Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihoods Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi Northeast Nigeria

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the award of Doctor of Philosophy
at Oxford Brookes University

September 2019

Abstract

This study investigates the extent to which post-conflict livelihoods change may contribute to conflict recurrence and a threat to human security. Post-conflict livelihoods studies (e.g. Jacobson 2002, 2005; Karf 2003; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009, 2010) have for too long focused on refugee and internally displaced person camp settings. Justino (2009; 2011a; 2012) however, argues that these are inadequate in providing sustainable post-conflict peace not only because of the restricted focus on refugees but failure to address the fundamental livelihoods changes and the specific implications. This study examines the nature of livelihoods changes in a post-conflict transition non-camp context. It draws on Justino to adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for the analysis of post-conflict livelihoods changes as a possible precursor for conflict recurrence in a non-camp setting.

The study utilises a case study design, Buni Yadi, North-east Nigeria for an empirical investigation of a post-conflict scenario. It employs a mixed methods approach combining quantitative surveys, observations and in-depth discussions with men and women whose livelihoods have been disrupted following the Boko Haram insurgency to analyse post-conflict predicaments.

The outcomes of the empirical investigation suggest heterogeneity in the livelihoods changes. Although they are mainly negative, evidence of positive resilience for the youths and women groups is observed. The study also found that post-conflict vulnerabilities are similar for camp and non-camp contexts in that the livelihoods experiences in the non-camp are mostly the extension of the camp conditions. However, while the livelihoods vulnerabilities in the camp contexts relate to legal, administrative, movement and economic restrictions, the existence of these challenges for the non-camp setting are insignificant. Instead, it is chronic post-conflict livelihoods deficiencies that are critical.

The research concludes that the conflict-induced livelihoods changes may be instrumental in conflict recurrence given the deteriorating resilience and weak post-conflict living conditions which expose individuals, groups and the community to the vulnerability that may be exploited to instigate another round of conflict. This research confirms the consideration that while interaction of unresolved pre-conflict challenges and the post-conflict living conditions (Walter 2004; Kreutz 2010; Hegre et al. 2011; Kantiok 2014) are essential, post-conflict livelihoods change whose vulnerability may be exploited by insurgents is a critical condition for conflict recurrence. The theoretical contribution of this research improves the analytical depth and application of the livelihoods framework to evaluate post-conflict context, while the empirical and methodological advancement is valuable for post-conflict recovery and development intervention and practice.

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For all the victims of Boko Haram insurgency, particularly in Buni Yadi.

Acknowledgements

I glorify Allah (SWT) for the health and wisdom to undertake this research to completion. Firstly, I would like to thank the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Petroleum Technology Development Fund PTDF, for funding my PhD. I am thankful to all the informants and research respondents in Buni Yadi who have kindly participated in completing my questionnaire, individual interviews and focus group discussions. This research may not have been possible without the unwavering support of my supervisory team. I am especially thankful to Dr Beacon Mbiba and Dr Graham Wood, whose professionalism and constructive critiques assisted me in securing the best possible research outcome. I am also grateful to all the research assistants, especially Aliyu and Abdurrasheed, who supported me during the fieldwork. I appreciate all the prayers and goodwill from my family and friends. To all staff and my PhD colleagues in the School of Built Environment and planning section, in particular, I say a big thank you for your support.

Introduction

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction to the Research: Insecurity Challenge

1.1 Research Background: Persistent Insecurity

Insecurity remains an intractable global human problem (Justino 2011a; Bennett et al. 2017) which manifests in many forms such as the outright protests against regimes, insurgency, terrorism, religious extremism, kidnapping, ethnoreligious conflicts, human trafficking, militancy, armed robbery etc. These phenomena of violence and conflicts have varying devastating socio-economic consequences depending on the scale and nature of the disputes (Justino 2011; Call 2012). The challenge of insecurity is particularly dire in the contexts where Collier and Sambanis (2002) refer to as 'conflict trap' due to higher susceptibility to conflict recurrence. Conflict and its attendant consequences truncate both human and physical development, and exposure to the ensuing vulnerabilities often lead to conditions that manifest into conflict resurgence (Hegre et al. 2011). This thesis seeks to make theoretical and empirical contributions to the ongoing debate regarding conflict and its recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Hartzell et al. 2001; Walter 2004; Ross 2006; Lujala 2010; Hegre et al. 2011; Keen 2012; Aubrey et al. 2016; Barkindo 2016; Lamloum 2016). The study primarily examines the significance of post-conflict livelihoods change as a potential trigger for conflict recurrence (Justino 2012).

While the causes of conflict remain contested (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Ross 2006 and Lujala 2010), weak economic conditions and access to resources are essential motivations to taking up arms. Similarly, it is often argued that a previous armed conflict is a likely 'stager' for subsequent ones (Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and Hartzell et al. 2001). This view draws from the consideration that unresolved grievances foster further rounds of conflict: previous conflicts re-enforce conditions that favour conflicts (resurgence) including the degeneration of social cohesion and mistrust and economic hardship (Hegre et al. 2011). In contrast, however, Walter (2004) affirms that conflict resurgence has often less to do with a previous one; but the existing post-conflict vulnerabilities that could necessitate taking up arms or joining rebel groups as a means to survival. This study takes the Hirshleifer (1995; 2001) and Keen (2012) 'all-inclusive' viewpoint in the debate to suggest that conflict recurrence is a function of a

complex interaction of unresolved undesirable conditions before a conflict, as well as post-conflict vulnerabilities from livelihood distortion. This position draws on the manifestations of the complex interactions of existing and evolving problems in many post-conflict contexts such as Syria, Tunisia and Nigeria (Aubrey et al. 2016; Barkindo 2016; Lamloum 2016).

Walter's (2004) post-conflict view has been a subtle source of inspiration in many post-conflict studies (e.g. Jacobsen 2002, 2005; Korf 2004; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009, 2010). These have sought to understand the direct impact of conflict on various aspects of victims' livelihoods in which the focus has been toward assessing the coping strategies of post-conflict communities as a means for identifying suitable post-conflict livelihood interventions. While these studies provide useful insight into post-conflict livelihoods strategies, Justino (2012) argues that the studies are insufficient to resolving post-conflict livelihoods challenges adequately. In other words, limiting the theorising of the post-conflict livelihoods to the coping strategy and the direct impact of conflict is inadequate for developing a sustainable intervention to prevent conflict recurrence. According to Justino (2009; 2011; 2012), the post-conflict analysis must adequately address both direct and indirect impacts of conflict to achieve long-term post-conflict security – livelihoods. The immediate (direct) impact in this sense refers to the physical destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods, while the indirect effect connotes the livelihoods changes that come with the conflict destructions. Addressing these two aspects helps to accomplish a holistic analysis of the post-conflict predicament, thereby prevent possible conflict relapse.

However, research which investigates specific post-conflict livelihoods changes as a relevant precursor for conflict recurrence is limited (Justino 2009; 2011; 2012). Justino (2012a) reviews existing literature in an attempt to establish 'channels of transmission' between conflict and poverty leading to a repeated cycle of unrest. While focusing on the conflict-induced impact of social and political changes on livelihoods, the analysis is limited to war-time context whose conditions may be different from post-conflict livelihoods dynamics. This thesis, however, addresses this post-conflict time-dynamics limitation. While acknowledging the significance of investigating post-conflict livelihoods change, it may be challenging to achieve this without examining the direct impact of conflict. Exploring the physical destructions may, therefore, help to analyse better and understand specific livelihoods changes and implications that emanate from

the effects after the conflict. Furthermore, post-conflict investigations (based on livelihoods framework) focus more on the refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camp context (e.g. Jacobsen 2002, 2005; Korf 2004; Werker 2007; Porter et al. 2008; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009, 2010). Also, these studies investigate individual aspects of post-conflict livelihoods at the expense of comprehensiveness that is emphasised in the framework to understand the linkages of the components better holistically (DFID 2000). Consequent to these, the comparative analysis on whether or not the post-conflict livelihoods predicaments in the camps are the same as the non-camp contexts may be crucial for understanding conflict recurrence. In line with Justino (2012; 2012a), therefore, this study seeks to respond to the research question (objective):

> To what extent is post-conflict livelihood change a potential contributor to conflict recurrence and a threat to human security?

Providing an answer to this question would undoubtedly add a perspective to the theorising of post-conflict discourse, specifically for the non-camp setting. While investigating this research question, the study draws on Justino (2009; 2011a; 2012) to broaden the theoretical analysis of post-conflict challenges in ways that pay critical attention to livelihoods changes. Review of livelihood changes may be useful for understanding the effects of those changes on human security and their potential for fostering conflict recurrence. The aim of the research, therefore, is to:

> To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-camp context.

The sustainable livelihood approach – developed by the department for international development (DFID) is a broad people-centred development concept which prioritises relevant efforts for reducing poverty. The framework is designed for effective analysis and understanding the precarious living conditions of the poor as a complex interaction of various aspect of human needs. The primary objective of the concept is to promote efforts towards achieving sustainable development through its components such as improved quality education and healthcare, access to necessary infrastructure, access to affordable financial and natural resources (DFID 2000). However, while the concept

was developed initially for poverty alleviation in the rural non-conflict contexts, its flexibility allows the expansion to other settings which are stable (e.g. urban), non-stable (conflict) or fragile and transition (e.g. post-conflict) (Jacobsen 2002). This framework is discussed in further depth in chapter four, which covers the utility and justification for its application for this study.

The following methodological processes are employed for the thesis in an attempt to achieve the aim of this research:

1) to establish a theoretical basis for understanding the dimensions of human security to identify the relevant factors that affect it. The consideration is to have a broadened view of the constituents of security and to determine how they interrelate. A review of the human security concept is particularly important for this research given the precarious living conditions and the lopsided conflict and post-conflict military intervention in the proposed case study (presented in chapter four). The dominance of the military intervention at the expense of livelihood efforts suffices to necessitate the review of the concept of human security for the study;

2) to draw upon the theoretical concept in (1) to articulate conditions for conflict motivations and livelihoods changes in the post-conflict context. This objective explores the discourse on factors that instigate conflict as a way of situating the construct into the case study of this research. The review of the literature on the post-conflict livelihoods changes provide existing knowledge and inspiration for identifying areas that need to be broadened and justifies the utility of the livelihoods framework for this study explicitly;

3) to develop a suitable methodological framework to contextualise the investigation based on the proposed case study for achieving the research question. With this, data is collected and analysed while inferences are drawn about the research findings;

4) to present research contribution(s) – theoretical and empirical, following the discussion of the results. The contribution to the theorising of conflict resurgence adds to the existing discourse while the empirical contribution provides new perspectives to post-conflict livelihoods dynamics, which are useful for intervention practices.

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This research contribution is particularly valuable for developing economies, given the depressing global security trend. As noted in the World Development Report (2011), the post-Cold War era, for instance, ushered in a change in the pattern of a global conflict from the dominance of interstate to intrastate conflicts with an apparent increase in conflict recurrence. The report underlines three discernible patterns namely (a) increase in disputes that are the continuation of previous ones; (b) decrease in the inter-state conflict starting from the end of Cold War giving way for increased internal conflicts in many states and (c) increasing concentration of violent recurring disputes in developing countries including sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Global Trend on Conflicts

Source: Adapted from World Development Report (2011)

Furthermore, the report shows a rather disturbing trend particularly for African conflicts which account for about 35% of all civil disputes in the 2000s (Figure 1.1) and the seeming non-abating trend in the continent's conflicts and their resurgence (World Development Report 2011:1). This concern for growing internal conflicts in Africa features prominently in the Habitat III Regional Report for Africa (UN 2017). The report underlines the surging new forms of security threats, particularly regarding precarious living conditions that have devastating consequences. Annan (2014), for instance, expresses worry that the wave of internal conflicts has had devastating costs on many African countries, and the adverse effects are enormous to the extent that some of its economies almost collapse while others rely on humanitarian aid to survive. These devastations are noticeable in the decades-long cycles of conflicts and atrocities in countries such as Somalia, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Burundi, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Ivory Coast to mention few (Stewart 2008; Sturges 2008; Call 2012; Branch 2013; UN 2017; Corbin and Hall 2019).

This concern inspires the current research and assessment of the persisting insecurity, with a particular focus on the context of Nigeria. Nigeria has had its fair share of the internal conflicts which result from a variety of regional security dynamics such as those relating to resource utilisation (oil and gas) and competition (e.g. farmer-herder), secessionism and precarious living condition. The six geopolitical divisions in the country have predominantly weak and low-level human capital development in the northern regions and relatively prosperous south. Buni Yadi, Northeast Nigeria, is a post-conflict and transition non-camp settlement that is selected in a case study design for the empirical investigation. The adoption of Buni Yadi follows the identification of features that makes it suitable for investigating the research question. However, Nigeria's regional insecurity diversity, the selection criteria and justification for using only one case study are discussed in greater depth in chapter four. This is to rationalise the current challenge of the case study to the theoretical underpinning for this research.

1.2 Chapter Summary

Chapter one is an introductory section of the study, which presents the broad subject – insecurity and the research question – livelihood change, for the investigation. The chapter points out that instability and conflict have continued to rack devastating consequences on communities all over the world. While a variety of theoretical arguments about the causes of conflict onset and recurrence exist, this research underlines the significance of precarious living conditions as a vulnerability factor which is exploited to instigate conflict and possibly its repetition. With a particular focus on the conflict recurrence, the chapter has presented an argument that post-conflict studies have focused more on the direct impact of conflict thereby understudying other pertinent indirect aspects such as the post-conflict livelihoods change. A case is, therefore, made for exploring the potential implication of the livelihoods changes on conflict resurgence. Similarly, the chapter contends that post-conflict studies had paid more attention to the refugee and IDP context hence the consideration for the post-conflict self-settled setting.

The global security trend, which suggests a growing concentration of conflict recurrence in developing economies informed the choice of selecting Nigeria for this study. Four specific objectives are also presented in the chapter to guide the empirical investigation. These objectives include the reviews of the human security concept, conflict

motivations to justify the application of livelihoods and the contextualization of the inquiry for suitable methodology. However, the arguments, theories and methodological considerations that are introduced in this chapter are discussed in greater depth in the subsequent sections. Accordingly, the next chapter presents the first objective of this investigation, which focuses the discussion on the review of the human security concept regarding its evolution, ramification, threats and the relevance to this study.

1.3 Structural Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into ten chapters and five sections including introduction, part 1-3 and conclusion. Chapter one is the introduction, which has introduced the broader concern – insecurity, as well as the theoretical argument of the research – livelihood change and its implication on conflict recurrence. The chapter also highlights the potential theoretical approach for the study based on the contextual peculiarity of the case study for the investigation. The literature review follows the introduction. The literature review forms part one of the research and is divided into chapters two and three. Chapter two discusses the concept of human security. The analysis focuses on the historical development and the evolution of security concept from the state-centric to human-centric. It also examines the ramifications of human security, its inter-related components, as well as the need to have a holistic understanding of their threats. The theoretical concepts for the subject of this investigation are discussed explicitly in chapter three. The chapter reviews the theoretical debates on the conflict motivations leading to conflict onset and recurrence. Concepts such as the resource curse and greed and grievance are articulated in the chapter. These concepts provide insight into the justification for exploring the utility and suitability of the livelihood concept upon which this research is based.

Part two covers the case study selection and the methodology in chapter four and five respectively. Chapter four examines the diverse security contexts in Nigeria and justifies the adoption of Buni Yadi as the case study. Chapter five - research methodology, begins by presenting the research question(s) and hypothesis. These, together with the theoretical underpinning of the research, informed the choice of the research design and strategy which guided the fieldwork. The chapter presents a detailed description of the utility of the case study design and mixed methods strategy for the fieldwork. The results of the empirical investigation follows as part three. This part covers chapters six,

seven eight and nine to show results of the empirical study and the discussions. Results of the quantitative survey are presented in chapter six. The section covers the quantitative analysis of the livelihoods change in the case study. Chapter seven shows the results of the physical surveys. The physical survey chapter presents the pictorial corroborative evidence of the pattern of infrastructural destruction in the case study. Chapter eight is for the qualitative results. The section shows the results of the individual interviews and focus groups discussions. Chapter nine is the analysis chapter in which the syntheses of the research findings and discussions are presented. The discussions centred on the synthesised themes of livelihoods change, including lack of access to farmland, declined resilience, mismatch needs and support as well as inter-relations of the challenges with infrastructure. Chapter ten is the conclusion section. Bibliography of references cited in this study is presented at the end of the thesis. Similarly, appendices of materials which provide additional information about specific steps and processes are provided after the references.

Part One

Human Security
and
Condition that Foster
Conflict

CHAPTER TWO

Multi-dimensionality of Security as a Concept: A Paradigm Shift from State-centric to Human-centric Security

2.1 Introduction: Towards Human Security

The preceding section has introduced the subject of the research – security and conflict, and focus – post-conflict livelihoods change. The chapter presents the global insecurity challenges and articulates a theoretical argument for the study. The potential theoretical lens – livelihoods, for the analysis has also been proposed based on the context of the case study. However, the tendency to over-rely on the military response to resolving insecurity in the developing economies such as Nigeria necessitates the review of the concept of human security – a human-centric approach, in the methodology of this investigation. The relevance of human security to this study derives from the recognition of the significance of according equal attention to the socio-economic wellbeing (livelihoods) of people as a conflict prevention strategy. This research also considers that while military effort is relevant, failure to attain a balanced (military and socio-economic) response to insecurity increases the vulnerability and exposure to conflict recurrence in the case study. Accordingly, the current chapter critically reviews the concept of human security to understand its components, features and ramifications.

Contemporary views on security suggest that military intervention on its own is insufficient for the attainment of peace and development in the world. However, taking a step back to the history of the evolution and transition of military security to human security helps to appreciate the inherent limitations of the military approach. The review shed light on the need for a paradigm shift for a concept that is human-friendly without undermining the significance of the military. Security has been an evolving concept, as its connotation and drivers have continued to change. The development of human security as a concept evolves as a sharp response to the changing security dynamics, mainly starting from the post-Cold War period. This section establishes broadened horizons of contemporary security issues which are hitherto not captured in the traditional security discourse, especially regarding socio-economics conditions. The chapter provides a comprehensive view of understanding security, and that threat to human security exists even in the absence of physical violence or conflict as a consequence of precarious livelihoods.

2.2 Prelude to Human Security: A Military State-centric Perspective

Vigorous pursuit of military dominance was the American realists' strategy for security and foreign relations (Snyder 2008; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). This military security notion survived mainly during the Cold War period, owing to the general perception of strategic scholars (e.g. Liddell-Hart 1932; 1967; Bull 1977) that military power was to be applied to gain political and economic dominance in international relations. The military strategy sustained its prominence on the premise that the state commanded military might and was the primary interface in the global system. Hence, the application of military force to suppress any form of threat - state or non-state, was considered the best option (Buzan 1987) for maintenance of state sovereignty (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). The power struggle influenced the rationale and justification for the application of force at the time (Burchill 2001) particularly in the face of the bipolar power balance between the US and the former USSR (Mearsheimer 1990) during the Cold War. This way, security was based on the aggressive encounter for gains by one State (or group) to incapacitate or repress another which the state regarded as a threat for various ends (Jolly and Ray 2006; Lawal and Mbiba 2020).

However, the destructive and unsustainable trend of the aggressive approach led to the thought for an alternative strategy for achieving lasting peace and security. This thought became necessary and inevitable, given the changing global security dynamics after the collapse of the former USSR in 1991. The United Nations, for instance, was established (in 1945) to mobilise for the initiation of peace and justice within the realm of international law. One of the primary purposes was to enshrine dialogue and negotiation to discourage the application of irrational military aggression (Jolly and Ray 2006). The call for the review of the security conceptualisation is traceable to the realist theorists themselves. For example, John Mearsheimer and Brzezinski envisaged the possible world disorder after the alteration of Cold War order. Mearsheimer (1990) believes that relative order (peace) was maintained (during Cold War) primarily due to the state-centric nature of security and bipolar military division at the time (by superpowers). It was those conditions that previously deter possible conflicts other than military aggression within and among nations. This consideration brought to the fore the need for the expansion of the scope of security to cover post-Cold War political, social and economic realities (Lawal and Mbiba 2020).

Perhaps the apparent effort to discourage military aggression (as security strategy) started with the establishment of the United Nations standards on the application of nuclear capabilities. Examples of these are the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968) and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic-Missiles Treaty (Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems 1972). Other standards for the reduction of military aggression are the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological [Biological] and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction 1972) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1993). The position on these treaties it was argued, aimed to protect communities and humans who suffer the devastating effect of those weapons although the action was carried out by state authority in an attempt to achieve its goals (Krause and Williams 1997; Lawal and Mbiba 2020).

Similarly, advocacy was led by France (in 1955) to encourage the reduction in the military budget of permanent Member States of the UN. And that the budget cuts are contributed to an international fund, part of which would be used for development purposes in underdeveloped states. Although differing perceptions emerged from other countries, the analysis indicated that inducement of income growth (from 3.5% to 5%) for backward states would require no more than one-tenth of half of the advocated contribution from the reduced military spending (Jolly 2005). This move was associated with bringing an end to the Cold War and disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The eventual collapse of the former Soviet Union changes the security focus from conflict containment to conflict prevention (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This change was informed by the anticipated peaceful world which the standards could not achieve after the nuclear treaties and the agreement among the UN Member States to reduce military spending. The Commission for Human Security- CHS, (2003) reports that United Nations had dealt with the highest number of peacekeeping missions after the Cold War (especially in the 1990s) than any other time since its establishment. Buzan et al. (1998), notes that non-state factors caused the conflicts including socio-political, economic deficiencies; environmental threats etc. and are hardly addressable by state military actions. The limitations of the traditional military approach to security became more visible and therefore needed to be expanded to accommodate new strategies for dealing with contemporary security threats.

Further to the need to discourage over-militarisation of security, more treaties were enacted and signed by United Nations Member States to ensure continued protection of individuals and groups from all forms of threats - especially the non-military. Among such pacts are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). Challenged by the problem, a host of scholars have also strived to make useful input in the debate for widening the scope of the security concept. For instance, Enloe (1989), considers security and conflict issues with particular regard to women, Roberts (1990), conceptualises security from the viewpoint of human right protection; while Weiner (1992), focused on international migration issues. Although universal definition does not exist, however, there is a general agreement on the insufficiency of reliance on military powers as the lone means of securing individuals and groups within states (Snyder 2008). But the extent to which the effort and advocacy for the reduction in the reliance on military intervention have been adhered to after the Cold War remained intangible. The next section attempts to highlight the deficiency of the excessive dependence on a military response to internal instability.

2.3 Internal Crisis and Military Intervention: A Lopsided Use of Military for Internal Conflict

The end of Cold War ushered marked decline in inter-state conflict but saw increased internal insecurity, especially in the developing economies (World Development Report 2011). However, the Cold War legacy of excessive reliance on the military for civil unrest, persist in many states. In Africa, for instance, Yoon (2005) notes that those countries continued to rely heavily on military solutions for their internal crises upon attainment of independence and beyond. This practice is attributable partly to the involvement of the African countries - which were used as proxies, in conflicts by the world powers during the Cold War (Aduloju and Pratt 2014). The military interventions in internal conflicts and the particular high handedness and brutality often leave behind the horror of their atrocities on individuals and households. In Zimbabwe, for example, the military operations of the 'fifth Brigade' unit (1983-1987) following the Matabeleland uprising – selective murder and destruction of property, was estimated to have caused the deaths ranging from 10,000 and 20,000 of unarmed civilians (Burke

2017; Simmons 2017). The massacres which are collectively tagged 'Gukurahundi Atrocities' was characterised with rampant human right abuses such as rape, torture, arbitrary detention and forced disappearance (Killander and Nyathi 2015; Burke 2017; Simmons 2017).

Similarly, the brutal murders of hundreds of unarmed civilians in Odi village, Bayelsa State – 'Odi Massacre' 1999, and several communities in Benue State – 'Zaki-Biam Massacre' 2001, are examples of the sequence of the repressive involvement of military in internal conflicts in Nigeria (Nwajah 1999; Human Rights Watch 2001; Sanusi 2005). Call (2012) recalls that punitive military actions in internal unrests featured prominently as one of the significant factors that triggered the escalation and recurrence of civil wars in many countries. Recurrent civil wars in Liberia - 1985 - 1996 and 1999 - 2003, Burundi - 1972, 1988 and 1993 – 2002, and Rwanda - 1962 – 1965 and 1990, are typical examples (Call 2012). The tendency of military intervention to cause the escalation of internal conflict is probably more apparent in the Nigerian context. The series of military operations in the Niger Delta unrests, for instance, has led to the repeated full-blown internal crisis in the region (Johnson et al. 2010; Newsom 2011; Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). Insecurity continued in the area up until recently (late 2016) when specific non-military palliative measures were employed to secure a cease-fire (Kazeem 2016; Toromade 2018). The secessionist movement in the South-east is instead thriving in the minds of its propagators despite the repeated military interventions which have continued to heat the unrest (Ibrahim 2017; Adonu 2018; Agbodo 2018).

Furthermore, the extrajudicial killing of the pioneer leader of the Boko Haram sect is widely held to have gotten the members radicalised into a full-blown terrorist group (Meagher 2013). The subsequent high-handedness, atrocities and Human Rights abuses that are committed against the civilians by the military has continued to make it challenging to win the war against the insurgency (Matfess 2017; Amnesty International 2018). The growing distrust for the military by aggrieved residents of the region benefits the insurgents who capitalised on the military actions to gain local support and recruitments (Matfess 2017). Military intervention alone can hardly address internal conflicts. Moreover, the abusive and excessive military intervention increases the existing despairs of precarious living conditions which have not had adequate attention. As noted by Bamgboye (2014) and Peterside (2014), military interventions have failed to provide a sustainable solution to the internal conflicts in Nigeria. They rationalised

this conclusion to the government's failure to address the socio-economic challenges, which are often the root cause of many disputes. Salkida (2016) explicitly attributes the inability of the Nigerian government to sustainably win the war against the North-east insurgency to this same challenge. A more encompassing perspective of resolving security challenges is therefore necessary. The following section discusses this consideration as human security concept.

2.4 Human Security Concept: A Human-centric Approach

United Nations Human Development Report (HDR 1994) could be asserted to be the first global report that projected security in a more encompassing fashion (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). It incorporates individuals' and communities' socio-economic needs as a significant component of security with policy and guidelines for implementation (Jolly and Ray 2006; Aduloju and Pratt 2014). The report was a follow up to the 1990 Round Table deliberation of the North-South titled 'Economics of Peace' at Costa Rica. It was unanimously clear and accepted in the Round Table that the post-Cold War era requires a more dynamic and internationally acceptable security concept. Emphasis was on the need to reduce military spending to engage in a more human-related development such as economic and environmental improvement as a means of achieving global peace in the context of post-Cold War order (North-South Roundtable 1990). The HDR put forward the argument that the notion of security had:

> For too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people (HDR 1994:22).

Human security conception was a conscious effort to include measures to prevent non-military threats to human lives, which were hitherto not captured in traditional security (HDR 1994). The HDR built human security on the notion of universality, interdependence of components, less costly to achieve and human survival and safety.

The universality of the human security concept in this sense refers to the commonness of the security threats people experience throughout the world. Although the level of impact and devastation that threaten nations' security differ, their consequences such as economic deprivations, oppression and human rights violation, climate change, illicit drugs trafficking, gender discrimination, environmental pollution exist almost everywhere. In other words, social security concern cut across international boundaries

and therefore requires genuine commitment from across the world to be successful. The interdependence of human security components brings to the fore the concern that substantial incidence of insecurity in any part of the world has an impact on others directly or indirectly. The Syrian crisis and the consequential humanitarian (e.g. refugee, migration) crisis in Europe is a recent and ongoing example. Insurgents' activities in the North-east region of Nigeria and their evident impacts on the neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad and Cameroon) are another case on point. The increasing pace of globalisation could also be said to be worsening this tendency where major conflicts are difficult to be restricted to a given country in which they originate (Gissinger and Gleditsch 1999; Derri and Popoola 2017).

The less costly feature of human security portrays the concept as preventive rather than the interventionist approach to solving security threats. The human security concept advocates adequate and peaceful precautionary handling of all forms of real or perceived threats to individuals in a nation by ensuring that they do not escalate to devastation. This feature derives from the universal notion that preventing conflict is cheaper than containing it. For instance, the report of Northeast Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) says the reconstruction of the war-torn region will require $9 billion – about a third of the 2016 budget ($30.6 billion) of Nigeria (NAN 2016; Gaffey 2016). Investing much less of this amount in agricultural, education, health care and other empowerment schemes could have averted the crisis. The lives lost are irreplaceable, and the wellbeing of those individuals and households whose livelihoods have been disrupted by the conflict may never be the same again. Human-centeredness is one of the major pillars of human security. Its concern is primarily on the livelihoods, survival and dignity of individuals and communities. The focus is about people's access to basic needs of living and the need for adequate and sustainable protection from any form of physical and non-physical danger.

The conception of human security had attracted the support and attention of academics, policy decision-makers and governments. This acceptance followed the recognition of the inherent benefits of its holistic approach as a useful strategy for domestic and foreign security policy. For instance, the former Costa Rican President and a 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner - Oscar Arias, identify the connection between human security and the proposed 'Global Demilitarisation Fund'. The fund aimed at helping to discourage the application of force to achieving peace and integrate people into the society while taking steps to ensure adequate arms regulations and enlightenment for a

democratic government (Jolly and Ray 2006). The concern here is the need to have policies that are developed primarily to overcome threats to individuals's and means of survival with dignity.

2.5 People and Rights in Human Security

Putting people – individual, at the centre of human security is a crucial feature of post 'HDR 1994' consideration. Many definitions have emerged – from academics, environmentalists, policymakers, multinational non-governmental organisations in an attempt to conceptualise and capture the essence of human security (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Kanti (2000), for instance, sees human security as synonymous with all efforts to ensure personal safety for people and to prevent them from such threats, whether real or perceived. In this sense, preventive measures and protection for individuals and communities against threats are the major focus to ensure human safety and wellbeing. Kanti argues that human development, prudent and collective resource management through good governance are the basic ingredients for achieving human security. David and Nana (2000), however, argue from the human rights viewpoint. They agree with Krause and Williams' (1997) view on the need to shift the attention for security concern from the state as an institution to people as the primary beneficiaries of security. They contend that human security can only be ethical and morally justifiable when it guarantees the freedom of individuals' human rights. They believe this rights and liberty relates mainly to the recognition of those of migrants (such as refugees) hence become an international responsibility of states to ensure their access to basic needs and protection (David and Nana 2000).

Lincoln (1995)'s conception of human security also put people as the referent subject, whose protection is to be the ends of security concerns. With this view, military security should be one of the means to achieving human security and not only for the need to secure territorial integrity. Leaning and Arie (2000) would rather have human security as a precondition for the attainment of overall human development. Talking from a development viewpoint, they underline that this is achievable through a sustained effort to ensure social, psychological and political freedom that guarantee the capability of individuals to achieve an acceptable standard of living. They argue that security success is measurable in terms of the absence (rather than the presence) of indicators of livelihoods component to achieve individual's and societal goals (Leaning and Arie

2000). Environmental concern drives the perception of Steven et al. (2000) concerning human security. Their position is that human security revolves around the recognition of the indivisibility of individual's success with his/her environment - physical, social or political. Human security is achievable when individuals are strengthened with the capacity to deal and adapt to the threats posed by their environment. It also entails the freedom to exercise those capacities and participate fully in decision making to attain those capabilities (Steven et al. 2000).

Human security concept was strongly advocated for by Kofi Annan - former Secretary-General of the United Nations. Annan, during the 2000 United Nations Millennium Summit stressed the need to evolve a more human-concerned approach to security. According to him:

> . . . security should be thought of less in terms of defending territory and more in terms of protecting people. . . . Security is a precondition for lasting peace . . . (Annan 2000).

The growing acceptance for the human security concept is not only the reflection of its adaptability for policy decisions but the recognition of the deficiency of the traditional state-centric security strategy (Annan 2005). In an attempt to institutionalise human security into Japanese domestic and foreign security policy, the former Japanese Prime Minister – Keizo Obuchi, considers security as:

> . . . comprehensively seizing all of the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthening the efforts to confront these threats (Obuchi 1998).

Similarly, the Canadian Foreign Affairs says:

> . . . human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even their lives' (Axworthy 1999).

The importance of people as referent subject reflects in the final report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security - Human Security Now (CHS 2003). Synthesised from a broad range of considerations human security encapsulates the totality of human survival. Commission for human security (CHS 2003) led by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata states that:

> . . . to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental Freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity (CHS: 2003: 4).

It is relevant to note that CHS (2003) formulation for human security is a consolidation and detailed consideration of the HDR (1994). This definition fundamentally seeks to reformulate the notion of security by deepening the concept and invigorating the need for more focus on human protection from threats (Aduloju and Pratt 2014). It stressed the need for rechannelling efforts to the protection of individuals' and communities' needs. It brings to the fore the multidimensionality of threats to human lives and the interrelation between security, human rights protection and development. Similarly, the definition advertises the need to re-conceptualise security as a human-centred issue that should integrate into the overall strategy for achieving sustainable peace and development (UNTFHS 2009). It, however, does not seek to replace the traditional military security concept entirely. Instead, human security aims to complement conventional military approach to security.

2.6 Human Security: Complimentary to Military Strategy

The people-centeredness of human security does not attempt to replace the traditional state-centric security. The two are complementary and mutually reinforcing (Aduloju and Pratt 2014). Ginwala (2002), underlines this point that state security ought not to be in any form of conflict with human security (human protection) or be the primary source of protection. She argues that human security seeks to comprehensively request the protection of individuals' welfare by the state from threats and itself. This way, the state provides its primary role of protection against external aggression while paying adequate attention to non-military threats such as human rights violation, environmental degradation, acute food shortage and lack of access, inadequate and decaying infrastructure, unemployment, poverty, political marginalisation and so forth. This condition will ensure the protection of collective human interest and individual freedom of rights and access to the primary livelihoods and survival needs of people and eventually violent free society (Ginwala 2002; CHS 2003).

A synthesis of the complementarity of human security and military actions can be made from Pettman (2005). In his rather lengthy description of human security, Pettman

considers human security as eliminating threats that can undermine the wellbeing of individual or community. He believes human security should be:

> . . . about the young child that did not die of neglect, the serious epidemic that did not break out, the job that was not cut, the gun that was not run, the ethnic prejudice that did not result in violence, the dissident voice that was not made silent, the landmine that was not sold and installed, the woman who was not trafficked across state borders and sexually abused, the agricultural product that was not dumped to the detriment of the poor farmers, the short-term capital investment that was not allowed to wreck an infant industry, the addictive product that was not produced and shipped, the refugee that was not forced to flee and remain abroad and so on (Pettman 2005:140).

Pettman's description of human security is in agreement with the HDR 1994 and CSH 2003, whose definition of human security anchored on the importance of resolving the fundamental human needs. This consideration seeks to prevent the occurrence of any form of threat and ensure the development of capabilities to support human survival, including economic, food, health, environmental, personal and community challenges. The concept of security in this sense can be seen, therefore, as being human-centred. And its preventive nature can be a quick way to assessing the level of threat through indicators such as rate of crimes, environmental degradation, poverty level, income disparity, illiteracy level and so on (HDR 1994). Pettman (2005) considers that human security as a security alternative is attainable only if it is holistic and logical. He argues that achieving this lies in the ability to make a concerted effort to understand the limitations of the traditional state-centric approach and how their assumptions are articulated concerning human nature and protection. This effort ensures a better understanding to explain and describe the comprehensiveness of human security and its ability to solve the domestic and global security challenge.

2.7 Threats to Human Security: Interlinked Dimensions

Possible risks to human security vary from place to place owing to the variation in the individuls' and communities' socio-cultural, political and economic experiences. This variation, in no small extent, also influences the notion of what constitutes a threat to human security in different contexts (Acharya 2001). Given the need to minimise risks to people's lives, the HDR (1994) provides a template of variables for consideration. These security variables whose vulnerability jeopardise peace include the economic, food, health, environment, political, personal and community security (Figure 2.1).

Securing those human challenges requires a comprehensive analysis of not only the individual elements but the interlinkages between them.

Figure 2.1: Components of Human Security

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Source: Adapted from UNHDR 1994

2.7.1 Economic (In)security: Economic security ensures that individuals and households have access to a steady basic income - base on their need, through salary/wage, self-employment productivity or public fund (for the unemployed). Economic security implies the assurance that people have income inflow in a continuous and sustainable basis as a result of secured employment, a job that is consistent with individuals' skills, within an environment that guarantees the safety of the workers and where skill development and self-actualisation (career development) is attainable. It also means an inclusive decision on labour matters through an adequate representation of individuals or group (labour group) to ensure that those conditions are achieved (HDR 1994; International Labour Organization 2006; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Economic security has a direct link to the ability of people to access the basic needs of

livelihoods such as food, shelter, healthcare and education. Access to basic needs, in turn, improves the quality of human capital accumulation through enhanced knowledge and skills, living standard, health and productivity. International Labour Organization (2006) report indicates that economic security has a direct and positive correlation with people's happiness, which invariably translates to societal peace. The reverse of this may also be true, particularly in the presence of pervasive poverty and unemployment and wide disparity of income among people.

Multi-country empirical evidence indicates a positive correlation between the most apparent effect of economic insecurity – poverty, and the risk of internal strife and civil war (Collier et al. 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Murshed and Gates 2005; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). The risk of civil conflict is higher in developing countries especially in the more impoverished communities and economically less secured regions (Collier 2007; Deininger 2003; Do and Iyer 2007; Miguel et al. 2004; Murshed and Gates 2005; Sanchez and Chacon 2006). Poor economic condition and its attendant socio-political challenges are both a cause and consequence of conflict. Conflict-ravaged communities often exhibit higher tendencies for increase poverty due to weakened individual and collective economic prosperity which may further expose them to the risk of conflict relapse (Collier et al. 2004; Collier 2007; Stewart and Fitzgerald 2001). However, Justino (2012b) captures the transmission mechanism between poverty and conflict in two ways. First, the availability of a large pool of poor unemployed and unemployable individuals or groups forms an easy target for recruitment into rebel groups to incite conflict. Secondly, the role of poverty in violent conflict may be rationalised with its tendency for encouraging collective mobilisation for conflict due to shared grievances. Despite this concern, the economic insecurity has continued to be alarming in countries where conflict is prevalent while unsustainable efforts such as military are given more attention.

According to the International Labour Organization (2006; 2015), World Youth Report (2015) and World Bank (2016), more than 70% of the world population faces economic insecurity. The projections (2019) do not indicate hope for the improvement of this condition. Youths and women are the most vulnerable to this security challenge. More than a third of the world youth population is unemployed and lacks adequate capacity - education and skills, to be gainfully employed (International Labour Organization 2015). More women risk wage disparity and other economic insecurity than men due mostly to gender discrimination and socio-cultural practices (Alkadry and Tower 2006;

Lo Sasso et al. 2011). The negative impact and uncertainty faced by citizens –youth, in particular, to be gainfully employed is a primary source of threat not only to the individuals or group but to the state as well. Majority of crises in Africa (UN 2017) and Asia (Aubrey et al. 2016), for instance, are connected to youth unemployment. These conflicts also relate to high-income inequality among people. International Labour Organization (2015) report indicates the existence of compounding economic insecurity where the increasing disparity between the incomes of the richest and the poorest. The report attributes this condition to the changing nature of employment pattern where medium-skilled jobs are gradually fading out. The consequence of the disparity is that those from the medium-skilled level are forced to compete for lower-skilled jobs, thereby removing the medium income class and increasing the lowest class vulnerability. Increase in income inequality results in distrust for government and potentially fuels social tension and unrest (Stewart 2016).

2.7.2   Food (In)security: Food security ensures that everyone can access food at all times and have the financial capacity to buy. It implies that foods that have adequate dietary and nutritional requirement are both readily available and accessible to individuals for consumption to enable them to undertake their daily productive endeavours. Availability of food refers to food production or stock level (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). According to George (1990) and Pinstrup-Andersen (2009), more food is produced than it is globally required, yet many lack access to it. A joined report of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP), indicates that no fewer than 795 million people in the world lack access to adequate food to live a healthy life. Developing countries account for the higher proportion of the people that are undernourished due to lack of access to adequate food. The report estimates that there is one person in every four people that are hungry (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2015). Reports also indicate that about a half of the child mortality (3,100,000 children) in the world is caused by poor diet annually (The Lancet 2013; WHO 2012) while one out of every six children suffers nutrition-related illness (WHO 2012). The condition of lack of access to food suggests that securing global food production is not enough to solving food insecurity since people still live with hunger in spite of abundant food production.

However, significant concern has been on the effective distribution and financial capacity of individuals and households to access the food they need. The effort on food access reflects in no small extent in the overall government policy and objective on food

security, income level and price mechanism of food at the market (HDR 1994; FAO 1996). Increase in food prices is a critical food security challenge which has a significant negative implication on human security, particularly human capital accumulation. Nonetheless, the nexus between food insecurity as a catalyst for social unrest has rapidly gained attention following the 2007-2008 global food crisis, which caused significant protests in many countries (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). Food insecurity as a conflict factor is debatable – concerning food prices, as being context-specific, relating to the existing food policies, economic development, social support and demography (Messer and Cohen 2007; Brinkman and Hendrix 2011; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). While it is arguable that food insecurity may not necessarily be a precipitating factor for large-scale political or civil conflict, the presence of hostile policies and conditions such as political exclusion and inequality, low-economic opportunities encourage collective mobilisation for civil war due to shared grievances (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). These conditions exemplify the food-related conflict that caused the ouster of the presidents of Tunisia and Egypt following the 2011 global increase in food prices (Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). Similarly, food insecurity has a positive correlation with civil wars. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) and Hendrix and Brinkman (2013), for instance, note that in 2010 the seven countries: Bangladesh, China, DRC, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, which constitute sixty-five per cent of world food-insured nations (FAO and WFP 2010) have all, except China, experienced civil wars.

Undoubtedly, civil war is a development challenge whose contribution to food insecurity is straight forward (Collier et al. 2004). The negative consequences of conflict such as forced migration and displacement, disease outbreak, injury and death and poverty directly affect food security adversely (Messer and Cohen 2007; Collier 2007; Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). Conflict outbreak fundamentally undermines the main dimensions of food security, including availability, access, utilisation and stability (FAO 2008). Conflict reduces access to, or loss of access to agricultural lands hence truncates food availability due to lack of production (Unruh 2004; Thu 2012; Matt 2016; Pritchard 2016). Displacement, loss of social cohesion and trust, injuries and sicknesses adversely affect resilience and income, thereby undermine the financial capacity to access food even when it is available (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). Adequate utilisation and stability of supplying food in conflict condition are often challenged by tension and fragile security environment coupled with conflict-related

illnesses such as trauma. Most importantly, however, is the cycle of livelihoods vulnerability that food insecurity exposes individuals or groups which are often argued to be a recipe for conflict recurrence (Licklider 1995; Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and Hartzell et al. 2001).

Despite efforts at national and global levels, much is still left to be desired to overcome food insecurity. The conditional relationship and the effect of food insecurity and conflict suggest the need to have a broad-based and multi-sectoral approach to achieving sustainable food security and minimise those conditional enablers. This also requires continuous collaboration and innovative engagement among relevant stakeholders at different levels to ensure that food security is achieved through appropriate policies. The food security policies must encourage sustainable production (self-production), capacity to buy (purchasing power) and favourable government policy to ensure that people are equitably empowered to have access to nutritional food they desire (Nelson et al. 2012). The food security strategy implies not only making food available but building individuals' or groups' capacity to be able to buy or produce food for themselves. Furthermore, food insecurity ensures that adequate measures are put in place to protect the vulnerable groups who are unable to afford food through social safety nets.

2.7.3 Health (In)security: Significant number of lives is lost to parasitic and infectious diseases around the globe annually. Majority of these deaths are avoidable and relate to the problem of malnutrition, unhealthy environmental practices, conflict and other lifestyles that is detrimental to good health. Although health insecurity is a global threat to human survival, there is a significant disparity in its distribution in terms of the type, region, gender, age and income groups. Reports indicate that mortality is generally higher in the developing and low-income regions than the developed area in a ratio of approximately 5:4:1 for every thousand deaths in the world (UN 2013; Population Report Bureau 2014; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). The predominant causes of deaths in developing countries are parasitic and infectious diseases while cancer and blood circulatory system-related diseases dominate the causes of deaths in developed economies (HDR 1994; WHO 2007, 2016). Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) has infected no fewer than 70 million persons while more than 35 million have died of it by 2015 and more than 37.9 million persons still live with it by 2017 (WHO 2016; UNAIDS 2019). Africa accounts for close to 70% of these cases (WHO 2016).

Similarly, in 2015 alone, some 830 women died daily (approximately 303 million annually) due to avoidable pregnancy and childbirth-related complications caused by haemorrhage, hypertension, infections, inadequate facility and qualified healthcare officers. Nearly all of these deaths occurred within the low-income environment where access to health care and skilled birth officers is deficient (WHO 2016).

