanis' perception of their national identity in so far as it features representatives of both the elite and people from the working classes without higher education.

Mixed-method research

In recent years, mixed-method research (MMR) has become increasingly popular in social and behavioural science. MMR is generally defined as a single study that necessitates the collection, analysis and interpretation of both quantitative and qualitative data in order to investigate the same underlying phenomenon (Lech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 267).

Despite its growing popularity and institutionalisation, the underlying motivations of MMR and its realisation remain hotly debated. Some describe MMR as a “third research paradigm” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 22; Johnson et al. 2007: 112; Morgan 2007: 60) or as a new way of thinking (Greene 2008; Schoonenboom 2018: 1013) and yet others call the chosen practice of combining methods under the MMR approach problematic (Beach 2020; Timans et al. 2019).

This section begins with a brief discussion of the key points of contention underlying the current debate about mixed-method research. Drawing on this theoretical background, the subsequent part will discuss the reason for choosing mixed-method research to explore the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies and the typology of the chosen research design.

The current debate about mixed-method research

Mixed-method research (MMR) traces its origins back to applied disciplines and thematic studies in educational and nursing research (Greene 2008: 7; Timans et al. 2019: 201). According to Greene (2008), practitioners in the field of education and nursing started to use mixed methods to meet the need for both generalisation and particularisation of findings in their field.

For these practitioners, whom I will refer to as MMR optimists, mixed methods techniques presented a “workable solution” (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004: 7; Johnson et al. 2007: 113) that helped to overcome the weaknesses of both variance-based approaches (large-N statistical methods) and case-based approaches (non-numerical, sometimes referred to as qualitative methods) by combining them within the same research project (Denscombe 2008: 272; Fearon and Laitin 2011: 1168; Halcomb and Hickman 2015: 3; Lund 2012: 157; Maxwell

2019: 135). Researchers who advocate either variance-based or case-based approaches in their work are often criticised by MMR optimists for being too simplistic and reductionist. In reality researchers act both subjectively and objectively in their research (Morgan 2007: 71) and no findings are so context-specific and unique that they have no influence on actors in other contexts or are universally applicable in every historical and cultural setting (Morgan 2007: 72). According to the optimists, the great strength of MMR is its stress on the connection between epistemological concerns of knowledge production and the actual methods they use to generate that knowledge. In combining different ways of generating knowledge in one study, MMR encourages a better overall understanding of a research phenomenon (Greene 2008: 20; Halcomb and Hickman 2015: 13; Maxwell 2019: 135; Morgan 2007: 73).

Sceptics acknowledge that MMR has become a distinct subfield in social and behavioural science research (Beach 2020: 163; Hesse-Biber 2015: 777; Timans et al. 2019: 196-205) but they highlight two particular aspects that require more attention from MMR practitioners in the future.

First, they criticise MMR scholars' commitment to designing a standardised methodological framework for combining methods in a "proper way" (Timans et al. 2019: 207). There is a growing body of literature that seeks to identify classifications of mixed methods designs. For example, Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009: 268- 271) proposed a three-dimensional typology for MMR that resulted in eight different types of mixed methods studies. They identified three criteria that underlie their typology: level of mixing, level of timing and the emphasis of the approach (Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2009: 268). However, according to MMR sceptics this tendency to develop guidelines for a proper MMR study undermines critical thinking and, in doing so, favours the unquestioning use of a standard methodology (Hesse-Biber 2015: 779; Timans et al. 2019: 207).

Second, sceptics make the case that there is a larger methodological divide between variance-based and case-based approaches – making true MMR very difficult (Beach 2020: 164; Timans et al. 2019: 210). MMR researchers have to acknowledge and address the fact that their combined variance-based and case-based methods address fundamentally different questions in their research design. Large-N statistical methods assess mean causal effects between X and Y across a

set of cases (for example across different states), whereas case-based approaches aim to find out how a causal process linking X and Y plays out in a particular context (for example one country) (Beach 2020: 164f). Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages and MMR practitioners have to be aware of these prior to combining them. Results obtained from cross-country regressions may allow generalisation, but no particularisation (ecological fallacies). Findings from individual interviews with citizens of a country, in contrast, tell us how things work in a particular setting but do not allow us to formulate “flawed generalisations” from the individual to larger groups of states (Beach 2020: 173).

Nonetheless, instead of viewing the link between the ontological assumptions that are woven into different methods and the data they gather as problematic, some MMR optimists go so far as to argue that the variance-based and case-based techniques are “neutral in respect of epistemological issues and debates” (Bryman 1984: 89). As a result, methods are primarily seen as a way of collecting data or as an analytical technique that handles a specific kind of data. Often the underlying ontological and epistemological aspects of different methods are not further addressed and are kept in a black box (Beach 2020: 176; Timans et al. 2019: 2010f).

I agree with MMR optimists, such as Maxwell (2019) and Greene (2008) that the complementary use of variance-based and case-based methods and their different mental modes (ontological view of the world) can facilitate a better understanding of the multifaceted and complex character of social phenomena such as globalisation and nationalism. The following section presents the two methods used in this study. It highlights that in order to incorporate the voices of the rooted “somewheres” an MMR study should avoid interviewing solely individuals who benefit from the increased interconnectedness.

Partially mixed, sequential equal status MMR

I acknowledge the *non-essentialists*’ position that political leadership exerts power on public opinion and on people’s identification with their nation. At the same time I criticise the undue focus of many post-Soviet studies on individuals who, due to their educational or social background, can be expected to benefit from globalisation, such as artists, businesspeople, hipsters, returning migrants, oligarchs or students

at a Western-style university (Blum 2016, 2019; Commercio 2014; Gladkikh 2017; Ibold 2010; Isaacs 2019; Kudaibergenova 2019a). The question therefore arises as to what extent their findings can be used to deliver insights into how globalisation may influence the wider population's perception of their national identity in the post-Soviet world. To date, scholarship on the region has renounced statistical regression to investigate the influence of globalisation on national identity among former Soviet states. In order to avoid "elite bias" (Johnson et al. 2007: 115), I have chosen to focus on nationalism as a sentiment experienced at grassroots level in post-Soviet societies.

One way of assessing post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity at grassroots level are large-scale data sets such as the European Values Study (EVS), World Values Survey (WVS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP) or AsiaBarometer. However, research that employs large-scale surveys often faces criticism for being too simplistic in reducing the complex phenomenon of national identity to marginal preferences and a single emotion of pride or shame (Malešević 2011: 278f; Maseland and Von Hoorn 2009: 527, 2010: 1325; Sinnott 2005: 214). Moreover, statistical analyses often tend to rely on state-centred indicators such as the KOF Globalisation Index and in doing so neglect individual-level manifestations of globalisation (Caselli 2013: 3-5).

Finally, large-N comparison across many countries and time periods often fails to account for contextual factors, such as political conflicts, economic crises or wars (Dyrstad 2012: 818-819; Massey et al. 2003: 76; Sasse and Lackner 2018: 3), which may influence respondents' identity shifts in addition to globalisation (Masella 2013: 448f). As highlighted in Chapter One, globalisation and nationalism can be expected to interact in rather complex ways in some republics of the former USSR, such as Kazakhstan, where the political regime supported both ethnic and civic nation-building.

A large-N statistical design using survey data, therefore, allows the identification of compelling general trends (generalisation) for the post-Soviet space, but it is unable to reveal if these causal mechanisms hold true in individual post-Soviet countries. Findings from interviews in one successor state, however, may complement the results of the statistical analysis in providing further in-depth knowledge of ordinary post-Soviet citizens' perception of globalisation and how they

may perceive the phenomenon to shape their identity or not. In this light, a sequential combination of both a statistical analysis (variance-based approach) and a case study in one post-Soviet state (a case-based approach), promised to be a convincing strategy for developing a more nuanced understanding of the causal relationship between globalisation and national identity within the post-Soviet world.

In conducting this research, the first step was to carry out several generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses in *R*, before augmenting the identified statistical trends with empirical data from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in one former Soviet state, Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has proved to be a valuable case study that offered deeper insights into the findings from the statistical evaluation, insofar as it additionally addressed the extent to which the growing number of Starbucks, McDonald's and KFCs are perceived as incarnations of globalisation, rather than westernisation, by ordinary citizens in a particular post-Soviet country. In this context, an additional single case study in Kazakhstan allowed us to capture the nuances of the different historically-embedded national narratives (Kazakhstani or Kazakh identity) and how they may have interacted with globalisation (whether they stress threat to the nation from outside the country, or whether they are more inclusive). In the subsequent parts of this chapter, the combined methodological approaches will be discussed in more detail. Figure 1 below illustrates the two methods used in this thesis.




Figure 1. Mixed-method approach

Longitudinal multilevel regression analyses

As discussed in Chapter One, the general consensus among the debates on nationalism sees globalisation as having an impact on post-Soviet people's identification with their nation, be it positive or negative. Previous area studies argue that, out of concern about losing their cultural values and identity, former Soviet citizens tend to form their national identity more and more in opposition to the alien West.

Drawing on this background, the following two hypotheses were tested in the statistical phase of this study: First, whether the macro-condition – a former Soviet republic's level of globalisation, the independent variable – influences ordinary post-Soviet people's perception of their national identity, the dependent variable. Second, whether increases in globalisation weaken former Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity or not.

The use of cross-national survey data facilitated such an analysis because post-Soviet citizens and states are conceptualised as a hierarchical data set, with the respondents to the survey – residing in different countries. In this context, a multilevel approach seemed convincing because my study featured both independent variables at the individual level (demographic variables) and at the macro level (globalisation). Multilevel models allow the examination of both macro-level and individual-level variable effects on individual-level dependent variables (Ariely 2011: 546, 2012: 472; Hox 2010: 1). Irrespective of whether a regression is multilevel or not, one can either use a linear regression analysis or a logistic regression analysis (depending on whether or not one's dependent variable is binary) (Sommet and Morselli 2017: 203). In view of the increased ease of visualising interaction effects when the dependent variable (in my study, national identity) is dichotomised, I decided to run several generalised logistic multilevel regressions⁸ in *R*.

For the above-mentioned hypotheses, both individual- and aggregate-level data were required. The subsequent sections present the measurements used for the

⁸ I used the `glmer()` function in the `lme4` package for *R*. For more details please see Bates et al. (2015) and <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/lme4.pdf>, (last accessed 8 September 2020)

dependent and independent variables in the generalised logistic multilevel regressions. The sub-chapter ends with a discussion of the invariance tests employed.

Individual-level dependent variable: national identity

For survey evidence to be of use in a comparative context, questionnaires should be worded in an analogous way across different states and other aspects of the survey methodology should be similar enough to ensure that the resulting data can withstand meaningful comparison. There are three main cross-national survey projects that meet these criteria: the World Values Survey (WVS), the European Value Study (EVS) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The individual-level data were drawn from waves 2 (1990-1991) (Inglehart et al. 2018a), 3 (1995-1998) (Inglehart et al. 2018b), 4 (1999-2004) (Inglehart et al. 2018c), 5 (2005-2009) (Inglehart et al. 2018d), 6 (2011-2014) (Inglehart et al. 2018e) and 7 (2017-2020) (Haerpfer et al. 2020) of the WVS, the 1990, 1999 and 2008 waves of the EVS, as well as the ISSP National Identity module series of 2013 (ISSP Research Group 2015). The European Values Study (europeanvaluesstudy.eu) is a large-scale, cross-national, repeated cross-sectional survey research programme on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe. The World Values Survey (worldvaluessurvey.org) and the International Social Survey Programme (geis.org/issp) feature representative surveys carried out every several years in states which collectively contain the vast majority of the world's population. Despite recent criticism (Malešević 2011: 278f; Maseland and Van Hoorn 2009: 527, 2010: 1325) the EVS, ISSP and the WVS data are highly suited to capturing the complex and multidimensional reality of the phenomenon of national identity in the post-Soviet world. All three survey-projects accumulated data from a representative sample of a former Soviet state's adult population (older than 16). Questions concerning respondents' global or national identification, aspects of national pride and support for their own nation have been collected in most study waves and series in all three survey projects.

The questionnaire items chosen to capture the multidimensional dependent variable national identity were four dichotomous-choice questions fielded in the EVS surveys of 1990, 1999 and 2008, the WVS waves 2-7 as well as the ISSP National Identity module series of 2013: 1) *Willingness to Fight*, whether or not respondents would be willing to fight for their country in a war scenario; 2) *Level of Pride*, the extent to which respondents are proud of their nation; 3) *Nation Citizen* and 4) *World Citizen*, respectively whether respondents think of themselves as citizens of their nation or as world citizens. These four survey questions were used to assess the extent to which a post-Soviet citizen feels attached to her nation (otherwise known as national identity). For more detail regarding the survey questionnaire items used to measure the multidimensional concept of national identity, please see table 2 below.

Table 2. Survey questionnaire items to measure national identity by the EVS, WVS and ISSP survey projects

Variable	European Value Study (EVS) 1990, 1999 and 2008	World Value Survey (WVS) Waves 2 – 7 (1990 – 2020)	International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 2013
Willingness to Fight	“Of course we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”* 1= yes 2= no *only asked in 1999	“Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” 1= yes 2= no	“Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” 1= yes 2= no
Level of Pride	“How proud are you to be a [country] citizen?” 1= very proud 2= quite proud 3= not very proud 4= not at all proud	“How proud are you to be [Nationality]?” 1= very proud 2= somewhat proud 3= not very proud 4= not at all proud	“How proud are you to be [Nationality]?” 1= very proud 2= somewhat proud 3= not very proud 4= not proud at all
Nation Citizen	“To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?” 1= locality or town 2= region or state 3= your country as a whole 4=Europe 5= the world as a whole	“To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?” (Waves 2 - 4) 1= locality or town 2= region or state 3= your country as a whole 4= continent 5= the world as a whole “I see myself as part of the [Nationality] nation.” (Waves 5 - 7) 1= strongly agree 2 = agree 3= disagree 4 = strongly disagree	“How close do you feel to: [Country]?” 1= very close 2= close 3= not very close 4= not close at all

World Citizen	"To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?" 1= locality or town 2= region or state 3= your country as a whole 4=Europe 5= the world as a whole	"To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to first of all?" (Waves 2 – 4) 1= locality or town 2= region or state 3= nation as a whole (country) 4= continent 5= world	"I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country." 1= strongly agree 2= agree 3= neither agree nor disagree 4= disagree 5= strongly disagree
		"I see myself as a world citizen." (Waves 5 – 7) 1= strongly agree 2 = agree 3= disagree 4 = strongly disagree	

The analysis of survey data included members of the titular ethnic group (for example, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan) as well as respondents who do not belong to the core national group (for example, Russians in Kazakhstan). They were included mainly because those who are not members of the titular ethnic group are still citizens of the post-Soviet countries in which they live and as a consequence may have civic nationalist identities. Prior to the statistical data analysis, the survey questionnaires from the EVS, WVS and ISSP underwent thorough data management. First, those respondents who were recorded by the EVS, the WVS or ISSP as having not provided an answer to one of the relevant survey questions for this study had to be omitted when the corresponding variable was analysed.

Second, the survey questionnaires from the cross-national data sets had to be changed into binary variables. All three large-scale survey data sets capture respondents' pride in their nation using four categories (1 = *very proud*, 2 = *quite/somewhat proud*, 3 = *not very proud*, 4 = *not at all proud*). Afterwards, those respondents who are either *very* or *quite/somewhat proud* had to be merged into the general category *proud* and those respondents who are either *not very* or *not at all proud* into the general category *not proud*.

Furthermore, due to the changed survey questionnaires between WVS waves 4 and 5 (see table 2 above for more details), it was only possible to carry out the multilevel analysis for the variables *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* for the decade of the 2010s. In order to run several generalised logistic multilevel regressions the ordinal four-point Likert scale (*strongly agree*, *agree*, *disagree* and *strongly disagree*) of the variables *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* from the WVS waves 5–7 had to be changed into a binary scale, by consolidating those respondents who either *strongly agree* or *agree* with the statement "I see myself as

a part of [my country's nationality]", or "I see myself as a world citizen", in the dummy category *agree* and those respondents who either *disagree* or *strongly disagree* with the same statement in the dummy category *disagree*.

The ISSP questionnaire captures the *World* and *Nation Citizen* variables slightly differently from the WVS, see table 2 above. Respondents who chose to *disagree* or *strongly disagree* with the statement "I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country", were recoded as *disagree*, whereas those who either *strongly agree* or *agree* with the same statement were merged into the dummy category *agree*. Moreover, the ISSP features one additional category for the variable *World Citizen*, *Neither agree nor disagree*, making 5 in all. Since those respondents (Lithuania 320, participants; and Latvia 203, participants) belonging to this category cannot be assigned to either the dummy category *agree* or *disagree*, they had to be excluded from the analysis. Finally, by asking the respondents, "How close do you feel to your country?", the ISSP uses rather different response categories (1 = very close, 2 = close, 3 = not very close, 4 = not close at all) for the *Nation Citizen* variable. This is why those respondents who are either *very close* or *close* had to be merged into the category *agree* and those who are either *not very close* or *not close at all* into the general category *disagree*, in order to include respondents from Latvia and Lithuania in my study.

In short, only after this substantial recoding was I able to merge the assembled data of the WVS, EVS and ISSP survey projects for the different dimensions of national identity, to measure post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity and how it may have changed over time for the three decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

Despite that, it was only possible to carry out the multilevel analysis for the first dimension of national identity for two of the three decades due to the limited availability of data for the dependent variable of *Willingness to Fight*: the 1990s (featuring 15 datasets) and the 2010s (featuring 21 datasets). For more details regarding which former Soviet countries and datasets are included for the dependent variable of *Willingness to Fight* in the different decades, please see table A1ⁱ in the appendix.

As previously mentioned, due to the changed survey questionnaires between WVS waves 4 and 5 (see table 2 above for more details), the available survey data

for the variables of *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* allowed the design of multilevel models only for the decade of the 2010s. For the number of macro-level cases included in the decade of the 2010s for the *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* variables please see table A2ⁱⁱ in the appendix. Only for the dependent variable *Level of Pride* did the available survey data permit the design of multilevel models for all three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. Table A3ⁱⁱⁱ in the appendix lists the post-Soviet countries included in each multilevel model for this variable across the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

In a hierarchical data set there is only one single outcome or response (dependent) variable (in this study, it is national identity), but several explanatory (independent) variables at all levels that need to be considered for a multilevel analysis (Hox 2010). It therefore seems pertinent at this point to introduce the range of independent variables for which I controlled at the individual level.

Individual-level explanatory variables

At the individual level, variables consistently found in comparative research that may affect people's identity choices in response to increased globalisation encompass *age* (age: 18-35, age: 36-50, age: 51-66, age: 67-91), *gender* (0 = male, 1 = female), *education* (university degree versus no university degree), *social class* (middle class, lower middle class and working class) and *urban/rural*.

Controlling for these five explanatory variables at the individual level seemed crucial, especially because younger, well-educated people who live in more urban areas tend to respond more positively to processes of globalisation than older and less well-educated people (Ariely 2011: 545, 2012: 472; Jung 2008: 593; Kunovich 2009: 575f, 585; Wimmer 2017: 624). Additionally, respondents' *gender* may affect their perception of their national identity (Ariely 2011: 545, 2012: 472; Bayram 2019: 773; Kunovich 2009: 586; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 39, 90). Generally speaking, men are prouder of their country than are women, older individuals are prouder than younger individuals, and the less-educated are prouder than better-educated people (Davidov 2009: 18; Kunovich 2009: 586; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 39, 90; Smith and Kim 2006: 4-6; Wimmer 2017: 624).

Finally, people living in the countryside tend to identify themselves less as *world citizens* than citizens living in cities, because the latter are likely to benefit more from being exposed to globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Norris and Ingelhart 2019: 136f, 164-167, 259; Rooduijn 2015: 6). These less mobile and disadvantaged groups who, through their contact with globalisation, may even develop a more nationalist, exclusive understanding of nationhood and, as a result, a stronger attachment to their national identity (Kriesi et al. 2006: 929; Nodia 2017: 16; Norris and Ingelhart 2019: 136f; Rooduijn 2015: 6). It was to check for this possible divide between “winners” and “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f) that this study determined the individual-level explanatory variables of *social class* and *urban/rural*. The *urban/rural* variable was measured as a binary variable; *urban* (inhabitant of a settlement with more than 100,000 citizens) = 1 and *rural* (inhabitant of a smaller settlement) = 0.

In order to capture the individual level variable *social class*, it is important to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was never a truly classless society. There seems to be considerable continuity between the former political and bureaucratic elite, the Soviet *nomenklatura* and the new post-Soviet political and economic elite. Thus, class categories continue to matter in the new successor states, be it as an analytical concept or as a central vector of inequality (Salmenniemi 2012: 26). In contrast to the Western (UK) conception of the *upper class*, which is generally associated with the landed aristocracy, the post-Soviet *upper class* seem to be less distinguishable from the new *middle class*. Both, the upper and middle classes have been able to use capitalist market mechanisms to their personal advantage and, therefore, are on the winning side of globalisation (Salmenniemi 2012: 12). Accordingly, it seemed sensible to measure the individual-level variable of *social class* for three categories, which are based on respondents’ self-identification⁹: *middle class* (including upper class and the higher middle class), *lower middle class* and *working class*.

In addition to the demographic variables of *gender*, *education*, *age*, *social class* and *urban*, a successor state’s level of globalisation was captured as the

⁹ In analysing the characteristics of a Brexiteer, Dorling and Tomlinson (2019: 40) showed that people’s feelings about their social status (in their case, income) turned out to be a substantially better predictor for social class than their actual income. According to them, it was not the poor voters who won the “leave” vote for Brexit in the UK, but voters of average means who felt poor.

critical independent variable at country-level. How this variable was measured requires some further explanation.

Macro-level independent variable: KOF Globalisation Index

In this study, at the macro level the critical independent variable is a post-Soviet country's level of globalisation. After comparison of the four well-known and anticipated measurements of globalisation¹⁰, I found that the only indicator that collected data for the measurement of globalisation systematically and continuously over time for all former Soviet republics among multiple dimensions is the KOF Globalisation Index (Gygli et al. 2019).

The KOF Globalisation Index was created by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, a part of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. The revised version of the KOF Globalisation Index determines a country's level of globalisation by measuring the performance for almost every country in the world since 1970 across 43¹¹ variables, which are then aggregated to form three main dimensions of globalisation: economic, political and social (Gygli et al. 2019: 545). These three indicators are combined into a single overall (aggregated) index on a scale from 1 to 100, where higher values denote higher levels of globalisation (Dorado-Moreno et al. 2016: 552; Dreher 2005: 2f). The overall KOF Globalisation Index combines de facto and de jure globalisation and is constructed from various data, such as foreign direct investments, income payments to foreign nationals (non-resident workers), hidden import barriers, the number of McDonald's restaurants, the number of mobile phone and internet users and a post-Soviet country's membership of international organisations. For a general overview of the KOF Globalisation Index's structure, its variables and their assigned weight, please see table 4 below. For a full list of indicators, see the KOF Swiss Economic Institute website available at: <https://kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html>.

¹⁰ The A. T. Kearney / Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, the CSGR Globalisation Index, KOF Globalisation Index and the Maastricht Globalisation Index)

¹¹ Contrary to the original index that was introduced by Dreher (2005) and updated by Dreher et al. (2008) the second revision of the index is based on 43 rather than 23 variables (Gygli et al. 2019: 543).

As we can see from table 3 below, another attribute of the updated KOF Globalisation Index is its changed measurement of cultural globalisation. The original selection of variables in the 2002 version of the index could be traced back to Saich's definition of cultural globalisation (2000) that defines the term in a way that seems to relate to the dissemination of American values. As a result, the KOF Globalisation Index has been criticised for capturing westernisation rather than cultural globalisation in general. In order to assess cultural globalisation more broadly, the revised version of the KOF Globalisation Index features three new de facto variables in addition to the number of McDonald's restaurants and IKEA stores: trade in cultural goods, trademark applications of non-residents and trade in personal, cultural and recreational services (Gygli et al. 2019: 553).

Table 3. Structure, variables and weighting of the 2019 KOF Globalisation Index

Globalisation Index, de facto	Weights	Globalisation Index, de jure	Weights
<i>Economic Globalisation, de facto</i>	33.3	<i>Economic Globalisation, de jure</i>	33.3
Trade Globalisation, de facto	50.0	Trade Globalisation, de jure	50.0
<i>Trade in goods</i>	38.50	<i>Trade regulations</i>	25.8
<i>Trade in services</i>	45.10	<i>Trade taxes</i>	25.3
<i>Trade partner diversity</i>	16.40	<i>Tariffs</i>	25.4
		<i>Trade agreements</i>	23.50
Financial Globalisation, de facto	50.0	Financial Globalisation, de jure	50.0
<i>Foreign direct investment</i>	27.3	<i>Investment restrictions</i>	32.2
<i>Portfolio investment</i>	16.9	<i>Capital account openness</i>	38.7
<i>International debt</i>	25.7	<i>International Investment Agreements</i>	29.1
<i>International reserves</i>	3.2		
<i>International income payments</i>	26.9		
<i>Social Globalisation, de facto</i>	33.3	<i>Social Globalisation, de jure</i>	33.3
Interpersonal Globalisation, de facto	33.3	Interpersonal Globalisation, de jure	33.3
<i>International voice traffic</i>	20.0	<i>Telephone subscriptions</i>	40.6
<i>Transfers</i>	21.8	<i>Freedom to visit</i>	32.4
<i>International tourism</i>	21.2	<i>International airports</i>	27.0
<i>International students</i>	20.4		
<i>Migrants</i>	16.6		
Informational Globalisation, de facto	33.3	Informational Globalisation, de jure	33.3
<i>Used Internet bandwidth</i>	43.2	<i>Television access</i>	35.7
<i>International patent</i>	23.6	<i>Internet access</i>	42.0
<i>High technology exports</i>	33.2	<i>Press freedom</i>	22.3
Cultural Globalisation, de facto	33.3	Cultural Globalisation, de jure	33.3
<i>Trade in cultural goods</i>	28.0	<i>Gender parity</i>	26.2
<i>Trade in personal services</i>	24.3	<i>Human capital</i>	41.2
<i>International trademarks</i>	11.1	<i>Civil liberties</i>	32.6
<i>McDonald's restaurant</i>	20.9		
<i>IKEA stores</i>	15.7		
<i>Political Globalisation, de facto</i>	33.3	<i>Political Globalisation, de jure</i>	33.3
<i>Embassies</i>	36.2	<i>International organisation</i>	36.0
<i>UN peace keeping missions</i>	26.1	<i>International treaties</i>	33.6
<i>International NGOs</i>	37.7	<i>Treaty partner diversity</i>	30.4

In summary, at the aggregate level, the KOF Globalisation Index (Gygli et al. 2019) was employed to measure a post-Soviet state's level of globalisation for the three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s among five dimensions: aggregated, economic, political, social and cultural. Tables A4 – A8^{iv} in the appendix list the KOF Globalisation Index values calculated for each post-Soviet state for all dimensions across the different measurement points.

Nevertheless, while using the KOF Globalisation Index, it is worthwhile addressing some of its methodological shortcomings, for example its mathematical validity and its neglect of individual-level manifestations of globalisation.

First, it can not be taken for granted that the mathematical form, a linear combination of the underlying variables and indicators that create an overall score, is the correct formulation, especially for large states where policy areas can significantly interact with each other (Dorado-Moreno et al. 2016: 552). Sometimes, “the use of a large number of indicators may lead to excessive coverage of certain dimensions, which risks the appearance of side effects (such as duplication and correlation), as some information might be recorded more than once and thus introduce distortion into the results” (Dorado-Moreno et al. 2016: 552). In order to account for measurement comparability errors relating to the KOF Globalisation Index it seems not only useful but necessary to break down the overall index further into political, economic, social and cultural forms of globalisation. This separation may offer further insights into the complex interrelation between globalisation and national identity within the former Soviet space.

Second, the KOF Globalisation Index, like most other globalisation indices, limits its observations to the state level (Caselli 2013: 3f). In doing so, it neglects within-country differences and often omits the geographical distribution of linkages (Gygli et al. 2019: 549). It also fails to account for individual-level manifestations of globalisation (Caselli 2013: 5). This widely adopted procedure seems understandable due to its practical convenience, the availability of statistical data at the sub-national level and the procedure's general acceptance (Caselli 2013: 4). Nevertheless, the focus on the state level allows us to grasp only those aspects of globalisation for which data on the national level is available (Caselli 2013; Martens et al. 2015). The Person-Based Globalisation Index (PBGI) that focuses on analysing the individual level (Caselli 2013: 5) would allow us to overcome these

limitations. Unfortunately, no statistical indicator exists so far that can fully capture individual-level manifestations of globalisation. Nevertheless, there are valid reasons to focus on the national level when capturing globalisation. Despite hyperglobalists' forecasts, national governments remain the principal actors in shaping the globalisation process and states continue to be the reference points for most people today.

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that there may be alternative external factors that affect former Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity in addition to globalisation (Ariely 2011: 540, 2012: 469), such as the "Soviet factor" addressed in Chapter One. In order to account for alternative factors that may influence people's identity shifts, I controlled for three additional macro-level variables: a post-Soviet country's economic prosperity, degree of peace and the level of democracy. Often such external effects are neglected by large-scale surveys and might cause measurement errors (Ariely 2012: 461; Masella 2013: 448f). The measurement of these macro-level variables is discussed in more detail in the following section.

Alternative macro-level variables: economic prosperity and democracy

As previously discussed in Chapter One, in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the former Soviet republics increasingly engaged in trade with the non-Communist world and began to participate in the capitalist world market. Some post-Soviet states, thanks to their vast natural resources, seem to have benefited more from their participation in the capitalist world market than others. Thus, it can be expected that respondents living in a more economically developed successor state of the former Soviet Union may display more welcoming attitudes towards the increased interconnectedness with the West during the three decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. To measure a former Soviet states' economic prosperity, I employed the country's gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (GDP per capita in PPP) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹²

¹² <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2019/02/weodata/index.aspx>

For more details regarding the GDP per capita in PPP values for the respective post-Soviet state used in the study, please see table A9^v in the appendix.

After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, most countries of central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe that were formerly under Communist rule began to promote certain democratic reforms such as multiparty elections. However, in Russia and most of the other non-Baltic states many authoritarian electoral and political practices from the Soviet area persist (Birch 2011: 717; Cameron and Orenstein 2012: 1f). As a result, it can be expected that respondents growing up in more democratic settings may react differently to increased global interconnectedness than their counterparts living in a more authoritarian state. It seems sensible, therefore, to control for a former Soviet country's level of democracy in addition to globalisation. I used the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy) from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project V-Dem Dataset V9 (Coppedge et al. 2019) to capture a post-Soviet country's level of democratisation. This measure coded answers to the question "To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?" and ranks from 0 (low) to 1 (high level of democracy). For more details regarding the V-Dem values deployed for each post-Soviet state please see table A10^{vi} in the appendix.

Finally, in addition to a post-Soviet state's economic prosperity and level of democracy, "wars (...) can facilitate identity shifts" (Sasse and Lackner 2018: 3). Thus, it seemed advisable to examine the extent to which a former Soviet country living in a state of peace may have shaped its citizens' perception of their national identity in addition to globalisation. The most reliable index to capture a post-Soviet state of peace is the Global Peace Index (GPI) from The Institute for Economics and Peace (<https://ecopeaceprod.wpengine.com/reports/>). Following the Institute for Economics & Peace's Global Peace report (2020: 84), peace is defined as the absence of violence (*Negative Peace*). The GPI measures a country's level of *Negative Peace* using three domains of peacefulness: *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict* (assessing a post-Soviet state's role and duration of involvement in internal and external conflicts), *Societal Safety and Security* (investigating the level of harmony or discord within a nation with indicators such as crime rates, stability of political scene etc.) and *Militarisation* (capturing a country's level of military build-up and access to weapons). Since the institute only began to collect data on the post-Soviet world in 2008, the macro-level variable *Peace* had to

be excluded from the multilevel models covering the decades of the 1990s and the 2000s. It could only be used for the decade of the 2010s and therefore did not allow the study of changes over time. For more details regarding the GPI values used for each former state of the USSR in the 2010s please see table A11^{vii} in the appendix.

Invariance tests

The study of changes over time and differences across countries in national attachment is important, but also implies additional methodological challenges (Ariely and Davidov 2012: 373; Ariely 2012: 468; Davidov 2010: 88). Often, studies that aim to compare latent constructs, such as national identity, face problems of measurement invariances (Ariely and Davidov 2012: 370; Davidov 2010: 91; Hirschfeld and Brachel 2014: 1). This is mainly because “these latent constructs are [frequently] measured by questionnaires comprised of different scales” (Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014: 1). As a result, studies using cross-national survey data are often asked to assess whether or not those survey questionnaires, under different conditions of observation and focused on a particular latent construct, measure the same attributes in the same way (Ariely and Davidov 2012: 373; Davidov 2010: 91; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998: 78).

Drawing on that theoretical background, therefore, it seemed sensible to observe how the different measurement dimensions of my dependent variable of *national identity* across countries and points in time may be affected by globalisation, by first assessing to what extent the measurement of the four different dimensions (*Willingness to Fight*, *Level of Pride*, *Nation Citizen*, *World Citizen*) is equivalent across the different post-Soviet countries (Ariely and Davidov 2012: 373; Ariely 2011: 550; Davidov 2009: 9, 2010: 91; Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014: 1; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998: 78). There are various techniques to test for measurement invariance (Davidov 2010: 91; Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014: 1). The most widely used and powerful method to establish invariant measurements across groups, such as countries or measurement occasions, is a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) (Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014: 1; Zercher et al. 2015: 2).

In line with previous studies (Ariely and Davidov 2012: 373; Davidov 2009: 9, 2010: 91) that measured national identity against multiple-items scales, I used this

method to establish the equivalence of scales across some of the observed post-Soviet countries. However, as the questionnaire items in table 2 highlight, the WVS and EVS survey projects changed their questionnaires to examine the *World Citizen* and *Nation Citizen* in 2006 and 2017¹³ respectively. The changed survey questionnaire only enabled me to run a MGCFA for the World Value Survey wave 6. Overall, the analysis indicates that partial measurement equivalence can be accepted at least for the 11 post-Soviet countries¹⁴ in the World Value Survey wave 6 (see Appendix^{viii} for further details). As a result, and in contrast to previous studies observing the impact of globalisation on national identities (Ariely 2011, 2012), my analysis partially verifies the assumption that one can compare four dimensions of national identity at least among the 11 post-Soviet countries in the WVS wave 6 (Davidov 2010: 98).

Apart from the WVS wave 6, the MGCFA analysis did not allow the inclusion of the data sets from any other survey wave from the WVS, the EVS or the ISSP because these surveys differ in their measurement of – and do not exhibit all four dimensions of – the dependent variable of national identity across the different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. Thus, in order to examine how much variance stems from between country variance while including the other survey projects, the intraclass correlation (ICC) coefficient was calculated prior to analysis of the generalised logistic multilevel regression results. This was to ascertain whether the WVS, ISSP, EVS data on the post-Soviet world can be considered equivalent to the WVS wave 6 data for the other cases.

Generally speaking, the ICC tells us how much of the fraction of the total variation in the current study's data stems from true differences across the different post-Soviet countries and how much is due to other changes (for example time, sample collection, analysis, or random error) (Hox 2010: 6; Musca et al. 2011: 2). It takes values from 0 to 1. An ICC of 0 indicates no variability between the different post-Soviet countries, but rather between different former Soviet citizens. Therefore, the main variance stems from the individual-respondents level and not from

¹³ For its fifth wave, the European Values Study agreed to collaborate with the World Values Survey to carry out the 2017 values survey in Europe. As a result, the EVS 2017 is incorporated in the WVS wave 7 and has adopted the WVS measurement scale for the *World* and *Nation Citizen* variables.

¹⁴ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan

between countries. The ICC is calculated by dividing the between-country variance (random intercept variance) by the total variance (i.e. the sum of between-country variance and within-country residual variance) (Hox 2010: 5; Musca et al. 2011: 2).

As a rule of thumb, an ICC higher than 0.05 seems to justify a generalised logistic multilevel regression analysis (Thomas and Heck 2001: 526). If the ICC is less, however, a simple single level analysis would suffice (Musca et al. 2011: 4; Lai and Kwok 2015: 424). This research uses the *R* command *icc()* from the *R* packages *sjstats*¹⁵ and *lme4*¹⁶ to calculate the ICC. In short, for each generalised logistic multilevel regression analysis the ICC was computed first and is displayed in the table output (see Chapter 3).

In short, the large-N statistical analysis employed in the first phase of my study sought to test if globalisation has an influence on respondents' perception of their national identity and whether globalisation strengthens or weakens sentiments of nationalism in the three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

However, contrary to variance-based approaches, the second component of my thesis, rather than testing hypotheses, aimed to learn more about how the causal mechanisms between globalisation and national identity operate within Kazakhstan through the combined use of focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews.

¹⁵ <https://strengjacke.github.io/sjstats/reference/icc.html> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

¹⁶ <https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/sjstats/versions/0.16.0/topics/icc> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

Focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews

Often the topic of globalisation and national identity in the former Soviet Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan has been tackled through the prism of citizens belonging to certain narrow sectors in the country, who are mostly in favour of the liberal values of freedom and equality intrinsic to the West (Bigozhin 2019; Blackburn 2019; Blum 2016, 2019; Isaacs 2019; Kudaibergenova 2019a). However, I argue that interviews with Almaty hipsters or returned migrants from the USA in Astana and Almaty are not representative in terms of capturing the identification of Kazakhstan's broader population with their nation mainly because, to this day, the wider public in the country does not possess the financial means to travel and live in the more distant non-CIS countries. I believe that any study that seeks to assess how globalisation may influence Kazakhstanis' perception of their national identity should focus its analysis on individual- or grassroots-level processes and therefore should seek to engage in an active dialogue with ordinary citizens.

To incorporate the previously under-represented voices of working-class people, 34 focus groups and 38 semi-structured individual interviews featuring a total of 137¹⁷ interview participants were run in Kazakhstan during a period of nine weeks in the summer of 2019. All interviews were conducted through local gatekeepers or "insiders" with pre-existing social groups based on the workplace, friendship or family.

This section seeks to address some of the methodological challenges I faced in the field. The first part illustrates why a combined use of focus groups and semi-structured interviews proved to be the soundest and most successful strategy to collect high-quality data in contemporary Kazakhstan. Afterwards, it continues with a brief appraisal of my chosen recruitment and sampling strategies, before the questions used to capture Kazakhstanis' exposure to globalisation and their reaction to it are presented. It ends with a brief outline of the chosen process of coding.

¹⁷ Out of 137 interviewees, 97 were native Kazakhs, and 23 ethnic Russian and other minorities. Three Ukrainians, three ethnic Koreans, two Tatars, one Bashkirka, one Belarusian, one Bulgarka, one Dunganka, one German, one Lesgen, one Moldovian, one Tajik and one Uzbek.

Methodological challenges in the field

Focus groups turned out to be particularly useful for my research because of the anticipated low levels of interest and/or knowledge about globalisation. Unlike individual interviews (Green et al. 2015: 511; Krueger and Casey 2015: 7), they enabled the collection of data from group interactions. For example, the fact that some respondents broke into spontaneous laughter while talking about transgender people's self-chosen gender offers further insights into the general public's perception of LGBTQ+ people and the discrimination queer Kazakhstani citizens may encounter on a daily basis. Furthermore, focus groups facilitated the gathering of rich qualitative data both more quickly and more cost-effectively, since I was able to interview more participants within the same time period (Dilshad and Latif 2013: 196; Freitas et al. 1998: 4f; Green et al. 2015: 511).

