Data Set to Self-Concordance Theory and the Goal-Striving Reasons Framework and their Distinct Relationships with Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well-Being


Self-concordance theory and the goal-striving reasons framework both measure the quality of people’s reasons for their goal pursuits. Both have provided substantial evidence for their predictive power for people’s well-being. However, it remains unclear which of the two goal-reason models is the better predictor for different forms of well-being. The paper analyses the distinct relationships of the two models in relation to hedonic well-being (Subjective Well-Being, Life Satisfaction, Affect Balance) and indicators of eudaimonic well-being (Basic Need Satisfaction, Purpose and Self-Acceptance). The findings are based on a cross-sectional, correlative research design based (N = 124). Using multiple regression analyses the results show that the goal-striving reasons framework is overall more strongly associated with hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. However, the differences for hedonic well-being as well as for self-acceptance and purpose are much larger than they are for the three basic needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Here, self-concordance achieves nearly similar correlations to the goal-striving reasons framework. The findings have implications for theory and practice as they highlight the theoretical differences between the two goal-reasons models but also help to decide which Positive Psychology Interventions are most suitable to increase which form of well-being.

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Ehrlich, Christian (Oxford Brookes University )
Cripps, Karen (Oxford Brookes University)
Ehrlich, Susanne (London Metropolitan University )

Oxford Brookes departments

Department of Business and Management


Year: 2024

Published by Oxford Brookes University

Creative Commons License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License


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