Health security is significantly dependent on the availability of the healthcare services - infrastructure and personnel, accessibility and affordability as well as the government policies (e.g. environment, water, food, income) toward the sustainable provision of healthcare services. Intuitively, this dependency explains why conditions such as poverty and hunger, income inequalities and social injustice affect health security adversely. The complex interaction of these conditions creates a sense of hopelessness and disaffections among individuals or groups or towards government and in turn provides fertile ground for protests and civil unrest which may be exploited by opportunist rebels (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008). Health insecurity often deteriorates drastically following the outbreak of conflict whose adverse legacy may last much longer after the battle (Justino 2011a). The health challenges compound during or after conflict due to increased risks of infectious diseases outbreak, transmission and mobility. Increased cases of physical injuries, trauma and death are common impacts of conflict. Large-scale conflict induces forced displacement of significant proportion (sometimes the whole) of a population which may be settled in camps that lack adequate basic human needs such as clean water and sanitation, food, shelter and medicines (Gayer et al. 2007; Mowafi 2011).

Apart from the fact that displacement, itself, is traumatic, conditions of displacement camps increase the exposure of the displaced persons to diseases vectors (Justino 2011a; Mowafi 2011). Similarly, the transmission of diseases may be facilitated due to overcrowding in camps, thereby increasing the rate of spreading. Illnesses which are alien to a community may also be transported from the camps upon return due to inadequate treatment of diseases at the camps (Gayer et al. 2007). Moreover, post-conflict situations are characterised with increased rate of sicknesses and deaths as a result of the disruption of healthcare system, destruction of healthcare infrastructure, inadequate or uncoordinated disease control programmes and lack of healthcare staff (Gayer et al. 2007; Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008; Brown et al. 2011; Mowafi 2011). Health insecurity creates short-term and long-term vulnerability whose implication has a significant adverse effect on human capital accumulation and

livelihoods. Cole and Neumayer (2006) find that poor health condition critically affects productivity, whose influence explains enduring underdevelopment in developing countries. Lack of development on the hand is a recipe not only for conflict but its recurrence due to persisting exposure to increased vulnerability.

2.7.4 Personal (In)security: This implies shielding and empowering individuals against physical harm or violence. Threats to the personal security or safety of people can come in many forms including but not limited to: by one's state (e.g. repressive policing and over militarisation), a foreign country, groups or gangs, based on age or gender or even own self (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Threats to personal security by the state are forms of physical harm or violence meted on individuals by their government without legal justification. The threat comes in the form of harassment, torture, extrajudicial killing and state-sponsored assassination. Deaths caused by governments soon gained prominence upon the declined inter-state war-deaths after the Cold War. Kivimaki (2013), for instance, notes that governments have caused the deaths of six times more of their citizens than the deaths caused by wars in the twentieth century put together. The threat to personal security by the foreign state includes death, injury, harm or violence caused by another country to individuals either as a result of inter-state war and conflict or targeted individuals. The end of the Cold War ushered a decline of inter-state conflict (World Development Report 2011). However, the persistence of invasion of individual countries by another has continued to undermine the personal security of individuals in the invaded countries. For example, the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria by the US and its allies has caused the physical and psychological injuries and death of hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians in their countries. Many more have been perpetually displaced (Burke 2004; Fawn 2006; Nurazzaman 2013; Specia 2018).

With increasing terrorism in the world, personal insecurity caused by groups has been on the increase. These are violence or physical harm directed to the individuals by a religious sect, ethnic group, terrorist groups, or other social community. For example, the human rights abuses and other atrocities that are carried out by the Shiite and Boko Haram sects constitute significant threats to the personal safety of individuals in Nigeria (Alao 2013; Zenn and Pearson 2014). Gangs, often for criminal exploitation, could threaten one's safety. This threat includes physical harm directed at individuals by notorious bands such as armed robbers, cult group, and kidnappers as a result of violent

crime. Moser (2004) underlines that this type of personal insecurity is perhaps more prevalent in urban contexts, especially in poor neighbourhoods – slums. The unabating personal insecurity continues to make the vulnerable communities physically unsafe, especially for the weaker gender or group such as women and children (Moser 2004; Jutersonke et al. 2009). Personal insecurity caused by groups may also be significantly affected by the delicate interaction of socio-economic and political conditions in one's country coupled with globalisation and foreign government intervention. The sudden unrest which caused the deaths of thousands of civilians in Libya and Syria, for example, represents the effect of Arab Spring through globalisation, existing socio-political conditions and the US (and its allies) support for the rebel groups (Sadat and Jones 2009; Atlas 2012). The arm conflicts without recourse to corresponding socio-economic intervention have continued to heighten the personal insecurity of citizens thereby truncate freedom, human rights and development (Louw and Lubbe 2017)

Threats to personal safety that is gender-based are a common concern with women who suffer most of gender discriminatory form of violence such as rape, domestic violence, trafficking and forced prostitution, economic discrimination and other cultural deprivation (Moser 2004). Gender-based violence is by no means limited to women. However, women are more susceptible to abuses (Zack et al. 2016). There are instances where these abuses and violence may be state-endorsed and culturally unprohibited. The threat that is gender-based not only put the physical safety of the victims in jeopardy but undermines their rights to economic and civic liberty (Collins 2016; Zack et al. 2016). The relative vulnerability of female sex to gender abuse and inequality directly affect the personal security of children. The adverse effect of female gender susceptibility on children relates to the natural and cultural mother-child attachment as primary carers. Personal threats directed to children come in different forms such as child trafficking and forced child labour, child abuse and domestic violence, deprivation to education and care. Furthermore, threats to personal security are not limited to those posed by other persons or groups. It includes jeopardising one's safety by own self. Personal threats to own self could be but not limited to unhealthy habits and lifestyle which are detrimental to one's safety. Examples of this threat include addiction to hard drugs, suicide tendency, irrational and risky ventures (HDR 1994).

2.7.5 Community (In)security: The feeling of lack of protection (neglect) by individuals (who share specific collective identity) from physical and/or abstract harm consequent to their affiliation (to racial, political, ethnic, cultural, religion, gender,

demography etc.) has often been a significant security concern to many social groups. This vulnerability stems from the sense of protection and security derivable from being associated with some community or culture in the form of ethnic or religious groups and other social community such as cooperative club and youth movement due to their social benefits (HDR 1994; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). McLean (2009) considers that, like personal security, community security may be threatened by one's state, a foreign state, other persons or group. In essence, community insecurity concerns relate to 'freedom from fear' (physical protection) as well as 'freedom from want' (socio-economic opportunities) where individuals' lives (survival) and livelihoods are in jeopardy due to their affiliations. The threats are manifest in many instances of torture targeted at a particular group(s) and deliberate political marginalisation and exclusion and hate crimes. Community insecurity has often caused conflicts due to ethnic rivalry and power tussle, religious intolerance and extremism, gender and social inequality and violence and child abuse (McLean 2009; Caballero-Anthony 2015; Christensen 2018).

At the macro level of the society, Pemunta and Rene Nkongho (2014), underline that deep-rooted history of social and welfare exclusion promotes political marginalisation of specific group(s). The caste system in India is a case on point, where the upper caste is favoured against the vulnerable tribe or groups such as the Dalits, Adivasi and Muslims. While this condition foments resentment among the marginalised groups, the ensuing poor civic engagement (public participation) exacerbates the tension and lack of trust which cause conflicts and the recurrence. The mechanism of transmission between community insecurity and violent conflict has been demonstrated in some of the worst ethnic and racial related violence such as the genocides in Indonesia (1960), Cambodia (1975-79), Rwandan (1994), and Myanmar (ongoing) (Call 2012; Caballero-Anthony 2015; Human Rights Watch 2019). Call (2012) and Meagher (2013) indicates that the quest for ethnic and religious liberty informed by conditions of economic, social and political exclusion and marginalisation has driven many separatist movements such as in Nigeria and (South) Sudan. The separatists' campaign, however, is often cited as justification by regimes (which may sometimes be bias or actors) for excessive use of military even in conditions that may be sustainably resolved through socio-economic efforts.

In a more specific term, community insecurity represents a multi-dimensional inequality (horizontal) where unequal access to resources and opportunities drives collective mobilisation or sponsored conflict between socially defined groups (Langer et al. 2007;

Stewart 2011; 2016). While the analysis of this form of inequality often relates to larger geographic space, community insecurity may exist at a micro (community) level where diversity is much less. Micro-level community insecurity may occur as a class inequality (vertical inequality) within individuals or group with a similar social background (Stewart 2016). In elitist communities in northern Nigeria, for instance, economic insecurity exacerbates the community insecurity for the majority poor and lower class. The discriminatory tendency which deprives the lower class opportunities has been in the form of subtle reservation of specific lucrative job opportunities for the elite and their cohort at the expense of others (Meagher 2013; UNDP 2018). According to Khan (2016), in some instances where inequality-induced vulnerable groups have access to opportunities, they are usually insignificant or too few to alleviate the fear of the entire group. Langer et al. (2007) find that this kind of marginalisation not only undermines the human capital development but has a positive correlation with increased conflict prevalence in Nigeria, Ghana and Ivory Coast.

2.7.6 Environmental (In)security: Contemporary human security challenges that emanate from environmental threats are enormous and complex. They are caused by sudden or long-term (cumulative) alteration of the physical environment through natural processes and mostly as a result of adverse environmental practices by humans. Threats to the environment are manifest in numerous kinds of pollution (air and water), drought, global warming, desertification, environmental (terrestrial) degradation, marine ecosystem destabilisation and species extinction. The causes and resultant impact of ecological threats may be localised or global, hence requires multi-level and multi-sectoral collaboration to be able to mitigate them (Elliot 2015; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Importantly, however, is the intrinsic threat the environment insecurity poses to the human wellbeing and survival due to the resultant socio-economic damages and conflict (Ohlsson 2000; United Nations Environment Programme 2007). United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2008) and Elliot (2015) concur that environmental destruction threatens human security and safety in such a way that it creates vulnerabilities through health challenges, resource depletion and scarcity and loss of livelihoods. These vulnerabilities are often exacerbated by poverty, which may both be an outcome as well as a cause of poor environmental practices and insecurity (Ohlsson 2000; Global Leadership for Climate Action 2009).

The conflict mechanism for environment insecurity reflects in the mutual symbiosis that exists between poverty and poor environmental practices. Ohlsson (2000) notes that

environmental insecurity in conflict discourse is best understood as both having reinforcing linkages with poverty and livelihoods loss, which precipitates conflict. This view draws on the concept of 'environmental scarcity', in which, at a micro-level, aggravates the vulnerabilities of individuals in low-income communities due to limited access to alternative sources of livelihoods opportunities (Ohlsson 2000; Global Leadership for Climate Action 2009; Elliot 2015). As a result, unsustainable exploitation of the natural environment is inevitable until scarcity, which creates competition, social and economic marginalisation emerges. This condition sets in motion the process which results in selective deprivations and (sometimes) catastrophic livelihoods outcomes that promote ethnic and sectional grievances and conflict (Ohlsson 2000; Wingqvist and Greene 2013). The adverse effect of environmental scarcity may help to understand the conflicts-environment mechanism following environmental resource exploitation in Nigeria, Angola, Sierra Leon, DRC and Liberia and the dreaded consequences (Gariba 2011; Wingqvist and Greene 2013; Herbert 2014). It may seem, at first, that these examples do not have a bearing on environmental scarcity, however, the chronic livelihoods deprivation lay bare the linkage wherein the large pool of unemployed people created by the process provides the foot soldiers for recruit by warlords who benefit from inciting conflict (Ohlsson 2000; Keen 2012).

While poor environmental practices often start locally, their effect may be both domestic and global (Elliot 2015). For example, the quest to keep track of the ever-growing world population demand for food has increased the practice of irrigation farming as well as the use of chemical (inorganic) fertiliser for improving crop production. Excessive irrigation and over-dependent on the chemical fertiliser are identified to have a long-term cumulative adverse effect on the environment, food production and human health (Food and Agriculture Organisation 2002; Environment 2015). Excessive long-term and unchecked application of chemical fertilisers result in accumulation of components of the synthetic fertilisers (e.g. nitrogen, potassium, sulphur, calcium, magnesium) in the soil. The cumulative effect of these chemicals and other materials in the land result in increased soil acidity. This condition degrades soil fertility and productivity; contaminate groundwater, releases gasses (nitrogen oxides) that cause global warming and disruption of the aquatic ecosystem when flooded to a water body (Environment 2015). Climate change – an effect of global warming, represents one of the worst effects of environmental insecurity as 'threat multiplier' that aggravate livelihoods challenges, which results in conflicts across the globe (Elliot

2015). It is stressed, for example, that climate change is exacerbating the already weakened livelihoods conditions that have been closely linked with the dreaded Boko Haram insurgency ravaging the Chad Basin countries - Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, due to the continued shrinking of Lake Chad (UNDP 2018; Vivekananda 2019).

2.7.7 Political (In)security: The HDR 1994 spells the element of political insecurity to include repression of people, violation of human rights and unjustified application of force on innocent and unarmed citizens either by the government or armed group. The report stressed that 'one of the most critical aspects of human security is that people should live in a society that honours their fundamental human rights (Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Political security may be construed as the aspect of human security that harmonises all other components based on informed government policy through a democratic and consensus process. There is a growing recognition that political security is achievable through good governance in an environment that guarantees public participation, the rule of law, consensus decisions, equality and inclusiveness, transparency and accountability and effective and responsive service delivery (UNDP 2018). The crux of political security, therefore, is achieving service delivery and fair social treatment at the micro-level in ways that make individuals, households and communities feel that their interests and aspirations are protected. Cummings and Paudel (2019) and Gunasekara et al. (2019) underline that these concerns affect the legitimacy of a government and may lead to civil unrest when people perceive unfairness with regards to the way the government treat their social (e.g. ethnic and region) groups.

While the desire to achieve political security – domestic and international, is not contended, the process and policy through which it may lead to attaining the fundamentals of human security - freedom from fear, freedom from want and dignity, has been a subject of debate (Caballero-Anthony 2015). Led by Canada, many developed economies in the West have tended to focus their domestic and foreign relations on promoting individual human rights and safety (freedom from fear) to ensuring political and human security. In doing this, the use of collective sanction may be applied to protect individual's rights and dignity (DFAIT 2002; Hassan 2015). In contrast, however, the developing economies - especially Asia, prefer the 'freedom from want' strategy that targets eliminating development challenges to human social and

economic wellbeing (Caballero-Anthony 2015; Hassan 2015). Although these subjective dispositions toward political security reflect the diversity in cultural dynamics and contexts (Acharya 2001), human security or its components are hardly achievable in isolation. In other words, it is the complex and delicate balancing between all aspects of human security that can lead to sustainable overall social wellbeing and dignity. Caballero-Anthony (2015) concurs, for instance, to argue that despite the economic progress and political development in Southeast Asia, countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and Philippines have continued to experience politically motivated ethnic and separatist conflicts.

Amidst the need for balancing through issues on political power, state territorial integrity, human and economic development, ethnicity and social identities; politically motivated insecurity has continued at all levels in the world. Amnesty International (2016) report indicates that at least 122 countries illegally torture and maltreated their citizens. Another 30 countries were believed to have forced refugees out of their host countries even when it was apparent that their lives were in danger. The report also indicates that at least in 19 states, war-related crimes were committed either by government forces or armed groups who wreak havoc on innocent unarmed citizens. Regimes hide under the guise of national security to break their laws to perpetrate repression on their people. This scenario is a common sight in many countries (e.g. Syria, Russia, US, Egypt, Nigeria, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Thailand, and North Korea) where anti-regime protesters and critics are physically or systematically restricted, arrested, tortured and killed. Civil unrests also provide a good avenue for government forces to unleash anger on political opposition (Amnesty International 2016; HDR 1994; Human Rights Watch 2016). Salil Shetty - Secretary General of Amnesty International, expresses worry over the continued neglect of the fundamental rights of citizens by governments all over the world. Governments deliberately undermined the existing laws and systems that ensure the protection of human rights to dismantle the basis upon which many national and international human rights protection mechanisms rely (Shetty 2015).

2.8 Features of Human Security: A Synthesis

The primary interest of the human security concept is the need to ensure a safe and sustained livelihood and welfare that is free from all sorts of deprivation for individuals and groups. Human security focuses on all facet of livelihoods such that they can be

brought together to ensure the right to access and protection by state (UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). The following are the essential characteristics of human security emerging from the various description of what is regarded as human security – as captured in the CHS 2003:

2.8.1 Human-Oriented: Human security is a pro-people concept that places the wellbeing of individual and community at the centre. Unlike state security where protection of state sovereignty is the dominant concern, human security places more emphasis on the vast range of non-state threats whose adverse effect put individuals or communities in a condition of hardship or susceptible to danger. The people-centeredness of human security means that it seeks to guarantee human survival and secured livelihoods in a dignified manner and prescribe an analytical benchmark for assessment (Tadjbakhsh 2009; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Since human security is about people, it means any form of intended intervention should involve them in generating relevant information regarding their needs and susceptibility. This process helps in identifying the remote causes of localised insecurity, their links hence useful in prioritising them for appropriate actions or interventions. Following this procedure is vital in developing an intervention and empowerment framework that recognises the strength and weakness of the local community to build resilience to insecurity (UNTFHS 2009).

2.8.2 Multi-Dimensional: The fact that human security takes into account the whole of human wellbeing as a referent subject means that it can potentially be successful through a multi-disciplinary approach. This entails seeking a more in-depth analysis and understanding of the broad range of threats to human lives such as poverty, unemployment, famine and malnutrition, environmental degradation, climate change, acute water shortage, inadequate infrastructure, armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, communal conflict, religious conflict, political marginalization, poor governance and foreign aggression (HDR 1994; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). Emphasis is therefore placed not only on those specific threats but also on the link that exists between and among them. Analysis of the interlinkages between and among the components of human security is necessary because their risks are complementary in the sense that one threat potentially triggers another/others or the effect of a security breach in one region (or country) possibly spills to another. The usefulness of this characteristic is that it helps to

develop a policy that is consistent and sustainable to achieving sustainable human security (CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009).

2.8.3 Holistic: The multi-dimensionality and interdependence nature of human security components means that a comprehensive and holistic approach in dealing with the threats is only logical. This consideration is particularly important for policymakers to understand the difficulty of achieving human security through a disjointed response and intervention. The implication of this is that concerted effort and maximum cooperation is necessary from across all sectors as well as from all states to deal with human security challenges. Collaborative efforts help in establishing a harmonised multi-sector and multi-level intervention that is comprehensive through an integrated approach that considers aligning security, development and human rights challenges (CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020).

2.8.4 Case-based: The characteristic peculiarity of individuals and communities of humans and security concerns implies that hardly can a uniform intervention apply to all contexts to dealing with insecurity. In other words, there may be no one-size-fits-all solution to tackling human security challenges. The subjective nature of humans drives the variations for the possible security intervention for different contexts. Diverse social and cultural experiences require a variety of solutions to accommodate such diversities. For instance, the understanding and conceptualisation of what constitutes a security threat to a market woman in Nigeria could be far different from what a teacher in Britain sees as insecurity. The notion of vulnerability for a child in IDP camp in Syria would be significantly different from that of a farmer in Nigeria who is in perpetual conflict with herder due to the climate change problem. It is, therefore, imperative to have a critical understanding of individual case study to prioritise the localised aspiration (Gasper and Gomez 2015; Lawal and Mbiba 2020). For human security to make meaning to any given individual or community, it has to demonstrate an adequate understanding of the expectations of the people to work out what they consider as threats to their livelihoods thereby making an effort to strengthen their capacity to overcome such risks. Doing this is particularly important to be able to capture and prioritise what society perceived to have made them vulnerable. Similarly, this practice helps the researcher and policymakers to understand the dislocation between local needs for security and those that are prescribed at the national and international policy level (Tadjbakhsh 2009).

2.8.5 Preventive: The CHS (2003) report considers the prevention characteristics of human security termed 'bi-parts' of the framework for intervention - protection and empowerment. The protection in this sense refers to measures that are put in place (by relevant actors) to shield individuals and communities from either sudden or gradual security threats. This notion recognises that risks to human security are usually beyond what individuals or community can on their own prevent and so require a top-down response. Empowerment, on the other hand, implies putting in place measures that enable people to quickly overcome and or adapt to change in their security condition when it happens. Empowerment, therefore, entails developing and strengthening the capacity of individuals and communities to attain their potentials to create resilience to threats through adequate participation in the decision-making process for solving their security problems (CHS 2003; UNTFHS 2009; Lawal and Mbiba 2020).

2.9 Chapter Summary

The concept of security during the Cold War period was primarily the need to deploy military capabilities for national-territorial protection. The global military struggles created a bi-power tussle between the former USSR and the USA. The power struggle produced a condition where superpower country or group (superpower and allies) apply military strength against any other, which is regarded as the enemy. The unfavourable outcome of the military notion of security triggered the paradigm shift to a more encompassing security concept – human security. Human security advocates securing all aspects of human life as components that need protection. Although the idea put human social concern at the centre, it does not seek to replace the state-centric security approach. Instead, they are taking to be mutually reinforcing. Human security also posits that lasting peace or sustainable human security does not necessarily stop at or means the absence of violent conflict. It implies that any condition that may result in deprivation of any element of human security constitutes a threat to individuals, groups or communities. These deprivations often lead to struggles which are violent and aggressive, thereby aggravate the living conditions of people. The failure of the lopsided deployment of military intervention for internal conflict supports the relevance of considering a strategy that pays critical attention to the living conditions of people for solving insecurity. Accordingly, the next chapter focuses on theories and concepts that elucidate some conditions that threaten human security. The analysis of living conditions leading to escalated situations of violent conflict and its recurrence form the

focus of the chapter. The review of literature explores and rationalise the utility of the sustainable livelihoods framework for the case study of this research.

<center>**CHAPTER THREE**</center>

<center>**Theoretical Construction for Understanding Threat to Human Security: Condition for Conflict Mobilisation**</center>

3.1 Introduction: Making a Case for the Livelihoods Approach

The preceding chapter has reviewed the development and evolution of the concept of security and its ramifications. The shift in paradigm from the military (state) to human security (a combination of state and socio-economic) is a response to the changing dynamics of security threats after the Cold War. Human security advocates individual capacity developments to enable people to overcome threats to their living conditions by holistically resolving its inherent components. However, achieving sustainable human security and by extension, lasting peace, requires a balanced understanding of the complex linkages among its features. It is necessary, therefore, to probe the socio-economic conditions that can truncate the realisation of peace and human development since sustainable human security does not end with the absence of conflict. This consideration is significant given that the interaction of precarious living conditions often leads to physical strife, violence and conflicts. The current chapter focuses on the critical examination of such conditions and how they threaten human security in a stable (non-conflict) and post-conflict situations. The discussions leverage on the existing debates, theories and concepts – e.g. resource curse, greed and grievance; regarding conditions or motivations that inform conflict onset and recurrence. Relevant syntheses are made from those concepts to articulate a justification for the utility of the livelihood approach for the investigation. The livelihood framework is articulated to inform the empirical study for conditions that threaten human security and potential for conflict resurgence, particularly in a post-conflict context.

3.2 Condition for Conflict Mobilisation: A Natural Resource Curse Perspective

There is a growing recognition that every conflict has its uniqueness in terms of dynamics. However, the property and human costs are often quite similar and consistent (Ikelegbe 2005; Obi 2009; Watts 2010). Understanding these dynamics and how they make individuals and communities vulnerable and the conditions that lead to insecurity is essential to reduce conflict risks. Underlying this consideration is the theoretical

construct and empirical evidence in support of motivations for conflict within specific contexts (Bannon and Collier 2003).

One of the early considerations for conflict motivation relates to the economic deprivations, political instability and conflict that results from the over-dependence on a highly prized natural resource. The famous 'Resource Curse' thesis, postulates how paradoxically natural resource endowment (supposedly nature's gift) causes physical and socio-economic underdevelopment. The thesis posits that economies with abundant natural resources tend to have slower or retarded economic growth and development (Leite and Jens 1999; Gylfason 2001). This negative correlation hinges on specific, measurable development indicators. According to Sachs and Warner (1997), for example, countries whose gross domestic product (GDP) to natural resource export is high tend to show slow growth. A World Bank (2002) report provides statistical evidence to support this assertion. It indicates that on the average countries whose resource dependency are less than 15%, and between 15% and 50% had an annual GDP decline by 0.7% and 1.1% respectively. Those who are more than 50% natural resource dependant had 2.3 yearly declines percentage of GDP. The implication of this for resource-dependent states is an increased susceptibility to internal strife due to the ensuing income decline and increase poverty among citizens. Ross (2001b) confirms this, that increased dependence on natural resources increases the level of impoverishment. Moreover, the higher the rate and severity of poverty among individuals and households in a state, the higher the risk of conflict (Bannon and Collier 2003; Justino 2012a).

The consideration of natural resource as a curse buttresses with Auty's (2001) argument which correlates resource dependence with the relatively weak economic performance of resource-rich countries in the 1960s. The debate hinges on adverse effect of resource dependence whereby the revenue accrued from the dominance of natural resources (oil and gas and metals) tend to impede the development of other sectors of the economy (Otawa 2001). This phenomenon has since been coined 'Dutch Disease', after the adverse impact of the gas export on the manufacturing sector of the Netherlands economy in the 1950-60s. Many other countries (e.g. Nigeria, Venezuela, DRC, and Angola) have exhibited this trait in which the growth of the oil and gas export results in the slump of other production sectors like agricultural and manufacturing (Otaha 2012). The negative consequence of this phenomenon manifests in the form of recession as a result of a mixture of some unfavourable conditions. The high influx of revenue in

foreign currency, for instance, hikes exchange rate, which in turn increase the value of the countries' currencies. This condition reduces competitiveness in the export of non-resource products. It also leads to reduced direct foreign investment, thereby increasing unemployment and poverty due to weakened non-resource sectors. The unemployment and poverty condition exacerbates when the prices of the resource commodity fall due to the inherent volatility in the international markets.

Natural resource dependence increases the conflict susceptibility of the resource-dependent countries by undermining the quality of governance. Lack of accountability and transparency, corruption and weak government often characterised resource-based countries (Ikelegbe 2005; Busse and Gröning 2013). Over-reliance on proceeds of exporting natural resources implies that the bulk of the state's income comes from the external remittance. This challenge, coupled with the volatility of prices and the sheer size of the proceeds, impedes potent tracking of payments. In effect, the condition encourages a lack of accountability and corruption. Dependence on highly-priced natural resources (especially those that require less sophisticated technology to extract) promotes the creation of criminal gangs that form parallel armies. These gangs fund their illicit activities through the exploitation of the resource, thereby reducing government control on such territory and activities (Ross 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2005). Ross (2003) underlines that ineffective territorial control has encouraged conflict in many countries (e.g. Nigeria, Liberia, DRC and Indonesia) that obtain a large proportion of their income from a natural resource. This condition also fuels the secessionist campaign and rebellion against the government. Saro-Wiwa (1989) and Gould (2011), for example, consider that some of the factors that influence secessionist agitation includes the sense of being unique (and different from other ethnic groups), and perceived neglect and the desire for resource control by the region. Such separatists movements (and other criminalities) get funds through either or combination of resource looting, extortion, kidnapping and significantly determine the severity and duration of conflict and civil wars (Ross 2003; Collier et al. 2004). These conditions typify the insecurity in Nigeria's Niger Delta.

Resource curse thesis aptly characterises the typical scenario of many resource-dependent countries. Critics of the theory, however, root their argument in the fact that not all resource-dependent countries exhibit traits mentioned above. There are good examples such as Australia, Botswana and Canada, whose economic growth is attributable to their resource utilisation (Mehlum et al. 2006). According to Mehlum et

al. (2006) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), the provisions of country's constitution and institutional quality for the management of the resources determine whether or not it would be a resource cursed, and not just the dependence on the resources. Resource-dependence causes income and growth decline only when the policies and institutional framework for the management of the resources favour few highly placed individuals who grab rent at the expense of the majority of the citizens. In other words, resource may be a curse when policies that guide the accruing benefits allow for resource-related criminal activities to thrive (Mehlum et al. 2006). Nonetheless, despite the strong arguments for or against the resource curse theory, its potential for conflicts prevalence and conceptual appropriateness is context-specific. This view hinges primarily on whether or not the potential threat to human security or conflict risks relates to the resource-dependence challenges in a context. It is, therefore, critical to analyse the contextual insecurity dynamics to determine the appropriate theoretical approach, especially in a setting that has vast internal diversity like Nigeria.

It is apparent that Nigeria mainly runs a mono-economy, which is oil-dependent. As a country, Nigeria is a geographically large country with a considerable regional, cultural and economic diversity and varying resources access and utilisation. It is, therefore, unlikely that the resource-curse thesis would be a one-size-fits-all concept for analysing the insecurity dynamics in the country. Its applicability may be appropriate for consideration at the macro (national) level or at best within the region (Niger Delta) that is oil-rich. This study, however, asserts that the resource-curse concept may be inappropriate for understanding the insecurity dynamics of the other parts of the country – e.g. North(east), which are less oil-dependent (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; Ugwu 2015). This position hinges on the understanding that the insecurity situation in the other regions is much less natural resource-driven (next chapter discusses further detail on Nigeria's regional insecurity variation). Regional disparity in the North-east, for instance, which manifests in a delicate combination of low education, poverty and unemployment, frustration due to inequality, small arms proliferation, inadequate infrastructure, religious extremism and bad governance form the remote cause of insecurity in the region (Katsina 2012; Muhammed 2013; Obasanjo 2014). The North-east security challenge is an indirect consequence of neglect for human and physical development. According to Otu (2014), Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015) and Bamidele (2016), insecurity in North-east Nigeria is the apparent consequence of government failure to adequately address citizen's needs. A concept that articulates these poor living

conditions into the analysis and understanding of conflict motivation may, therefore, be more appropriate. The next section explores this consideration by revisiting the greed and grievance proposition concerning the conflict.

3.3 The Greed and Grievance Thesis: Economic Gains or Socio-political Grievance?

It is increasingly evident that natural resources are not the only cause of violent conflict around the world. Conflicts and civil war are also being analysed from the lenses of citizens' acute grievances leading to protest and rebellion. This perspective relates the role of the economic, political and ethnic circumstances of people with conflict occurrence. However, the causal mechanism that links these conditions with conflict onset is debatable. An economics account views violent conflict as a profit-making venture, where insurgents or rebels hide under the cloak of violence to undertake to 'loot' as economic ends (Grossman 1991; 1999). This view features prominently in Collier and Hoeffler's (2004) greed and grievance thesis, which provides a further useful perspective to the discourse. Collier and Hoeffler assert that the economic agenda of rebels proxy grievances for considering the viability of rebellion. The thesis posits greed as the most crucial rebellion motive for financial gains (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2005; Keen 2012). This conclusion follows the recognition that some common proxies for conflict such as inequality, political marginalisation, and so forth exhibit a weak correlation to rebellion initiation. However, the livelihoods condition of people - the level of education, per capita income, and so forth influence the opportunity for rebellion.

Development economics and conflict analyses literature suggest that the participation of indigent individuals in a civil war is subject to the organisational and financial capacity for mobilisation which is often beyond their means (Muller and Seligson 1987; Goodhand 2001; Justino 2012b). Hirshleifer (2001), Grossman (2002), Walter (2004) and Keen (2005) suggest that poor living conditions due to a prolonged period of unemployment may make 'soldering' a means of survival for poor individuals since non-violent means provides limited hope. Participation of the poor in a civil war in this sense may be influenced by the need to survive, although the vulnerability presents the opportunity for exploitation by warlords. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) find in an empirical study involving 1,000 Sierra Leone that almost half of ex-fighter who participated in the country's civil war came from poor households and one of their

primary drives was to get basic needs and protection. The rebel leadership, however, tend to focus on looting, profiteering and power-grabbing from the conflicts (Walter 2004; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). While analysing similar scenario of greed-conflict relations in DRC, Liberia and Angola, Ohlsson (2000), points that rebel (elites) purposely create chaos as a way of forming a new system for profit-making and power seizing.

However, the possibility of conflict onset because of greed-conflict relations may be rationalised in the cost of mobilising members with regards to the anticipated gains. Concerning the anticipation of economic benefits in conflict, the understanding is that if the livelihoods vulnerability – e.g. a low standard of living, is high, the viability of recruiting rebels to foster conflict is high. Collier et al. (2009) term this instance as the 'feasibility of civil war'. For example, low per capita income may translate to lower cost for recruiting rebels to incite a civil war. In contrast, the political science explanation to conflict motivation considers that grievances, which emanate from chronic dissatisfaction about social conditions force people into violence. Stewart (2008; 2011; 2016) argues that precarious living condition of people is the most important driver of conflict. According to her, poverty, which is often the consequence of profound economic insecurity, inequality and political marginalisation are more dominant causes of grievance and conflict. Socio-economic and political inequality and the ensuing poverty may instigate collective mobilisation for conflict onset when the condition is critical enough to intensify social tie through collective grievance among the marginalised group(s) (Justino 2012b; Stewart 2016). While these arguments subsist, civil wars have been analysed to have occurred as a consequence of complex interaction between existing grievances and criminal greed (Keen 2012). Keen's position is in tandem with Hirshleifer (1995; 2001) who construe the greed and grievance dichotomy as being mutually reinforcing. This way the grievances due to poor living conditions provide vulnerability context which is exploited by the greedy - e.g. the insurgents in the case of North-east Nigeria, for their criminal and economic interests (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

This research, however, aligns with the greed and grievance proposition based on the mutual reinforcing perspective. Aligning with this theoretical position is justifiable, at least, giving that neither arguments (greed or grievance) have dispelled the implications of each other's element of considerations on conflict entirely. Similarly, this stance takes into cognisance the manifestation of the complex interactions of genuine

grievances which are exploited to instigate civil wars by rebel groups in many contexts. This suggests that the delicate interplay of conditions leading to greed-grievance exploitation should be of more significant concern. The impact of this concern has manifested in the complex interaction of socio-economic grievances and insurgents' greed in many contexts such as Syria, Tunisia and Nigeria (Aubrey et al. 2016; Barkindo 2016; Lamloum 2016). Aubrey et al. (2016) find that the conflict in Syria is the result of long-term interactions of complexities that relate to precarious economic conditions, oppression, deprivation of individual and community social needs and inadequate livelihood infrastructure. The vulnerability conditions provided feasible ground for the civil war, which attracts youths to take up arms financed by rebel groups. An age-long unresolved regional, political, social and economic disparity trigger the violent conflict of the border settlement in the Southeast Tunisia (Lamloum 2016). The consequences of these conflicts are shocks which come with negative impacts on livelihood assets - economic, physical, political, social, environmental and human capital assets, of individuals and communities. Failure to resolve these pre-conflict and post-conflict challenges may continue to threaten human security in the region.

Similarly, Barkindo (2016) hinges the analysis of the insecurity and conflict of the North-east region of Nigeria on the historical antecedent of the area. He argues that carefully exploited religious extremism and ethnicity (he termed it 'selective memory') was indirectly employed to instigate the insurgency. This view considers insecurity as being intertwined with the struggle for ethnic-religious identity and history. He contends notwithstanding that the precarious livelihoods of people in the region provided the enabling incentive for the insurgency to thrive. Barkindo's view is in concurrence with Hussaini Salisu (a cleric) who has warned that:

> The level of frustration and poverty among youths in the country is a fertile ground for activities of Boko Haram . . . their conduct is totally un-Islamic but the whole problem boils down to the failure of government at all level to make the welfare of the citizenry a priority, a nation that allows its youths to be idle is sitting on a time bomb because frustrated people seek relief in religion (Tell, August 10, 2009: 38).

While the narratives of, for example, Otu (2014), Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015), Bamidele (2016) and Barkindo (2016), on security dynamics in North-east Nigeria are valid, citizenship failure provides an added perspective to the discourse. This consideration may be construed from the condition where citizenship failure represents merely being a member of a country nominally. Whereas citizenship connotes the possession of the right to membership of a country to which comes obligations as well as certain

fundamental rights to claims and entitlements (Baylis and Smith 2001; Brysk and Shafir 2004 and UNESCO 2017). These entitlement rights denote by Sen (1981) may be summarised as possessing the legitimacy to access one's basic needs (e.g. water, shelter, food, clothes, roads and electricity) either through an exchange - trading, employment and resources or through social security system - for the vulnerable. Active citizenship ensures that efforts and processes are put in place to enable citizens to attain this status for economic, political and general inclusiveness. The consequences of citizenship failure generate susceptibility characterised with a high rate of unemployment, poverty, starvation, inequality, and so forth (Wright 2011). These are the evident condition in the North-east of Nigeria, where government presence is absent. The deficient social participation and welfare rights deprivation incubate the vulnerability, which creates a sense of victimhood in people (Barkindo 2016), and the ensuing grievances set the people against the authorities. This vulnerability, as well as the feeling of helplessness and victimhood, was 'cleverly' exploited by the insurgents who use religion, ethnicity and financial inducement as an enticement for recruiting members. Having established causes of conflict onset; it is pertinent to probe the extent to which the pre-conflict factors or conditions can potentially instigate its recurrence. The following section explores the on-going debate concerning conflict recurrence.

3.4 Beyond Conflict Onset: What for Conflict Recurrence?

The phrase - violent conflict begets violent conflict, is often contextualised to emphasise the tendency for a violence onset to promote further violent behaviour. This tendency is perhaps more apparent for civil wars or armed conflicts. Kreutz (2010) for instance, notes that 159 (60%) of the 259 armed conflicts investigated in different countries reoccurred. In conflict studies, however, this condition has since been coined conflict recurrence, to indicate the repeat of a previous conflict in a given context. Conflict recurrence is often the manifestation and expression frustration due to unresolved grievances among dissenting and warring parties in a conflict (Gates et al. 2016). Nonetheless, there are contrasting views regarding ongoing debates on conflict recurrence especially in the light of post-conflict economic condition and how the previous conflict ended.

The concern for resolving the precarious living condition of people derives from the wisdom of its positive correlation with conflict occurrence and its significant potential for causing conflict relapse (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;

Sambanis 2004). This notion draws on Collier and Hoeffler (2000), Call and Cousens (2008) and Collier et al. (2009) with regards to the probability and feasibility of civil war. The 'feasibility of conflict' proposition relates to the economic development and living conditions of people - e.g. level of per capita income, as a measure for the opportunity cost for conflict - relating the cost of recruitment to anticipated conflict gains (Quinn et al. 2007). This view coincides with Walter (2004) regarding the chances of conflict recurrence. According to her, conflict is unlikely to occur or recur in a condition where the living condition - primarily economic, of people is good, and in the absence of micro motive, civil war recurrence has little or nothing to do with previous ones. However, the precarious living condition which lowers the opportunity cost for recruiting rebels does instigate conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Walter 2004). Quinn et al. (2007), however, added a condition for the possibility of civil war recurrence. While upholding Walter's view, they note that the manner with which the previous conflict ends has a direct implication on the chance of having conflict relapse. To this effect, conflict recurrence is a function of the extent to which conditions (victory for one side or peace agreement) that end an initial conflict can undo the circumstances that sustain what they refer to as 'dual sovereignty'. Dual sovereignty to this effect connotes the organisational structure, human and financial capacities of the government and rebel group. Quinn et al. (2007) conclude, however, that civil wars whose end is brought about by the defeat of the rebel group have a higher chance of relapsing than those ended by rebel victory or negotiated settlement (with external third party).

The rationale for Quinn et al. (2007) conclusion predicates on that government's victory in civil war often ended as merely technical defeat whereby rebels are forced to lay down arms for fear of annihilation temporarily. The resulting suspension of hostility hardly dismantles the initial conflict motive and ideology and the organisational capacity of the rebellion. The rebels would usually blend into the civilian population unnoticed and reorganise and re-strategise upon return of favourable condition where resources are available, and the opportunity cost for rebellion is 'sustainable' (Quinn et al. 2007; Call 2012). However, a different conclusion to this view is presented by Joakim Kreutz, based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP). According to Kreutz (2010), civil war is unlikely to reoccur if it ends through rebel defeat or deployment of peacekeeper. He, however, adds that this condition may not hold where the rebel motive in the previous conflict is to take total control of the government or

ethnic liberation. These theoretical arguments present useful insights for analysing post-conflict conditions regarding the potential for conflict recurrence in a context.

In Nigeria, for instance, the preceding debates may be pertinent with regards to conflict motivation and outcome and the susceptibility to conflict recurrence for non-oil dependent regions of the country in which poor living conditions drive grievances. With regards to the North-east, for example, it may be argued, on the one hand, that unresolved weak living condition may lead to conflict relapse (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Call and Cousens 2008; Collier et al. 2009). This view derives from the understanding that living conditions may have deteriorated after the conflict episode (Aljazeera 2014; Daily Trust 2014; Sahara 2014; 2017). This condition hypothetically increases the susceptibility of the region to another round of conflict due to further impoverishment (Hegre et al. 2011). On the other hand, however, the contrasting views within the proponents of the 'outcome of previous conflict' thesis may require being appropriately rationalised with regards to the contextual dynamics. At the moment, the government claims it has technically defeat(ing) the insurgents (Munshi 2018; Onuah 2018) while the option for peaceful negotiation has mostly been unexploited due to the lack of willingness of the insurgents (Kantiok 2014; Simon 2014; Onuah 2018).

Similarly, the 'revolutionary' ideology and unhidden desire to take total control of the government to establish an entirely new order is visible in the insurgents' mode of operations (UNDP 2018). At least this has been demonstrated when the insurgents captured certain territories in the past (Sahara 2017). The seeming analytical contradiction may have presented a condition of philosophical disagreement within the camp, which promotes the 'outcome of previous conflict' thesis regarding possible conflict recurrence. Since on one side, if the government is victorious the chance of the conflict relapse is high (Quinn et al. 2007; Call 2012) and on the other hand, when the government wins, there is less chance of conflict recurrence (Kreutz 2010). However, the exception that the latter presents may be a ground to conceptually argue the possibility of conflict relapse in North-east Nigeria, for instance, since the government is wining and the insurgents are not willing to embrace peaceful dialogue. Given the scenario, the insurgents' suspension of hostility may have been due to superior military capability of the government. The chance of the conflict resurgence, therefore, may mainly be determined by the insurgents' ability to regroup upon the favourable condition to exploit the post-conflict vulnerabilities, especially the worsening living conditions in the region.

The above consideration may have informed Kantiok's (2014) call for minimising conflict (recurrence) threats in the North-east by exploring strategies for improving governance and living conditions of people to discourage the tendency of joining the insurgent group. In line with Walter (204), Kreutz (2010), Hegre et al. (2011) and Kantiok (2014) it may be appropriate, therefore, to posit that while interaction of unresolved pre-conflict challenges and the post-conflict living conditions are the essential factors for consideration, the chance of conflict resurgence depends mainly on the ability of the rebels to regroup and exploit the post-conflict vulnerabilities. The livelihoods condition of the people becomes the most critical determinant of the conflict recurrence in the given circumstance. Exploring the utility of the concept of the livelihoods with regards to post-conflict vulnerability become inevitable for this research. This consideration informs the focus of the next section on the livelihoods approach in a post-conflict setting.

3.5 Livelihoods Approach to Human Security: A Development Consideration

The appropriateness of adopting a particular theoretical framework for assessing the security challenge may depend on the adequate understanding of the underlying insecurity dynamics within the context. Given the conceptual background of the possible livelihoods implications for this research, analysing the security challenges through the livelihoods lens is appropriate. Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002) have drawn from the strength of sustainable livelihood as an analytical tool for evaluating the vulnerability (poor wellbeing and deprivation) of households – particularly the poor, in the rural and urban context. Livelihood approach conceptualises the basis upon which rational understanding of the complex livelihoods issues is drawn. The analysis of the livelihoods concept is with the view to determining the appropriate policy for poverty intervention. Many livelihood approaches exist, but the sustainable livelihood approach (SLA) – base on Chambers and Conway (1992), has enjoyed wide acceptability and adapted by many development organisations such as the Oxfam and World Bank. Developed by the British Department for International Development (DFID), sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) has been widely employed as a development practice framework primarily for rural poverty alleviation (GLOPP 2008).

> A livelihood comprises of capabilities, assets and activities required for the means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and future while not undermining the natural resource base (DFID 2000:1).

The primary target of sustainable livelihood is to eliminate the vulnerability of individuals or households by improving their capacities and strength to enable them to sustainably access their assets thereby achieve the desired minimum level of wellbeing (GLOPP 2008). This notion suggests the need for providing and improving the capacity of people to access their physical and non-physical needs to fulfil individual and societal goals and resilience. Kollmair and Gamper (2002) note the basic tenets of sustainable livelihoods as follows:

People-centeredness is a fundamental consideration in that survival and wellbeing of people is the ultimate priority rather than the resources. This proposition builds on the notion that human vulnerability and undesired consequences emanate from poor policy decisions and structures for managing resources rather than its availability. Livelihood approach's people-oriented idea is taken to mean developing a critical analysis of the multiplicity of issues about people's' livelihoods in a **holistic** manner. The conditions, policies and institutions that shape the livelihoods of people are dynamic and so should be the approach for livelihoods interventions; to be **flexible and dynamic** to accommodate the constant changes that take place. As mentioned, the core of this approach is to capitalise on **strengthening the capacity** of people to overcome or remove those obstacles to realising their desired potentials on their own. The approach stressed the need to establish **sufficient link** between the local (micro) and general (macro) development agenda such that mismatch of needs and decisions can be avoided at various level to achieve sustainability. For the approach to be **sustainable**, it has to be **resilient** over uncertainties (e.g. shocks and stress) and achieve desired long-term goal with greater independence from external support without jeopardising the chance of others to attain their livelihoods.