Nevertheless, running focus groups alone did not promise to be the most convincing and successful strategy in Kazakhstan for the following reasons:

First, often a few vocal individuals belonging to the older generations (40+) not only dominated group discussions (featuring more than four respondents), but sometimes even denounced other participants and, in doing so, influenced younger participants' answers. This problem is anticipated in the existing literature on focus groups (Krueger and Casey 2015: 16; Dilshad and Latif 2013: 197). Particularly while discussing how the mentality and cultural practices of Kazakhstan's citizens may change through their experience of broader global/Western influences, the country's youth (18- 29) either chose to agree with the view voiced by older interview participants or to remain silent and not to answer the question at all. This was to comply with the Kazakh convention of *"uvazheniia k starchim"* (a Russian expression meaning "to show respect to one's elders") (Blum 2016: 112). Thus, younger participants often felt too intimidated to share sensitive personal ideas within a larger group of people.¹⁸ Under those circumstances, conducting semi-structured individual interviews and smaller focus groups (with two or three

¹⁸ "Jasmin, even though we may not agree with the elderly, our tradition of 'uvazheniia k starchim' asks us to keep our opinions to ourselves in order not to act disrespectfully towards people of older generations. Is there any chance I and a friend of mine who is my age can speak privately with you?" This statement provided by a female Kazakh aged 23, who is based in the country's south, illustrates the pressure of conformism the youth faces in contemporary Kazakhstan and in Central Asia in general (Blum 2016: 112; Kikuta 2019: 193f).

participants) in order to obtain the youth's viewpoint, which unsurprisingly differed significantly from their parents and grandparents, seemed a sensible approach in addition to conducting larger focus groups.

Second, following the unexpected resignation of Kazakhstan's long-standing president Nursultan Nazarbayev on 19 March 2019, early presidential elections were held on 9 June 2019. This political spectacle influenced my fieldwork: after the arrest of more than 500 protesters in Almaty and Astana together with state-led blockage of all major social networks and online platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and YouTube, which lasted for almost a week¹⁹, the organisation of focus groups became slightly more difficult. Particularly in Almaty, the largest city of Kazakhstan, where I conducted interviews in the aftermath of the election, I felt the *poll effect*, because almost all participants (except for two focus groups featuring only young female Kazakhs) insisted on expressing their points of view in an individual interview. Thus, again it seemed reasonable to simultaneously run semi-structured individual interviews to ensure respondents' safety and well-being.

Finally, since Russian is still the main language of interethnic communication (Buelow 2012: 105; Friedrich Ebert Foundation 2019: 19; Sharipova 2019: 83), all focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews were conducted in Russian. In situations in which respondents did not speak Russian well, their relatives or friends agreed to act as translator. Again, in this situation focus groups proved to be helpful, because they allowed me to record group discussions in Kazakh, which I could translate into English afterwards. Since I got to know most participants only on their arrival for the interview, I welcomed the language-switching provided by their educated, but professionally untrained, native Kazakh- and Russian-speaking companions.

Nonetheless, while translating the recorded interview discussions from Kazakh into English with the help of Dr Zhanibek Arynov, a postdoc at Nazarbayev University, Dr Arynov explained to me that some untrained interpreters had (often unintentionally) manipulated the construction of the narrative. Instead of expressing the questions in an unbiased manner, they asked them in a rather judgemental tone, so that participants felt forced to respond to them in a certain way. For example,

¹⁹ <https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-and-streaming-services-blocked-in-kazakhstan-on-election-day-dAmOP7y9> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

instead of asking their friend the neutral question, “Do we have to do something to protect Kazakh culture in today’s globalised world?”, they asked the less objective question, “Don’t you think we have to protect Kazakh culture in today’s globalised world?” For that reason, the coding of these interviews was slightly more time consuming.

In summary, in order to handle the unanticipated situations in the field, the pooled use of focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews has proven to be the most sensible strategy. The combined use of individual and group interviews allowed me to capture the voices of the wider Kazakhstani public in surroundings where most respondents felt welcome and free to speak.

Since any interview situation represents a shared space which is a by-product of the identity of both the participant and researcher (Bourke 2014: 1), it seems important to briefly reflect on my positionality and the recruitment and sampling strategy that was employed as a result of it.

Recruitment of participants and sampling strategy

Overall, my positionality as a young, white, Russian-speaking Swiss woman served to create spaces in which most respondents and particularly young female Kazakhs²⁰ felt free to express themselves without fearing judgement or silencing. While young females were quite talkative during the interviews, their male peers were much more reserved.²¹ Their reticence to engage may also be linked to my positionality, insofar as the young men (often stemming from the country’s south)

²⁰ Given my age, young women (18-29) in particular responded to my sincere interest in their lives as an opportunity to engage in a discourse of inclusion and gender equality. As a result, the individual and group interviews with young female Kazakhs often lasted longer and were continued afterwards without recording.

²¹ Young men, in choosing their words very carefully, seemed to act in a less relaxed and natural manner during the interviews. Topics such as the growing visibility of LGBTQ+ culture and changed gender roles on social media platforms were met with strong resistance by men, who refused to answer the questions and even verbally attacked me. Especially in those situations, my five years’ work experience dealing with angry passengers in an airport lost-and-found office turned out to be very valuable. Happily, none of the interview participants ended up crying, screaming, expressing themselves physically or leaving the interview before completion.

might have viewed my presence and research as a challenge to their conception of the world.²²

Drawing on that background, it comes as no surprise that some – young male respondents in particular – were more likely to agree to join and show up for an individual or group interview if they were invited by someone they knew, or someone they perceived to stem from their local community. As a result, many participants were successfully recruited in the field through existing and associated contacts, through so-called “insider” recruiting (Krueger and Casey 2015: 85). My local “insiders”²³ recruited their relatives, friends and working colleagues. Using pre-existing social groups allowed the incorporation of diverse participants (students, professionals, entrepreneurs, office workers, market sales persons, nurses, etc.) and facilitated a generally relaxed atmosphere during the interviews. A drawback of this recruitment strategy is reduced control over the composition of the groups. Prior to the interviews, whenever possible, I asked my contacts to share their demographics (ethnicity, age, language, education, occupation, religion) with me, so that I could include this in my data analysis. Moreover, in order to limit any gatekeeper effects my local agents received a detailed criteria sheet on the basis of which the participants for the interviews were selected (see figure A1^{ix} as a possible illustration in appendix). Some of those criteria are discussed at length in the following paragraphs.

To control for possible gender and “respect for elders” (Blum 2016: 112) biases, in addition to big mixed-age and mixed-gender focus groups, the insiders

²² I am referring here to the Kazakh heteronormative behaviour patterns that dictate a woman should marry young and have children (Beyer and Finke 2019: 318). Similar observations with the same age cohort were reported by Dr Didar Kassymova, KIMEP University, and Dr H       Thibault, Nazarbayev University, who have both lived and taught in Kazakhstan for many years.

²³ Most focus groups and individual interviews were organised by my existing contacts in the four different regions. I am indebted to Anastassiya and her husband Alexandr for organising the interviews and venues in Kostanay and Aktau. In Almaty, Dr Didar Kassymova at KIMEP University and her teaching assistant Zhanyia assisted me in the recruitment process. In Astana, Kristina and Ruslan, two business friends of my father helped me to organise the interviews. In Shymkent, Dr Zhanibek Arynov and his family helped me to conduct interviews with their local friends and colleagues. Apart from hotel staff, whom I approached myself on arrival or at breakfast, all participants were initially invited verbally to participate by one of my contacts, who in each case was a person well known to them. The interviews were held in caf      s, at the hairdresser’s, in hotels, hospitals, public markets, business offices, parks, restaurants, shopping malls, schools, and university offices. All interviews were audio recorded and took place on a voluntary, unpaid basis. I moderated the discussions in Russian and participants spoke Russian and/or Kazakh according to preference. Depending on the participants’ interest in the topic and their availability, the focus groups and individual interviews lasted between 10 and 55 minutes.

were instructed to organise small (2-3 participants) focus groups and individual interviews.

Furthermore, to take into account the possible biases that might derive from Goodhart's differentiation between the rooted "somewheres" and cosmopolitan "anywheres", the interviews were divided further into those *disadvantaged* and *advantaged* by globalisation. In line with the existing literature, participants who are *advantaged* by globalisation were defined as entrepreneurs and qualified employees working in sectors open to international competition and are in the process of obtaining or already hold a university degree (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6). In contrast, participants who are *disadvantaged* by globalisation were identified as less educated entrepreneurs and employees working in local, traditional sectors that do not face international competition (for example butcher, baker, salesperson in a local shop, primary school teacher in a local school).²⁴ This separation into the *advantaged* and *disadvantaged* of globalisation aimed to make participants feel more comfortable saying what they think or feel while talking about their experiences with the processes of globalisation because they are with those in a similar position to themselves. This assumption proved to be correct in the field.

Finally, to control for the previously discussed urban versus rural divide (for more details see Chapter One), interviews in five different regions of Kazakhstan were conducted: in Astana²⁵ and Almaty, the two most "globally connected and modern cities in [contemporary] Kazakhstan (...)" (Blum 2016: 67f); in the more Russified northern, less globalised and more rural city of Kostanay; in its southern counterpart the less globalised and rural city of Shymkent; and finally in Aktau, which due to its geographical position on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea is now a centre for oil and, gas fields and therefore, is more exposed to foreign labour and expats working in the oil and gas sector than the four other cities.

²⁴ In the case of Kazakhstan, it seems sensible to exclude participants' salary as a criterion, mainly because respondents who work for a company which faces international competition and are therefore in daily contact with foreign companies still might earn less than the average Kazakh salary (USD 549 in 2014: <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russians-average-salary-on-par-with-kazakhstan-52985>, last accessed 8 September 2020)

²⁵ The capital city of Kazakhstan was renamed in March 2019 to Nur-Sultan, as a tribute to former leader Nursultan Nazarbayev, who resigned in the same month. However, since my respondents throughout the interviews openly voiced their disapproval of this 'overnight' renaming and refrained from using the new name Nur-Sultan, I have used the capital's old name Astana.

Overall, 34 focus groups and 38 semi-structured individual interviews featuring a total of 137 interview participants were run. Thanks to the detailed criteria sheets the age distribution across respondents mirrors Kazakhstan's demographic composition, namely that almost half of the Central Asian republic's population was born after 1991 (Laruelle 2019: 2; Skalamera 2020: 164): 67 (40 female and 27 male) interviewees were between 18 and 30 years old, 32 (19 female and 13 male) respondents were between 31 and 43 years old and 37 (22 female and 15 male) belonged to the oldest age cohort (44 years old and above). In terms of gender distribution, 59.6 per cent of the respondents were female. This can still be considered acceptable, even though it is slightly higher than the official World Bank 2019²⁶ statistics for Kazakhstan (51.5 per cent of the population are women). Tables 4 and 5 below illustrate the total numbers of focus groups (FG) and semi-structured individual interviews (SI), as well as the location and date at which they were conducted. The status of respondents in terms of their likely relationship with globalisation is also included in the tables.

Table 4. Composition of focus groups and individual interviews in Kostanay, Almaty and Astana

Place	Date	Interview no.	Gender	Advantaged/ Disadvantaged	Participant no.
Kostanay	31.05.2019	SI1	Female	Advantaged	1
Kostanay	01.06.2019	FG1	Male	Disadvantaged	4
Kostanay	02.06.2019	FG2	Female	Disadvantaged	2
Kostanay	03.06.2019	FG3	Female	Advantaged	7
Kostanay	04.06.2019	FG4	Mix	Disadvantaged	4
Kostanay	05.06.2019	FG5	Male	Advantaged	2
Kostanay	07.06.2019	SI2	Female	Advantaged	1
Kostanay	09.06.2019	FG6	Mix	Advantaged	3
Kostanay	12.06.2019	SI3	Female	Advantaged	1
Kostanay	12.06.2019	SI4	Female	Disadvantaged	1
Almaty	16.06.2019	SI5	Male	Disadvantaged	1
Almaty	17.06.2019	FG7	Female	Advantaged	3
Almaty	17.06.2019	FG8	Female	Disadvantage	2
Almaty	17.06.2019	SI6	Female	Advantaged	1
Almaty	18.06.2019	SI7	Female	Advantaged	1
Almaty	18.06.2019	SI8	Female	Advantaged	1
Almaty	18.06.2019	SI9	Female	Advantaged	1
Almaty	20.06.2019	SI10	Male	Advantaged	1
Almaty	20.06.2019	SI11	Male	Advantaged	1
Almaty	20.06.2019	SI12	Male	Advantaged	1
Almaty	21.06.2019	SI13	Male	Disadvantaged	1
Almaty	24.06.2019	SI14	Male	Advantaged	1
Almaty	24.06.2019	SI15	Male	Advantaged	1
Astana	26.06.2019	FG9	Mix	Advantaged	3
Astana	26.06.2019	SI16	Male	Advantaged	1
Astana	27.06.2019	FG10	Female	Advantaged	2

²⁶ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS> (last accessed 8 September 2020)

Astana	28.06.2019	SI17	Male	Advantaged	1
Astana	29.06.2019	SI18	Male	Advantaged	1
Astana	30.06.2019	SI19	Male	Advantaged	1
Astana	01.07.2019	FG11	Male	Disadvantaged	4
Astana	01.07.2019	FG12	Male	Disadvantaged	4
Astana	01.07.2019	FG13	Female	Disadvantaged	3
Astana	02.07.2019	SI20	Female	Advantaged	1
Astana	03.07.2019	FG14	Mix	Advantaged	2
Astana	04.07.2019	FG15	Mix	Disadvantaged	2
Astana	04.07.2019	FG16	Female	Disadvantaged	4
Astana	04.07.2019	FG17	Mix	Disadvantaged	2
Astana	04.07.2019	SI21	Female	Advantaged	1
Astana	04.07.2019	SI22	Female	Advantaged	1
Astana	04.07.2019	SI23	Female	Disadvantaged	1

Table 5. Composition of focus groups and individual interviews in Shymkent and Aktau

Place	Date	Interview no.	Gender	Advantaged/ Disadvantaged	Participant no.
Shymkent	12.07.2019	SI24	Female	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	12.07.2019	SI25	Female	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	12.07.2019	FG18	Female	Advantaged	5
Shymkent	12.07.2019	SI26	Male	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	12.07.2019	SI27	Female	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	13.07.2019	FG19	Mix	Advantaged	4
Shymkent	13.07.2019	FG20	Male	Advantaged	3
Shymkent	13.07.2019	FG21	Male	Disadvantaged	2
Shymkent	13.07.2019	FG22	Female	Disadvantaged	4
Shymkent	13.07.2019	FG23	Female	Disadvantaged	2
Shymkent	14.07.2019	SI28	Female	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	14.07.2019	FG24	Male	Disadvantaged	2
Shymkent	14.07.2019	FG25	Female	Disadvantaged	2
Shymkent	14.07.2019	SI29	Male	Advantaged	1
Shymkent	14.07.2019	SI30	Male	Advantaged	1
Aktau	18.07.2019	SI31	Male	Advantaged	1
Aktau	18.07.2019	FG26	Female	Advantaged	2
Aktau	19.07.2019	FG27	Male	Disadvantaged	2
Aktau	19.07.2019	SI32	Female	Advantaged	1
Aktau	19.07.2019	FG28	Female	Advantaged	2
Aktau	19.07.2019	SI33	Male	Advantaged	1
Aktau	19.07.2019	SI34	Female	Disadvantaged	1
Aktau	20.07.2019	SI35	Female	Disadvantaged	1
Aktau	20.07.2019	SI36	Female	Disadvantaged	1
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG29	Male	Advantaged	2
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG30	Mix	Advantaged	2
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG31	Female	Disadvantaged	3
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG32	Male	Disadvantaged	2
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG33	Female	Disadvantaged	2
Aktau	20.07.2019	SI37	Male	Advantaged	1
Aktau	20.07.2019	SI38	Female	Advantaged	1
Aktau	20.07.2019	FG34	Mix	Advantaged/Disadvantaged	5

In short, furnishing my local “insiders” with a list of criteria proved to be a good strategy to capture the views of diverse social groups in Kazakhstan and showcase the previously neglected voices of the rooted “somewheres” in this study.

In the subsequent section, the interview questions which were used to capture Kazakhstanis' relationship to the different dimensions of globalisation and their perception of their national identity will be presented.

Capturing Kazakhstanis' relationship to globalisation

As I explained in the first part of this chapter, some kind of Person-Based Globalisation Index, as proposed by Caselli (2013: 5), may provide new perspectives and additional insights into the multidimensional concept of globalisation. As a result, and in contrast to the study's statistical component, the interview questions used in the second phase were intended to reveal both ordinary people's exposure to globalisation and their reaction to it.

Given the contested and complex nature of globalisation (see the debates on globalisation in Chapter One), I expected ordinary people in Kazakhstan to be unfamiliar with its meaning and, therefore, to barely use the term in their daily conversation. My field observations have shown that the term is frequently used in finance and trade newspapers but is mostly absent from respondents' everyday vocabulary. The results reported in Chapter Four, therefore, confirm my previous assumption. For participants to be engaged and feel relaxed and comfortable, they were slowly introduced to the complex topic and not initially asked questions about the phenomenon itself. Only at the very end of the interview, in order to shed light on the connotations of the term globalisation within the context of Kazakhstan, respondents were asked the following questions: "Have you already heard the word 'globalisation'?", "With what do you associate the term globalisation?", "Do you perceive globalisation to be something positive or negative?". Depending on the answer provided by respondents, follow-up questions such as, "Why do you think it is something positive or why is it something negative?", were formulated.

In 2017, 70 per cent of Kazakhstan's population were using social media platforms and online messaging apps in order to communicate and chat (Kosnazarov 2019: 254). It therefore seemed sensible to start the interview with questions concerning participants' activities on social and communication networks. As previously discussed in Chapter One, global cultural flows reaching people through social media networks and the internet can be expected to shape their

attachment to their national identity. In order to assess Kazakhstanis' exposure to and reactions to global culture on social media networks (as social and cultural forms of globalisation), the following questions were asked during the interview: "Do you use social media sites such as Facebook, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Twitter, Instagram?"²⁷, "Do you think it is good that people from different parts of the world can engage with people from Kazakhstan on social media networks?", "Are there times when these exchanges/interactions with foreigners on social media channels could be problematic?", "Do you think that cultural practices, values, customs and traditions in Kazakhstan may change through contact with foreign cultures via social media, or foreigners living and working in Kazakhstan?", "Do you think those changes in your culture (etc.) are something good or bad?" and "Do we have to do something to protect cultural practices in Kazakhstan?".

Since it is not only participants' exposure to and reaction to global culture online, but also their experience of being abroad that matters for people's national identity in Kazakhstan²⁸, participants were asked about the number of times they had been to more distant non-CIS countries, about their opinion of foreign tourists and whether they are exposed to foreign tourists in their work place or spare time.

In a second stage, questions assessing respondents' exposure to and evaluation of economic forms of globalisation were raised: "Do you think that it is good that foreign countries can invest in or even own their own business in Kazakhstan?", "Do you think it is good that foreigners can come and visit and even live and work in Kazakhstan?". Follow-up questions were formulated in light of the statements made by participants, such as which country they perceive to be the biggest investor in contemporary Kazakhstan. To capture respondents' exposure to foreign labour migrants and expats, observational data were collected during the interview.

Furthermore, since conducting research on the broader political system of Kazakhstan has its risks due to the sensitive nature of questions related to government and authoritarian governance, I avoided some of the more sensitive

²⁷ Based on the participant's answer, follow-up questions regarding usage, frequency and preference were asked.

²⁸ In his recent works on young returning migrants who had studied in the United States, Blum (2016: 137-144, 2019: 214-215) observes how young Kazakh women in particular begin to question their Kazakh mentality and cultural identity through their experience of new gender stereotypes overseas.

areas such as the nature of politics in the country.²⁹ One could therefore argue that I did not capture political forms of globalisation at all during my interviews in Kazakhstan. However, as the results in later chapters will reveal, this did not hinder interview participants from expressing their personal views about their leadership. By contrast, the country's youngest citizens especially felt quite comfortable sharing ideas about the political regime with me because they were not directly asked about their own political opinions. Thus, the fact that interviewees' answers addressing the soft-authoritarian government were the by-product of the respondents' own thought processes makes the study's findings with regard to the political dimension of globalisation even more valuable.

Finally, prior to the fieldwork, I had planned to capture respondents' perception of their national identity with the following question: "What does it mean to you to be a Kazakh in today's globalised world?". In the field this question had the following drawbacks. First, it presumed that any native Kazakh has to identify herself as ethnic Kazakh, which is not necessarily the case, as previous scholarship has shown (Blackburn 2019; Rees and Williams 2017; Sharipova 2019; Sharipova et al. 2017). Given the multi-ethnic make-up of Kazakhstan, the usage of the term Kazakh would have excluded all other ethnic groups (such as Russians, Belarusians, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and so forth), who live in the country and call it their home. Second, the term "globalised" had to be eliminated, mainly because among the wider public in Kazakhstan this term is rarely used (for more details see the previous section on globalisation). Thus, in the field the question had to be reformulated. First, respondents were asked if they identify themselves more as Kazakhstani or Kazakh and, based on their answer, the second question was changed accordingly: "What does it mean to you to be a Kazakh or a Kazakhstani in today's world?"

Of course, one could criticise the fact that limiting participants' choice of identification with Kazakhstani or Kazakh is not right either because there may be respondents who identify themselves neither as Kazakh nor as Kazakhstani. Nonetheless, as the chapters presenting the results will reveal, this

²⁹ Prior to fieldwork, ethical permission from the Oxford Brookes University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) was obtained on 8 November 2018, in order to guarantee the ethical protection of all interview participants.

predetermination of respondents' identity choice did not hinder interview participants from looking for other possible identity narratives (such as a world citizenship) to define themselves. For more details regarding the exact questioning schedule used in the focus groups and semi-structured interviews, please see the appendix^x.

Conducting 72 interviews is one task, coding and analysing them another. In the following section, the coding strategies that I employed are briefly outlined.

Coding process

Given the scale of the data gathered during my fieldwork, I began with the transcription of the interviews while I was still in the field. To begin with, each focus group and individual interview was transcribed separately, while respondents' answers were grouped according to the questioning schedule employed in an Excel sheet. Figure 2 below illustrates this stage for the small focus group 28, which was conducted with two female native Kazakh hotel interns in Aktau on 19 July 2019.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M
1	Date	Interview	Gender	Age	Ethnicity	Origin	Times Abroad	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5: So for yo	Q6	Q7
2	19/07/2019	FG28	F		20 Kazakh	Aktau	never	0217-0233 ф	0513-0535 д	0407-0415 ки	0612-0619 н	0706-0755 и	0940-я дума
3	19/07/2019	FG28	F		19 Kazakh	Aktau	never	0215- да кон	0539-0600 я	0418- 0500 н	0618-да есть	0800- 0900 э	1003-1106 д

Figure 2. Transcription stage of interview questions

When the initial stage of transcription was completed, respondents' answers were grouped according to their gender and generation (18-30, 31-43, 44+) in another Excel sheet. Simultaneously, the initial stage of coding, so-called "open coding" (Thornberg and Charmaz 2014: 156f), was initiated. First, the labelling of each interview question was changed to correspond with the relevant category of globalisation. For example, question 2 (Q2) was renamed Soc3 (social globalisation 3). For more details regarding the changed labelling for each interview question see table 6 below.

Table 6. Coding stage of interview questions

Assigned Label for Coding	Interview Question
Language (LANG)	Q4: Which languages do you use to communicate with other people on social media and in general?
Social Globalisation 0 (Soc0)	Q1: Tell us your first name or pseudonym, age, where you are from and how many times have you been abroad during the last year and in your whole life?
Social Globalisation 1 (Soc1)	Is respondent exposed to foreign tourists? (collected from observational data)
Social Globalisation 2 (Soc2)	Q7: Do you think it is good that foreigners can come and visit and even live and work in Kazakhstan?
Social Globalisation 3 (Soc3)	Q2: Do you use social media sides such as Facebook, VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Twitter, and Instagram?
Social Globalisation 4 (Soc4)	Q3: Do you think it is good that people from different parts of the world can engage with people from Kazakhstan on social media networks? Q5: Or are there times when these exchanges/interactions with foreigners on social media channels could be problematic?
Cultural Globalisation 1 (Cul1)	Q8: Do you think that cultural practices, values, customs and traditions in Kazakhstan may change through contact with foreign cultures via social media, or foreigners living and working in Kazakhstan?
Cultural Globalisation 2 (Cul2)	Q9: Do you think those changes in your culture are something good or bad?
Cultural Globalisation 3 (Cul3)	Q10: Do we have to do something to protect the cultural practise in Kazakhstan?
Economic Globalisation 1 (Eco1)	Q6: Do you think that it is good that foreign countries can invest or even own their own business in Kazakhstan?
Economic Globalisation 2 (Eco2)	Q7: Do you think it is good that foreigners can come and visit and even live and work in Kazakhstan?
Economic Globalisation 3 (Eco3)	Is respondent exposed to foreign labour migrants or expats? (collected from observational data)
Identity	Q11: Do you identify yourself more as Kazakhstani or Kazakh?
Narrative	Q12: What does it mean to you to be a Kazakh respectively Kazakhstani in today's world?
Globalisation (Glob1)	Q13: Have you already heard the word "globalisation"?
Globalisation (Glob2)	Q14: With what do you associate the term globalisation?
Globalisation (Glob3)	Q15: Do you perceive globalisation to be something positive or negative? Why do you think it is something positive or why it is something negative?

On the basis of the initial coding, the coding of respondents' reactions in terms of their exposure to the different dimensions of globalisation was undertaken in a second step. Green and red were chosen to visualise respondents' attitudes to social, cultural, economic and general globalisation. For example, if a respondent argued that it is good that people from different parts of the world can engage with people from Kazakhstan on social media networks, her answer for Soc4 was coded in green. However, if a person perceived her engagement with foreigners online as negative, her response was captured in red. The same coding strategy was applied to the other interview questions and their assigned dimension of globalisation.

The next step was to analyse interview participants' chosen identification. Initially, respondents' answers to the question, "Do you identify yourself more as Kazakhstani or Kazakh?", were grouped in three main categories, each including sub-categories. Respondents who identified themselves as Kazakhstani or Kazakh

were captured as “civic” or “ethnic”. However, if they preferred to think of themselves in global rather than national terms, their response was coded with “world”, for world citizenship. None of my respondents chose not to identify either as Kazakhstani, Kazakh or world citizens. Subsequently, individual comments and exchanges with regard to the question, “What does it mean to you to be a Kazakh or Kazakhstani in today’s world?”, were manually coded a second time, followed by “emotion coding” (where I applied codes accompanying emotion(s) to explore the personal experiences that were responsible for my respondents’ identity choice) and “versus coding” (where I assessed how my respondents’ chosen identity narrative influences their assessment of globalisation) (Saldaña: 2009: 86f, 94f) to probe participants’ underlying motivation and reasoning for their identity choice. As a result, six identity narratives (“State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity”, “Modern Kazakhstani Woman”, “Rural Kazakh identity”, “Anti-globalist Kazakh identity”, “Anti-elite Kazakh identity” and “World Citizen identity”) were inductively identified, as the findings in Chapter Five will reveal. Figure 3 below illustrates the outcome of the above-described coding process for focus group 28. For more details regarding a general overview for the different generations and gender, see tables A12-A17 in the appendix^{xi}.

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Aktau	FG28	Jul-19	KZ20 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG28	Jul-19	KZ19 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	no	yes	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman

Figure 3. Selective coding of national identity narratives

In order to explore the connotations of the expression “globalisation” in the context of Kazakhstan, the associations with the word “globalisation” cited by interview participants were coded and analysed in a separate Excel sheet. Again, interviews were split and respondents grouped according to their age and gender. If participants were familiar with the word “globalisation” prior to the interview, their answer to Q13 (now labelled as Glob1, see table 6 above) was coded with yes, and with no if they were unfamiliar with it. In line with their attitudes towards the different aspects of globalisation, respondents’ responses to Q15 (now labelled Glob3) were green if they perceived the phenomenon of globalisation to be something positive, and red, if they perceived it to be something negative. Finally, in order to capture

the most frequently cited association by respondents with the word “globalisation” (Q14 now labelled Glob2, see table 7 above), multiple themes and responses were initially mapped visually, before being grouped in five main categories (“Communication networks”, “Borderless world”, “Equation of globalisation with westernisation”, “Capitalist Economy”, “Global warming”), again each featuring sub-categories. The five main classifications and their subnarratives will be introduced and discussed in more detail when the results are discussed in Chapter Four. For now, figure 4 below presents the output of the described coding process for focus group 28. Again, for more details regarding the other individual and group interviews see tables A18-A23 in the appendix^{xii}.

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Aktau	FG28	Jul-19	KZ20 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	↔
	FG28	Jul-19	KZ19 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Capitalist economy

Figure 4. Selective coding of globalisation narratives

Conclusion

In summary, in this chapter I have sought to emphasise that both large-N statistical studies and case studies have their limitations. However, integrating them in a partially mixed sequential equal status design overcomes some of their weaknesses and allows the formulation of a more nuanced answer to my research question of how any aspects of globalisation influence ordinary citizens' perception of their national identity. Overall, a mixed-method approach has proven to be a sound strategy to incorporate the previously neglected voices of the rooted "somewheres" in my study.

As a result, the findings are presented in three different chapters: Chapter Three presents an analysis of statistical data arising from several longitudinal generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses employing survey data from three large cross-national surveys the EVS, ISSP and WVS to capture post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in the three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. The subsequent chapters (Chapters Four and Five) contrast these wider statistical trends with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in one of those former Soviet states, namely Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER THREE: GLOBALISATION IN THE POST-SOVIET WORLD

As outlined in Chapter Two, the first phase of the thesis seeks to assess first, whether a post-Soviet country's level of globalisation has an influence on citizens' perception of their national identity and second, whether a higher degree of globalisation affects ordinary former Soviet people's attachment to their national identity positively or negatively. These hypotheses were tested by conducting several longitudinal generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses in *R*.

As a case *sui generis*, the multilevel analyses observed the direct impact of each dimension of the KOF Globalisation Index (aggregated, economic, political, social and cultural) on the multidimensional dependent variable of national identity in a longitudinal framework (across three different decades: the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s). The study's statistical stage contains, on the one hand, a valuable and insightful contribution to the existing literature addressing the debate on nationalism and globalisation in the context of the post-Soviet world. On the other hand, the statistical approach employed contributes to the overall methodological debates on how to observe the impact of globalisation on national identities in general.

The chapter is divided into three parts: The first section presents the statistical trends obtained by (non-)longitudinal multilevel regressions assessing the impact of the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index on post-Soviet people's perception of their national identity for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s (where applicable). It highlights that globalisation can engender nationalist as well as globalist attitudes among university-educated citizens in the states of the former USSR in the 2010s. The subsequent part discusses the main trends identified for the other dimensions of globalisation economic, political, social and cultural – and predicts that especially political and cultural forms of globalisation affected national identities in post-Soviet societies in the 2010s. The chapter ends with a concluding remark that, drawing on the statistical analyses, aims to formulate an answer to the two hypotheses of the study and attempts to highlight the importance of mixed methods to assess the complex interrelation between the two phenomena of globalisation and national identity within the former Soviet space.

Influence of globalisation

Before the results of the longitudinal analyses are presented, a brief descriptive review of citizens' positions with respect to the different dimensions of national identity across the different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s is required.

75.9 per cent of the respondents in the pooled sample of the EVS 1990, 1999 and the WVS waves 2 and 3, who have expressed their level of pride in their nation, were either very proud or quite proud of their nation in the 1990s. These figures slightly increased but remained relatively stable over time: 82.9 per cent in the 2000s and 81.1 per cent in the 2010s. During the three decades both men and women displayed relatively high levels of pride in their nation (increasing from 75 in the 1990s to 88 per cent in the 2010s for women). In contrast to post-Soviet people's patriotic sentiments, their willingness to fight for their country slightly lessened over time. Whereas, in the 1990s, 81.5 per cent of all interviewees were willing to fight for their country, in the 2010s only 75.8 per cent were still willing to sacrifice their lives. Given the changed survey questions for *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* (for more details see Chapter Two) the descriptive figures for these two variables feature only one decade, the 2010s. Overall, irrespective of their country's level of globalisation almost 90 per cent of the respondents (89.7 per cent) embraced a national identity, whereas only 48.7 per cent simultaneously thought of themselves as world citizens in the same decade.

In short, the brief overview suggests that there is no clear pattern of relations between a post-Soviet republic's level of globalisation and its citizens' attachment to their national identity.

It therefore remains open to what extent former Soviet citizens' support of one of the dimensions of national identity is actually related to a post-Soviet republic's degree of globalisation. In order to shed light on this issue, several generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses were carried out in the preceding sections to examine the relationship between globalisation and the different dimensions of national identity across the three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

Individual-level data were used from the World Values Survey Waves 2 - 7, the European Value Study EVS 1990, 1999 and 2008 and the ISSP National Identity

III. For the critical independent variable at country-level globalisation the KOF Globalisation Index's aggregated measure of globalisation was employed. Since there may be other external factors that have had a crucial impact on former Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in addition to globalisation, additional macro-level variables such as a post-Soviet republic's level of *economic development*, *democracy* and *peace* were incorporated into the analyses.³⁰

In order to justify a multilevel analysis, the intraclass correlation (ICC) had to be computed in advance of the interpretation of the generalised logistic multilevel regressions. Overall, the proportion of the between-country variance at the country level is higher than 0.05 and therefore justify a multilevel analysis. For more details see the ICC values reported in each table.³¹

Willingness to fight

Table 7 below presents two multilevel models designed to test the two main hypotheses of this thesis (H1 and H2) with regard to the first dimension of national identity, *Willingness to Fight*. Thus, it seeks to assess whether globalisation has an influence on former Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their country (H1) and if globalisation makes people more willing to go to war for their country (H2), measured in the different decades of the 1990s and 2010s while controlling for a post-Soviet state's *economic prosperity*, level of *democratisation* and level of *peace*.

Both models in table 7 confirm the findings of previous studies (Ariely 2011: 545, 2012: 472; Bayram 2019: 773; Kunovich 2009: 586; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 39, 90) that the demographic variables of *female gender* and *urban* are negatively associated with respondents' willingness to fight for their country in the case of a war. Participants living in more urbanised areas seem less likely to be willing to go to war than their counterparts living in the countryside. This trend slightly increases

³⁰ Given the very small number of macro-level cases (15-23 post-Soviet countries) for the different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s we need to be cautious in drawing any definitive conclusions from the findings. The lack of a significant effect of globalisation (level-2 variable) on people's willingness to fight, level of pride or likeliness to embrace a nation citizen or world citizen identity (level-1 variable) might be due to the very small number of level-2 variables. By contrast, a significant correlation suggests that the effect might be even more pronounced in a regression that features a larger sample of macro-level cases.

³¹ The *screenreg()* function in the *R* package *texreg* (Leifeld 2013) was used to convert the *R* model outputs into text output tables.

from the $p < 0.05$ in the 1990s to the $p < 0.001$ level in the 2010s. Men are, generally speaking, more likely than women to be willing to fight for their nation in the case of a war, even once all other factors are controlled for. This trend is also highly statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for both decades. This finding may stem from the fact that, unlike women, men usually have to complete military service and as a consequence are more attuned than their fellow countrywomen to possible military threats to their country.

Table 7. Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their country in the 1990s and 2010s

williness to Fight:	1990s	2010s
Intercept	5.128 *** (0.921)	2.798 (1.743)
Gender (f)	-0.822 *** (0.042)	-0.841 *** (0.032)
Age: 30-49	0.215 *** (0.053)	-0.146 *** (0.041)
Age: 50-91	-0.352 *** (0.053)	-0.424 *** (0.041)
Education	0.045 (0.051)	0.128 *** (0.035)
Lower Middle class	-0.071 (0.060)	-0.161 *** (0.042)
Working Class	-0.304 *** (0.061)	-0.171 *** (0.042)
Urban	-0.098 * (0.041)	-0.329 *** (0.032)
Globalisation	-0.068 ** (0.023)	0.002 (0.033)
Economic Development	0.035 (0.035)	-0.030 (0.023)
Democracy	0.856 (0.999)	-0.931 (1.245)
Peace		0.042 (0.526)
AIC	16362.567	27548.185
BIC	16457.029	27654.974
Log Likelihood	-8169.283	-13761.093
Individual-level N	19377	27296
Macro-level N	15	21
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.101	0.102

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Despite that, the findings regarding the individual-level variables of *age* and *education* seem to contradict previous research findings on non-Soviet citizens' *Willingness to Fight* for their country (Ariely 2012: 472). Ariely finds that older, less educated people are more likely to go to war for their country than their better educated and younger fellow citizens. However, the results in table 7 show that, all other factors being equal, older participants (in their fifties or older) are less willing go to war for their country than younger generations (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for both decades). Again, one reason for this may be that, like women, older people are not conscripted into the military.

As regards *education*, unlike Western scholars' forecasts, post-Soviet people who have benefitted university education seemed more likely to be willing to fight for their nation in the case of war than their less-educated fellow citizens in the 2010s.

Another interesting finding is that in the 1990s respondents in their thirties and forties were significantly more willing to sacrifice their lives for their country than their fellow citizens in their teens and twenties. However, this trend was completely reversed in the 2010s, when post-Soviet citizens in their thirties and forties showed themselves to be less willing to fight for their country than the state's youngest citizens. A simple explanation for this reversed trend might be that the peace-loving youth of the 1990s grew older and in their thirties and forties were less willing to go to war than other generations. Furthermore, contrary to their Western fellow citizens, working-class people growing up within the former Soviet Union were less willing to go to war, all factors being equal (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level) in both decades.

While controlling for a former Soviet country's level of *economic prosperity*, degree of *democratisation* and *peace*, the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index is significantly and negatively correlated to respondents' willingness to fight for their country in a war scenario only in the 1990s. This trend is significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Apart from globalisation no other country-level variable seem to impact respondents' willingness to go to war in any of the three decades. In short, respondents who were living in a former Soviet country with a higher level of globalisation in the 1990s tended to be less willing to go to war for their country than their fellow citizens living in a former Communist country with a lower level of globalisation within the same decade. A similar trend as regards globalisation can be observed for the second national identity dimension, *Level of Pride*, as table 8 below demonstrates.

Level of pride

Table 8 below illustrates three models designed to test the two main hypotheses of this thesis (H1 and H2) with regard to the second dimension of national identity, *Level of Pride*. Thus, it seeks to assess whether globalisation influences former Soviet citizens' patriotic feelings for their country (H1) and if globalisation made

people prouder of their nation (H2) during the different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. In line with the results for respondents' willingness to fight, post-Soviet citizens growing up in a more globalised state of the former USSR were less proud of their nation than their counterparts living in a less globalised republic in the 1990s (significant at the $p < 0.01$ level). Apart from in the 1990s, globalisation seems to have had no direct influence on respondents' level of pride in their nation in the subsequent decades. In the 2000s, rather than a post-Soviet states' level of globalisation, it is its level of *economic development*, captured by the GDP per capita in PPP that seems to influence post-Soviet citizens' patriotic sentiments towards their country. Apart from these findings, a former Soviet country's level of *democracy* and level of *peace* seem to have no impact on respondents' level of pride in their nation in any decade.