The DFID approach to livelihoods recognises that having a critical grasp of living condition (livelihood analysis) of the poor is the basis for effective planning and appropriate prioritisation of needs. However, the flexibility of the approach allows for the design of a strategy to fit into peculiar circumstances and needs of people to make the best possible prioritisation for intervention to suit different contexts (GLOPP 2008). DFID's sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) (Figure 3.1) is structured as a concept for understanding people's response within a context and how the combination of vulnerability condition, institutional policy and processes and access to available assets influence their choices for livelihood outcomes (de Stage et al. 2002).

The framework depicts stakeholders as operating in a context of vulnerability, within which they have access to certain assets. Assets gain weight and value through the prevailing social, institutional and organizational environment (policy and processes). This context decisively shapes the livelihood strategies that are open to people in pursuit of their self-defined beneficial livelihood outcomes (Kollmair and Gamper 2002).

Figure 3.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

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Source: Adapted from DFID (1999)

The sustainable livelihood approach anchors on development strategy as a conduit to providing an analytical tool for understanding the living condition of the poor with the view to improving their wellbeing by strengthening their capacities. As noted by Carney (1998), the livelihoods framework primarily helps to (a) establish and analyse underlying factors that affect livelihoods (b) manage the complexity of livelihoods assets and (c) determining suitable livelihoods intervention in a context. It is crucial to highlight that the approach is primarily designed as an analytical and response tool for poverty reduction in the rural (non-conflict) context.

Notwithstanding, sustainable livelihoods approach has its areas of weakness. The immediate critics of the sustainable livelihoods approach relates to its excessive focus on the development of individuals' and households' capability based on the internally available assets in a context (Morse et al. 2009). This consideration potentially undermines possible consideration for exploring interaction with external assets - e.g. networking, whose accruing benefit may improve the capacities of individuals and households in the context. This may be particularly relevant in the current rapidly changing global trends and globalisation where inter-human interaction for economic and social benefits does not necessarily require sharing common relations or geography. The fact that no economy survives in isolation is undisputedly more relevant now than ever before. Another setback to the livelihoods approach is its weak consideration for

the politics of access to available assets. Scoones (2015; 2019) concurs that development stakeholders have often paid little attention to the political dynamics in the assessment of livelihoods of contexts. This view argues that this happens because the intellectual underpinning for the livelihoods framework finds its way into the global development discourse in a constraint manner such that it simply focus attention on the evaluation - assets availability, of the poor (marginalised) people in a context (Sneyd 2017). In essence, analysis of the livelihoods of people may not be enough to understand their development challenges without critically relating it to the prevailing political economy of the context (Scoones 2015).

Despite the critics of the livelihoods approach, however, the strength of its inherent features have continued to sustain its relevance in the development literature more than two decades after its launch. The approach's flexibility and compatibility with other concepts are perhaps most important in this regards. Scoones (2019), for example, argues that the integration of sustainable livelihoods framework with the SDGs could help to achieve its goals by eliminating its weak sectoral linkages which is one of the strengths of the SLA. This consideration is adopted for this research to merge the concept of human security (social) with the SLA (this is discussed further below). The flexibility of SLA supports the utility of the framework in other settings, including stable, unstable (conflict) and transition (post-conflict) communities. For instance, Jacobsen notes that:

> In communities facing conflict and displacement, livelihoods comprise how people access and mobilize resources enabling them to increase their economic security, thereby reducing the vulnerability created and exacerbated by conflict, and how they pursue goals necessary for survival and possible return (Jacobsen 2002:99).

Jacobsen's submission suggests that post-conflict livelihoods are primarily about survival and access to assets that reduce people's vulnerability. The vulnerability may be as a result of post-conflict challenges including unresolved pre-conflict and post-conflict livelihoods difficulties. This research, therefore, draws on Jacobsen (2002), to consider the post-conflict adaptation of the livelihoods approach as an appropriate framework for post-conflict investigation. Exploring the livelihoods framework invariably provides an opportunity to expand further and adopt the strategy to improve existing understanding of its utility for post-conflict livelihoods intervention for this research. In doing so, analysis of the livelihoods assets based on the framework and livelihoods changes would be invaluable in theorising the inherent vulnerabilities and their implication for conflict recurrence. The integration of the concepts – human

security and SLA, helps in doing the assessment to highlight both economic and social dynamics to understand vulnerability. Discussion and analysis of post-conflict livelihoods vulnerability form the focus in the next section. However, shedding light on the nexus between the human security concept and livelihoods approach is useful for this research to highlight the interrelatedness between the two concepts.

Human security concept has had significant global acceptability since its inception. Nonetheless, its desired target and objectives for attaining long-term peace and wellbeing for individuals and communities has not been achieved. Human security failure may be evident when each of the integral aspects of the concept is analysed (Caballero-Anthony 2015). The situation is particularly dire in developing countries where essential means of survival and livelihoods are always in short supply. Human rights and dignity are continually being truncated (Aduloju and Pratt 2014; Magcamit, 2014; Song 2015). For developing countries, human insecurity relates to gross human and infrastructural underdevelopment. These have led to economic, social and political deprivation and human rights violations which have fuelled many internal strife and conflicts. Human security and livelihoods - development, approaches are closely related to human development since inception. The primary goal of economic growth and development is the need to create sustainable human development – particularly in transition contexts (UNDP 2018). Stewart (2004) starkly demonstrates this in the tripartite relationships that exist between development and human security. In her work 'Development and Security', Stewart argues that (a) achieving secured wellbeing (human security) is the ultimate goal of people, which is also the core objective of development. (b) The absence of human security hurts the socio-economic capacity of people (poverty) which can lead to underdevelopment and (c) unhealthy development - based on inequality and deprivation, is a potential source of conflict and violence. She concludes that achieving sustainable development is possible only if human security is assured.

The consideration for the nexus between human security and livelihoods seeks to portray the two concepts as being two sides of the same coin which despite having similar targets can exist as reinforcing concepts (Gasper and Gomez 2015). In essence, the strength of the reinforcement between development (livelihoods) and human security may be a useful strategy for defining the success in minimising wellbeing vulnerability for individuals (Jehangir 2012). Similarly, the relationship between these two concepts may be construed from the sheer similarities between their components.

While human security embodied the notion of safety beyond the traditional sense of it, human development – livelihoods, empowers individuals with the capacity to optimally exploit available choices to achieve peace (UNDP 2018). It is, therefore, relevant to address post-conflict challenges through this lens. Each of the components of the concepts is almost (if not all) captured in each other except that human security draws more on social consideration while livelihoods on economic. Furthermore, wisdom may be tapped from Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Walter (2004) and Collier et al. (2009) for instance, regarding the impacts of deficient livelihoods on human security or the reverse. This mutual relationship tells of the positive correlation between the concepts of human security and livelihoods. It is often difficult, for instance, to make a distinction when analysing the components of human security and livelihoods framework. It would appear that the analysis of the elements of human security means examining those of the livelihood framework. Importantly also for the convergence of the these concepts is the deliberate focus on the individuals' and households' wellbeign as the unit of analysis.

3.6 Post-conflict Livelihoods Change: A Transition Between Pre-conflict and Post-conflict Conditions

There is a growing quest for understanding post-conflict livelihoods coping strategies in communities that have experienced conflict-induced livelihoods disruption. This attempt is to analyse their vulnerabilities and theorising a sustainable intervention that can be used to prevent possible conflict recurrence. The analysis of post-conflict livelihood is particularly relevant given the inherent inability of the short-term post-conflict interventions (e.g. humanitarian aid) to address long-term needs of transition communities effectively. The short-term nature of most humanitarian supports for post-conflict societies makes livelihood recovery slow and full of uncertainty with a high level of vulnerabilities. The consequence is evident in the unabating precarious livelihoods that results in the inadequacies due to lack of access to long-term livelihoods supports. There is often the mismatch of needs and available choices for conflict victims (Shah and Shahbaz 2015; Levine 2016). This dislocation of needs poses significant concern given the resultant vulnerability and the risk of conflicts resurgence. The pursuit for a long-term post-conflict intervention may have influenced the recognition of the need to address both short-term and long-term livelihoods challenges in conflict-affected communities. Achieving the long-term post-conflict sustainability require

concerted efforts, which focuses on analysing conditions that trigger the initial conflict and additional problems that emanate afterwards to prevent recurrence (IRIN 2005). Livelihoods in a post-conflict context come with distortion of the pre-conflict conditions and these manifest in a sudden decline in the basic needs of people. This circumstance exposes conflict victims to a variety of vulnerable conditions that is capable of fuelling the relapse of conflicts (Malual 2008). The conceptualised scenario of this sort shows in figure 3.2 below. Analysis of the post-conflict livelihood changes become necessary to have a legitimate understanding of the nature of the ensuing livelihoods vulnerabilities. This analysis also helps to theorise the coping strategies of conflict-affected communities, thereby determine the appropriate intervention.

Figure 3.2: Livelihoods in Post-conflict Context

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Source: Adaptation of DFID (2000); PCLI = Post Conflict Livelihoods Interventions

Foremost victims of conflicts are human and physical assets. Death, injuries and unattended illnesses are a common sight in a large scale conflict and post-conflict situations. Destruction of infrastructures such as houses, schools, clinics, and the road is a strategic way of dealing with 'enemy' in conflicts (Stewart 2011; Bangura 2016; Corbin and Hall 2019). The insurgency in Nigeria's North-east, for instance, has caused the death of no fewer than twenty-seven thousand people while more than two million are displaced between 2009 and 2018. Properties worth nine billion dollars ($9bn) are estimated to have been destroyed (NAN 2016; The Guardian 2017; Munshi 2018). Similarly, World Without Genocide (2015) reports that six million people died in the protracted crisis of Democratic Republic of Congo amidst rampant looting, property destruction and violation of human rights (e.g. rape and torture). A sudden eruption of conflict and the resultant displacement accompanies the destruction of social assets in

the form of loss of family ties, friends and other social networks. These are essential survival tools for many people, and the loss of the social asset exposes members of affected communities to economic challenges and other forms of vulnerability such as psychological injuries, trauma, human right abuse and loss of dignity (Bangura 2016; Corbin and Hall 2019). Violent conflicts also come with a loss of valuable economic assets and means of income and savings. Malual (2008) reports that the significant economic losses such as agricultural land, livestock and forest resources that support the livelihoods of agrarian communities during the protracted conflict in South Sudan. One of the consequences of these livelihoods disruption is widespread poverty and deprivation that characterises most post-conflict context (Branch 2013; Bangura 2016; Tollefsen 2017; Corbin and Hall 2019).

However, one of the conventional (often immediate) sources of post-conflict livelihood support is direct humanitarian assistance which provides relief for conflict-affected communities and to support and strengthen government capacity to ameliorate the predicaments of its citizens (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). The short-term nature of aid couple with poor coordination, mismatch of needs and support provided and selective access to the support; could create dissatisfaction and hostility (in extreme cases) among victims (Grossman 1991; Esman and Herring 2003). For example, the withdrawal of the aid organisations from Gulu district of northern Uganda creates a condition of sudden cut in the supply of humanitarian assistance for the displaced. This withdrawal creates new forms of livelihoods challenges within the context, given the government's inability to provide needed livelihoods support for its citizens (Branch 2013). The condition degenerated into internal struggle and rebellion against the government and created a new form of insecurity. The rationale for the short-term post-conflict interventions relates to the urgent need to shore up support in providing the immediate needs of conflict victims. The primary target of humanitarian assistance is giving sustenance to ease victims' predicaments of lack of capacity to meet their immediate livelihoods needs. Interventions such as cash disbursement, food aid, shelter, and so forth are a common practice in the short-term post-conflict assistance (Shah and Shahbaz 2015). There is, however, negligible evidence to suggest that post-conflict humanitarian aid has a significant long-term impact on the livelihoods of conflict-affected communities. This assertion is in part attributable to the lack of adequate understanding of the existing local dynamics for post-conflict needs and coping strategy. The condition often leads to the failure to meet the relevant livelihoods

aspiration of conflict victims (Jacobsen 2005; Porter et al. 2008; Omata 2012; Shah and Shahbaz 2015; Levine 2016). It is therefore not surprising that many post-conflict communities experience a relapse of conflict from the similar (or worsen) vulnerability conditions that cause the previous one.

The ability and pace with which communities recover from conflict shocks may have a bearing (among other things) on the level of livelihoods devastation experienced in a conflict (Justino 2012a). The level of devastation also determines the degree of post-conflict changes that may emanate from the disruption and destruction of people's livelihoods. This livelihoods change creates vulnerability trend that deprives people access to their livelihoods, thereby forcing them to depend on any available means of survival (Justino 2012a) including those that may become another source of insecurity. This condition underscores the importance of the need to analyse the post-conflict livelihoods conditions and the implications of changes that occur therein. The analysis may provide useful insight into the post-conflict processes and livelihood coping strategies for conflict-affected communities. Examining those livelihoods change in a post-conflict context is the main focus of this research.

3.7 Coping Strategies in Post-Conflict Context: Resilience and Adaptation to Post-Conflict Livelihood Change

The complexities and extensive application of the concept of resilience by a wide range of disciplines (e.g. engineering, ecology, psychology and economics) have made its definition quite slippery (Greene et al. 2004; Menkhaus 2013). While the denotation of the concept varies for different stakeholders, terms, such as flexibility, adaptation, coping and change to certain conditions in a system remain consistent. In other words, the capacity of a system to survive, adapt and carry on in the face of existential threat is central to the concept of resilience. This notion presents the opportunity for the adoption and use of the concept in ways that add value to the understanding and analysis in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding studies (Menkhaus 2013). With regards peacebuilding, Justino (2012) and Menkhaus (2013) suggest the relationship between conflict challenges and resilience exists at different possible stages. First, resilience may relate to the ability to prevent conflict onset in which case individuals and households defy threats to their peace. This way, the resilience capacity helps to sustain positive peace. Second, resilience capacity may be exhibited in another form of conflict prevention in a circumstance where individual and households or groups can transform

a negative peace into a positive one. This may be in the form of the ability to demand in a peaceful but transformative manner for changes in, for instance, oppressive regime. Third, resilience plays a critical role in minimising the livelihoods vulnerabilities that emanate from the challenges and negative consequences after a conflict to prevent reccuranece.

With reference post-conflict livelihoods setting, however, resilience may refer to the ability of individuals or groups to survive, cope, adapt and recover from livelihoods changes and challenges that are caused by conflict to minimise the resulting vulnerabilities which may foster conflict recurrence (Bujones et al. 2013). Jacobsen (2002) rationalises the application of livelihoods approach in a post-conflict setting as a useful tool for the analysis of resilience capacity of individuals, households and groups to explore livelihoods opportunities for survival and increase economic security to reduce vulnerabilities. The analyses of the post-conflict livelihoods resilience for the individual components of the framework is a useful starting point for understanding resilience. However, categorising these into institutional (e.g. legitimacy, efficiency), resource (e.g. availability, accessibility, diversity, utilisation) and adaptive flexibility (e.g. networking, value, behaviour, innovation) helps to understand their relationships better (Bujones et al. 2013). Jacobsen (2002) and Menkhaus (2013) underscore the importance of this relationship in a post-conflict context since these resilience components (institutional, resource and adaptive flexibility) operate in a delicate and complementary manner to achieve overall livelihoods resilience and sustainability. This consideration indicates that a post-conflict livelihoods resilience is dependent on achieving the institutional, resource and adaptive flexibility synchronously (Jacobsen 2002; Menkhaus 2013; Suarez 2013). Furthermore, resilience may vary between individuals, groups or communities since the capacity to access and utilise those aspects of livelihoods resilience differs (Jacobsen 2002; Bujones et al. 2013). A resilient livelihood is, therefore, one in which the elements of its resilience is comprehensive and complementary and are accessible and utilised to cope and minimise vulnerability.

The term coping or coping strategy have been widely used in conflict studies to describe victims' response to devastating consequences following a conflict. Post-conflict coping strategies relate to how individuals, households and communities address these livelihoods predicaments and changes such as financial and economic needs, changing social fabric, psychological trauma, infrastructure inadequacy and so forth (Justino 2012). While the magnitude and effect of conflict vary from one context to another,

adopting a coping strategy reflects specific contextual livelihoods dynamics in the setting (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010; Justino 2012; 2012a). Although post-conflict livelihoods coping strategy targets improving the adaptation and resilience to the ensuing challenges, not all efforts lead to sustainable post-conflict livelihoods development (Werker 2007; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010). This scenario may be more so for vulnerable victims and who may be unable to access adequate post-conflict supports to improve their adaptive and resilience capacity (Justino 2012).

There is an emerging pool of research understanding of the livelihoods coping strategy and post-conflict development of communities – especially for refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Long-term improvement of the wellbeing of people and communities is the primary target of sustainable livelihood framework (SLF) (DFID 2000). Unruh (2004) links the long-term sustainability in a post-conflict context to two crucial features of the SLF - resilience capacity of individuals and communities and the ability to survive within the locally available and accessible assets. There is the view (e.g. Azam et al. 1994; Bundervoet 2006, De Walque 2004,) that most of the available means of survival or coping in a post-conflict situation are destroyed during the conflict. This condition weakens the post-conflict resilience capacity of conflict victims in many possible ways. The ensuing vulnerability potentially develops into what Collier (2007) and Justino (2012a) refers to conflict and poverty traps, respectively. This is an indication of poor livelihoods resilience (Justino 2012a) Analysis of the post-conflict livelihoods coping strategies becomes necessary in theorising livelihoods change and their implications for conflict recurrence.

Economic and financial resilience are some of the most critical coping and recovery strategy in post-conflict transition contexts. This view may relate to the consideration that the apparent difference between individuals in conflict-affected communities (e.g. refugee and IDP camps) and stable communities is their level of vulnerabilities due to availability (or non-availability) of economic opportunities (Jacobsen 2002; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). In other words, individuals and families (conflict survivors) in conflict-affected communities have the capacity and resourcefulness to engage in active economic activities to attain self-reliance. However, they often lack relevant long-term opportunities to sustain their post-conflict livelihoods. According to Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010), pre-conflict savings of 'movable' physical assets (e.g. jewellery) is one useful source of financing livelihoods in a post-conflict situation. Such assets, however, can hardly be considered to have the potential for long-term

sustainability since it is easily exhaustible. What then becomes the survival strategy afterwards in the absence of other assets and choices? Promotion of long-term strategy for sustainable economic self-reliance is a crucial means of achieving post-conflict livelihoods (Omata 2012). According to Jacobsen (2002), the pursuit for improved income for individual refugees improves human security of both refugees and host community since economic empowerment has the potential to resuscitate the social and economic interdependence within them. This proposition is particularly relevant in a refugee/IDP context where host community harbour the feeling that refugee presence adds to their existing economic pressure. Dissatisfaction and agitation within host communities may fuel new form of insecurity as observed in Gulu, Northern Uganda and Sri Lanka, for instance (Branch 2013; Thu 2012). Income-generating programs (as a means of capacity development) and improved financial access for livelihoods has excellent potentials of removing the burden on the host community. The strategy may be useful in promoting human security, mainly when it is inclusive and bottom-up (Jacobsen 2002).

The productivity of refugees is shaped by the refugee/IDP policies of a host community or country regarding restriction on movement and work as well as the spatial context (isolation) of the camp. As noted by Werker (2007) and Porter et al. (2008), the complex interaction of refugee policies (and their outcome), humanitarian support and the demographic composition of the camp determine the economic wellbeing-livelihood, of the refugees. The sustainable livelihood framework holds that desirable livelihoods outcome is achievable through accessibility and interactions among assets and institutional environment. It, therefore, means that an economic strategy in a post-conflict context must be analysed with regards to the other livelihood assets to be comprehensive. Korf (2004) upholds similar sentiment as he sought to model the adaptability of the DFID livelihood framework for a post-conflict camp context. He focuses mainly on the tripartite concern on household livelihoods strategies where he contends that coping strategy in the presence of a high level of vulnerability, household's adaptation to economic and social capitals and political assets are essential determinants for long-term post-conflict livelihoods development. The empirical analysis of his findings in Sri Lanka, suggests that political and social assets are crucial to household coping strategy in a post-conflict context in addition to economic and financial assets. Access to social assets and networks within and outside refugee camps provides useful survival support for conflict-displaced migrants – IDPs. The ability of

refugees/IDPs to access available assets in a restricted camp environment may depend on complex social networking as a means of earning a living and livelihoods strategy for refugee-host relations. Porter et al. (2008) demonstrate that there are negative livelihoods implications for refugees who lack networks - internal or external, in a restricted camp context. In the event of short supply which characterises humanitarian supports, external networks are a vital source of income to many refugees.

Alternatively, the ability to adapt and form new networks within the context of the host community is an essential strategy for survival. Complex social networking through adaptation of host community language, participation in peer activities and blending into the 'new culture' are crucial ways of creating new social networks (Porter et al. 2008). Coping strategies in a post-conflict context can be quite diverse and complex depending on the degree of prevailing changes in livelihoods of people and the alternatives available to them. The spatial context of the new environment for displaced persons has a tremendous effect on their resilience and may exacerbate their inability to secure livelihoods. One of the significant causes of livelihoods disruption in a post-conflict context is displacement, which often increases livelihoods vulnerability for conflict affect-communities. This vulnerability is commonly due to mismatch of the available labour of the camp residents and the local labour needs. According to Amirthalingan and Lakshman (2009), post-conflict displacement has different implications for different labour skills. The difference depends on the categories and applicability of refugee's human resources stock concerning the local needs of host communities.

3.8 Knowledge Gap: A Case for Post-conflict Livelihoods Change

Analysis of the above-mentioned post-conflict analysis - refugee/IDP context, confirms the utility of the livelihoods framework for understanding post-conflict vulnerabilities. They provide useful insight into the coping strategies for conflict victims. Analysis of those cases also offers the opportunity to explore further and expand the approach to improve existing theorising of the post-conflict challenges. While the current research provides valuable insight into post-conflict livelihoods vulnerabilities in the context of refugees/IDPs, there appears a knowledge gap in understanding similar condition in a non-camp (self-settled) context. Are the post-conflict susceptibility the same for the refugee/IDP and the non-camp self-settle settings? What can we learn from the difference (if any)? Similarly, Levine (2016) asserts that not all post-conflict livelihoods

difficulties are the direct implication of violent conflict. Does this apply to both camp and non-camp contexts? What impact does it have on long-term post-conflict vulnerability? These and many more questions confirm Justino's (2011; 2012) concern that research study on post-conflict vulnerabilities is understudied. Her call relates more to the need to improve the theorising on the implications of post-conflict livelihood change where she argues that the existing studies have mainly focused on the direct impact of conflict - physical destructions, whereas more need to be done to have a comprehensive knowledge of post-conflict vulnerabilities.

Justino (2012a) reviews existing literature in an attempt to establish 'channels of transmission' between conflict and poverty leading to a repeated cycle of unrest. While focusing on the conflict-induced impact of social and political changes on livelihoods, the analysis is limited to war-time context whose conditions may be different from post-conflict livelihoods dynamics. This thesis, however, addresses this post-conflict time-dynamics limitation. Post-conflict theorising must adequately address both the direct and indirect impacts of conflicts (Justino 2012). The indirect implications of conflict, in this sense, relates to the livelihoods change that emanates from the direct effects. Although post-conflict debates and analysis acknowledge livelihoods destruction and disruption, investigation on the specific implications of the changes, especially for conflict recurrence is limited. Analysis of the nature of these changes and their implications for conflict recurrence would undoubtedly add a perspective to the existing debate and theorising on this subject.

As noted in the preceding section, these studies have analysed post-conflict coping strategies with regards to individual livelihoods components. For instance, Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) and Jacobsen (2002) examine the economic and financial coping strategies for refugee and IDP contexts. Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009) consider the survival of different categories of skill sets (human capital) of conflict victims and its implication on their level of post-conflict impoverishment. For Korf (2004) and Porter et al. (2008), social assets and political networks prominently feature in the discussions for post-conflict coping strategy. According to Werker (2007), existing post-conflict policies and institutional framework is a crucial determinant to accessing available assets for conflict victims. There seems to be no contention on the inevitability of the interdependence among the livelihood components. Analysis of individual components of the livelihoods in isolation may, therefore, undermine the significance of comprehensiveness which is a crucial feature of the livelihoods

framework in achieving a holistic perspective of a context (DFID 2000). Similarly, analysis and implications of the post-conflict infrastructures (e.g. roads, water, telecommunications, electricity, houses, and hospital) seem non-existent despite the understanding that infrastructure forms the basis upon which other livelihood assets may be accessed (Malual 2008). Analysis of the post-conflict physical infrastructure may further enrich this investigation, given the intricate connection that exists between access to physical infrastructure and livelihood success that may be achievable, especially in a post-conflict context.

Human loss is a common consequence of large-scale violent conflict, and the condition can significantly distort the economy of families, especially when the casualties are the family heads or breadwinners. These losses potentially create environments of vulnerability for families – especially women and children, thereby making life more challenging - a situation which is a recipe for conflict recurrence (Collier 2007; Justino 2012a; Branch 2013; Corbin and Hall 2019). Understanding the livelihoods changes for women and children who are the primary victims of losing breadwinners should be of great interest in a post-conflict discourse. Furthermore, conflict displacement is an integral feature in a post-conflict setting. While the displaced families reside in another community, they often lose their natural rights and access to livelihoods assets (Branch 2013; Corbin and Hall 2019). The vulnerability condition that emanates from the displacement may be enormous as a result of livelihoods changes through the loss of lands, social ties (network), loss of business, loss of dignity, and so on. Predicaments of displaced people compound when they cannot access the livelihoods assets or are unable to take part in activities they have skills for in their new environment (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009). The livelihood vulnerabilities of this group in a non-camp condition would add to the understanding of the possible cause of conflict relapse discourse.

Nonetheless, this investigation draws on Justino (2009; 2011; 2012) to broaden the theoretical analysis of post-conflict challenges in ways that pay critical attention to livelihoods changes. Review of the interlinkages among the aspects of livelihoods is as vital as the components themselves. Accordingly, the research probes the interdependence of infrastructure change and other livelihood components. The investigation seeks to analyse the implications of the outcome of the interactions of the changed livelihoods components on the possible conflict recurrence. In line with Justino

(2009; 2011; 2012), the objective of this research is to respond to the following specific questions, as shown in figure 3.3.

1. What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-camp context?

Examination of the nature of livelihoods change is a useful starting point for this study, given the widespread destruction of both social and economic infrastructure in the case study of the investigation. The analysis of the nature of the damage may reveal the detailed level of livelihood changes in terms of devastation and possible vulnerabilities. Also, attacks and disruptions may be construed as one of the most typical methods of expressing frustration and grievances by individuals or groups. The analysis of the destruction pattern may, therefore, reveal actors' motivations as well as the possibility of the violence recurrence.

2. What is the implication of the livelihoods change for conflict recurrence?

Analysis of the level of devastation may offer a rough understanding of the impact of conflict on victims' livelihoods. However, an in-depth analysis of the effects of conflict and the post-conflict challenges is best understood when the narrative is from the victims themselves. Accordingly, interpretation of conflict victims' story of what they make of the post-conflict livelihood changes would provide a sense of the significance and level of impoverishment. A useful conclusion may then be drawn on the possible implications of the post-conflict livelihoods changes for conflict recurrence.

Response to these questions provides the answer to the primary question of this research:

To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change a potential contributor to conflict recurrence and a threat to human security?

The aim of the research, therefore, is:

To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-camp context.

Figure 3.3: Proposed Livelihoods Framework for a Post-conflict Context

Figure 3.3 has been removed from this version of the thesis due to copyright restrictions

Source: Adaptation of DFID (2000); PCLI = Post-Conflict Livelihoods Interventions

3.9 Chapter summary

This chapter has reviewed the theories and concepts that establish the causes of threats to human security, leading to conflict incidence. Theoretical considerations on the variety of motivations for conflicts onset and recurrence focused on the resources-curse, greed and grievance, Dutch disease and sustainable livelihoods theses respectively. The contextual consideration for the case study helps to articulate and adopt the livelihood approach as an appropriate theoretical framework for this research. This was necessary to highlight the premise upon which the theoretical construct hinges in the context of this research. Similarly, the review of some examples of post-conflict cases studies further strengthens the justification for the utility and appropriateness of adopting the livelihoods framework. Furthermore, the contextualisation of the proposed framework helps in articulating the knowledge gap for this research thereby specifies the research question(s) and aim. However, to provide a relevant response to the research question (s) and achieve the aim of this investigation, an appropriate methodology is necessary to identify a suitable and relevant method of data collection and analysis for the research. Accordingly, the next chapter focuses on the methodological consideration for the study.

Part Two

Buni Yadi in the Context of Diverse Regional Insecurity in Nigeria

CHAPTER FOUR

Introduction to the Research Case Study

4.1 Introduction: Buni Yadi in the Context of Diverse Insecurity in Nigeria

The earlier chapters have explored the rationale and theoretical underpinning for this study. Chapter two reviews the concept of human security covering its evolution, components and ramifications. To deepen the understanding of threats to human security, chapter three critically examine the discourse concerning theories on conditions that trigger conflicts onset and recurrence. The conceptual analysis helped to situate the context (North-east, Nigeria) of this research within the theoretical debate, thereby articulate the justification for adopting the livelihoods concept for a post-conflict setting as an appropriate framework. It is pertinent, however, to establish the specific case study within which the investigation is undertaken. To achieve this, the chapter analyses the broader context of Nigeria to identify relevant specific setting that is suitable for the inquiry given the diverse regional insecurity dynamics and problem in the country. The chapter also justifies the selection of Buni Yadi as the case study for the research.

4.2 Broad Regional Pattern of Insecurity in Nigeria

Nigeria is an example of a post-colonial country with increasing and recurring conflicts since independence (1960). The series of civil disputes in Nigeria include the 'Biafra War' - in the late 1960s (Orobator 1983; Diamond 2007; Iruonagbo and George 2007; Oparaku et al. 2017), and 'Maitatsine' uprising of 1970s and 1980s (Hickey 1984; Kastfelt 1989; Adesoji 2011). Recent conflicts occur after Nigeria's return to democratic rule (post-2000) (Okafor 2011), which preceded the increased ethnoreligious violence across many regions. The Niger-Delta militancy, North-east Boko Haram insurgency and the farmer-herder conflicts in the North-central are examples of significant disputes in the country in recent times (Akinbi 2015; Nwankwo 2015; Dimelu et al. 2016; Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017; Idowu 2017).

Insecurity in Nigeria also manifests in the incessant and increasing cases of crimes, violence, uncertainty and fear across the country (Adagba et al. 2012; Ahmed 2014). Researchers and policy analysts have widely described the security threats in the country as ones that concern basic human needs (Katsina 2012; Ahmed 2014). Salkida

(2016), however, contends that interventions have relied more on military actions while sustainable means of discouraging acts of criminality and violence in the form of development have received relatively less attention. Odo (2012) acknowledges the effort of Nigeria security agencies in providing physical security but argues that a lasting solution to insecurity depends on government's ability to create livelihoods opportunities to end the existing precarious living conditions of people. This view has informed a growing recognition of the need to complement military efforts with improvement in socio-economic wellbeing and general livelihoods in the country – particularly in the North-east region, which is one of the most impoverished. It may be relevant, however, to question the effectiveness of any possible intervention - which does not critically assess the changes in the post-conflict livelihoods of the individuals. The analysis of the livelihood conditions is particularly critical in a context such as Nigeria where there is tremendous regional and economic diversity.

A good starting point for insecurity interventions in a country with sizeable internal diversity like Nigeria requires an understanding of the underlying causes and dynamics (Achumba et al. 2013). Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015) note that Nigeria's insecurity is regionally diverse with different factors which trigger conflicts and general instability (Figure 4.1). Examining the conditions that cause regional instability is necessary to distinguish those dynamics as a critical strategy to unravelling the relevant concept for approaching the challenge (see Table 4.1). The analysis is vital since different insecurity drivers may require different approaches for sustainable interventions (Achumba et al. 2013). The review of the diversity provides useful insight for identifying pertinent underlying causes of insecurity for each region, thereby informing the appropriate conceptual approach to tackling their peculiarities. Achumba et al. (2013) suggest that this is necessary to avoid the age-long unsustainable consideration that a one-size-fits-all intervention is sufficient for addressing insecurity in Nigeria. This section, therefore, focuses on the analysis of the broad regional distribution of security vulnerabilities in Nigeria. At least six regions can be determined based on the geopolitical zoning in the country (Figure 4.1).

4.2.1 Resource Curse in the Niger Delta (South-south Region)

The social unrest and violent conflict in the Niger Delta – South-south, region of Nigeria can be traced to the pre-colonial and independent periods (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). Protests, occasioned with violence formed the response against economic

domination, alienation and oppression (Joab-Peterside 2007). The discovery of crude oil and subsequent attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960 soon transformed the protests into the demand for a fair share of the proceeds of the regions' resources - mostly oil and gas (Obi 2009). In recent times, strong demand for full control of the resources which form the mainstay of the country's economy and sometimes secessionist agitation dominates the violence and insecurity in the region (Joab-Peterside 2007; Obi 2009). The movement and campaign against apparent neglect primarily associated with the violence in the Delta region leading to further deplorable living conditions of people and communities; where resources that the country depends on are extracted (Nwankwo 2015; Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017).

Table 4.1: Regional Security Dynamics in Nigeria

Regional Security Dynamics in Nigeria		
Security concept	**Regional insecurity dynamic**	**Conceptual explanation**
Livelihoods – precarious living conditions and governance failure	North East – Insurgency, banditry, poor education, high rate of unemployment and poverty.	Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. (2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu (2014); Tella (2015); Ugwu (2015); Bamidele (2016)
Livelihoods – precarious living conditions and governance failure	North West – Ethno-religious conflict, Cattle rustling, banditry, poor education, high rate of unemployment and poverty.	Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. (2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu (2014); Tella (2015); Ugwu (2015); Bamidele (2016)
Livelihoods – precarious living conditions and governance failure	North Central – Ethno-religious violent, farmer-herder disputes, banditry, high rate of unemployment and poverty.	Collier and Sambanis (2002); Collier et al. (2004); Walter (2004); Eze et al. (2014); Tayo and Nasrullah (2016); Abbas (2012); Hoffman 2017); Otu (2014); Tella (2015); Ugwu (2015); Bamidele (2016)
Unsustainable Urbanization	South West – Thuggery, robbery, cultism, high rate of youth unemployment.	Okwuashi et al. (2011); Oyesola (2012)
Resource Curse	South-south – Militancy, cultism, kidnapping, poor education, youths' unemployment and poverty.	Collier et al. (2004); Ross (2006); Joab-Peterside (2007); Obi (2009) Ajodo-Adebanjoko (2017); Nwankwo (2015); Ikelegbe (2005)
Political marginalisation and exclusion and Resource Curse	South East – Secessionist agitation, kidnapping, human trafficking, youths' unemployment and poverty.	Collier et al. (2004); Oparaku et al. (2017); Obi-Ani (2009); Onuoha (2011); Ike (2012); Smith (2014)

Source: Adapted based on Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015)

The impoverished conditions of communities (especially oil-producing) are attributable to the environmental degradation due to oil exploration and the spillages which render arable lands into wastelands and waters (Asuni 2009). Oil exploration has also adversely affected the forest ecosystem in the region while the continued destruction of the rich and diverse ecological zones has caused the depletion of the region's biodiversity thereby distorts its ecological balance (Eragha and Irughe 2009). Oil spills contaminate water, thus making it unsafe for human consumption and destroy aquatic plants and animals. Air pollutants from gas flaring have been a primary atmospheric contaminant which results in critical respiratory health challenges in the region (Ajodo-Adebanjoko 2017). Despite all these problems, the level of economic and social support for the communities in the area has been widely acknowledged to be significantly inadequate to offset the continued damage to the local means of livelihoods of the indigenes (Nwankwo 2015). And where efforts are made to enhance the deplorable conditions of the people, they hardly reach the poor given the difficulties caused by the characteristic poor governance, occasioned with a high level of corruption - by top government officials and the oil companies (Ikelegbe 2005).

Figure 4.1: Broad Regional Distribution of Insecurity in Nigeria.

Source: Adapted based on Peterside (2014) and Dambazau (2015)

The combined effect and activities of genuine agitators for improved living and environmental conditions and the criminal gangs – mostly militants and cultists, who take advantage of the situation, have been the cause of continuing violence and armed confrontations in the South-south (Asuni 2009). Johnson et al. (2010) note that depriving the indigenous people the oil proceeds and competition for scarce resources and political exclusion form some of the significant causes of insecurity in the Delta region. The effect of these unresolved practices is manifest in the numerous communal clashes among communities due to the struggle for scarce resources (Ikelegbe 2005; Joab-Peterside 2007) and the armed battle between the government forces, and the rebel groups is a notable form of a violent clash in the region. The oil companies are not spared in the violence where both genuine agitating groups and criminals launch attacks on oil installations and pipeline purposely to scuttle oil activities and production and perpetuate oil theft (Watts 2007). The kidnapping of oil workers (especially expatriates) and rich people for ransoms makes media headlines regularly (Obi 2009).

4.2.2 Historical Legacy of Secessionism in the South-east Region: Before and After Biafra War

The insecurity in the South Eastern region has widely been considered to be deeply rooted in the controversies that preceded the 1914 amalgamation which culminates into the creation of the current Nigerian State. As indicated by Ballard (1971) and Momah (2013), the then British colonial government merged the Northern (now North-west, North-central and North-east) and Southern (currently South-west, South-south and South-east) protectorates to form the current Nigerian State for efficient administration). The Eastern region (mainly present-day South-east) was said to have been coerced – against its will, into the union. According to Gould (2011), the rejection (by Eastern region) of the proposed amalgamation was on the ground of the region's consideration (or recognition) of being politically unique and the sharp cultural and religious differences that exist between its people and those from other areas. The discovery of oil in some parts of the region compounded the current unresolved issue leading to competition for the proceeds of the resources within the region and beyond. With regards to the Biafra war, for instance, Ken Saro-Wiwa stresses that …competition between the three majority groups [Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba] in Nigeria brought about civil war (Saro-Wiwa 1989:11). These subsequently snowballed into the post-independence security challenges the country has had to contend.

Analysts of the region's instability mostly hold that the South-east's unresolved grievances form part of the motivations for the planning and execution of the first military (bloody) coup d'état and the subsequent counter-coup and resistance that led to the first Nigeria civil war in 1967. This narration supports the fact that, at least, the exercise was led and implemented mainly by the officers and soldiers of the Eastern extract (Oparaku et al. 2017). The Civil War (also called Biafra War) which lasted about three years (1967-70), was the result of the Eastern region's secessionist campaign. The grievance triggered the campaign over the perceived economic and political unfairness (among other things) the area was said to have been subjected. As noted by James (2011) and Pellissier (2015), the Federal Government's overwhelming military response claimed the lives of no fewer than 2 million people with many more displaced. Hence some (e.g. Orobator 1983; Diamond 2007; Iruonagbo and George 2007) have characterised it as genocide. The resultant destruction of lives, properties and the environment left the region and its people in a state of dire humanitarian crisis and almost (if not total) collapse where the general livelihoods were shattered and disrupted. However, the war ended with the re-integration of the region into the Nigerian State.

The anticipated need for the full reconstruction of the physical, environmental, economic, and the general livelihoods of the region may have been largely unfulfilled. And agitations for the demand for better living conditions were suppressed mainly by the long period of military regimes in the country after the civil war (Obi-Ani 2009). Furthermore, the return to democratic rule in 1999 resurrected the Eastern region's secessionist spirit whose campaign has remained a significant source of insecurity in the area and beyond in recent times (Onuoha 2011; Ike 2012; Smith 2014). At the moment, the campaign is on the grounds of economic and political marginalisation and exclusion. The evident poverty, decayed and deficient infrastructure and youth unemployment have been widely associated with the growing spate of violent conflicts in the region. Violent secessionist strife, communal clashes, ritual killings and cultism, armed robbery, human trafficking and kidnapping are some of the manifestations of insecurity in the South-east region (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015).

4.2.3 Urbanization Induced Insecurity: The South-west Defective Urbanization

South-west region provides a relatively different scenario for the problem of insecurity in Nigeria. Unlike the other southern parts, the security vulnerability in the South-west primarily emanates from decades of unguided and unsustainable urban development

(physical and social) and the resultant challenges of urbanisation (Okwuashi et al. 2011). This region is among those that had the earliest contact with other parts of the world (including Europe) for commercial activities. A city from the South-west region (Lagos) was the colony of the then British government and later became Nigeria's capital upon the amalgamation of the North and South to form the Nigeria State, up until 1991 (Moore 1984; Adama 2007). This advantageous feature is still apparent in the region's prosperity and its unique role as the dominant economic and commercial centre in Nigeria (Campbell 2011). As noted by Oyesola (2012), the region houses more than two-thirds of the country's commercial and industrial activities. The consequent concentration of administrative, commercial and industrial activities in the area created the agglomeration of people and businesses and the eventual rapid population growth due to migrations and natural births.

Okwuashi et al. (2011) and Oyesola (2012) observe that sudden population growth in the cities of the South-west exerted unprecedented pressure on all facets of the urban fabrics. This pressure creates significant social, economic, environmental and political challenges which exposed the region to the threats of insecurity. Population increase in the cities caused urban sprawl wherein the available social amenities became insufficient and unsustainable to cater for the needs of the inhabitants. Consequently, this challenge creates substantial urban poor who live in the ever-expanding slum and poverty-stricken areas at the periphery of core areas of many cities in the region. This unhealthy and unsustainable growth manifests in the attendant increase in violent crimes including rampant armed robbery, cult activities and ritual killing, political assassinations, gangsterism, kidnapping, land grabbing, rape and other forms of social insecurity (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015).

4.2.4   A Complex Scenario: Beyond Livelihoods in Northern Nigeria

The Northern half of Nigeria is entrapped in perpetual insecurity which results from a complex mixture of unresolved economic, political and ethnoreligious challenges. At independence and beyond, the Northern region was the most underdeveloped - human and physical, area in comparison to the more prosperous Southern part (Campbell 2011). As noted by Campbell (2011) and Eze et al. (2014), the North is more impoverished and usually ranks lowest in most of the country's human development indicators such as income, education and literacy, mortality, healthcare, infrastructure and so forth. The low level of western education in the North, for instance, is

attributable to the negative perceptions about education held in the region for generations as being evil (Salihu 2012; UNDP 2018). The consequence is the high level of unemployable youths, given that the official measure of employability in Nigeria is western education. This condition explains the regions high rate of poverty and precarious livelihoods (Adekola et al. 2016; World Bank 2016).

Geographically, the Northern region of Nigeria has by far the largest land area - approximately 78%, (Dudley 1968; Dear and Foot 1995) a great deal of which is arable (Figure 4.2). The development of the agriculture and agro-related economy mainstay of the region has mainly remained underdeveloped as a result of the continued deindustrialisation and inadequate infrastructure (Campbell 2011). This challenge in effect has confined the agricultural activities to the traditional subsistence farming and centuries-old nomadic animal herding practices. According to Tayo and Nasrullah (2016), however, these farming practices have fuelled a considerable number of clashes between farmers and herders. Increased competition for croplands and grazing areas has worsened the occurrence, recurrence and devastation of the conflicts in recent times. Traditionally, the pastoral animal herders practice seasonal migration in search for pasture to graze animals within the government designated grazing areas in the Northern region. However, the combined effect of increased demand for spaces for physical development; crop production, corrupt land acquisition and climate change have continued to diminish the reserved grazing sites. A first-class Emir narrates this scenario in the North:

> [The] Grazing routes have been taken away by politicians. We have demographic implosion in the North, desertification, reduction in water reserves and competition for resources among various aspects of agriculture – crop production, animal husbandry and fishing – Mohammad Sanusi II (Akinkuotu and Tyopuusu 2018).

This forces animal herders to seek pasture and water for their animals outside the designated grazing area and have resulted in many cases of violent clashes between farmers and herders (Abbas 2012).

By contrast, the Northern region is more populated (54% of the 2016 projected population of 193,392,517 persons) and ethnically and culturally more diverse than the South (National Bureau of Statistics 2016). This condition, together with other socio-political factors – e.g. poor education, poverty, religious misapplication, political exclusion, have played a significant role in fostering many conflicts in the region. The cultural diversity coupled with religious bigotry has been exploited to fuel many internal struggles for political power, economic domination, territories, economic

opportunities and insurgency (Meagher 2013). This sophisticated and interwoven peculiarity of the North explains the long history of ethnoreligious tensions and conflicts in the region. It is more often than not related to the firmly held grievance, and perception – by minority tribes, of political and economic domination by the majority tribes or social class (Hoffman 2017) and the results of these create security vulnerabilities which escalate into violent conflicts on many occasions. Furthermore, the conditions provide fertile ground for exploitations and criminality wherein influential personalities and politicians, criminal gangs and religious extremists lure vulnerable youths into crimes including political thuggery, cattle rustling, farmer/herders clashes, drug abuse, kidnapping, and terrorism such as the one experienced in the North-east region.

Figure 4.2: The North-South Land Coverage in Nigeria

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Source: National Boundary Commission; National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria (2016).

One of the recent insecurity, in the North-east for instance, according to Otu (2014), Tella (2015), Ugwu (2015) and Bamidele (2016), is the apparent consequence of government failure to adequately address citizen's needs. This condition results in

deprivation and chronic high rate of poverty, low level of education, poor healthcare, injustice, inadequate infrastructure and arms proliferation. The effect culminates into unresolved grievances which are exploited to incite the violent insurgency. Development in the form of improved livelihoods conditions has been seen as a priority and strategy for improving the security challenge in the region (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; Ugwu 2015). Experts and policy analysts suggest the need for a holistic re-examination of the North-east security challenge through a livelihoods approach. This call indicates that deliberate efforts must be the focus on improving developmental problems sustainably to attain durable peace and security in the region (Bamidele 2016; UNHCR 2016).

Synthesis, as shown in table 4.1, presents a useful insight into Nigeria's wide regional security variation, which may be helpful to contextualising each regions challenge and determine the particular approach to providing sustainable solutions. Achieving this, however, requires the identification of the relevant and useful conceptual approach for each of the regions. It is discernible that the susceptibility to conflict for the various areas relates to the grievances and challenges which are associated at least with lacking access or inequitable and unsustainable distribution of resources. Nonetheless, the underlying regional insecurity factors and their contextual interplay differ across the country (Peterside 2014; Dambazau 2015). These variations, therefore, support the consideration that insecurity in Nigeria requires a contextually different conceptual approach for analysing different regional instability as advocated by Achumba et al. (2013).

Unlike the relatively more prosperous South, insecurity in the Northern part of Nigeria relates more to the interplay of precarious living conditions. The complex interaction of the ensuing low-level human and physical development makes the region susceptible to perpetual unrest (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004). Vulnerability to conflict is particularly apparent in the North-east given the complex interaction of poor living conditions and how they are being exploited by the insurgents to incite conflict (Otu 2014; Tella 2015; Ugwu; 2015; Bamidele 2016). Careful analysis of the North-east security dynamic suggests the relevance of approaching the case study's conflict and its possible recurrence through the livelihoods lens (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004; Eze et al. 2014). The theoretical basis and justification for considering the livelihoods approach for investigating the insecurity in the case study of this research have been presented in Chapter three.

4.3   Research Case Study Area: Buni Yadi, North-east Nigeria

The case study for this research is Buni Yadi, geographically situated at $11^{\circ}16'8''$ North of Equator and $11^{\circ}59'49''$ East of the Greenwich covering an approximately 4.6Km^2 land area (Figure 1.5). Buni Yadi is about 55.8 Km and nearly 50-minute drive through the famous Damaturu-Biu road southward to the Yobe State capital, Damaturu. The settlements which include Bularafa, Buni Gari, Dokshi, Wagir and Ajigin border the case study which is famous for its abundant agricultural and business activities making it one of the major business hubs in the region (Government of Yobe State 2018). Gujba Local government, whose 2016 projected population is 184,200 persons (National Bureau of statistics 2016) has its headquarter in Buni Yadi.

Gujba Emirate, historically was an independent kingdom which existed (from 13th century) for about 650 years until the traditional setting was altered following the invasion by Shehu Umar El-Kanemi in the 19th century. El-kanemi was the second Shehu (Emir) of the old Bornu Empire whose reign lasted between 1837 and 1881. Gujba kingdom was eventually annexed having been conquered and controlled by the old Bornu Empire. The kingdom was, therefore, administered as a province under the old Bornu Empire through its representative – traditionally called Aja (Gujba Emirate Council 2018). The old Gujba Emirate shared similar cultural identity with the old Bornu Empire whose major traditional ethnic groups include Kunuri, Babur and Magas. This ethnic makeup continued until the Fulani Jihadist invasion of the Usman Dan Fodio of some parts of old Burnu Empire in the late 19th century. This invasion and conqueror of part of the Empire caused a major upset in the ethnic composition due to the infiltration by other tribes particularly the Hausa-Fulani who govern those territories under the command of the Dan Fodio. Like other Kanuri-dominated territories, the British colonial rule further opens up the Gujba to other tribes due to the colonial administration (Hickey 1984; Joel 2014). Present day Buni Yadi has a population whose origins cut across the length and breadth of Nigeria.

Although Kanuri is the dominant tribe in the case study, the major local dialects are Kanuri and Hausa languages. The heterogeneity of Buni Yadi settlement is identifiable from its internal delineation based on spatial feature - streets which divide the entire community into six geographic clusters (micro-subdivisions). These clusters include Mairi (head of the settlement area), Kasakchiya (migrants), Hausari (Hausa-majority neighbourhood), Shuwari (Shuwa-majority neighbourhood), Ngomari (Ngoma-majority

neighbourhood) and Fulatari (Fulani-majority neighbourhood) (Figure 4.4). Buni Yadi is located within the Sudan Savannah belt of Nigeria with a climate condition that is characterised with annual long and short dry and rainy seasons respectively. The scrubby vegetation interspersed with trees as well as the alluvial flood plain soil suitably supports crop farming (Ali et al. 2009; Diarra et al. 2010; Mulima 2015). This climate condition and vegetation also supports the pastoral animal herding. These traditional activities – crop and animal farming, are the primary economic activities in Buni Yadi, thereby making it a major centre for commerce in the region due to trading of agricultural commodities (Sule et al. 2013 Edikpo et al. 2014). The people of Buni Yadi are predominantly Muslims. The teaching and practice of Islam are believed to have been imported into the region since 11th century and this has continued to play a critical role in almost all the day-to-day life among the people including the legal jurisprudence, marriage, food, dress code, interpersonal relations and so forth. It is a common practice to enrol children into Arabic and Qur'anic schools (often informal) at a tender age particularly to sustain the religious ethics (Abubakar 2017). This has made the Islamic education the dominant knowledge in the area.

Similarly, as permissible in Islam, men in Buni Yadu are polygamous. This practice and the traditional extended family system encourages formation of compound houses in which multiple households (small family units) live. Men double as heads and major decision makers on issues relating to the families affairs. Women in this area are simply adored and treated delicately, hence married women are often secluded while all her economic and social needs are provided for by the husband (Abubakar 2017). However, Buni Yadi is one of the North-east settlements (Figure 4.4) that have witnessed the recent violent attacks by the insurgent group, Boko Haram, where thousands of people including school children have been murdered in the deadly attacks (McElroy 2013; Aljazeera 2014). A significant proportion of the infrastructure has been destroyed as well. The attackers have targeted and destroyed both public and private properties including schools, hospitals, police stations, water sources, electricity and telecommunication facilities, businesses and houses (further details in chapter 6 and 7) (Aljazeera 2014; Daily Trust 2014; Sahara 2014; 2017). The town was taken over in 2014 by the insurgents leading to the complete displacement of its people. It was, however, reclaimed after the intense military offensive consequent to which the residents had returned and resettled since 2015 (Sahara 2017).

Nonetheless, a lot may have changed for the people of Buni Yadi given the high level of destruction and distortion of livelihoods in the community (Channels 2016). This condition further supports the appropriateness of approaching the case study's security challenge from livelihood perspective, as highlighted in table 4.1. Understanding the challenges this livelihoods distortion brings to people, and its implication on long term post-conflict development forms the main thrust of this research. The investigation is specific to the concern of the changes in those livelihoods and their potential for causing conflict recurrence. The insecurity dynamics in the North-east region of Nigeria present unique features that make it suitable for this study. Unlike other areas (e.g. South-south), North-east security challenge is not primarily natural resource-based. Similarly, it is unlikely for the region's insecurity to be urbanisation or industrialisation driven considering the current underdevelopment (both human and physical) in the area.

Figure 4.3: Buni Yadi in the Context of North-East Nigeria

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Source: National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), Nigeria (2018)

However, the North-east region is one of the poorest and ranks lowest in the level of human development in the country. According to Akinbi (2015), a high rate of joblessness, abject poverty and poor education are some of the significant insecurity factors in the North-east. These vulnerability conditions put people (especially youths) in a situation where they can be easily manipulated and recruited for rebellion. The region's insecurity presents a unique opportunity for theorising conflict within the

livelihoods – grievance, debate as a condition for the onset and potential for recurrence (through livelihoods change) (Collier et al. 2004; Walter 2004).

The choice of Buni Yadi for this study predicated on four primary conditions which make the settlement suitable for the investigation and supports the research argument. These conditions include safety concern, presence of returnees and migrants, non-camp setting and fulfilment of the requirements for post-conflict settlement. Oxford Brookes University's, University Research Ethics Committee's (UREC) approval for this research was granted based on the assurance for the safety of the researcher and research participants. This safety concern is crucial, given the fragility of the context haven recently emerged and recovering from conflict experience.

Figure 4.4: Residential Satellite Image of Buni Yadi

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Buni Yadi presents substantially safer physical condition to undertake the study. This assessment was based on extensive consultation with acquaintance and community leaders from the area who confirmed the absence of threats other than day-to-day risks. Informants from other proposed settlement options – e.g. Bama and Madagali were unable to guarantee safety for conducting the fieldwork. Buni Yadi serves as a haven both for returnees and conflict migrants from other communities following the military certification and voluntary return from displacement. The presence of these migrants compensates for the need to use additional context to examine the livelihoods of conflict migrants since one of the research targets is to understand the post-conflict conditions of the migrants. Historical residents and migrants currently live in Buni Yadi without physical or administrative restriction, except in very few areas where there is safety concern – e.g. possible land mine. The settlement also fulfils conditions for designating post-conflict context as discussed below.

4.4   Buni Yadi – A Returnee Post-conflict Transition Context

Post-conflict implies a situation whereby open physical confrontation or hostility has ended after a conflict. Tension often lingers in post-conflict contexts for many years after the conflict depending on how the conflict ended and the peacebuilding efforts that follow. In other words, the post-conflict condition does not necessarily mean the attainment of real peace. Conceptually, however, the designation of a war-ravaged community as a post-conflict context is often not straight forward given that violence hardly stops at a discrete-time within the setting of intra-state conflict. As noted by Brown et al. (2011), depending on the conflict dynamics, the beginning of the end to physical hostility and attacks is often not the same for all conflict contexts. However, some level of atrocities may be witnessed often in a guerrilla form after a declaration - formally or informally, of the end to the conflict (Call 2012). Brown et al. (2011) argue that it would be counterproductive to consider the post-conflict condition as a discretely time-bound event or period; instead, it should be viewed as a transition process through which permanent peace may be realised. This process-oriented reflection of post-conflict setting describes Buni Yadi context given the relevance of the prevailing indicators such as the end to hostility, the return of the displaced, existence of civic rules and economic recovery. Although these indicators relate primarily to spatially macro-scale (state), they seem appropriate to be adopted for the relatively micro context of Buni Yadi as follows:

End to Open Hostility: Cessation of violence may be brought about by a peace agreement between warring parties (sometimes including a third party) in a civil war as it was the case in, for example, Liberia (1990-1996 Abuja Accord), Zimbabwe (1987 ZANU and ZAPU Power-sharing Agreement) and Central African Republic (1997 Bangui Agreement) intra-state conflicts (Call 2012). The end to an armed conflict may also come through victory for one side over other(s) parties involved in the conflict through superior military capability as seen in cases of Afghanistan (2001) and Sri Lanka (2009) (Call 2012; Kreutz 2010). In Buni Yadi, however, cessation of hostility and violent attacks by the insurgents is achieved through military intervention in which the government troops overpower the armed insurgents. The town had subsequently not witnessed open attack up until early 2018 when an attempted suicide bomber was foiled. The settlement may, therefore, be considered to be in the process of the absence of a violent attack.

Return of the Displaced – Often, communities (e.g. Sri Lanka, DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and Burundi) face forceful displacement from their homes during significant conflicts. This condition creates a considerable burden of internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. The voluntary repatriation of IDPs or refugees to their original communities is one of the indicators of return of peace after the end of open hostility (UNHCR 2016), and the case of Buni Yadi is no exception. Given the modus operandi of the insurgents, they targeted and destroyed the town purposely to displace the people and the presence of government and take control of local resources and administration. However, upon retaking and re-opening of the town by the military, residents have voluntarily returned at the end of 2015. This decision followed the military certification of the town as being safe for civilian habitation. Buni Yadi is, therefore, a post-conflict returnee community in which people (original residents and conflict migrants) live freely and as self-residents.

Establishing Civic Rules – The return of the residents to the town upon reopening ushers the re-establishment of a functional civil society in which the residents live peacefully within the dictate of the rule of law. Public institutions are gradually being restored to minimise impunity and engender the civic practices in the community. Although there is a military presence in the settlement, they are meant to support the police to boost confidence and ensure the general safety of residents. The police and other local authorities oversee the day-to-day civil affairs of the town.

Economic Recovery and Development – This may be said to be the current state in Buni Yadi given the residents' effort to rebuild their disrupted livelihoods. Although at an abysmal pace, efforts are being made to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and social lives. These efforts target the stimulation of social and economic recovery and development and reduce vulnerability. It is an ongoing process which requires an adequate understanding of the peculiarity of the context (Brown et al. 2011) to ensure that an appropriate strategy for intervention. This analysis of the post-conflict livelihood dynamics, especially regarding their changes is vital to prevent possible relapse to conflict due to increased vulnerability (Collier 2007; Walter 2004).

4.5   Chapter Summary

This chapter starts with an analysis of the broader context of insecurity in Nigeria. The regional security dynamics were examined to identify the relevant approach for these regional security variations. While justifying the appropriateness of adopting the livelihoods approach for the North-east, Nigeria, Buni Yadi presents conditions that make it suitable for the case study of this research. The justification for selecting the case study predicates on its current conditions, including which support the theoretical underpinning of the study. However, the next chapter focuses on the methodological consideration for the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

Research Design and Methodology

5.1 Introduction: Methodological Consideration

The previous chapter has established a specific case study for this research. As an empirical investigation, however, this chapter focuses on the methodological consideration for undertaking the research. The methodological process provides standardised procedures for providing verifiable empirical evidence that is suitable for the study. Based on the theoretical framework; this chapter explains the aspects of the data collection methods and analysis which premise on the relevant philosophical and epistemological paradigm for conducting research. The chapter also discusses the justification for adopting the methods and ethical reflection for the conduct of the fieldwork. Before presenting the details of the methodology, however, a reminder of the aim and research question is worth a while.

5.1.1 Research Aim:

To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-camp context.

5.1.2 Primary Research Question:

To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change threat to human security and potential for conflict recurrence?

Sub-research Questions:

1. What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-camp context?

2. What is the implication of the post-conflict livelihoods change for conflict recurrence?

5.2 Research Strategy: Pragmatism

The theoretical position for this research is that precarious livelihoods are important insecurity drivers in the case study area. The research contends that post-conflict livelihoods change affects human security and has the potential for causing conflict relapse. However, the objective of this chapter is to develop a suitable methodology for obtaining relevant empirical evidence to test the hypothesis. The underlying research argument influences the choice of a research strategy and the case study to collect the desired empirical data (de Melo 2017). This strategy is necessary for selecting a method that is deemed appropriate for an investigation. The approach underpinning (philosophy) plays a significant role in determining the processes and type of data used, which reflects on the collection and analysis. Both spatial and non-spatial data are necessary for this research, including thematic components of livelihoods such as human, social, physical environmental and economic variables. However, the plurality of the data required for the investigation necessitates the consideration for multiple sources approach for data collection. Multi-sources approach is consistent with the pragmatic philosophical reflection for this research. The pragmatic approach derives its strength from the promotion of pluralistic viewpoints to research investigation. Its worldview about research posits that critical understanding of social problems (e.g. situations and consequences of actions) in necessary instead of an excessively rigid methodological construct (Creswell 2014).

Pragmatic philosophy hinges on adopting ideas and practices that are both useful and workable as necessary criteria for understanding the truth about a social issue (Reason 2003; Anyigor 2012). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie emphasise the premise that pragmatism:

> . . . offers a practical and outcome-oriented method of inquiry that is based on actions and leads, iteratively, for further action and elimination of doubts (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004:17).

According to Patton (1990), Morgan (2007) and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010), Pragmatism offers the opportunity for using multiple approaches to understanding social research problems wherein mixed methods are employed to undertake research. This research strategy presents an advantage that is leveraged upon to ensure data triangulation (Holborn 2004). Anyigor (2012) has used this strategy to researching the effect of weak social capital on economic development in a case study of South-east Nigeria. He notes that it allows for the use of data that are collected from multiple

sources (both primary and secondary) using multiple methods (e.g. qualitative, quantitative and observation). The multi-sources strategy ensures that data is rich and comprehensive, thereby increases their validity for analysis. The liberal stance of pragmatism is indicative of its 'non-allegiance' to any one particular approach. Its offers for a pluralistic philosophical approach to research and presents the advantage of combining, for instance, quantitative, qualitative and observation methods in a study to gain more insight into the reality of the social problem. This notion embeds in a philosophical consideration that the social world varies greatly, hence the need to accommodate a combination of methods for data collection and analysis for a realistic outcome (Cherryholmes 1992; Morgan 2007 and Creswell 2014). The need for reliable data for an in-depth analysis of thematic components of post-conflict livelihoods changes influences the choice of adopting the pragmatic worldview to research in which primary data is sourced from the original context of the conflict. This strategy refers to a case study design or method (Yin 2014).

5.3 Case Study Design

The post-conflict transition context of this research requires critical and in-depth analysis of a range of elements that constitute livelihoods in the settlement. This analysis is necessary to gain insight into the impact of conflict on livelihoods thereby identify possible changes to theorise their implications on conflict recurrence. It is, therefore, appropriate to undertake the study within the original context where the phenomenon – conflict, took place. Case study research design suffices for this need. Yin (2014) describes the case study research:

> . . . as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context. . . . Yin (2014:16).

The case study design has been widely applied across disciplines to investigate social events that require holistic analysis of phenomenon (Harrison et al. 2017; Zaidah 2007). Post-conflict studies are no exception. The case study design is probably the most appropriate for investigating conflict and post-conflict conditions given the need for conducting the study within the original context. Case study design, for instance, has provided a valuable research outcome for Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009; 2010), Werker (2007) and Jacobsen (2002) in their investigation of post-conflict coping strategies analysis. This implies the utility and appropriateness of adopting the research design for investigating social issue such as post-conflict livelihoods change.

Zaidah (2007) and Harrison et al. (2017) underlines that the case study design has some alignment with the pragmatic research philosophy. This view premises on the case study's flexibility, which allows for the use of multiple (mixed) approaches for data collection - mostly quantitative and qualitative. Mixed methods strategy enable the researcher to generate corroborative answers to research questions through the use of quantitative and qualitative (and other) data collection methods. Case study research by its nature is conducted within a specific time - cross-section or over a specified period - longitudinal (Yin 2014). The cross-section case study design is, however, deemed appropriate for this research. Adoption of the cross-section method owes to the need for the collection and analyses of the thematic data regarding the components of livelihoods of the case study at a particular time. The collection of the array of data suggests the need for a multiple (mixed) methods in which a corroborative analysis is possible. Case study design supports this approach to investigation.

5.4 Mixed Methods Approach

Mixed methods approach is deemed appropriate for this study to take advantage of its strengths for minimising the weaknesses inherent in any standalone method such as qualitative, quantitative and other (observation) approaches (Creswell 2014; Bryman 2016). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) underline that mixed methods provide a practical and results-based approach to research. The constituent methods within a mixed-methods approach are mutually reinforcing, thereby ensures reliable results and research outcome. Creswell (2014) identifies different possible types of mixed methods research including convergent, explanatory and exploratory mixed methods. The explanatory sequential mixed method is deemed appropriate for this research considering the order with which data collection methods are undertaken. The choice of this method followed its consistency with the research design for the study in which data collection is designed to support the exploratory approach in two phases to explore the potential livelihoods changes and their implications. The quantitative and physical (observation) surveys are conducted first to ascertain conflict impacts, and the possibility of livelihoods change in the case study.

Nonetheless, the strength of using the mixed methods strategies may as well forms its drawback. The apparent reason that it involves multiple sources and techniques makes the process complex and therefore, may be challenging to manage. The constituent methods used often require the use of different data collection strategies, processing and

presentation hence require high skill to manage (Adolphus 2020). Brannen (2005) underlines, for example, that coherently harmonising the findings and presentation of the numbers, words and other evidence in the different aspects may be challenging to achieve due to discrepancies that may arise from their interpretations. The mixed-methods approach requires relatively more time and resources for planning and implementation.

It was sequentially appropriate for this study to start with the quantitative and observation methods given that outcomes of the analysis from the data provide a preliminary answer(s) to the research questions - the nature of livelihoods change. Results of the surveys were used to articulate the appropriate qualitative approach for an in-depth study and analysis. The reverse of this method - explanatory, is unlikely to provide this outcome. Although in a stable context, an exploratory method has been applied by Anyigor (2012) in livelihoods study, which produced a reliable research outcome. A similar approach has also been used in some post-conflict studies such as Jacobsen (2002) and Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009; 2010). These have produced research outcomes that have a robust corroborative richness of evidence.

The first phase of this research involved the use of the quantitative technique –survey method, where numerical variables regarding livelihoods components and their changes were obtained. This method is relevant to determine the preliminary validation of the possibility that post-conflict livelihoods changes have a possible negative implication on human security and conflict resurgence. Similarly, the appropriateness of the quantitative method hinged on its usefulness for collecting data which are a descriptive narrative of the livelihoods change as a result of the conflict in Buni Yadi. This consideration necessitated the adoption of survey strategy to provide an adequate representative description of the characteristics of livelihoods and their changes in the case study. The nature of this research made it inevitable to undertake spatial mapping for the analysis of the pattern of infrastructure destruction in the case study area. The spatial data provided corroborative evidence and ensured the richness of the data in the first phase of the empirical investigation. Similarly, it helped in achieving a robust understanding of the interplay of different elements of livelihoods and how their change has a potential influence on conflict recurrence in Buni Yadi.

The second phase of the research used a qualitative method, mainly through focus group discussion and individual interviews as the data collection technique. The need for these methods arose from the desire to gain an in-depth understanding of the livelihoods

changes in the case study area as well as the interpretations of what the residents make of them. A more detailed insight into the impacts and implications of the conflict and the livelihoods changes is obtainable when narratives come from the perspectives of the primary victims in their community (Holt 1997). Accordingly, the next section highlights the detailed processes of applying these research strategies (methods) - namely quantitative, observation and qualitative methods, respectively.

5.4.1 Quantitative Research: Survey Sampling and Data Collection

The quantitative design primarily associates with the positivist philosophical ideology which employs a deductive process in social research (Golafshani 2003; Bryman 2016; Creswell 2014). In practice, the quantitative strategy uses the natural science procedure for investigation where social reality is treated objectively without researchers influence on participants' views. The approach relies on the quantification of social variables using numbers as a means of data collection and analysis (Bryman 2016). Basic features of quantitative research are identifiable from its epistemological underpinning. Amaratunga et al. (2002) and Bryman (2016) identify some discernible features that characterise quantitative research strategy, namely measurement, causality, generalisation, replication and validity and reliability. These features are commonly considered as some of the strength of the quantitative research strategy (Amaratunga et al. 2002). As indicated by Campbell and Stanley (1963), Thomas (1999) and Creswell (2012); quantitative research design is broadly categorised into experimental (or true experiment) and quasi-experimental and non-experimental quantitative research. Experimental research seeks to provide answers to research question relating to why a certain phenomenon takes place under a specific condition. The aim is to examine and find an explanation about how a condition influences certain events. Primarily, this method applies for analysing cause-effect relations in social or natural settings (Cooper and Schindler 2011). Experimental research is, therefore, considered appropriate for the quantitative aspect of this research. The experimental quantitative strategy was useful in part for rationalising the possible cause-effect relation of precarious livelihoods and conflict onset and recurrence in the case study.

The first phase of this study focused on the generation of quantitative (non-spatial) and spatial data. The non-spatial data included the conditions of basic human needs – livelihoods, which underlie conflicts in the case study. It also consisted of the changes in access to those needs as a result of the conflict. Relevant data required for the

empirical investigation included residents' levels of income, level of education, employment status, housing, access to water, electricity, health facilities, and so forth. Also, it examined changes in those basic needs by way of a descriptive comparison of the pre-conflict and post-conflict conditions where possible. The relevant data were generated through a primary field survey using a systematic random sampling for selecting participants' household who volunteer information. The quantitative method of the study involved the participation of 450 households, which constitutes approximately 10% of the total households in Buni Yadi. However, the desire to obtain an unbiased selection of participants influenced the choice of a systematic random sampling technique given the scarcity of reliable secondary data that could be used to predetermine the selection and number of households in the case study. Other probability sampling methods such as the simple, stratified and cohort or cluster sampling may not be appropriate for the research in such circumstance. The systematic random sampling used involved the selection of '1 in 10' households as representative samples of households in the case study area. This method of selection ensured the objectivity of the study and even the spread of selected participants across the case study. The responses from the sampled representative households were assumed to reflect the views of the entire residents of the case study (Henn et al. 2006; Bryman 2016).

The household selection process was made by way of taking the first ten households from the beginning of the settlement from which a household is selected on a random basis as the first potential participant. The tenth next household was selected as the subsequent participant household after the first selection, and the process is repeated until the entire settlement was covered. The case study area may be described as being mostly rural with predominantly bungalow type of buildings. These buildings are socially structured such that related families live in compound buildings comprising of few family households (between 2 and 5). Members of these compound houses know one another. This arrangement made it easy to identify households within buildings with a residents' assistance whose effort supplements the effort of identifying and ascertaining the number of household in buildings. This rigour checked the possible error of considering all buildings as being a single household. The residential map (Figure 4.4) of the case study was used for this exercise. Residential imagery of the case study was studied together with a research assistant who is conversant with the settlement. The assistant was requested to be thorough in identifying individual

buildings that have more than one household to ascertain the number of households in each building in the case study.

The researcher envisaged the need for research assistants for the study, given his limited knowledge of coupled with the sizeable spatial expanse of Buni Yadi with regards to the available time for undertaking the fieldwork. Three local research assistants – including a female, were recruited (for the quantitative and qualitative exercise) from the pool of researchers assigned from the Local Council researchers. The procedure has been that a request is made to the local council for researchers who are locals and have requisite field experience with excellent communication ability and understand both Kanuri and Hausa (the major local dialects). The head of personnel responsible for assigning research assistant was contacted to make a request which was granted upon presentation of Oxford Brookes University, University Research Ethics Committee's approval for the fieldwork. The research assistants were adequately briefed about the study and the specific tasks they were requested to do. The remit of the research assistants was helping the researcher in the aspect of data collection, including identification of prospective participant households, questionnaire administration and retrieval and co-facilitation of focus group discussions. The assistants were encouraged to ask for clarifications on tasks or issues that were not clear to them throughout the fieldwork.

One representative of each household (often family head) was requested, through invitation (appendix 2) to participate by completing a structured questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered after participants volunteer to take part in the study. Before volunteering to participate, potential participants were given the participant's information sheet (appendix 1) to read and understand the purpose and benefits of the study. However, the researcher interpreted the translation (in Hausa dialect) of the participant's information for the prospective participants if they were unable to read. The completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher on site. The process of questionnaire administration was through a face to face method where the researcher visited the household of participants and administered the questionnaires for completion by a representative of the families. The researcher, together with respondents went through the questions while they completed the questionnaires for any possible clarification.

5.4.2 Structured Questionnaire

The application of a structured questionnaire to collect information about the livelihood conditions of households was deemed appropriate for this research. The desire to achieve full coverage of the case study influenced the choice of a questionnaire. As noted by Phellas et al. (2012), the use of a questionnaire for data collection eliminates bias, enables greater geographic coverage and reduces time/resources wastage. The nature of this research and the desired information necessitated the use of households instead of individuals. Unlike an individual, the household survey provided holistic livelihoods characteristics of families and the effect of conflict on the livelihoods of those families. Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010), for instance, used the quantitative method as part of the mixed methods in their post-conflict studies. By contrast, however, their structured questionnaire captures only the livelihoods conditions for individuals. This study considered the individual survey as being inadequate as it leaves out a vital part of the household livelihoods condition from other members of the families. Using the individual survey may render the data noncomprehensive for instance if the livelihood contributions or conditions of, for example, mother or adult child, who contribute to the family economy is not part of the analysis.

Accordingly, the questionnaire asked questions concerning the socio-economic conditions of the respondents (family representative) and those of other members of the families as affected by conflict. This approach was a necessary way to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the livelihoods conditions of households in the case study. Heads of families (male or female) were, therefore, preferred to respond to the questionnaires as they may have a better appreciation of their families' economy and the conditions. However, the desire to obtain an objective and reliable social reality through quantitative method (Shuttleworth 2008; Matveev 2002) has often led to research 'stiffness'. Criticism of the quantitative approach relates to the rigidity of the methodological processes which fails to distinguish between natural world order (object of nature) and human social behaviour (Schutz 1962) in its measurement of social reality. As highlighted by Cicourel (1982), excessive reliance on quantitative measurement instrument - e.g. devices, structured questionnaire, hinders adequate understanding of the reality of everyday life of people. Quantitative research does not offer respondents the opportunity to express their opinion based on their experiences, interpretations and meanings they attached to social events or phenomenon (Bryman

2016). These weaknesses inform the choice of applying the mixed methods for this study such that the weakness of one method is compensated for by another to achieve a robust empirical methodology and outcome.

For clarity and simplification of questions, the survey questionnaire (appendix 3) was divided into five sections to cover the different components of livelihoods of the respondents' household. The opening section asked questions about general information of the respondents such as age, gender, level of education, and so forth. The subsequent sections contained questions that relate to the impacts of conflict and changes in income, road, social assets, housing and other infrastructure. Although the questionnaire was primarily structured, the desire to have more information from the perspective of the respondents necessitated the inclusion of some open-ended questions such as 'Why did you leave your original community?' These open questions, however, minimised the restrictiveness of the structured questionnaire. Similarly, open-ended questions provide the researcher with the opportunity to clarify certain areas of the questionnaire where respondents requested additional explanations. Giving further clarifications for respondents was noted to be particularly helpful as some of the respondents preferred to respond in the native language – Hausa. This preference also informed the choice for the physical contact (face-to-face) to administer the questionnaires.

5.5 Spatial Data: Observation

The spatial data required for this study included a locational map (Figure 4.3) and residential imagery of the case study (Figure 4.4). To spatially locate the damaged infrastructures residential imagery was used to prepare a digitised spatial pattern of the infrastructure destruction for facilities, utilities and services in the case study (Figure 7.1). The residential satellite imagery of the case study area, which formed the basis of this spatial method was sourced from the archives of the National Space Research and Development Agency (NASRDA), Nigeria. NASRDA is a medium spatial resolution satellite image provider in Nigeria. The spatial data was acquired mainly through physical surveys by observation to identify infrastructures destruction in the conflict. The spatial map, which was prepared using ArcGIS software, presents the distribution and the pattern of physical damage that occur in the case study area. Physical observation also involved the collection of physical information using photographs to corroborate or complements information that was obtainable through the questionnaire.

A note-taking and digital camera were the primary methods used for physical observation. Data collected through this method involved the physical observation to identify locations and conditions (nature of destruction) and general destruction pattern of houses, schools, hospitals, electricity and water supply facilities and roads networks and other infrastructure.

5.5.1 Data Analysis: Processing and Presentation of Survey Results

The survey phase of this research provided a descriptive statistical pattern of livelihoods and the impact of conflict on the livelihoods of people in the case study. It also provided an insight into the livelihoods changes of the residents. The analysis of result from this stage essentially determined the occurrence of livelihoods changes in the case study. And this outcome provided the basis for the qualitative method. Considering the above, descriptive statistical and spatial tools were employed for the analysis and presentation of the survey data. Descriptive analysis was deemed appropriate for the quantitative study, given its utility for organising and presenting quantitative sample data in a summarised form. The pattern and distribution of livelihoods variables and the changes were easily discernible using this process. Descriptive statistical tools, together with graphical analysis, are used for fundamental descriptive analysis (Henn et al. 2006; Trochim 2005). Statistical tools such as frequency distribution table, charts, and data percentages were used to summarise and present the components of livelihoods where the comparisons between the pre-conflict and post-conflict results were used to ascertain the existence of a change in livelihoods of the participants. The descriptive results provided a simplified and sharp overview of livelihoods conditions in the case study (Blaikie 2003). The spatial data was presented in the form of a digitised map which shows the pattern and distribution of infrastructure destruction in the case study. Pictorial evidence was used to complement the spatial plan for the analysis and presentation of the results of the physical survey (see appendix 13 for further details).

5.6 Qualitative Research: Consideration for Focus Group and Individual Interview Techniques

The qualitative technique derives its essence from the interpretive paradigm in research (Bryman 2016). This research paradigm gains prominence during the late 20th and early 21st centuries as a valuable alternative that accommodates the deficiency of quantitative analysis in social research (Creswell 2014). Unlike quantitative research, qualitative

research follows the inductive procedure by asking hypothetical questions about the phenomenon to develop a relevant theory(s) regarding a subject of interest (Henn et al. 2006; Bryman 2012). These theories and ideas are developed through rigorous and in-depth interaction with the subject of the social world – notably humans. Researcher interacts with the subjects of an investigation with a view to understanding and interprets the people's day-to-day experiences as individuals, groups and community concerning a phenomenon. The decision or conclusions that a researcher draws about a social subject derives from the adequate understanding of the meaning and interpretations the actors have on the subject. Qualitative research strategy adopts data collection and analysis procedure base on word text obtained from participants who discuss their experiences, perceptions and assumptions about social events in their context. According to Flick (2014), the need to adopt a qualitative approach to research should be influenced by the recognition that social phenomenon is dynamic and human knowledge about the dynamism is limited. Creswell (2014), Flick (2014) and Bryman (2016), also note that many qualitative research strategies are in use owing to their peculiar applicability for different context and subjects.

As noted, qualitative research is broadly categorised into the narrative and phenomenological study (Bryman 2016). The phenomenological analysis is a research design where the researcher strives to understand and describe the experiences of participants concerning certain events based on their accounts (Creswell 2014). According to Moustakas (1994) and Giorgi (2009), research strategies in this category predominantly use interviews (sometimes observations) as the data collection process. Many types of phenomenological research exist, but some of the commonly used ones include ground theory, ethnography and case study research (Law et al. 1998; Bryman 2012; Creswell 2014). The phenomenological case study was, however, deemed appropriate to maintain a methodological consistency wherein individual interviews and focus group discussions were used for data collection. Many post-conflict studies use this method either as stand-alone (e.g. Werker 2007) or mixed methods (e.g. Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009; 2010) and useful research outcomes were obtained.

The second phase of the field study of this research built on the results of the quantitative and observation methods. The quantitative research results provided initial insight for identifying livelihoods change in Buni Yadi. It was from these results that questions for focus group discussions and individual interviews were articulated. The

combined use of the focus group discussions and interviews was deemed appropriate for the qualitative aspect of the research given its utility for an in-depth investigation where a proper understanding of the opinions of the participants may be obtained concerning livelihoods changes. However, Shah and Shahbaz (2015) have deployed an individual interview as a stand-alone qualitative technique for a post-conflict study. This research considers that using interview alone may be inadequate as it may potentially leave out some useful details that could only be tapped using a focus group technique. As noted by Kitzinger (1995) and Powell and Single (1996), the focus group is the gathering of individuals whose purpose is to discuss social issues (or phenomenon) of interest. The use of such a study is to obtain a first-hand and genuine understanding of the underlying problems, based on the experiences and opinions of participants.

Similarly, according to Powell et al. (1996), focus group discussion provides an appropriate platform for identifying potential issues or clarification about a known subject which may not be adequately achieved by other techniques. The choice of the focus group technique was influenced by its usefulness not only for understanding the experiences and opinions of participants but the rationale behind the construct of their thoughts (Kitzinger 1995). Similarly, it provided a quick and easy way of generating data from many people at the same time. Interactions between participants encouraged increase participation, especially those whose response may be less accessible in a one-on-one interview. Furthermore, focus group discussion provides the platform for cross-fertilisation of ideas, experiences, opinions and clarifications as they discuss the open-ended questions (Kitzinger 1995; Powell et al. 1996). It is also a viable avenue through which contrasting views may be identified about the subject of the investigation (Rabiee 2004).

5.6.1 Focus Group Structure

There appear to be no strict standard or consensus as to how many participants should constitute a focus group. There is no agreement on the appropriate number of focus groups in a study either. However, Macintosh (1993), Rabiee (2004) and Morgan (2013) highlight some primary considerations which commonly guide focus group discussions. These include homogeneity of participants who should be between six and ten number of people in groups of between three and five per research. These considerations, however, must be exercised with caution so as not to restrict researcher from optimally utilising options that could generate better outcome (Morgan 2013).

Focus group discussions involving some homogeneous (e.g. occupation, origin, gender) and heterogeneous (e.g. age and gender) participants from the case study were employed to generate relevant and robust information for this research. There were five categories for the focus group discussions, including migrants who currently reside in Buni Yadi as a result of conflict displacement from their original communities. Others included local farmers, local market people, women and youth groups. Each of the focus groups consists of 6 individuals to ensure adequate and efficient management of the discussion proceedings (Rabiee 2004). Cultural considerations informed the choice of employing homogeneous categories (particularly for age and gender). Culturally, the level of interaction and association among people of the case study is a function of their age and gender classifications. The researcher envisaged that it would be challenging for young adults to freely express their opinions if they were classified into the same group with the older adults. A similar consideration applies to women in a cultural environment where the opinions of men are dominant. Anyigor (2012) underscores this cultural difficulty. Although he employed a mixed gender and age for the focus groups, he reflects that better research results may have been obtained with homogeneous groups. Participants were selected from each of the six residential clusters in the community to achieve extensive opinion coverage and avoid bias to ensure reliability and richness of data obtained. The criteria for participants selection in each group is shown below:

Migrants Group – Migrants who currently reside in Buni Yadi as a result of conflict displacement from their original communities. It is worth repeating that the community as a whole was once displaced during the conflict but have returned to their homes. Upon return, people from other communities who have had similar experiences (conflict displacement) but could not go back found Buni Yadi as a haven. So, participants for this group were mainly those who are initially non-indigenes of Buni Yadi but now reside there due to conflict displacement. Migrants could be from any conflict-affected community within the North-east region. This group is considered to be relevant for this research because the condition of participants in the group indicates one of the significant impacts (displacement) of conflict. The consequential changes in availability and accessibility to livelihoods assets they experience have theoretical significance for this research. Discussion with this group provided useful insight into the peculiar

experience of conflict migrants (IDPs), and the livelihoods changes and challenges they encountered in a non-restricted or camp environment.

Farmers Group - Farming is the mainstay of the economy of the Buni Yadi. Participation of local farmers becomes naturally inevitable. Participants in this group included residents of Buni Yadi whose primary livelihood activity/occupation is farming. Only residents of the case study whose farm location was within its geographic boundary are eligible for participation in this group. The case study area is mostly an agrarian settlement with most of its population engaging in agriculture and agriculturally related endeavours. The conflict had affected farming activities in the area due to the destruction of farmlands and farming facilities. This invariably affects the known means of earning a living for this group, hence its relevance for this study.

Local market group – Medium and small scale agro-related businesses are perhaps the second most crucial livelihood activity in Buni Yadi. The participants for this group, therefore, included residents whose primary livelihood activity was business or trading in Buni Yadi. Business sustained many households before the conflict. However, the conflict destroyed many private properties (livelihood assets) and businesses. The inclusion of this group was useful to understand the changes and accessibility to their livelihood assets. Discussion with the group also helped to understand the post-conflict implication of these changes and the alternative survival choices they adopt.

Women Group – Women constitute a significant proportion of the population in the case study; therefore, including them in this investigation was inevitable to ensure gender balance. Participants of this group included women who were residents in Buni Yadi. Married, divorced, widows and unmarried women were eligible for participation in the group. Women are known to be one of the most vulnerable groups in conflict or post-conflict situation like those experienced in the case study of this research (Call 2012; Corbin and Hall 2018). Hence, the need to register the opinion of women ensured that given the cultural dominance of their male counterparts. Discussion on the ethical and cultural consideration for interaction between the researcher and the women group is contained in the ethics section.

Youths Group – Buni Yadi has a population that has significant proportion which is youth. The delineation of age brackets for defining youths varies from society to society as it is often the reflection of existing peculiarities and objective considerations for political and socio-economic realities in different contexts. The Nigeria Youth Policy

(2009) for instance, defines youth as citizens of Nigeria who are within the age limit of 18 years and 35 years old. For this study; therefore, youth is considered to be a resident of Buni Yadi who is between the age of 18 years and 35 years old. This group constitutes a vulnerable group who usually are both actors and victims of conflicts (Bangura 2016) and yet constitutes a significant active population of the case study area. The vulnerability of this category of the population is the one which is often exploited to incite conflict. The need for engaging the youth group in a discussion to reveal the possible causes and potentials for conflict resurgence cannot be overemphasised.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the categorisation for the focus groups is a simplification of the possible social groupings in the case study given that many residents engage in more than one livelihood activity for survival. Grouping them by these multiple livelihoods activities may render the process difficult and could prevent obtaining a reliable outcome. Furthermore, all participants for the study were local adults of the case study area whose age was 18 years or above. Religion, political affiliation and origin (except for migrant group) of participants were not relevant inclusion/exclusion criteria for the study provided the participants were resident in Buni Yadi. Regarding the recruitment of individuals for the focus groups, the researcher reached out to the prospective participants through local social platforms such as mosques, churches, markets associations and youth and women groups. Upon consultation, the community head and youths leader assisted the researcher in identifying the social networks within which members and individuals were requested to participate in the focus groups voluntarily. The identified potential participants were asked to contact – through the mobile number provided, the researcher when they decided to participate to register their interest. Like in the quantitative research process, individuals who expressed interest to participate were given the participant's information sheet (appendix 1) to read and understand the purpose of the research and the details about their participation. A translation was read to those who were unable to read, upon request. After the final decision to participate, a follow-up phone call/text messages were made by the researcher to agree on a date, time and venue for the discussions.

5.6.2 The Process of Focus Group Discussion

Each session of the focus group discussions began with an introduction of the researcher and the study. The interaction with some local leaders in the community before the

survey indicated a preference for local language as a medium of communication. Given this preference and the level of the researcher's understanding of the local language, Hausa - one of the most spoken, was adopted as a means of communication throughout the sessions. The participants were requested to introduce themselves at the start of each discussion session for familiarity purpose among themselves and the researcher. This gesture created a friendly environment for the discussions. The researcher coordinated and moderated each group discussion by introducing discussion topics and subtopics from the discussion questionnaire (appendices 7-11) while participants had the chance to express their opinions freely in the focus group discussions that lasted between 60-90 minutes with 15 minutes break in-between. Although a communal space - community hall, was proposed as a venue for the conduct of the discussions; this could not be accessed given that it was destroyed in the conflict. The palace of a community leader (locally called Lawani) who voluntarily offered the space was used instead. The researcher ensures that the venue for the group discussion was well lit and ventilated, and the setting and sitting arrangement was such that it encouraged informal interaction to provide a relaxed environment for participants. An African proverb says that you don't ask for a chair when you are in a place where the chief himself sits on the floor. Culturally, the people of Buni Yadi enjoy socialising while sitting on mats spread on the floor; hence, the practice was adopted for the conduct of the focus group discussions. Participants sat on the mat in a circular form, thereby ensuring a culturally conducive and informal setting. Individuals in each of these groups had the opportunity to express their views and perceptions in detail freely. The discussion sessions were recorded by way of note-taking and audio player with written consent (appendix 5) of the participants.

5.6.3 Individual Interviews Technique

The focus group sessions were anticipated to open up an avenue for further information generation about post-conflict livelihoods change in Buni Yadi. Individual's interviews were deemed appropriate to obtain such additional insight which the focus group discussions are unable to harness. Potentials for those kinds of questions were identified from individuals who participated in the group discussions and were envisaged to have more valuable information to provide willingly. Such individuals included those who exhibited unique and peculiar opinions in the course of the focus group discussions. The individual interviews where semi-structured and open-ended questions were employed

for the identified individuals considering their suitability for this kind of inquiry (Sauders et al. 2003). The open questions for these interviews offered the opportunity for flexibility in exploring participants' new detailed opinions about questions highlighted from the focus group sessions. Participants for the individual interview were identified and selected from the five focus groups to ensure full coverage of the case area and avoid bias. Each of these participants was interviewed at their chosen locations and convenient times. Like the focus group sessions, the interviews were conducted using Hausa language and recorded by audio and note-taking.