Table 8. Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' level of pride in their nation in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s

Level of Pride:	1990s	2000s	2010s
Intercept	4.222 *** (0.696)	-0.599 (1.829)	6.764 ** (2.348)
Gender (f)	0.066 * (0.031)	0.075 (0.044)	0.157 *** (0.037)
Age: 30-49	0.170 *** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.101 * (0.049)
Age: 50-91	0.631 *** (0.042)	0.245 *** (0.059)	0.093 (0.050)
Education	-0.188 *** (0.038)	0.015 (0.049)	0.032 (0.044)
Lower Middle Class	-0.006 (0.046)	-0.064 (0.058)	-0.247 *** (0.054)
Working Class	-0.281 *** (0.047)	0.007 (0.062)	-0.315 *** (0.054)
Urban	-0.271 *** (0.032)	-0.291 *** (0.047)	-0.307 *** (0.042)
Globalisation	-0.061 ** (0.019)	0.070 (0.040)	-0.076 (0.043)
Economic Development	-0.018 (0.029)	-0.043 *** (0.009)	-0.001 (0.030)
Democracy	0.591 (0.735)	-3.090 (1.759)	0.021 (1.551)
Peace			0.486 (0.711)
AIC	25763.535	13865.428	20335.763
BIC	25861.155	13957.883	20444.361
Log Likelihood	-12869.768	-6920.714	-10154.882
Individual-level N	25209	16392	31373
Macro-level N	19	14	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.073	0.156	0.173

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

In addition to this, the findings in table 8 reaffirm the observations from recent work on the West that the demographic variables of *urban*, *education* and *age* are either negatively or positively associated with respondents' patriotic sentiments for their country. As regards *urban*, participants living in big cities seem to be less proud of their country than rural dwellers if we control for other variables. This trend is

highly statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for all three decades. As regards *education*, those post-Soviet people holding a degree were significantly less likely to be proud of their country than their less educated counterparts in the 1990s. This trend is highly significant at the $p < 0.001$ level. In the 1990s and 2000s respondents in their fifties and older voiced more patriotic sentiments towards their nation than the youngest age cohort of 18–29 years old. This trend is highly significant at the $p < 0.001$ level.

In contrast to women in Western countries (Ariely 2011: 545, 2012: 472; Kunovich 2009: 586; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 39, 90), women growing up within the former Soviet space seemed to feel prouder of their nation than their male compatriots in the 1990s and 2010s. Moreover, contrary to the dominant view in the West, working-class people tended to be less proud of their nation than respondents identifying themselves as middle class in the 1990s and 2010s (both significant at the $p < 0.001$ level). This finding is perhaps in line with the observation that working-class people in the post-Soviet world suffered more from the post-independent economic turmoil in the 1990s and continued to be disadvantaged by the capitalist world market in the 2010s. Contrary to the scholarships' prognosis on the post-Soviet space, increases in globalisation seem to weaken respondents' attachment to their national identity in the 2010s, as the results for the dependent variable of *Nation Citizen* in table 9 demonstrate (significant at the $p < 0.05$ level).

Nation versus world citizen

Table 9 below presents the output of two multilevel models designed to test the two main hypotheses of this thesis (H1 and H2) with regard to the third and fourth dimension of national identity, *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* for the decade of the 2010s while controlling for a post-Soviet state's *economic prosperity*, level of *democratisation* and state of *peace*. While post-Soviet citizens growing up in a more globalised state seem to be less likely to define themselves with their national community, higher levels of democratisation are positively related with their likeliness to identify as *Nation Citizens*. Both trends are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The results in table 9 reaffirm recent trends identified by scholarship on the West (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 96f, 259; Tamir 2019: 10) that found people

who describe themselves as working class are less likely to embrace world citizenship than their economically well-off fellow citizens. This trend is highly significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for the *World Citizen* variable in the decade of the 2010s. Despite that, in the 2010s a former Soviet person's social status seemed to have no influence on her choice to call herself a citizen of her nation.

Table 9. Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen and a world citizen identity in the 2010s

2010s:	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	4.930 (2.676)	2.466 (1.917)
Gender (f)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	0.086 (0.049)	-0.162 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.124 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.007 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.097 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Globalisation	-0.103 * (0.049)	-0.030 (0.035)
Economic Development	0.011 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.025)
Democracy	3.967 * (1.796)	0.872 (1.291)
Peace	1.117 (0.833)	-0.021 (0.598)
AIC	20136.386	39336.489
BIC	20245.710	39445.157
Log Likelihood	-10055.193	-19655.244
Individual-level N	33174	31544
Macro-level N	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.217	0.127

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Nevertheless, the results in table 9 confirm findings from recent research on the West that the demographic variables of *age* and *urban* are positively or negatively linked to respondents' likeliness to identify themselves as citizen of their nation. The results in table 9 show that, all other factors being equal, older participants are significantly more likely to associate themselves with their nation than their country's youngest citizens in the 2010s. This trend is highly significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for respondents in their fifties and above. In line with urban citizens in the West, respondents growing up in the former states of the USSR who live in

urban areas were less tempted to identify themselves with their national community than their counterparts living in the countryside during the decade of the 2010s (significant at the $p < 0.05$ level).

In support of the findings for the variable of *Nation Citizen*, the results in table 9 for the variable of *World Citizen* above demonstrate that *ceteris paribus*, affluent post-Soviet people in their teens and twenties were more likely to embrace a global citizenship than their older, economically less well-off counterparts. All trends are statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for the decade of the 2010s.

Furthermore, there seems to exist a gender divide for the variable of *World Citizen*. As the findings in table 9 show, compared with men, women seemed to be significantly less likely to define themselves in supranational/global terms in the post-Soviet world (this trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level) in the 2010s. Despite that, in the 2010s *female gender* does not act as a decisive criterion for a nationalist, at least according to the results in table 9 for the variable *Nation Citizen*.

Finally, the reported findings in tables 7 and 9 for the demographic variable of *education* highlight that, contrary to their counterparts in the West, some university-educated post-Soviet citizens saw themselves both as world citizens (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level) and as members of their nation (significant at the $p < 0.01$ level), and they were willing to engage in a war for their country (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level) in the 2010s. In doing so, the results for the individual-level variable of *education* add texture to our understanding of the effect under analysis, as they suggest that a person's liberal educational background is not a necessity for someone to embrace a world citizenship in the post-Soviet world.

Although globalisation generally had no impact on the *Willingness to Fight*, *Level of Pride* and *World Citizen* variables in the 2010s (see tables 7, 8 and 9 for more details), the interaction between *education* and *globalisation* had a negative or a positive effect in the same decade, as table 10 below shows. The fact that *education* and *globalisation* were positively correlated in the 2010s for the *World Citizen* and the *Level of Pride* variables and negatively correlated for the *Willingness to Fight* variable seem to suggest that globalisation may have engendered different identity scenarios among people of different educational background in the 2010s.

Table 10. Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *education* and *globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.677 (1.750)	7.114 ** (2.342)	4.923 (2.678)	2.689 (1.919)
Gender (f)	-0.839 *** (0.032)	0.155 *** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.101 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.144 *** (0.041)	-0.104 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.166 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.423 *** (0.041)	0.090 (0.050)	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.685 * (0.278)	-1.256 ** (0.447)	0.157 (0.400)	-0.725 *** (0.213)
Lower Middle Class	-0.157 *** (0.042)	-0.250 *** (0.054)	0.012 (0.053)	-0.185 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.172 *** (0.042)	-0.313 *** (0.054)	-0.007 (0.053)	-0.245 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.330 *** (0.032)	-0.305 *** (0.042)	-0.097 * (0.043)	-0.037 (0.027)
Globalisation	0.004 (0.033)	-0.081 (0.043)	-0.102 * (0.049)	-0.033 (0.035)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.029)	0.011 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.025)
Democracy	-0.919 (1.250)	0.012 (1.544)	3.967 * (1.796)	0.865 (1.291)
Peace	0.043 (0.528)	0.481 (0.708)	1.118 (0.833)	-0.023 (0.598)
Education*Globalisation	-0.008 * (0.004)	0.018 ** (0.006)	-0.000 (0.006)	0.013 *** (0.003)
AIC	27546.066	20329.420	20138.379	39320.890
BIC	27661.069	20446.372	20256.113	39437.918
Log Likelihood	-13759.033	-10150.710	-10055.190	-19646.445
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.103	0.171	0.217	0.127

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

Figure 5 below plots the predicted probabilities for the *Level of Pride*, *World Citizen* and *Willingness to Fight* dependent variables at different levels of globalisation for respondents who have obtained a university degree (green) and those who have not (red). As can be seen from the graph, overall post-Soviet people's patriotic sentiments towards their country remained very high in the 2010s (over 80 percent) irrespective of their educational background. This is consistent with the conjecture in table 8 that *university education* does not condition citizens' patriotic feelings for their country. Interestingly, at a certain level of globalisation (around 70 percent) people without higher education can be expected to become slightly less proud of their nation than university-educated respondents in the 2010s. At higher levels of globalisation people who have enjoyed some form of higher education are slightly prouder of their country (2 to 5 percentage points) than their less educated counterparts (see figure 5 below).




Figure 5. Predicted margins for the *Level of Pride*, *World Citizen* and *Willingness to Fight* variables at different levels of globalisation for (non)-university-educated post-Soviet people in the 2010s.

If we explore the relationship between *education* and *globalisation* for the dependent variable of *World Citizen* in table 10 visually (see figure 5 above), it becomes clear that increased exposure to different aspects of globalisation seems

to lessen post-Soviet people's likeliness to identify as world citizen, irrespective of their educational background. Overall, a higher level of globalisation did not seem to increase respondents' willingness to embrace a cosmopolitan identity in the 2010s. However, with growing levels of globalisation (higher than 55) less educated citizens' likeliness to embrace a world citizen identity seems to drop more drastically (from 75 to almost 55 percent) than university-educated respondents' likeliness to identify themselves as global citizen (which only drops from 75 to 65 percent). This explains why, as evident in table 9, the overall effect of *university education* was to boost post-Soviet people's likeliness to identify as world citizen in the 2010s.

Finally, the predicted margins for a post-Soviet citizen to be willing to fight for their country were very high (over 90 percent) for both people who have obtained a university degree and those who have not (see figure 5 above). With higher levels of globalisation university-educated citizens could be expected to become slightly less willing to go to war for their post-Soviet state. At the same time, higher levels of globalisation had an opposite influence on their less educated counterparts, who became more willing to fight for their country in the 2010s. Overall, however, the magnitude of this effect remains very small (3 percent) and seems to disappear at higher levels of globalisation.

Despite that, there are no noteworthy interaction effects between *urban* or *gender* and *globalisation*, as table A24^{xiii}, and table A25^{xiv} in the appendix reveal.

In short, we have to be very careful in drawing any final conclusions from the cross-level interaction effects in table 10 because the visualisation of those cross-level interaction terms in figure 5 showed that, overall, higher levels of globalisation can be expected to lessen both post-Soviet citizens' level of pride in their country and their likeliness to embrace a world citizen identity, irrespective of their educational background.

Nonetheless, the visualisation also highlights that those trends were slightly less pronounced among university-educated people in the 2010s. Drawing on that background, we can expect that some university-educated post-Soviet citizens did tend to be "winners" of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922) and as a result were more likely to identify as world citizens in more globalised societies than their counterparts living in less globalised republics of the former Soviet Union (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, see table 10). However, the cross-level interaction terms may

also suggest that some cosmopolitan “anywheres”, through contact with different forms of globalisation, became both prouder of their nation and more likely to embrace world citizenship in the 2010s. Thus, embracing globalisation did not necessarily lead university-educated people to shed their national identity in post-Soviet societies. In contrast, some of them may have embraced a dual identity that embodies both patriotism and cosmopolitanism.

In summary, the evidence presented here suggests that globalisation had a negative impact on post-Soviet citizens’ perception of their national identity – and especially in the 1990s and the 2010s. However, in the 2010s in particular globalisation may have encouraged some “winners” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922) to embrace both patriotic and globalist sentiments. In the same period, however, a post-Soviet country’s level of economic prosperity and democracy had no noteworthy influence on national identities in post-Soviet societies.

In this context the question arises if well-educated post-Soviet peoples’ twofold or dual identity choice was influenced by their encounter with different forms of globalisation in the 2010s. In order to shed light on this question, it seems sensible to separate the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index into the following dimensions; economic, political, social and cultural. The subsequent section discusses the outputs for each dimension of the KOF Globalisation Index and in doing so emphasises that especially political and cultural forms of globalisation seem to play an important role for people’s national identity in the post-Soviet world.

Different forms of globalisation

In replacing the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its different dimensions, the generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses in this final section seek to confirm or challenge trends, identified in the previous part. In doing so, they also aim to find out what forms of globalisation are responsible for respondents' choice to be a nationalist or globalist, while controlling for a post-Soviet country's economic prosperity, state of peace and level of democratisation.

Again, for all multilevel models the proportion of the between-country variance (ICC) at the country level is higher than 0.05 and therefore seems to justify a multilevel analysis. The overall findings suggest that political and sociocultural forms of globalisation in particular do have an impact on post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity.

Economic forms of globalisation

Table 11 below shows the results obtained by repeating the generalised logistic multilevel regressions shown in table 8 for the dependent variable of *Level of Pride*, but this time replacing the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its measurement of economic globalisation as an independent variable at country level. Similar to the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index in table 8, the results in table 11 highlight that in the 2000s respondents living in a more economically prosperous country tended to be less proud of their nation, than their counterparts residing in a less economically developed post-Soviet republic (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level).

Despite that, while controlling for economic globalisation the other independent macro-level variable of *democracy* is significantly negatively related to respondents' level of pride in their nation in the 2010s. This trend is significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Post-Soviet citizens residing in more democratic states are, therefore, less proud of their nation than their counterparts living in a more authoritarian setting. This finding seems to suggest that after the geopolitical turmoil of the 1990s, which led some post-Soviet states to adopt democratic reforms, higher levels of democratisation have not fulfilled peoples' dream of a more just and fair

society and therefore have led people to adopt more critical stances towards their country.

Table 11. Multilevel analyses for the direct effect of economic globalisation on respondents' level of pride in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s

Level of Pride:	1990s	2000s	2010s
Intercept	2.429 ** (0.749)	0.952 (1.570)	2.805 (2.214)
Gender (f)	0.065 * (0.031)	0.075 (0.044)	0.157 *** (0.037)
Age: 30-49	0.170 *** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.101 * (0.049)
Age: 50-91	0.630 *** (0.042)	0.246 *** (0.059)	0.092 (0.050)
Education	-0.187 *** (0.038)	0.014 (0.049)	0.031 (0.044)
Lower Middle Class	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.065 (0.058)	-0.247 *** (0.054)
Working Class	-0.279 *** (0.047)	0.005 (0.062)	-0.317 *** (0.054)
Urban	-0.271 *** (0.032)	-0.291 *** (0.047)	-0.310 *** (0.042)
Economic Globalisation	-0.005 (0.023)	0.033 (0.032)	0.027 (0.026)
Economic Development	-0.063 (0.035)	-0.040 *** (0.009)	-0.040 (0.022)
Democracy	-0.691 (1.518)	-1.681 (1.527)	-3.182 * (1.389)
Peace			0.094 (0.692)
AIC	25772.106	13867.178	20337.783
BIC	25869.726	13959.633	20446.381
Log Likelihood	-12874.053	-6921.589	-10155.892
Individual-level N	25209	16392	31373
Macro-level N	19	14	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.111	0.173	0.182

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

In addition to this, I also ran models utilising the KOF Globalisation Index's measurement for economic globalisation for the dependent individual-level variables of *Willingness to Fight* (see table A26 in the appendix)^{xv}, *Nation Citizen* and *World citizen* (see table 12 below). The findings in tables A26 and 12 demonstrate that a post-Soviet country's increased level of economic globalisation does not correlate with respondents' willingness to go to war or their likeliness to identify themselves as a nation citizen or world citizen in any decade.

Rather than increases in economic interconnectedness, it was increases in a post-Soviet country's level of economic development that seemed to lessen respondents' likeliness to embrace a cosmopolitan identity to a statistically significant level (at p<0.01) in the decade of the 2010s (see table 12 below).

Table 12. Multilevel models for the direct effect of economic globalisation on respondents' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen and world citizen identity in the 2010s

2010s:	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.300 (2.686)	3.105 (1.688)
Gender (f)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	0.086 (0.049)	-0.162 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.123 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Economic Globalisation	-0.019 (0.031)	-0.035 (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.043 ** (0.017)
Democracy	1.740 (1.681)	1.375 (1.064)
Peace	0.505 (0.847)	-0.231 (0.533)
AIC	20140.057	39334.167
BIC	20249.381	39442.836
Log Likelihood	-10057.028	-19654.083
Individual-level N	33174	31544
Macro-level N	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.246	0.116

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Thus, people growing up in an economically prosperous post-Soviet state could be expected to be less likely to identify as world citizens in the 2010s. In line with the direct influence of economic globalisation, there are no noteworthy interaction effects between *urban*, *education* or *gender* and *economic globalisation*, as table A27^{xvi}, table A28^{xvii} and table A29^{xviii} in the appendix reveal.

Overall, the analysis in this section has highlighted that economic globalisation does not play a very decisive role for post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in any decade.

Political forms of globalisation

Contrary to economic forms of globalisation, political forms of globalisation do exert an influence on post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their country. Similar to the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index in table 7, the results in table A30^{xix} for the dependent variable of *Willingness to Fight* highlight that political forms of globalisation are negatively correlated with post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight in the 1990s while all other individual- and macro-level factors are controlled. This

trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. People growing up in a post-Soviet state that was more politically globalised, were less willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation in a war scenario in the 1990s.

Furthermore, increases in political interconnectedness appear to lessen former Soviet people's patriotic sentiments for their nation drastically in the 1990s and 2010s, as table 13 below demonstrates. This trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for both decades. Table 13 below presents the results of the same generalised logistic multilevel regression analyses described in table 8 for the dependent national identity variable of *Level of Pride*, if we substitute the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its measure for political globalisation.

Table 13. Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on respondents' level of pride in their nation in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s

Level of Pride:	1990s	2000s	2010s
Intercept	3.407 *** (0.447)	2.338 * (1.115)	5.232 *** (1.553)
Gender (f)	0.066 * (0.031)	0.075 (0.044)	0.157 *** (0.037)
Age: 30-49	0.171 *** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.101 * (0.049)
Age: 50-91	0.632 *** (0.042)	0.246 *** (0.059)	0.093 (0.050)
Education	-0.188 *** (0.038)	0.014 (0.049)	0.031 (0.044)
Lower Middle Class	-0.005 (0.046)	-0.065 (0.058)	-0.247 *** (0.054)
Working Class	-0.280 *** (0.047)	0.006 (0.062)	-0.315 *** (0.054)
Urban	-0.271 *** (0.032)	-0.291 *** (0.047)	-0.306 *** (0.042)
Political Globalisation	-0.026 *** (0.007)	0.002 (0.017)	-0.066 *** (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.041 *** (0.009)	0.019 (0.024)
Democracy	-1.388 ** (0.521)	-0.552 (1.126)	-1.019 (0.860)
Peace			1.015 (0.629)
AIC	25760.671	13868.205	20328.660
BIC	25858.290	13960.660	20437.258
Log Likelihood	-12868.335	-6922.103	-10151.330
Individual-level N	25209	16392	31373
Macro-level N	19	14	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.063	0.184	0.130

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

When replacing the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its index of political forms of globalisation, higher levels of *democracy* are significantly and negatively correlated with post-Soviet citizens' level of pride in their nation in the 1990s. This trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Contrary to the assumed lost faith in democratic values by people in the 2010s, higher levels of *democracy* were often associated with chaos by older people in the 1990s who

resented the collapse of the USSR. Thus, some citizens living in more democratised states might have been influenced by feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union, when asked about their level of pride, rather than patriotic sentiments for their newly independent state in the 1990s.

In line with the reported findings in table 9 for the dependent variable of *Nation Citizen*, increases in political interconnectedness seemed to have weakened respondents' likeliness to identify with their national community in the decade of the 2010s, as the results in table 14 below reveal. This trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level. Thus, people living in a more politically globalised state of the former USSR tended to be less likely to identify themselves with their nation than those living in a less politically interconnected country.

Table 14. Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen and a world citizen identity in the 2010s

2010s:	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.428 (2.019)	1.458 (1.546)
Gender (f)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	0.086 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.123 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.098 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Political Globalisation	-0.065 ** (0.025)	-0.001 (0.019)
Economic Development	0.016 (0.031)	-0.045 (0.024)
Democracy	2.164 (1.135)	0.019 (0.860)
Peace	1.499 (0.836)	-0.184 (0.634)
AIC	20134.118	39337.186
BIC	20243.441	39445.855
Log Likelihood	-10054.059	-19655.593
Individual-level N	33174	31544
Macro-level N	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.202	0.130

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Finally, while political forms of globalisation do not exert any direct influence on post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight nor on their likeliness to embrace a world citizen identity in the 2010s (for more details please see table A30 in the appendix and table 14 above), the interaction effect between *education* and *political globalisation* suggest that some university-educated post-Soviet citizens through contact with political forms of globalisation indeed thought of themselves in global

rather than national terms and were less willing to go to war for their country in the 2010s, as table 15 below shows. This trend is highly statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level for the *World Citizen* and at the $p < 0.01$ level for the *Willingness to Fight* variable.

Table 15. Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *education* and *political globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.889 *	5.160 ***	2.331	1.653
	(1.340)	(1.558)	(2.022)	(1.541)
Gender (f)	-0.839 ***	0.157 ***	0.052	-0.100 ***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.144 ***	-0.101 *	0.086	-0.165 ***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.426 ***	0.092	0.294 ***	-0.234 ***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Education	0.660 ***	0.315	0.505	-0.556 ***
	(0.192)	(0.300)	(0.264)	(0.154)
Lower Middle Class	-0.156 ***	-0.246 ***	0.013	-0.185 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.009	-0.244 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Urban	-0.332 ***	-0.307 ***	-0.099 *	-0.036
	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Political Globalisation	-0.007	-0.065 ***	-0.064 **	-0.003
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Economic Development	-0.022	0.018	0.016	-0.045
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Democracy	-0.708	-1.021	2.164	0.026
	(0.789)	(0.862)	(1.136)	(0.859)
Peace	0.170	1.014	1.500	-0.184
	(0.548)	(0.630)	(0.837)	(0.633)
Education*Political Globalisation	-0.007 **	-0.004	-0.005	0.010 ***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
AIC	27541.875	20329.745	20133.957	39316.802
BIC	27656.878	20446.696	20251.690	39433.830
Log Likelihood	-13756.937	-10150.872	-10052.978	-19644.401
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.131	0.203	0.131

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

In line with the findings in figure 5, the visualisation of the cross-level interaction term between *education* and *political globalisation* for the *Willingness to Fight* variable in figure 6 below highlights that overall, more than 90 percent of respondents were very willing to go to war for their former Soviet country in the 2010s, irrespective of their educational background. Whereas in less globalised states, university-educated people were marginally more likely to go to war than their less educated counterparts (less than 2 percentage points). However, this margin between university-educated and less educated respondents seems to almost disappear in more globalised post-Soviet countries in the same decade.

In contrast to the predicted margins in figure 5, which found higher levels of globalisation to lessen post-Soviet people's likeliness to identify as world citizen,

irrespective of their acquired level of education, exposure to higher levels of political forms of globalisation seem to increase university-educated citizens' willingness to embrace a cosmopolitan identity in the 2010s (see figure 6 below). People who have obtained some form of higher education are up to 5 percentage points more likely to report a world citizen identity than their less educated fellow citizens in post-Soviet states that are more politically interconnected/globalised. The magnitude of this effect is thus not huge, but explains why, as evident in table 9, the overall effect of *university education* was to raise post-Soviet people's likeliness to identify as world citizens in the 2010s.




Figure 6. Predicted margins for the *Willingness to Fight* and *World Citizen* variables at different levels of political globalisation for (non)-university-educated post-Soviet people in the 2010s

However, it is not only respondents' educational background that might influence their response to different aspects of political globalisation, also their *gender* seems to play an important role, as the cross-level interaction terms between

gender and *political globalisation* for the variables of *World Citizen*, *Willingness to Fight* and *Nation Citizens* in table 16 below illustrates. Women through their contact with political forms of globalisation seem to become more willing to fight for their country (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level), more likely to identify themselves with their national community (significant at the $p < 0.05$ level) and simultaneously more likely to embrace a cosmopolitan identity (significant at the $p < 0.05$ level). These relationships seem to suggest that political globalisation may have engendered different identity scenarios among men and women in the 2010s.

Table 16. Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *gender* and *political globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	3.433 * (1.346)	5.479 *** (1.561)	2.698 (2.027)	1.630 (1.545)
Gender (f)	-1.458 *** (0.178)	-0.294 (0.265)	-0.427 (0.233)	-0.395 ** (0.137)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 *** (0.041)	-0.102 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.426 *** (0.041)	0.091 (0.050)	0.294 *** (0.050)	-0.239 *** (0.033)
Education	0.124 *** (0.035)	0.030 (0.044)	0.120 ** (0.044)	0.159 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.163 *** (0.042)	-0.248 *** (0.054)	0.009 (0.053)	-0.181 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.176 *** (0.042)	-0.317 *** (0.054)	-0.012 (0.053)	-0.247 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.328 *** (0.032)	-0.307 *** (0.042)	-0.097 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Political Globalisation	-0.014 (0.017)	-0.069 *** (0.019)	-0.068 ** (0.025)	-0.003 (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.022 (0.021)	0.019 (0.024)	0.016 (0.031)	-0.045 (0.024)
Democracy	-0.701 (0.790)	-1.018 (0.861)	2.165 (1.137)	0.018 (0.860)
Peace	0.173 (0.548)	1.015 (0.629)	1.500 (0.838)	-0.184 (0.634)
Gender*Political Globalisation	0.008 *** (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.006 * (0.003)	0.004 * (0.002)
AIC	27537.349	20327.708	20131.787	39334.305
BIC	27652.352	20444.660	20249.521	39451.333
Log Likelihood	-13754.674	-10149.854	-10051.894	-19653.153
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.130	0.203	0.131

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Figure 7 below plots the predicted probabilities for the *Nation Citizen*, *Willingness to Fight* and *World Citizen* variables at different levels of political globalisation for men (red) and women (green) in the post-Soviet space for the decade of the 2010s. Overall exposure to higher levels of political globalisation can be anticipated to lessen both women and men's attachment to their national identity. Post-Soviet citizens became both less willing to fight for and less likely to identify

themselves with their national community through contact with increased levels of political globalisation irrespective of their gender.




Figure 7. Predicted margins for the *Nation Citizen*, *Willingness to Fight* and *World Citizen* variables at different levels of *political globalisation* for men and women in the post-Soviet space in the 2010s

Despite that, regardless of the level of political globalisation people were exposed to, women were almost 10 percentage points less likely to be willing to go

to war for their post-Soviet country than their male peers. This finding is consistent with the conjecture in table 7 that found *female gender* to weaken post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their country in the 2010s. The low margins (maximum 3 percentage points) between female and male citizens' likeliness to identify as nation citizens at different levels of political globalisation support the evidence presented in table 9 that *female gender* did not act as a decisive criterion for a former Soviet citizen to embrace a nation citizen identity in the 2010s.

Moreover, the margins in figure 7 above reaffirm the findings in table 9 that overall men were slightly more likely (5 percentage points) to embrace a cosmopolitan identity in less globalised post-Soviet republics than their female fellow citizens in the 2010s. However, this magnitude effect disappears with a higher level of political globalisation. Whereas men, through their contact with increased political globalisation, became slightly less likely to identify as world citizens, the same forms of globalisation seemed to have a reverse effect on women's perception of their national identity. Women growing up in the post-Soviet space started to develop a greater cosmopolitan awareness through their contact with increased political globalisation in the 2010s.

Finally, there are no significant cross-level interaction terms between *urban* and *political globalisation* to investigate, as table A31^{xx} in the appendix reveals.

In summary, the evidence presented here supports the hypothesis that some post-Soviet citizens – and women and university-educated people in particular – can be expected to develop a more critical approach towards their own nation through the increased contact with political forms of globalisation in the 2010s and consequently a weaker attachment to their national identity.

Social forms of globalisation

In contrast to political forms of globalisation that seemed to weaken post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in the 2010s, social forms of globalisation had a reverse effect on respondents' level of pride in their nation in the 2000s, as the results in table 17 below for the individual-level dependent variable of *Level of Pride* illustrate. Unlike political forms of globalisation in the 2010s, the macro-level variable of social globalisation is significantly and positively related to

peoples' patriotic feelings towards their nation in the 2000s, all other individual- and macro-level factors being equal. Thus, participants residing in a more socially globalised state of the former Soviet Union were prouder of their nation than their fellow citizens living in a less socially interconnected successor state. This trend is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

Table 17. Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on respondents' level of pride in their nation in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s

Level of Pride:	1990s	2000s	2010s
Intercept	2.031 (1.196)	-0.990 (1.374)	6.374 * (2.558)
Gender (f)	0.065 * (0.031)	0.075 (0.044)	0.157 *** (0.037)
Age: 30-49	0.170 *** (0.039)	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.101 * (0.049)
Age: 50-91	0.631 *** (0.042)	0.245 *** (0.059)	0.092 (0.050)
Education	-0.187 *** (0.038)	0.014 (0.049)	0.032 (0.044)
Lower Middle Class	-0.004 (0.046)	-0.064 (0.058)	-0.247 *** (0.054)
Working Class	-0.279 *** (0.047)	0.006 (0.062)	-0.315 *** (0.054)
Urban	-0.271 *** (0.032)	-0.291 *** (0.047)	-0.308 *** (0.042)
Social Globalisation	0.010 (0.043)	0.077 ** (0.029)	-0.060 (0.047)
Economic Development	-0.066 (0.041)	-0.046 *** (0.009)	-0.006 (0.033)
Democracy	-1.362 (1.651)	-3.155 * (1.305)	-0.309 (1.731)
Peace			0.304 (0.714)
AIC	25772.105	13862.424	20337.127
BIC	25869.724	13954.878	20445.725
Log Likelihood	-12874.052	-6919.212	-10155.563
Individual-level N	25209	16392	31373
Macro-level N	19	14	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.111	0.128	0.181

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

When replacing the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its index of social forms of globalisation, higher levels of *economic development* and *democracy* are significantly and negatively correlated with post-Soviet citizens' level of pride in their nation in the 2000s. This finding partially supports the results in table 13 for the decades of 1990s and 2000s for the same national identity dimension.

Despite that, social forms of globalisation seem to exert no impact on respondents' willingness to fight for their nation nor on their likeliness to embrace a *Nation Citizen* or *World Citizen* identity in any decades. For more details please see table A32^{xxi} for the dependent variable of *Willingness to Fight* and table A33^{xxii} for the dependent variables of *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen* in the appendix. Increases in social interconnectedness, therefore, seem to affect only post-Soviet

citizens' level of pride in their country during the decade of the 2000s. The extent to which previously unknown social practices may boost nationalistic or patriotic feelings among citizens in the former USSR in the 2010s remains partly unanswered by the reported results in table 17.

However, although social forms of globalisation had no direct impact on the *World Citizen* and *Level of Pride* variables in the 2010s, the interaction effect between the demographic variable of *education* and the independent variable of *social globalisation*, had a positive effect in the same decade, as table 18 below shows. These findings support the evidence presented in table 10 for the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index as they highlight that the influence of globalisation on the way university-educated people, so-called “winners” of globalisation, perceive their identity is complex. Through contact with social forms of globalisation some well-educated individuals identified themselves both as cosmopolitan (they became more likely to embrace a world citizen identity, significant at the $p < 0.05$ level) and expressed a strong sense of attachment to the nation (they became prouder of their nation, significant at the $p < 0.001$ level).

Table 18. Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *education* and *social globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.329 (1.839)	6.793 ** (2.547)	1.821 (3.110)	0.757 (2.048)
Gender (f)	-0.839 *** (0.032)	0.154 *** (0.037)	0.049 (0.038)	-0.100 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.145 *** (0.041)	-0.105 * (0.049)	0.085 (0.049)	-0.164 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.423 *** (0.041)	0.089 (0.050)	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.570 * (0.263)	-1.516 *** (0.407)	-0.107 (0.359)	-0.421 * (0.203)
Lower Middle Class	-0.159 *** (0.042)	-0.249 *** (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	-0.182 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.172 *** (0.042)	-0.314 *** (0.054)	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.329 *** (0.032)	-0.306 *** (0.042)	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Social Globalisation	0.013 (0.034)	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.010 (0.057)	0.020 (0.038)
Economic Development	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.034 (0.040)	-0.058 * (0.027)
Democracy	-1.248 (1.331)	-0.318 (1.721)	1.313 (2.106)	-0.685 (1.402)
Peace	0.007 (0.513)	0.297 (0.710)	0.567 (0.882)	-0.287 (0.587)
Education*Social Globalisation	-0.006 (0.004)	0.022 *** (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.008 ** (0.003)
AIC	27547.163	20324.463	20141.974	39330.512
BIC	27662.166	20441.415	20259.708	39447.540
Log Likelihood	-13759.581	-10148.232	-10056.987	-19651.256
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.179	0.249	0.129

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

If we explore the relationship between *education* and *social globalisation* for the dependent variables of *World Citizen* and *Level of Pride* in table 18 visually (see figure 8 below), it becomes clear that increased exposure to different forms of social globalisation seems to lessen post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity, irrespective of their educational background. Through contact with social globalisation people become less proud of their country and more likely to develop a cosmopolitan identity.

Again, we must be cautious in drawing any final conclusions from these observations, because the predicted margins in figure 8 highlight that, even though social forms of globalisation can be anticipated to reduce respondents' level of pride in their post-Soviet country, overall the predicted margins for the variable of *Level of Pride* remain very high, never falling below 80 percent. This trend holds true for both less educated (red) and university-educated (green) people.




Figure 8. Predicted margins for the *Level of Pride* and *World Citizen* variables at different levels of social globalisation for (non)-university-educated people in the post-Soviet space in the 2010s

In contrast to the predicted margins in figure 5, but in line with the predicted margins in figure 6, people who have obtained some form of higher education are up to 3 percentage points more likely to report a world citizen identity than their less educated fellow citizens in more socially interconnected post-Soviet states. The magnitude of this effect is quite small but legitimises why the overall effect of *university education* was to boost post-Soviet people's likeliness to identify as world citizens in the 2010s. In short, the findings in figure 8 suggest that some university-educated citizens became both prouder of their nation and more likely to identify as world citizens through contact with social forms of globalisation.

Furthermore, whereas respondents' *gender* does not seem to interact with social globalisation (see table A34^{xxiii} in appendix), urban citizens, through their contact with social forms of globalisation, turned out to be less likely to embrace a nation citizen identity in the 2010s (significant at the $p < 0.01$ level), as the cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *social globalisation* in table A35^{xxiv} in the appendix suggests. However, if we explore this relationship visually (see figure 9 below), we learn that despite the fact that urban people (green) compared with rural citizens (red) might become slightly less likely to identify themselves with their national community at higher levels of social globalisation, the predicted margins for the *Nation Citizen* variable overall remain very high (over 90 percent) for post-Soviet citizens, regardless of the degree of urbanisation they are exposed to.




Figure 9. Predicted margins for the *Nation Citizen* variable at different levels of social globalisation for people living in urban and rural areas in the post-Soviet space in the 2010s

Thus, in the 2010s people living in both big cities and small villages were very likely to identify themselves with their national community (over 90 percent), irrespective of their post-Soviet country's level of social globalisation.

In summary, while increased social interconnectedness (i.e. social media platforms) boosted nationalist sentiment among the wider public in post-Soviet societies in the 2000s, in the 2010s the same forms of globalisation exerted a dual influence on some university-educated post-Soviet citizens, who identify themselves both as patriots and world citizens.

In contrast to social forms of globalisation, cultural forms of globalisation have a direct influence on respondents' willingness to fight for their country, their level of pride in their nation and their likeliness to embrace a world citizen identity in the 2010s, as the subsequent section reveals.

Cultural forms of globalisation

As table A36^{xxv} for the variable of *Willingness to Fight* in the appendix and table 19 below for the variable of *Level of Pride* show, post-Soviet people residing in a more culturally globalised country were less proud of their nation (significant at the $p < 0.01$ level) and less willing to sacrifice their for their nation in a war scenario (significant at the $p < 0.05$ level) than respondents living in a less culturally interconnected state of the former USSR in the decade of the 2010s. In line with political forms of globalisation (see table 13), increases in cultural interconnectedness appear to lessen former Soviet people's patriotic sentiments for their nation drastically in the 2010s, as table 19 below demonstrates.

Table 19. Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on respondents' level of pride in their nation in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s

Level of Pride:	1990s	2000s	2010s
Intercept	2.645 *	1.405	4.197 *
	(1.129)	(1.531)	(1.658)
Gender (f)	0.065 *	0.075	0.157 ***
	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.037)
Age: 30-49	0.170 ***	-0.032	-0.101 *
	(0.039)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Age: 50-91	0.630 ***	0.245 ***	0.093
	(0.042)	(0.059)	(0.050)
Education	-0.187 ***	0.015	0.032
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Lower Middle class	-0.004	-0.065	-0.247 ***
	(0.046)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Working class	-0.279 ***	0.006	-0.315 ***
	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Urban	-0.271 ***	-0.291 ***	-0.307 ***
	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.042)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.012	0.026	-0.071 **
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Economic Development	-0.051	-0.042 ***	0.021
	(0.043)	(0.009)	(0.029)
Democracy	-0.710	-1.420	1.243
	(1.110)	(1.607)	(1.534)
Peace			0.835
			(0.685)
AIC	25772.044	13867.673	20332.246
BIC	25869.664	13960.127	20440.844
Log Likelihood	-12874.022	-6921.836	-10153.123
Individual-level N	25209	16392	31373
Macro-level N	19	14	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.111	0.179	0.152

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

This trend also correlates with the findings in table 20 below for the variable of *World Citizen*. Table 20 presents the results obtained by repeating the generalised logistic multilevel regressions shown in table 9 once again, but this time replacing the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index with its measurement of cultural globalisation as an independent variable at country level while controlling for *economic development*, *democracy* and *peace*. In line with the findings for the *Level of Pride* and *Willingness to Fight* variables for the decades of the 2010s, increases in cultural interconnectedness seems to make post-Soviet citizens more likely to embrace a supranational/global identity. This trend is statistically significant at the p<0.05 level.

In short, despite the fact that cultural globalisation seems to have no direct impact on respondents' likeliness to identify with their national community (see table 20 below), generally speaking cultural forms of globalisation could be anticipated to lessen post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in the 2010s. Through contact with cultural globalisation, they become less proud of their nation,

less willing to fight for their country, but more likely to identify themselves as world citizens.

Table 20. Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen and a world citizen identity in the 2010s

2010s:	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	1.411 (2.257)	1.439 (1.388)
Gender (f)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	0.086 (0.049)	-0.162 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.123 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.040 (0.027)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.012 (0.035)	0.044 * (0.021)
Economic Development	-0.029 (0.039)	-0.083 *** (0.024)
Democracy	1.601 (2.065)	-2.127 (1.269)
Peace	0.663 (0.936)	-0.690 (0.576)
AIC	20140.295	39333.304
BIC	20249.619	39441.973
Log Likelihood	-10057.148	-19653.652
Individual-level N	33174	31544
Macro-level N	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.249	0.113

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Although cultural forms of globalisation seem to have no direct impact on former Soviet citizens' preference for embracing a *Nation Citizen* identity (see table 20 above), the cross-level interaction terms between *urban* and *cultural globalisation* for the *Nation Citizen* variable is significant, as table A37^{xxvi} in the appendix demonstrates. In line with the findings in table A35 in the appendix for social forms of globalisation, the interaction effect of *urban*cultural globalisation* has a negative impact on respondents' likeliness to identify as citizens of their nation in the 2010s. This trend is significant at the p<0.001 level and suggests that urban citizens living in a more culturally globalised country were less likely to embrace a nation citizen identity than their counterparts residing in less culturally interconnected successor states in the 2010s. This term is significant, consistent with the conjecture that urban citizens are less likely to identify themselves with their national community than their fellows in the countryside, as outlined in table 9.

Nevertheless, when plotted visually the influence of cultural globalisation on respondents' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen identity seems to be less significant. As the predicted margins for the *Nation Citizen* variable in figure A2^{xxvii} in the appendix demonstrate, in general post-Soviet citizens' likeliness to identify themselves with their country never dropped below 90 percent in the 2010s. This suggests that the magnitude of the cross-level interaction effect between *urban* and *cultural globalisation* on respondents' likeliness to identify as nation citizens was low.

Furthermore, the cross-level interaction terms between *education* and *cultural globalisation* for the *World Citizen* and *Level of Pride* variables are significant (see table A38^{xxviii} in the appendix). These findings in line with the evidence presented in table 10 for the aggregated KOF Globalisation Index and table 18 for social globalisation suggest that some university-educated citizens through contact with increased cultural globalisation became both more likely to identify themselves as world citizens (significant at the $p < 0.01$ level) and became prouder of their national community and in doing so developed a stronger attachment to their national identity in the 2010s (significant at the $p < 0.001$ level).

However, when explored visually (see figure 10 below), we learn that at higher levels of cultural globalisation post-Soviet citizens became less proud of their country and were more likely to embrace a world citizen identity, regardless of their level of education in the 2010s. The predicted margins for the *Level of Pride* variable drop very drastically from up to 99 to less than 70 percent with higher levels of cultural globalisation. Overall, university-educated post-Soviet people were only marginally prouder of their country than their less educated fellow citizens (maximum of 6 percentage points).

Similar trends seem to hold true for the predicted margins for a world citizen identity. In general, higher levels of cultural globalisation had a positive impact on respondents' likeliness to embrace a cosmopolitan identity in the 2010s, irrespective of their educational background. University-educated people were only slightly more likely (3 percentage points) to support a world citizen identity than their less educated counterparts. In short, the predicted margins in figure 10 reaffirm the trends identified in table 19 (illustrating the direct impact of cultural globalisation on the *Level of Pride* variable) and in table 20 (illustrating the direct impact of cultural

globalisation on the *World Citizen* variable) that cultural forms of globalisation can be anticipated to weaken post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity in the 2010s, regardless of their educational background.




Figure 10. Predicted margins for the Level of Pride and World Citizen variables at different levels of cultural globalisation for (non)-university-educated post-Soviet people in the 2010s

However, rather than the level of urbanisation a post-Soviet citizen was exposed to or their educational background it was a person's gender that distinguished a patriot from a world citizen in the 2010s, as the significant cross-level interaction term between *gender* and *cultural globalisation* in table A39^{xxix} in the appendix suggests.

Figure 11 plots the predicted probabilities of the *Willingness to Fight* variable at different levels of cultural globalisation for men (red) and women (green) in the post-Soviet space for the decade of the 2010s. The predicted margins for the *Willingness to Fight* variable in figure 11 below are consistent with the predicted

direct negative impact of cultural globalisation on respondents' willingness to fight in table A36 in the appendix. They also reaffirm the predicted margins for the same national identity variable at different levels of political globalisation in figure 7, in as much as they show that women through contact with cultural forms of globalisation were less willing to fight for their former Soviet country than men in the 2010s. In more culturally interconnected post-Soviet states women were up to 15 percentage points less likely to go to war for their country than their male fellow citizens. Higher levels of cultural globalisation can therefore be expected to somewhat weaken women's attachment to their national identity in the post-Soviet space.




Figure 11. Predicted margins for the Willingness to Fight variable at different levels of cultural globalisation for men and women in the post-Soviet space in the 2010s

In short, increased cultural interconnectedness lessens post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity, irrespective of their educational background or the level of urbanisation they were exposed to in the 2010s. The findings reported here, propose that women in particular through their contact with cultural forms of globalisation started to develop a weaker relationship to their national community.

In summary, the main findings of the exercise of replacing the macro-level variable of globalisation with its substitute for economic, political, social and cultural forms of globalisation are that increases in political and cultural interconnectedness can be expected to weaken the wider post-Soviet public's relationship to their national identity in the 2010s, lessening pride in their country and (in the case of political globalisation) identification as citizen of their nation as well. The interaction

effects introduced here find that women and university-educated people in particular, can be anticipated to develop a more critical approach towards their own nation through the increased contact with political globalisation (and to a less significant extent cultural globalisation).

At the same time, the evidence presented here highlights the fact that social forms of globalisation in particular can be anticipated to have a twofold influence on some university-educated post-Soviet citizens' perception of their identity in the same period. Some cosmopolitan "anywheres" may even have developed an integrated dual identity that embodies both patriotism and cosmopolitanism as a result of their exposure to social and cultural forms of globalisation. Others may have developed one of these two traits, but not the other.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evidence presented in this chapter provides support for the first hypothesis of my thesis, namely that different aspects of globalisation influenced former Soviet people's perception of their national identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR. However, the results from the longitudinal multilevel analysis demonstrate that the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies is not conclusive and may vary over time.

Over the three different decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s the generalised logistic multilevel regressions have shown that different aspects of globalisation exerts an influence on four dimensions of national identity; *Willingness to Fight*, *Level of Pride*, *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen*. Contrary to recent work on economic crisis scenarios, the geoeconomic turmoil in the region is not responsible for post-Soviet people's identity shifts in the early 1990s. Also the level of democracy and the degree of peace citizens are exposed seems to play a less decisive role for their identity choice as previously predicted. Therefore, globalisation seems to play an important (but not the only!) role for post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation in today's globalised world.

Despite that, the study's second hypothesis that former Soviet citizens through their engagement with processes of globalisation develop a stronger attachment to their national identity has to be rejected. The (non-)longitudinal findings demonstrate that the impact of globalisation on national identities in the states of the former USSR is anything but straightforward, as previously assumed. Apart from social forms of globalisation in the 2000s, other forms of globalisation seemed to lessen the wider public's level of pride in their nation in the 1990s and 2010s. Increases in cultural and political interconnectedness in the 2010s especially can be anticipated to weaken post-Soviet citizens' attachment to their national identity, this tendency being most marked in women and university-educated people in particular.

At the same time, the identified trends with regard to the interaction between *education* and *(social) globalisation* for the dependent variables of *Level of Pride* and *World Citizens* suggest two possible identity scenarios for university-educated post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity in the 2010s. First,

globalisation could be anticipated to exert a twofold influence on some university-educated people in the post-Soviet world. Some “winners” of globalisation, through their contact with its social forms especially, may have embraced this new social standards and developed a so-called world citizen identity (more likely to embrace a world citizen identity), whereas others reject them and begin to associate themselves more with their national group (prouder of their nation). However, an alternative explanation for these correlations is that some of these highly educated individuals embraced an integrated dual identity that embodied both nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the 2010s.

As a result, in contrast to forecasts by Western scholars, the reported findings suggest that a post-Soviet person’s embrace or rejection of a world citizen identity is not predetermined by her educational background. University-educated citizens in the post-Soviet world can be nationalists (see results for the variable *Nation Citizen* in table 9) and willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation in a war scenario (see the reported results for the variable of *Willingness to Fight* in table 7) in the 21st century. In doing so, the chapter questions the dominant Western discourse on what distinguishes a nationalist from a cosmopolitan mindset.

Although Goodhart’s (2017: 3) distinction of the rooted “somewheres” and the cosmopolitan “anyhweres” may not be directly convertible to the various former republics of the Soviet Union, the (non-)longitudinal findings on post-Soviet peoples’ identity choices ascertain some of the trends previously identified by Western scholarship. In line with their Western counterparts, post-Soviet respondents who describe themselves as members of the working class are less likely to embrace global citizenship. Furthermore, the multilevel results confirm the general assumption of previous Western statistical scholarship that older generations are prouder of their nation and *ceteris paribus* more likely to identify themselves with their national community than the country’s youngest citizens (18 – 35 years old) in the 2010s. Only post-Soviet youth, who unlike their parents and grandparents are more frequently exposed to some form of globalisation and have had a greater opportunity to study, travel and work abroad can be expected to develop a so-called world citizen identity in the 21st century. Thus, there seems to exist a clear generational gap between older generations and the post-Soviet youth’s attitudes towards cosmopolitan values.

Moreover, the roles of sex and gender also seem important for post-Soviet citizens' identity choice in the 2010s. As forecasted by previous studies on the USA and Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2019), Central and Eastern Europe (True 2003), but also by scholarship on Asia and the Pacific (Derné 2008; Puri 2008) some aspects of globalisation (e.g. in the form of changed cultural and political norms) can be anticipated to have a mixed impact on women's and men's identification with their nation in the former USSR. Increases in political and to a lesser extent in cultural interconnectedness can be expected to weaken women's attachment to their national identity in the 2010s.

In summary, despite the limitations of the applied approach (see Chapter Two for more details), the identified statistical trends in this chapter provide relevant insights into the interrelationship of globalisation and nationalism, as they indicate that globalisation— and political and cultural forms of globalisation in particular — can be anticipated to weaken the wider public's attachment to their national community. Simultaneously, the statistical results suggest that social forms of globalisation may interact in rather complex ways with university-educated people's perception of their identity in post-Soviet societies. They can be both world citizens and nationalists, and this dual identity is compatible with patriotic obligations. In contrast to the dominant Western view, rather than a person's educational background, a post-Soviet citizen's *age*, *gender* and *class* seem to act as an important predictor for a nationalist attitude.

Despite that, the statistical trends presented in this chapter remain somewhat ambiguous about the forms of globalisation that encouraged post-Soviet citizens to embrace or reject nationalist attitudes in the 2010s. Under those circumstances, a micro-case study in one of the observed former Soviet republics will enable us to tackle not only whether social, political, cultural or economic forms of globalisation are responsible for people's identity shifts in post-Soviet societies, but it might also shed light on the question whether and how cosmopolitanism and nationalism are compatible with each other in the post-Soviet world. The particular case study will also allow us to test whether post-Soviet youth embraces cosmopolitan values and is beginning to identify with the global rather than the local or national community. A case study might also clarify if cultural and political forms of globalisation are gender-neutral, or if they are associated with female empowerment or victimisation in a particular former Soviet republic.

Finally, a case study will also help us to better differentiate between former Soviet peoples' identity shifts that stem from their contact with the processes of globalisation and those that result from political, economic crises, wars and other alternative contextual circumstances. Such a micro-study will also demonstrate whether concepts such as internationalisation or westernisation are more appropriate to capture the increased cultural, social, political and economic interconnectedness than globalisation. For that purpose, Chapters Four and Five will confront the statistical trends identified in this chapter with the empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER FOUR: GLOBALITY IN POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN

To discuss the extent to which the statistical multilevel analysis findings relating to the impact of globalisation on former Soviet people's attachment to their national identity are echoed in the utterances of ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan, we need to grasp what Kazakhstanis understand by the term globalisation. The broad aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore the connotations of the expression globalisation within the context of Kazakhstan by discussing the three main associations cited by interviewees when asked to describe the term *globalizatsiya* (the Russian word for globalisation). As outlined in Chapter One, the country's image as a state that is well-amalgamated within the globalised world remains somehow controversial. In semi-authoritarian settings, it is open to debate to what extent globalisation is happening or if it remains a wishful illusion that the public believes to be true.

The chapter is broken down into three sections, presenting the three main narratives linked to globalisation by my respondents according to their frequency of occurrence: communication networks; capitalist economy; and equation of globalisation with Westernisation.

The first section demonstrates that although "networked-authoritarian" (Anceschi 2015: 282) strategies continue to dominate people's lives, globalisation is perceived to be real and to announce the beginning of a new epoch in contemporary Kazakhstan, especially since the launch of cheaper 3G and 4G mobile handsets and smartphones.

The second part shows that it is not only the revolution in communications technologies that Kazakhstanis associate with globalisation, but also other scientific innovations brought to them by their country's increasing participation in the capitalist world market.

Despite that, as the last section highlights, not all constitutive features of globalisation are equally welcomed. Particularly cultural forms of globalisation are rather viewed as Western erosion of Kazakhstan's local culture (westernisation) than a by-product of the increased global interconnectedness.

Communication networks

Given the complex and contested nature of the concept of globalisation, it is not surprising that 20 per cent of the respondents were unfamiliar with the term before joining the interview. Mirroring the trends of previous scholarship on Western countries (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 96f, 123, 259; Rooduijn 2015: 6), especially less educated interviewees living in the more rural provinces of South Kazakhstan, Kostanay and Mangystau (see figure 12 below), struggled to understand the concept. Most of them have spent their whole lives living and working in their local traditional communities that do not face international competition, and therefore can be expected to be less familiar with the term globalisation.



Figure 12. Mangystau (= coat of arms) emblem at Aktau's coast

Even though some of them may have heard or read the term globalisation before, the vast majority are unacquainted with its meaning, as the quote below from an interview with a Russian woman working at a local fish market in Aktau shows:

*"Of course, I have already come across the term [globalisation]. However, I first have to understand the extent to which it [globalisation] is positive and helpful for me. If I were working for a big [international] company, I would be more familiar with the concept. However, I work here [local fish market] and that is all. To me globalisation is as incomprehensible as the mysterious ways chosen by God."*³²

³² SI36 Russian, aged 48, Aktau

In clearly identifying herself as a fishmonger who sells her products on the local market, she draws the line between herself and her fellow citizens who are employed by firms that do participate in the international market. This excerpt emphasises that it is important to bear in mind that the socially less mobile parts of Kazakhstan's society barely make use of the term globalisation in everyday life, mainly because they are less exposed to its various forms.

Nevertheless, as the subsequent section demonstrates, there appears to be a generation gap. In Kazakhstan, where access to the internet has risen dramatically in the last decade, the country's youngest citizens seem to associate the term globalisation first and foremost with the image of a "borderless world" brought to them by the revolution in ICT ("borderless communication").

A borderless e-world

Since the wider public in Kazakhstan continues to lack the financial means to travel abroad, it does not seem surprising to the reader that the technological revolution of the internet, allowing ordinary citizens to communicate with people around the globe, without needing to physically cross borders (= borderless communication), is the most frequent association drawn with the term globalisation by my interviewees. 55 per cent of respondents linked the term globalisation with "borderless communication tools" ^{xxx}, such as the internet and online messaging apps. Innovative online communication tools, such as social media, are seen by those respondents not as side effects of globalisation, but rather as the phenomenon's main visible operating mechanisms in their country^{xxxi}, as the subsequent quote illustrates:

*"What do I associate with the term globalisation? The main driving force behind globalisation is the internet. Only the World Wide Web facilitates the global spread of both business and energy. Thanks to the internet you can basically start a business anywhere in the world. The same is true for energy. Oil is traded online worldwide nowadays."*³³

³³ SI13, male Kazakh, aged 31, Almaty

Although internet access in Kazakhstan seems recent, it has jumped from 3 per cent of the population in 2005 to 31 per cent in 2010, and since then has climbed to almost 80 per cent of the country. In eradicating all kind of frontiers between humans, online communication tools have led to the establishment of a “borderless e-world”^{xxxii} of e-commerce, e-friendship and e-mail in Kazakhstan. New online messaging services allow ordinary Kazakhstanis to easily reach out and keep in touch with their friends who live in other parts of the world, as the quotation below demonstrates:

“The internet is the advent of globalisation. It erases all kinds of boundaries between people. Today, even though I am physically in Kazakhstan, I can communicate with my friends who live in Europe, Asia, the United States or Canada. In the past we had to communicate by post. Now, it literally takes me a second to send out a text, voice or even video message to my friends overseas.”³⁴

In this context, the opportunity to share information and engage with foreigners on social networks and messaging apps is particularly well-received among the country’s youngest citizens, who so far have not had the opportunity to physically travel abroad. For these millennials and post-millennials (14-29 years old), social networks constitute a window onto the world that provides them with previously unknown liberty, flexibility and the opportunity to learn more about other people’s cultures and lifestyles online^{xxxiii}. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s founding mission to make the world more “open and connected” seems to resonate among the country’s youth, as the following excerpt from an interview with a young hairdresser from Almaty shows.

“I associate globalisation with the advocacy of Mark Zuckerberg, a former student at Harvard University who founded Facebook. According to him, globalisation entails the expansion of all communication channels and will unite all people around the globe.”³⁵

However, also older generations were very fond of the voice and video call options on WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype and other online messaging apps.^{xxxiv} The mobile internet on people’s smartphone not only enables ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan to stay in touch with their friends abroad, it also allows them

³⁴ SI33, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau

³⁵ FG8, female Kazakh, aged 18, Almaty

to access global news outlets. The internet and social networks keep them in the loop about events in other countries.^{xxxv} As a result, the interviewees do not perceive themselves as secluded from the rest of the world.^{xxxvi} They no longer live as nomads on the steppes, isolated from the global community, as the quotation below shows:

“We used to live on the steppes and we were not aware of anything that happened outside our community. Now, thanks to the internet we can visit the world and communicate with people from other countries about events happening outside Kazakhstan. Right now, globalisation is happening in people’s minds in Kazakhstan, in particular in recent years. In the past, everything was straightforward, because nothing changed. Nowadays, thanks to the internet and social media sites people in Kazakhstan are starting to broaden their minds. (...) Today, we can form an idea of the world thanks to social networks.”³⁶

The internet and social media platforms provide Kazakhstanis with the possibility to be part of world affairs and to broaden their minds. Sometimes people’s encounters with different ideas and views online leads them to embrace some of these universal cultural values. For some interviewees, the phenomenon of globalisation, therefore, seems to be intertwined with the concept of universalisation (universalism) the worldwide homogenisation of cultural, education, economic and political standards ^{xxxvii}. In breaking down the boundaries between people, globalisation encourages some Kazakhstanis to identify themselves in global rather than in national terms. They begin thinking globally^{xxxviii}, as the excerpt below from an interview with a young female Kazakh in Aktau shows for example:

“From my personal point of view globalisation means the dissolution of borders in all kind of spheres such as ethnicity, science, culture, politics or economy. To the extent that people stop identifying themselves as citizens of their country, but rather start to think of themselves as citizen of our planet.”³⁷

In short, the most frequently voiced narrative linked to globalisation by respondents is the picture of a “borderless e-world” enhanced by the internet and social media platforms. According to them the phenomenon of globalisation in the

³⁶ SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau

³⁷ SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau

form of online communication tools announces the beginning of a new era^{xxxix}, whether the Kazakhstani leadership approves it or not. In spite of everything, as previously discussed in Chapter One, the liberating and globalising potential of the internet and social media platforms in semi-authoritarian states such as Kazakhstan, remains a hotly debated topic among area scholars.

An e-world myth?

According to internet-pessimists, the Kazakhstani leadership continues to monitor its people, to censor online conversations by means of surveillance software, and to arrest dissident social media users and bloggers. Contrary to them, cyber-optimists emphasise the potential of ICTs to circulate political criticism and foment resistance or even uprisings. My interview participants seem to agree with internet-optimists' argument that news content is certainly more global and plural in contemporary Kazakhstan than it used to be under Soviet rule thanks to the internet. Respondents belonging to the older generation, the so-called Soviet generation (44+), in particular, compared Kazakhstan's current media landscape with the time of more severe isolation and censorship under the Communist regime^{xl}. However, younger respondents also feel freer and less fearful of the government in their online rather than offline activities, as the quoted discussion from a focus group³⁸ in Astana with two postdocs illustrates:

Sanzhar: *"This [social media] is clearly a great tool, because now local people have the courage to speak out on certain topics. They can even consult and discuss those issues with people from other countries. Kazakhstanis can openly share their views with a wider audience without risking any harm. Because of this, I think transparency [brought by social networks] is a good thing."*

Leyla: *"I also think that this [social media] is a great communication tool. It allows us to disseminate and share information and ideas. And I agree with Sanzhar that Kazakhstanis now have the opportunity to speak out and discuss topics such as politics that were forbidden in the past. Now we can access foreign news outlets and posts by foreign bloggers, especially on Facebook. We can even share the information obtained with our friends! (...) It seems to me that people have started to use Facebook more frequently in the last few years."*

³⁸ FG9, male and female Kazakh, aged 29 and 34, Astana

Thanks to the information on Facebook, people are more knowledgeable, because their eyes have been opened!”

Sanzhar: *“Yes, exactly! Social networks constitute an alternative source of information for the public and they are also an alternative channel for activists to communicate their opinions without fearing government interference.”*

Leyla: *“Thanks to social media platforms we have glasnost’ [transparency]. Unlike under Soviet rule, Kazakhstanis can no longer be fooled [by the government]. (...) Nowadays, it is impossible to hide things from people.”*

For both Sanzhar and Leyla, the internet and social media platforms are channels that enable the quick circulation of alternative views among the wider public. They are frequently used by political activists to share ideas with their followers. Unlike under Communist rule, the Kazakhstani government no longer possesses the means to conceal information from its citizens. The successful online live streaming of the 9 June 2019 protests for fair and transparent elections in Almaty and Astana support Leyla and Sanzhar’s argument that we should not underestimated the potential of the internet and social networks to disseminate alternative (Western) views and values to Kazakhstan’s citizens, even under conditions of “networked authoritarianism”.

In summary, especially among the Kazakhstani youth the most common association with the term globalisation is that of a “borderless e-world”, brought to them by the revolution in information and communications technology, such as social networks and the internet (= borderless communication). However, it is not only the transformation in ICT that respondents in Kazakhstan relate to the phenomenon of globalisation, but also other scientific innovations such as the global exchange of scientific knowledge and Kazakhstan’s participation in the capitalist economy, as the following section will demonstrate.

Capitalist economy




Figure 13. Statue of the 19th-century Kazakh poet Abai Qunanbaiuly with an electric bobby car at the entrance of park Abaya in Shymkent

Whereas the country's youngest citizens seem to be mainly attracted by the increased social interconnectedness enhanced by globalisation, particularly older generations are very much tempted by the new technologies (such as iPhones and cars)^{xli} and scientific expertise, which they perceive to be a by-product of Kazakhstan's integration in the world economy. They associate globalisation with technological progress that blends Kazakhstan's traditions with a more civilised and economically developed society.^{xlii} Figure 13 above illustrates the mingling of old conventions (Kazakh poet Abai Qunanbaiuly) with new technologies (bobby car). The interview data gathered demonstrate that particularly respondents who have spent much of their lives under Soviet rule and who are economically less well-off perceive globalisation to be intertwined with new opportunities^{xliii} that will help them and younger generations to make a better living in their country^{xliv}. The following excerpt from a focus group interview with a Russian pensioner in Kostanay illustrate the hope vested in globalisation by older citizens in Kazakhstan.

“I associate globalisation with the opportunity to learn from other countries’ expertise and experience (...). Globalisation is something positive because it enables us to communicate with other people and in doing so helps us to develop and improve our country for the future.”³⁹

Like their older fellow citizens, interviewees in their twenties and thirties with a working-class background have high expectations of the opportunities and innovations offered by increased technological and scientific interconnectedness.^{xlv} They see globalisation as a source of hope of a better future, as the excerpt below from a focus group⁴⁰ discussion with two young housewives in Shymkent illustrates:

Zhaniya: *“I associate globalisation with foreign direct investment as well as with the exchange of expertise and knowledge and the improvement of our [local] infrastructure.”*

Karlygash: *“I totally agree with Zhaniya. In the past, many people had to go abroad to receive adequate medical treatment, mainly because we did not have the necessary medical facilities and instruments. Today, thanks to globalisation that enhances the exchange of technological innovations, it is possible to take care of patients in our city’s local hospital.”*

Through the scientific and technological exchange with Western countries, facilitated by foreign direct investment, globalisation is seen to improve Kazakhstan’s local infrastructure and thus also Kazakhstanis’ living standards.^{xlvi} In this context, interviewees, like Karlygash above, often compared their current situation with the economic struggles in the country’s first years of independence. In introducing especially Western technologies and scientific knowledge to Kazakhstan, globalisation has helped the Central Asian republic to improve its local health care system.^{xlvii} Today, Western health technologies such as ventilators are installed even in some of Kazakhstan’s rural hospitals. Thus, especially Western technologies and foreign direct investments are associated with globalisation and are welcomed by Kazakhstan’s citizens.

³⁹ FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay

⁴⁰ FG25, female Kazakhs, aged 23 and 31, Shymkent

Foreign technologies and investments

Overall, the wider public seems to welcome European and American technologies and investments, which they perceive to be of better quality than locally fabricated items.^{xlviii} Thanks to globalisation Kazakhstan's companies have Western and "American machinery in their manufacturing plants"^{xlix} at their disposal.

Despite this, most foreign direct investments (FDIs) continue to be largely invisible to ordinary citizens' eyes.^l The low visibility of investments is perceived to derive from the political elite's lack of transparency and continuing practices of corruption. In general, the wider public welcomes foreign investors and investments, but they do not trust their government's investment choices.^{li}

However, not all foreign innovations are equally welcomed by ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan. While Kazakhstan's political and economic elites have thus far publicly welcomed the opportunities brought by Chinese investment (Garibov 2018: 143; Sadovskaya and Utyasheva 2018: 123), my interview data shows that its sheer scale seems to have caused increasing scepticism amongst the wider public. Beijing's growing investments in Kazakhstan's local infrastructure as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are thought to serve China's interests at the expense of the local population: "Suddenly our *Shymbulak*⁴¹ belongs to Chinese investors."⁴² Chinese machinery is seen as polluting and of low quality and, therefore, something that should not be further promoted in Kazakhstan. The excerpt below from an interview with an administrator in higher education in Almaty highlights this argument.

"For example, Chinese investors building a nuclear power plant⁴³ on our territory just next to Almaty do not care about our environment. We do care about this! For them it is an investment, but we already look at their investment from a long-term perspective and fear that all of a sudden, we may have a second Chernobyl in Kazakhstan."⁴⁴

⁴¹ Ski resort in the upper part of the Medeu Valley in the Zailiisky Alatau mountain range near Almaty

⁴² FG8 female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty

⁴³ It seems relevant to point out here that it was not China, but rather Russia that expressed an interest in building a nuclear power plant in the Almaty region (Isaacs 2020: 4).

⁴⁴ SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty

In short, despite image campaigns by Beijing and the political elite, anti-Chinese views seem to be widespread among the broad population in Kazakhstan. However, it is not only China's economic conquest of Kazakhstan by means of credits for infrastructure which causes feelings of resistance among some of my interviewees, also the growing presence of Western multinational companies is increasingly perceived as a threat to local firms, as the following section shows.

Global competition

Thanks to dramatic changes in information and communications technologies, the focus of Kazakhstan's industrial production and consumption is shifting from local to global. "Today, citizens in Kazakhstan can eat fresh and tasty bananas from Africa and China. This was not possible in the past."⁴⁵ Particularly respondents exposed to international competition in their workplace seem to link globalisation with Kazakhstan's participation in the global market economy, as the following quote from an interview with a Russian woman working for a flour mill that sells her products to Turkey shows:

"Since I work for our local flour mill in Kostanay⁴⁶, I know that we sell some of our products on the global market. Thus, I immediately associate globalisation with the global market. It [globalisation] enhances economic development, salary increase and raises hope of attaining financial stability."⁴⁷

For some respondents globalisation promises a pay rise. However, especially since the devaluation of the national currency in 2014 and the preceding financial crisis, some ordinary citizens begin to question Kazakhstan's national economy's fitness for the capitalist world market,^{lii} as the subsequent quotation from a Kazakh woman working in the educational sector in Astana highlights.

⁴⁵ SI33, male Kazakh, aged 24 Aktau

⁴⁶ In the aftermath of the Second World War, due to an acute grain supply shortage, the Soviet officials under Nikita Khrushchev initiated the *Virgin Lands Campaign* to increase cropland. From 1953 to 1964, approximately 23 million hectares of Eurasian steppe and grassland were converted into cropland in Northern Kazakhstan. As a result, Kostanay *oblast* (region) became and continues to be one of the breadbaskets of the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan (Kraemer et al. 2015: 1).

⁴⁷ FG2, female Russian, aged 34, Kostanay

*"I associate globalisation with our country's participation in the global market. (...) However, I think Kazakhstan is not ready to enter the world market, because the world is globalising in accordance with world standards, but our national economy is not stable enough to catch up. For example, if you look at our currency, the Kazakhstani tenge (KZT). The current exchange rate from the Kazakhstani tenge to the US dollar is 380 KZT for one dollar. This is mainly because our Kazakhstani tenge is very weak due to the instability of our economy. (...) Of course, on the one hand this exchange rate is very good, because our products are cheaper, and this is very helpful for our export sector. However, as long as the value of our currency remains unregulated, I think we do not benefit from the world market, it only causes huge losses to our citizens."*⁴⁸

The current exchange rate of the Kazakhstani tenge to the US dollar might boost Kazakhstan's exports, but could also harm the country's import sector. Moreover, the opening up of the country's borders to the free flow of goods might be an advantaged for the individual consumer in Kazakhstan, but constitutes a huge threat to local enterprises,^{liii} as the quote below from an interview with a female postdoc in Astana shows.

*"I associate globalisation with transnational firms. Today, global businesses enter Kazakhstan and start competing with our local companies. For me as an individual consumer this is very comfortable because I can buy the sophisticated products where I want and for the price I am willing to pay. However, for our small national firms, global competitors are a huge threat."*⁴⁹

Thus, as a result of increased economic interconnectedness, local businesses in Kazakhstan have to increasingly compete against multinational firms that can cheaply install local facilities. Simultaneously, the better, faster and easier access to global information online and the growing availability of well-known Western brands locally^{liv} make people's consumption behaviour more influenced by price and quality than by economic nationalism. As a result, people are ceasing to purchase articles merely because they are labelled "Made in Kazakhstan" and begin to embrace mass consumerism.^{lv}

In summary, it is not only the dramatic change in communications technology that respondents in Kazakhstan relate to the phenomenon of globalisation, but also the presence of foreign companies and the availability of foreign consumer goods

⁴⁸ SI21, female Kazakh, aged 28, Astana

⁴⁹ FG10, female Kazakh, aged 30, Astana

in the country. As a result of the growing technological and scientific interconnectedness with the more advanced West, Kazakhstan's industry and consumers are shifting their focal point from local to global. In these circumstances, particularly those citizens who are exposed to international competition at work are beginning to reflect critically on the fitness of Kazakhstan's national economy for global capitalism.

However, it is not only their local businesses' competitiveness in the world market, but also the transmission of Western cultural values and lifestyles, such as changed gender roles, that increasingly bother Kazakhstan's citizens. The following section will shed light on this.

Equation of globalisation with westernisation



Figure 14. McDonald's advertisement at a local bus stop in Almaty

As the previous section has illustrated, respondents often seem to associate visible forms of globalisation with Western innovations and goods. Thus, when asked to explain their associations with globalisation in more detail, Western clothing brands^{lvi} such as Mango and Zara are mentioned by interview participants of all age cohorts. The opportunity to consume products such as Coca Cola, McDonald's (see figure 14 above) or Starbucks in Kazakhstan is seen as an indicator of increasing/improving living standards in Kazakhstan.^{lvii} This idea was shared by older respondents too, for example:

"Globalisation is something very positive. For example, I am not such a huge admirer of Starbucks or McDonald's, but those people who are devoted to Starbucks and McDonald's are able to consume these products almost anywhere in the world now thanks to globalisation."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ S18, female Kazakh, in her late forties, Almaty

Here it is clear that although some respondents might not be enthusiastic about Western food chains, the existence of Starbucks coffee shops and McDonald's restaurants^{lviii} in Kazakhstan is seen as a by-product of globalisation. In this context, the country's youngest citizens went further and linked the increased cultural interconnectedness with the growing importance and presence of the English language^{lix} in their everyday lives, be it online on social media platforms^{lx} or offline in the jargon or slang they use^{lxi} or while travelling abroad^{lxii}. Globalisation is seen "to operate" through the English language, as the quote below illustrates:

"Globalisation exerts an influence on our language behaviour. It [globalisation] operates through the English language. Because, nowadays, if you want to travel overseas you need to be able to speak English."⁵¹

In this and other interviews with women, there was a strong sense that foreign cultural values not only have an influence on people's purchasing and language behaviour, but also on their broader attitude towards the environment. Raising awareness of global warming and environmental standards in Kazakhstan is seen as a by-product of the Central Asian country's growing interconnectedness with the West.^{lxiii} Thus, a growing environmental awareness, in recent years mobilised by the Fridays for Future movement (Rucht and Sommer 2019), seems to have reached Kazakhstan, as the quotation from an individual interview with a young female receptionist in Kostanay (below) shows.

"For example, the USA and Europe keep the environment very clean. Today, we are striving to align ourselves with these countries. Even though we have a slightly different mentality. (...) Today, we try our best to separate our waste according to Western standards."⁵²

In spite of that, Western cultural influence, as a side-effect of globalisation, is not equally welcomed among all interview participants. In particular, respondents in their thirties and forties, who have experienced the post-Soviet economic demise in their early and late youth, display a slightly critical attitude towards Western cultural practices, as the following section demonstrates.

⁵¹ S11, female Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay

⁵² S11, female Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay

Western cultural interference

Often when asked about the negative side-effects of globalisation, those interviewees who are exposed to international competition at their workplace argue that not everything coming from the West is good and can be implemented one-for-one in the context of Kazakhstan. Some of the Western practices may not suit Kazakh customs. Thus, in order to be feasible, certain ideas need to be “glocalised” (Giulianotti and Robertson 2007: 134; Fleming 2019: 81; Robertson 1995: 28) that is, they have to be tailored to suit Kazakhstan’s own local conditions and cultural tastes. The following two excerpts, from interviews with a female academic in Astana and a female translator working for a global company in Aktau, illustrate this argument:

“We should not adopt everything from the West without thinking. We have to analyse everything that comes from the West critically. (says in English) ‘It should be glocalised’. I am in favour of (says in English) glocalisation. Because, everything should be implemented according to Kazakhstan’s local context.”⁵³

“With the transition to globalisation and growing foreign direct investments in Kazakhstan, I noticed that in recent years several fast-food chains, such as KFC and McDonald’s or Kebab have opened. Fast-food restaurants are not typical for the Kazakh kitchen and culture. Why not open up a fast-food store called Boursak⁵⁴ which offers Kazakh dishes such as Kumis⁵⁵ or Beshbarmak⁵⁶? To make sure that we absorb some of the Western cultural practices but mix them with our own traditions? (Author: So, a kind of glocalisation?) Yes! So that we adopt fast-food or clothing brands such as Mango and H&M but blend them with our local culture.”⁵⁷

These well-educated women are both in favour of globalisation, but at the same time they voice the need to avoid the mindless adaptation of Western cultural practices. According to them, global food and fashion trends shall be mingled with Central Asian conventions in order to be implementable in Kazakhstan.

Contrary to their female fellow citizens, the vast majority of men in their thirties or early forties^{lxiv} express more negative sentiments towards the West, when

⁵³ FG9, female Kazakh, aged 34, Astana

⁵⁴ Puffy fried bread served on special occasions all over Kazakhstan.

⁵⁵ A mildly alcoholic national beverage of Kazakhstan, made from fermented mare's milk.

⁵⁶ Kazakh national dish, consisting of boiled horsemeat and noodles.

⁵⁷ FG30, female Russian, aged 35, Aktau

discussing the expected influences of globalisation on Kazakhstan's culture. The Western or European way of thinking "is not an ideal type". Kazakhstan has its own pace of development. In this context even respondents who could be expected to have positive sentiments towards the West, due to their acquired educational training in non-CIS countries, justify their anti-globalist/anti-Western views by referring to unscientific polemical arguments issued by the Kazakhstani leadership for reasons of political propaganda against the West:

"People frequently compare the local circumstances in Kazakhstan with the standards prevailing in the West. What you find in the West 'is not an ideal type'. However, some people in Kazakhstan are too radical, because they think we should totally incorporate the Western lifestyle. (...) As a result, they do not pay enough attention to the fact that we have to protect our identity and that we should avoid becoming another state of the USA or a member state of the EU. We have our own path of growth. Thus, when our president⁵⁸ says that we have our own way of development, of course he is polarising here, but from my point of view there is a grain of truth in his argument. We should protect our integrity. Many countries lose their uniqueness in today's globalising world."⁵⁹

As the quotation above from a well-travelled university professor in Almaty shows, also so-called "winners" of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f), out of concern about losing their culture and language through their contact with Western lifestyles, are beginning to oppose globalisation. This reaffirms previous studies' observations on migrants returning from the USA (Blum 2016: 144, 2019: 215), that found male Kazakhs in particular develop a stronger affinity to their Kazakh traditions as a result of their encounter with Western lifestyles abroad.

Especially those interviewees employed by international companies in the public (universities^{lxv}) or private sectors (export firms^{lxvi}, international hotels^{lxvii} or banking sector^{lxviii}) perceive different aspects of Western lifestyles (e.g., queer culture) to constitute a threat against which the uniqueness of their Kazakh cultural identity and mentality has to be protected.^{lix} The quoted discussion from a focus group⁶⁰ with three male employees working for an export firm in Astana illustrates this argument:

⁵⁸ Nazarbayev, Nursultan (2008): *The Kazakhstan Way*. London: Stacey International.

⁵⁹ S110, male Kazakh, aged 37, Almaty

⁶⁰ FG11, three male Kazakhs, two aged 32 and one aged 25, Astana

Author: “Are there any downsides to globalisation?”

Ismagul: “Yes, of course there are. For example, some people argue that we [Kazakhstanis] do not respect human rights, because the rights of LGBTQ+ people are limited in our country. However, I believe that all my fellows here [points to his male co-workers] agree with me that we do not need and want such things [LGBTQ+ people]. (...) I mean we support human rights, do not get me wrong, but we do not want them to come out. Every person has the right to do whatever, with whomever and whenever they want, as long as they do it in privacy at home. There is no need to take such things outdoors. Even though we have a secular constitution in our country, most of our population are Muslims and Orthodox Christians. These kind of people [LGBTQ+] go against and even violate traditional family values propagated by Islam and the Christian Orthodox Church. Therefore, if you are one of them, you can practice it, but simply do not do it in public. For example, in Kazakhstan we do not understand why in Europe, the USA or Canada all this [LGBTQ+ culture] is openly and visibly propagated to such an extreme that even schoolchildren are taught that there are not solely men and women but also transgender people and some 15 other gender types. This does not seem logical to me at all.”