5.6.4 Data Analysis

The need to gain an accurate and in-depth analysis of the post-conflict livelihoods change in Buni Yadi influenced the choice of adopting the Hausa language. It was used as a medium of communication in the group discussions and interviews. The use of Hausa language was deemed necessary following the participants' preference for responding to questions using local dialects during the quantitative study. The audio recordings of the responses obtained from the discussions and interviews were transcribed into word documents and translated into the English language. Analysis of the transcribed word document was generated based on the thematic elements of livelihoods and patterns that arose during the discussions and interviews (see appendix 13 for further details). The qualitative data analyses contain discussions and narrative quotes from participants. These were used as evidence to support further discussions in the study.

5.7 Ethical Considerations in the Research

Ethical considerations (also refers to 'research morality') ensures the rights and wellbeing of participants are fully protected. Research ethics is a necessity given the required attention for fulfilling the recommended minimum acceptable standard for research practices (Cobanoglu and Cobanuglu 2003). The need for research morality is particularly essential when there is human participation to ensure that rights and wellbeing of participants are not undermined or taken for granted as a result of their involvement in the research. The need to adhere to research ethics for this study was necessary considering the sensitive nature of the study – post-conflict. This concern also relates directly to the need to avoid the possibility of undermining the vulnerability conditions of the research participants who have been through a conflict situation.

Oxford Brookes University Code of Practice for Research Ethics for Research Involving Human Participation provides a valuable basis upon which the human recruitment and participation for this research were conducted. In line with the ethical requirement for research at Oxford Brookes University, participants for this study were formally invited (appendices 2 and 4) to participate in the study.

Similarly, the participants were made to be fully aware of the purpose, benefits of the research as contained in the participants' information sheet (appendices 1and 6). The need for the participants to participate in the investigation was also clearly highlighted and adequate information was provided to them about the nature of the research and the specific tasks they were required to do during their involvement. All participants for the study were adults – 18-year-old and above. The adult-only participation policy for the research was to ensure that participants had the mental capacity to understand the nature of the study and to be able to give consent and make informed decision to participate. Participation in this research was strictly voluntary given that participation was by their informed written consent (appendix 5) without any form of undue pressure. Participation was subject to participants' approval to accept the audio recording of the discussion and interview sessions.

Confidentiality of participants' personal information was of great significance in the conduct of this research. The confidentiality for the study was in line with the Data Protection Regulations of Oxford Brookes University. Responses of participants that contained personal identities or information were securely handled to prevent access by unauthorised persons. All notes, transcripts and audio records of proceeding were always securely stored in the researcher's lockable safe. Electronic data were stored in electronic devices (laptop or hard drive) which were encrypted (password protected) at researcher's residence during the fieldwork and at Oxford Brookes University for processing and analysis. A backup copy of the research document was stored in Google Drive that is linked to the researcher's Brookes Google account, to be available in an unlikely case of data loss. Similarly, the research assistants who were recruited to support the researcher were requested to sign the confidentiality agreement form (appendix 12) for their involvement in the study. This procedure was a further step to ensure confidentiality and to prevent unauthorised access to information from this study.

Furthermore, the cultural requirement for interaction with people (especially women) in the case study was adhered to adequately. Culturally, prolong interaction between

unrelated men and women put women in a state of discomfort. To avoid this condition and balance the cultural requirement, the service of experience female research assistant was employed as a co-facilitator of focus group sessions. The presence of a female in the focus group for women not only makde them relaxed but encouraged them to express their opinions and experiences freely and confidently. Similarly, cultural concerns for all other groups were taken into consideration adequately during the sessions. To ensure due process and adherence to laid down procedures for undertaking research fieldwork in Oxford Brookes University approval was requested and granted for both quantitative and qualitative data phases after meeting all requirements.

5.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the details of the philosophical and epistemological underpinning for applying the research methodology, which is consistent with the theoretical consideration of the investigation. Considering the post-conflict nature of this study and its context the justification for adopting the case study design and multi-sources mixed methods strategy were presented as the suitable methodological processes for data collection and analysis. The mixed-methods comprised of the quantitative survey using questionnaire, physical surveys by observations and the qualitative technique, which involved the focus groups and individual interviews. The chapter also discusses the details of the procedures for undertaking each of these techniques as well as the cultural and ethical concerns for conducting social research that involves human participation. These methodological processes guided the fieldwork activities for the collection of relevant data for the investigation. However, the subsequent chapters present the analysis of the empirical results sequentially in the order of quantitative, observations and qualitative discussions.

Part Three

Deteriorating Post-conflict Livelihoods in Buni Yadi

CHAPTER SIX

Results of the Quantitative Survey: Structured Questionnaire

The preceding section has discussed the relevant methodological considerations which guide the data collection and analysis for this research. Using the case study design mixed-methods data collection and analysis considered include the quantitative, observation and qualitative surveys. Based on the data collected using the survey technique through questionnaires, this chapter, however, presents the results of the quantitative method. The survey results are based on the 450 sampled household participants who provided information about both individual and household post-conflict livelihoods conditions. The summarised data are displayed using charts and graphs in the form of proportions and relative distribution - such as percentages, of livelihoods variables.

6.1 Reason for Migration from Buni Yadi

This section shows empirical evidence to support the claim that conflict once displaced residents of the case study. As shown (Figure 6.1), the survey results indicate that insurgency was the primary cause of displacement in Buni Yadi. During the movement, the residents migrated to various places within and outside Yobe State including IDP camps and non-camps settlements in states such as Kano, Bauchi and Kaduna. The choice of the destination for the conflict migration may have been influenced by factors such as the level of affluence, presence of networks and relations outside Buni Yadi. These choices for destinations had deferring implications for the post-conflict livelihoods experiences of the residents. For example, the conflict victims who migrated to the IDP camp are likely to be more impoverished after the return due to the unfavourable livelihoods conditions in camps. Similarly, residents who migrated to faraway places where the majority of the residents are not aware faced the difficult challenge of lack of trust due to suspicion upon return (see section 6.7). However, further discussion on the impact of the displacement is in the focus group discussion (chapter eight)

Figure 6.1: Reason for migration from Buni Yadi

6.2 Reason for the Return to Buni Yadi

It is crucial to determine whether residents of the case study have returned to their community after conflict displacement. This evidence is critical to support the theoretical consideration for selecting a case study, which is a non-camp post-conflict settlement. Figure 6.2 indicates that residents have returned to Buni Yadi from the displacement for one reason or more. Responses of the respondents suggest that their resettlement is voluntary, giving that the return of peace and livelihoods activities, e.g. farming and business constitute the primary reasons. This condition also confirms that the case study is a self-settled context. This status fulfils one of the critical requirements for designating post-conflict setting upon which the research argument for this investigation is based.

Figure 6.2: Reason for the return to Buni Yadi

6.3 Post-conflict Duration of Stay in Buni Yadi

This section shows the length of stay of respondents in Buni Yadi to establish evidence for the presence of recent migrants (conflict) who are now living in the case study as a self-settled community. The lengths of stay in the case study differ among the current residents, as shown in figure 6.3. About 18% of the respondents who have lived in the case study for between one and three years are the recent migrants whose migration to Buni Yadi coincides with the period of return from conflict displacement. This condition justifies using Buni Yadi as a lone case study giving the presence of both historical residents who are now returnees and migrants from other conflict communities. These conflict migrants, however, may have peculiar predicaments in the case study, hence deserves attention (in addition to the historical residents) to have an in-depth understanding of the livelihoods changes of the group. Discussions with the migrants enrich the research by identifying possible variation between the conditions and coping mechanism of conflict migrants in a restricted camp and those in the unrestricted and non-camp context. It may also be useful for a deeper understanding of the possible variation in the coping strategies of the original residents of the case study and those of the conflict migrant despite living unrestrictive lives. The discussion may also help to unravel potential friction between these migrants and the returnees as is often the case for IDP-host community relationships.

Figure 6.3: Post-conflict duration of stay in Buni Yadi

6.4 Post-conflict Human Capital Change in Buni Yadi

6.4.1 Age and Sex Distribution in Buni Yadi

The results indicate that both male and female genders participated in the survey in which the male-female participation ratio is about 2:1, respectively (Figure 6.4). This figure indicates the male - household heads, dominated responses. The male dominance may be a reflection of the male-dominant cultural environment of the case study where the women participation was subject to men approval or the absence of the male, thereby limiting the women participation. Giving this cultural setting, this level of female participation may be seen as a change that is brought about by conflict, possibly due to deaths of male household heads thereby shifting the responsibility of heading family affairs to women. This change may have also distorted the household economy, given the limitation of what or how much a female gender can do to make provision for the family in a male-dominated environment. Similarly, the demographic representation is nearly balanced for all participants across the age classifications, except for the young adults (18-24 years) who are least represented (7%). The low representation of this group may be attributable to the focus on household heads who are mostly older adult. This condition may limit the youths – an essential segment of the population, from voicing their post-conflict situations and experiences. Apart from ensuring inclusive narratives and gender balance, further engagement with the women and youth groups in discussions may help to unravel unique post-conflict livelihoods experiences that may be useful for this investigation.

Figure 6.4: Age and sex distribution in Buni Yadi

6.4.2 Post-conflict Education Level in Buni Yadi

The survey results show five categories of educational qualification for participants of the research (Figure 6.5). The residents of the case study indicate a significant poor educational status whereby a large proportion (59%) of the population have no formal education and 20% of those who had formal education have not gone beyond primary (elementary) level. The conflict may not have been the cause of this education status, but it indicates a weak post-conflict human capital. The traditional informal Qur'anic education, which about 51% of the population acquired may not gain them employment for formal jobs since the official measure of employability is western/formal education in Nigeria. But even with formal training, securing jobs in a setting where the unemployment rate is surprisingly highest among those who have post-secondary education (UNDP 2018) may not be a guarantee for economic security. While formal education is linked with improved human capital accumulation and its positive effect on livelihoods (Justino 2012a), informal economic activities which may not require significant level of education may also support securing livelihoods (Meagher 2013).

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
Figure 6.5: Education level in Buni Yadi

6.5 Post-conflict Change in Economic Conditions in Buni Yadi

6.5.1   Pre-conflict Means of Livelihood in Buni Yadi

The survey results show that the means of livelihoods in the case study include artisanship, labour work, farming, civil service and business. Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of the means of livelihoods before the conflict. As indicated, the pre-conflict livelihood means was predominantly informal, and business (mostly small to medium scale trading) and farming were the primary activities. Employment in the formal sector (civil servants) was significantly low (3%). This condition may be a reflection of the high rate of low-level formal education, coupled with the unemployment among the educated residents. However, the low-rate pre-conflict unemployment (7%) does not seem significant to have been a critical motivating factor for a collective mobilisation for conflict in the case study. If the economic factor was substantial, this might raise the question of how gainfully employed, or the pattern of distribution within the community was. The break down of the pre-conflict livelihoods into the six zones in Buni Yadi indicates an unequal distribution of livelihoods. Table 6.1 shows that livelihoods in Hausari, Shuwari and Ngomari were better off than in Mairi, Fulatari and Kasakchiya and Mairi had the highest unemployment rate and labourers. This scenario may be relevant for understanding the possibility of the impact of this livelihoods inequality on the conflict and its likely implication for recurrence.

Figure 6.6: Pre-conflict livelihood in Buni Yadi

Cross-tabulation of Pre-Conflict Livelihoods in Buni Yadi						
Pre-conflict livelihood	Mairi	Fulatari	Hausari	Shuwari	Ngomari	Kasakchiya
Business	5	3	14	19	14	9
Farming	7	18	17	35	36	5
Artisan	2	7	9	3	12	4
Civil Servant	2	2	7	6	4	3
Labourer	4	1	2	0	0	0
Unemployed	27	9	4	9	6	3

Table 6.1: Cross-tabulation of pre-conflict livelihoods in Buni Yadi; **Source:** Field survey (2017)

6.5.2 Post-conflict Livelihoods Change in Buni Yadi

The post-conflict livelihoods of the survey respondents indicate alteration of the pre-conflict means of livelihoods. Figure 6.7 shows distortions and deterioration of means of livelihoods after the conflict in Buni Yadi. As a typical post-conflict setting, unemployment increased more than five folds while businesses crumbled significantly. An increase in labourer job may imply devising new means of livelihoods to survive. The rise in farming may be as a result of the post-conflict deplorable economic condition which pushes more people into subsistence farming as an alternative to buying foods. The number of people in the civil service (e.g. teacher and healthcare workers) remained unchanged after conflict. The consistency in the public service is because the government is the primary employer for this group, and the conflict did not affect their employment status. This condition suggests that formal sector employment is more resilient to shock than the informal activities in the case study. Although it is difficult to accurately establish the proportion of civil servants who have returned after conflict (because they are targeted), formal sector employment seemed negligible in

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Buni Yadi. This scenario implies that the large informal economy is more susceptible to conflict shocks. The next section highlights the effects of conflict on livelihoods assets and coping strategy of the residents within this condition.

Post-conflict Livelihood Change in Buni-Yadi (n=364)

Figure 6.7: Post-conflict livelihoods change in Buni Yadi

6.5.3   Impact of Conflict on Livelihoods Assets of Individual

The conflict in the case study has negatively affected the livelihoods of a significant proportion of the residents, especially those in the informal sector, due to the change in means of livelihoods. Figure 6.8 shows the susceptibility of livelihoods in Buni Yadi as a result of the distortion of access to individuals' livelihoods assets. The most significant effects of the conflict on livelihoods are the destruction and looting of the residents' assets by the insurgents. Displacement - especially for the migrants and reduced business patronage also contribute to the post-conflict livelihoods challenges. The impact of this condition may be significant, giving the predominantly informal economy where individual bear the risks of their means of livelihoods. This condition adversely affects livelihoods resilience, mainly because access to compensation or insurance cover is alien to Buni Yadi.

However, a similarity exists between the household and individuals concerning the effect of conflict on access to means of livelihoods assets. As noted in figure 6.9, assets destruction is significant for households as it is for individuals, although looting is not as significant as it is reported for the individuals'. Difficulty to access assets – e.g. for

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fear of attacks or blockage for safety concerns, is a critical post-conflict means of livelihoods challenges. Loss of jobs by household member contributes to the effect of livelihoods predicament in Buni Yadi. While the variations in the change in access to means of livelihoods between individuals and households are apparently due to the aggregation of the experiences of individuals in the households, the overall condition portrays a negative trend whose consequences on the post-conflict livelihoods resilience is critical in the community.

Figure 6.8: Effect of conflict on livelihoods of individual

Effect of Conflict on Household Access to Livelihoods Asset in Buni Yadi (n=388)

Figure 6.9: Effect of conflict on the livelihoods of households

6.5.4 Post-conflict Household Coping Strategy for Change in Access to Livelihoods Assets in Buni Yadi

The survey results show different post-conflict livelihoods coping strategies in Buni Yadi. Figure 6.10 highlights the three primary ways in which the residents are coping with the post-conflict challenge due to the change in access to their means of livelihoods. The condition indicates a weakness in livelihoods resilience as a significant proportion (38%) relies on humanitarian support for survival. While devising a new means of livelihoods for survival may be challenging, the reduction of consumption can significantly affect the health condition of the population, especially the children. Anyone of these coping strategies has a negative implication for post-conflict Buni Yadi. The category that devises new means of survival, for example, would have to learn how to do and make a living from the newfound means of livelihoods. This process may be significantly challenging for individuals in a fragile economic environment with limited opportunities and the need to get means of sustenance. The possible negative health implication of the reduction of consumption may impair the post-conflict human capital accumulation of the residents due to poor health and the ensuing poverty. It is difficult to ascertain the mechanism adopted by the minority group (1%) whose livelihoods are not affected by the conflict using this quantitative method. While further insight may be developed from the focus group discussion, however, this category is negligible.

Household Coping Strategy for Change in Access to Livelihood Assets in Buni-Yadi (n=264)

Figure 6.10: Household coping strategies for change in access to livelihood assets in Buni Yadi

6.5.5   Effect of Conflict on Household Income in Buni-Yadi

With a weakened economic resilience, the change in income levels of households in Buni Yadi is inevitable. The survey results indicate that a variety of post-conflict conditions lead to a decline in the household level of income. Figure 6.11shows another livelihoods weakness due to unsustainable informality of Buni Yadi economy as the decline in business patronage, loss of jobs, injuries and loss of family members and loss of assets combined to induce income reduction. While specific statistics concerning this income decline could not be ascertained due to this informal setting, income deterioration may lead to increased poverty and further livelihoods vulnerability.

Effect of Conflict on Household Income in Buni-Yadi (n=216)

Figure 6.11: Effect of conflict on household income in Buni-Yadi

6.6 Post-Conflict Social Assets Change in Buni Yadi

6.6.1 The Significance of Social Network Before Conflict in Buni Yadi

Different people attached varying significance to social networking before conflict broke out in Buni Yadi. The social platforms in which the residents associated include but limited to family and relations, age-related associations, e.g. youths association, farmers association, women association and market associations. While a significant proportion of the population indicated that their associations were useful before the conflict, a minority indicated that social network was not beneficial for them (Figure 6.12). Some of the benefits of the social networks for farmers, for example, includes securing cheaper fertiliser for members. Women had used their networking platform as a medium for assisting one another in the time of needs through financial contribution among members. However, social networks have been affected by conflict.

Significance of Social Network Before Conflict in Buni Yadi (n=366)

Figure 6.12: Significance of social networks before the conflict

6.6.2 Effect of Conflict on Social Network in Buni Yadi

The outbreak of conflict and the ensuing challenges have caused a significant adverse effect on the social capital of Buni Yadi residents. As noted in figure 6.13, loss of social ties due to displacement is the most important factor that affected social assets in the community. Loss of social ties and the accruing livelihoods benefits is also affected by the deaths of family members and friends. Displacement of the residents to different places during the conflict created a significant level of lack of trust among the residents upon return. This lack of trust emanates from the suspicions among the residents towards former associates of being covert members of the insurgent group. The effect of this suspicious atmosphere creates the condition of unwillingness to assist one another in the critical condition. Social networks in Buni Yadi seemed largely horizontal whereby associations are often within people who live in the same context or with similar social status. This condition may have contributed to the level of the devastation the conflict has on this asset, given the lack of vertical social networking that may be more useful in the circumstance or for social mobility.

Figure 6.13: Effect of conflict on the social network in Buni Yadi

6.6.3 Post-conflict Coping Strategy for Household on Social Network Change

The survey results show that different residents of Buni Yadi adopt varying coping strategies for social network change after conflict. Figure 6.14 indicates that while a significant part of the residents (68%) are rebuilding trust and relations, others apply caution in social interactions. Another segment of the population is simply helpless as the conflict has adversely affected their social assets and the accruing benefits beyond repairs. This group is worst-off, probably due to the effect of the dominance of horizontal associates who may have died during the conflict.

Figure 6.14: Post-conflict coping strategy for the household on social network change

6.7 Post-conflict Infrastructure Change in Buni Yadi

6.7.1 Effect of Conflict on Housing in Buni Yadi

Figure 6.15 shows a summary of the results for the effect of conflict on housing in Buni Yadi. The conflict has caused significant damage to the housing infrastructure in which more than two-thirds of the households were affected directly or indirectly. The level of destruction varies for different households where a significant proportion (43%) of the community had their houses destroyed completely. There are others whose houses had major damage such as burnt roofs and collapsed walls. The third category of the residents is those whose houses had minor damages such as cracked walls and broken doors or windows. Further details on the analysis of the physical observations on the nature of the housing destruction are in the next chapter. However, these changes in the housing infrastructure affect the residents differently and consequently influences different coping strategies. Figure 6.16 shows the different coping strategies residents adopt following the changes in their housing conditions.

As shown, a category which constitutes about 28% of the residents have been rendered homeless, and they resort to using public spaces such as damaged public schools as a temporary shelter. These residents are likely to be among those whose houses were completely damaged and are unable to find or rent one. They may also be those who do not own a home of their own, but the ensuing scarcity of houses have rendered them

homeless when they cannot afford to migrate to another community. Half of the residents have to endure overcrowding due to the housing scarcity and poor housing conditions. The third category is for those residents whose poor housing conditions have forced them to live in buildings that are in poor states and physically unsafe for habitation. The people in this category live in broken houses in which they create partitions with makeshift materials such as metal sheets and plastic bags. While a tiny fraction of the residents resorts to spending more money to rent a house, a negligible proportion have to keep their families elsewhere while they live in Buni Yadi. This latter group still consider themselves displaced

Figure 6.15: Effect of conflict on housing in Buni Yadi

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
Figure 6.16: Coping with Effect of Housing Destruction in Buni-Yadi

Conflict in Buni Yadi has a significant negative impact on the residents' housing condition, and the consequences undermine the wellbeing of the majority of the residents. However, the residents' opinions differ concerning possible strategies for improving the poor housing condition where two to three discernible views emerge. As shown in figure 6.17, the first category favours direct intervention by government or aids agencies. In this group, more than 60% of the residents hold the view that government (at all levels) should intervene by reconstructing their homes. The large size of the group who hold this opinion may be a reflection of a pervasive impoverishment where people feel they cannot afford to rebuild their houses but rely on the intervention from the government they hardly trust. The second classification is for those who believe in pulling themselves out of the current condition if they have access to necessary support. They believe that the best strategy for improving the post-conflict housing condition is through jobs creation and financial assistance. These residents hold the view that when people get necessary financial supports through loans for business or employment, they will be able to make savings and rebuild their houses themselves. This way, they will improve not only their houses but their economic resilience. The last group, which is negligible is simply indifferent and indecisive.

Opinion on Post-conflict Housing Improvement (n=393)

Figure 6.17: Opinion on post-conflict housing improvement

6.7.2 Post-conflict Road Condition in Buni Yadi

Roads are essential livelihoods infrastructure, especially in a post-conflict context. The post-conflict road condition is a vital component of the livelihoods framework, given its critical role in supporting other livelihoods capitals such as economic assets. Four categories of road conditions are identified based on the assessment of the quantitative opinions of the survey respondents. Figure 6.18 shows that while some roads are in good condition and accessible others in similar condition are inaccessible. The category of roads which the residents referred to as good and accessible is the recently reconstructed major inter-city road (Damaturu-Biu road) which crosses and links Buni Yadi with Damatu. The good but inaccessible roads are those that may have been barricaded for safety concerns such as fear of possible land mines. The chart also indicates pervasive bad roads which are accessible. However, a few roads are bad and inaccessible. Further details on the physical conditions of roads and the implication for the post-conflict livelihoods are in the subsequent chapters.

Figure 6.18: Post-conflict road condition in Buni Yadi

These deplorable road conditions have adverse effects on roads accessibility in the case study area. The challenge of post-conflict road accessibility emanates from four primary conflict impacts on the road infrastructure. Figure 6.19 indicates that destruction of road infrastructure – e.g. bridge, by the insurgents is a major cause of road inaccessibility. Another significant cause of lack of access to the road is the damage due to lack of maintenance. This condition is likely to have been the consequence of neglect because of the long period of displacement. There are residents whose access to the road is truncated due to the fear of being attacked by insurgents, especially when they travel far from home into the farms. However, very few respondents indicated that their post-conflict road access is not affected. This category may be for the residents whose livelihoods activities do not require frequent travelling, hence the feeling that post-conflict deplorable road condition is not a challenge for them. Nonetheless, the implication of road inaccessibility may still be affecting them indirectly as shall be discussed in chapter eight and nine.

Effect of Conflict on Road Accessibility in Buni Yadi (n=402)

Figure 6.19: Effect of conflict on road accessibility

The change in access to roads adversely affect livelihoods of Buni Yadi residents. Figure 6.20 indicates that reduced access to important livelihoods assets – e.g. farmland, and travelling difficulties for businesses are widespread after conflict due to change in road accessibility. This condition constitutes a significant post-conflict economic threat given that farming and business are the major livelihoods activities in Buni Yadi. Discussion on the specific implications of this condition on the post-conflict livelihoods and conflict is made in further depth in chapter nine. Change in access to roads has also caused a rise in the cost of commuting due to bad road conditions. One of the possible implications of this effect is the increase in the cost of doing business and inefficiency, which potentially increases the cost of living in the case study. This condition may increase the hardship of the already impoverished residents.

Effect of Changed Road Accessibility on Livelihoods in Buni-Yadi (n=288)

Figure 6.20: Effects of changed road accessibility on livelihood in Buni Yadi

6.7.3 Post-conflict Access to Water in Buni Yadi

The conflict has affected the supply and access to portable water in Buni Yadi. The survey results (Figure 6.21) show that a significant proportion of the residents is adversely affected by this change in access to water. However, the post-conflict sources and access to water are not the same for the residents who have access. The predominant source of water, especially for those who have access is the borehole which may be manually operated or motorised. Other sources of water include tap, wells, stream and purchase from commercial water vendors (see next chapter). Water supply in Buni Yadi is often a public infrastructure except, for example, in a few cases where individuals build wells in their houses or boreholes (for the effluents). However, the survey results show that the residents spent varying times to access water due to the changes. As shown in figure 6.22, while it takes larger parts of the population to access water within 30 minutes, a significant proportion spent between 31 minutes and more than 60 minutes to access water for every round.

Figure 6.21: Post-conflict access to water in Buni Yadi

Figure 6.22: Post-conflict duration for accessing water in Buni Yadi

It is apparent that the change in access to water in the case study affects the residents differently, and this may have informed the variation in the coping strategies. Figure 6.23 indicates that the largest segment of the community spends more scarce resources (money) to buy water, especially from the water vendors. The largely impoverished residents resolve to travel to nearby communities for water, most likely because they cannot afford to buy it every day. Others rely on humanitarian organisations who from time to time supply water to the community using water tanker. This condition of lack of access implies that a large section of the residents wastes valuable time on sourcing water every day. This scenario may undermine productivity as the time that may be

used for other needs is wasted on one basic need in a fragile economy with a high rate of impoverishment.

Figure 6.23: Post-conflict Effect of change in access to water and coping strategy in Buni Yadi

6.7.4 Post-conflict Access to Healthcare Services and their Proximity to Users in Buni Yadi

Like other infrastructure, health facilities have been badly affected by the conflict in Buni Yadi. The survey results (Figure 6.24) indicate that a significant proportion (22%) of the residents could not access healthcare services due to the destruction of healthcare facilities. A larger proportion of the residents who indicate that they can access healthcare after conflict relies on the local private pharmaceutical store or clinic who dispense simple medical service such as a prescription for fever. However, the post-conflict access to healthcare varies among Buni Yadi residents. While the majority of the residents patronise the local options for their healthcare services, others have to travel to nearby communities to access healthcare services. More than 30% of the residents in Buni Yadi are forced to travel to the State capital city (Damaturu) or other states to access healthcare services. This is often for health conditions which are beyond what can be treated locally. Others rely on the alternative means of accessing healthcare - e.g. traditional medicines. The resort to traditional alternative for healthcare may be a reflection of either lack of means for accessing the services from the available healthcare centres or preference for the alternative medicine (e.g. for cultural reasons).

It may also be the combination of these conditions that make this group stick to traditional medicine.

Post-conflict Access to Healthcare Services and their Proximity to Users in Buni Yadi (n=395)

Figure 6.24: Post-conflict access to healthcare services and their proximity to users in Buni Yadi

The difference in the proximity and access to healthcare services in Buni Yadi reflects on the time spent in accessing the service after conflict. Figure 6.25 shows a semblance of how the proximity to a healthcare facility may have affected the duration for accessing the services. For example, a large proportion of the residents who can access healthcare services from Buni Yadi (Figure 6.24) coincides with the proportion that spent between 1 and 2 hours to access healthcare services in the community. Those that have to travel to nearby communities, city and other states reflect the longer duration (3 hours or more) for accessing healthcare service. However, this study is unable to immediately ascertain the impact of conflict on healthcare using the quantitative technique because of the lack of data to have a clear sense of the condition before the conflict. Accordingly, attempt is made for further discussion on the impact of the conflict on healthcare services in the subsequent chapters.

Figure 6.25: Post-conflict duration for accessing healthcare in Buni Yadi

6.8 Chapter summary

This chapter has presented the results of the quantitative survey which cover the conditions of the existing thematic livelihoods components in the case study for individuals and households. The current livelihoods conditions constitute the changes from the pre-conflict in which the effects and coping strategies of residents are examined. The preliminary results indicate alterations in livelihoods of the residents in the case study, which suggest the deterioration of living conditions and increase vulnerabilities. However, the survey part of this investigation comprises of the questionnaire and the physical observations. The results of the physical (observations) survey aspect are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Results of the Physical Surveys: Condition of Post-conflict Infrastructure in Buni Yadi

The results of the quantitative surveys have been reported in the preceding chapter covering the analysis of the thematic components of livelihoods and changes that have occurred due to conflict. This chapter covers the aspects of physical surveys. The purpose of this additional aspect of the study, as mentioned in chapter four, is to apply multiple sources methods for producing corroborative evidence and robust research outcome. The outcome of this chapter is particularly relevant for the study given the significance of the need to understand the infrastructure changes and analysis of the pattern of destruction and the implications. The results presented in this chapter supplement the ones discussed in the previous chapter. The observation results of the post-conflict conditions of infrastructure are primarily shown in pictographic evidence and spatial map (Figure. 7.1)

Figure 7.1

7.1 Change in Housing Infrastructure

A substantial section of residential buildings is confirmed to have been destroyed in the case study consequent to the conflict (as noted in section 6.7.1) (Figure 7.1). While some of these are already undergoing rehabilitation, many others are still in the condition of disrepair. The observation also confirms the variation in the degree of destruction (Figure 6.15). It is, however, observed that the destruction might have taken a particular pattern in which selected houses are targeted and destroyed. As shown in figure 7.1a, houses made from cement blocks are targeted and destroyed. Physically those houses indicate the possibility of being owned by more affluent social categories in the community. Majority of these type of houses are fenced and gated, and the observations suggest that their destruction is mostly by fire and other physical means. Another category of destroyed houses is the ones made from mud blocks. There is no evidence to suggest that this category of buildings is destroyed by fire or by physical means. As shown in figure 7.1b, the poor state of the buildings are better conceived as being the effect of adverse climate conditions such as rain and wind, which may have damaged the houses. The observation considers that the current conditions of the mud buildings could have been aided by the two-year displacement, which prevented the owners from carrying out maintenance.

Figure 7.1a: Post-conflict condition of cement block houses in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.1b: Post-conflict condition of mud-block houses in Buni Yadi

This selective pattern of destruction in Buni Yadi is observed to have a possible correlation with the livelihoods distribution (table 6.1) across the community. As shown in figure 7.1, the concentration of the destruction, especially houses and business premises, is higher within the zones that have better livelihoods before the conflict. Destructions within the weaker livelihoods area are often the targeted 'features of interest' such as Emirs palace, police stations and schools or houses that were destroyed by the effect of rain or wind. Given this scenario, grievance due to inequality and frustration may have played an important role in fostering the conflict in the case study. While the impact of the destruction negatively affects the physical and socio-economic wellbeing of residents, the grievance from the unequal pattern of livelihood may continue, thereby cause conflict relapse.

7.2 Change in Business and Commercial Buildings

The physical surveys reveal that private businesses and commercial properties may have been targeted and destroyed during the conflict. These destroyed properties include shops, banks, filling stations, and so forth (Figure 7.2) and they are mostly within the major activity area (community centre) of the town (Figure 7.1). A significant proportion of these properties have been destroyed often by fire or other means. The degree of the destructions differs from property to property as some are destroyed beyond repairs and others had significant damages which could be rehabilitated. A great deal of these properties has remained non-functional while few have been renovated somewhat and put to use again.

Figure 7.2: Post-conflict condition of shops and stores in Buni Yadi

7.3 Change in Education Infrastructure

Like other social infrastructures in Buni Yadi conflict, education facilities are not spared given that all categories of schools – primary, secondary and post-secondary, in the case study, are destroyed. Virtually all the teaching and learning and extra-curricular facilities such as classrooms, libraries and games equipment in the schools are destroyed, and figure 7.3 shows the remains of the school structures. The physical observation indicates that the schools are damaged by fire and other physical means. The destruction of schools may not be a surprise given the open hostility of the insurgents (and what they represent) towards western education and anything that comes from it. It is worth mentioning that it is difficult to ascertain in specific terms if Quranic schools were targeted and destroyed. This difficulty stems from the fact that Quranic education is highly informal and is not taught in an elaborate or formalised space. The students of the Quranic schools often receive lessons from the homes of the tutor or any other space in the community. If Quranic schools have been destroyed, it may have been because the house in which the student receives lessons are damaged or in the case where the teacher (Islamic cleric) is a target for having contrary opinions to those of the insurgents.

Figure 7.3: Post-conflict condition of schools in Buni Yadi

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7.4 Change in Healthcare Infrastructure

The healthcare facilities in Buni Yadi have suffered similar ill-fate like other infrastructure as observed. This observation confirms the quantitative survey results (section 6.7.4) which suggest that conflict caused the change in access to healthcare. The physical surveys reveal that all private and public healthcare facilities are destroyed in the case study (Figure 7.4), suggesting that these facilities were deliberately targeted and destroyed. The destructions are caused by fire as the health facilities are currently non-functional and abandoned. Valuable time, energy and resources are spent by a large section of the residents to access healthcare services while they travel as far as to other cities and states. Healthcare infrastructure plays a significant role in supporting and sustaining quality human capital. The quantitative results and observations for this component of livelihoods is further discussed in the subsequent chapter through focus group discussions with residents concerning their experiences, coping and implications of the deplorable condition of the healthcare service delivery.

Figure 7.4: Post-conflict condition of hospitals in Buni Yadi

7.5 Change in Road Infrastructure

The physical surveys confirm the state of disrepair of many roads infrastructure due to conflict as identified in the quantitative survey (section 6.7.2) in the case study. A bridge on a major road that links Buni Yadi and Damaturu is destroyed by the insurgents (Figure 7.5a), perhaps to truncate movement. It could not be established, however, through observation that the severe state of other roads infrastructure within

the case study are caused by direct physical destruction. It is easily identifiable that the current conditions of the roads are a result of lack of maintenance, which has caused the visible damage possibly by erosion. The current state of the road infrastructure may have been aided by the lack of supporting facilities such as drainages and water channels (Figure 7.5b). This change in road condition affects access and efficiency of utilising other assets, e.g. farm. Road infrastructure is an important livelihood public asset that supports both access and utilisation of other livelihoods assets. Chapter eight and nine provides further insight into the residents' coping mechanism and the implications of the roads conditions on post-conflict development.

Figure 7.5a: Damaged bridge in Buni Yadi after conflict.

Figure 7.5b: Damaged road in Buni Yadi after conflict.

7.6 Change in Water Supply Infrastructure

The physical surveys reveal that access to the water supply is a significant problem in Buni Yadi, confirming the quantitative survey findings (section 6.7.3) which attribute the change in access to the water supply to the adverse effect of conflict. As noted, a variety of coping strategies employed for accessing water includes queuing up for a long duration to obtain water from a few available taps in the community (Figure 7.6a and c). The alternative to waiting for a long time is the purchase from the water vendors who hawk the water around in carts (Figure 7.6b). Those who cannot afford any of the above options travel to the nearest villages where they can access water often using a bicycle to journey from Buni Yadi to the villages to collect water with kegs (Figure 7.6d). Water is an essential commodity both for quality human capital and the environment.

Figure 7.6a: Residents queuing to fetch water in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.6b: Water vendor hawking water in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.6c: Public tap water source in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.6d: Resident travelling to a neighbouring village to fetch water

7.7 Change in Electricity and Telecommunications

The physical survey results show the visibly vandalised electricity facilities such as electricity poles, cables and transformers consequent to the conflict in the case study (Figure 7.7a) thereby leaving the entire settlement in a total blackout as at the time of this fieldwork. Similarly, the observations reveal the vandalisation of the telecommunication facilities, such as the communication mast of the service providers (Figure 7.7b). The deplorable conditions of the telecommunication facilities explain the current difficulties of accessing telecommunication services in the case study.

Figure 7.7a: Vandalised electricity infrastructure after the conflict in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.7b: Vandalised telecommunication infrastructure after the conflict in Buni Yadi

7.8 Change in Public and Administrative Buildings

Virtually all the public infrastructures are observed to have been affected by the conflict in the case study in which buildings such as local government offices, police station, courtrooms and traditional authority buildings are mainly targeted and torched (Figure 7.8a, b,c).

Figure 7.8a: Destroyed local government offices after the conflict in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.8b: Vandalised police station in Buni Yadi

Figure 7.8c: The destroyed palace of the Emir of Buni Yadi after conflict.

7.9 Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the physical survey results in which pictographic evidence and spatial map are used. The analysis of the physical destruction shed more light on the results of the quantitative survey. The pattern of the damage is noted to correlate with the livelihoods distribution in the community, thereby suggesting a possible impact of grievance due to inequality and frustration on the conflict. However, the following chapter discusses further details of the livelihoods changes in focus group discussions to have an improved understanding of the possible implications of the post-conflict livelihoods conditions in Buni Yadi.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Results of the Qualitative Study: Focus Group and Individual Interviews

The last two chapters present the study results base on the application of surveys - quantitative and observations, for the livelihood conditions in the case study. The preliminary results, which are presented in statistical, pictorial and spatial forms, suggest livelihood changes range from the distortion of the means of livelihoods and access to infrastructures and services. However, these preliminary outcomes require further investigation with a view to engaging the residents for in-depth discussions on those livelihoods changes and the implications for possible conflict recurrence. The corroborative evidence from the process of the discussions enhances the quality of the final results of the focus group and individual interviews that are presented in this chapter. The chapter covers discussions on the impacts and implications of changes in the aspects of livelihoods, such as access to income, roads, farmland, hospitals, schools, telecommunications, and so forth.

8.1 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Economic Resilience in Buni Yadi

8.1.1   Change in means of livelihood and income:

The focus group discussions and individual interviews confirm the severe decline in the income level of residents of the case study area as identified in chapter six and seven. Participants note that although a high rate of poverty and joblessness existed before the conflict, they attribute their current deteriorated income level to the sudden loss or lack of access to means of livelihoods and assets during and after the conflict. The conflict-induced displacement forced the residents to abandon their means of livelihoods such as shops, sewing machine, animals, which were eventually destroyed or looted. Their inability to flee with enough resources subjected them to the condition of hardship in their various places of refuge. The hardship conditions are noted in their narratives, which suggest the inability to afford the basic needs of living such as food, housing and clothing during displacement and beyond.

The miserable income decline was caused by the [conflict] displacement, which forced people to abandon their means of livelihoods. Many of these are looted, and others are burnt and destroyed. Some of us used to have sewing machines. Some of us had a grinding machine. We used them to get some income to help ourselves. …Upon migration, rent payment was a major hustle. Many times [landlords] threaten to evict you when you cannot pay [rent]. Some went to the extent of removing the [house] roofing [to evict migrant tenants forcefully]. In that hard condition, we struggle to pay rent and food was also expensive. …When Buni Yadi was reopened, people returned, but many had developed and suffered trauma and high blood pressure and other heart-related diseases. We lost practically all that we had (Women focus group 2018).

Upon return from the displacement, the lack of access to farmland for agriculture due to fear of attack compounds the income challenge for the mostly agrarian community. The residents note that the eastern farm areas of Buni Yadi which is more productive is inaccessible and the other sections are too expensive to manage given their current economic condition. The few available ones that are close to the town are only used for subsistence.

I have a farm in the eastern skirt of the town. [Stressing the fear] If it [the farm] is cultivated and the product is prepared, you would not go there to pick it. Everyone is afraid. The eastern region which happens to be the most fertile is not safe at the moment. . . . Other areas are less fertility, and we do not have enough capacity and money to farm them.

We are afraid less the insurgents attack you while you are working on the farm. . . . No one would have rest of mind to want to farm there [eastern region of the town]. But if that area would be accessible, we would be able to get some produce (Farmers focus group 2018).

However, this reduced access to farmlands has particularly affected migrants' access due to scarcity. The conflict migrants noted that their peculiar lack of access to the farm is the result of the shortage as the historical residents have no enough themselves. Farmlands that were offered to them are inaccessible for the same (fear) reason the original owners could not use them.

We cannot farm because the farms that were offered to us are too far from the town. Everyone is afraid to go farm in a far place from the town for the fear of possible attack [by insurgents].

We were not denied access to farmlands except that the ones we were offered are far from town. The farmlands that are close to the town have been put to use by their owners. So accessible farms are scarce. All the ones that were shown to us were too far (Conflict migrant focus group 2018)

The discussions also confirmed earlier consideration (chapters six and seven) that precarious livelihoods conditions due to unemployment and poverty played a significant role in instigating the conflict. The interplay of chronic poverty, inequality and pervasive poor educations – especially among youths, apparently provided the conducive condition that was exploited by the insurgents to cause the conflict. The

resultant impact such as displacement has continued to threaten the economic resilience in the community. Increased poverty, for instance, during the displacement has adversely affected the current economic conditions of the residents, and has snowballed and persisted after they have returned to their community upon reopening.

> To begin with, I want to state that the involvement of the youths from the inception sustained the insurgency. This is mainly because of the youths' joblessness. That is why they were an easy target for recruitment. They were financially induced [to take part]. But if they had had a means of earning a regular income, they would not have had the interest in joining the insurgency. So one of the major causes of the insurgency is the lack of skills and resource [among youths] leading to joblessness [and poverty]. …Honestly, what they have said regarding youths' joblessness is true. The condition has worsened upon our return [from displacement (Youth focus group 2018).

> Surely all the things that happened and their impact on us are destined to happen. But they are rooted in the lack of education. Lack of education is rampant because the government has not provided its citizens with a quality education that would prevent them from this menace. This is particularly so for western and religious education. People are not empowered with these two forms of education.

> Money was used to take advantage of people vulnerability to the extent that persons [from this community] you hardly expect they would join this group had done so. These are all the causes of the conflict (Farmers focus group 2018).

Furthermore, the impoverishment caused by loss of means of income has forced some of the residents to adopt other means of getting income. For instance, some people who used to have a stable income from their businesses have resorted to daily labourer work to survive. The conflict migrants and business people seem to be worst affected by this condition, although there is pervasive impoverishment in the community. This condition confirms the weakened economic resilience, which is attributable to the crude informality of the economy.

> The conflict has negatively affected our means of income and the income level. This [condition] is particularly so for those of us who were into crop farming, animal farming, and agro-related businesses. But now none of us is into all these. No crops farming, no animal farming and no means for [doing] business. We have stopped all of these [economic activities] because of change in the environment [due to displacement]. The high cost of living due to the high cost of rent and food and other needs have taken the limited resources [we manage to escape with] (Conflict migrant focus group 2018).

> Change [negative] in income is a known and obvious phenomenon, especially in this region. This is because you see people who had no fewer than 100 dependants before [the conflict] cannot survive on their own now, in this town. There were people who have stable capital [for businesses] before the conflict and forced displacement but only depend on labourer work to buy food upon return. Almost everything that you have before the forced displacement has been looted and destroyed. The little you are [able to] escape with has been finished on house rent, food and so forth during migration. Everything you have has been finished. (Businessmen focus group 2018)

8.1.2 Impact of Change in Income Level:

The change in the income level of the residents of the case study area is confirmed to have had adverse effects on various aspects of their welfare. These impacts are noted in the focus groups participants' narratives of how the change has affected their health and nourishment and general wellbeing. It has also affected their ability to access and afford services and basic needs such as education, farm inputs, and so forth. The following quotes from the discussions are evidence of the impacts of declined income in the case study:

> There are people whose children used to attend private [schools] but could no longer afford it. This is because they no longer have the means. At the moment, a private school would hardly have more than 30 pupils in it, and the public schools do not have qualified teachers, so they do not deliver quality education. Poor education is inevitable in our current condition. We send our kids to those schools [public] because we do not have a choice.
>
> There are some [people] whose children's educations are truncated as the parents do not have the means to send them to school. Even in the public schools [where you do not pay tuition fee], there are other expenses that pupils would be required [to pay]. Books, uniform and so forth would be required from time to time (Women focus group 2018).
>
> The problem had affected farming negatively. Firstly, before the conflict and eventual displacement, we could afford to pay for renting tractors to plow our farmlands. We could buy fertiliser and also pay for labourers [who work for us on the farm] (Farmers focus group 2018)
>
> It is never like when you are in your original place where you used to render assistance to others, and now you are the one looking for help from others [to survive]. You are literally begging to survive. There is no rest of mind except that you just accept fate and pray to God for relief. . . .
>
> Our predicament and challenges, as mentioned, are many. The challenges include lack of houses [to live]; the condition is worsening as we have lost all our means of survival and exhausted the little that we manage to escape. We are really struggling to pay rent here and many other challenges (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

8.1.3 The Implication of Change in Income:

It is evident from the focus group discussions that the change in income of the residents has a significant negative implication on their human capital accumulation due to deteriorated wellbeing. The participants identify some consequences including the decline of food production, increase poverty, decreasing quality of education and declining quality of human capital.