Zhanibek: “I agree with **Ismagul** because this [LGBTQ+ culture] is morally wrong. (...) I think it is positive that we communicate with foreigners and that we sometimes adopt healthy things from them. However, anything that originates in the West must be consumed and adopted through a kind of filter. We should only absorb those aspects of Western culture that do not harm our own culture, values and traditions.”

Diyar: “There are of course positive, civilised aspects of globalisation that we [Kazakhstanis] should embrace. However, there are also those things that **Ismagul** has mentioned earlier [LGBTQ+], that I do not understand. Why do we need them? They have an aberration/medical disorder.”

The extracts from a focus group discussion in Astana above illustrate male Kazakhs’ selective encounters with social and cultural forms of globalisation. They welcome new communication technologies, while strongly dismissing the increased visibility of same-sex and queer cultural practices that challenge Kazakhstan’s patriarchal heteronormative gender roles.

The same seems to be true of the socially less mobile and less affluent part of Kazakhstan’s society. Western values such as the normalisation of same-sex unions^{lxx} or the emancipation of women often evoke feelings of aversion and resistance, especially among the older, less well-off wider public, residing in the

more ruralised southern parts of the country (Dall'Agnola 2020: 112-113). Overall, these Western ideas are understood as something artificial, imported from outside, which are alien to Kazakh life (Dall'Agnola 2020: 109f), as the quote from an interview with a housewife in Shymkent below illustrates.

“Even though I have never been to the West, we learn through social media that there are many gay parades organised in Europe and the USA. The open deployment of queer culture is not welcomed in Kazakhstan’s society. It is seen as a negative aspect of European culture that is alien to ours, because it contradicts our mentality.”⁶¹

In this context, Facebook and Instagram are often mentioned by the same respondents as the main transmitter of Western cultural “propaganda”^{lxxi}. Especially Kazakh youth – “who spend too much time on those social media sites anyway”^{lxxii} - have to be protected from content permitting the spread of immoral Western culture online. Thus, although Western technology and knowledge are equally welcomed by the wider public in Kazakhstan, Western cultural standards and values such as LGBTQ+ and gender equality are seen as morally inferior Western perversion.

In short, the data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews demonstrate that citizens use the term globalisation interchangeably with the term westernisation in the context of Kazakhstan’s increased cultural interconnectedness with the West.

⁶¹ FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent

Conclusion

To analyse how different processes of globalisation (social, cultural, political and economic) may influence Kazakhstanis' perception of their national identity, this chapter has sought to discuss Kazakhstan's citizens' conception of the term itself. It has demonstrated that the internet and social media platforms in particular are seen as the main driving force and visible mechanism of globalisation in contemporary Kazakhstan. In enabling ordinary citizens to be part of the world in one click from their kitchen table, social networks and the World Wide Web seem to herald the start of a new age of "borderless communication" even under conditions of "networked authoritarianism".

Nevertheless, it is not only the revolution in information and communications technology that is linked by respondents in Kazakhstan to the phenomenon of globalisation, but also other technological innovations such as the availability of new medical facilities and the global exchange of scientific knowledge and expertise. Those new tools are identified to be side effects of Kazakhstan's participation in the world economy. In this context, particularly those citizens who are exposed to international competition in their work seem to associate the term globalisation with Kazakhstan's growing involvement in the global market. Thanks to information technology, a firm is now able to operate virtually anywhere in the world without having to establish a local branch in Kazakhstan. Thus, due to the innovations in ICT and growing FDIs, Kazakhstan's industry and individual consumers are far more globally oriented nowadays than they were in the past. As a result, consumers are becoming more sensitive to price and quality and are less influenced by economic nationalism.

Regardless of the ongoing predominance of the Russian media in Kazakhstan and the growing Asian cultural influence brought to the country by Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and Korean popular culture, cultural and social forms of globalisation continue to be Eurocentric or Atlantic-centric. Thus, contrary to Giddens' (1990: 175) suggestion, the interview data gathered illustrates that the term globalisation seems to be equated by Kazakhstanis with westernisation in the context of the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan.

As a reaction to the promotion of Western lifestyles, such as queer culture and gender equality on- and offline, some respondents – and men in particular – are beginning to embrace anti-Western and anti-American sentiments and opposing the process of globalisation.

These findings seem to contradict the reported results for the impact of *cultural globalisation* on the *Level of Pride* and *World Citizen* variables in Chapter Three. Increases in cultural interconnectedness do not necessarily encourage the wider public to embrace this global culture. Despite that, also “winners” of globalisation can favour the idea of keeping Kazakhstan’s traditions from merging with Western moral and cultural practices. Thus, whereas some Kazakhstanis, in particular Kazakhstani youth through their contact with alternative ideas and values online, express a more welcoming attitude towards cosmopolitan values, others are beginning to display negative attitudes towards the Western lifestyles that are being propagated. These observations support the reported findings for the demographic independent variable of *education* and the identified trends with regard to the interaction between *education* and (social and cultural) *globalisation* for the dependent variables of *Level of Pride* and *World Citizens* in Chapter Three.

Despite *hyperglobalists’* forecasts, Kazakhstan’s common cultural heritage, faced with Western cultural influence, continues to serve as a link between ordinary people in contemporary Kazakhstan. Therefore, rather than supporting the *hyperglobalists’* account of globalisation, my findings support *transformationalists’* claim that globalisation does not transform the world uniformly into a nationless, borderless void, but rather transforms identities. In summary, the data gathered from interviews with the wider public in Kazakhstan suggests that especially cultural and social forms of globalisation via the use of social media – have only reached much of the Central Asian population through the wider availability of cheaper 3G and 4G mobile technologies in the 2010s.

Let us now move on to Chapter Five that discusses the extent to which recent online access to the e-world and Western culture has encouraged people in Kazakhstan to reflect on their national identity and to change their identification with their nation. It will also address the question of if and how access to online sources can facilitate the spread of dissident and Western information in the Central Asian republic.

CHAPTER FIVE: GLOBAL FLOWS CHALLENGING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN KAZAKHSTAN

As indicated in Chapter Four, ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan mainly associate the word globalisation with “borderless communication tools”. According to detractors, these encourage Western social and cultural erosion of the Central Asian republic’s local practices and customs. Now, a more in-depth analysis is required to investigate the extent to which the wider public perceives their use of messaging apps or their exposure to content on social media platforms and the internet as shaping their identification with the nation. This chapter, therefore, seeks to assess whether the increased interconnectedness with the West encourages Kazakhstan’s citizens to change their perception of their national identity or not. The chapter also seeks to further evaluate the statistical trends identified in Chapter Three. For this purpose the chapter is divided into three sections, each discussing the most frequent different identity narratives expressed by the interview participants: Civic Kazakhstani identity; Ethnic Kazakh identity and World citizenship.

The first section demonstrates that, overall, people embracing a Kazakhstani identity are generally in favour of the increased interconnectedness with the West. However, it also shows that there exist two Kazakhstani narratives in contemporary Kazakhstan. The first form of Kazakhstani identity is an institutionalised form of nationhood. Particularly older Russian-speaking citizens who spent most of their lives under Soviet rule tend to embrace this identity. At the same time, university-educated female Kazakh youth in particular seems to support a second kind of Kazakhstani narrative, which is based on a (protest-) resistance identity against the political regime’s propagation of traditional gender stereotypes and roles in Kazakhstan’s society. Their identity choice seems to be the by-product of their exchange with and exposure to Western women on- and offline (social and cultural forms of globalisation).

The subsequent section highlights that, despite the governmental promotion of an inclusive Kazakhstani identity, native Kazakhs in Kazakhstan are more tempted to define themselves in ethnic than in civic terms, irrespective of their social

class or the degree of urbanisation they are exposed to.⁶² Contrary to the prognosis of Western scholarship (see Chapter One), this part reveals that it is not only concern about protecting their unique Kazakh culture against globalisation that may prompt young, social-media-savvy, well-educated people to embrace a Kazakh identity. There seems to be a second form of Kazakh identity, which stems from the movement of protest and popular resistance to the political regime's post-electoral practices in June 2019 and, and, consequently, a reluctance to identify with a state-sponsored Kazakhstani concept of nationhood. These Kazakhstanis displaying anti-elite feelings are usually in favour of increased interconnectedness with the West.

The last part shows that global cultural flows shape ordinary citizens' perceptions of their national identity and particularly affect Kazakhstan's younger generation. Youth in Kazakhstan is increasingly exposed to foreign cultural norms and global values through their use of social networks. As a result, some of those technically sophisticated and multilingual youngsters, rather than calling themselves "Kazakhs" or "Kazakhstanis", prefer to think of themselves as "global citizens".

⁶² The study featured 137 interview participants. Out of 97 participants born Kazakhs, 49 defined themselves in ethnic terms and only 39 identified themselves as Kazakhstani. The overall number of Kazakhstani is slightly higher (70), due to the fact that most ethnic minorities chose to define themselves as Kazakhstani.

Civic Kazakhstani identity

As previously discussed in Chapter One, in contrast to other Central Asian republics, when Kazakhstan declared independence from the USSR on 16 December 1991, ethnic Kazakhs constituted a minority in the new state. This was in large part due to the settlement of the country by Slavs over two centuries and the famines of the 1930s that disproportionately killed ethnic Kazakhs. Given the composition of the country's population, the political elite of Kazakhstan faced additional nation-building challenges and started to promote a more inclusive citizenship, a so-called Kazakhstani identity in addition to an exclusive Kazakh identity. A Kazakhstani identity is generally associated with multinationalism, multi-lingualism and interethnic and religious inclusiveness. The extent to which this state-sponsored Kazakhstani identity prevails under the pressure of globalisation and enjoys support among my interviewees will be discussed in the following section.

A state-sponsored Kazakhstani identity

Overall, the interview data show that the government's propagated image of the Central Asian republic as a multinational, multilingual, interethnic and religiously peaceful former Soviet state, enjoys particular support amongst older participants (40+), residing in the more Russified parts of Kazakhstan⁶³, who were socialised during the Soviet period. These respondents frequently draw a comparison between the Kazakhstani identity promoted by the political leadership and the former Soviet citizenship, *sovetskii narod*^{lxixiii} (the Russian word for "Soviet people") (Fierman 2005: 393f; Rakowska-Harmstone 1992: 529-530), as the quotation below from an interview with a shopkeeper in Almaty shows.

*"I was born in the USSR. There existed only one term, sovetskii narod (Soviet people). Today I identify myself more as Kazakhstani, because Almaty is such a multi-ethnic city."*⁶⁴

⁶³ Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Kostanay

⁶⁴ S15, male Kazakh, aged 55, Almaty

Often these respondents defended their identity selection while referring to the multi-ethnic composition of their region and the whole country^{lxxiv}. Due to their experience of growing up under Soviet rule, they tend to strongly oppose any ethnic or religious separation:

“Irrespective of our ethnicity, we were all citizens of the Soviet Union. Thus, we were seeking unification and not separation. Nowadays, we can observe a growing extremist nationalism, patriotism. I do not support this separatism at all and I do not want to become such a crazy patriot.”⁶⁵

The growing popularity of extremist and nationalist movements is seen as endangering Kazakhstan’s unity,^{lxxv} which is why these respondents support the Kazakhstani leadership’s dichotomised approach to nation-building. They often draw an analogy between the state-promoted slogan of “unity in diversity” (Balpanov et al. 2018: 31), which calls for tolerance among different ethnic and religious groups in Kazakhstan, and the Soviet principle of *druzhba narodov* (the Russian term for “fraternity of peoples”) (Adams and Rustemova 2009: 1259) as the extract below from an interview with a female pensioner in Kostanay illustrates:

*“I was born, raised and spent my whole life in Kazakhstan. I think that our president has led Kazakhstan to a very high standard. He makes friends with all countries (...) He is a friend to Russia, to Turkey etc., he pursues a policy of *druzhba narodov* [fraternity of peoples] (...) During Soviet times, many Turkmens, Moldavians and Ukrainians used to live in Kazakhstan. Nowadays, Kazakhstan’s leadership upholds the principle of *druzhba narodov*.”⁶⁶*

As the quote above shows, for these interviewees, interethnic tolerance^{lxxvi} is perceived to be one of the most significant characteristics of a Kazakhstani’s mentality. Thus, to be a contemporary Kazakhstani means to respect Kazakh culture and traditions and simultaneously to respect the rights of other ethnic groups living within Kazakhstan.^{lxxvii} A contemporary Kazakhstani should be open, flexible and welcoming towards changes and innovations. Thus, a modern citizen of Kazakhstan should know how to speak other international languages (especially English and Russian) in addition to her mother tongue, but, at the same time, should

⁶⁵ SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty

⁶⁶ FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay

not forget her roots.^{lxxviii} For these interviewees Russian remains the language of interethnic communication and therefore continues to be more often used in daily on- or offline conversations than the Kazakh language.

As a result, the same respondents often voiced their aversion to hearing that a native Kazakh must speak Kazakh. For them, the *Kazakhness* openly displayed by their southern, often rural, fellow citizens is perceived as exclusive^{lxxix} of other ethnic minorities, and tantamount to fanaticism and radicalism.^{lxxx} This clearly applies to younger Kazakhs living in the north of the country - as well as the older Soviet-educated generation - as the long quote below comes from a 24-year-old.

“As you have already noticed, in the north we speak Russian more frequently than Kazakh. Today, a hotel guest, a native Kazakh, approached me, speaking to me in Kazakh. Since I went to a Russian school, my knowledge of the Kazakh language is limited. After he noticed my poor language skills, he started to shout at and insult me for not being a pure Kazakh. (...) If another Kazakh blames me for not being fluent [in the Kazakh language], I strongly disapprove of this kind of behaviour! Thanks to those fanatics, I do not identify myself as a Kazakh anymore.”⁶⁷

Such stories of being chastised by their fellow Kazakhs for not using the Kazakh language highlights that there exists a growing internal division between the more Kazakhified and Russified Kazakh population in contemporary Kazakhstan. As a reaction to discrimination by their fellow Kazakhs, for these interview participants the choice to define themselves as Kazakhstani seemed very simple: “more civilised” people associate themselves with the Republic of Kazakhstan and not just with their ethnic group.^{lxxxi}

Finally, the interview data gathered found that especially respondents who trust their country’s current political regime and believe in their country’s glorious future,^{lxxxii} are tempted to describe themselves as Kazakhstani. Thus, to be a Kazakhstani means first and foremost “to love your mother country [Kazakhstan] and to be a loyal supporter of the current government.”⁶⁸ The data arising from interviews validate previous scholarship’s observations on Kazakhstan which found ordinary citizens’ faith and pride in their government to be an important predictor of

⁶⁷ SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay

⁶⁸ SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau

a Kazakhstani identity. In order to illustrate their patriotic feelings for their country, some interview participants used examples of everyday nationalism (Billig 1995; Fauve 2015: 116) generated by sports^{lxxxiii} or music events as the excerpt below illustrates.

“I am a Kazakhstani. Every time somebody represents us [Kazakhstan] like Dimash Kudaibergen⁶⁹, I am full of pride when they raise the flag of Kazakhstan.”⁷⁰

In summary, the findings arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interview in Kazakhstan illustrate that the successor state elite’s nation-branding strategy of Kazakhstan as an ethnically diverse, welcoming, dynamic, successful and globalised country finds approval especially among those ordinary citizens, growing up in the more Russified parts of Kazakhstan, whose mother tongue is Russian. These respondents seem to exhibit a more welcoming attitude towards possible changes to the country’s national culture and mentality. Boosted by the state-sponsored campaign of civic understanding of nationhood and as a backlash against the openly displayed ethnic fanaticism and radicalism of their fellow Kazakhs, these interviewees chose to define themselves as Kazakhstani. This type of Kazakhstani identity, therefore, represents an institutionalised form of nationhood, institutionalised by political, economic and cultural elites through the ideology of nationalism in order to unite the multi-ethnic citizenry.

Despite that, not everybody who chose to identify as Kazakhstani is a supporter of the political regime’s nation-building policies. Young native Kazakh women in particular prefer to think of themselves in civic terms, as a reaction to the state’s promotion of traditional gender hierarchies and endorsement of the official restoration of male privilege. Their identity choice is indirectly connected to their encounter with social and cultural forms of globalisation, as the following section demonstrates.

⁶⁹ Dimash Kudaibergen is a famous Kazakh singer who gained popularity in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet countries in 2015 upon becoming the Grand Prix winner of Slavianski Bazaar in Vitebsk, Belarus. He rose to fame in China with his participation as a “wildcard competitor” in the Hunan TV show “I am a Singer” in 2017 (Chinese version of UK X-Factor).

⁷⁰ FG14, male Kazakh, aged 42, Astana

A modern Kazakhstani woman

The interview data found respondents' choice to embrace a Kazakhstani identity to be not necessarily driven by their leaderships' nation-branding strategy. Often while engaging with female Kazakh youth about their relationship to their identity and culture, the implications and burdens of being a young female Kazakh in contemporary Kazakhstan were thematised.^{lxxxiv} Since the control of Kazakh women and their sexuality remains central to the country's post-Communist elite's *Kazakhisation* policy (for more details see Chapter One), it comes as no surprise that especially the well-educated and well-travelled female Kazakh youth, the so-called female "winners" of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922) linked the state-sponsored Kazakh identity narrative to the advocacy of traditional gender roles in their society.^{lxxxv}

Kazakh customs, such as the hierarchy of domestic privileges that tells a *kelin* (the Kazakh expression for "a young married Kazakh woman") to act as a subordinate to her husband and *ene* (mother-in-law)^{lxxxvi}, together with the Kazakh cultural mentality of *uyat* (the Kazakh word for "shame")^{lxxxvii} (Kabatova 2018: 4; Kudaibergenova 2019b: 364) that blames young unmarried women for having sexual intercourse, were frequently described by young female interview participants as "backward-looking"^{lxxxviii}, "narrow-minded"^{lxxxix}, "outdated"^{xc} and "discriminatory"^{xc}. The same respondents voice their concern about the recent rise of cases in non-consensual *pokhishchenie nevest* (the Russian term for "bride abductions")^{xcii} in the southern regions of Kazakhstan.⁷¹ "Non-consensual bride kidnapping is an act of violence against a woman that not only harms her physically but psychologically as well."⁷² For these young, often well-spoken Kazakh women it is a mystery how "it can be possible that while some women are travelling into space, Kazakh men still think it is fine to kidnap the woman they wish to marry without her permission".⁷³ The issue of bride kidnapping was stirring up controversy between

⁷¹ For more details about bride kidnapping in Kazakhstan consider the following link: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-rise-non-consensual-bride-kidnapping-kazakhstan-developing-culturally-informed-and>, last accessed 8 September 2020

⁷² S19, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty

⁷³ S19, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty

female participants in focus groups, as the quoted discussion from a focus group⁷⁴ with two young hotel interns in Aktau demonstrates:

Aisha: “I agree with her [**Zhanar**] that some Kazakh conventions should be preserved. However, I think some of our traditions such as the convention of *nevestu ukral* [bride kidnapping] are outdated and are morally wrong.”

Zhanar: “This convention [bride abduction] is still popular nowadays. However, a Kazakh man only abducts a woman with her explicit consensus. They are usually a couple before the kidnapping happens. Often, they choose this practice because their parents cannot afford to pay the *kalym* [the bride price].”

Aisha: “Let’s try to think things through, even our tradition of paying for a bride seems very questionable nowadays. This is a very strange and outdated Kazakh custom that needs to be changed.”

Zhanar: “Yes, maybe it should be changed. However, it is often the case that a man kidnaps his girlfriend, because their parents do not have enough money to pay for their wedding.⁷⁵ Under those circumstances, I approve his action.”

Both Aisha and Zhanar are enjoying Western university education in Kazakhstan and agree that some Kazakh conventions should be preserved. However, whereas Zhanar tries to provide an objective and logical explanation for why young Kazakh men abduct their girlfriends, Aisha actually begins to question the Kazakh tradition of the groom paying the *Kalym* (the Kazakh term for “bride-price”) to the bride’s parents. What leads some female Kazakh youth to “think things through” and in doing so to question Kazakh cultural practices?

For these young often well-travelled women their conversations with foreign female tourists^{xciii} or their online chats with and exposure to westernised women on social media platforms^{xciv} (such as Kim Kardashian^{xcv}) help them to develop a bigger picture of the world. They begin to understand that a woman’s role is not limited to maternity and that women in the West do not necessarily have to get married. “Western women can work and travel the world.”^{xcvi} For them the increased interconnectedness with the West is a positive development, mainly because contact with Western values on- and offline encourages the wider public in

⁷⁴ FG28, female Kazakhs, aged 20 and aged 19, Aktau

⁷⁵ In Kazakhstan it is usually the groom’s parents who pay for the wedding.

Kazakhstan to question Kazakh cultural norms^{xcvii}, as the quotation below from an interview with a young receptionist in Kostanay illustrates:

“Today, many young people no longer like the Kazakh language, traditions and culture. I am also one of those who calls herself a modern Kazakhstani because I do not understand and do not like our [Kazakh] traditions (...) luckily, our culture is changing because young people go abroad to work and travel and frequently visit social media networks. Thanks to this, they see the behaviour and values of foreigners and start imitating their Westernised conventions.”⁷⁶

Thanks to their exchange with and exposure to westernised women off- and online, some female Kazakh youth become more aware of the existing patriarchal structures in contemporary Kazakhstan. They start to critically reflect on their Kazakh upbringing and to distance themselves from the Kazakh mentality. Contrary to their mothers^{xcviii}, who had to follow old Kazakh conventions, these young Kazakh women demand the freedom to decide for themselves how and what life they want to live, as the passionate excerpt below from an interview with a female university student in Almaty shows:

“Ten years ago, Kazakh women were not allowed to study at the university. In those days, they were supposed to get married, to have children, and it was forbidden to file for divorce. Personally, I do not agree with this. We all make mistakes: that is life! It is our [Kazakh women’s] decision, no one has the right to blame us or to dictate to us, how we should live our life. (...) I do not agree with the state-promoted Kazakh mentality of uyat (shame), which is why I identify myself as a modern Kazakhstani woman.”⁷⁷

As the quote above highlights, some female youth speak out openly against the state-sponsored Kazakh identity that calls for the “retraditionalisation” of a woman’s role in society in describing themselves as an *evropeizorovannaia* (the Russian word for “Europeanised”) ^{xcix}, *sovremennaia* (the Russian term for “modern”) ^c Kazakhstani woman. To the surprise of Aisha and me even more traditionally minded young Kazakh women, such as Zhanar (see the previous discussion about bride kidnapping) when asked whether she identifies herself more as Kazakh or Kazakhstani, prefers to think of herself as Kazakhstani, due to her own experiences of sexism in her private life. For both of them (Zhanar and Aisha),

⁷⁶ SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay

⁷⁷ FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty

a Kazakhstani identity seems to be intertwined with the Western concept of gender equality, as the extract from their focus group⁷⁸ discussion below illustrates:

Zhanar: *“I prefer to think of myself as Kazakhstani too.”*

Aisha: *“Really? I would have called you a Kazakh.” (Aisha is bursting into laughter.)*

Zhanar: *“How come? Yes, I am a born Kazakh and I think it is important to uphold some of our [Kazakh] traditions. However, I call myself a Kazakhstani, because ... I do not know how to say this ... (...) I am not against the continuation of our traditions, but like Aisha, I strongly oppose any kind of discrimination against women. Our [Kazakh] mentality dictates that a woman should stop working, stay at home and take care of her children after she gets married. However, if a woman wants to work, I think she should be allowed to do so.”*

Author: *“Therefore, does being a modern Kazakhstani woman mean to be in favour of gender equality? (Both participants are nodding their heads.)*

Aisha: *“Yes, to be a contemporary Kazakhstani woman entails being in favour of gender equality. Yes, this is why I like globalisation. Because through contact with different forms of globalisation [travel and social media platforms] people’s mindset, and all in all our Kazakh mentality towards women and young people, changes in a positive way.”*

Thanks to their experiences of Western perceptions of gender roles in their working environment (while talking to foreign female tourists) and their exchange with and exposure to content and photos of Western women online, some female Kazakh youth become more aware of the existing gender imbalance in their Kazakh culture. In protest against the state-sponsored campaign of traditional gender hierarchies, some of these young women describe themselves as modern Kazakhstani women and in doing so embrace a so-called civic-centred “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421-424).

In summary, mainly younger female Kazakhs through their contact with Western gender stereotypes on- and offline begin to embrace a civic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421-424) as a reaction to the gender

⁷⁸ FG28, female Kazakhs, aged 20 and 19, Aktau

imbalances inherent in their Kazakh mentality. They form their civic-centred “resistance identity” in opposition to the state’s promotion of traditional women’s roles in Kazakhstani society. Their encounter with cultural and social forms of globalisation seems to reinforce their awareness of their *Kazakhstaniness* – to borrow the term from Rees and Williams (2017: 817) – their Kazakhstani identity.

While the portrait of westernised women on- and offline provides grounds for hope for young female Kazakh “winners” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922), it causes feelings of aversion among their older counterparts and among their male fellow citizens in Kazakhstan. The impact of social and cultural forms of globalisation on their identification with their nation will be addressed in the following section.

Ethnic Kazakh identity

Overall, the vast majority of native Kazakhs who joined the interview preferred to think of themselves as Kazakhs.⁷⁹ This finding contradicts the observations of previous grassroots research on national identity in Kazakhstan that found the wider public's perception of their national identity to be shifting gradually towards a more citizenship-based understanding of nationhood (Burkhanov 2019: 59, 64; Sharipova et al. 2017: 222-223; Spehr and Kassenova 2012: 144-147). Of course, in this context the question arises as to what extent processes of globalisation are responsible for people's increased awareness of their Kazakh identity. The subsequent paragraphs aim to shed light on this issue.

Rural Kazakh identity

Generally speaking, I found less-educated employees in traditionally protected sectors of the labour market⁸⁰ in their thirties and forties, who identify strongly with their local southern Kazakh community, to be more likely to identify themselves as Kazakh than as Kazakhstani. For these rural dwellers a "pure" Kazakh is a Muslim⁸¹, who speaks the Kazakh language, who upholds Kazakh traditions and who is proud of her ancestry.^{ci} Thus, a person's knowledge of the Kazakh language and traditions remains an important identity marker for the Kazakh community. During the interview, the same respondents emphasised the importance of being raised and born in a more rural setting as a quality of being a "pure", "authentic" Kazakh as the quotation below from an interview with a Kazakh housewife in Shymkent illustrates:

*"I am a pure Kazakh. (Author: What do you mean by pure Kazakh?) I grew up in a rural place and was brought up following pure Kazakh traditions. Shymkent is the place which has preserved true Kazakh traditions."*⁸²

⁷⁹ Out of 97 native Kazakhs, 49 defined themselves in ethnic terms, whereas only 39 identified as Kazakhstani.

⁸⁰ Ticket inspector, nurse, cleaning lady, taxi driver, housekeeper, ward

⁸¹ Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that even though respondents may describe themselves as Muslim, most of them do not necessarily follow and practise religious rituals in their everyday lives. Indeed, "many of them never even attend a mosque". (Sharipova 2019: 77).

⁸² FG23, female Kazakh, aged 28, Shymkent

For the same reason, Russian-speaking Kazakhs who do not know the Kazakh language and reside in the more urbanised Russified parts of the country (such as Almaty, Astana, Karaganda, Kostanay, Ust-Kaemogorksi and Semei) were often labelled “mankurts” or “shala-Kazakhs”⁸³ – “cultureless persons” or “half-Kazakhs” by these respondents.

In contrast to their fellow citizens who describe themselves as Kazakhstani, the vast majority of interviewees defining themselves as Kazakh display a slightly negative attitude towards possible changes to their Kazakh culture and mentality. For them, cultural practices typical for Kazakhstan are increasingly being challenged by an all-encompassing loose understanding of freedom coming from the West,^{cii} in the forms of changed cultural conventions such as tattoos^{ciii} or clothing styles^{civ} that run counter to and even violate traditional Kazakh cultural values. In this context, the increased conspicuousness of LGBTQ+ people in Kazakhstan, is considered to be a negative side effect of the growing pressure from and impact of European and Western values on Kazakhstan’s society.^{cv} According to some more traditionally minded and Kazakhified interviewees^{cv}, transgender people and their cultural practices run counter to the country’s values in many ways, as the excerpt below from a focus group⁸⁴ discussion with female doctors in Shymkent illustrates:

Aigul: *Yesterday, I watched a documentary where Dumaschat (male Kazakh name) became Esil (female Kazakh name). He became a woman! She changed her gender...he changed his gender. (Participants burst out laughing.)*

Gulzhan: *For somebody to change her gender does not fit in with our Kazakh mentality at all!!*

Aigul: *Exactly!*

Gulzhan: *What matters most to our people [Kazakhs] is the formation of a family. Nobody is interested in finding out how much money or wealth you possess. People are concerned about your family life and about the number of children you have. A Kazakh family has to consist of a healthy mother, father and children, in order to secure*

⁸³ According to Kudaibergenova (2019a: 90) the term “Shala” is the Kazakh word for “asphalt” and therefore a “Shala” Kazakh is an urban Kazakh who does not speak Kazakh and mainly communicates in Russian.

⁸⁴ FG18, two female Kazakhs, aged 35 and 55, Shymkent

the future/survival of the Kazakh nation (...) This is why I think these [queer] people should not exist.

Aigul: *I partially agree with **Gulzhan**. Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that takie [those transgender people] are also human beings (...) maybe he or she experienced a psychological trauma during his/her childhood or had a hormonal endocrine disorder during puberty. I do not know why, but I feel sorry for him. As a human being he has the right to live and we are not allowed to kill him.*

Gulzhan: *I believe if nature designed you as a woman, you should live your life as a woman and produce offspring. If you were born as a man, you should remain a man, build a house and start a family. To start a family is the most important duty of a Kazakh.*

In propagating unconventional types of marriage, such as same-sex unions, queer culture is perceived to be a threat to traditional family values and gender roles in Kazakhstan. What matters most to these rural inhabitants is the formation of a family that will secure the survival of the Kazakh nation. For the same reason, in order to preserve the Kazakh nation from extinction, some of these respondents strongly oppose interethnic marriages^{cvii} and even develop xenophobic feelings towards foreign labour migrants^{cviii} and expats, as the quotation below from an interview with a housewife in Shymkent illustrates:

“Kazakh women increasingly get married to foreigners; these women will leave our country and as a result our ethnicity is slowly dying out.”⁸⁵

In summary, out of an aversion to losing parts of their unique Kazakh traditions through their contact with Western cultural practices and values (such as LGBTQ+) on- or offline, especially those interviewees who are disadvantaged by the process of globalisation, start to develop a stronger attachment to their Kazakh identity. They begin to embrace anti-globalist sentiments and form an ethnic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421) against the cultural homogenisation (= westernisation) encouraged by globalisation. As the debates on nationalism suggest (for more details see Chapter One), their Kazakh identity seems to be reinforced by – but opposed to – globalisation.

⁸⁵ FG23, female Kazakh, aged 43, Shymkent

Xenophobic and ethnonationalist feelings are also reinforced amongst young Kazakh men in particular, when they leave their rural birthplaces to work and study in the more urbanised and globalised cities of Astana and Almaty, as the following section shows.

Anti-globalist Kazakh identity

In contrast to their young fellow country women (see previous section “Modern Kazakhstani woman”), native male Kazakhs irrespective of education, age and the rural places they have migrated from, seem to become more aware of their Kazakhness through their encounter with urban lifestyles. The quote below from an interview with a male Kazakh labour migrant in Astana illustrates that in the impersonal, anomic environment of the cold, hostile urban jungle, urban migrants’ ethnic ties^{cix} and familial socialisation seem to constitute the most important identity markers for these male Kazakhs’ chosen identification.

“No matter how long you live away from home [your village], if your parents have taught you to follow Kazakh traditions, you always remain a Kazakh in your heart and soul, due to your genetic inheritance.”⁸⁶

No matter how far away they live from their home town, these well-educated men will always maintain a strong bond with their traditional local community. However, it is not only their contact with urban cultural lifestyles which reinforces young male Kazakhs’ consciousness of their *Kazakhness*. In contrast to their female peers who have worked and studied in non-CIS countries, male Kazakhs’ experiences of *otherness* and *foreignness* abroad seems to reinforce their awareness of their *Kazakhness*, as the following quotation from an interview with a former *Bolashak* in Shymkent shows.

“I identify myself as Kazakh because I was born a Kazakh. Kazakhstani just captures your citizenship. In any part of the world, I can call myself a Kazakh. My Kazakh identity remains, but my Kazakhstani identity is subject to change.”⁸⁷

⁸⁶ FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, migrated from Aktobe to Astana for work

⁸⁷ SI29, male Kazakh, aged 25, Shymkent former *Bolashak*

The quote above demonstrates that despite Kazakh men's higher education acquired abroad, their cultural socialisation during early childhood continues to rule their decisions and emotions. For them, their pre-university educational and social experiences play a more decisive role in the formation of their identity and cultural values than their favourable educational and social status, which they acquire in later life. Irrespective of the country they end up living in, their ethnic core continues to dominate their identity.

Despite that, it is not only the *otherness* they encounter overseas that intensifies their ethnic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421), but also the propagated *otherness* online. For those well-educated Kazakh men, often, the portrayal of westernised independent and self-confident women and queer culture (see quoted discussion from focus group 11 on page 149) on social media⁸⁸ seems to have a reverse effect on their perception of their national identity. While young female Kazakhs seem to be striving to increase gender equality, these young men seem to develop a more conservative understanding of a woman's role in society out of their contact with Western perception of gender roles online, as the quote below from a banker, let's call him Nurlan, in Aktau illustrates. Undeterred by the presence of Kazakh women friends he drunk beer with, who were quite unlike the calm and subservient stereotype of Kazakh women, Nurlan expressed his indirect disapproval of his friends' chosen path:

Nurlan: *"As a young man I am of course for globalisation and for knowledge exchange. However, as a future father the outlook of globalisation is frightening. I am worried about my children, in particular about my daughter. Mainly because I can see now all these same-sex and provocatively dressed (koli lav) women and I do not want my daughter to become one of them. I want her to become a modest and traditional Kazakh woman."*⁸⁹

Not surprisingly, Nurlan's statement was met with astounded silence by his female colleagues. Also, his homophobic attitudes towards queer people were not openly shared by the female focus group participants. In line with Ismagul, Zhanibek and Diyar (see Chapter Four page 149), Nurlan does not welcome Western

⁸⁸ The internet remains the main source of information for sexual education (Kabatova 2018: 7)

⁸⁹ FG34, male Kazakh, aged 22, Aktau

perceptions of sexual liberty in the form of queer culture. This observation confirms Blum's (2016: 144, 2019: 215) findings on returning migrants from the USA. He found that most male Kazakh returnees, contrary to their female peers, fail to absorb Western values such as gender equality and queer culture. This may be intentional because they benefit from the existing patriarchal structures propagated by the Kazakh mentality. Thus, contrary to previous research (Isaacs 2019: 237; Kosnazarov 2019: 247) that found young people who have studied and lived in the West or are receiving Western-style education in Kazakhstan to have a more liberal outlook towards gender stereotypes, the gathered data show that the vast majority of young Kazakh men^{cx} interviewed who have obtained a degree in a non-CIS country or have received Western-style education in Kazakhstan develop a more traditional understanding of gender roles, that strongly opposes Western perception of gender equality and LGBTQ+ culture.

In summary, even though these young well-educated and widely travelled men can be expected to benefit from the process of globalisation, they augment a more exclusive traditionalist understanding of Kazakh nationhood, an ethnic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421) out of their contact with different aspects of Western and urban life-styles. For these cosmopolitan "anywheres" (Goodhart 2017: 3), the increased cultural and social interconnectedness with the West constitutes a threat to the uniqueness of their Kazakh cultural identity and mentality.

Nonetheless, it is not only concern about protecting their unique Kazakh culture against cultural homogenisation reinforced by globalisation that may draw young, social-media-savvy, well-educated Kazakhstanis to embrace an exclusive ethnic Kazakh identity. There seems to exist a second form of Kazakh identity, which draws on the movement of protest and popular resistance against the state-sponsored Kazakhstani identity. Contrary to their counterparts embracing ethnic-centred, xenophobic nationalism, people displaying such anti-elite nationalist feelings are usually in favour of the increased interconnectedness with the West, as the following section demonstrates.

Anti-elite Kazakh identity

As previously discussed, the interview data gathered found ordinary citizens' support of their current political leadership to be an important predictor of a Kazakhstani identity. In contrast to the previously predicted political apathy of Kazakhstan's youth (Burkhanov 2019; Laruelle, 2019; Junisbai and Junisbai 2019; Sharipova 2019), only respondents belonging to the country's youth chose their identity in accordance with their opinion of the current political establishment's governing practices, as the quotations below from a focus group⁹⁰ with young bank employees in Aktau show:

Zarina: *"I identify myself more as a Kazakh than a Kazakhstani. Mainly because for me, you are either a patriot of your country or just a Kazakh. I am not a loyalist of our regime; therefore, I am Kazakh."*⁹¹

Gaisha: *"I love Kazakhstan, but I am not a patriot, because I have lived and studied overseas and have learned that there are other cultural, political systems and lifestyles. In the future, Kazakhstan may develop itself, but those young people who can, leave the country, due to the lack of opportunities provided by our government."*⁹²

Nuri: *"I agree with them. I identify myself as a Kazakh mainly because I like the people close to me, but I just do not like our government at all."*⁹³

Author: *Therefore, do you associate being a Kazakhstani with somebody who is a supporter of the Kazakhstani government? (All participants are nodding their heads.)*

In contrast to their male working colleague Nurlan (see previous section on "Anti-globalist Kazakh identity") who defines himself as Kazakh out of an aversion to losing parts of his Kazakh culture to globalisation, Zarina, Gaisha and Nuri prefer to think of themselves as Kazakh out of their discontent with the Kazakhstani leadership. As a former Bolashak student in Prague, Gaisha's lack of trust in the political regime in Kazakhstan seems to be partially linked to her own experience of

⁹⁰ FG34, three female Kazakhs all aged 26, Aktau.

⁹¹ FG34, female Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau

⁹² FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau, former *Bolashak*

⁹³ FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau

living, studying or working outside Kazakhstan. She strongly believes that due to the missing government support, the well-educated Kazakh youth will sooner or later leave the country in order to make a better living for themselves abroad.

However, it is not only their experience of living, studying or working abroad that leads some of the more affluent and socially mobile young Kazakhstani citizens to prefer to think of themselves as Kazakh and not Kazakhstani. Their lack of faith in their government seems to derive also from the state-led mass detention of peaceful protesters and the nationwide blockages of major social networks and online platforms (such as Facebook, Instagram and YouTube)⁹⁴ in the aftermath of the 9 June 2019 presidential elections. Some young digital natives indicated their disapprobation of the leadership's post-electoral proceedings by actively choosing to define themselves as Kazakh and not Kazakhstani, as the quotations below from an interview with a former *Bolashak* exchange student in Astana illustrates:

*"I identify myself more as Kazakh than Kazakhstani. Mainly because, after the regrettable incidents [jailing of more than 100 peaceful protesters] this year, I cannot consider myself to be a loyalist of this country any longer. Our government neither cares about our life, nor about our social system."*⁹⁵

The excerpt above demonstrates that, despite the Kazakhstani government's attempt to co-opt, manipulate or control online information, social media platforms and messaging apps can be used to spread dissident information among the wider public in Kazakhstan. Social networks and online chat services help political activists to communicate their dissident views and remain difficult to censor even under "networked authoritarianism". As the excerpt below from an interview with a male postdoc in Astana shows, especially the more affluent part of the country's youth, who have lived and studied in more distant non-CIS countries or have enjoyed Western-style education in Kazakhstan, can obtain some less-censored information on political events in Kazakhstan and outside on social media platforms:

"I think it is very important to have a channel to exchange ideas between countries, ethnic groups and people. For Kazakhstan social media platforms are a huge advantage, because through those

⁹⁴ <https://netblocks.org/reports/internet-and-streaming-services-blocked-in-kazakhstan-on-election-day-dAmOP7y9>, last accessed 8 September 2020

⁹⁵ SI21, female Kazakh, aged 28, Astana, former *Bolashak*

channels we are able to obtain unfiltered information about events outside and inside our country.”⁹⁶

These findings confirm previous scholarships’ observations on Kazakh youth identity formation (Bekmagambetov et al. 2019: 540f; Nikolayenko 2015: 261) that web-based content on social media can have a negative impact on the college-educated youth’s confidence and trust in their country’s electoral institutions.