> I was a witness when my neighbour used the proceeds of farming to build his house and gave out his daughter for marriage. But this year he struggled to farm half a bag of grain. His wife had to sell their remaining mattress in order to buy food and some farm inputs. He used to hire a tractor to do his farm, but he cannot now.

> The most significant impact of this conflict on people, in summary, is hardship wherein some people do not have a dime to live on (Farmers focus group 2018).

> Majority of us depend on humanitarian supplies. In fact, many of us could not have been able to survive in the town if not for the food aid that we get (Women focus group 2018).

Similarly, declined income has a negative implication on societal social fabric, such as increase divorce and broken homes. The discussions also revealed that the reduced income in the case study has a high chance of undermining general safety conditions.

> The condition has caused many divorces as a result of lack of food. . . . Women no longer have access to what they use to have and [this] results in discord [between spouses due to the overburden of husband], and consequently, this causes many divorces.

> Women no longer have enough resources and husbands do not have enough either as family responsibilities especially children up-keep are enormous (Women focus group 2018).

> Ah! Ah! Ah! It [declined income] would cause terrible condition [that is worse than what we have experienced]. The unexpected [worst situation] could happen. We do not wish for it!

> This [negative implication of decline income], you do not need to mention it as it is a trending phenomenon everywhere. [The conflict situation] may have subsided or is subsiding [here] but other places like Zamfara, Kaduna are still battling with them. Also, wherever you go, youths are involved [in the violence]. The youths' involvement can be seen both from the leadership and followership strata of the insurgent groups. If no concerted and problem-specific effort is made to change this trend, the worst can happen (Youths focus group 2018).

8.2 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Infrastructure in Buni Yadi

8.2.1 Change in Housing Conditions

Change in housing and building condition is one of the visible and evident consequences of conflict in the case study area. The destructions of buildings have been confirmed by quantitative and the physical survey (chapters 6 and 7), while further details are explored from the focus group discussions. The discussions corroborate previous findings (see sections 6.7.1 and 7.1) that a significant proportion of residential and non-residential buildings suffered various degrees of destruction. Some are destroyed by fire and some - especially the mud buildings, by rain due to long-term abandonment and lack of maintenance.

Some houses were razed by fire, and some were destroyed by rain. It would be unfair to say this is the person that destroys my house. My house was built with mud, and it was destroyed. Some houses got burnt because of the presence of grasses which caught fire around them. Some houses that do not have grasses around them were intact. However, you never can say who did what.

My house was completely destroyed. It was a five-room house, but not even a pin was spared in the house. We had to look for a home and rented when we returned (Women focus group discussion 2018).

There are many [people] that could not access their houses up till now as a result of the conflict. People have lost their houses to fire or were destroyed by rains after they flee [during the forced displacement]. Some were deliberately burnt and destroyed. Now many people do not have houses. The houses have been destroyed, and they do not have the means of rebuilding them (Farmers focus group 2018).

The change in housing condition has subjected residents to the differing state of hardship and further impoverishment as noted in section 6.7.1.

Whenever you lose your abode, the devastating thought of where to live takes a toll on you. Because we had a lot of houses and buildings destroyed. . . . I live in a rented house, and I was there temporary and no rest of mind. Because the house owner could ask you to move out any time he wishes to use his house (Youths focus group 2018).

Some people rent houses to live while some just used make-shift materials to make temporary spaces in the house to live. Some people use large plastic materials to cover the house and live in it because they could not get another place. Some people could not return due to the lack of accommodation. They have no means of rebuilding their destroyed houses (Farmers focus group 2018).

8.2.2 Selective Destruction of Buildings

The physical surveys (section 7.1) has revealed the suspicious pattern of destructions that have taken place in the case study. It is confirmed that public buildings, including government offices, schools, hospitals, banks, public water were targeted and destroyed.

When you talk about destruction, I will lay more emphasis on education infrastructure. In this town we had six primary schools – Kasakchiya Primary, we have Shuwari Primary, and there is Islamiyya Primary. We also have Central Primary, we have Nur-deen, and we have Nurul Huda. Now all of them have been destroyed (Youths focus group 2018).

Particular types of residential buildings such as houses made of cement blocks were selectively destroyed. There is no evidence to suggest that the effect of fire caused the destruction of mud houses that were destroyed.

Majority of the houses that were destroyed by fire were deliberately torched [by the insurgents] like the house I told you about earlier [refering to an earlier discussed house with the researcher], it was torched. In my friend's house, we found the car tyre that was used to start the fire. The car tyre did not burn completely, and the house was not completely damaged either. There are countless cases of this sort (Farmers focus group 2018).

A lot of the houses were not destroyed by accidental fire; they were razed on purpose as you would see a burnt house and the one next to it is intact. This happened to my neighbour. His two houses, just opposite ours were burnt but ours was not touched. If it was the accidental fire, it would have consumed or destroyed everything within [its] area of effect. But you see selection where some are destroyed and some are not.

One of the women among the last set of people who fled the town narrated that she says it when the insurgents torched and destroyed the houses [one of the participants narrating her discussion with other conflict victims]. There are some that were damaged by either wind or rain afterwards (Women focus group 2018).

Similarly, shops, banks, filling stations and other commercial stores were selectively destroyed in the case study.

The major street [Babban layi] is the centre of commerce in Buni Yadi town. Almost all the shops were [already] burnt and destroyed upon our return (Youths focus group 2018).

However, further discussions confirm factors the respondents believed had influenced the particular pattern of destruction observed in the community. Some of these include hate, jealousy, intolerance, frustration and outright criminality. These factors are some of the symptoms and consequences of the livelihoods inequalities that are noted in the previous chapters, hence its significance on the conflict.

There could be an element of hate and jealousy in the mind of the people [insurgents]. This is because there were cases of selective destruction of houses [even] before we were eventually displaced from the town. They targeted and destroyed houses of people that have a link or relationship with the government. They targeted and destroyed houses of people that have a link with the royalty in the town. . . . We feel these [hate and jealousy] are the things that influenced [their] mindset. We cannot think of something else (Farmers focus group 2018).

These [jealous and hate] are the major driver of their actions. This is because there were cases where houses of wealthy people who have links with government or royalty were burnt even before we were displaced. Successful people in business were not spared. They could just come and destroy your house once they noticed a sign of success in you . . . . When they noticed you are doing well and progressing they start hating you.

Frustration played an important role as well in the process . . . . Some times when you have argument [and you express a contrary opinion to their ideology] they just hate you. They explore all opportunities to identify your house irrespective of its condition, purposely to destroy it (Individual interview 2018).

The destruction of shops can be related to achieving the looting goal [by the insurgents]. This is because many people run away and left their stocks in the shops [when the conflict broke out] while the insurgents looted and burnt the shops [to cover up] (Youths focus group 2018).

8.2.3 Impact and Implications of Change in Housing

It can be inferred that the destruction of buildings and other valuable properties have had a significant effect on the residents of Buni Yadi. This is evident from the narratives

of the focus groups participants who identified the loss of their residential and commercial buildings. The destructions had impacts on the residents' access to private and public infrastructure and services such as schools, hospitals, banks and so forth. The participants of the discussions also identified the negative implications of the housing change. These implications include increased poverty due to a general increase in the cost of housing following scarcity and the deterioration and the declined quality of health and wellbeing of the residents. The continued impoverishment that may emanate from these conditions as a result of decline in the quality of human capital, coupled with the existing livelihoods inequality and its evident consequences have the potential of plunging the case study into another round of conflict.

> The impacts are pronounced as people are living in temporary make-shift houses which we had to use plastic materials [to cover it] to be able to sleep [in the houses]. Some of the early returnees whose houses were destroyed moved from one house to another as the owners of the houses return. Today you are in this house, tomorrow you are in another and you have to move out when the owner comes since it is not yours (Women focus group 2018).

> This [poor conditions of houses] has brought a sudden increase in the cases of [life threatening health conditions like] heart attack, hypertension and trauma and chronic depression in the town. These are the resultant effect of destructions of houses and properties and the challenges it brought.

> My wife had suffered a similar condition [heart attack] as a result of all these problems [poor conditions of houses]. She collapsed upon realising [that our house was destroyed].

> The impact of the change in housing brings problems. . . . People have different capacity to absorb shocks. This has triggered many cases of trauma, hypertension, depression, and deaths. It is more so for the elderly who mostly are in retirement and do not have alternatives for survival (Youths focus group 2018).

The implication of housing destruction in Buni Yadi is not limited to economic and health vulnerabilities. The consequences of the change in housing and the support that followed are capable of degenerating into a more significant social challenge. For example, Red Cross has assisted a few households in rebuilding their houses following the return from displacement. However, the process and criteria they adopted for selecting eligible houses for the support have been causing significant social tension in the community. The residents expressed concern over the arbitral selection, which does not reflect prioritising beneficiaries. Some respondents direct their dissatisfaction towards the elites who they alleged influenced the officials of the organisation in the process, thereby truncating fairer selection procedure and outcome.

Here is what happened. When Red Cross came [to support us for housing], they looked for houses that were physically destroyed or burnt. From that, they selected the houses that were built with mud for eligibility for assistance. And when they come for the selection they do it based on their own criteria. Cement-block houses were not included in the selection. But these people also needed assistance.

Again even after the selection, their final list of beneficiaries indicated many houses [that are eligible based on the observed selection criteria] that were omitted. You see this one benefits. That one does not benefit even when he has nowhere to live.

It has been causing [resentment]. There is an example of someone who lives in a rented house of another person [because his house was destroyed]. The house he was renting was selected for an assistant for reconstruction while his house was not selected [despite its unliveable condition]. He made an effort to see that the allocation to the house he is renting is changed to his house. So when the owner of the house hears about it [trouble started]. He was asked to vacate his house (Youths focus group 2018)

8.2.4 Change in Road Conditions

Conditions of many roads in the case study are bad except for the inter-city road (Damaturu-Biu road) which is reconstructed recently as earlier noted in the quantitative and physical surveys results (chapters 6 and 7). Participants in the discussions highlight that although the conditions of roads were bad before the conflict; this has worsened them. The conditions of the township roads, in particular, are exacerbated by the indirect impact of the conflict consequent to the displacement and long-term abandonment and lack of maintenance.

The conflict negatively affected the roads by making them worse than their condition before the conflict. Before conflict people do repair work [through community service] on roads such that broken portions were refilled and drainages were cleared where there was a blockage. But when we were displaced, and the town was deserted, this [practice] was stopped. The drainages became blocked, and water created ways for itself thereby destroyed the roads.

And when we returned, we could not continue the old practice as everyone was struggling for survival. Road condition is the least among the problems people think about at this time when survival [due to hunger] is at risk.

It is apparent that it was not the direct physical destruction of roads that caused the deplorable condition of the roads; it was the displacement and the resultant lack of maintenance. In all fairness that was what happened (Farmers focus group 2018).

Our roads have never been in good condition even before the conflict. We may say we have it a little better after the conflict. This is because at least it takes a shorter time to travel to Damaturu [from this town] and from here to Biu [referring to recently reconstructed Damaturu-Biu road]. You can now travel with rest of mind unlike before that people panic whenever they are travelling for fear of attack as well as bushy and dangerous road condition. Everything has been cleared now.

However, the township roads are bad; we do not have good roads. There are no drainages except the ones that community members construct through community service (Women focus group 2018).

But we spent two complete years away from the town. We used to do maintenance of the roads [through community volunteering] when we noticed the need for it. So when we fled the town, there was no one that could do the maintenance. The rain has destroyed most parts of the roads.

But even before the conflict when we were here, our roads have been in bad conditions, no drainages. When it rains, the water from as far as 3km to the west [of the town] runs through this town. Leaders in the community have appealed severally for the construction of a diversion channel to no avail (Youths focus group 2018).

8.2.5 Impact and Implications of Change in Road Condition:

The change in the conditions of roads is confirmed to have had a negative impact and implications for the residents of the case study, as noted in the discussions. The visible expression of difficulty to commute within the case study is noted as participants identified other challenges such as the reduced access to or inability to access economic assets and damage to the environment such as farmlands. The poor conditions of roads caused the destruction or depletion of farmlands, and the adverse implications of the roads condition include the inefficiency of commuting within and about the case study leading to the high cost of doing business as a result of the high cost of transportation.

Now there are places in the outskirt [farms] that are not accessible by car during the rainy season given that the roads are so bad that a vehicle would not be able to move on them. When you want to bring out farm produce, you have to create a path for the vehicle to be able to manage to pass the roads (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

Severe conditions of roads also have a direct negative implication on food production as farmer struggle to access their farms or move out their farm produce from the farm to the markets. Similarly, the continuous reduction in the size of farmland area due to erosion and flood has both short-term and long-term negative implication on food production. Participants have also highlighted a possible threat to personal safety regarding the access to roads given that certain sections of roads are barricaded for fear of potential landmines.

Undoubtedly, some of the roads are cut-off; especially the roads that you would follow to go to the farm have been turned to waterways. You see, there is a problem. The bad roads [with poor drainage] in the town caused the water to flow into farms thereby flooding and wash away portions [of farms]. There are many places [farm lands] that we know that were not waterways but have been so made and it has washed away the land thereby reducing the farm areas. There are many instances of this sort (Farmers focus group 2018).

There are effects because there are roads that are cordoned off and blocked from access for fear of possible landmines or the likes (Youths focus group 2018).

The prevailing conditions of roads in Buni Yadi may also be linked to social capital deterioration as the condition of roads are worse than what the residents can repair as

they used to. This condition, coupled with the level impoverishment, may limit the level of social interaction through road community services that were practice previously.

8.2.6 Change in Power Infrastructure and Electricity Supply:

Discussions with participants of the focus groups confirm the dire state of power infrastructure and supply of electricity in the case study area. The dismal state of power due to the change that is caused by the conflict is noted in the power infrastructure vandalised and stolen, leading to a total power outage in the community. It is evident from the discussions that long-term displacement also affected the power infrastructure as some of the vandalised facilities could have been salvaged if residents were around immediately after the conflict. Most of the distribution wires were stolen during the long period of displacement.

> Electricity facilities were destroyed during the conflict. We do not have power at the moment, and nothing has been done about it. The electric wires have been stolen and transformers are vandalised. In this town now, the only means of getting power is through the use of the individual domestic generating set. That is the only option for those who can afford it. However, there was power from the national grid and solar before the conflict (Women focus group 2018).

> The conflict has had an adverse effect on the power [in the town]. There was electricity before our forced displacement, but there was none upon our return after two years. After we left, you know, for instance, when you notice that [electric] pole has [problem or] fallen in your neighbourhood, you report it for possible replacement [or repairs]. But when there is no one in the town, when one pole falls another would fall tomorrow, and another would fall the day after. In the end, you would find that the entire poles would fall. There would be none (Youths focus group 2018).

> The conflict is the cause of power outage in this town, and up till this moment, we do not have electricity. Electricity was useful for people in many ways (Farmers focus group 2018).

8.2.7 Impact and Implications of Change in Power Supply:

Participants of the group discussion have confirmed the effects of the deplorable state of power infrastructure and supply of electricity in the case study where they expressed a lack of access to the power supply. The power outage in the case study increases the difficulty with which the residents undertake their day-to-day activities. Implications of power outage include deprivation of residents' means of income and increase the burden and cost of accessing other utilities such as water thereby increases poverty. The participants also expressed the concern that the lack of electricity has negatively affected the well-being of the residents, given the climate condition in the area. This hot weather condition adversely affects the health of residents and their general

productivity. It is evident, therefore, that the post-conflict situation of power in Buni Yadi has a direct negative impact on income and wellbeing of the residents. Apart from the increased economic vulnerability that this condition may cause, it undermines the quality of human capital, since lack of electricity negatively affects wellbeing and health in the community.

> When there is power, there are people who use it to power refrigerator which they use for cold drinks and ice water, and they make a living out of it. Now there is no power; you can see it has a negative effect on people. The lack of power has negatively affected the means of income of many people. It enables people to do a lot of things with ease, but we do not have the power supply at the moment. It also provides a means of livelihood to many people. You can see that it has an effect on people (Farmers focus group 2018).

> You see the weather is hot now. If there is electricity people would make cold water [and sell]. At homes, people could use the electricity to power fans and make cold water [to drink], now one has to use generating set to do all that, but it is very expensive. You have to buy fuel and maintain the generating set regularly. This problem [lack of power] is beyond what we can handle, and there is nothing we can do (Women focus group 2018).

> The lack of electricity has an impact on [local] businesses and general wellbeing of people. We have to contribute money [every now and then] to buy diesel to power the generator that would pump water from the borehole. However, if there were power from the national grid we would be relieved (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

8.2.8 Change in Telecommunication Services

Individual and focus group discussions confirmed the adverse effect of conflict on access to telecommunication services as identified in the quantitative and observations methods in the case study. There were at least four major mobile telecommunication companies - MTN, GLO, Etisalat, and Airtel, that provided services and established their transmission facilities in the case study before the conflict. The conflict situation and the subsequent vandalising of the telecommunication infrastructure and displacement forced the operators to stop their services and leave the case study site. However, one of the companies (Airtel) has returned to the site and is currently providing services. The functions of Airtel is, however, widely considered to be inefficient and has less coverage area.

> At the moment we have [only] Airtel communication. There are no other telecommunication service providers in the town, but even the one we currently have access to has limited coverage area.

> There are other telecommunication services providers before the conflict. These include MTN, GLO, Airtel, and Etisalat, but now it is only Airtel that is available (Women focus group 2018).

We have problems with telecommunication. When problems are too many, they defy solutions. Telecommunications at the moment we have only Airtel and the Airtel, once there is a signal problem, everything stops. However, before the conflict, we had MTN, GLO, Etisalat and Airtel services. Only Airtel is accessible at the moment (Youths focus group 2018).

8.2.9 Impacts and Implications of Change in Telecommunication

The impact of vandalising the mobile telecommunication infrastructure and the eventual loss of the services from most of the service providers is evident. This condition reduces access to the service as a result of the reduction in the number of service providers and the inefficiency of the only company that is available. The remarks from the participants confirm the negative implications of this change on the social, economic and personal security of the residents. The inability to communicate with friends and relations worry the residents as it truncates social communications and eventual loss of social assets. This condition may further limit an already weakened social environment as communication is difficult. More so, the poor telecommunication services imply reduced access to the social contemporary networking platforms, e.g. Facebook, Twitter, thereby preventing the social capital from breaking from the mostly horizontal to create vertical networking. The adverse consequence of this is already evident in the condition of helplessness for some of the residents regarding the accruing benefits of social capital.

> This [lack of access to telecommunication services] has impacts on us because we are usually unable to communicate with other people [family or social networks]. We hardly can communicate to get certain things from somewhere else without going there physically. It generally truncates social interaction as you cannot contact your relations when you needed to. Whenever communication is impossible, there is a problem (Individual interview 2018).

> The problem with the telecommunication is the inefficiency whereby you call, and you don't hear the voice of whom you are calling up until you exhaust the airtime [and there is] no communication is made. Sometime you would be charged for making calls even when you could not connect to the person you wish to call (Conflict migrants focus group 2018).

The absence of alternatives to the existing inefficient mobile telecommunication service provider increases the cost of doing business, and the condition denies many residents access to their means of livelihoods and income, especially businesses. This condition increases joblessness and poverty in the case study area.

Lack of telecommunication is also affecting businesses. It is difficult to communicate with people from other places to order certain goods that you need for your customers. For example, if a customer comes to order some goods that are not readily available in his store, he can place the order with his supplier through [mobile] phone and the goods would be delivered. But the absence of that has caused many businesses to lose customers. Businesses are practically handicapped due to lack of adequate telecommunication services (Women focus group 2018).

Eeh, it has affected us negatively economically, socially, all of it. At the moment if the signal goes, it is a big problem. That is the means of earning a living [income] for some people. It is only when there is a signal that they make sell.

This telecommunication was useful in many ways. When the [mobile] telecommunication networks were all accessible, people sell recharge card [call-cards] of not less than ten to twenty thousand Naira daily. Some other people do commercial [mobile] phone charging for fifty phones or more daily. When the networks for the other platforms are no longer available, it has negatively affected their means of income (Youths focus group 2018).

Access to the telecommunication had helped businesses before the conflict. Calls or mobile banking transactions were made to order goods from Kano [A major commercial city]. The goods were sent upon receipt of payments. This made business easy and more profitable. These services are no longer accessible (Businessmen focus group 2018).

There was a telecommunication signal shutdown last Friday up till Saturday. I received complaints from between twenty to thirty people [about the difficulties this caused]. Some were at the bus station on their way [to the city to make orders for goods] as a result of the signal short down. [They said] they spent a thousand Naira [Nigerian currency] for a transaction they could have used a hundred Naira to do. The challenges are many in this regards (Individual interview 2018).

Change in the access to telecommunication services also threatened personal safety as residents are subjected to panic condition whenever the mobile signal is off due to inefficiency. The threat to personal safety relates to their inability to access real-time safety information in their post-conflict transition situation.

It [telecommunication services] is useful for safety and security. Lack of it is [a] significant deficiency in the town. We are always worried when the available telecommunication signal goes off. We are very disturbed because nobody knows what was happening [safety and security wise]. Information sharing and updates about safety tips and alert are communicated through the mobile telecommunication as well as information from residents to security operatives are communicated through mobile telecommunication for identity protection.

8.3 Post-conflict Human Capital Accumulation

8.3.1 Change in Access to Education and Education facilities

The evidences from chapters six and seven confirmed that education facilities and infrastructures had suffered significant destruction as a result of the conflict in the case study area. This condition is corroborated in the focus group discussions and individual interviews, where participants acknowledged that school buildings and facilities were primarily targeted and destroyed. The changes in education infrastructure include the

destruction of the primary, secondary and tertiary education buildings and facilities thereby truncating access to education in the community.

> Schools do not have adequate classes anymore [because they are destroyed] (Women focus group 2018).

> If you go to Kasakchiya Primary School, no single block of the classrooms is good, no! It is only one tent [that is being used]. The condition is the same when you go to Shuwari Primary School, except that just recently a senator donated two classrooms and a store in the school. If you go to Islamiyya Primary the story is the same, no classes. If you go to Central Primary, the inside was partly renovated recently by the Victim Support Fund. The only thing you see at Nur-deen is the one classroom that was rebuilt by UNICEF. There are no classes except temporary ones that are made from makeshift materials (Individual interview 2018).

> As it is now, I can say there is no single education facility which youths can access to acquire quality education. There are one or two primary and junior secondary schools that are working [sub-optimally]. [We used to have] the senior secondary, and diploma awarding institutions which includes the college of agriculture and an annexe of a privately owned college of Professional College of Science and Technology. However, we do not have them any longer, because they have all been relocated to Damaturu; consequent to the destruction of the facilities during the conflict (Youths focus group 2018).

8.3.2 Impact and Implication of Change in Education

One of the visible effects of the change in education in the case study is the reduced access. The inadequacy of the limited educational facilities - e.g. classrooms, can hardly guarantee access to quality education. While the lack of facility prevents many students from accessing education, the terrible conflict experiences caused trauma and panic for other school-going children who are now afraid of going to school. The poor physical state of the facilities posed threats to the safety and health of students who have to study in broken classes, makeshifts, under the tree or open fields. There are no enough qualified teachers, given the unsustainable student-teacher ratio in the schools. This shortage in the number of qualified teachers may relate to the teachers' conflict experiences and the fear of being targeted.

> Fear has been instilled in the mind of [school going] children.

> You would see schools where about 200 pupils are put in one class. There can hardly be any learning with 200 pupils in one class (Women focus group 2018).

> The school closes [because of poor condition], and children are sent home once the rain starts, even if it is in the morning. There are no [good] schools. Anything can happen to a child that is send-off in the rain before he gets home (Individual interview 2018).

> Our children cannot go to school. You lose many things in life whenever you are displaced from your original home (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

It is also noted that chronic post-conflict poverty is preventing many residents from enrolling or advance their education following the deficiency in Buni Yadi. This poverty condition prevents them not only because their parents could not afford their education in another city, but they have become contributors to the family economy. The circumstance leading to the reduced access to school for the youths also reflects the impact of conflict and poverty, on the community's social fabric in which injuries, deaths and poverty-induced divorces distort households' configurations and economy. The oldest siblings are often the victims of this scenario where they suddenly share in the pastoral (for the younger siblings) and economic responsibilities of the family to support or replace breadwinners. This changing circumstance increases out of school children and youths and potentially threaten the quality of human capital further, in a community where poor education is pervasive.

> There are many youths who have completed their junior secondary education and desire to proceed for senior secondary education but they could not. This is because many of them do not have parents who have the financial capacity to sponsor them to go to Damaturu to further their education. [The parent] cannot afford the regular financial needs for their food, and other things. This condition has prevented many youths that have the desire to advance their education from doing so. They can't because some of them are the oldest children of the family and once he decided to go away to Damaturu [for education] – despite its proximity to our town, he would hardly have the rest of mind and the needed concentration [to study]. This is as a result of the [precarious] conditions of his parents and younger siblings (Youths focus group 2018).

> When we came newly, we were able to enrol our children in the school, but the difficulties of life have forced us to withdraw them. We are basically looking for how to get food and survive first (Conflict migrant focus group 2018)

> Many people cannot enrol their children to school because they cannot afford it when they are asked to pay for this and to pay for that; when food is still a major challenge. Yet you know well that education is important. Without it, people would not have value, and this creates a problem in the future [as we have seen]. This is the change in livelihood that we have experienced.

> There are many people who wish to do better but that they cannot, and the government is not supporting us here. You are forced to be looking while your children are wasting off. We are helpless! (Farmers focus group 2018)

8.3.3 Change in the Access to Healthcare

The physical destruction, changes and the challenges of the healthcare facilities highlighted in the quantitative and physical surveys (section 6.7.4 and 7.4) are confirmed in the focus group discussions. The hospital buildings and other healthcare facilities are destroyed during the conflict. Like other workers in the formal sector, health workers have been targeted and maimed by the insurgents and as a result, fled

during the conflict. These conflict experiences have prevented the return of health officers since the town was reopened.

> All the hospitals [in the community] have been destroyed. The health workers have been scared away by the activities of the insurgents. They could no longer live in the town. We need help so that the health workers can return and reside close to the hospitals. We want hospitals in the town to have the capacity to handle all health challenges for our patients, except where it is absolutely necessary for a referral (Women focus group 2018).

> This [change in access to healthcare] is one of the areas we have a big problem as a result of the conflict. This is because the health facilities in Buni Yadi are just by name [at the moment]. There is no [hospital] equipment, and there are no health officers for sick people to consult. Whenever anything happens, you have to go to Damaturu [to seek medical attention], or if you are financially buoyant, you go to private hospitals. Whether or not you are financially buoyant you have to go to Damaturu for medical attention (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

> This [change in access to healthcare] is the biggest [challenge] one. This problem is a big issue here. There was significant destruction to our hospitals as a result of the conflict. It was only recently- about two months ago, we had little relief that we don't have to go to Damaturu for every healthcare need. The deterioration of healthcare services got to the extent that whenever someone is sick, you have to take him to Damaturu or risk his life to the hand of the local quack pharmacist in the town (Farmers focus group 2018).

8.3.4 Impact and Implication of Change in Healthcare

The change in healthcare in the case study area impacts negatively on the residents from the narratives of the participant's discussions who revealed increase exposure to health challenges. The vulnerabilities are in the forms of residents' lack of easy access to healthcare and the increased cost of healthcare despite the harsh economic realities. The increased cost and the residents' direct out-of-pocket payments for healthcare imply the absence of the existing health insurance system. The implication of these includes the loss of lives of residents due to increased poverty and lack of access to the services. Deaths due to lack of easy access to healthcare services are more so for women, especially during childbirth due partly to the possible preferential treatments for residents of the city they have to travel to for healthcare. These difficulties and panic that come with seeking healthcare services have a negative implication on the quality of health of the residents. All of these challenges have a direct negative impact on the economic and human capital of the case study hence the increased poverty.

We no longer have rest of mind whenever a person is sick. It is always a hustle for us to get attention as and when needed each time we take our sick people to other towns for healthcare services. This [difficulty] happens only because we do not have hospitals any longer. To be honest we are in a difficult situation in this regard. The health workers do not live in this town because of the conflict experience.

In my presence, a woman delivers [a baby] in a tricycle in this town [on her way to the hospital . . . (Women focus group 2018).

This [healthcare challenge] is mainly for the healthcare concern of women where many women have lost their lives as a result of lack of access to hospitals in this town. It is always a big problem for women during childbirth when she is in labour; before getting to Damaturu, especially during the night.

There is movement restriction in the night, and you won't be allowed to go anywhere until day breaks. When there are complications, women labour till death, and this has happened not once, not twice. Patients who are in critical condition and needed emergency treatment died before reaching Damaturu. All these happen up till this time (Farmers focus group 2018).

Before now when you take your wife to the hospital for childbirth, you spent between 1000 and 1500 Naira, but now any medical concern that involves taking your wife to the hospital for delivery would cost you at least 7000 Naira (Conflict migrant's focus group 2018).

8.4 Focus Group Discussion on Post-conflict Social Assets in Buni Yadi

8.4.1 Change in Social Network:

The residents of the case study have enjoyed both social and economic benefits that were derivable from their social groups and networks before the conflict. These benefits, however, have been negatively impacted as the social groups hardly exist anymore. The participants' of the focus group discussions confirmed the change in the social assets in the case study. Their narratives indicate evidence that suggests the deterioration and collapse of many social groups and networks consequent to the conflict and the eventual displacement from the community thereby corroborate the earlier findings (section 6.6).

We used to have women social groups that we [use to] assist one another whenever there was the need to do so. However, since the incidence of the conflict, we no longer have that kind of opportunity (Women focus group 2018).

There was one social group that I know in this town before the conflict and our eventual displacement. I do not know if anyone knows any other one apart from it. It was called Yadi Development Association (YADA). Honestly, the association in collaboration with the state government and the World Bank was useful before the displacement (Youths focus group 2018).

Before the conflict and our eventual displacement, we had social groups. Our attention was drawn to the need to have social groups and networks that would be useful for helping ourselves by ourselves. We started [the association], and it was not long after then [the conflict broke out] (Conflict migrants focus group 2018).

There was a time when every section [there are six sections] of the town had farmer associations. The members of these associations farmed for individual members of the associations in addition to ensuring that all members have access to fertiliser from the government. All of the group members would be mobilised to work the farm of a member at a given date, and the same process is followed until all members have their farms done. This [reciprocal farming practice] happened because there was peace (Farmers focus group 2018).

8.4.2 Impact and Implication of Change in Social Assets

The change in social assets has resulted in the general breakdown of social cohesion, supportive coexistence and the economic benefits that come with it in the case study. The discussions confirm earlier findings that some of the reasons for the ineffectiveness or absence of the social groups and accruing benefits are traceable to the increased poverty, loss of trust, ill-health, and deaths of some group members.

There is a high chance that if someone goes to work another person's farm [in the name of association] today, he will come back without food or money to bring home [since he will not be paid for the service]. There are many people that cannot feed their families unless they do daily labourer jobs. You can see that the conflict has really affected this important asset negatively.

Nobody wants to have time for any association as it is every man to his problem at the moment. No one even talks about it. Nobody! Social interaction and engagement have been shattered as everyone is struggling for his [own] survival. It is only in the atmosphere of peace and bounty that one could think about this kind of association. At the moment we do not have that atmosphere (Farmers focus group 2018).

Seriously yes! The conflict has brought about a severe lack of trust among people, [this is worse] to the extent that, even your own son [you cannot trust him]. When people were displaced to different places, and you do not have a regular update about their whereabouts and what they do there. Any day that he comes back, you find it difficult to trust him. This is because you do not know where he had gone and who he has been associating with [while he was away] (Individual interview 2018).

Increase in poverty has been a significant reason this kind of social groups are not attainable anymore, and there are some of our members who have died. Some are seriously battling with ill-health. There are some of our members that had a stroke and paralysed (Women focus group 2018).

However, a contrasting narrative emerged in the youths' and women social groups suggesting that the conflict has had a slightly positive impact on their social assets. Although the conflict had got them displaced, the youths' experiences during this period have influenced the resolve for strengthening the previously ineffective social group. In addition to stimulating the existed youths' social group; they have established new ones in the case study. The discussion with participants of the youths' focus group confirmed the post-conflict resilience leading to positive impacts of the new associations. One of

the positive impacts of change in the social assets of youths includes empowerment programmes.

> The association has been revived and I dare say it is better than before. . . . After our return, we are able to call ourselves . . . all of us in Buni Yadi and [we] reminded ourselves of the need to set up a self-help association. We highlighted the danger facing us given the younger ones that would be faced with the joblessness and our age mate and those above our age who used to have means of living but lost everything to the insurgency.

> It would reach a stage where those that have never consider terrorism start considering it as a survival means when money is offered to them. . . . These thoughts influenced our decisions, and some youths from other neighbourhoods have set up an association called 'Youth for Education and Development'. This association has been able to secure scholarships for some students in the town (Youths focus group 2018).

> Our association called 'Help Yourself Buni Yadi Youths Development Association'; in collaboration with sister associations was able to train [in vocation] not fewer than 150 youths with the support of the North-east Initiative Forum. Under sport and education, we have supported students with text and exercise books and pens (Youths focus group 2018).

A similar resilience capacity is also identified in women of Buni Yadi. In spite of the current conflict-induced hardship in the community, women now take up responsibilities that are hitherto alien to their culture to support their families. In Buni Yadi, men are culturally responsible for the financial needs of the family while domestic and pastoral duties – e.g. childcare, cooking housekeeping, are women's preserve. However, the increased poverty following the conflict has significantly reduced men's capacity to fulfil this obligation; hence, women stepped in for support. In some instances, women assume this kind of role following the husbands' death in the conflict when she has children to look after. While this resilience is critical, it is also a strategy for escaping divorce as men resort to doing this to relieve themselves of the financial responsibilities.

> Our current situation has made it mandatory for women to assist their husbands. For example, before now, there were men who could farm between 10 and 20 bags of farm produce. But now many don't even have the farm. He depends wholly on humanitarian aid. Isn't it? [As a woman] whatever little money you make from petty jobs around it become mandatory to assist on some of the family needs.

> And now the hardship is too much for men to carry alone. Some have up to three wives and many children. It is practically impossible to be able to discharge all his [husband] responsibilities on them [given the current situation]. It is in this hardship condition that he has to provide for food. It is, therefore, mandatory for women to lend a hand given the condition. And failure to assist would also put you [woman] in a difficult condition [to escape divorce] (Women focus group 2018).

8.5 Process of Engagement in Post-conflict Buni Yadi

8.5.1 Post-conflict Public participation

Public participation is considered to be at its lowest in the post-conflict context of the case study area as evident in the absolute affirmation of the deficiency or lack of government commitment to engage communities on its activities (if any). The participants of the focus group discussions confirmed that government or non-governmental organisation hardy carry them along or seek their opinions on any decision-making process that involves them or any government activities.

> As far as we know, we have never been involved in any decision-making process for the post-conflict development and redevelopment in this town or region [participants responded in unison] (Women focus group 2018).

> Apart from the aid card that National Emergency Management Agency [NEMA] gave to people for the past ten months [without anything to show for it], there has been no any support that has been brought to us [by the government]. There has never been any form of an opinion-seeking discussion between the government and us. There was none, to be honest! (Youths focus group 2018).

> To the best of my knowledge NGOs have once brought fertiliser and plant seeds to support [us]. They had a meeting about the distribution with the dry season farmers, but they did not engage us on our needs [before bringing the fertiliser], and they just brought the fertiliser for support (Farmers focus group 2018).

8.5.2 Impact of Lack of Participation:

The participants of the focus group discussions have highlighted the adverse effects of the lack of involvement in the decision-making process on their post-conflict predicament. This concern is evident in their narratives of the government inability to identify their problems, hence the lack of necessary support. It is understood from the discussions that the poor participatory practices of the government have made it impossible for the residents to obtain appropriate relief and support from the government to meet their immediate and long-term post-conflict needs. Although the residents are rarely consulted for any decision-making, the NGOs are noted to have been more supportive – at least on the short-term basis, than the government.

> The only thing I can point to that has been done by the government, as at last two months is the rehabilitation of two classrooms at Central Primary School Buni Yadi, but the work is ongoing.

> For me, the only thing I know is the renovation of the Federal Government College Buni Yadi. The school was burnt and school children were murdered. . . . There was renovation going on. That was the only obvious thing I know. [But] Even the renovation has been stopped (Youths focus group 2018).

If not for some of the aid that we get in the town, many of us would not be able to survive. Humanitarian groups have really helped us. Some NGOs particularly focus on women needs (Women focus group 2018).

8.5.3 The Implication of Lack of Participation

The participants of the discussions are explicit about their experiences of being denied the opportunity to be part of the decision-making processes on issues that concern them. This concern was particularly so for farmers who expressed displeasure over the losses the supposed support (e.g. seeds) has caused to them. The mismatch between the seeds variety that produced yield for the farmers and the one that was donated to them without consultation caused waste of time, money and other resources. On the political perspective, this lack of participation increases displeasure, and resentment towards government as participant expressed the feeling of being alienated by the government. This practice is a threat to the personal, community – especially for the lower social class, and overall security in the community as this has the potential to trigger another round violence due to collective grievance as noted by the participants.

> We have seen the clear negative implication of lack of consultation in the last cropping season. A seed of sorghum was donated to us [as a support for farmers], and a lot of us spent [our limited] resources to plant the seed. However, we were surprised as the seeds did not produce a yield even after the raining season has passed. But if they had engaged the farmers to discuss the kind of seed they use or want, we would have informed them of the one that is suitable for our lands. That was not done as they just brought the seed and distribute to people. People further shared the seeds among themselves to those who could not access from the donor organisation (Farmers focus group 2018).

> Yes, lack of so doing [participation] has a tremendous effect on the thoughts and perception of people [toward government]. For instance, as the conflict befell us, there has never been any Federal Government representative that came to find out about our predicaments or to find out what problems we have, what condition we are in and what needs do we have on an emergency. We have the feeling that we are not being cared for in the North-east of Nigeria, because if a similar thing happens in other parts of Nigeria; they are treated differently.

> This [lack of participation] is the kind of things that give rise to political thuggery and violence (Youths focus group 2018).

> Some group [NGOs] came and to assist women in the area of vocation training such as sewing and garment design. We hoped that could bring some succour, but few of us that had the training are still jobless. This is because you cannot do any design without the electricity [to run the machine] (Women focus group 2018)

CHAPTER NINE

Research Discussion and Theoretical Reflection

The last three chapters have focused on presenting the results of the empirical findings of this research, covering the outcomes of the quantitative and physical surveys and qualitative methods. The results presented in the chapters corroborate one another to suggest that livelihoods changes have indeed occurred in the case study. Although the changes in livelihoods are predominantly negative, evidence of positive ones emerged regarding the youths and women social resilience. This chapter, however, presents discussions regarding the details of those findings as a reflection for the theoretical and empirical contribution of the research.

9.1 Discussion and Theoretical Reflection

9.1.1   People Centeredness: Access to Locally Available Resources

The people-centeredness of the livelihood framework derives from the need to understand the complexity of challenges that can prevent people from accessing their locally available resources (DFID 2000). Partial or total lack of access to livelihoods assets and resources has been highlighted (chapter 3) to be commonplace in a post-conflict context of a large-scale uprising. The results of this research do not suggest otherwise to this understanding except, however, the context-based variation due to peculiarity of dynamics that truncate the access to the assets. In Buni Yadi, farming is confirmed to be one of the significant livelihoods activities which depend on direct access to natural assets (farmland). Access to farm has been dramatically reduced due to conflict and forced displacement, as noted in the empirical results (section 8.1.1). This condition of a post-conflict lack of or reduced access to land takes precedence from existing research (e.g. Unruh 2004; Thu 2012; Matt 2016; Pritchard 2016) thereby confirms the theorising that post-conflict access to land - especially for agriculture in the rural setting, is often truncated by complex challenges. The existing knowledge concerning these challenges to land access relates to tenure security that emanates from the combination of mix-up, competitions, criminality and claims and counterclaim for the legality of lands ownership after conflict. Difficulties regarding access to land after conflict may also relate to gender-based deprivation in which women are often the victims due to certain cultural practices (Corbin and Hall 2019).

Levine (2016) and Corbin and Hall (2019) reports on the post-conflict context of the rural land disputes in Northern Uganda are positive examples to draw from regarding post-conflict land access challenges. Returnees from refugee camps experienced the stiff challenge of accessing croplands (for farming) given that residents attach lots of importance to accessing their agricultural lands as the first strategy for food security and economic recovery. The challenge of lack of access to the land stems from the inability of the legal system to adequately resolve the multiplicity of evidence (formal and informal) as a means to claim rights to land. This difficulty results in prolonged intra-family land disputes and creates an opening for land grabbing, which prevents people from accessing their ancestral lands. Similarly, women experience a peculiar challenge regarding inheritance and access to lands of death husbands due to unfavourable cultural norms and difficulty of obtaining legal assistance to claim such lands (Corbin and Hall 2019). Thu (2012) identifies a similar case of a post-conflict struggle for accessing land in the Timor-Leste. The post-conflict settler-landowner dichotomy of Mulai village (Timor-Leste) fuelled cases of land dispossessions. 'Settlers' of the village who have a customary land title were denied access to their grazing lands upon return from forced displacement by 'landowners' who did not flee the conflict. The inconsistency of the land law at various districts further compounds the land ownership disputes which exist within the 'settlers' themselves and the landowners.

Furthermore, post-conflict communities often struggle with harmonising what can or should typically be accepted as legitimate evidence for the right to claim lands. This challenge leads to a multiplicity of what is termed 'legal pluralism of evidence' for the rights to access and has negative consequences on access to lands in many post-conflict contexts such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique and Peru (Brown et al. 2011). Moreover, this difficulty negates the efforts for attaining food security in the post-conflict situation, given the positive correlation between land tenure and food security (Unruh 2003). The research findings for this investigation, however, contrast above experiences for post-conflict lack of access to land as the evidence suggests challenges other than physical restriction, legal or gender-related challenges to claims a right to land. The lack of access to farmland in the post-conflict Buni Yadi emanates primarily from two conditions namely: fear and trauma the residents have developed from extremely violent experiences during the conflict and the adverse effect of bad roads and lack of stormwater channels (section 8.2.4). The farmlands at the eastern outskirt of

the town are known to the local farmers for their higher fertility for crop production, but coincidentally the area was the insurgents' base during the conflict. Before dislodging the insurgents, this area was the launchpad from which they strategise and strike (section 8.2.4).

This fear and trauma have remained in the minds of the residents - including farmers, despite the absence of any form of physical, legal or institutional restriction to access their farmlands. The farmers would never go to the eastern region of the town for whatever reason, not even farming. This condition has significantly reduced food production in the case study, hence the declined income and increased poverty and hunger. This is a confirmation of Jacobson (2002, 2005), Karf (2003) and Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2009, 2010) on the negative impact of conflict on the economic security in a post-conflict context. Nonetheless, Brown et al. (2011) report post-conflict experiences which relate to fear and lack of access to farmlands in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Mozambique. The prevalent land-mine of agricultural lands significantly reduced access to land for farming in those countries. But there is limited evidence to suggest that mines are significant cause to lack of access to farmlands in Buni Yadi after conflict. However, the supposedly less dangerous farming areas are known to be less fertile compared to the east (section 8.1.1) hence they are more expensive to cultivate and require more resources such as money and farm inputs which are scarce given the residents' poverty conditions and lack of access to financial assets such as banks. The farmers, however, rely on subsistence practices on farmlands which are much closer to the town for safety reasons. Although the reduced access to croplands affects the entire community, the condition is particularly dire for the conflict migrants. The scarcity of cropland makes it challenging to parcel out a large area of land that could be enough for subsisting farming for the conflict migrants (section 8.1.1). They have to rely on other alternatives for food such as aid or purchasing despite the hike in prices of food and increased poverty. This finding confirms the current understanding that forced displacement strips conflict migrants of rights to access resources to improve their livelihoods (Jacobsen 2002; Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009). In Buni Yadi, however, unlike in a restricted camp context, the lack of access to cropland by conflict migrants result from the apparent general lack of access and not from any form of legal, political or institutional denial. Not even the conflict migrants have indicated this possibility in Buni Yadi.

The possible explanation to the variations between the cause of lack of access to land in Buni Yadi and those examined in other research (e.g. Unruh 2003; Thu 2012; Levine 2016) may be construed from the notable difference in nature, duration and return pattern after displacement. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (2016) notes that prolonged displacement (five years or above) is one of the obstacles to reclaiming land by returnees after conflicts. In other words, the chance of having land disputes is higher in long-term displacement which provides the avenue for disputes, speculation and grabbing of land while those who occupy it assume ownership (legally or illegally). In this regard, however, the displacement of Buni Yadi which lasted for two years may be a possible explanation to the absence of land access challenges that emanate from legal or administrative difficulties for the right to claim lands. The difference in the post-conflict land access challenges may also be explained from the pattern of displacement, for instance, in a context where only a section of the community is displaced or where some of the displaced return substantially long before others as exemplified in the cases of Timor-Leste and Northern Uganda respectively (Levine 2016; Thu 2012). Given these scenarios, the land dispute is often argued from the perspective of whether or not the persons who have lived and possibly improved the lands should be allowed to retain them or the original owners who 'abandoned' the lands and probably do not have the currently recognised legal evidence to claim the right to ownership. It is evident, however, that the lack of access to land is different in Buni Yadi because the entire community was displaced at about the same time during the conflict and a significant proportion returned within a similar period. Although the residents migrated to different places during displacement, the return was done at about similar time for many following military certification and facilitation of return. Similarly, the fact that everyone in the case study could not access their farmland due to fear prevents the kind of scenario in other contexts, as noted above.