In summary, the experience of having enjoyed Western-style education, together with the regime’s post-electoral practices, seems to have prompted a “cultural backlash” (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 363, 454) against a state-sponsored Kazakhstani identity among some parts of Kazakh youth, who, due to their social and educational background, can be expected to be advantaged by the process of globalisation. These so-called cosmopolitan “anywheres” (Goodhart 2017: 3) actively choose to define themselves as Kazakh and not Kazakhstani out of discontent with their political establishment. Their ethnic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421) seems to be reinforced by, but in favour of, the increased interconnectedness with the West.

Given the restrictive nature of both identity categories (Kazakh and Kazakhstani identity), it is not surprising that the country’s youngest citizens in particular are seeking alternative ways of defining themselves. Some of these youngsters are beginning to develop a cosmopolitan awareness through their engagement with other people on- and offline. They prefer to think of themselves in global rather than national terms, as the following section shows.

⁹⁶ SI19, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana

World citizenship

Overall, the data arising from focus groups and semi-structured interviews in Kazakhstan seem to support the study's statistical observations insofar as only native Kazakhs belonging to the country's youngest age cohort (18-29), the so-called "Nazarbayev generation" (Laruelle 2019: 1), when asked to express their identity, chose to identify themselves as *grashdanin mira* (the Russian term for "citizen of the world").^{cxix} Whereas only Kazakh youth usually thought of themselves as world citizens, some respondents in their thirties and forties belonging to an ethnic minority also did so. For more details see the coding sheets in the appendix.

Nonetheless, it is not only the well-connected youth who live in the most globalised urban hubs who can embrace the idea of global citizenship. Out of seventeen participants who identified themselves as citizens of the world, ten stemmed from less urbanised and globalised regions, such as Kostanay (two respondents), Shymkent (three respondents) and Aktau (five respondents) and seven lived in the more urbanised and globalised cities of Astana (five respondents) and Almaty (two respondents). Unlike previous scholarship on Kazakhstan (Bigozhin 2019: 116ff, 128f, 131; Isaacs 2019: 237), the gathered interview data suggest, therefore, that Kazakhstanis' global consciousness is not necessarily formed by their own experience of working and living in the West or by their own experience of living in non-CIS countries, but rather to be a side effect of their exposure to global norms and different cultural practices at their workplace (hotels, international trading company) or on social media platforms and the internet, as the following paragraphs demonstrate.

Winners of globalisation

The vast majority of interviewees identifying themselves as world citizens argue that they were socialised in more Russian-speaking surroundings and therefore prefer to use the Russian language than Kazakh in their daily conversations, be that online or offline.^{cxii} Furthermore, many of these young people have enjoyed some form of higher education and thanks to this know at least one other foreign language and do not shy away from using it on social media platforms or in everyday situations. In contrast to their bilingual or multilingual peers who chose to identify themselves

in national terms, these young citizens prefer to think of themselves as “global citizens”.

Their identity choice seems to be partially a result of their international working environment. Seven out of seventeen respondents who think of themselves as world citizens are exposed to non-CIS foreigners on a daily basis, because they work at the reception or bar of a hotel. The rest are employed by multinational trading companies and, thanks to that, are used to working with non-Kazakhstani citizens. Thus, the findings seem to complement previous scholarship on the West (for more details see Chapter One) that found respondents who, due to their professional occupation and educational background can be classified as lower middle class or middle class, tend to describe themselves more as citizens of the world than those participants who can be defined as belonging to the working class. In short, given their social and educational background, these young people seem to be more advantaged by the increased interconnectedness with the West (i.e. = globalisation) than the average citizen. In doing so, they differentiate themselves from the more Kazakh-speaking, conservative, traditional section of youth in Kazakhstan.

Unsurprisingly, the part of Kazakh youth describing themselves as citizens of the world seems to be familiar with the concept of globalisation. For them the increased interconnectedness with the West (i.e. = globalisation) is something positive that enables people from different parts of the world to develop a better understanding of each other, irrespective of their ethnicity, country, gender, race or orientation.^{cxiii} What they associate the most with globalisation are technological evolution, knowledge and cultural exchange and the increased social and cultural interconnectedness through social media platforms that leads people to develop a bigger picture of the world, as the following section shows.

Social media platforms

In particular the option to engage with foreigners and to share visual and audio information by posting so-called stories on Instagram is very well received among these young people. These post-millennials and millennials are eager to learn more about other people’s lives and cultural practices, and for that they make use of social

media channels on a daily basis.^{cxiv} Thus, even though some of them may lack the financial means to travel, social networks provide them with the opportunity to engage with people from other countries, to be part of the world and, in doing so, to broaden their minds.^{cxv} Through their exchange with foreigners on social networks, these youngsters are beginning to understand that sometimes they may have more in common with young people growing up in other countries than with their fellow citizens, as the excerpt below from a focus group⁹⁷ discussion in Astana with young Kazakhstanis, who have never travelled to non-CIS countries, shows:

Ivan: *"I do not have a strong sense of belongingness to Kazakhstan. I think of myself more as a grashdanin mira (world citizen) than Kazakhstani. (...) Just because you live in a specific country, it does not mean that your fellow citizens share your values and beliefs. Sometimes, a stranger may have more in common with you, he may be closer to your soul, than neighbours in your village. This is why, I prefer to think of myself as a grashdanin mira."*

Alexandr: *"I agree with Ivan. I also like to think of myself as a grashdanin mira (world citizen), because I am not tied to my country, I can live in whatever country I feel comfortable. I could also imagine living in Sweden."*

Like Alexander and Ivan, the vast majority of interviewees identifying as world citizens could imagine beginning a new life outside of Kazakhstan. They do not feel themselves chained to their traditional communities and country. Contrary to the more traditional and conservative part of Kazakh youth, who aim to protect Kazakh cultural habits against the cultural homogenisation reinforced by globalisation (for more details see rural and anti-globalist Kazakh identity), these self-identified world citizens oppose pressures and policies that seek to preserve outdated traditions.^{cxvi} For them it is something positive that Kazakh conventions are changing through the contact with foreigners on social networks and while travelling abroad.^{cxvii}

Even those interviewees who grew up in a more traditional setting can sometimes be expected to embrace a world citizen identity out of their contact with foreigners on- or offline, as the quote below from a young hotel-receptionist in Shymkent demonstrates:

⁹⁷ FG12, male Russian, aged 21 and male German aged 24, Astana

“I stem from a quite traditional background, because my grandmother and father raised me following Kazakh conventions. Of course, not in all aspects. On the other hand, I feel myself slightly separated from my ethnicity. Because expressions such as race, gender or ethnicity are not of any relevance to me. Now, I identify myself as a citizen of the world.”⁹⁸

Thus, in engaging with foreigners and their cultural practices offline (at their workplace) and online on social networks and messaging apps some young people in Kazakhstan start to reflect critically about their own socialisation and develop a different understanding of their identification. Some of them, through their exposure to global norms and different cultural practices, even stop thinking in terms of borders, nations, ethnicities and gender and, in doing so, start to embrace a so-called cosmopolitan awareness.^{cxviii}

In summary, in contrast to their contemporaries, who develop a stronger attachment to their national identity out of concern about losing their Kazakh culture or out of discontent with the state’s promotion of traditional women’s roles in Kazakhstan society, these youngsters become happier to embrace global citizenship.

⁹⁸ SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent

Conclusion

In conclusion, while the statistical trends presented in Chapter Three remain somewhat vague about the forms of globalisation that encouraged the wider post-Soviet public to support or reject nationalist attitudes in the 2010s, the findings arising from interviews with ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan show that cultural and social forms of globalisation in particular strengthen Kazakhstanis' perception of their national identity. However, the interview data gathered highlights that social and cultural interconnectedness can engender different forms of national "resistance identities" (Castells 2011: 421), including some that are more universalist and global.

In particular (young) female Kazakh "winners" of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f), through their encounter with Western women in their international working environment or in the form of social media narratives around western values, seem to develop a growing awareness of the existing gender asymmetry in power and status, both in the public and private sphere in their country. Out of discontent with the state-sponsored Kazakh narrative that calls for the "retraditionalisation" of a woman's role in Kazakhstan's society, they are describing themselves as modern Kazakhstani women and, in doing so, embracing a so-called civic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421-424).

While different forms of cultural and social globalisation seem to encourage young women to define themselves more in civic terms, the same forms of globalisation seem to have a reverse effect on young male Kazakhs. For these often well-educated and well-travelled Kazakh men, the increased cultural and social interconnectedness with the West constitute a threat against which the uniqueness of their Kazakh cultural identity and mentality has to be protected. They develop an ethnic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421) opposing globalisation.

Nevertheless, it is not only the need to protect their unique Kazakh culture that may draw cosmopolitan "anywheres" (Goodhart 2017: 3) to embrace a Kazakh identity in Kazakhstan. There seems to be a second form of Kazakh identity, which is based on a narrative of protest and popular resistance to the state-sponsored Kazakhstani identity, rather than an adherence to age-old Kazakh traditions.

Especially the more affluent, social-media-savvy, well-educated Kazakh youth expressed their disapproval of the political regime's post-electoral practices in June 2019 by actively choosing to define themselves as Kazakhs and not as Kazakhstanis. People embracing these anti-elite sentiments, contrary to their peers embracing an ethnic-centred national "resistance identity" (Castells 2011: 421) opposing globalisation, are usually in favour of increased contact with the West.

Finally, in line with the statistical results in Chapter Three, some of Kazakhstan's youngest citizens, who due to their educational or occupational situation are advantaged by the process of globalisation, through their contact with other cultures and lifestyles at their workplace (hotels, international trading companies) or on social media platforms and the internet, begin to reassess their identification with their nation and develop a so-called world citizen identity. These young technically sophisticated and multilingual youngsters, rather than calling themselves "Kazakhs" or "Kazakhstanis", prefer to think of themselves as "global citizens".

In summary, the interview data partially support the trends identified in Chapters Three and Four that globalisation can engender both nationalist and cosmopolitan identities among people in post-Soviet societies; while some better-educated Kazakh youth do indeed see themselves as world citizens, many of those who travel (either abroad or to other cities) find that their Kazakhstani identity (in the case of women in particular) or their Kazakh identity (particularly men) is reinforced by their contact with other people, ideas and lifestyles. The case study of Kazakhstan, therefore, reaffirms the often ambiguous findings of the multilevel statistical analysis regarding the impact of education on nationalist sentiment (see Chapter Three) in as much as it shows that for post-Soviet people's identity choice their gender, pre-university educational and social experiences rather than the favourable educational or social status they acquire in later life play the most decisive role. An individual's semblance of cosmopolitanism (university education), therefore, is not necessarily a prerequisite for a globalist mindset in the post-Soviet world.

Furthermore, the interview data confirms to some extent the assumption of the statistical analysis that globalisation has a varied impact on men and women in the post-Soviet space. Cultural and social forms of globalisation (mediated by social

media platforms) are associated with the promotion of non-patriarchal norms, such as gender equality and LGBTQ+. Young male Kazakhs approve globalising representations of gender and sexuality that enhance their traditional privileges over women, while at the same time they seem to reject any images that might lessen their control over women's sexuality. As a result, they develop a stronger attachment to their Kazakh identity.

Nonetheless, the interview data reveal that not all identity shifts of Kazakhstan's citizens have necessarily to be prompted by their encounter with processes of globalisation. Some of the myriad forms of national identity embraced are deeply ideological and therefore rather the by-product of their political regime's nation-building policy than respondents' contact with different forms of globalisation.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this final chapter I draw together the overarching findings from the statistical multilevel analysis and the results arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Instead of merely restating each preceding point and conclusion, I seek to home in on how the observations may contribute to the general understanding of the complex interrelation between globalisation and contemporary national identities. The statistical trends identified on the post-Soviet space, together with the case study of Kazakhstan, demonstrate that the influence of globalisation on post-Soviet people's perception of their identity is not clear-cut. Thus, the project has led to many answers, insights, and realisations, but it has also raised a number of new questions to be explored. Leading on from the project, there are a number of directions in which future work could go. The subsequent subdivisions will offer a research agenda that furthers the outlined empirical and theoretical contributions by suggesting ways in which these may be brought forward.

One of the primary premises of *hyperglobalists* has been that the boundaries of states are weakened and diminish in importance as globalisation grows in strength. However, my study suggests the opposite. It highlights that the relationship between global and national spaces is complex and interactive. Rather than eliminating borders and identities, globalisation transforms them. In this context, the complexity of the current pandemic's effect on peoples and borders acts as a useful metaphor for the complexity of globalisation's effect on the same. The Covid-19 pandemic has forced nation states to shut down their borders and introduced a new level of uncertainty into global affairs. The speed and scope of the virus's spread across the globe have highlighted people's vulnerability to seemingly distant foreign threats because of globalisation. For that reason, the chapter ends with a critical reflection on the current scholarly debate on the interplay of nationalism and globalisation in a post-pandemic world.

Globalisation ≠ westernisation?

The density and intensity of cultural and economic links between the Soviet Union and the wider capitalist world have increased dramatically since 1990. The collapse of the USSR was a turning point in post-Soviet people's lives, values, and identities. In this context, the aim of my thesis was to investigate how post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation has changed because of increased globalisation since 1991. I also sought to answer the question of whether or not the complex interrelationship of globalisation and national identity in post-Soviet societies has followed Western paths of development. Contrary to previous scholarship on the region, I tackled this question through the prism of non-elite perspectives on globalisation and national identity by giving prominence to representatives of the working classes and people without higher education. Given the shortcomings of previous grassroots-level research, I decided to use a mixed-method approach that contrasted wider statistical trends for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s in the post-Soviet world with empirical data arising from focus groups and semi-structured individual interviews in Kazakhstan.

The findings of the statistical multilevel analysis were that post-Soviet people – and university-educated citizens in particular – react in one of two ways when they meet other people, ideas, and lifestyles; they either embrace global culture or resist it. Whereas cultural and political forms of globalisation could be anticipated to weaken the wider post-Soviet public's attachment to their national identity – and women and university-educated respondents in particular – some of the individuals who have acquired higher education through contact with social globalisation may even have developed an integrated dual identity that embodies both patriotism and world citizenship in the 2010s.

In this context, Kazakhstan, with its state-led dichotomy of nationhood, having both an ethnic exclusive Kazakh and a civic inclusive Kazakhstani identity, has turned out to be a good case study to illustrate globalisation's dual or twofold influence on former Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity. Overall, my interview data challenges *hyperglobalists'* forecast that globalisation erodes national identities. While some Kazakhstani youth, through their contact with different cultural practices and global norms on social media platforms and at their workplace are starting to embrace a more cosmopolitan identity, most interview participants

through their contact with globalisation found their Kazakhstani identity (in the case of young Kazakh women in particular) or their Kazakh identity cemented. Rather than diminishing existing identity categories, I found globalisation tends to transform them, at least in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Globalisation can engender both civic and ethnic-centred national “resistance identities” among Kazakhstan’s citizens.

While some young well-educated/ or well-travelled Kazakh women, through their contact with social and cultural forms of globalisation, began to describe themselves as “modern Kazakhstani women” and in doing so embraced a civic-centred national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421-424) in opposition to the Kazakhstani leadership’s promotion of traditional gender roles in Kazakhstani society, the vast majority of interviewees – and young well-educated Kazakh men in particular- as a result of their contact with *otherness* overseas, or in big cities, seem to have become more aware of their *Kazakhness* and as a result have developed an ethnic-centred national “resistance identity”. Their Kazakh identity is reinforced by – but opposed to – globalisation and characterised by anti-western sentiments.

My findings reveal that not only the “losers”, but also the “winners” of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Rooduijn 2015: 6f) can be drawn to embrace a national “resistance identity” (Castells 2011: 421) opposing globalisation and/or dominant elite narratives in post-Soviet societies. Contrary to the prognosis of Western scholarship (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922; Norris and Inglehart 2019: 136, 140, 164-167; Rooduijn 2015: 6; Tamir 2019: 107), neither in the multilevel regression analyses that I presented in Chapter Three, nor in the focus group findings that I presented in Chapter Five, did I find an individual’s educational status to act as the main defining criterion for nationalist sentiment within the states of the former USSR. Rather than education, I found a post-Soviet citizen’s age, gender and pre-university educational and social experiences act as an important predictor for a nationalist attitude in both my statistical and non-statistical analysis. My project, therefore, suggests that a person’s immersion in a cosmopolitan environment (e.g. university education) is not necessarily a prerequisite for a globalist mindset. I therefore agree with Bayram’s study (2019) that future research in the fields of globalisation and contemporary nationalism should critically reflect on the main criteria that distinguish a nationalist from a cosmopolitan in general.

Besides exploring the ways in which processes of globalisation may influence ordinary citizens' perception of their national identity within the former states of the Soviet Union, my findings contribute to the wider scholarly debate on the connotations of the term globalisation in countries that have experienced socialism. In my study, I have critically assessed the extent to which Kazakhstan's citizens' newly obtained access to the world is real and not just a figment of their political regime's nation-branding strategy. I have shown that the phenomenon of globalisation is real and heralds the beginning of a new epoch of increased social, cultural, economic and political interconnectedness with the West, particularly since the launch of 3G and 4G mobile phones and headsets in the 2010s. Unsurprisingly, my interviewees most frequently associate the term globalisation with "borderless communication tools", encouraging Western social and cultural erosion of the Central Asian republic's local cultural practices and customs. Therefore, despite the predominance of the Russian media and the growing Asian cultural influence, particularly through Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and Korean popular culture (K-pop), globalising forces seem to promote first and foremost Western values in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan. Thus, contrary to Giddens' (1990: 175) suggestions, I agree in my thesis with *transformationalists*' argument that the term globalisation can be used interchangeably with the previous buzzword of westernisation, at least in the context of post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

Nonetheless, although my findings shed light on the dynamics of globalising forces in former Soviet societies and how they may influence ordinary citizens' perception of their identity, there is a need for further qualitative research in the region, as my thesis was merely confined to interview data from one former Soviet republic, namely Kazakhstan. As discussed in the introduction and Chapter One, Kazakhstan due to its dichotomy of nationhood and the rather recent exposure of its population to global culture, seems to be a typical but also an atypical case within the region. The trends identified by this thesis may not be shared by ordinary citizens growing up in another post-Soviet state or non-Western country that does not know such a dichotomy of identity and that is more social and cultural globalised. Nevertheless, the Central Asian republic offered an interesting opportunity to investigate the complex relationship between globalisation and national identity within post-Soviet societies.

Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that political elites and the wider public can be expected to interact in rather different ways with various features of globalisation in a more social and cultural globally interconnected state. As the marketing of Estonia as a high-tech e-states shows, some elite nation-building policies might be informed by pro-Western and pro-globalisation propaganda for the purpose of economic competition. In these contexts, people can be expected to have a rather different understanding of the concept of globalisation. They might not use it synonymously with westernisation and they might display a more welcoming attitude towards changed cultural norms in general. I therefore suggest that future scholarship in the field of globalisation and nationalism could reflect on the future direction and implications of globalising forces and to what extent, if at all, they remain Eurocentric and Atlantic-centric in (former) non-Western societies.

Also, in states that unlike Kazakhstan have experienced conflict or civil war due to their inherited ethnic homogeneity or ethnic territorial structure, globalising forces can be anticipated to connect differently with elite and public identity narratives.

In this context, additional single-case studies may enable us to capture the nuances of the different historically embedded national narratives (weak, strong, pro-Communist, anti-Communist, pro-Western) and how they may interrelate with globalisation (whether they stress threat to the nation/national culture from outside the country, or whether they are more inclusive or “open”), as well as with the different legacies of contested nationhood.

In summary, I am cautious in drawing any generalisation from my findings. However, it is my dearest hope and believe that the trends identified in the thesis will provide a good foundation for future qualitative and quantitative studies in the field of globalisation and nationalism in (former) non-Western societies.

The starting point for this study was the assumption that the transition from Communism in the states of the former Soviet Union has been a process of economic, political, social, and cultural change: a process I refer to as globalisation. Yet, both my findings from the statistical and the interview data from Kazakhstan show that globalisation seems to interact differently with women’s and men’s identity choices in former Communist societies. My thesis thereby makes an important contribution to the feminist debate on globalisation, as the following section reveals.

Gendered globalisation

Is globalisation gendered? So far, there is little research addressing this question, even though first-generation feminist scholarship emphasised the need for an agenda in international studies that takes gender seriously. Until recently most feminist thinkers tended to analyse globalisation in terms of its negative impact on women. From their perspective, global flows (e.g. the international market economy, internet and social media) are promoting the remasculinisation of sexuality discourses, values, and practices, rather than transforming the existing gender hierarchies (Tsatsou 2012).

Yet, my study seems to agree with second-generation feminists (True 2003; Ferguson et al. 2008) that, rather than promoting patriarchal, heteronormative values and identities, social and cultural forms of globalisation (mediated by social media platforms) are advancing notions of gender equality and gender blurriness and challenging the existing gender hierarchies and identities in the post-Soviet space. Both my statistical and non-statistical analysis provide evidence that global cultural flows celebrating untraditional gender norms are perceived differently by women and men in the post-Soviet space.

Thanks to their online chats with Western women and exposure to the content and photos of Western women (such as Kim Kardashian) on social networks, some young female Kazakhs reject the patriarchal notions that they associate with the state-led Kazakh narrative and describe themselves as modern Kazakhstani woman. They are beginning to openly speak out against Kazakhstan's prevailing gender hierarchies and demand the freedom to make their own choices and decisions. While nudity posts by Kim Kardashian on Instagram could be seen as women's objectification in the West, they are greeted by these young Kazakh women as denoting women's new-won sexual freedom.

Yet while young women seem to embrace this global celebration of female empowerment and non-heterosexual gender norms, the same forms of cultural and social globalisation seem to have an opposite effect on young Kazakh men. For them, the portrayal of independent and self-confident women and queer culture on social media platforms constitutes a threat against which the uniqueness of their Kazakh culture and mentality must be protected. They openly resist messages that

celebrate new freedoms for women. Their resistance seems intentional because the existing patriarchal system serves their interest. Similar observations were reported by other scholars researching post-Soviet Central Asia (Bigozhin 2019; Blum 2016, 2019; Harris 2019), but also by scholarship on Asia and the Pacific (Derné 2008; Puri 2008) and the USA and Europe (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 90; Tsatsou 2012). For example, Derné's analysis of the film-viewing practices of male middle-class youth in India highlights men's dislike of embracing Western images of female emancipation. He found that men only approve of globalising representations of gender and sexuality that support their traditional privileges over women, while they dismiss any image that might reduce their control over women's sexuality. Similar sentiments were expressed by the young well-educated and well-travelled banker Nurlan in Aktau and the export company employees Ismagul, Diyar and Zhanibek in Astana.

In summary, my thesis provides evidence that cultural globalisation has a mixed impact on women's and men's identification with their nation in the former USSR. There seems to be a gender gap among the younger generations, with women's views adapting faster to changed gender roles promoted by cultural globalisation than men's. I therefore agree with feminist scholars such as Jacqui True (2003) and Ferguson et al. (2008) that globalisation is far from being gender neutral. In contrast, cultural and social forms of globalisation (e.g. Western culture, social media networks) are "deeply implicated in the production and reproduction of gender identities and differences". (True 2003: 164) My findings presented here therefore suggest that utilising a gendered lens on globalisation might offer new insights into the complexities of globalisation and mass identities.

In this context, I found that social media, as the main visible operating mechanism of globalisation, offer Central Asian women a safe place to discuss their concerns about discriminatory norms and practices against women in their societies. Kazakhstani feminist activists such as Madina Musina, through provocative posts, openly criticise the state-led retraditionalisation of women's role in their society (Kudaibergenova 2019). Following the digital hashtag campaign #IAmNotAfraidToSayIt in Ukraine in 2016 (Lokot 2018), female Facebook users in Kazakhstan began to openly speak out against sexual abuse and harassment, using the adapted hashtag #DontKeepSilent (Udod 2018). Are digital feminist campaigns, therefore, responsible for women's increased awareness of gender imbalances in

Central Asia? So far, there is little research on the extent to which feminist bloggers are successful in influencing the wider female public's perception of gender roles in Central Asia. The potential of digital feminism to promote female empowerment in Central Asia is just one possible area that future feminist scholarship could focus on.

In addition to the gendered impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet societies, the findings of my thesis demonstrate the potential of social media platforms to mobilise and spread political dissidence, especially among post-Soviet youth, as the following section reveals.

Mobilising and meaning-making potential of ICT in Kazakhstan

What is the mobilising and meaning-making potential of information and communication networks in authoritarian settings? This question has been studied globally, with the “Arab Spring” (Ghonim 2012) also known as the “MENA Uprising” (Axford 2011: 684) heightening the urgency and the stakes for social science theories of digital mobilisation. In the last decade, scholarship has addressed the top-down strategies non-democratic states use to manage dissent online and the bottom-up mechanisms by which the internet and social media facilitate the spread of dissident information and collective organisation.

In Kazakhstan, where access to the internet has risen dramatically in the last five years, various social media platforms have served as stages for state-sponsored identity construction and grassroots debates about memory and belonging. According to cyber-pessimists, the Kazakhstani leadership has demonstrated quite often how easy it is to manipulate, regulate and monitor online content through state-sponsored bloggers and influencers, through legislation and by temporarily blocking websites and online messaging services in an ad hoc manner. Despite the growing authoritarian grip on social media and internet platforms, cyber-optimists believe in their meaning-making potential. According to them, the protests for fair and open presidential elections in Kazakhstan's largest cities in June 2019 – organised digitally and playing out through hybrid online-offline activities – illustrated the mobilising power of ICTs, which facilitate the dissemination of dissident voices and articulation of alternative political futures in Kazakhstan.

Perhaps unexpectedly, my interview data offered a rather optimistic view of social media's mobilising potential in Kazakhstan. Social networks constitute a window onto the world that provides especially the country's youngest citizens with previously unknown liberty, flexibility and the opportunity to learn more about other people's cultures and lifestyles online. Through involvement in social networks, some of them have begun to reflect on their cultural socialisation and in some cases to question the Kazakhstani leadership's nation-building policies.

Some of Kazakhstan's youngest citizens, as a result of their introduction to global norms and different cultural practices online, even stop thinking in terms of a country's borders and prefer to think of themselves as global citizens rather than as Kazakh or Kazakhstani. Moreover, rather than silencing dissident voices, the government's attempts to shutdown social media and messaging apps and the jailing of peaceful protesters in the aftermath of the presidential elections in June 2019, seem to have provoked a "cultural backlash" (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 363, 454), especially among the more affluent, social-media-savvy, well-educated Kazakh youth. Those young citizens expressed their disapproval of the regime's post-electoral practices by actively choosing to define themselves as Kazakhs and not as Kazakhstani. In short, the data arising from interviews with ordinary citizens in Kazakhstan not only questions the Kazakhstani leadership's success in managing online dissent, but also pushes back against a dominant scholarly discourse that Kazakhstan's youth are politically disengaged (Burkhanov 2019: 64; Junisbai and Junisbai 2019: 35, 39; Laruelle 2019: 5).

Nonetheless, since I did not primarily attempt to capture anti-elite narratives in my thesis, I am cautious about making broad statements regarding these effects in other contexts, or even in relation to other subgroups in Kazakhstan. Much of the scholarship about Kazakhstan's digital landscape has changed significantly in recent years, so much so that scholarship on internet culture in the country published five years ago barely reflects the current situation. Analysis of how the Kazakhstani government and citizens use the internet and social media for political and social goals that took data from even a few years ago misses out on major changes to access and innovative digital interactions. It is my hope that my findings will provide a starting point for future research that features more specific questions about the potential of social media platforms to transmit dissident voices and to

mobilise anti-elite feelings among Kazakhstan's citizens as well as the citizens of other former Soviet republics.

As such future studies should seek to bring the debate between cyber-pessimists and optimists up to date. How has expanded access to the internet and more sophisticated digital infrastructure shaped the Kazakhstani leadership's approach to managing online dissent on the one hand, and facilitated collective action on the other? How do distinct features of different social media platforms affect the potential to shape memory and identity? How does social media use affect trust and protest behaviour across different authoritarian regimes in Central Asia? These are just some general questions that future research could focus on.

The importance of advanced communications technologies to connect places and communities virtually in authoritarian but also democratic settings has recently gained momentum. National governments across the ideological spectrum introduced heavy travel restrictions and temporarily suspended international travel to contain the spread of the Covid-19 infection in spring 2020. Until then, a "borderless world" seemed to be the obvious current stage of human development. With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the world as we know it has fundamentally changed within less than six months.

Covid-19: an era of deglobalisation and "coronationalism"

So far there is little literature addressing the impact of pandemics on the interplay of nationalism and globalisation. Given the pace of the Covid-19 crisis and the uncertainties that come with it, scholars in the studies of nationalism and globalisation are desperately trying to overcome this gap in the academic literature.

It is argued that Covid-19 has exposed some of the "dark sides of globalisation" that have been known for a long time but remained largely ignored in policy circles (Revi 2020: 4). It has spotlighted the inherent vulnerabilities of an interconnected and interdependent global political economy. Thus, in line with the financial crisis of 2008 (Figge and Martens 2014: 17), ongoing ecological disasters such as global warming (Keohane and Nye 2000: 4; Malešević 1999: 579) or outbreaks of other infectious diseases (Katz 2017: 5), for example HIV in the 1980s (Kippax and Stephenson 2015: 218-219), the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 (Katz and

Phelan 2020) has shown that increased interconnectedness may not always be a plus. The current pandemic has illustrated how effortlessly and fast a virus originating in any corner of the globe can travel and threaten our “borderless world”.

Some analysts believe that Covid-19 has served to reinforce the role of the nation state and in doing so ushered an era of “de-globalisation” (Niewiadomski 2020: 652) and “new regionalism” (Wheatley 2020) in the neoliberal world order. According to these scholars, the leading actors responding to Covid-19 are nation states, because migration, security and health-care services are controlled and provided by states and not by transnational organisations (Bieber 2020: 8; Woods et al. 2020: 15). In contrast, in the light of the current pandemic, the efficiency and legitimacy of international and transnational institutions such as the World Health Organisation and the European Union (EU) are undergoing a serious crisis. The initial emergence of uncoordinated national responses to Covid-19 by EU member states highlighted the internal divisions within the EU. This partially undermined the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the general public (Woods et al. 2020: 6), until it approved a €750 billion coronavirus recovery fund in July 2020 and agreed to pool debt. The outbreak of a global pandemic reminds us that nation states rather than transnational institutions are the “key players” in a neoliberal world order (Revi 2020: 3). Thanks to Covid-19, states are gaining, rather than losing, power and influence (Bieber 2020; Woods et al. 2020).

Some states may even experience a comeback of “regionalism” (Wheatley 2020; Woods et al. 2020: 15) within their own borders, especially in countries (such as the UK) where regional governments are in control of healthcare and make the key decisions on how to respond to the Covid-19 crisis. As an example, the centrality of the Scottish government in ordinary Scottish people’s lives, as compared to a remote and (in the eyes of many Scottish voters) incompetent Westminster government, seems to fuel Scottish nationalism and in doing so the case for Scottish independence (Wheatley 2020).

Furthermore, the (temporary?) return of borders has not only strengthened the position of nation states and regional governments, it also seems to be affecting the individual’s orientation. Now people are redirecting their focus from the global to the local. Covid-19 has taught people to look to their respective nation states for help in these unprecedented times (Ozkirimli 2020). People were flown home by

national airlines that had been ordered by their respective government to do so and not by non-national carriers (Niewiadomski 2020: 653). In addition to that, new rituals that have emerged during the lockdown, such as the weekly national applause for key workers or the newly established national days of mourning in various countries across the globe, seem to boost nationalist sentiments (Woods et al. 2020: 14). On 9 July Kazakhstan's president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared 13 July as a day of national mourning for Kazakhstani citizens who have died from Covid-19 (Kumenov 2020).

Some citizens have even gone as far as openly priding themselves on living in a country that is containing the virus more effectively than others. This type of new nationalism has been described as "biopolitical nationalism" (Kloete et al. 2020: 637) and can be found particularly in countries of East Asia, but also in Europe. Those feelings of supremacy are in turn frequently exploited and reinforced by the xenophobic and anti-immigrant statements issued by the media and far-right parties who link the spread of the virus to immigration and anti-elite conspiracy theories (Woods et al. 2020). In short, some scholars of nationalism predict anti-immigrant and anti-globalist sentiments to rise in the months and years to come (Woods et al. 2020).

At the same time, others paint a more optimistic outlook in predicting that the current globally shared fears, uncertainties and risks, i.e. the overall experience of a "shared pandemic citizenship" (Calzada 2020: 2), may endure and promote cross-national solidarity and cooperation in the aftermath of the pandemic (Bieber 2020: 1).

Nonetheless, I personally agree with Eric Taylor and Robert Schertzer's statement in Woods et al. (2020: 13) that it is far too early to predict whether the Covid-19 pandemic fuels nationalist sentiments in the long run or not. In countries where the government's response to the virus has reduced public trust in the government, the nation state, nationalist sentiments may be weakened as well. One possible example of this are the current protests in Belarus, unleashed after Alexander Lukashenko's proclaimed election victory with an overwhelming majority of 80 per cent in August 2020. Some observers believe that for many Belarusians, the final straw that took them onto the streets was Lukashenko's poor handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. His denial of the existence of the virus and his poor

performance during the pandemic in general have weakened Lukashenko's credibility in the eyes of his citizens.

In the current state of affairs, one possible road research could take is to analysis how citizens' trust in their government may be weakened or strengthened as a reaction to a state's chosen strategy for handling the Covid-19 crisis. Future scholarship should therefore focus on whether elites' responses to Covid-19 fuels or lowers citizens' pride in their nation. Rather than condemning the resurfacing of anti-globalist attitudes and the anger of the vulnerable masses in the post-pandemic world as reactionary and allowing it to be (again!) exploited by populist parties, the political and economic elite should take them seriously. But we too, as academics, should find a better way to address and fight the inequalities that are inherent in a neoliberal world order (Easterly et al. 2004: 70; Stiglitz 2003: 478) and are now unmasked and exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. I predict that in a post-pandemic world cosmopolitanism will remain a worldview of a small, largely intellectual minority, unfortunately.