However, the inability of the residents to access and use their natural assets in spite of its availability raises the concern about the limitation in the sustainable livelihoods framework with regards to the role natural assets can play in improving livelihoods. The livelihoods framework posits natural assets - from a market economy perspective, as being a primary basis for income provision. This notion has been questioned by Sarkar and Sinha (2015) who argue that the sustainable livelihoods approach view is inconsistent with reality where human activities (mainly economic) are derived from

nature. Instead, the livelihoods framework considers natural assets as that 'marketable' product that has the ultimate value for providing income. This view may pose challenges to the utility of the livelihoods approach, especially in a post-conflict context like Buni Yadi, where factors that are external to the land prevent the residents from using it. This argument suffices to mean that productivity of the natural assets (farmland in this case) is determined by a combination of its availability, accessibility and other dynamics - such fear and trauma, which may be external to it.

Infrastructure forms an essential platform upon which access to other assets is possible. The absence of infrastructure does not only truncate access to other assets (e.g. natural assets); it prevents economic activities and increases poverty and other vulnerabilities (Malual 2008). The current predicament in Buni Yadi confirms this consideration regarding post-conflict access to land as an economic asset. The deterioration of roads and associated infrastructure – drainage, in particular, has been another significant obstacle to accessing farmlands in post-conflict Buni Yadi. The two-year displacement and abandonment of the settlement prevented the residents from carrying out the routine maintenance of roads through community volunteering (section 9.2.4). The topographic setting of Buni Yadi - a depression, compounds this challenge whereby stormwater from many kilometres away from the upper regions flows through the case study and its farmlands and consequently cause the destruction of the drainages, roads and farmlands. Some roads leading to the farms are converted to waterways by erosion due to drainages blockage and poor water channels and consequently, truncate access to farmlands. The challenge has also caused flooding of some farms which become waterlogged, thereby reducing their productivity while portions of others are washed away.

This effect of poor roads on farmlands confirms Levine (2016) assertion that not all post-conflict challenges may be a direct impact of physical attacks on communities or infrastructure during a conflict. In other words, the road-related (poor road drainages) reduction and lack of access to farmlands in Buni Yadi is an indirect consequence of conflict. Again this scenario brings to question the effectiveness of the sustainable livelihoods framework consideration that infrastructure is primarily a public or formal sector provision (Ali 2002). Governments in many contexts are known to have been unable to meet the infrastructure needs of their citizens, and the response to this challenge informs many informal and individual initiatives for providing infrastructure or maintaining existing ones in their communities as it was the case in Buni Yadi (Ali

2002). This concern and its implication for post-conflict recovery are examined in greater depth in the subsequent section (9.1.4) that discusses infrastructure as a means of reducing vulnerability and improve resilience.

9.1.2 Sustainability: Post-conflict Resilience

Livelihoods sustainability in a stable (non-conflict) context is primarily related to the ability of individuals and households to overcome shocks and survive with less reliance on external support - resilience (DFID 2000; Rakodi 2014). In a post-conflict context, however, resilience relates more to recovery from the effect of the impact of conflict while exploring strategies for communities to deal with the indirect consequences within the locally accessible resources (Jacobsen 2002). The first and perhaps most crucial step to post-conflict resilience is surviving the conflict alive (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2009). Empirical evidence from this study suggests the attainment of this level of resilience in Buni Yadi given that a significant majority of the residents survived the conflict physically unharmed as they were able to escape following the information on the insurgents' plan to attack and take over the settlement. However, Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) underline the deficiency of post-conflict livelihoods resilience when human capital lacks the complement of other livelihood assets. Analyses of research findings for this investigation affirms the livelihoods deficiency in Buni Yadi given the current survival challenges and dire living condition due to reduced access to economic, infrastructure, natural and other complementary assets despite the limited loss of human lives.

Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) note that although economic resilience is vital for coping in a post-conflict context, achieving this depends mostly on the pre-conflict assets with which the individuals or households can escape the conflict. The volume, as well as the value of those resources the conflict victims can escape conflict, are essential for determining the effectiveness and duration they can finance the post-conflict livelihoods needs of the displaced persons. The Sri Lankan case is a relevant example of this understanding. Analysis of the Batticaloa eastern region, Sri Lanka, shows that sale or mortgaging pre-conflict savings of mobile assets such as jewellery is useful for financing post-conflict livelihoods of IDPs. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the strategy is helpful for more than a year because this kind of asset is easily exhaustible (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). The research findings for this study confirm a similar scenario in Buni Yadi as the analysis of the results reveals the

weakened economic resilience of the residents and the inability to adequately finance their post-conflict conditions. Two patterns are discernible, however, in the case of Buni Yadi: firstly, a high rate of pre-conflict poverty which perhaps truncated the residents' ability to save for worse days, and secondly, the residents could not escape the conflict with many valuable assets. Although they possessed some physical assets (e.g. sewing machine) which they used for earning incomes before the conflict, they could not flee with them as the conflict started abruptly (section 8.1.1). Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that whatever the residents were able to escape with had lasted up to the two years of their displacement as evident in their inability to finance basic needs such as food and shelter during and after displacement.

The refugee or IDP policy of the host community is also an essential element for the resilience of the displaced as refugee policy imposes certain restrictions such as movement and types of job an IDP or refugee can undertake (Jacobsen 2002). Werker (2007), reports the example of this kind of challenge in the Western Ugandan context, which is a case involving the displacement across international boundaries. The Buni Yadi displacement, however, differs given that it did not involve crossing an international border. This variance in Buni Yadi context lies in the inability of the residents to be able to work or engage in economic activities while in displacement is mainly due to stigmatisation. The psychological torture from the stigmatisation prevented many of the residents from engaging in productive activities during displacement. Similarly, participants of this study reported cases of rejection and stereotyping of the residents during their displacement by the members of the host communities due to the fear of being a mole for the insurgent groups. The above conditions denied many residents the opportunity to create new social assets or engage in business transactions or economic activities during displacement, thereby further weakened their economic resilience, hence increased poverty at displacement. The impoverishment persisted upon return to their original community given that income assets and means of livelihoods have been destroyed and looted thereby make survival a daily struggle. Although the investigation confirms Amirthalingam and Lakshman (2010) position on the significance of the pre-conflict savings for a post-conflict economic resilience - with contextual peculiarities, it further shows that poverty during displacement may extend beyond displacement period. This condition has severe adverse implications on the economic and social resilience of residents, thereby increase post-conflict vulnerability.

Declined economic resilience increases poverty and destroys social capital and benefits accruable from it as identified in this investigation. For example, conflict-induced increase in poverty prevents farmers from participating in the farmers' social groups (section 8.4.2). The practice of community services for road repairs and women self-help associations had suffered a similar fate. It may appear at first glance that poverty has limited impact on these social assets, but considering the link from the fact that people now live from hand-to-mouth makes it more apparent that they are unlikely to engage in activities that will not fetch those means of survival on the immediate. This condition denied farmers, for instance, access to the age-long self-organised reciprocity practices (locally called 'gidauniya') of farm labour provision for one another. The practice enables farmers to access labour and farm inputs such as fertiliser at a relatively cheaper cost thereby improve productivity. Watson (2001) identifies that this kind of self-organised associations has the potential of reducing post-conflict vulnerabilities when the benefit accruable from it is accessible, and the complex social capital challenges of rebuilding and creating more enablers are overcome. In the post-conflict Kono District of Sierra Leone, for instance, farming labour clubs (locally called 'boma') have been an essential tool for the post-conflict recovery process. The boma group members undertake a variety of demanding farm labour in a reciprocity manner while the beneficiaries provide resources such as food, water and logistics (Maconachie et al. 2012). This practice is similar to that of Buni Yadi except that the farmer group members' inability to provide the necessary resources such as food and transportation has truncated the practice after conflict as their poverty conditions have increased. Similarly, Maconachie et al. (2012) indicate that the Sierra Leone success is attributable to the deliberate revival and institutionalisation of the practice and its benefits among the members. The opportunity to institutionalise this reciprocal farming practice has not been explored in the context of Buni Yadi due to the weak vertical social network. This condition undermines access to appropriate support for revamping the practice after conflict. The challenge contributes to the farmers' inability to afford necessary farming facilities and inputs leading to significant fall in food production and increase poverty, hence the dependence on humanitarian assistance for food, healthcare, education and so forth. The declined social resilience applies to many other social groups in the case study, except for the youths and women groups.

The resilience of the youths and women regarding social capital after conflict provides a different scenario to those of other social groups in the case study and may also present a limitation to livelihoods approach views regarding the outcome of sudden shocks such as conflict. The livelihoods framework tends to favour the consideration that the consequences of large scale conflicts come with livelihoods destructions, which may be homogenously negative (Rakodi 2014). However, while this consideration may be consistent regarding the negative consequence of livelihoods disruption for other social groups, the framework fails to envisage the possible exception in a post-conflict condition that may be positive. The case of farmers' social groups in Sierra Leone, for instance, is a confirmation of this oversight; and the resilience of youths group in Buni Yadi leading to the ability to sustain their social assets after conflict further exposes this weakness.

The Buni Yadi youths group realised the importance of rejuvenating their social asset upon return from displacement, decided to strengthen the pre-conflict social clubs and create new ones. The inter-group collaborations and assistance from other external stakeholders have aided the clubs to assist some youths to access education and vocational training. This positive change, however, has not made much impact because of lack adequate infrastructure as well as active vertical networking which may facilitate proper institutionalisation as noted in other contexts. The disadvantage of failing to acknowledge and explore the potentials of this positive change in a post-conflict analysis may undermine optimal intervention outcomes as the community (youths in particular) is denied access to capacities which may provide new opportunities. Similarly, this investigation notes the resilience of women despite the dire living conditions and the ensuing hardship. Having realised the declined ability (sometimes inability) of men who culturally are responsible for financing the family welfare, women now actively participate in making provision for the families. Changes in social responsibilities and other family dynamics are also responsible for the women resilience which is a coping strategy for sustaining the family. Women in Buni Yadi have, for instance, assumed the role of being the sole providers for the family following the death of husbands in the conflict or actively engaged in the household financial obligations to escape the threat of divorce as men use the declined income as an excuse to initiate divorce. Like the youths group in Buni Yadi, the resilience of women lacks complementary support to make it more useful for post-conflict recovery and development, given the continued reliance on humanitarian aid to survive.

The destruction of infrastructures is apparent in the case study of this research as a result of direct physical attacks as well as climate factors such as rain and flood after displacement. Although pre-conflict gross deficiency was reported, these infrastructures supported both the economic and social livelihoods of the residents irrespective of their ownership - public or private. The high costs of providing infrastructure prevent the residents from rebuilding their community infrastructures given the severe economic conditions, and government intervention is instead not forthcoming. Although aid agencies are not known to primarily undertake long-term projects such as community infrastructure redevelopment (Shah and Shahbaz 2015), the study examines evidence to this effect in post-conflict Buni Yadi. Red Cross, for instance, is reported to have assisted some residents with building materials and other logistics to rebuild their houses. However, the predetermined criteria used by the agency for considering eligibility for support marred the success of the programme. Many residents expressed dissatisfaction over the selection processes as they noted that many houses that truly deserved support are left out while undeserved houses make the support list. This condition is adversely affecting social cohesion, thereby weaken resilience in the community.

Reconstruction of health and education amenities tops the priorities of infrastructure needs of the residents for redevelopment in Buni Yadi. These have received significantly less attention as at the time of fieldwork for this study. All categories of schools – including primary, secondary and post-secondary, were destroyed during the conflict, and only a few of the classrooms in primary and junior secondary schools are currently reconstructed. Similarly, both private and public healthcare facilities are in a state of disrepair as inadequate attention has prevented the redevelopment of these facilities while they lack adequate equipment and staffing. The condition of power supply and telecommunication are not any different. There seemed to be no indication of restoring the destroyed power infrastructure two years after the return of the residents while the only mobile telecommunication service in the case study is inefficient as residents complained regarding the difficulty to use it for social or economic benefit. The combined effect of these has adverse implication for post-conflict human capital resilience given that the dire state of infrastructure truncates access to education, health and other infrastructure that support social development.

However, Shah and Shahbaz (2015) underscore that the criticism against relief organisations and sometimes government regarding post-conflict infrastructure stems

from the poor understanding of the negative implications of inadequate infrastructure on post-conflict resilience. Shah and Shahbaz exemplify this deficient understanding in the post-conflict infrastructure inadequacy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa district of Pakistan in which women are offered kitchen gardening seeds as a post-conflict support package but could not plant them due to lack of water supply. A similar scenario is reported in the post-conflict redevelopment programmes in Buni Yadi whereby women receive vocation training for sewing garments as post-conflict empowerment programme. However, the skill could not be put to use as there is no electricity to power the sewing machines in the community. Similarly, youths groups in collaboration with Victim Support Programme reported having trained some youths on vocation skills such as e-commerce, but the skills have barely made an impact because of the lack of power and the poor condition of telecommunication and internet. The current state of disrepair of infrastructures and the ensuing livelihoods difficulties confirms the adverse implications of inadequate infrastructure on the resilience - social and economic, capacities of Buni Yadi residents hence increased vulnerability. Overral, the above resilience scenario is consistent with the understanding that resilience differ between indiduals and groups. It also confirms that defiency of any aspects of post-conflict resilience (e.g. institutional effectiveness, poverty and behavioural response) may undermine the overall livelihoods resilience in a context but contextual varience is inevitable (Jacobsen 2002; Bujones et al. 2013; Menkhaus 2013).

9.1.3 Mismatching Post-conflict Needs and Available Support for Conflict Victims

Rebuilding conflict-ridden communities to overcome the challenges of post-conflict livelihoods changes is by no means an easy task given the complex nature of impoverishment and their implications for conflict victims. The need to reduce individuals' and households' level of vulnerabilities often informs the necessary shoring up of livelihoods of conflict victims, but the abrupt nature of the programmes and processes of undertaking post-conflict interventions come with challenges. Lack of adequate analysis and understanding of the needs of conflict victims poses a significant challenge to achieving success in communities where chronic poverty, poor education, and limited skilled labours are widespread (Solomon and Ginifer 2008; Bangura 2016; Tollefsen 2017). A micro-level assessment of the conditions of conflict victims become an essential part of post-conflict livelihoods strategy to provide relevant supports. This

analysis and the availability of accessible resources may be a relevant determinant of a sustainable post-conflict intervention success through minimising the mismatch of needs that characterise many post-conflict interventions (Solomon and Ginifer 2008; Bangura 2016).

The mismatch of needs of conflict victims and the support they get is commonly used to assess the success or failure of post-conflict interventions. For example, most of the post-conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (e.g. Sierra Leon and Liberia) are considered to be ineffective because they could not match the needs and resolve long-term local concerns of the participants. In Sierra Leone (post-2002) for instance, the programme is believed to have recorded success at the macro level, at least for the general disarmament programme, but there is limited evidence to suggest micro – individuals and households, long-term livelihoods success. According to Solomon and Ginifer (2008) and Bangura (2016), the demobilisation process fell short of expectations due to its inability to establish and resolve the peculiar needs of participants by their gender or demography (age). For instance, women were kept in the same place with men in camps which are managed by men, thereby exposing them to continued violence (by male ex-combatants), rape and unwanted pregnancies. Similarly, participants of the economic reintegration programmes could not establish a new lease of life - livelihoods. This failure is rationalised to the arbitral enrolment of participants into vocation training without profiling their socio-economic interests and aspiration and poor analysis of the local economic opportunities that can be accessed. Participants of the programme eventually sold the training toolkits due to lack of employment opportunities despite the skills acquisition training that could help them start up new lives. Furthermore, Bangura (2016) fears that the situation poses threat to peacebuilding given the growing youths' (ex-combatants) grievance and frustration.

Failure of governance, including process and people in the decision making concerning interventions, is a primary cause of post-conflict intervention failure. The condition of mismatching needs is confirmed in this investigation; although there is a contextual peculiarity given the non-camp setting of the study and the participants are not ex-combatants (as noted above). The farmers' narrative is a relevant example of the negative implication of mismatched needs and available supports in post-conflict Buni Yadi. Having identified the imminence of famine and the dire economic situation in the town; an NGO donated sorghum seed to farmers to grow their food. The seed failed to produce yield despite the time, energy and scarce resources (money) that was expended

in growing it (section 8.5.3). A kind gesture that could have helped the desperately needy turned out to be a misfortune as the farmers lamented that this happened because they were not consulted to know the kind of seeds that produce a yield in their community. Moreover, they had no choice than to accept the support given their precarious living condition. The incidents of mismatch of needs and available assistance in post-conflict context may also relate to the involvement of humanitarian groups during conflict or early post-conflict periods as is the case in Buni Yadi.

Furthermore, mismatch of needs and available support may occur in a condition which favours non-inclusion, or a selective inclusion of participants in the process of analysing the local needs of conflict victims. According to Shilue and Fagen (2014), the inherent short-term nature of humanitarian assistance in Liberia could not provide the necessary long-term livelihoods support for displaced returnees and coupled with the government non-inclusive policy undermine the identification of the specific needs of certain displaced returnees. The condition results in a situation where the displaced are socially and economically isolated upon return to the community. However, although a case of general exclusion by the government is examined in Buni Yadi, there are few cases where conflict migrants have expressed concern over the possible bias in terms of their access to supports. The most probable explanation for the variation between these cases may relate to the nature of the conflict and the pattern of the displacement.

The example of selective isolation in Liberian, for instance, occurs in a context where the conflict was between combatants of the warring factions within the same community leading to the displacement of a section of the community. The case is different regarding the Buni Yadi context, although some members of the population actively participated (as insurgent foot soldiers) in the conflict (section 8.1.1). The insurgents primarily attack the town leading to the displacement of the entire residence, and the return occurred about the same times. However, some strained social relations which may be considered as isolation occur at the beginning of the return, and the fear and lack of trust have continued to diminish with time. The lack of confidence and trust was primarily towards the returnees whose whereabout during displacement was unknown to many residents (section 8.4.2). In general, there is a limited concern regarding isolation, but non-inclusiveness which has caused resentment is widespread. The residents note, for instance, that the unilateral adoption of selection criteria for housing support programme by the Red Cross undermine the need to identify and

prioritise housing support and this is already causing a new dimension of social insecurity as some residents exhibit resentment against one another (section 8.2.3).

Moreover, the non-inclusive process for post-conflict support programmes is generating dissatisfaction leading to resentment toward the government, which is allegedly not doing enough or undertake programmes without consulting the target beneficiaries. The Federal Government, for example, has announced plans to commence reconstruction of the conflict-ravaged North-east region of the country; the residents have nonetheless, express the imminent failure of the programme given the gross lack of residents' participation in the planning process. It was almost universal in the case study that the residents are not aware of the government programmes (section 8.5.1), thereby confirming a top-down-only process of intervention. The top-down nature of the processes and decisions on issues that have direct implications on lives of conflict victims often result in programmes failure as seen in many post-conflict cases (Solomon and Ginnifer 2008; Shilue and Fagen 2014; Sserwanga et al. 2014). Residents expressed dissatisfaction over the inability of stakeholders to address or design a long-term plan on pressing concerns and their vulnerability implications regarding lack of education, vocational skills, and economic prosperity. Instead, food aid and other short-term programmes are prioritised. Furthermore, this kind of resentment, often towards government and elites, in the community appears to be a vital security threat given that it may relate a lot to the mind-set (Bangura 2016). As noted in the empirical chapters, the selective destruction in Buni Yadi which is the outcome of resentment may be understood as the effect of frustration due to government failure to meet people's need and the negative perception about the elite due to significant inequality.

While the sustainable livelihood framework recognises that the level of vulnerability determines the ability of people to access their resources (Rakodi 2014), the classification of conflict as short-term shock may be misleading. This consideration is not consistent with the reality in many conflicts and post-conflict scenarios which have lasted a decade or more while the post-conflict vulnerabilities that come with them last longer (Branch 2013; Stewart 2016; Tollefsen 2017). Perhaps this explains why short-term post-conflict programmes in which needs-supports mismatch is prominent in the interventions of organisations (e.g. World Bank, Oxfam, and UN) that are pro-livelihoods framework (May et al. 2009; UNDP 2017). This seeming limitation of the livelihoods framework regarding the conflict and post-conflict shocks and vulnerability

tends to encourage prioritising short-term measures in vulnerability contexts such as post-conflict where long-term intervention may be more appropriate. Post-conflict analysis and responses need to address both short and long-term concerns of the conflict victims. Short-term programmes and interventions potentially trap post-conflict communities and conflict victims into a poverty cycle as confirmed in this investigation and previous studies (e.g. Collier 2007). Sserwanga et al. (2014), narrate the post-conflict experience in Gulu community, Uganda, where post-conflict impoverishment and the hand out from aid organisations creates an unending dependency thereby undermine the ability of the people to survive without external support. A similar scenario is examined in Buni Yadi regarding women and youths, in particular, who have stressed the need to be supported with relevant and sustainable vocation and entrepreneurial skills alongside supporting infrastructure to start up new lives instead of the food and non-food aid that characterised the existing support programmes.

9.1.4 Interlinkages in Post-conflict Livelihoods Challenges: Highlighting the Significance of Infrastructure

Post-conflict communities face a plethora of challenges in an attempt to access and use locally available resources after conflict. These challenges occur as the communities and stakeholders strive to restore peace and revive livelihoods amidst the complexity of the changes and the intricate interrelatedness of the different components. The livelihoods framework, however, advocates adequate analysis and understanding of those interrelations in livelihood features to determine the appropriate strategy for interventions as a panacea to resolving identified challenges holistically (DFID 2000). This feature is perhaps one of the significant strengths of the sustainable livelihoods approach given the benefits of the analysis of the mutually reinforcing tendencies of the components of the framework. For instance, Ali (2014) identifies that infrastructure (physical capital) has direct linkage with human capital, environmental protection and income sustainability. Nonetheless, large scale violent conflict such as the one in Buni Yadi distorts the physical, economic and social fabric of affected communities.

Economic recovery often tops priorities in post-conflict interventions as essential aspects of peacebuilding. This strategy takes precedence from the understanding and recognition of the critical role of financial well-being and its multidimensional impacts on other aspects of livelihoods (Amirthalingam and Lakshman 2010). It is crucial, however, for the recovery programme to critically analyse the changes in economic

conditions of conflict victims to develop strategies for a robust post-conflict development that is inclusive to reduce vulnerabilities thereby minimise the risk of conflict relapse (Walter 2004; Collier 2007; Subedi 2012). This consideration is particularly crucial for the context in which the conflict predicates on precarious livelihoods due to pervasive deprivations and poverty. In Buni Yadi, however, the high rate of multidimensional poverty and poor education are widespread. While rebuilding economic prosperity is widely regarded as one of the viable strategies for post-conflict recovery, the role of infrastructure in achieving this cannot be overemphasised given the strong link between access to infrastructure and economic and other social capitals (Ali 2014).

Achieving post-conflict recovery, to a large extent, depends on the availability, accessibility and adequacy of the infrastructure to achieve immediate and short-term as well as long-term economic and social resilience. According to Subedi (2012), reconstruction of infrastructures and their accessibility must be prioritised to promote economic well-being and provide social services in post-conflict contexts. In his report, Subedi underlines that lack of adequate infrastructure truncates the desired economic recovery in the post-conflict Nepal where inadequate power supply, bad roads, poor telecommunications and lack of irrigation facilities increase the rate and severity of poverty of the agrarian communities. In Buni Yadi, the adverse implication of the dire state of infrastructures is apparent, given the declined income and increased poverty conditions. The deplorable conditions of roads, for instance, have had negative implications on food production and income as described in the previous sections. The residents narrated how the lack of power supply has forced increased use of fuels such as petrol, diesel, kerosene, and firewood for domestic and commercial purposes despite the economic burden and the environmental consequences. The hike in prices of these commodities increases the cost of living as well as production and market prices of goods and services, and consequently pushes the already impoverished residents into poverty further. However, poverty is not only an obstacle to accessing immediate human needs but truncates the ability to access services that have long-term social and economic impacts on post-conflict communities (Branch 2012; Buhaug et al. 2011; Tollefsen 2017). Typically, lack of access to education, water, healthcare, farming facilities and so forth characterises post-conflict Buni Yadi, and they have a long-term negative implication on the quality of human capital.

In an agrarian context such as Buni Yadi, infrastructure like farming facilities and implements are frequent targets for destruction in conflicts. This condition, coupled with other post-conflict challenges (including poverty) makes it difficult for farmers to return to farming. In Buni Yadi, apart from limited access to most of the productive farmlands, destruction of farm facilities and equipment affect agriculture. Food production and productivity have significantly reduced as farmers could not afford farm machinery and equipment such as tractors, plough, and other irrigation facilities. Lack of access to loan facilities to buy or rent equipment further compound the challenge as banks no longer render services in the case study following the conflict and the ensued destructions. The inadequate infrastructure not only undermines the economic wellbeing of individuals but truncates access to other social needs – e.g. healthcare and education, of the residents given the increasing poverty that it creates. This scenario is a confirmation of Justino (2011) and Ali (2014) consideration that infrastructure deficiency has a direct negative implication on human capital accumulation, especially in a post-conflict context.

The revitalisation of pre-conflict economic opportunities and creating new ones is essential to the process of post-conflict recovery and development to reduce socio-economic deprivation and engender inclusive economic development (Subedi 2012). Achieving this feat require not only start-up capital but the appropriate infrastructure that would support and hasten the realisation of set targets. Although the initial design of the livelihoods approach targets poverty reduction in poor rural communities, its applicability has extended to urban poverty analysis (DFID 2000). With regards to infrastructures, the extension of the livelihoods approach to urban context may relate to the traditional notion that infrastructure provision and the significance that is attached to it vary, depending on the context – rural or urban. As noted by Ali (2014), for instance, farming infrastructure such as irrigation facilities, roads and drainage are some of the priorities for rural agrarian communities while the provision of adequate housing, sanitation, waste management and other high-tech facilities form the demand in the urban setting. This notion may serve as a good starting point for understanding different needs of different contexts it, however, undermines the consideration for the role of innovations, particularly those in information and communication technology, regarding changes in infrastructural needs for different settings. The growing application of innovative technology in resolving perennial rural agricultural challenges may be an affirmation of the closing gap, for example, between the demand for technological

infrastructure in the rural and urban setting and poverty alleviation in the rural agrarian communities. A 2014 World Bank report, for example, shows the positive contribution of the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution for poverty reduction in post-conflict Afghanistan, Rwanda, Tunisia, and Timor-Leste (Kelly and Souter 2014).

In Afghanistan, for instance, the post-conflict development and sophistication in the telephony and internet services correlate positively to some poverty reduction, especially in the countryside. Increase access to information, financial services as well as identification of new market has been reported to have a positive impact on the economy. In particular, the deliberate installation of telecommunication terminals at the villages improves the economy of rural communities by increasing access to services such as money transfer and agricultural market prices using mobile internet and devices. Similarly, Rwanda is taking advantage of the benefits of the global ICT revolution as one of its post-conflict recovery strategies embedded in the country's strategic plan which places significant emphasis on the growth of ICT as a driver for post-conflict socio-economic recovery and development. The National Information and Communication Infrastructure plan have aided progress in the transformation of the most traditional subsistence agrarian economy into a knowledge-based. Tunisia and Timor-Leste are other positive cases where ICT is identified to have made positive impacts or at least has aided the identification of potentials that are important for rural post-conflict infrastructure and economy (Kelly and Souter 2014).

Nonetheless, the revolution in ICT not only improves access to services by rural communities but provides means of income to individuals and households. The growth in ICT may be another point for the critique of the livelihoods approach regarding the responsibility for the provision of infrastructure and the beneficiaries in the face of the blurring distinction between the contextual needs of infrastructure for different contexts. While the livelihoods approach prioritises the provision of infrastructure for improving livelihoods, the framework has tended to represent infrastructure (e.g. education, healthcare, water, and telecommunication) provision as predominantly public and formal sector investment (Ali 2002). This view is capable of undermining the extent of the usefulness of infrastructure, thereby limiting it to improving social benefits, while infrastructure has been a direct source of income in many contexts – stable or post-conflict. Before the conflict in Buni Yadi, for example, provision of water, education,

transportation and telecommunication services provided income for individuals or groups (often as informal services) as a response to government inability to provide those services. This effort enabled public access to those services as well as provides income to the individuals or groups service providers. Similarly, mobile telecommunication employed youths who engage in buying and selling of top-up vouchers, commercial mobile phone charging for a fee and buying and selling of mobile phones and accessories. The availability of these services aided businesses through the use of mobile phones for voice calls and other services (e.g. texting, WhatsApp, Facebook) to order and purchase goods and services and market prices inquiries. The services aided the transmission of information about available agricultural produce in the community as well as reduced cost of doing business which reflected on the market prices of goods and services before the conflict compared to current experiences.

According to Kelly and Souter (2014), the deliberate policy that encourages the private sector-led provision of telecommunications services aids the post-conflict recovery successes recorded in Rwanda and Timor-Leste. Private and especially the informal sector provision of infrastructure is an indication that individuals or groups can both be infrastructure providers as well as the consumers. This notion, however, seems to be contrary to the consideration of the livelihoods approach on the provision of infrastructure. Holding on to this may create a condition of 'communal poverty' when the government is unable to fulfil its obligation on infrastructure provision, and the individual or groups are not empowered to be viable alternative providers. The impoverished condition of Buni Yadi residents is a classic testimony of this tendensy. Individual efforts augmented the government inability to meet the infrastructure needs of the residents before the conflict. The post-conflict poverty after return can be attributed to the residents' failure to perform the complementary function of the infrastructure provider. This condition led to the widespread impoverishment as they could neither access income supporting infrastructure nor make income from providing it themselves. It is crucial, therefore, to fully incorporate the more comprehensive understanding of infrastructure into the livelihoods framework. The consideration for infrastructure improvement should comprehensively capture the need to protect human well-being, environment as well as provides income through employment. This would go a long way in reducing post-conflict vulnerability, thereby improve resilience which would   prevent   possible   relapse   of   conflict.

Conclusion

CHAPTER TEN

Conclusion and Recommendations: Livelihoods Change and the Risk of Conflict Recurrence

While Buni Yadi has made a transition from being a conflict to a post-conflict community, the sustainability of this progress leading to stability and growth depends in no small extent on achieving increased resilience by overcoming post-conflict livelihoods changes and the ensuing vulnerabilities. This study has examined the conflict-induced livelihoods changes and analysed the resultant increased susceptibility due to multi-dimensional poverty and deprivations. The analyses of the empirical outcomes of this research provide a definitive response to the primary and sub-research questions for this investigation:

> To what extent is post-conflict livelihoods change a potential contributor to conflict recurrence and a threat to human security?

- What is the nature of livelihoods change in a post-conflict transition non-camp context?

- What is the implication of the post-conflict livelihoods changes on conflict recurrence?

In response to the first sub-research question, this investigation identified the significance of precarious living conditions of the residents in Buni Yadi as a vulnerability condition that was exploited to foment the conflict. The conflict was brought to an end through state-led military victory and the eventual return of the community which had been displaced previously by the insurgency. Upon return, however, the precarious conditions of these returnees – historical and migrant residents, further deepened in the agrarian settlement. This condition prevails due to the destruction of the means of livelihoods of the residents leading to chronic poverty, inadequate human resources aided by weak state institutions and inequality and marginalisation. While political discourse was deliberately avoided (due to its sensitivity in the fragile post-conflict environment) in this study, participants have expressed bitterness over what they considered as political neglect given the residents' lack of access to political appointments and the accruing benefits. Despite this concern, however, economic and social exclusion appears to be more significant.

Stewart (2008, 2016) notes that the effect of marginalisation and inequality regarding conflict are reinforcing among the different types – political, economic or social. Multilevel marginalisation leading to pervasive inequality and poverty is reported regarding the North-east region of Nigeria before the conflict, and the condition has continued to deteriorate after the conflict as noted in Buni Yadi. In what is primarily regarded (at least among the poor) as systemic marginalisation and structural inequality, the ostentatious consumption of the elite and the failure to meet the needs of the masses provides grounds for rebellion (UNDP 2018). In Buni Yadi, both micro interpersonal – vertical, and regional - horizontal inequalities; poverty and expression of neglect, dissatisfaction and abandonment are noted to have existed before the conflict, and this feeling is persisting after conflict. This resentment may have been the reflection and manifestation of the regional inequality and deprivation, which is captured in the World Bank (2016). The World Bank report covering 2003-2013 shows that the region is the most unequal and deprived in Nigeria. It is ranked with the highest rate of poverty and unemployment and had the lowest rate of income and access to other means of livelihoods, such as education and healthcare (UNDP 2018).

Nevertheless, while the regional inequality remains a significant problem before and after the conflict, the sub-regional (state) and local level inequality is perhaps more critical. Oxford Poverty Human Development Initiative (OPHDI 2017), for example, reports that Yobe State, while being in the most impoverished North-east region had the highest rate of multi-dimensional chronic poverty due to inequality and deprivation in the area. Adetiloye (2014), with regards to the insurgency, also opines that the ever-widening disparity between the rich and poor inevitably creates resentment and conflict that is social class-related. In Buni Yadi, absolute poverty and persistent inequalities at the local level are visible in the social class and elitist domination which deprives the majority of the masses access to the means of livelihoods leading to high rate of poverty. While mostly regarded as been illegally acquired, the arrogant flaunting of wealth (e.g. cars and houses) and ostentatious lifestyle by the elite promotes hatred. The decisive expression of the resentment toward the elite has been noted in the pattern of conflict destruction in which the houses and other properties of political elites and royalty are mainly targeted and destroyed. This frustration may have also influenced the disillusion and envy towards successful businessmen and businesswomen who the poor and unemployed – particularly youths, view as being accomplices to their predicaments. This resentment appears to be unabating in Buni Yadi even after the conflict as residents

relate their inability to access post-conflict relief support to the elites' old practice of selective determination of who gets what and at what point. The residents' expression of dissatisfaction and resentment toward the elite regarding the arbitral selection of beneficiary of the Red Cross support for post-conflict housing support in the community is a typical example.

Regarding the second sub-research question, the arbitrary determination of access to post-conflict livelihoods as suggested by the expressions of Buni Yadi residents is an indication of a weak state which is typical of post-conflict environment and has fostered conflict recurrence in many contexts such as East Timor and Haiti. The effect of institutional weakness is visibly dominant in the post-conflict vulnerabilities of Buni Yadi, as seen in various aspects of the livelihoods of the residents. The weak public participation practice that characterises most of the government and non-governmental activities in the community has increased the sense of marginalisation and alienation. The apparent non-presence of government to provide both short-term and long-term social services is a suggestion of weakness, which is attracting growing resentment due to the feeling of neglect. Many respondents feel that government response would be different if their predicament were to happen in another region – mainly oil-producing. The residents have expressed worry, for instance, regarding their inability to access farmlands after the conflict, thereby hold the feeling that the seeming government inaction is because the affected people are from the low social class.

Furthermore, institutional weakness and failure may be related to inadequate provision of social and economic infrastructure, leading to continued deficient human resources and widespread poverty before and after conflict. Like a typical post-conflict environment (Brown et al. 2011), Buni Yadi exhibits weak human resource with a population that has low-level education, poor health condition and psychological trauma and lack of technocrats. The poor state of, for example, schools, healthcare facilities, water and electricity, is exacerbating the situation, thereby constraining possible improvement. This condition points to a lack of government spending on the social and basic needs of the citizens when it is needed the most. The consequence of this continued low human capital is a perpetual susceptibility to poverty and further inequality, which may create a population that is an easy target for insurgents' recruitment. Moreover, the Quranic education that is prevalent in the community and the region is not mainstreamed into the modern education system, thereby further truncate the chance of capacity development for the residents to improve access to

livelihoods opportunities. The health sector is not any different as access to healthcare is truncated by many factors including lack of health infrastructures, staff and insurance. Poor governance characterised with highly personalised and corrupt practices have truncated the development of economic and social infrastructure such as roads, electricity, telecommunication and farming and irrigation facilities. The combined effects of these are noticeable in the growing poverty and reduced resilience, which may be overstretched to increase vulnerabilities in the community.

Similarly, failure of government at all levels to meet the economic and socio-political needs of people in Buni Yadi and beyond is manifest in the sense of disaffection towards the government. However, conflict and its possible recurrence in Buni Yadi are indirectly intertwined. Poor governance, combined with weak institutions that encourage endemic corruption and misuse of the public resource by public office holders creates precarious livelihoods for a large proportion of the population (UNDP 2018). The indirect relations of conflict in Buni Yadi may be related to the government inability to deliver on the provision of public goods and services such as education, health, equal economic opportunities and development, peace and justice thereby creating grievances. The grievance and the ensuing vulnerabilities are then exploited to justify the recruitment and conflict by the insurgent groups who profiteer from it (UNDP 2004; 2018). It is, therefore, crucial to address these challenges, relating to the pre-conflict and post-conflict livelihoods changes to prevent conflict recurrent in Buni Yadi and beyond. This is necessary given the seeming difficulty in achieving post-conflict economic prosperity in an environment where livelihoods are devastated amidst weak institution, without deliberate and decisive actions.

The combined responses to the sub-research questions above suffice to answer the main research question for this investigation. The effects and the consequences of the post-conflict conditions imply that livelihoods changes in no small measure may be instrumental in conflict recurrence given the deteriorating resilience and weak post-conflict living conditions which expose individuals to human security threats. The study, therefore, concludes that the prevailing livelihoods pose significant threats which undermine human security. If not addressed adequately, the consequent grievance and frustration may be exploited by insurgents to stir conflict recurrence. This conclusion hinges not only on the theoretical underpinning of this study and the apparent post-conflict deterioration of living conditions of residents in the case study but the traits which are the conditions that have formed the precipitating or supporting factors for

conflict recurrence in other post-conflict contexts. While being mindful of the contextual peculiarities of conflicts, the consideration draws on similar post-conflict experiences and conditions from settings such as East Timor, Haiti and Afghanistan. Some of the features which Buni Yadi shares with these post-conflict contexts include state-led military victory to achieving the end of hostility in a mostly agrarian setting, inadequate human resources, weak state institutions, chronic poverty and inequality and marginalisation (Simonsen 2006; United Nations Special Commision of Inquiry for East Timor 2006; Dupuy 2009; Call 2012).

10.1 Recommendations: Way Forward to Prevent Conflict Recurrence

It is often contended that every conflict is unique regarding the actors, dynamics and nature. The interplay of these features has significant implication on the conflict outcomes and post-conflict peculiarity which must be adequately analysed to propose recommendations to resolve challenges that are specific to a setting (Brown et al. 2011). While acknowledging the existence of other pertinent conditions, it has been contended from the outset of this study that precarious living condition is a significant conflict factor and that further deterioration of the livelihoods after the conflict has the potential of causing conflict recurrence. The analysis of the post-conflict livelihood change in the case study supports this argument hence the following recommendations which may be useful pointer toward resolving the identified challenges (See Figure 10.1)

- **Addressing Development and Livelihoods Change Challenges**
  The conflict in the case study of this research is conceptually and empirically the consequences of underdevelopment – physical and human, in which poor standards of living create vulnerabilities for rebellion. These precarious livelihoods have further plummeted as a result of the conflict-induced challenges, hence, require specific policy toward sustainable recovery and development. Given this scenario, a good starting point may be to adequately analyse the development (livelihoods) challenges that may have played a role in causing the conflict and the changes that have occurred after conflict. Upon analysis and identification of relevant problems, prioritisation of policies and actions into short-term, medium-term and long-term is crucial. This process is necessary so that critical stakeholders – e.g. government and development partners, categorise problems base on the degree of urgency with which they are

to be resolved. While requiring collaborative efforts of the government (Federal, state and local), non-governmental, civil society and private organisations, analysis and prioritisation of the problems ensure that aspirations of beneficiaries are captured (UNDP 2018). Although it is arguable, that post-conflict stability in Buni Yadi has (or should have) passed the stage of reliance on humanitarian support, life-threatening conditions still exist. Apparent hunger, poor health and lack of water and sanitation, for instance, require urgent attention to ameliorate the suffering of the poorest and most vulnerable – women and children.

Figure 10.1: Proposed Framework for Post-conflict Intervention

The high rate of poor education and poor quality of health, leading to weak human resources are the consequences of the dire state of development in those sectors before and after conflict. Policies which are specific to improving the human resource capacity in the case study are therefore crucial. For instance, specific medium-term and long-term programmes to improving access to education and provide incentives for increasing school enrolment, teachers training and retraining, adult education, and so forth should be put in place. A specific policy should be targeted at encouraging children of school-going age who are scared of going back to school following the trauma from conflict experiences.

Similarly, mainstreaming the Quranic education into the general education curricular and system would improve access to education and literacy for the poorest. It is critically essential to devise a strategy for taking care of the children that have been orphaned by the conflict to prevent them from becoming the potential future recruit of the insurgents due to neglect. Similarly, effort must be focussed on healthcare to support the training of local health workers as encouragement and provide incentives to those who may have fled due to conflict (Brown et al. 2011). A local health insurance scheme, education trust and similar programmes for other social services would improve access to healthcare, education and other social services. While designing these programmes, particular attention should be paid to the peculiar challenges of all categories of people and the most vulnerable such as women, children, aged, disabled and youths.

The post-conflict health policies should be particular about the common conflict health challenges such as physical injuries, infectious diseases (e.g. HIV and TB), disabilities, malnutrition, trauma and hypertension (Pedersen 2002; Guha-Sapir and van Panhuis 2004; Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010). Most importantly, however, is the need to prioritise spending on infrastructure to support the social and economic needs of the residents as a strategy to increase job creation and improve the level of income and general wellbeing. While acknowledging the difficulties regarding attracting private investment in a post-conflict context (Matovu and Stewart 2001; Ra and Singh 2005), deliberate incremental (at all stages) government spending or incentivising private sector and foreign direct investment in infrastructure is crucial. Medium-term and long-

term investment in the reconstruction of, for instance, roads, telecommunications, education, healthcare, water supply and electricity would improve human resource capacities, increase employment opportunity, improve income and reduce poverty in Buni Yadi. Skill acquisition programmes for the largely uneducated youths and women would improve the artisanal skill labour in the community, thereby increasing employment opportunities, increase income and reduce poverty. These artisanal skills would also help in quickening the post-conflict recovery when the residents can provide services that improve the economy of their community (Brown et al. 2011; UNDP 2018).

- **Poverty Reduction and Alleviation**

  Chronic poverty is significantly rooted in the North-east - Buni Yadi, conflict and could potentially cause another round of conflict. As noted, the vulnerabilities created exposed the youths, in particular, to the scheming of the insurgents who use the precarious living conditions to justify their recruitment and the necessity of the conflict. Policies must, therefore, urgently target poverty reduction as a deliberate strategy to reducing the ensuing vulnerabilities.

  Given the mostly informal economy in Buni Yadi, policies that focus on agriculture and agro-related businesses and entrepreneur would be most effective. This consideration draws from Brown et al. (2011), who note that agriculture-related interventions make recovery easier and faster in low-income post-conflict settings with a large informal sector. This consideration also supports the importance of targeting the majority of the residents through agriculture which Buni Yadi has a comparative advantage. The first step and a short-term policy toward achieving this target should ensure improved access to farmlands by rebuilding the roads that lead to farms and the ones that are causing damage to the farmlands. Demining any possible mined area and improving personal safety should also be prioritised to eliminate the fear and boost confidence for accessing farmlands. Similarly, residents should be supported with appropriate farm inputs and facilities such as seeds, fertilisers, tractors, irrigation facilities, livestock, and so forth. Supports for businesses – especially the small scale, is essential at this stage to enable them to restart their businesses. Non-interest loan programmes such as the Federal Government's 'TraderMoni' which is ongoing in other parts of the country may be adopted to improve access to loan and encourage small-scale entrepreneurs.

Medium-term to long-term policies may focus, mainly, on youth training and empowerment in agricultural skills and services such as extension work, agro-businesses, and agro-processing as well as modern applications of technologies in farming and agro-related businesses. Policies should also target supporting and encouraging farmers associations and networks to revive the pre-conflict unions and create new ones. This process may be achieved, as it has been done in Sierra Leon (Maconachie et al. 2012), for instance, by institutionalising the 'Gidauniya' system of reciprocal farming labour for different groups in the community. Institutionalising social intervention (such as monthly stipends) to support unemployed would go a long way in reducing poverty and increase sense of belonging. The policy can potentially reduce susceptibility to being recruited into insurgents groups. It is also crucial to pay particular attention to the resilience of youths and women groups and their associations in the community. Exploring the positives of this resilience would help to sustain and harness their potentials and further improve the accruing benefit as a poverty alleviation strategy. Particular attention must be paid to the poverty reduction of vulnerable groups, especially women and youths. Programmes should be designed to provide women and youths with artisanal and entrepreneurial skills that are relevant to their social and economic aspiration in relation to the economic opportunities in the community.