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APPENDIX

ⁱ **Table A1.** Macro-level cases included in each decade for the dependent variable *Willingness to Fight*

1990s	2010s
Armenia 1996 (WVS 3)	Armenia 2011 (WVS 6)
Azerbaijan 1996/7 (WVS 3)	Armenia 2017 (WVS 7)
Belarus 1996 (WVS 3)	Azerbaijan 2011 (WVS 6)
Belarus 1999 (EVS 1999)	Azerbaijan 2017 (WVS 7)
Estonia 1996 (WVS 3)	Belarus 2011 (WVS 6)
Georgia 1996 (WVS 3)	Belarus 2017 (WVS 7)
Latvia 1996 (WVS 3)	Estonia 2011 (WVS 6)
Lithuania 1996/7 (WVS 3)	Estonia 2017 (WVS 7)
Lithuania 1999 (EVS 1999)	Georgia 2011/4 (WVS 6)
Moldova 1996 (WVS 3)	Georgia 2017 (WVS 7)
Russia 1990 (WVS 2)	Kazakhstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Russia 1996 (WVS 3)	Kazakhstan 2018 (WVS 7)
Russia 1999 (EVS 1999)	Kyrgyzstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Ukraine 1996 (WVS 3)	Kyrgyzstan 2017 (WVS 7)
Ukraine 1999 (EVS 1999)	Lithuania 2017 (WVS 7)
	Moldova 2011 (WVS 6)
	Russia 2011 (WVS 6)
	Russia 2017 (WVS 7)
	Tajikistan 2020 (WVS 7)
	Ukraine 2011 (WVS 6)
	Uzbekistan 2011 (WVS 6)

ⁱⁱ **Table A2.** Macro-level cases included in each decade for the dependent variables of *Nation Citizen and World Citizen*

2010s
Armenia 2011 (WVS 6)
Armenia 2017 (WVS 7)
Azerbaijan 2011 (WVS 6)
Azerbaijan 2017 (WVS 7)
Belarus 2011 (WVS 6)
Belarus 2017 (WVS 7)
Estonia 2011 (WVS 6)
Estonia 2017 (WVS 7)
Georgia 2011/4 (WVS 6)
Georgia 2017 (WVS 7)
Kazakhstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Kazakhstan 2018 (WVS 7)
Kyrgyzstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Kyrgyzstan 2017 (WVS 7)
Latvia 2011 (ISSP 2013)
Lithuania 2011 (ISSP 2013)
Lithuania 2017 (WVS 7)
Moldova 2011 (WVS 6)
Russia 2011 (WVS 6)
Russia 2017 (WVS 7)
Tajikistan 2020 (WVS 7)
Ukraine 2011 (WVS 6)
Uzbekistan 2011 (WVS 6)

iii **Table A3.** Macro-level cases included in each decade for the dependent variable of *Level of Pride*

1990s	2000s	2010s
Armenia 1996 (WVS 3)	Armenia 2008 (EVS 2008)	Armenia 2011 (WVS 6)
Azerbaijan 1996/7 (WVS 3)	Azerbaijan 2008 (EVS 2008)	Armenia 2017 (WVS 7)
Belarus 1996 (WVS 3)	Belarus 2008 (EVS 2008)	Azerbaijan 2011 (WVS 6)
Belarus 1999 (EVS 1999)	Estonia 2008 (EVS 2008)	Azerbaijan 2017 (WVS 7)
Estonia 1990 (EVS 1990)	Georgia 2008 (EVS 2008)	Belarus 2011 (WVS 6)
Estonia 1996 (WVS 3)	Georgia 2009 (WVS 5)	Belarus 2017 (WVS 7)
Estonia 1999 (EVS 1999)	Kyrgyzstan 2003 (WVS 4)	Estonia 2011 (WVS 6)
Georgia 1996 (WVS 3)	Latvia 2008 (EVS 2008)	Estonia 2017 (WVS 7)
Latvia 1990 (EVS 1990)	Lithuania 2008 (EVS 2008)	Georgia 2011/4 (WVS 6)
Latvia 1996 (WVS 3)	Moldova 2003 (WVS 4)	Georgia 2017 (WVS 7)
Latvia 1999 (EVS 1999)	Moldova 2008 (EVS 2008)	Kazakhstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Lithuania 1996/7 (WVS 3)	Russia 2008 (EVS 2008)	Kazakhstan 2018 (WVS 7)
Lithuania 1999 (EVS 1999)	Ukraine 2006 (WVS 5)	Kyrgyzstan 2011 (WVS 6)
Moldova 1996 (WVS 3)	Ukraine 2008 (EVS 2008)	Kyrgyzstan 2017 (WVS 7)
Russia 1990 (WVS 2)		Latvia 2011 (ISSP 2013)
Russia 1996 (WVS 3)		Lithuania 2011 (ISSP 2013)
Russia 1999 (EVS 1999)		Lithuania 2017 (WVS 7)
Ukraine 1996 (WVS 3)		Moldova 2011 (WVS 6)
Ukraine 1999 (EVS 1999)		Russia 2011 (WVS 6)
		Russia 2017 (WVS 7)
		Tajikistan 2020 (WVS 7)
		Ukraine 2011 (WVS 6)
		Uzbekistan 2011 (WVS 6)

iv **Table A4.** Aggregated KOF Globalisation Index

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	45.74	-	-	-	49.18	-	63.77	68.60
Azerbaijan	-	36.69	-	-	-	50.98	-	60.07	65.24
Belarus	-	43.09	46.46	-	-	56.80	-	65.14	68.62
Estonia	46.98	65.42	71.19	-	-	80.43	-	82.08	83.89
Georgia	-	41.08	-	-	-	63.37	64.11	66.46	75.69
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60.46	64.68
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	50.69	-	-	-	61.33	63.94
Latvia	43.68	57.23	61.16	-	-	73.23	-	74.28	-
Lithuania	-	59.39	63.57	-	-	76.78	-	77.54	81.29
Moldova	-	44.05	-	52.40	-	64.48	-	65.81	-
Russia	44.82	59.91	62.46	-	-	69.26	-	70.32	72.57
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.08
Ukraine	-	53.41	59.46	-	67.22	70.86	-	72.94	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.10	-

Table A5. Economic KOF Globalisation Index

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	57.01	-	-	-	62.98	-	69.77	69.41
Azerbaijan	-	40.34	-	-	-	61.65	-	60.40	70.92
Belarus	-	42.51	44.69	-	-	49.79	-	56.89	62.99
Estonia	60.85	76.22	82.28	-	-	85.47	-	85.62	86.27
Georgia	-	47.56	-	-	-	73.69	71.63	70.70	82.02
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49.41	52.59
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	56.24	-	-	-	63.90	62.04
Latvia	49.28	68.00	70.40	-	-	77.59	-	79.21	-
Lithuania	-	65.18	68.55	-	-	74.78	-	75.50	79.36
Moldova	-	56.96	-	64.16	-	67.28	-	63.65	-
Russia	23.89	43.62	51.17	-	-	47.25	-	48.30	54.07
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43.93
Ukraine	-	43.08	53.83	-	54.85	59.25	-	61.55	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42.00	-

Table A6. Political KOF Globalisation Index

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	32.65	-	-	-	53.49	-	54.76	70.57
Azerbaijan	-	35.15	-	-	-	56.67	-	60.19	64.74
Belarus	-	46.38	50.88	-	-	60.82	-	72.69	75.22
Estonia	22.66	53.71	59.93	-	-	74.23	-	76.36	80.05
Georgia	-	33.46	-	-	-	54.72	55.34	55.85	69.41
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65.88	71.61
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	53.16	-	-	-	59.34	63.55
Latvia	26.83	43.75	51.65	-	-	64.96	-	65.62	-
Lithuania	-	55.32	61.30	-	-	77.74	-	77.33	79.20
Moldova	-	30.67	-	43.44	-	66.36	-	67.11	-
Russia	65.32	88.00	88.22	-	-	92.09	-	92.74	93.05
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49.28
Ukraine	-	71.57	76.64	-	84.75	86.86	-	86.77	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49.12	-

Table A7. Social KOF Globalisation Index

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	47.57	-	-	-	62.10	-	66.79	65.82
Azerbaijan	-	34.43	-	-	-	55.79	-	59.58	59.66
Belarus	-	40.14	43.48	-	-	59.38	-	65.18	67.07
Estonia	57.42	66.34	71.37	-	-	81.58	-	84.27	85.34
Georgia	-	42.29	-	-	-	61.58	65.44	73.30	75.64
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	66.10	69.83
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	42.66	-	-	-	60.74	66.23
Latvia	54.93	59.96	61.45	-	-	77.15	-	78.01	-
Lithuania	-	57.66	60.86	-	-	77.82	-	79.77	85.31
Moldova	-	44.51	-	49.59	-	59.79	-	66.69	-
Russia	45.26	48.11	47.99	-	-	68.45	-	69.94	70.60
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45.02
Ukraine	-	45.57	47.90	-	62.05	66.47	-	70.51	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.39	-

Table A8. Cultural KOF Globalisation Index

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	50.63	-	-	-	60.09	-	59.72	54.81
Azerbaijan	-	38.44	-	-	-	48.03	-	46.03	44.04
Belarus	-	36.64	40.35	-	-	52.66	-	53.36	49.81
Estonia	51.51	64.70	69.00	-	-	78.46	-	81.90	84.90
Georgia	-	41.86	-	-	-	53.67	55.04	62.93	61.78
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	57.32	60.87
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	41.99	-	-	-	50.48	52.46
Latvia	57.46	60.72	63.23	-	-	72.14	-	72.48	-
Lithuania	-	59.56	63.43	-	-	74.31	-	74.70	86.47
Moldova	-	49.93	-	53.45	-	55.77	-	61.94	-
Russia	55.30	53.75	51.97	-	-	71.54	-	71.99	67.56
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33.27
Ukraine	-	45.60	51.19	-	64.58	68.20	-	68.21	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.81	-

Table A9. GDP per capita in PPP values used at country-level in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	2322.467	-	-	-	7376.325	-	6803.483	8643.884
Azerbaijan	-	3623.860	-	-	-	14591.342	-	15861.326	16051.124
Belarus	-	5631.093	7119.187	-	-	14960.900	-	17152.522	17171.218
Estonia	10433.126	11651.324	13935.888	-	-	25435.414	-	24191.296	28996.778
Georgia	-	2634.237	-	-	-	6711.837	6498.234	7511.627	9706.345
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21128.019	23920.044
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	2302.261	-	-	-	2940.321	3432.474
Latvia	8756.480	8613.198	10560.713	-	-	21443.695	-	19816.914	-
Lithuania	-	9869.924	11605.618	-	-	23461.909	-	22751.706	29470.953
Moldova	-	2975.873	-	3232.607	-	4695.487	-	5013.369	-
Russia	20661.017	12364.754	12739.460	-	-	24020.233	-	24260.044	25007.641
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2896.760
Ukraine	-	4818.856	4691.467	-	7903.561	8835.300	-	8327.929	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5385.690	-

vi **Table A10.** Level of Democracy used at country-level in the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s.

Country	1990/91	1996	1999	2002/03	2006	2008	2009	2011	2017
Armenia	-	0.415	-	-	-	0.330	-	0.332	0.412
Azerbaijan	-	0.227	-	-	-	0.193	-	0.205	0.192
Belarus	-	0.502	0.314	-	-	0.231	-	0.208	0.270
Estonia	0.798	0.868	0.890	-	-	0.888	-	0.906	0.910
Georgia	-	0.381	-	-	-	0.528	0.557	0.544	0.668
Kazakhstan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.243	0.237
Kyrgyzstan	-	-	-	0.264	-	-	-	0.480	0.472
Latvia	0.590	0.819	0.853	-	-	0.804	-	0.856	-
Lithuania	-	0.866	0.844	-	-	0.849	-	0.830	0.798
Moldova	-	0.593	-	0.535	-	0.481	-	0.700	-
Russia	0.241	0.499	0.471	-	-	0.336	-	0.310	0.274
Tajikistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.174
Ukraine	-	0.584	0.437	-	0.616	0.635	-	0.521	-
Uzbekistan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.164	-

vii **Table A11.** Level of Peace used at country-level in the 2010s.

Country	2011	2017
Armenia	2.260	2.220
Azerbaijan	2.379	2.426
Belarus	2.283	2.141
Estonia	1.798	1.712
Georgia	2.558	2.084
Kazakhstan	2.137	1.992
Kyrgyzstan	2.296	2.216
Latvia	1.793	-
Lithuania	1.760	1.732
Moldova	1.892	-
Russia	2.966	3.047
Tajikistan	-	2.263
Ukraine	1.995	-
Uzbekistan	2.260	-

viii **TESTING FOR MEASUREMENT INVARIANCE**

My data analysis starts with the computation of 11 single country confirmatory factor files (CFAs) for the World Value survey wave 6 in the *R* program interface. My latent variable *national identity* is measured with the four binary-scale latent variables: *Fight for your country* (= named *Willingness to Fight*, “yes”, “no”), *Patriotism* (= named *Level of Pride*, “proud”, “not Proud”), *National Belonging 1* (= named *Nation Citizen*, “agree”, “disagree”), and *National Belonging 2* (= named *World Citizen*, “agree”, “disagree”). In order to test whether the WVS survey questionnaires in those 11 different former Soviet countries capture my latent variable *national identity* equivalent, I conducted one overall CFA for the baseline model 1, aggregating the WVS country data sets of the 11 countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, with a sample of 12,812 respondents, for the year of observation 2011 (Davidov 2009, 2010: 49; Ariely and Davidov 2012; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). In line with previous scholars (Davidov 2009, 2010; Chen 2007), I used the comparative fit index (CFI) together with the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) to indicate to what extent all 11 countries measure the four dimensions as equivalent or not. As a rule of thumb, a CFI level of at least 0.90 is required

to accept a model, while a value of at least 0.95 is required to accept the model fit as *good* (Hox 2010: 307; Ariely 2011: 556; Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014; Davidov 2009: 94, 2011). In the case of the root mean square error of approximation, an RMSEA of less than 0.08 is required to accept a model, and an RMSEA of less than 0.05 is required to define the model fit as *good* (Hox 2010: 307; Ariely 2011: 556; Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014; Davidov 2009: 94, 2011). The comparison of the baseline model CFA with the single country CFA in the table below reveals that in most countries the measurements of the different dimensions of my latent variable *national identity* have *good fits* with and sufficient factor loading on the constructs. All countries except Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have an RMSEA smaller than 0.05 or a CFI larger than 0.95. This indicates that the baseline model 1 fits the aggregated data of all the 11 countries *well*. Furthermore, the overall CFI together with the overall RMSEA is 0.999 and 0.005 respectively; this again supports the baseline model 1 and indicates that the measurement of my latent variable of *national identity* in each of the 11 former Soviet countries seems to be equivalent.

2011	RMSEA	CFI	ΔRMSEA	ΔCFI
Baseline Model 1	0.005	0.999	-	-
Armenia	0.002	1.000	0.003	0.001
Azerbaijan	0.098	0.969	0.093	0.030
Belarus	0.053	0.973	0.048	0.026
Georgia	0.000	1.000	0.005	0.001
Estonia	0.014	0.998	0.009	0.001
Kazakhstan	0.000	1.000	0.005	0.001
Kyrgyzstan	0.050	0.950	0.045	0.049
Moldova	0.000	1.000	0.005	0.001
Russia	0.026	0.990	0.021	0.009
Ukraine	0.046	0.976	0.041	0.023
Uzbekistan	0.050	0.794	0.045	0.205

However, in order to explore whether my latent variable of national identity compares like with like across the 11 former Soviet countries, I needed to conduct a Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis MGCFA for all ten countries, which assesses two out of three^{viii} important hierarchical levels of measurement equivalence: “configural” and “metric” invariance (Davidov 2010: 91, 2009; Ariely 2011; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998: 80). The lowest level of invariance “configural invariance” captures to what extent my four dimensions of *national identity* are measured by the same indicators across the 11 post-Soviet countries (Davidov 2010: 91, 2009; Ariely 2011; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998: 80). In short, it measures if my four variables of *national identity* have been captured in the same way by the WVS interviewers in all 11 countries. In doing so, the MGCFA verifies that these four items (Willingness to Fight, Patriotism, National Belonging 1 and National Belonging 2) exhibit the same configuration of loadings across the eleven former Soviet countries (Davidov 2010: 91, 2009; Ariely 2011; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998: 80). However, “configural invariance” neither tells us if people living in these post-Soviet countries understand the four dimensions of *national identity* in the same way nor if those four dimensions are measured on the same scale (Davidov 2010: 90ff, 2009; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998; Davidov et al. 2012: 559, Ariely and Davidov 2012: 367). For that, the next higher level of invariance, “metric invariance” is required (Davidov 2009: 91f, 2010; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). The test for “metric invariance” helps us to understand to what extent former Soviet citizens living in different countries comprehend the WVS questionnaires similarly (Davidov and Ariely 2012: 367). Only if both “configural” and “metric equivalence” (= “metric noninvariance”) holds the comparison of regression coefficients across the 11 post-Soviet countries for the measurement occasion of 2011 seems to be justified (Davidov 2010: 91f; Davidov and Ariely 2012: 367; Davidov et al. 2012 559f; Davidov et al 2018: 632; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998). “Metric noninvariance” is evidenced by a negative change in CFI smaller than 0.01, supplemented by a negative change in the RMSEA larger than 0.015 compared with the “configural invariance model” (Zercher et al. 2015: 209; Hirschfeld and von Brachel 2014; Ariely 2011; Davidov 2009, 2010).

2011	RMSEA	CFI	Δ RMSEA	Δ CFI
Baseline Model 1	0.005	0.999	-	-
Configural Invariance	0.038	0.979	0.038	0.021
Metric Invariance	0.040	0.945	0.002	0.034

The test for the “configural invariance” indicates that the baseline model 1 fits the data well, as illustrated in the smaller table above. Because the RMSEA at 0.038 is still smaller than 0.05 and the CFI at 0.979 is still larger than 0.95. Given the sample size of 12,812 respondents. The small table above shows that the MGCFA for the baseline model 1 indicates partial “metric” equivalence, since the negative change in CIF is larger than 0.01, but the negative change in the RMSEA is smaller than 0.015 (namely 0.002) compared with the “configural invariance model”. Finally, the overall CIF of the “metric invariance model” is still larger than 0.9. This implies on the one hand that my latent variable *national identity* has equal scale intervals across the 11 countries and on the other hand that their citizens understand the WVS questionnaires similarly (Davidov et al 2018: 632; Davidov and Ariely 2012: 367; Davidov et al. 2012: 559f; Davidov 2010: 91f; Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998).

ix **Figure A1. Participant recruitment sheet for local agents**

Organisation of Group Interviews in Kostanay. Period 31st May – 14th June 2019

Date	Group Interview number	Gender	Advantaged or Disadvantage by Globalization	Suggested Participants by local Agent for each Group Interview/ Min 2 to Max 7 participants (Name & Age & Education & Profession)
	Group 1	Female	Advantaged	
	Group 2	Female	Disadvantage	
	Group 3	Male	Advantaged	
	Group 4	Male	Disadvantage	
	Group 5	Mixed	Advantaged	
	Group 6	Mixed	Disadvantaged	

How to select the participants? Which participants does the study consider to be Advantage or Disadvantaged by Globalization?

The Criteria for Advantaged:

- Some form of higher education
- Entrepreneurs &/or qualified Employees working in sectors open to international competition who welcome cultural diversity

The Criteria for Disadvantage:

- No higher education
- Entrepreneurs &/or Employees working in local, traditional sectors, that do not face international competition (example Butcher, Baker, Sales Person in local shop, primary school Teacher in local school.)

Additionally please try to organise small groups (2-3) or individual interview with young people (18-29).

x Questioning Schedule for Interviews before fieldwork:

Ethical information given to the participants

Please bear in mind that it is up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this group discussion. At the beginning of this group discussion you will be asked to sign a consent form. Additionally, you will be asked to give verbal consent if you still agree to take part in this group interview. Your verbal consent will be recorded on tape. The group discussions will last for a maximum of one hour and will be audio-recorded. No sensitive questions regarding the nature of politics in Kazakhstan or any other country will be raised, so the risks to you involved in this study are minimal.

To ensure your confidentiality and protection, the data gathered from you during the group discussions will be completely anonymized and will be kept confidentially and securely in electronic form for a period of ten years after the completion of this research project. Your name will be removed during the data analysis process and replaced with a code and, thus, you will be de-identified. Laptops and other devices (such as tapes) are encrypted, under strict password protection, and are

stored in Google Drive, for which the interviewer's university has a security agreement. Data generated by the study must be retained in accordance with the university's policy on academic integrity.

However, if you are unhappy with your participation in the group discussion afterwards, you are still free to either have your interview answers de-identified and anonymised, or to have your answers completely removed from the research.

Opening question

1. *"Tell us your first name or pseudonym, age, where you are from and how many times you have travelled abroad within the last year."*

Назовите, пожалуйста, Ваш имя, сколько вам лет, откуда вы (город), и сколько раз вы были за границей в последний год?

Introductory questions

2. *"Do you use social media such as Facebook, VKontakte, Odnaklassniki, Twitter, Instagram? Often?"*

Вы используете Фейсбук, ВКонтакте, Одноклассники, Твиттер, Instagram? Как часто?

3. *"Do you think it is good that people from different parts of the world can talk to people in Kazakhstan on social media?"*

Как Вы думаете, это хорошо что у людей из разных странах есть возможность общаться с жителями Казахстана в социальных сетях?

4. *"Which languages do you use to communicate with other people on social media and online?"*

Какие языки Вы используете в социальных сетях и онлайн?

Transition questions

5. *"Are there times when these exchanges/interactions via social media could be a problem?"*

А такие взаимодействия с иностранцами в социальных сетях могут стать проблематичными?

6. *"Do you think that it is good that foreign countries can invest in Kazakhstan or own Kazakh businesses?"*

Как Вы думаете, это хорошо что у зарубежных стран есть возможность инвестировать в Казахстан или владеть бизнесом в Казахстане?

7. *"Do you think it is good that people from outside can come and visit or even live in Kazakhstan?"*

Как Вы думаете, это хорошо что иностранцы могут посещать Казахстан или даже могут жить здесь?

Key questions

8. *"Do you think Kazakh culture may change because of influences from abroad?"*
Как Вы думаете, может ли культура Казахстана меняться через контакт с иностранными культурами?
9. *"Do you think this is a good or bad thing?"*
Как Вы думаете, это хорошо или плохо?
10. *"Do we have to do something to protect Kazakh culture in today's globalised world?"*
Нужно ли что-то делать для защиты культуры Казахстана в современном глобализированном мире?
11. *"Do you identify yourself more as Kazakhstani or Kazakh?"*
Вы чувствуете себя больше как Казахом или Казахстанцем?
12. *"What does it mean to be Kazakh or a Kazakhstani in today's world?"*
Что значит, быть Казахом или Казахстанцем в современном глобализированном мире?

Closing questions

13. *"Have you already heard the word 'globalisation'?"*
А Вы уже слышали слова глобализация?
14. *"What do you associate with the word globaliation?"*
С чем Вы ассоциируете мировую глобализацию?
15. *"Do you perceive globalisation to be something positive or negative? Why do you think it is something positive or why is it something negative?"*
Для Вас глобализация что-то позитивное или негативное? Если да, то почему? Если нет, то почему?

Table A12. National identity coding output Excel sheet for female Kazakhstani youth (18-30 years old)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Kostanay	SI1	May-31	K222 Receptionist	E&R	no	yes		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG3	Mar-06	K228 Local Teacher	E,K,P&Lit	yes	no		yes		<>		no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG4	Jun-04	UKR21 Dentist/student	RU	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI2	Jun-07	RU28 Receptionist	E,TR,G,R	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI3	Jun-12	K223 Receptionist	E,F&R	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen
Almaty	FG7	Jun-17	K222 Student	R,K&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no	<>	civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG7	Jun-17	BL23 Student	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG7	Jun-17	K223 Student	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG8	Jun-18	K219 Hairdresser	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen & Modern Woman
	FG8	Jun-18	K228 Hairdresser	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI9	Jun-18	K228 Uni Admin	E,P&K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	K227 PhD Candidate	E&K,R	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG10	Jun-27	K230 Receptionist	E&R	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG10	Jun-27	K224 Receptionist	K&R&E	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG13	Jul-01	K220 Accountant	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG13	Jul-01	UKR27 Accountant	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG13	Jul-01	K228 Accountant	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	SI21	Jul-04	K228 Administration	R,E&K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		ethnic	Anti-elite Kazakh identity
	SI22	Jul-04	K224 Administration	R	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI23	Jul-04	K223 Cleaning lady	K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes	<>	ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
Shymkent	FG15	Jul-04	K218 Drycleaning lady	K	no	no	<>	yes	<>	<>	<>	no	<>		yes	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI24	Jul-12	RU18 Receptionist	R	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI25	Jul-12	KOR18 Receptionist	K,P&E	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG18	Jul-12	K227 Assistant doctor	R&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG18	Jul-12	K223 Nurse	K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	SI27	Jul-12	K219 Receptionist	R,K,E,C,TR	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen & Modern Woman
	FG22	Jul-13	K221 Student	K,P&E	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG23	Jul-13	K228 Housewife	K&KOR	no	no		yes				no	<>		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG25	Jul-14	K223 Student	R&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Aktau	SI28	Jul-14	K221 Receptionist	R&K	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG26	Jul-18	K221 Receptionist	R&E	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG26	Jul-18	K223 Receptionist	R&K	no	yes	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG28	Jul-19	K220 Hotel-Intern	K,P&E	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	FG28	Jul-19	K219 Hotel-Intern	K,P&E	no	yes	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	Modern Kazakhstani Woman
	SI34	Jul-19	K218 Student	R,E&K	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG31	Jul-20	K229 Nurse	K	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	SI38	Jul-20	K220 Receptionist	R,CH&K	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R,E,CH&K	yes	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-elite Kazakh identity
Aktau	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R,E&K	no	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-elite Kazakh identity
	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R	no	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-elite Kazakh identity

Table A13. National identity coding output Excel sheet for male Kazakhstani youth (18-30 years old)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Kostanay	FG1	Jun-01	RU22 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG1	Jun-01	KZ20 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG1	Jun-01	MDL21 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no			yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG1	Jun-01	BEL24 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG4	Jun-04	RU22 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG4	Jun-04	KZ24 Dentist student	R&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG4	Jun-04	KZ25 Dentist student	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		world	World Citizen
	FG5	Jun-05	KZ22 Student	R,E,CK&G	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Almaty	SI14	Jun-24	KZ22 Student	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	SI15	Jun-24	KZ20 Student	R&E	yes	no		no				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	KZ29 Postdoc	R,E&K	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	SI17	Jun-28	KZ28 Receptionist	K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	SI18	Jun-29	RU24 Entrepreneur	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI19	Jun-30	KZ29 Postdoc	R,E&K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG11	Jul-01	KZ25 Administration	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	FG12	Jul-01	KOR20 Mechanic	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		world	World Citizen
	FG12	Jul-01	KZ19 Mechanic	R&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG12	Jul-01	RU21 Mechanic	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG12	Jul-01	GE24 Mechanic	R,E,G&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	SI26	Jul-12	KZ27 Stomatologue	R&K	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen
Shymkent	FG20	Jul-13	RU29 Teacher	K&R	no	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	<>	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI29	Jul-14	KZ 25 Receptionist	R,E&K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG24	Jul-14	KZ19 College student	K,R&E	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG24	Jul-14	KZ21 College student	K,R&E	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	SI33	Jul-19	KZ24 Receptionist	R	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Aktau	FG30	Jul-20	KZ23 Hotel-barman	R,E,G&K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		world	World Citizen
	FG34	Jul-20	KZ24 Bank employee	R	yes	no		no				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity

Table A14. National identity coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani women in their thirties and early forties

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Kostanay	FG2	Jun-02	RU34 Fabric worker	RU	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG3	Jun-03	KZ34 Teacher	RU&E	yes	no	<>	yes			<>	no	no		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG3	Jun-03	KZ38 Teacher	KZ	no	no	<>	yes			<>	no	no		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG3	Jun-03	KZ34 Teacher	RU&E	yes	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	no	no		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG3	Jun-03	KZ39 Teacher	RU&E	yes	no	<>	yes	<>			no	<>	<>	<>		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG6	Jun-09	RU35 Foreign company	R&E	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG6	Jun-09	RU34 Housewife	R	yes	no	<>	yes			<>	no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Almaty	SI6	Jun-17	KZ38 Administration	R&E	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	KZ34 Reseracher	R&E	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	SI20	Jul-02	KZ38 Housewife	R,E&K	yes	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
Shymkent	FG18	Jul-12	KZ35 Doctor	R&K	yes	no		yes			<>	no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG18	Jul-12	UZ36 Nurse	U,K&R	no	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	no	<>	<>	<>	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG19	Jul-13	KOR40 Teacher	R	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG19	Jul-13	T&41 Teacher	R, Tatarski	no	no		yes	<>			no	no		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG25	Jul-14	KZ31 Housewife	R,E&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Aktau	FG30	Jul-20	RU35 Foreign company	R,TR,U,E,F	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		yes		world	World Citizen
	FG31	Jul-20	KZ37 Jobless	K&R	no	no		yes		<>	<>	no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG33	Jul-20	KZ33 Nurse	K&R	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG34	Jul-20	RU37 Bank employee	R	yes	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		no	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity

Table A15. National identity coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani men in their thirties and early forties

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Kostanay	FG5	Jun-05	RU38 Assistant dentist	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG6	Jun-09	K233 Entrepreneur	R&E	yes	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Almaty	SI10	Jun-20	K237 Professor	R,E&K	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI13	Jun-21	K231 MA student	R,E&K	no	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
Astana	SI16	Jun-26	K232 Entrepreneur	K,R&E	yes	no	<>	yes			<>	yes	no		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	FG11	Jul-01	UKR31 Sales-Manager	R&E	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG11	Jul-01	K232 Financial Administration	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	FG11	Jul-01	K232 Administration	R	yes	no		yes			<>	no	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
Shymkent	SI30	Jul-14	K235 Receptionist	R&E,K	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
Aktau	FG27	Jul-19	RU32 Yoga teacher	R&E	yes	yes		yes				no	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG32	Jul-20	K233 Taxi-driver	K&R	no	no		yes			<>	no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG32	Jul-20	K235 Hairdresser	K&R	no	no		yes			<>	no	yes		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
	SI37	Jul-20	K2 34 Ingenieur	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity

Table A16. National identity coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani women (aged over 45)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Kostanay	FG2	Jun-02	RU62 Pensioner	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG3	Jun-03	K255 Teacher	K,E&R	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG3	Jun-03	K2 62 Teacher	K	yes	no		yes		<>		no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI4	Jun-03	Bashkirk46 Gymnistructor	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Almaty	SI7	Jun-18	Dunganka53 Administration	R&E	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI8	Jun-18	K2late 40s Researcher	R&E	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Astana	FG14	Jul-03	RU43 Researcher	R&E	yes	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		no		world	World Citizen
	FG16	Jul-04	K243 Cleaning lady	K	no	no	<>	yes			<>	no	yes		yes	<>	ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG16	Jul-04	K258 Cleaning lady	K	no	no	<>	yes			<>	no	yes		yes	<>	ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG16	Jul-04	K248 Cleaning lady	K&R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG17	Jul-04	K255 Housewife	R&K	yes	no	<>	yes				yes	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
Shymkent	FG18	Jul-12	K250 Gynaecologist	R&K	no	no	<>	yes				no			yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG19	Jul-13	K253 Teacher	K&R	yes	no		yes				no	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG22	Jul-13	K257 Teacher	K&R	no	no	<>	yes			<>	no	yes		yes	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG22	Jul-13	K267 Pensioner	R&K	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG22	Jul-13	RU48 Teacher	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Aktau	FG23	Jul-13	K243 Housewife	K&R	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	SI32	Jul-19	UKP58 International dancer	R&E	yes	yes		yes				yes	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	S35	Jul-20	Lesgen54 Fishmonger	R&Les	no	no		yes				no			yes	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	S36	Jul-20	RU48 Fishmonger	R	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		no	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG31	Jul-20	K259 Ticket inspector	K&R	no	no		yes				no			yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG33	Jul-20	K258 Nurse	K&R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity

Table A17. National identity coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani men (aged over 45)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Soc0	Soc1	Soc2	Soc3	Soc4	Eco1	Eco2	Eco3	Cult1	Cult2	Cult3	Glob3	Identity	Narrative
Almaty	SI5	Jun-16	K255 Shopkeeper	R	no	no	no	no				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI11	Jun-20	K245 Professor	R,K&E	yes	no	yes					yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	SI12	Jun-20	K243 Professor	K,E&E	yes	no	yes					yes	yes		no		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
Astana	FG14	Jul-03	K242 NGOworker	R	no	no	<>	yes				yes	<>	<>	<>		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG15	Jul-04	TAJK45 Drycleaner	K&R	no	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	no	no		yes	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG17	Jul-04	K258 Pensioner	K&R	no	no	<>	yes				no	no		yes		ethnic	Anti-globalist Kazakh identity
Shymkent	FG19	Jul-13	K258 Teacher	R&K	yes	no	<>	yes	<>			no	yes		yes		ethnic	Rural Kazakh identity
	FG20	Jul-13	K254 Teacher	R&K	no	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG20	Jul-13	RU56 Teacher	R	no	no	<>	yes	<>	<>	<>	no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG21	Jul-13	Tatar43 Housekeeper	R	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG21	Jul-43	RU53 Ward	R	no	no	<>	yes				no	yes		yes		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
Aktau	SI31	Jul-18	K241 CEO	R&E	yes	no		yes				yes	yes		no		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG27	Jul-19	RU44	R&E	no	no		yes				no	yes		yes		world	World Citizen
	FG29	Jul-20	RU44 Business man	R,E,G&	yes	no	<>	no		<>	<>	yes	no		<>		civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity
	FG29	Jul-20	RU44 Business man	R,E,G&	yes	no	<>	yes		<>	<>	yes	no		<>	<>	civic	State-sponsored Kazakhstani identity

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Table A18. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for female Kazakhstani youth (18-30 years old)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Kostanay	SI1	May-31	K222 Receptionist	E&R	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>	<>
	FG3	Mar-06	K228 Local Teacher	E,K,R&Lit	yes		Communication networks	<>	<>
	FG4	Jun-04	UKR21 Dentiststudent	RU	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	SI2	Jun-07	RU28 Receptionist	E,TR,G,R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	SI3	Jun-12	K223 Receptionist	E,F&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Borderless world	<>
Almaty	FG7	Jun-17	K222 Student	R,K&E	no	<>	<>	<>	<>
	FG7	Jun-17	BL23 Student	R&E	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	FG7	Jun-17	K223 Student	R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	<>	<>
	FG8	Jun-18	K218 Hairdresser	R	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Capitalist economy
	FG8	Jun-18	K228 Hairdresser	R&E	yes		Borderless world	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	SI9	Jun-18	K228 Ulni Admin	E,R&K	yes		Communication networks	Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	K227 PhD Candidate	E&K,R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	FG10	Jun-27	K230 Receptionist	E&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Capitalist economy	<>
	FG10	Jun-27	K224 Receptionist	K&R&E	yes		Borderless world		Communication networks
	FG13	Jul-01	K220 Accountant	R	yes		Borderless world	<>	<>
	FG13	Jul-01	UKR27 Accountant	R&E	yes		Communication networks	Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG13	Jul-01	K228 Accountant	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Borderless world	<>
	SI21	Jul-04	K228 Administration	R,E&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Borderless world	<>
	SI22	Jul-04	K224 Administration	R	yes		Borderless world	<>	<>
	SI23	Jul-04	K223 Cleaning lady	K	no	<>	<>	<>	<>
	FG15	Jul-04	K218 Drycleaning lady	K	no	<>	<>	<>	<>
	FG15	Jul-04	K218 Drycleaning lady	K	no	<>	<>	<>	<>
Shymkent	SI24	Jul-12	RU18 Receptionist	R	yes		Capitalist economy	<>	<>
	SI25	Jul-12	KDR18 Receptionist	K,R&E	no		Capitalist economy	Capitalist economy	<>
	FG18	Jul-12	K227 Assistant doctor	R&K	no		<>	<>	<>
	FG18	Jul-12	K223 Nurse	K	no		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>	<>
	SI27	Jul-12	K219 Receptionist	R,K,E,C,TR	yes		Borderless world	<>	<>
	FG22	Jul-13	K221 Student	K,R&E	yes		Global market	Borderless world	Capitalist economy
	FG23	Jul-13	K228 Housewife	K&KDR	no		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>	<>
	FG25	Jul-14	K223 Student	R&K	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	<>
	SI28	Jul-14	K221 Receptionist	R&K	yes		Communication networks	Borderless world	<>
	FG25	Jul-14	K221 Receptionist	R&K	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
Aktau	FG26	Jul-18	K221 Receptionist	R&E	no		<>	<>	<>
	FG26	Jul-18	K223 Receptionist	R&K	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>	<>
	FG28	Jul-19	K220 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	<>
	FG28	Jul-19	K219 Hotel-Intern	K,R&E	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Capitalist economy
	SI34	Jul-19	K218 Student	R,E&K	yes		Borderless world	Communication networks	Capitalist economy
	FG31	Jul-20	K229 Nurse	K	no		Capitalist economy	<>	<>
	SI38	Jul-20	K220 Receptionist	R,CH&K	no		Borderless world	<>	<>
	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R,E,CH&K	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R,E&K	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	FG34	Jul-20	K226 Bank Employee	R	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>

Table A19. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for male Kazakhstani youth (18-30 years old)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Kostanay	FG1	Jun-01	RU22 Dentist student	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG1	Jun-01	K220 Dentist student	R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG1	Jun-01	MOL21 Dentist student	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Borderless world	↔
	FG1	Jun-01	BEL24 Dentist student	R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG4	Jun-04	RU22 Dentist student	R	no		↔	↔	↔
	FG4	Jun-04	K224 Dentist student	R&K	yes		↔	↔	↔
	FG4	Jun-04	K225 Dentist student	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG5	Jun-05	K222 Student	R,E,CK&G	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	↔
Almaty	SI4	Jun-24	K222 Student	R&E	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	↔
	SI5	Jun-24	K220 Student	R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	↔	↔
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	K229 Postdoc	R,E&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	SI7	Jun-28	K228 Receptionist	K	yes		Borderless world	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	SI8	Jun-29	RU24 Entrepreneur	R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks
	SI8	Jun-30	K229 Postdoc	R,E&K	yes		Communication networks	Borderless world	Capitalist economy
	FG11	Jul-01	K225 Administration	R	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG12	Jul-01	KOR20 Mechanic	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG12	Jul-01	K219 Mechanic	R&K	yes		Capitalist economy	↔	↔
	FG12	Jul-01	RU21 Mechanic	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	Borderless world
	FG12	Jul-01	GE24 Mechanic	R,E,G&K	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Borderless world
Shymkent	SI26	Jul-12	K227 Stomatologue	R&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG20	Jul-13	RU29 Teacher	K&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	SI29	Jul-14	K2 25 Receptionist	R,E&K	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG24	Jul-14	K219 College student	K,R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	↔	↔
	FG24	Jul-14	K221 College student	K,R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Aktau	SI33	Jul-19	K224 Receptionist	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks
	FG30	Jul-20	K223 Hotel-barman	R,E,G&K	yes		Borderless world	↔	↔
	FG34	Jul-20	K224 Bank employee	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔

Table A20. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani women in their thirties and early forties

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Kostanay	FG2	Jun-02	RU34 Fabric worker	RU	yes		Capitalist economy	↔	↔
	FG3	Jun-03	K234 Teacher	RU&E	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG3	Jun-03	K238 Teacher	KZ	no		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG3	Jun-03	K234 Teacher	RU&E	yes		Communication networks	↔	↔
	FG3	Jun-03	K239 Teacher	RU&E	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	↔
	FG6	Jun-09	RU35 Foreign company	R&E	yes		Global Warming	Borderless world	↔
	FG6	Jun-09	RU34 Housewife	R	yes		Atomic Bomb	↔	↔
Almaty	SI6	Jun-17	K238 Administration	R&E	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks
Astana	FG9	Jun-26	K234 Reseracher	R&E	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks
	SI20	Jul-02	K238 Housewife	R,E&K	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔	↔
Shymkent	FG18	Jul-12	K235 Doctor	R&K	yes		Communication networks	Global Ecological prob., Atom Bomb&Aral sea	Capitalist economy
	FG18	Jul-12	U236 Nurse	UK&R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG19	Jul-13	KOR40 Teacher	R	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Capitalist economy
	FG19	Jul-13	Tal41 Teacher	R, Talarski	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG25	Jul-14	K231 Housewife	R,E&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Aktau	FG30	Jul-20	RU35 Foreign company	R,TR,U,E,F	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Borderless world
	FG31	Jul-20	K237 Jobless	K&R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG33	Jul-20	K233 Nurse	K&R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG34	Jul-20	RU37 Bank employee	R	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔

Table A21. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani men in their thirties and early forties

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Kostanay	FG5	Jun-05	RU08 Assistant dentist	R	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	↔
	FG6	Jun-09	K233 Entrepreneur	R&E	yes		Communication networks	Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Almaty	SI10	Jun-20	K237 Professor	R,E&K	yes		Economic development	Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	SI13	Jun-21	K231 MA student	R,E&K	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	↔
Astana	SI16	Jun-26	K232 Entrepreneur	K,R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG11	Jul-01	UKF01 Sales-Manager	R&E	yes		Borderless world	↔	↔
	FG11	Jul-01	K232 Financial Administration	R	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG11	Jul-01	K232 Administration	R	yes		Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
Shymkent	SI30	Jul-14	K235 Receptionist	R&E,K	no		Borderless world	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Aktau	FG27	Jul-19	RU32 Yoga teacher	R&E	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	Communication networks
	FG32	Jul-20	K233 Taxi-driver	K&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG32	Jul-20	K235 Hairdresser	K&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	SI37	Jul-20	K234 Ingeneur	R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	↔

Table A22. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani women (aged over 45)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Kostanay	FG2	Jun-02	RU62 Pensioner	R	yes		Borderless world	Capitalist economy	Communication networks
	FG3	Jun-03	K255 Teacher	K,E&R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	↔
	FG3	Jun-03	K262 Teacher	K	yes		Capitalist economy		↔
	SI4	Jun-03	Bashkinka46 Gymnistructor	R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
Almaty	SI7	Jun-18	Dunganka53 Administration	R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	SI8	Jun-18	KZlate 40's Researcher	R&E	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Ecology
Astana	FG14	Jul-03	RU43 Researcher	R&E	yes		Capitalist economy	↔	↔
	FG16	Jul-04	K243 Cleaning lady	K	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG16	Jul-04	K258 Cleaning lady	K	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG16	Jul-04	K248 Cleaning lady	K&R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG17	Jul-04	K255 Housewife	R&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
Shymkent	FG18	Jul-12	K250 Gynaecologist	R&K	yes		One planet/ Ecology	Capitalist economy	Communication networks
	FG19	Jul-13	K253 Teacher	K&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	↔
	FG22	Jul-13	K257 Teacher	K&R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG22	Jul-13	K267 Pensioner	R&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
	FG22	Jul-13	RU48 Teacher	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
	FG23	Jul-13	K243 Housewife	K&R	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	↔
Aktau	SI32	Jul-19	UKF68 International dancer	R&E	yes		Ecology	Communication networks	Capitalist economy
	S35	Jul-20	Lesgen54 Fishmonger	R&Les	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	S36	Jul-20	RU48 Fishmonger	R	no	↔	↔	↔	↔
	FG31	Jul-20	K259 Ticket inspector	K&R	no		↔	↔	↔
	FG33	Jul-20	K258 Nurse	K&R	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation

Table A23. Globalisation coding output Excel sheet for Kazakhstani men (aged over 45)

Place	IN	Date	Personal details	LANG	Glob1	Glob3	Glob2 FIRST	Glob2 SECOND	Glob2 THIRD
Almaty	SI5	Jun-16	K255 Shopkeeper	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Westernisation
	SI11	Jun-20	K245 Professor	R,K&E	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks
	SI12	Jun-20	K243 Professor	K,E&E	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks	<>
Astana	FG14	Jul-03	K242 NGDworker	R	yes		Capitalist economy	Communication networks	<>
	FG15	Jul-04	T.A.J.K45 Drycleaner	K&R	no	<>	<>	<>	<>
	FG17	Jul-04	K258 Pensioner	K&R	yes		Capitalist economy	Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation
Shymkent	FG19	Jul-13	K258 Teacher	R&K	yes		Capitalist economy	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>
	FG20	Jul-13	K254 Teacher	R&K	yes		Borderless world	Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Protect KZ culture
	FG20	Jul-13	RJ56 Teacher	R	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Communication networks	Capitalist economy
	FG21	Jul-13	Tatar43 Housekeeper	R	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Widening rift btw. Poor and rich	Capitalist economy
	FG21	Jul-13	RJ53 Ward	R	no		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	<>	<>
Aktau	SI31	Jul-18	K241 CEO	R&E	yes		Communication networks	Capitalist economy	<>
	FG27	Jul-19	RJ44	R&E	yes		Equation of globalisation with westernisation	Threat to KZ culture (LGBTQ)	<>
	FG29	Jul-20	RJ44 Business man	R,E,G&K	yes		Capitalist economy	<>	<>
	FG29	Jul-20	RJ44 Business man	R,E,G&K	no	<>	<>	<>	<>

xiii **Table A24.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.827 (1.745)	6.605 ** (2.362)	4.740 (2.685)	2.650 (1.912)
Gender (f)	-0.841 *** (0.032)	0.157 *** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 *** (0.041)	-0.100 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.093 (0.050)	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.128 *** (0.035)	0.031 (0.044)	0.123 ** (0.044)	0.162 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.161 *** (0.042)	-0.247 *** (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	-0.180 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 *** (0.042)	-0.316 *** (0.054)	-0.010 (0.053)	-0.242 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.411 (0.249)	0.142 (0.419)	0.450 (0.397)	-0.540 ** (0.196)
Globalisation	0.002 (0.033)	-0.074 (0.044)	-0.100 * (0.050)	-0.032 (0.035)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.030)	0.011 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.024)
Democracy	-0.937 (1.245)	0.050 (1.558)	3.989 * (1.800)	0.864 (1.287)
Peace	0.041 (0.526)	0.493 (0.714)	1.125 (0.835)	-0.027 (0.596)
Urban*Globalisation	0.001 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.007 (0.003)
AIC	27550.076	20336.600	20136.441	39331.873
BIC	27665.078	20453.552	20254.174	39448.901
Log Likelihood	-13761.038	-10154.300	-10054.220	-19651.937
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.174	0.218	0.126

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xiv **Table A25.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *gender and globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	3.348 (1.758)	7.110 ** (2.360)	5.064 (2.686)	2.598 (1.921)
Gender (f)	-1.614 *** (0.254)	-0.475 (0.393)	-0.190 (0.353)	-0.328 (0.184)
Age: 30-49	-0.145 *** (0.041)	-0.101 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.162 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.092 (0.050)	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.238 *** (0.033)
Education	0.124 *** (0.035)	0.030 (0.044)	0.122 ** (0.044)	0.159 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.163 *** (0.042)	-0.249 *** (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	-0.180 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.177 *** (0.042)	-0.318 *** (0.054)	-0.009 (0.053)	-0.246 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.328 *** (0.032)	-0.307 *** (0.042)	-0.097 * (0.043)	-0.038 (0.027)
Globalisation	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.081 (0.044)	-0.104 * (0.050)	-0.032 (0.036)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.001 (0.030)	0.011 (0.034)	-0.031 (0.025)
Democracy	-0.918 (1.249)	0.019 (1.552)	3.966 * (1.798)	0.871 (1.291)
Peace	0.040 (0.528)	0.487 (0.712)	1.118 (0.834)	-0.021 (0.598)
Gender*Globalisation	0.011 (0.004)	0.009 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.003)
AIC	27540.625	20335.152	20137.918	39336.885
BIC	27655.628	20452.104	20255.652	39453.913
Log Likelihood	-13756.312	-10153.576	-10054.959	-19654.443
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.103	0.173	0.218	0.127

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xv **Table A26.** Multilevel analyses for the direct effect of economic globalisation on respondents' willingness to fight for their nation in the 1990s and 2010s

willingness to Fight:	1990s	2010s
Intercept	4.342 *** (1.030)	2.482 (1.573)
Gender (f)	-0.823 *** (0.042)	-0.841 *** (0.032)
Age: 30-49	0.214 *** (0.053)	-0.146 *** (0.041)
Age: 50-91	-0.354 *** (0.053)	-0.424 *** (0.041)
Education	0.045 (0.051)	0.128 *** (0.035)
Lower Middle Class	-0.070 (0.060)	-0.160 *** (0.042)
Working Class	-0.305 *** (0.061)	-0.171 *** (0.042)
Urban	-0.099 * (0.041)	-0.329 *** (0.032)
Economic Globalisation	-0.051 (0.030)	0.008 (0.018)
Economic Development	-0.041 (0.042)	-0.030 (0.016)
Democracy	1.974 (1.861)	-1.196 (1.034)
Peace		0.065 (0.495)
AIC	16366.770	27547.999
BIC	16461.232	27654.788
Log Likelihood	-8171.385	-13761.000
Individual-level N	19377	27296
Macro-level N	15	21
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.130	0.102

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

xvi **Table A27.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of economic globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *economic globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.560 (1.572)	2.678 (2.230)	2.442 (2.677)	3.189 (1.685)
Gender (f)	-0.840 *** (0.032)	0.156 *** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 *** (0.041)	-0.101 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.425 *** (0.041)	0.094 (0.050)	0.295 *** (0.050)	-0.238 *** (0.033)
Education	0.128 *** (0.035)	0.031 (0.044)	0.124 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.161 *** (0.042)	-0.248 *** (0.054)	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.170 *** (0.042)	-0.319 *** (0.054)	-0.006 (0.053)	-0.242 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.544 *** (0.160)	0.010 (0.213)	-0.478 * (0.233)	-0.272 * (0.129)
Economic Globalisation	0.006 (0.018)	0.029 (0.026)	-0.022 (0.031)	-0.037 (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.016)	-0.040 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.043 ** (0.017)
Democracy	-1.193 (1.033)	-3.205 * (1.398)	1.772 (1.675)	1.395 (1.062)
Peace	0.072 (0.494)	0.085 (0.696)	0.516 (0.844)	-0.224 (0.532)
Urban*Economic Globalisation	0.003 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.004 (0.002)
AIC	27548.120	20337.444	20139.319	39332.742
BIC	27663.123	20454.396	20257.053	39449.770
Log Likelihood	-13760.060	-10154.722	-10055.660	-19652.371
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.101	0.184	0.245	0.108

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xvii **Table A28.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of economic globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *education* and *economic globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.488 (1.574)	2.998 (2.206)	2.356 (2.685)	3.166 (1.689)
Gender (f)	-0.841 *** (0.032)	0.156 *** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.098 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 *** (0.041)	-0.105 * (0.049)	0.085 (0.049)	-0.164 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.086 (0.050)	0.295 *** (0.050)	-0.238 *** (0.033)
Education	0.105 (0.176)	-0.684 ** (0.225)	-0.102 (0.235)	-0.074 (0.139)
Lower Middle Class	-0.161 *** (0.042)	-0.247 *** (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	-0.180 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 *** (0.042)	-0.316 *** (0.054)	-0.009 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.329 *** (0.032)	-0.310 *** (0.042)	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.038 (0.027)
Economic Globalisation	0.008 (0.018)	0.024 (0.025)	-0.019 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.016)	-0.039 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.043 ** (0.017)
Democracy	-1.197 (1.034)	-3.194 * (1.383)	1.737 (1.680)	1.372 (1.064)
Peace	0.065 (0.495)	0.090 (0.689)	0.504 (0.847)	-0.232 (0.534)
Education*Economic Globalisation	0.000 (0.003)	0.011 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.002)
AIC	27549.981	20329.285	20141.102	39333.183
BIC	27664.984	20446.237	20258.835	39450.211
Log Likelihood	-13760.991	-10150.642	-10056.551	-19652.592
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.101	0.181	0.246	0.116

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xviii **Table A29.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of economic globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between gender and economic globalisation

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.464 (1.578)	2.811 (2.217)	2.118 (2.686)	3.070 (1.689)
Gender (f)	-0.814 *** (0.164)	0.147 (0.199)	0.380 (0.211)	-0.037 (0.123)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 *** (0.041)	-0.101 * (0.049)	0.085 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.092 (0.050)	0.295 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.128 *** (0.035)	0.031 (0.044)	0.124 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.160 *** (0.042)	-0.247 *** (0.054)	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 *** (0.042)	-0.317 *** (0.054)	-0.007 (0.053)	-0.243 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.329 *** (0.032)	-0.310 *** (0.042)	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Economic Globalisation	0.008 (0.018)	0.026 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.019)
Economic Development	-0.030 (0.016)	-0.040 (0.022)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.043 ** (0.017)
Democracy	-1.197 (1.034)	-3.182 * (1.388)	1.742 (1.680)	1.375 (1.064)
Peace	0.065 (0.495)	0.094 (0.692)	0.504 (0.847)	-0.231 (0.533)
Gender*Economic Globalisation	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
AIC	27549.971	20339.781	20139.537	39335.912
BIC	27664.974	20456.733	20257.271	39452.940
Log Likelihood	-13760.986	-10155.890	-10055.769	-19653.956
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.101	0.182	0.246	0.116

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xix **Table A30.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their nation in the 1990s and 2010s.

Willingness to Fight:	1990s	2010s
Intercept	3.786 *** (0.681)	3.017 * (1.335)
Gender (f)	-0.822 *** (0.042)	-0.841 *** (0.032)
Age: 30-49	0.216 *** (0.053)	-0.146 *** (0.041)
Age: 50-91	-0.352 *** (0.053)	-0.424 *** (0.041)
Education	0.045 (0.051)	0.128 *** (0.035)
Lower Middle Class	-0.070 (0.060)	-0.160 *** (0.042)
Working Class	-0.303 *** (0.061)	-0.171 *** (0.042)
Urban	-0.098 * (0.041)	-0.329 *** (0.032)
Political Globalisation	-0.021 * (0.009)	-0.009 (0.017)
Economic Development	0.036 (0.040)	-0.022 (0.021)
Democracy	-1.085 (0.912)	-0.699 (0.786)
Peace		0.174 (0.546)
AIC	16365.014	27547.919
BIC	16459.477	27654.707
Log Likelihood	-8170.507	-13760.959
Individual-level N	19377	27296
Macro-level N	15	21
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.118	0.101

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

xx **Table A31.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of political globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *political globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.960 *	5.267 ***	2.160	1.593
	(1.338)	(1.561)	(2.019)	(1.540)
Gender (f)	-0.841 ***	0.157 ***	0.050	-0.097 ***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.146 ***	-0.101 *	0.086	-0.163 ***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 ***	0.093	0.294 ***	-0.236 ***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Education	0.127 ***	0.031	0.122 **	0.162 ***
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.160 ***	-0.247 ***	0.010	-0.179 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.010	-0.243 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Urban	-0.217	-0.373	0.438	-0.307 *
	(0.181)	(0.294)	(0.264)	(0.147)
Political Globalisation	-0.008	-0.066 ***	-0.062 *	-0.002
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Economic Development	-0.022	0.018	0.017	-0.045
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Democracy	-0.697	-1.022	2.189	0.011
	(0.786)	(0.861)	(1.132)	(0.858)
Peace	0.179	1.012	1.530	-0.199
	(0.546)	(0.629)	(0.835)	(0.632)
Urban*Political Globalisation	-0.002	0.001	-0.007	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
AIC	27549.528	20330.606	20131.836	39335.784
BIC	27664.531	20447.558	20249.570	39452.812
Log Likelihood	-13760.764	-10151.303	-10051.918	-19653.892
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.101	0.130	0.202	0.130

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxi **Table A32.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on respondents' willingness to fight for their country in the 1990s and 2010s

willingness to Fight:	1990s	2010s
Intercept	3.860 *	2.417
	(1.718)	(1.833)
Gender (f)	-0.823 ***	-0.841 ***
	(0.042)	(0.032)
Age: 30-49	0.215 ***	-0.146 ***
	(0.053)	(0.041)
Age: 50-91	-0.353 ***	-0.424 ***
	(0.053)	(0.041)
Education	0.046	0.128 ***
	(0.051)	(0.035)
Lower Middle Class	-0.070	-0.161 ***
	(0.060)	(0.042)
Working Class	-0.304 ***	-0.171 ***
	(0.061)	(0.042)
Urban	-0.098 *	-0.329 ***
	(0.041)	(0.032)
Social Globalisation	-0.036	0.012
	(0.059)	(0.034)
Economic Development	0.012	-0.036
	(0.050)	(0.024)
Democracy	0.449	-1.261
	(2.243)	(1.327)
Peace		0.007
		(0.512)
AIC	16369.114	27548.067
BIC	16463.576	27654.856
Log Likelihood	-8172.557	-13761.034
Individual-level N	19377	27296
Macro-level N	15	21
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.149	0.102

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

xxii **Table A33.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on respondents' likeliness to embrace a nation citizen or world citizen identity in the 2010s

2010s:	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.780 (2.347)	0.115 (1.776)
Gender (f)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	0.086 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.123 ** (0.044)	0.161 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	0.012 (0.053)	-0.179 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.244 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.040 (0.027)
Social Globalisation	-0.000 (0.049)	0.017 (0.036)
Economic Development	-0.038 (0.038)	-0.056 * (0.026)
Democracy	0.544 (1.663)	-0.287 (1.156)
AIC	20138.810	39335.078
BIC	20239.724	39435.388
Log Likelihood	-10057.405	-19655.539
Individual-level N	33174	31544
Macro-level N	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.252	0.130

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

xxiii **Table A34.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *gender and social globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	3.045 (1.847)	6.698 ** (2.567)	1.927 (3.118)	0.742 (2.051)
Gender (f)	-1.731 *** (0.236)	-0.460 (0.352)	-0.241 (0.311)	-0.316 (0.174)
Age: 30-49	-0.145 *** (0.041)	-0.101 * (0.049)	0.086 (0.049)	-0.162 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.092 (0.050)	0.296 *** (0.050)	-0.238 *** (0.033)
Education	0.122 *** (0.035)	0.029 (0.044)	0.121 ** (0.044)	0.159 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.163 *** (0.042)	-0.249 *** (0.054)	0.011 (0.053)	-0.180 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.178 *** (0.042)	-0.319 *** (0.054)	-0.011 (0.053)	-0.246 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.327 *** (0.032)	-0.308 *** (0.042)	-0.099 * (0.043)	-0.039 (0.027)
Social Globalisation	0.003 (0.035)	-0.065 (0.047)	-0.012 (0.057)	0.020 (0.038)
Economic Development	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.033)	-0.034 (0.040)	-0.058 * (0.027)
Democracy	-1.245 (1.331)	-0.318 (1.732)	1.310 (2.109)	-0.681 (1.402)
Peace	0.004 (0.513)	0.304 (0.715)	0.567 (0.883)	-0.287 (0.587)
Gender*Social Globalisation	0.013 (0.003)	0.009 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)
AIC	27535.365	20336.016	20141.498	39337.240
BIC	27650.368	20452.968	20259.232	39454.268
Log Likelihood	-13753.683	-10154.008	-10056.749	-19654.620
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.181	0.249	0.129

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxiv **Table A35.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of social globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *social globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.411 (1.835)	6.271 * (2.570)	1.428 (3.144)	0.759 (2.036)
Gender (f)	-0.841 *** (0.032)	0.157 *** (0.037)	0.050 (0.038)	-0.097 *** (0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.146 *** (0.041)	-0.101 * (0.049)	0.085 (0.049)	-0.163 *** (0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 *** (0.041)	0.093 (0.050)	0.294 *** (0.050)	-0.237 *** (0.033)
Education	0.128 *** (0.035)	0.032 (0.044)	0.124 ** (0.044)	0.162 *** (0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.161 *** (0.042)	-0.247 *** (0.054)	0.009 (0.053)	-0.180 *** (0.034)
Working Class	-0.171 *** (0.042)	-0.316 *** (0.054)	-0.013 (0.053)	-0.243 *** (0.034)
Urban	-0.308 (0.234)	0.006 (0.385)	1.008 ** (0.365)	-0.467 * (0.188)
Social Globalisation	0.012 (0.034)	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.005 (0.057)	0.020 (0.037)
Economic Development	-0.036 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.058 * (0.026)
Democracy	-1.259 (1.327)	-0.291 (1.737)	1.352 (2.129)	-0.689 (1.393)
Peace	0.007 (0.512)	0.305 (0.717)	0.569 (0.892)	-0.288 (0.583)
Urban*Social Globalisation	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.016 ** (0.005)	0.006 (0.003)
AIC	27550.059	20338.452	20132.819	39333.599
BIC	27665.062	20455.404	20250.552	39450.626
Log Likelihood	-13761.030	-10155.226	-10052.409	-19652.799
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.102	0.182	0.253	0.128

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxv **Table A36.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on respondents' willingness to fight for their country in the 1990s and 2010s

Willingness to Fight:	1990s	2010s
Intercept	4.009 ** (1.398)	2.905 * (1.203)
Gender (f)	-0.823 *** (0.042)	-0.841 *** (0.032)
Age: 30-49	0.215 *** (0.053)	-0.146 *** (0.041)
Age: 50-91	-0.353 *** (0.053)	-0.423 *** (0.041)
Education	0.046 (0.051)	0.129 *** (0.035)
Lower Middle class	-0.070 (0.060)	-0.160 *** (0.042)
Working class	-0.304 *** (0.061)	-0.170 *** (0.042)
Urban	-0.099 * (0.041)	-0.328 *** (0.032)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.036 (0.040)	-0.039 * (0.020)
Economic Development	0.024 (0.051)	0.004 (0.022)
Democracy	0.098 (1.400)	1.120 (1.199)
Peace		0.459 (0.499)
AIC	16368.699	27544.553
BIC	16463.161	27651.342
Log Likelihood	-8172.349	-13759.277
Individual-level N	19377	27296
Macro-level N	15	21
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.145	0.087


*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

xxvi **Table A37.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *urban* and *cultural globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.940 *	4.210 *	1.125	1.465
	(1.206)	(1.660)	(2.288)	(1.386)
Gender (f)	-0.840 ***	0.157 ***	0.050	-0.097 ***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.147 ***	-0.101 *	0.085	-0.163 ***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.423 ***	0.093	0.292 ***	-0.237 ***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Education	0.129 ***	0.032	0.123 **	0.161 ***
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.160 ***	-0.247 ***	0.008	-0.179 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Working Class	-0.170 ***	-0.315 ***	-0.013	-0.244 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Urban	-0.405 **	-0.336	0.564 **	-0.099
	(0.141)	(0.231)	(0.208)	(0.109)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.039 *	-0.071 **	-0.008	0.044 *
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.021)
Economic Development	0.004	0.021	-0.028	-0.083 ***
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.024)
Democracy	1.111	1.241	1.625	-2.128
	(1.201)	(1.533)	(2.092)	(1.267)
Peace	0.457	0.835	0.683	-0.691
	(0.499)	(0.684)	(0.949)	(0.575)
Urban*Cultural Globalisation	0.001	0.000	-0.011 **	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
AIC	27546.241	20334.230	20131.486	39334.986
BIC	27661.244	20451.181	20249.219	39452.014
Log Likelihood	-13759.120	-10153.115	-10051.743	-19653.493
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.087	0.152	0.253	0.112

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxvii **Figure A2.** Predicted margins for *Nation Citizen* variable at different levels of cultural globalisation for post-Soviet people in urban and rural areas in the 2010s.



xxviii **Table A38.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *education and cultural globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	2.849 *	4.428 **	1.435	1.530
	(1.205)	(1.651)	(2.256)	(1.385)
Gender (f)	-0.839 ***	0.155 ***	0.050	-0.100 ***
	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.025)
Age: 30-49	-0.145 ***	-0.103 *	0.086	-0.164 ***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 ***	0.092	0.296 ***	-0.236 ***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Education	0.383 *	-0.814 ***	0.022	-0.200
	(0.161)	(0.245)	(0.215)	(0.121)
Lower Middle Class	-0.158 ***	-0.249 ***	0.012	-0.183 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Working Class	-0.172 ***	-0.312 ***	-0.008	-0.244 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Urban	-0.329 ***	-0.304 ***	-0.099 *	-0.038
	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.038	-0.074 **	-0.012	0.043 *
	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.035)	(0.021)
Economic Development	0.005	0.020	-0.029	-0.083 ***
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Democracy	1.142	1.193	1.596	-2.148
	(1.201)	(1.526)	(2.064)	(1.266)
Peace	0.462	0.819	0.661	-0.695
	(0.499)	(0.681)	(0.936)	(0.575)
Education*Cultural Globalisation	-0.004	0.013 ***	0.002	0.006 **
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)
AIC	27543.898	20321.996	20142.062	39325.987
BIC	27658.901	20438.948	20259.796	39443.015
Log Likelihood	-13757.949	-10146.998	-10057.031	-19648.994
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.087	0.151	0.248	0.112

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxix **Table A39.** Multilevel models for the direct effect of cultural globalisation on four national identity dimensions in the decade of the 2010s, in combination with a cross-level interaction term between *gender and cultural globalisation*

2010s:	Willingness to Fight	Level of Pride	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	3.325 **	4.414 **	1.567	1.523
	(1.212)	(1.663)	(2.262)	(1.391)
Gender (f)	-1.439 ***	-0.238	-0.226	-0.244 *
	(0.144)	(0.219)	(0.185)	(0.102)
Age: 30-49	-0.145 ***	-0.101 *	0.086	-0.162 ***
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Age: 50-91	-0.424 ***	0.092	0.296 ***	-0.238 ***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.033)
Education	0.122 ***	0.030	0.120 **	0.159 ***
	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.029)
Lower Middle Class	-0.163 ***	-0.249 ***	0.010	-0.180 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Working Class	-0.178 ***	-0.318 ***	-0.012	-0.246 ***
	(0.042)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.034)
Urban	-0.326 ***	-0.307 ***	-0.098 *	-0.039
	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.027)
Cultural Globalisation	-0.046 *	-0.075 **	-0.015	0.043 *
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.021)
Economic Development	0.005	0.021	-0.028	-0.083 ***
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Democracy	1.155	1.249	1.608	-2.123
	(1.205)	(1.534)	(2.068)	(1.271)
Peace	0.459	0.837	0.665	-0.689
	(0.501)	(0.685)	(0.938)	(0.577)
Gender*Cultural Globalisation	0.010 ***	0.006	0.005	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
AIC	27527.978	20330.880	20139.970	39333.110
BIC	27642.981	20447.832	20257.703	39450.138
Log Likelihood	-13749.989	-10151.440	-10055.985	-19652.555
Individual-level N	27296	31373	33174	31544
Macro-level N	21	23	23	23
Intraclass Correlation (ICC)	0.088	0.152	0.249	0.113

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

xxx "Today, it is very difficult to maintain borders between people, because, thanks to the internet and other technological innovations, we can easily travel the world. This was impossible 50 years ago." (FG13, female Ukrainian, aged 27, Astana) / FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 28, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 34, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 38, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 34, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 39, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 55, Kostanay / SI2, female Russian, aged 28, Kostanay / FG6, male Kazakh, aged 33, Kostanay / FG7, female Bulgarian, aged 23, Almaty / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / SI11, male Kazakh, aged 45, Almaty / SI12, male Kazakh, aged 43, Almaty / SI13, male Kazakh, aged 31, Almaty / FG9, female Kazakh, aged 34, Astana / SI17, male Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / SI19, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG12, male Russian, aged 21, Astana / FG12, male German, aged 24, Astana / FG14, male Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / SI28, female Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG19, female Kazakh, aged 53, Shymkent / FG20, male Russian, aged 56, Shymkent / SI29, male Kazakh, aged 25, Shymkent / FG22, female Kazakh, aged 67, Shymkent / SI30, male Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau / SI32, female Ukrainian, aged 58, Aktau / FG24, male Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent / FG27, male Russian, aged 32, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19, Aktau / FG31, female Kazakh, aged 37, Aktau / SI33, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau / SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau / FG32, male Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau / SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 58, Aktau / FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau / FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau / FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau / FG34, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau

xxxi SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty

xxxii "For me globalisation entails the erosion of all national boundaries. Today, there may be frontiers on the map, there may be economic or political borders, but globalisation spans them all." (SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty) / SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG5, male Russian, aged 38, Kostanay / FG5, male Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay / FG6, male Kazakh, aged 33, Kostanay / FG9, female Kazakh, aged 34, Astana / SI8, female Kazakh, in her 40s, Almaty / FG13, female Ukrainian, aged 27, Astana / SI17, male Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / SI30, male Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG20, male Russian, aged 56, Shymkent / FG24, male Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent / SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau

xxxiii SI2, female Russian, aged 28, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakhs, aged 28 and 34, Kostanay

xxxiv FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 55, Kostanay / FG19, female Kazakh, aged 53, Shymkent / SI32, female Ukrainian, aged 58, Aktau / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 58, Aktau / FG14, male Kazakh, aged 42, Astana / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau

xxxv "10 or 15 years ago, there was no internet available in Kazakhstan and we had no idea what was going on in other countries such as Australia or Switzerland. Today, the internet on our mobile phones enables us to read the news worldwide." (FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19, Aktau) /

xxxvi FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Aktau

xxxvii FG4, female Ukrainian, aged 21, Kostanay / FG5, male Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay / FG6, female Russian, aged 35, Kostanay / FG11, male Ukrainian, aged 31, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 25, Astana / FG12, male Russian, aged 21, Astana / FG12, male German, aged 24, Astana / FG13, female Kazakh, aged 20, Astana / SI21, female Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / FG17, male Kazakh, aged 58, Astana / FG19, female Korean, aged 40, Shymkent / FG19, female Tatar, aged 41, Shymkent / "For me globalisation erases all frontiers between countries and enhances a so-called universal standard that embraces all kind of spheres, such as economic, political and cultural." (FG22, female Russian, aged 48, Shymkent) / FG23, female Kazakh, aged 43, Shymkent / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / SI28, female Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent / FG27, male Russian, aged 32, Aktau / FG30, female Russian, aged 35, Aktau / SI38, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau

xxxviii SI14, male Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty

xxxix "At some point people have to adapt themselves to the new era of computerisation and globalisation, which is taking place in Kazakhstan now. From my point of view, we will not remain the same, we will adjust to these new developments." (SI28, female Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent)

xl FG3, female Kazakh, aged 62, Kostanay / SI11, male Kazakh, aged 45, Almaty / SI12, male Kazakh, aged 43, Almaty / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 50, Shymkent / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau

xli SI5, male Kazakh, aged 55, Almaty / FG5, male Russian, aged 38, Kostanay

xliv "I associate globalisation first of all with the transition to a civilisation." (FG19, male Kazakh, aged 58, Shymkent)

- xliii FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 55, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 62, Kostanay / SI5, male Kazakh, aged 55, Almaty / FG14, female Russian, aged 43, Astana / FG14, male Kazakh, aged 42, Astana / FG17, female Kazakh, aged 55, Astana / SI32, female Ukrainian, aged 58, Aktau / FG19, male Kazakh, aged 58, Shymkent / FG20, male Russian, aged 56, Shymkent / FG21, male Tatar, aged 43, Shymkent / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 58, Aktau
- xliv FG3, female Kazakh, aged 62, Kostanay / FG17, female Kazakh, aged 55, Astana / "Globalisation exerts a huge influence on us and our country's future. Thus, I very much welcome the contact and exchange of expertise and knowledge between Kazakhstan and other states" (FG33, female Kazakh, aged 58, Aktau)
- xlv FG32, male Kazakh, aged 35, Aktau / FG4, male Kazakh, aged 25, Kostanay / SI26, male Kazakh, aged 27, Shymkent / FG13, female Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / FG22, female Kazakh aged 21, Aktau / "I associate globalisation mainly with progress and new opportunities. Even though our professor has discussed the positive and negative aspects of globalisation with us, from my point of view there are only advantages." (SI15, male Kazakh, aged 20, Almaty) / "From my personal point of view this [globalisation] is an excellent process because it ensures that a person constantly develops and improves herself." (SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay)
- xlvi SI26, male Kazakh, aged 27, Shymkent / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent
- xlvii FG31, female Kazakh, aged 29, Auktau
- xlviii FG1, male Russian, aged 22, Kostanay / FG4, male Kazakh, aged 25, Kostanay / FG12, male Korean, aged 20, Astana / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 23, Shymkent / FG31, female Kazakh, aged 29, Auktau / FG27, male Russian, aged 32, Aktau
- lix "Globalisation entails the exchange of expertise and technology. Thanks to globalising forces we now have American technologies and products in our manufacturing plants." (FG12, male Korean, aged 20, Astana)
- i FG5, male Russian, aged 38, Kostanay / SI19, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana
- ii "The vast majority of issues when it comes to foreign investments stem from the lack of transparency and the corruption of our government. (...) Overall, we are not opposing international investments, we just do not trust the choice made by our administration." (SI12, male Kazakh, aged 43, Almaty)
- iii SI21, female Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / FG17, male Kazakh, aged 58, Astana / FG19, male Kazakh, aged 58, Shymkent / FG22, female Russian, aged 48, Shymkent / FG22, female Kazakh, aged 67, Shymkent
- liii FG22, female Kazakh, aged 67, Shymkent
- liv "I believe globalisation is linked to the many new global brands and trends that our people in Kazakhstan are starting to consume." (FG9, female Kazakh, aged 27, Astana)
- lv SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty / "It [globalisation] means mass consumption in all spheres of life. I do not think that this is bad, every person has to choose what the best is for herself." FG9, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana / FG9, female Kazakh, aged 27, Astana / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 30, Astana /
- lvi FG6, female Russian aged 35, Kostanay / SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty / SI20, female Kazakh, aged 38, Astana / FG30, female Kazakh, aged 35, Aktau
- lvii SI33, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau / SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty
- lviii SI8, female Kazakh in her 40is, Almaty / SI16, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG30, female Russian, aged 35, Aktau
- lix FG23, female Kazakh, aged 28, Shymkent / FG34, female Kazakh, aged 26, Aktau
- lx SI18, male Russian, aged 24, Astana
- lxi FG1, male Russian, aged 22, Kostanay
- lxii FG4, female Ukrainian, aged 21, Kostanay / FG9 Female Kazakh, aged 27, Astana
- lxiii SI1, female Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay / FG6, female Russian, aged 35, Kostanay / FG6, female Russian, aged 34, Kostanay / SI7, female Dunganka, aged 53, Almaty / SI8, female Kazakh in her 40is, Almaty / SI24, female Russian, aged 18, Shymkent / FG18 female Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 50, Shymkent / SI32, female Ukrainian, aged 58, Aktau
- lxiv FG6, male Kazakh, aged 33, Kostanay / SI10, male Kazakh, aged 37, Almaty / SI11, male Kazakh, aged 45, Almaty / SI12, male Kazakh, aged 43, Almaty / SI13, male Kazakh, aged 31, Almaty / SI16, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / SI30, male Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG20, male Kazakh, aged 54, Shymkent / FG21, male Tatar, aged 43, Shymkent / FG21, male Russian, aged 53, Shymkent / FG27, male Russian, aged 44, Shymkent / FG32, male Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau / FG32, male Kazakh, aged 35, Aktau / SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau
- lxv SI11, male Kazakh, aged 45, Almaty / SI12, male Kazakh, aged 43, Almaty / SI13, male Kazakh, aged 31, Almaty / SI16, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana

lxvi FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 25, Astana

lxvii SI17, male Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / SI29, male Kazakh, aged 25, Shymkent / SI30, male Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent

lxviii FG34, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau

lxix "If we talk about the economic sphere of globalisation, just like in Western countries, today you can now find big shopping malls in Kazakhstan. In this context we kind of partially lose our (says in English) 'identity'. Mainly because in Europe, I find the same shopping malls with the same Starbucks. 'It is the same thing everywhere now'. (...) However, if you get the chance to visit a country and to encounter its unique culture, this is something very interesting. I think Kazakhstan has to protect its uniqueness, because this is our 'identity', this is all we have." (SI16, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana)

lxx FG11, male Kazakh, aged 25, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 50, Shymkent / FG20, male Russian, aged 29, Shymkent / FG20, male Kazakh, aged 54, Shymkent / FG20, male Russian, aged 56, Shymkent

lxxi FG20, male Russian, aged 56, male Kazakh, aged 54 and male Russian, aged 29, Shymkent / FG27, male Russian, aged 44, Aktau

lxxii FG18, female Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 38, Kostanay / FG32, male Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau

lxxiii FG2, female Russian, aged 62, Kostanay / FG5, male Russian, aged 38, Kostanay / SI5, male Kazakh, aged 55, Almaty / FG21, male Russian, aged 53, Shymkent /

lxxiv FG6, male Kazakh, aged 33, Kostanay / FG5, female Russian, aged 34, Kostanay / SI10, male Kazakh, aged 37, Almaty / FG21, male Tatar, aged 43, Shymkent / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau / SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau

lxxv FG21, male Russian, aged 53, Shymkent

lxxvi FG5, female Russian, aged 34, Kostanay / SI7, female Dunganka, aged 53, Almaty

lxxvii SI10, male Kazakh, aged 37, Almaty, / SI7, female Dunganka, aged 53, Almaty

lxxviii FG3, female Kazakh, aged 55, Kostanay / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 63, Kostanay / SI16, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty

lxxix SI6, female Kazakh, aged 38, Almaty / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent

lxxx SI8, female Kazakh, late 40ies, Almaty

lxxxi SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau

lxxxii "By ethnicity I am a Kazakh. However, I am proud to be a citizen of Kazakhstan of this progressive and globalising country." (FG22, female Kazakh, aged 67 Shymkent) / FG3, female Kazakh, aged 62, Kostanay / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 23, Shymkent / FG 22, female Kazakh, aged 67, Shymkent / SI31, male Kazakh, aged 41, Aktau

lxxxiii "I identify myself as [a] citizen of Kazakhstan. Of course, I am a patriot of my country, because I always cheer for our national sports teams." (SI1, female Kazakh, aged 22, Kostanay) / FG5, male Russian, aged 38, Kostanay /

lxxxiv SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty / SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 23, Shymkent / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent / SI28, female Kazakh, aged 21, Shymkent / FG26, female Kazakh, aged 21, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19

lxxxv FG7, female Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19 Aktau

lxxxvi FG7, female Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19 Aktau

lxxxvii FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty

lxxxviii FG26, female Kazakh, aged 21, Aktau

lxxxix FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty

xc FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau

xci SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged, 19, Aktau

xcii SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau

xciii SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau

xciv SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / FG28, female Kazakh. Aged 20

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- xcv SI9, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty
- xcvi SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana
- xcvii SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / FG21, female Kazakh, aged 21, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau
- xcviii FG7, female Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau
- xcix FG7, female Kazakh, aged 23, Almaty
- c SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay, SI22, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / FG26, female Kazakh, aged 21, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / FG28, female Kazakh, aged 19, Aktau
- ci SI38, female Kazakh, aged 20, Aktau / "I identify myself as Kazakh, because I speak the Kazakh language and I uphold Kazakh traditions." (SI19, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana) / "I identify myself more as Kazakh, because they [Kazakhs] speak my mother tongue and they know our culture." (SI15, male Kazakh, aged 20, Almaty)
- cii FG18, female Kazakh, aged 35 and female Uzbek, aged 36, Shymkent
- ciii FG26, female Kazakh, aged 23, Aktau
- civ SI23, female Kazakh, aged 23, Astana / FG19, male Kazakh, aged 58, Shymkent
- cv FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana
- cvi FG11, male Kazakh, aged 25, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 32, Astana / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 35, Shymkent / FG18, female Kazakh, aged 55, Shymkent / FG25, female Kazakh, aged 31, Shymkent
- cvii "Today young Kazakh women are more open, and they already get married to foreigners. I do not agree with this, I am myself a nationalist and I want our [female Kazakhs] to wed only people from our ethnicity." (FG31, female Kazakh, aged 37, Aktau) / FG31, female Kazakh, aged 31, Aktau
- cviii FG17, male Kazakh, aged 58, Astana / FG19, male Kazakh, aged 58, Shymkent / FG33, female Kazakh, aged 33, Aktau / SI37, male Kazakh, aged 34, Aktau
- cix "I identify myself more as Kazakh, because they [Kazakhs] speak my mother tongue and they know my culture. My family told me to uphold all these Kazakh traditions. Thus, being a Kazakh, I have this in my blood and my genes." (SI15, male Kazakh, aged 20, migrated from Kostanay to Almaty to study)
- cx SI15, male Kazakh, aged 20, Almaty / FG9, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana / SI17, male Kazakh, aged 28, Astana / SI19, male Kazakh, aged 29, Astana / FG11, male Kazakh, aged 25, Astana / FG12, male Kazakh, aged 19, Astana / SI29, male Kazakh, aged 25, Shymkent / FG34, male Kazakh, aged 24, Aktau
- cxii SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty / SI14, male Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 30, Astana / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / FG12, male Korean, aged 20, Astana / FG12, male Russian, aged 21, Astana / FG12, male German, aged 24, Astana / SI24, female Korean, aged 18, Shymkent / SI26, male Kazakh, aged 27, Shymkent / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau / FG30, male Kazakh, aged 23, Aktau
- cxiii FG4, male Kazakh, aged 25, Kostanay / SI14, male Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty / SI26, male Kazakh, aged 27, Shymkent / FG30, male Kazakh, aged 23, Aktau / SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 28, Almaty / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 30, Astana / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau
- cxiv FG30, male Kazakh, aged 23, Aktau
- cxv "Through the cultural exchange on social networks with people from different countries, who may have a different outlook of the world, we learn something new and become more open-minded." (FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty) / SI3, female Kazakh, aged 23, Kostanay / FG8, female Kazakh, aged 19, Almaty / SI27, female Kazakh, aged 19, Shymkent / SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau
- cxvi FG4, male Kazakh, aged 25, Kostanay / FG10, female Kazakh, aged 30, Astana
- cxvii "Today, some parts of the population in Kazakhstan oppose any kind of change that may affect the traditions of the Kazakh people. From my personal point of view, it is something positive that we are changing through contact with foreigners on social networks and through travel and, in doing so, becoming so-called cosmopolitans, kind of global citizens. Mainly because, for me, a person's ethnicity is irrelevant. We are all Earthlings who live on the same planet." (SI34, female Kazakh, aged 18, Aktau)
- cxviii FG10, female Kazakh, aged 24, Astana / SI14, male Kazakh, aged 22, Almaty