However, achieving poverty alleviation depends significantly on the provision and accessibility to supporting infrastructure for agriculture and agro-related activities and as well creates employment in other sectors. Electricity, telecommunications and transportation, for example, would crucially support agriculture and can employ many people in a short period and long-term. However, infrastructure policy should be designed in such a way that it supports both the social and economic wellbeing of the beneficiaries. In the design of policy for improved access to information, for example, investment in the telecommunications must be targeted at social benefits as well as employment to individuals or households, e.g. as top-up voucher vendors.

- **Improvement of Personal Safety**

While physical attacks and other hostility have generally ceased in Buni Yadi, the sense of fear regarding personal safety is critical livelihoods problem. This condition reflects Annan (2005) consideration that absence of physical hostility

is not a guarantee of security. In other words, achieving peace requires securing both physical and emotional condition that guarantee access to means of livelihoods without fear (UNDP 2018). It is instructive to note, however, that the pace and degree of the effectiveness of post-conflict intervention or recovery (economic and social) depend significantly on the current safety concerns (Brown et al. 2011). These concerns may be attributable to a large extent, to the ongoing deficiency or absence of services such as banking, education, healthcare and market in the community. This problem relates mainly to the destructions of the infrastructures, which truncate the activities, and inadequate human resource, most of whom may have fled as a result of trauma and fear of being targeted. Similarly, this trauma, as well as the concern of possible land mines, create a general sense of lack of personal safety thereby prevents farmers from accessing farmlands for agriculture and merchants who come to Buni Yadi to buy farm produce.

It is apparent, therefore that there is the need to intensify effort toward ensuring that sources of these fears are eliminated. Priority should be on having adequately equipped security personnel, modern surveillance facilities, as well as routine surveillance of the community and its environs. Experts should be engaged to critically conduct post-conflict safety environmental survey, to identify possible mined areas, thereby demining them. Secured and effective means of communication and improved civil-military (or police) relation should be promoted to encourage residents to have confidence in the security personnel and to report unusual activities. Active local or community policing (such as community watch) may be a useful boost for personal safety as well as bridging the gap between the security forces and the civil society. There should also be regular update on the safety conditions, sensitisation and security tips to the residents by the security personnel as an approach to increasing confidence. The improvement in the security situation should also be promoted to encourage investment, businesses and the return of resourceful members of the community. Furthermore, a fair law institution must be available to ensure speedy dispensation of justice to forestall the tendency of increase poverty-related crimes after conflict.

- **Institutional Capacity Development and Inequality Reduction**

Poor governance, which manifests in weak public institutions and leading to persistent social and economic inequality, has played a significant role in stirring the insurgency and conflict. As noted, the disparity is multi-layered, identified in the regional, sub-regional and local levels. In Buni Yadi, horizontal inequality manifests in the social divisions – elite domination, and discriminatory access to social and economic opportunities. The effect of the horizontal disparity creates the vertical imbalance in which only people who have access to the elite can access opportunities, thereby creating impoverished majority who are susceptible to the influence of the few. The post-conflict policy should, therefore, address this challenge to prevent conflict recurrence. Strengthening the democratic institutions is an essential starting point toward ensuring equitable access to post-conflict resources (e.g. farmland) and opportunities (e.g. jobs). The policies should target reducing and discouraging individualised institutions and enforce the rule of law.

However, while inequality is real, the feeling may have also been exacerbated by subjective perception (Bangura 2016) due to chronic poverty. Resolving the real and perceived challenge of inequality would depend in no small extent on the degree of the accruable benefits of good governance practices. Deliberate policies that target political, economic and social inclusive governance in a democratic environment would significantly reduce the chance of conflict recurrence (Walter 2004; Brown et al. 2011). Public participation which encourages adequate dialogue to allow residents to have voices on matters that concern their welfare should be institutionalised to promote inclusion and sense of belonging. To entrench good governance and discourage individualistic practices, policies must target locally possible institutionalisation of mechanisms for equitable access to social and economic opportunities. Similarly, the post-conflict strategy must institutionalise a just and the equitable rule of law to enforce impartiality on matters relating to human rights.

Furthermore, post-conflict policies must target sustainability by institutionalising effective and efficient processes that are result oriented based on the local needs and within the available resources. To achieve good governance, however, transparency and accountability are central to undertaking all activities at all levels. This is to ensure that relevant information is available

and accessible by the public, thereby ensure monitoring and probity of all stakeholders.

10.2 Contribution to Knowledge

This study primarily contends that post-conflict livelihoods change is an essential precursor for conflict recurrence, particularly in a non-camp setting; hence, the aim:

> To adapt then use the sustainable livelihoods framework for improved understanding and theorising of the nature of livelihoods changes and their implication on post-conflict human security and conflict recurrence in a non-camp context.

The investigation contributes to the knowledge regarding security and conflict and specifically post-conflict recurrence in ways that it affirms existing ones, extend some and critique others. These contributions are theoretical, methodological and empirical, thereby presents a useful analytical framework for academics and policy decision-making tool for intervention in a post-conflict setting. The thesis contributes to existing knowledge in the following core areas.

The concept of human security stressed the need for balanced attention to all threats (military and non-military) to human wellbeing as a preventive strategy against conflict (CHS 2003). Despite the wide acceptance of this concept, lopsided deployment of the military has persisted even in contexts whose problems are caused by non-military challenges (Yoon 2005). This study confirms the unsustainable and devastating role of the military as a sole conflict and post-conflict intervention strategy. The thesis notes that while insecurity in the North-east relates primarily to precarious livelihoods and chronic deprivations, interventions have relied more on military solutions. The military handedness and gross abuses of human rights further compound the existing grievance leading to escalation of the conflict which continued for an extended period. However, a large scale violent conflict is often followed by its renewal with more devastating consequences than the previous one (Collier 2007). This concern influenced the analysis of conflict and post-conflict motivations to adapt and articulate a framework that is consistent with the conflict dynamics in the case study of this research.

The thesis addresses the critical theoretical construct for analysing motivations that foster conflict or its recurrence. The resource curse concept advances that the presence, over-reliance and unbalanced utilisation of natural (e.g. oil and diamond) play a

significant role in the adverse consequence of poor living conditions which cause grievance leading to conflict (Ross 2003; Bannon and Collier 2003). It is argued in this study that the relevance of such a concept depends on context dynamics as to whether or not natural resource utilisation is the primary source of grievance. In a non-resource conflict context, however, the conflict has been theorised as being about economic gains or socio-political agenda in the greed and grievance thesis (Grossman 1991; 1999; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2009). In contrast, the recurrence of conflict is argued on the one hand as the function of the degree to which the previous conflict is resolved (Quinn et al. 2007; Kreutz 2010), and on the other hand on the effect of post-conflict living conditions (Walter 2004). This study contends that while these considerations are valid; conflict recurrence is conceptually possible in a context in which pre-conflict greed-grievance exploits dominate the previous conflict regarding how it ended as well as the post-conflict livelihoods conditions. Given the scenario, the thesis posits that livelihoods conditions are a critical determinant of conflict recurrence; hence, the adoption of the livelihoods approach.

The sustainable livelihoods approach is primarily designed as an analytical tool for evaluating individual and household wellbeing as a strategy to address poverty. The concept is developed to provoke appropriate thinking on lifting people out of precarious living, which is primarily the source of vulnerability. The flexibility of the concept allows for its utility to extend beyond the initial stable rural context it was designed for, to the urban (stable) and unstable (post-conflict) settings. However, the existing studies on the post-conflict application of livelihoods concept focus primarily on the direct impact of conflict destructions in a camp context. In line with Justino (2009; 2012), research on post-conflict intervention is insufficient, and this thesis contends that studies which investigate specific post-conflict livelihoods changes as a relevant precursor for conflict recurrence in a non-camp context are limited. This advancement is a significant theoretical contribution which provokes critical analytical depth and empirical ramifications to understand post-conflict livelihoods development better.

This thesis employed a case study design using a mixed-methods approach to data gathering and processing. While this approach may not be new entirely, the contribution relates to the variation in a specific manner, its application is made for post-conflict livelihoods study in a non-camp context. Post-conflict livelihoods studies have either adopt the qualitative approach as a stand-alone method or combined in a mixture with the quantitative method. The quantitative aspect predominantly employed the

questionnaire for the individual respondent representative of a family or household. However, this thesis contends that individual questionnaire is inadequate as it tends to leave out a vital part of the household livelihoods condition for other members of the families who may be contributors to the family economy. A household questionnaire, in contrast, is employed to avoid this tendency. Similarly, the individual interview is commonly used in the qualitative method in post-conflict studies. By contrast, this research combined individual interviews with focus group discussions to leverage on the advantage this combination may achieve as against the individual interview alone. Furthermore, categorising the respondent into homogeneous groups for discussions provided the opportunity of understanding the peculiar experiences and challenges of the various groups. Additional physical observation method used in this study provides further corroborative evidence, patterns and empirical outcome that could not be identified with either interview or questionnaire.

There are primarily four themes that emerge from the empirical findings for this research. These include reduced or lack of access to land resources (farmlands), declined resilience, mismatch of needs and post-conflict supports and the deficiency of infrastructure, which has an adverse implication on other aspects of livelihoods. While these findings may not be entirely peculiar to the case study, the contextual variations of the causes of these problems are unique. The uniqueness of the empirical findings contributes to the current understanding regarding more possible causes of post-conflict challenges. For example, existing literature regarding the reduction or lack of access to farmland is associated with problems which relate to physical, administrative or legal restriction and challenges in post-conflict settings such as Northern Uganda, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. In Buni Yadi, however, this lack of access emanates mostly from the psychological trauma from the conflict experiences, and the adverse impact of failed road infrastructure. The findings also bring to the fore the peculiar post-conflict experience in Buni Yadi (non-camp) and its variation from the causes of lack of access to land compared to the camp contexts.

Similarly, the empirical contribution of this study exposes certain limitations of the livelihoods framework. For example, the framework posits natural assets - from a market economy perspective, as being a primary basis for income provision. Given this notion, the livelihoods framework considers natural assets as that 'marketable' product that has the ultimate value for providing income (Sarkar and Sinha 2015). This view may pose challenges to the utility of the livelihoods approach, especially in a post-

conflict context like Buni Yadi, where non-market factors that are external to the land prevent the residents from using it. This argument suffices to mean that productivity of the natural assets (farmland in this case) may be determined by a combination of its availability, accessibility and other dynamics - such fear and trauma, which may be external to it. Furthermore, the livelihoods framework tends to classify conflict as a short-term shock. This consideration may be misleading as it is not consistent with the reality in many conflicts and post-conflict scenarios (including Buni Yadi) which have lasted a decade or more while the post-conflict vulnerabilities that come with them last longer (Branch 2013; Stewart 2016; Tollefsen 2017). This seeming limitation of the livelihoods framework regarding the conflict and post-conflict shocks and vulnerability tends to encourage prioritising short-term measures in vulnerability contexts such as post-conflict where long-term intervention may be more appropriate. Moreover, short-term programmes and interventions potentially trap post-conflict communities and conflict victims into a poverty cycle as confirmed in this investigation and previous studies (Collier 2007).

It was unclear from existing literature if the post-conflict vulnerabilities are the same for camp and non-comp settings. However, this study found that post-conflict livelihoods challenges are similar for camp and non-camp contexts in that the livelihoods experiences in the non-camp are mostly the extension of the camp conditions. However, while the livelihoods vulnerabilities in the camp contexts relate to legal, administrative, movement and economic restrictions, the existence of these challenges for the non-camp setting are insignificant. Additionally, the outcomes of the empirical investigation of this research suggest heterogeneity in the livelihoods changes. Although they are mainly negative, evidence of positive resilience for the youths and women groups was observed. This outcome challenges the framework which tends to consider conflict (shock) outcome as negative only.

10.3 Limitation

This study has conceptually and empirically examined the effects of weak livelihoods on conflict onset in the case study. The adverse changes in these livelihoods after conflict pose a threat to human security and possible conflict recurrence. While upholding the weak human and physical development and the conflict vulnerabilities premise for this investigation, it does not discuss other pertinent complementary narratives to the challenge. Historical legacies of colonial rule, religious struggle and

geography, for instance, have been widely reported to have had deep-seated implications for the conflicts in North-east Nigeria. These interconnected narratives epitomise the recurring North-east religious and ethnic contestation and conflict even before Boko Haram (UNDP 2018).

In the 19th century, for instance, the Muslim dominated North-east was embroiled in the famous Usman Dan Fodio Jihad and whose conquest results in the sudden (corrective) change in what was described as un-Islamic and corrupt administrative practices (Hickey 1984). Dan Fodio's subsequent incorporation and institutionalisation of the territory into Sokoto Caliphate (now North-west region); resulted in misapprehension and distrust among the variety of the religions, ethnicities and cultures in the area (Joel 2014). The process of colonisation by the British government further heightened the resistance as the region is administered through an indirectly rule, thereby suppressed the power of native authorities. Abubakar (2003) and Idahosa (2015), note that the ensued pursuit for ethnic assertion and domination and the emergence of a political class which became entangled in competition over resources have shaped conflicts in the North-east. The creation of Boko Haram insurgency and the subsequent conflict is, therefore, sometimes discussed from this lens of fear of religious, political and ethnic domination and supremacy. This research, nonetheless, avoided analysis of the North-east conflict dynamics from these perspectives given the fragility of the context and the sensitivity of the subjects.

Geographically, the North-east region shares international boundaries with the Republic of Niger, Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon. Kashim (2012), underlines that the geographic location of the North-east predisposes it to conflicts given its proximity to those countries which are prone to political unrest and religious extremism. Similarly, given that some of the North-east states (Yobe, Borno and Adamawa) form the entry point to Nigeria from the North and Central Africa, the characteristic porosity of the international borders makes it easy for illegal cross-border activities - such as human trafficking and arms smuggling, to flourish (Nte 2011; Onuoha 2013; UNDP 2018). The high presence of light weapons and ammunition (often believed to have found their way from Libya and Mali) in the region is widely considered to have aided the Boko Haram insurgency and may continue to do so if not checked (Omede 2011; Onuoha 2013).

10.4 Suggestions for Further Study

This study has contributed to the ongoing discourse regarding conflict and its recurrence. The analysis of the specific implications of the post-conflict livelihoods changes adds to the pool of research on the potential precursor for conflict relapse. Consequently, conflict prevention recommendations - relating to the underlying developmental challenges, have been proposed to prevent recurrence of conflict. However, the investigation notes a possible few areas that may worth further research to improve the knowledge about this subject.

The historical narratives of conflicts in the North-east suggest that pursuit of ethnic and religious dominance and supremacy have often played an essential role in instigating uprising (Abubakar 2003; Idahosa 2015). Stewart (2016), however, underlines that ethnic and religious identity is an essential motivation for conflict mobilisation in a low-income setting that has a high rate of inequality. Although the case study of this research is predominantly Muslim, the diversity of ethnic groupings exists as reflected in geographic (ethnic) zoning in the town. This grouping is worth further research to analyse the possibility of conflict mobilisation, reflecting the identified inequality (Table 6.1) that may be ethnic-related. The analysis may throw more light on the selective destruction that has been noted, in addition to resentment that emanates from the general sense of inequality.

Respondents in this investigation described the relative pre-conflict sustenance of Buni Yadi as a reflection of the micro-regional complementarity it shares with its neighbouring villages. Being the local council headquarters, Buni Yadi serves as a market for selling agricultural produce for the surrounding communities, and in return, the villages form an essential market for finished goods. This relation benefits both sides, but the businesses in Buni Yadi were particularly vibrant beneficiaries. However, these villages have since been displaced by the conflict in the region. A respondent (businessman) asserts that post-conflict recovery in Buni Yadi may, to a large extent, depend on the return and resettlement of the neighbouring villages. Research that focuses on this area may worth the while for understanding the effect of the relationship on post-conflict recovery and possible conflict relapse.

While this research is based on conflict experiences in Buni Yadi North-east, Nigeria; its theoretical underpinning is global, hence the replicability in other contexts. Nonetheless, the replication of the investigation in another context may require

reflecting on the similarities and differences that exist between it and the case study to inform the appropriate methodological strategies and recommendations.

10.5 Reflection

The mixed-methods strategy employed for this research is considered to be robust, given that it leverages on the strength of combining quantitative surveys, observations and individual and focus group interviews. The empirical outcomes from the deployment of the method have helped in answering the research question of the study. However, the Hausa language was used primarily as a medium of communication during the fieldwork for data collection. While the author's understanding of the language used is sound, some richness and complexity of the participants' responses may have been inadvertently lost in the course of translation into the English language. While there was persistent assurance from the community members and leaders, the fragility and prevailing conditions in the case study were sources of safety concern during the fieldwork. The fear of the insurgents' hostility towards western education and persons whose activities relates to it was real and could be seen from the nature of the destructions. This concern informed the researcher's decision not to reside in Buni Yadi during the fieldwork but commuted from Damaturu (capital city) every day. Also, safety concern prevented the researcher from undertaking physical surveys on some livelihoods assets (closed roads, damaged roads, damaged farmlands etc.), which participants have mentioned that they were not accessible due to post-conflict conditions. Although the researcher could not find any reason to doubt the narratives of the research participants, it was believed, however, that visiting those sites could have added value to the empirical richness of this investigation. The research avoided those areas for safety concern. Similarly, the power relation in Buni Yadi is such that community leaders exert enormous influence on their subjects. This power play sometimes tends to make the leaders want to undermine the research ethics concerns (e.g. written consent) for the participants during the fieldwork. The researcher insisted – diplomatically though, that each participant needed to sign the consent form to participate.

The role played by individuals or a group and peacebuilding spoilers, who may undermine the peace process and post-conflict recovery, is an essential aspect of post-conflict context that cannot be overlooked. While spoilers' saboteur role is often primarily located within the peace agreement which they form a part (Stedman 1997),

they may exist in many other forms and guise even in a non-negotiation peacebuilding setting (Menkhaus 2007). Peace agreement seemed not to be significantly pursuit in the North-east peace process and fight against the insurgency (Kantiok 2014); however, factionalisation of the insurgent group may be regarded as spoiling the tendency for securing effective peace talk. Similarly, accusations have been made about the possible involvement of vested interests that sabotage the counter-insurgency and peacebuilding process in the North-east. High ranking officers in the Nigeria Military, for instance, are said to have been court-martialled for aiding the insurgents with classified information and weapons (Aljazeera 2014). Furthermore, in 2018 the military suspended (the ban has been lifted) the operations of UNICEF in the North-east following an accusation of sabotage by the staffs of the aid organisation who were allegedly spying for the insurgents (Aljazeera 2018; Kazeem 2018).

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Apendices

Appendix 1

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Questionnaire for households

Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi

Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

Supervisors:
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk

Invitation
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?
This research is focused on understanding the nature and process of livelihood changes due of conflict and their implications on long term post conflict development and security. I intend to use Buni Yadi as a case study in an attempt to obtain residents' personal experiences, perceptions and opinions regarding livelihood changes they might have noted and how those changes can/have impacted their long term post conflict livelihood development and security. This will be useful to develop framework for sustainable intervention for post conflict livelihoods.
The pilot study of the field work is scheduled for between July and September 2017. The researcher will be at Buni Yadi during this period to administer questionnaire to households. The questionnaire contains questions that relates to income, employment, literacy, access to water, access to healthcare, access to electricity, housing etc. Data will be collected by asking an adult representative of each participating households to fill the questionnaire at their houses and return this to the researcher. The analysis and final results of this research will be a PhD thesis and summary reports for participants. It is also possible to publish findings from this research in academic journals and/or other relevant medium. However, the anonymity and confidentiality of participants' personal information will surely be maintained.

Why have I been invited to participate?
You have been invited to participate in this study because of your experience of living and familiarity with Buni Yadi. Your opinions are extremely valuable for this research and therefore, I am inviting you to take part in the research study and please be clear that your participation is on a voluntary basis. The selection is based on a systematic random sampling which proposed to include one household from every ten in Buni Yadi.

Do I have to take part?
The decision on whether or not to take part as participant for this research study is yours, given that it is entirely voluntary. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form at the start of the session. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied without giving a reason.

What will happen to me if I take part?
The pilot study involves administering of questionnaire that you will be expected to fill. This will take approximately 30 minutes to be completed and express your opinion and experience about your place of living, and livelihoods before and after conflict in your community. The questionnaire is proposed to be administered at your house or other convenient location (preferably communal space) of your choice within the community provided it is safe for you and the researcher. In addition, the questionnaire contains questions about your income, access to food, literacy, access to water, access to healthcare, access to electricity, and other basic needs of live. It also contains questions about changes in those basic needs of living that you may have noticed or experience before and after conflict in your community and how these affect your livelihoods. If requested a summarised copy of the findings will be available to the community for you to access after the study is concluded.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
You will refine your experience in the process of livelihood improvement framework. You will also be given opportunity to present your aspiration about what and how you think things should be done to improve the living conditions of people in your community for a long term post conflict development.

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?
All data collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Your privacy and anonymity will be ensured in this data collection, storage and publication of the research material. For data storage, the data will be encrypted and only accessible to the researcher for transcription and storage purposes. Data generated through this study will be retained for 10 years in accordance with the University's Policy on Academic Integrity.

What should I do if I want to take part?
If you like to take part and participate in this study you can indicate your interest to participate immediately and the researcher will confirm your eligibility. If you will like some time to think about your decision to participate, the researcher will be happy to contact you after two day to confirm your decision.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of your information will be used in the researcher's PhD thesis of which copies will be placed in the library of Oxford Brookes University, UK, and some journal articles without mentioning your name. In case you would like to have a copy of the summary Report and the journal articles at the end of the research, please inform the researcher.

Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised and undertaken by **Lukman Lawal**, a PhD research student under **Dr Beacon Mbiba**, as the Director of studies and **Dr Graham Wood** as second supervisor. The researcher is carrying out this research as a doctoral study in School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment at Oxford Brookes University, UK. Funding for the program is being provided by the **Petroleum Technology Development Fund** (PTDF) Nigeria.

Who has reviewed the study?
This research has been approved by the Oxford Brookes University's Research Ethics Committee.

Contact for Further Information
For further information or queries please contact **Lukman Lawal** on 15121995@brookes.ac.uk or by phone through [number removed] (Nigeria)/[number removed] (UK). If you have any concerns about the way in which the study is being or has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk.

Thank you for taking your time to read this information sheet

………………………..
Lukman Lawal
June 2017.

Appendix 2

    1.   Invitation to Participate in Study: Quantitative Survey

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is **Lukman Lawal**. I am a PhD student from Nigeria conducting research on **Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi** at Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

As part of my PhD research, I would like to meet a cross section of individuals and households to talk about their livelihoods with specific considerations to understand changes that may have occur before and after conflicts in their communities. The information will help to understand the implications of post conflict livelihood changes on the long term livelihoods of people in Buni Yadi, Gujba Local Government, Yobe State. The information from this research will be useful to develop appropriate and sustainable post conflict intervention strategy for the northeast and Nigeria at large.

I would appreciate your participation in this research which will involve completing my questionnaire regarding your experience, impressions and perceptions of the changes you might have noticed and how it affects your livelihoods.

I have attached an information sheet about my research and a consent form with this invitation. I would appreciate it if you could read both documents and get back to me with any questions you may have. If you would like to be part of this study, you may indicate your interest immediately or I can contact you through phone call or text message after two days to confirm your decision please.
I will be in Nigeria from the 20th July, 2017 to 30th September, 2017. I hope to complete the pilot study of data collection during this period.

Thank you for your time and consideration, your participation is highly appreciated.

Best regards,

Lukman Lawal
PhD Research Student
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment
Oxford Brookes University.
Email: 15121995@brookes.ac.uk
Mobile: [number removed] (Nigeria) /[number removed] (UK)

(Attachments: Participant Information Sheet – Consent Form)

Appendix 3

SURVEY SCHEDULE (QUESTIONNAIRE)

RESPONDENT'S PROFILE

1. **Gender**
   Male ( )   Female ( )

2. **Age**
   18-24yrs ( )   25-34yrs ( )   35-44yrs ( )   45-54yrs ( )   55yrs and above ( )

3. **Education Level**
   Tertiary education ( )   Secondary education ( )   Primary education ( )   Quranic education only ( )   No education ( )

4. **How long have you lived in Buni Yadi?**
   Less than 1 yr ( )   1-3 yrs ( )   4-6 yrs ( )   7-9 yrs ( )   More than 10 yrs ( )

5. **Why did you leave your original community?**

6. **Where did you live before coming to Buni Yadi?**

7. **Why did you decide to live in Buni Yadi?**

8. **Do you currently live with your family at Buni Yadi?**
   Yes ( )   No ( )

9. **If No, please explain why**

ROADS INFRASTRUCTURE

10. **Describe the conditions and accessibility to roads in Buni Yadi.**

11. **How does conflict affected road accessibility in your community?**

12. **What effect does the changes in accessibility to roads has on your means of earning a living?**

13. **What effect does the change in accessibility to roads has on the means of earning a living of other members of your family?**

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND EXPERIENCES

14. **Do you have access to water supply in your household?**
    Yes (   )   No (   )

15. **If yes, how do you access the water?**
    Tap water (   )   Borehole (   )   Well (   )   Stream (   ) others specify……………..

16. **How long does it take to walk to access water from your household?**
    0-15minutes (   )   15-30 minutes (   )   31-45 minutes (   )   46-60 minutes (   )
    More than 1 hour specify…………………………………………………………………………….

17. **Please describe how conflict has affected water supply in your family.**
    Not affected (   )
    Affected, explain…..

18. **How does your family cope with change in water supply after conflict?**

19. **Does your family have access to healthcare?**
    Yes (   )   No (   )

20. **If yes, how do you access the healthcare?**
    In my community (   )   From a neighbouring community (   )   From the city (   )
    From another state (   )   others specify…………………………………………………….

21. **How long does it take you to access healthcare?**
    Less than 1 hour (   )   2 hours (   )   3 hours (   )   4 hours (   )   5 hours or more (   )

22. **Please describe how conflict has affected access to healthcare in your family.**
    Not affected (   )
    Affected, explain…..

23. **How does your family cope with change in access to healthcare after conflict?**

24. **How have your social networks useful to you before conflict?**

25. **How does conflict affect your social network benefits?**
    I don't have social network (   )

Affected, explain…..

26. How does conflict affect the social networks of other members of your family?

27. How does your family cope with the change in your social network after conflict?

ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENT

28. What are your means of earning a living before conflict?

29. What are your means of earning a living after conflict?

30. How does conflict affect access to your livelihood assets?

31. Does conflict affect the access to livelihood asset of other members of your family?
Yes   (   )   No   (   )

32. If Yes, how does conflict affect the access to livelihood assets of your family members?

33. How does your family cope with livelihood assets change after conflict?

34. What is your employment status?
Employed (   )   Unemployed (   )   Retired (   )   Student (   )   Others (   )

35. **If employed, what is your current job?**

36. What is your job before coming to Buni Yadi?

37. Please describe how conflict has affected your employment.
Not affected (   )

Affected, explain…..

38. How does conflict affect the employment of other members of your family?

39. How does your family cope with the effect of employment changes after conflict?

40. **Please describe how conflict has affected your income level**.
Not affected (   )
Affected, explain…..

41. Does conflict affect your family income?
Yes   (   )   No   (   )

42. If Yes, Please explain...

43. How does your family cope with change in income level after conflict?

HOUSING INFRASTRUCTURE

44. Do you own the house you live in?
Yes (   )   No (   )

45. How has conflict affected your housing?
Completely destroyed (   )   Largely destroyed (   )   Fairly destroyed (   )   Not affected at all (
)

46. How has the effect on your housing affected your family wellbeing?

47. What do you think should be done to improve the housing needs of your family?

Appendix 4

Invitation to Participate in Study: Focus group and interviews

Dear Sir/Madam,

My name is **Lukman Lawal**. I am a PhD student from Nigeria conducting research on **Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi** at Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

This is an extension of the previous study (questionnaire) I have conducted in this community as part of my PhD research. I would like to meet a cross section of groups of individuals to discuss about their livelihoods with specific considerations to understanding changes that may have occur before and after conflicts in their communities. The information will help to understand the implications of post conflict livelihood changes on the long term post conflict livelihoods development of people in Buni Yadi, Gujba Local Government, Yobe State. The information from this research will be useful to develop appropriate and sustainable post conflict intervention strategy for the northeast and Nigeria at large.

I would appreciate it if you participate in this research by taking part in a focus group discussion. The discussion will ask questions regarding your experience, impressions and perceptions of the changes you might have noticed and how it affects your livelihoods.

I have attached an information sheet about my research and a consent form with this invitation. I would appreciate it if you could read both documents and get back to me with any questions you may have. If you would like to take part in the study, you may decide to declare your interest to participate immediately or you contact me through phone call or text message after two days to confirm your decision please.

Thank you for your time and consideration, your participation is highly appreciated.

Best regards,

Lukman Lawal
PhD Research Student
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment
Oxford Brookes University.
Email: 15121995@brookes.ac.uk
Mobile: [number removed] (Nigeria) /[number removed] (UK)

(Attachments: Participant Information Sheet – Consent Form)

Appendix 5

CONSENT FORM (Main Study - Focus Group Discussion)
Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi
The research will be submitted to Oxford Brookes University, and graded as part of a requirement for completion of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree.

Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

Supervisors:
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk

Please initial box

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions ☐

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason ☐

3. I understand that the focus group will be audio-recorded ☐

4. I agree to take part in the above study ☐

Please initial box
Yes   No

5. I'd like to receive a summary of this research findings when completed ☐   ☐

6. I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been anonymised) in a specialist data centre and may be used for future research. ☐   ☐

……………………………………..   …………………….
…………………………..
  Name/Initials of Participant   Date   Signature

……………………………………….   ..……………………
…………………………..
  Lukman Lawal   Date   Signature

Appendix 6

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET
Focus Group Discussion and interviews

Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihood Change Context: Case of Buni Yadi

Principal Researchers: Lukman Lawal, PhD Research Student, 15121995@brookes.ac.uk
School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment,
Oxford Brookes University, United Kingdom.

Supervisors:
Dr Beacon Mbiba, bmbiba@brookes.ac.uk
Dr Graham Wood, gjwood@brookes.ac.uk

Invitation
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

What is the purpose of the study?
This research is focused on understanding the nature and process of livelihood changes due to conflict and their implication on long term post conflict development and security. I intend to use Buni Yadi as a case study in attempt to obtain residents' personal experiences, perceptions and opinions regarding livelihood changes they may have noted or experienced and how those changes can/have impacted their long term post conflict livelihood development and security. This will be useful to develop framework for sustainable intervention for post conflict livelihoods.
This research is mainly an academic work whose aim is to improve understanding of post conflict livelihood changes and their implications on long term post conflict recovery and development. The study intends to contribute to the wider debate on post conflict livelihood intervention strategy which may inform future policy decision of Government and other stakeholders. The research is not being undertaking on behalf of any government, international organization or NGO, and therefore does not involve distribution of relieve materials or humanitarian aid.
The focus group discussions are scheduled for between March 2018 and May 2018. The searcher will be at Buni Yadi during this period to coordinate the discussion proceedings. The transcript for the group discussion contain questions that relates to income, employment, education, access to water, access to healthcare, access to electricity and housing of people in Bini Yadi. Data will be collected during the focus group proceedings by way of note taking and voice recording by the researcher with the consent of participants. Consent for audio recording will be a condition for accepting potential participants' participation in the study. All group discussions are proposed to take place at a communal space within the community or other agreed venue that is convenient and safe for all participants and the researcher. The analysis and final results of this research will be a PhD thesis and summary reports for participants. It is also possible to publish findings from this research in academic journals and/or other relevant medium. However, the anonymity and confidentiality of participants' personal information will surely be maintained.

Why have I been invited to participate?
You have been invited to participate in this focus group discussion because of your experience of living and familiarity with Buni Yadi. You are also being invited because you are an adult and have met the inclusion criteria for one or more focus groups discussion for local farmers, local business persons, youths, women, conflict migrants in Buni Yani. Your opinions are extremely valuable for this research and therefore, I am inviting you to take part in the focus group discussion and please be clear that your participation is on a voluntary basis. Participants will be selected randomly based on set inclusion criteria for each group. Each group is proposed to consist between 5 and 7 adults who will participate in the focus group discussions. There are five groups that are proposed for this study and they include conflict migrants, market/business people, youths, women, and local farmers groups.

Do I have to take part?
The decision on whether or not to take part as participant for this research is yours, given that it is entirely voluntary. If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form at the start of the session. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and to withdraw any unprocessed data previously supplied without giving a reason.

What will happen to me if I take part?
Each focus group discussion session will last for approximately 60-90 minutes. In each case the researcher will introduce the discussion topics/sub-topics and will seek to get your opinions and experience about your place of living and livelihoods before and after conflict in your community. You will be requested to discuss about your income, access to food, education, access to water, access to healthcare, access to electricity, and other basic needs of live. The discussion will also involve asking you

about changes in those basic needs of living that you may have noticed or experience before and after conflict in your community and how these affect your livelihoods. During the discussion session, a voice-recording will be taken with your consent. The discussions are proposed to take place within a communal space in the community (e.g. community hall) or other agreed location that are convenient and safe for all participants and the researcher. The researcher will be happy to make presentation of the result of findings for this research when it is completed. If requested a copy of transcripts and summarised copy of findings will be made available for access to the community after study is completed.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?
You will refine your experience in the process of livelihood improvement framework. You will also be given opportunity to present your aspiration about what and how you think things should be done to improve the living conditions of people in your community for a long term post conflict development.

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential?
All data collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). Your privacy and anonymity will be ensured in this data collection, storage and publication of the research material. For data storage, the data will be encrypted and only accessible by researcher for transcription and storage purposes. Data generated through this study will be retained for 10 years in accordance with the University's Policy on Academic Integrity.

What should I do if I want to take part?
If you like to take part and participate in this study you can indicate your interest to participate immediately and the researcher will confirm your eligibility. If you will like some time to think about your decision to participate, the researcher will be happy to contact you after two day to confirm your decision.

What will happen to the results of the research study?
The results of your information will be used in the researcher's PhD thesis of which copies will be placed in the library of Oxford Brookes University, UK, and some journal articles without mentioning your name. In case you would like to have a copy of the summary report and the journal articles at the end of the research, a copy of the findings of the research will be made available in the community hall upon completion.

Who is organising and funding the research?
The research is being organised and undertaken by **Lukman Lawal**, a PhD research student under **Dr Beacon Mbiba**, as the Director of studies and **Dr Graham Wood** as second supervisor. The researcher is carrying out this research as a doctoral study in School of Built Environment, Faculty of Technology, Design and Environment at Oxford Brookes University, UK. Funding for the program is being provided by the **Petroleum Technology Development Fund** (PTDF) Nigeria.

Who has reviewed the study?
This research has been approved by the Oxford Brookes University's Research Ethics Committee.

Contact for Further Information
For further information or queries please contact **Lukman Lawal** on 15121995@brookes.ac.uk or by phone through [number removed] (Nigeria)/ [number removed] (UK). If you have any concerns about the way in which the study is being or has been conducted, you should contact the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk.

Thank you for taking your time to read this information sheet

………………………..
Lukman Lawal
March 2018.

Appendix 7

Focus Group Discussion (Local farmers)

1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict development of people?

2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in their incomes? What in your opinion are the implications of the changes in income of farmers on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?

3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good housing due to conflict? What in your opinion are the implications of the changes in access to good housing on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good housing?

4. Access to Roads
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?

5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity availability?

6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare services on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and accessibility to healthcare services?

7. Social Network
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in their social network? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social network on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social network?

8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that farmers of Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in particular)?
c. To what extent was the views and aspirations of farmers considered and captured in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
d. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of farmers in decision making process on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?

Focus Group Discussion (Conflict Migrants)

1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict development of people?

2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the incomes of migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of migrants on their post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?

3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the access to good housing for migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good housing?

4. Roads Access
a. In what way do you think conflict changes access to roads for migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?

5. Electricity Availability
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the availability of electricity for migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity availability?

6. Healthcare
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services for migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare services on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and accessibility to healthcare services?

7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think conflict changes the social networks of migrants? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social network on post conflict development?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social network?

8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that conflict migrants in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making process for the on- going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in particular)?
c. To what extent was the views and aspirations of conflict migrants considered and captured in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
d. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of conflict migrants in decision making process on post conflict development?

Appendix 9

Focus Group Discussion (Women)

1. **General Question**
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict development of people?

2. **Economic Changes**
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in their incomes? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of women on their post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?

3. **Housing Problem**
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in access to good housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good housing?

4. **Roads Access**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?

5. **Electricity Availability**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity availability?

6. **Healthcare**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare services on post conflict development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and accessibility to healthcare services?

7. **Social Networks**
a. In what way do you think women in this community have experienced changes in their social network? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social networks on post conflict development of women in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?

8. **Participation**
a. To what extent do you think that women in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of women considered and captured in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of women in decision making process on post conflict development?

Focus Group Discussion (Market/Business People)

1. **General Question**
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict development of people?

2. **Economic Changes**
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced changes in their incomes? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of business men/women on their post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?

3. **Housing Problem**
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good housing?

4. **Roads Access**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?

5. **Electricity Availability**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on businesses in post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity availability?

6. **Healthcare**
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare services on post conflict development of in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and accessibility to healthcare services?

7. **Social Networks**
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced changes in their social networks? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social network on post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?

8. **Participation**
a. To what extent do you think that business men/women in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of business men/women considered and captured in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of business men/women in decision making process on post conflict development?

Appendix 11

Focus Group Discussion (Youths)

1. General Question
a. What in your opinion are the impacts of conflict on people in Buni Yadi?
b. What livelihood changes do you think these impacts have brought to people in Buni Yadi?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of the livelihood changes on long term post conflict development of people?

2. Economic Changes
a. In what way do you think youths in this community have experienced changes in their incomes? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in income of youths on their post conflict development in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in income?

3. Housing Problem
a. In what way do you think people in this community have experienced changes in access to good housing? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to good housing on post conflict development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to good housing?

4. Roads Access
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes access to roads in the community or its environs? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in road access on post conflict development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in access to roads?

5. Electricity Availability
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes availability of electricity in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in electricity availability on post conflict development for youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in electricity availability?

6. Healthcare
a. How do you think the conflict in Buni Yadi changes the availability and accessibility to healthcare services in the community? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in access to healthcare services on post conflict development of youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in availability and accessibility to healthcare services?

7. Social Networks
a. In what way do you think businessmen/businesswomen in this community have experienced changes in their social networks? What in your opinion are the implications of changes in social networks on post conflict development for youths in Buni Yadi?
b. What in your opinion should be done to overcome the impact of the changes in social networks?

8. Participation
a. To what extent do you think that youths in Buni Yadi were involved in the decision making process for the on-going post conflict reconstruction in the North East (and your community in particular)?
b. To what extent was the views and aspirations of youths considered and captured in the on-going post conflict reconstruction?
c. What in your opinion are the implications of non-inclusion of youths in decision making process on post conflict development?

Appendix 12

DATE

STUDY TITLE

Translation Services /Transcription of Interviews / Moderation of focus groups (amend /delete as applicable)

In order for the University to utilize the Services, [Name, organisation] may need to have access to some personal data ("**Data**") which data is protected under the Data Protection Act 1998 ("**the Act**").

These Data will include, but not necessarily be limited to: Transcription of interviews as directed by the Principal Investigator of the project, or moderator and note taker of group interviews or focus groups.

The parties agree that in respect of the Data, the University is the Data Controller and [Name, Organisation] is the Data Processor. [Name, Organisation] warrants to the University that it shall:

(i)   process the Data at all times in accordance with the Act and solely for the purposes of providing the Services to the University and for no other purpose or in any manner except with the express prior written consent of the Data Controller; and

(ii)   comply with the seventh Data Protection Principle by implementing appropriate technical and organisational measures to prevent unauthorised and unlawful processing of the Data and to prevent accidental loss, or destruction of, or damage to the Data; and

(iii)   ensure that each of its employees, agents and subcontractors are made aware of its obligations with regard to the security and protection of the Data and require that they enter into binding obligations with the Data Processor to maintain the appropriate levels of security and protection of the Data; and

(iv)   not divulge the Data whether directly or indirectly to any person, firm or company or otherwise without the express prior written consent of the Data Controller except to those of its employees, agents and subcontractors who are subject to (iii) above or except as may be required by any law or regulation; and

(v)   not process the Data outside of the European Economic Area except with the express prior written authority of the Data Controller; and

(vi)   to comply with any request from the Data Controller to amend, transfer or delete data and on completion of the Services to deliver to the Data Controller or destroy, at the Data Controller's sole option, all the Data Controller's Data in its possession or under its control

[Name, Organisation] agrees to indemnify the University for any fine it may receive from the Information Commissioner and/or pursuant to sections 13 and 14 of the Act arising from any breach by [Name, Organisation] of the above warranties; provided: (a) [Name, Organisation] has sole control of the defence and/or settlement of such claim to the extent possible; and (b) the University notifies [Name, Organisation] promptly in writing of each such claim and gives [Name, Organisation] all information known to the University relating thereto and (c) the University cooperates with [Name, Organisation] in the settlement and/or defence of such claim and (d) the University mitigates its loss to the fullest extent possible and (e) the University makes no admission in respect of such claim.

The parties agree that any commercially sensitive information disclosed during the provision of the Services shall be treated with confidence and used only to the extent necessary to perform the Services.

For the avoidance of doubt these terms and conditions replace and supersede any other terms and conditions between the parties relating to their respective obligations under the Act.

Please counter-sign a copy of this letter if you are happy to provide the Services on these terms.

Name of researcher

Study title

Data Protection Act 1998 Compliance & Confidentiality Acceptance

I refer to the terms of your letter set out above and hereby unconditionally accept its terms and agree to comply with all Data Protection Act 1998 requirements in respect of any processing of personal data performed by me in the provision of the Services and to treat in confidence any confidential information which may become known to us during the provision of the Services.

Yours faithfully

…………………………………………….   ....

Printed Name of person undertaking   **Date**
transcription or moderation

Appendix 13

Human Security in a Post-conflict Livelihoods Change: Case of Buni Yadi

Data Processing and Analysis Method

1. **Quantitative method data**

   Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State.

   Collection date: $14^{th} – 20^{th}$ August 2017

   Type: These are numerical information for the thematic components of the livelihoods framework. The data are the quantitative measures for pre and post-conflict economic, social, infrastructure and human capital variables for individuals and households in Buni Yadi.

   Processing tool: Microsoft Excel was used to process the data for this method.

   Analysis method: The numerical entry for each of the collected livelihoods variables were recorded into the Excel spreadsheet according to the themes of the framework. This information was used to generate the descriptive pattern of the pre and post-conflict livelihoods conditions for individuals and households in the case study.

   Presentation: The processed data were transformed and presented in the form of tables and charts e.g. bar and pie.

2. **Physical surveys data**

   Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State.

   Collection date: $14^{th} – 20^{th}$ August 2017

   Type: These are spatial and pictorial evidence regarding the location and physical conditions of infrastructures in Buni Yadi after the conflict. These infrastructures include houses, roads, schools, hospitals, business premises, police stations, public buildings etc.

   Collection method: These include physical observation and note-taking on the base map and photography.

   Processing tool: ArcGIS software was used to process and identify the locations, types and conditions of the infrastructures in the case study. The photographic images were copied from the camera onto the computer for presentation.

   Analysis method: The recorded locations, physical conditions and the types of destroyed infrastructures were uploaded onto the ArcGIS interface. Based on the residential satellite image of Buni Yadi, this information was analysed thereby used to generate the spatial distribution and conditions of the infrastructure in the case study area. The output provided the ground for further interpretation of the pattern that emerged.

   Presentation: The processed physical surveys information were presented in the form of spatial plan and photographic images.

3. **Qualitative method data**

   Collection location: The empirical data for this research method was collected from the residential area of Buni Yadi, Gujba LGA, Yobe State.

   Collection date: 3rd – 7th April 2018

   Type: This is oral evidence regarding pre and post-conflict livelihoods in Buni Yadi.

Collection method: The oral information was collected through individuals and focus groups discussions. The discussions were recorded using note-taking and audio recording following the written consent by participants.

Processing tool: The collected data were manually processed. Having conducted the discussions in the Hausa Language recorded audio was first transcribed into a word document. This was then translated into the English Language.

Analysis method: The processed data were grouped into the themes based on the livelihoods framework. Each category was then aligned to fit the purpose of this research thereby study the pattern that emerged.

Presentation: The analysed data were presented as words quotes based on the individual themes and pattern that emerged.